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User prompt 1 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 2:50:56 AM:
INCONVENIENT PLACES TO WALK
(a)
(Mishnah): If one throws four Amos at sea, he is exempt;
(b)
If many people walk through [gravel covered by] a puddle, one who throws four Amos in it is Chayav.
(c)
The puddle discussed is less than 10 Tefachim (Ritva - if it is deeper than 10 it is a Reshus ha'Yachid; Rashi - it is Karmelis; Mishnah Berurah (345 48) - perhaps Rashi agrees that mid'Oraisa it is Reshus ha'Yachid);
(d)
If one throws into a puddle that many people walk through, he is liable.
(e)
(Gemara) Question: We understand why the Mishnah mentions 'walking' twice - this teaches that walking with difficulty is considered walking, but usage with difficulty is not considered usage;
1.
But why does it mention 'puddle' twice?
(f)
Answer #1 (Rava): This is to teach that this applies in summer and winter:
1.
Had it only taught about summer, we would have thought that that is because people often go there to cool off (but in winter it is not Reshus ha'Rabim);
2.
Had it only taught about winter, we would have thought that that is because people's garments are dirty anyway, so people often go there (but in summer it is not Reshus ha'Rabim).
(g)
Answer #2 (Abaye): This is to teach that this is even if it is four Amos:
1.
One might have thought that it is Reshus ha'Rabim only if it is less than four Amos, but if it is four Amos, people go around it and do not go through it - the repetition teaches that this is not so.
(h)
Answer #3 (Rav Ashi): This is to teach that this is even if it is less than four (Rashi - Amos; Rambam - Tefachim):
1.
One might have thought that it is Reshus ha'Rabim only if it is four, but if it is less, people step over it and do not go through it - the repetition teaches that this is not so. (Rashash questions Rashi, for even three Amos is too big to step over. Rashi himself (113B) says that the size of a normal step is one Amah. This is not difficult for the Rambam - since a person's foot is about half an Amah, if the puddle is four Tefachim, if one takes normal steps, part of his foot will be in the puddle.)
(i)
This is like Rav Ashi taught elsewhere:
1.
(Rav Ashi): If one threw something and it landed on a plank of a bridge that is not in line with the others, [even though some people skip over it, since others walk on it] he is liable.
================
Explain this sugya clealy and logicallu
GPT-4o mini:
This sugya discusses the halachic implications of throwing an object into a puddle in a public domain (Reshus ha'Rabim) and the conditions under which one is liable (Chayav) for doing so. The discussion is based on a Mishnah and further elaborated by the Gemara, with various interpretations and explanations provided by different sages.
### Key Points of the Sugya:
1. **Mishnah's Initial Statement**:
- If someone throws an object four Amos (a unit of measure) into the sea, they are exempt from liability. This is because the sea is not a public domain in the same way as a street or a path where people walk.
2. **Puddle with Many People**:
- If there is a puddle that many people walk through, throwing an object into it makes one liable. This indicates that the puddle is considered a public space due to the frequent foot traffic.
3. **Depth of the Puddle**:
- The discussion specifies that if the puddle is less than 10 Tefachim (another unit of measure), it is treated differently than if it were deeper. If it is deeper than 10 Tefachim, it is classified as a private domain (Reshus ha'Yachid), while if it is shallower, it may be considered a Karmelis (a category of semi-public space).
4. **Repetition of 'Walking'**:
- The Mishnah mentions 'walking' twice to clarify that even if walking is difficult (e.g., through mud), it still counts as walking. However, using the puddle (e.g., throwing something) with difficulty does not count as usage.
5. **Repetition of 'Puddle'**:
- The Gemara questions why the term 'puddle' is mentioned twice. Several answers are proposed:
- **Answer #1 (Rava)**: The repetition indicates that the ruling applies in both summer and winter. In summer, people might walk through to cool off, while in winter, they might walk through despite the cold.
- **Answer #2 (Abaye)**: The repetition teaches that the ruling applies even if the puddle is four Amos wide. One might think that if it is four Amos, people would walk around it, but the repetition clarifies that this is not the case.
- **Answer #3 (Rav Ashi)**: The repetition indicates that the ruling applies even if the puddle is less than four Amos. One might think that if it is smaller, people would step over it, but the repetition clarifies that this is not the case.
6. **Comparison to a Bridge**:
- Rav Ashi provides a parallel case: if an object is thrown onto a plank of a bridge that is not aligned with the others, even if some people skip over it, others still walk on it, making one liable for throwing onto it.
### Conclusion:
The sugya illustrates the complexities of halachic definitions of public and private spaces, the implications of foot traffic on liability, and the nuances of how different conditions (like the size of a puddle) affect legal rulings. The discussion emphasizes the importance of context in determining liability and the need for clarity in halachic language.
--------------------
User prompt 2 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 2:56:05 AM:
so i am confused when is a puddle a reshut harabim and one is liable make atable
GPT-4o mini:
To clarify when a puddle is considered a Reshus ha'Rabim (public domain) and when one is liable for throwing an object into it, we can create a table summarizing the conditions discussed in the sugya:
| **Condition** | **Description** | **Liability (Chayav)** |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| **Puddle Depth < 10 Tefachim** | The puddle is shallow enough that it does not constitute a private domain. | Yes, if many people walk through it. |
| **Puddle Depth ≥ 10 Tefachim** | The puddle is deep enough to be considered a private domain (Reshus ha'Yachid).| No, throwing into it is exempt. |
| **Puddle Width < 4 Amos** | The puddle is narrow enough that people can step over it. | No, if people avoid walking through it. |
| **Puddle Width = 4 Amos** | The puddle is wide enough that people may walk around it. | Yes, if many people walk through it. |
| **Puddle in Summer** | People may walk through to cool off. | Yes, if many people walk through it. |
| **Puddle in Winter** | People may walk through despite the cold. | Yes, if many people walk through it. |
### Summary of Key Points:
- A puddle is considered a **Reshus ha'Rabim** (public domain) if it is less than 10 Tefachim deep and many people walk through it.
- If the puddle is **10 Tefachim or deeper**, it is classified as a **Reshus ha'Yachid** (private domain), and one is **exempt** from liability for throwing into it.
- The width of the puddle also matters: if it is **4 Amos or wider**, people may choose to walk around it, but if it is less than 4 Amos, they may step through it.
- The time of year (summer vs. winter) can affect the likelihood of people walking through the puddle, but if many people do walk through it, liability applies regardless of the season.
This table should help clarify the conditions under which a puddle is considered a public domain and when one is liable for throwing an object into it.
--------------------
User prompt 3 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:03:01 AM:
whar does rav asho say
GPT-4o mini:
Rav Ashi's contribution to the discussion in the sugya revolves around the implications of the size of the puddle and how it affects the classification of the area as a Reshus ha'Rabim (public domain). Here’s a summary of what Rav Ashi says:
1. **Repetition of 'Puddle'**: Rav Ashi explains that the repetition of the term 'puddle' in the Mishnah serves to clarify that the halachic ruling applies even if the puddle is less than four Amos wide.
2. **Liability for Smaller Puddles**: He argues that one might think that a puddle is only considered a Reshus ha'Rabim (and thus one is liable for throwing into it) if it is four Amos wide. However, the repetition teaches that even if the puddle is smaller than four Amos, it is still considered a public domain if many people walk through it.
3. **Comparison to a Bridge**: Rav Ashi also provides a parallel case: if someone throws an object onto a plank of a bridge that is not aligned with the others, even if some people skip over that plank, others still walk on it. In this case, the person is still liable for throwing onto it, reinforcing the idea that the presence of foot traffic can establish an area as a public domain.
### Summary of Rav Ashi's Key Points:
- The halachic status of a puddle as a Reshus ha'Rabim applies even if it is less than four Amos wide.
- Liability is determined by the presence of foot traffic, regardless of the puddle's size, as long as many people walk through it.
- The analogy to the bridge illustrates that even if some people avoid a specific area, the overall usage by others can still establish liability.
Rav Ashi's insights emphasize the importance of foot traffic in determining the legal status of an area and the implications for liability in halachic terms.
--------------------
User prompt 4 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:05:02 AM:
amen the table w rav ashi'sb=views
GPT-4o mini:
Certainly! Here’s an updated table that incorporates Rav Ashi's views regarding when a puddle is considered a Reshus ha'Rabim (public domain) and when one is liable for throwing an object into it:
| **Condition** | **Description** | **Liability (Chayav)** | **Rav Ashi's View** |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| **Puddle Depth < 10 Tefachim** | The puddle is shallow enough that it does not constitute a private domain. | Yes, if many people walk through it. | Applicable as a Reshus ha'Rabim if many walk through. |
| **Puddle Depth ≥ 10 Tefachim** | The puddle is deep enough to be considered a private domain (Reshus ha'Yachid).| No, throwing into it is exempt. | Not applicable; considered a private domain. |
| **Puddle Width < 4 Amos** | The puddle is narrow enough that people can step over it. | No, if people avoid walking through it. | Liability may still apply if many walk through. |
| **Puddle Width = 4 Amos** | The puddle is wide enough that people may walk around it. | Yes, if many people walk through it. | Liability applies even if it is exactly 4 Amos. |
| **Puddle in Summer** | People may walk through to cool off. | Yes, if many people walk through it. | Applicable; foot traffic establishes public domain. |
| **Puddle in Winter** | People may walk through despite the cold. | Yes, if many people walk through it. | Applicable; foot traffic establishes public domain. |
### Summary of Key Points with Rav Ashi's Views:
- **Rav Ashi emphasizes** that the presence of foot traffic is crucial in determining whether a puddle is considered a Reshus ha'Rabim, regardless of its width, as long as many people walk through it.
- **For puddles less than 4 Amos wide**, even if some might step over it, if many people are walking through it, it is still considered a public domain, and one is liable.
- **For puddles that are 4 Amos wide**, liability applies regardless of whether people walk around it or through it, as long as there is significant foot traffic.
- **The depth of the puddle** also plays a role: if it is 10 Tefachim or deeper, it is classified as a private domain, and one is exempt from liability.
This table should provide a clear understanding of the conditions under which a puddle is considered a public domain and when one is liable, incorporating Rav Ashi's insights.
--------------------
User prompt 5 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:09:50 AM:
TRANSFERRING BETWEEN A SHIP AND THE SEA
(a)
(Mishnah): If one throws from the sea to the land or vice-versa, or from the sea to a ship or vice-versa, or from one ship to another, he is exempt;
(b)
If ships are tied to each other, one may carry from one to the other; if they are not tied, even if they are near each other, one may not carry from one to the other.
(c)
(Gemara - Rav Huna): If one extends a ledge of any size out of a Sefinah (ship), he may draw water from the sea (this will be explained);
(d)
(Rav Chisda and Rabah bar Rav Huna): He must extend an area four by four [Tefachim, surrounded by short walls] to permit drawing water.
(e)
(All agree that Karmelis extends up to 10 Tefachim, above this is Makom Patur.) Rav Huna says that a ledge of any size suffices - he holds that Karmelis begins at the sea floor, the air above the water is Makom Patur;
1.
Letter of the law, he does not need any ledge to draw water - it is required for a mere Heker (so people will not take from a proper Karmelis).
(f)
Rav Chisda and Rabah require an area four by four - they hold that Karmelis begins at the surface of the water, all the water is like a thick floor;
1.
If he will not make an area four by four, he takes from Karmelis to Reshus ha'Yachid!
(g)
Question (Rav Nachman): Rav Huna says that a ledge of any size suffices - sometimes the water is shallow, i.e. less than 10 Tefachim above the sea floor, and he takes from Karmelis to Reshus ha'Yachid!
(h)
Answer (Rabah bar Avuha): We have a tradition - 'Sefinah' refers to a big ship that does not go in water less than 10 Tefachim.
(i)
Question: The prow (front) of the ship is above the water, there the water can be less than 10 (perhaps one will draw from there)!
(j)
Answer (Rav Safra): People at the prow hold poles in the water and feel for the ground to ensure that the ship will not go into water less than 10 [lest it get stuck].
(k)
Question (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak): Rav Chisda and Rabah require an area four by four - according to them, how may one dump wastewater out of a ship?
1.
Suggestion: Perhaps they spill it out of the four by four area for drawing water!
2.
Rejection: If so, he would despise that place (he would not draw water from there any more)!
(l)
Answer: He pours the water on the side of the ship, it descends to the sea by itself.
(m)
Question: Even though he does not pour it directly into the sea, his Ko'ach (impetus) causes it to go to the sea!
(n)
Answer: Chachamim did not forbid Ko'ach regarding Karmelis.
===========
conmtinue to explain this and make atable
GPT-4o mini:
This sugya discusses the halachic implications of transferring items between a ship and the sea, as well as between ships. It addresses various scenarios and the conditions under which one is liable or exempt from carrying items in these contexts. Below is a summary of the key points followed by a table to clarify the concepts.
### Key Points of the Sugya:
1. **Mishnah's Initial Statement**:
- If one throws an object from the sea to the land, from the sea to a ship, from a ship to the sea, or from one ship to another, they are exempt from liability. This is because these actions occur between different domains.
2. **Carrying Between Ships**:
- If ships are tied together, one may carry items from one to the other. If they are not tied, even if they are close, one may not carry between them.
3. **Drawing Water from the Sea**:
- **Rav Huna**: If a ledge of any size extends from a ship, one may draw water from the sea. He holds that the Karmelis (a semi-public domain) begins at the sea floor, and the air above the water is considered Makom Patur (an exempt area).
- **Rav Chisda and Rabah bar Rav Huna**: They require a ledge that is four by four Tefachim, surrounded by short walls, to draw water. They believe that Karmelis begins at the surface of the water, treating the water as a solid surface.
4. **Questions and Answers**:
- **Rav Nachman's Question**: If Rav Huna allows a ledge of any size, what if the water is shallow (less than 10 Tefachim)? This could lead to taking from Karmelis to Reshus ha'Yachid (private domain).
- **Rabah bar Avuha's Answer**: A "Sefinah" refers to a large ship that does not operate in water less than 10 Tefachim deep.
- **Rav Safra's Clarification**: People at the prow of the ship use poles to check the depth of the water, ensuring it is not less than 10 Tefachim.
5. **Wastewater Disposal**:
- **Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak's Question**: How can one dump wastewater from a ship if Rav Chisda and Rabah require a four by four area?
- **Answer**: They pour the wastewater over the side of the ship, allowing it to descend to the sea by itself. This is permitted because the Chachamim did not forbid the use of Ko'ach (impetus) regarding Karmelis.
### Summary Table:
| **Condition** | **Description** | **Liability (Chayav)** | **Halachic Views** |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| **Throwing Between Domains** | Throwing from sea to land, ship, or between ships. | Exempt | All agree on exemption due to domain transfer. |
| **Carrying Between Tied Ships** | Ships tied together allow carrying items between them. | Permitted | Allowed if ships are tied. |
| **Carrying Between Untied Ships** | Ships not tied together do not allow carrying items between them. | Not permitted | Prohibited even if ships are near each other. |
| **Drawing Water (Rav Huna)** | A ledge of any size from a ship allows drawing water from the sea. | Permitted | Karmelis begins at the sea floor; air is Makom Patur. |
| **Drawing Water (Rav Chisda/Rabah)** | Requires a ledge of four by four Tefachim to draw water. | Permitted | Karmelis begins at the water's surface. |
| **Shallow Water Concern** | Concern about drawing from shallow water (less than 10 Tefachim). | Not applicable | Large ships do not operate in shallow water. |
| **Wastewater Disposal** | How to dispose of wastewater from a ship. | Permitted | Wastewater descends to the sea by itself; Ko'ach is allowed. |
### Conclusion:
This sugya highlights the complexities of transferring items between different domains, particularly in the context of ships and the sea. It emphasizes the importance of the physical conditions (like the depth of water and the size of ledges) in determining liability and the permissibility of certain actions. The discussions among the sages clarify the halachic principles governing these scenarios.
--------------------
User prompt 6 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:13:14 AM:
why does rav hun rewuire a ledge at all
GPT-4o mini:
Rav Huna's requirement for a ledge, even if it is of any size, when drawing water from the sea is primarily for the purpose of establishing a clear boundary and preventing confusion regarding the halachic status of the area from which one is drawing water. Here are the key reasons for this requirement:
1. **Distinction Between Domains**:
- The ledge serves as a physical demarcation between the ship (which is considered a private domain) and the sea (which is a Karmelis). By having a ledge, it is clear that one is drawing water from the sea and not inadvertently transferring from a Karmelis to a Reshus ha'Yachid (private domain).
2. **Avoiding Confusion with Karmelis**:
- Without a ledge, there could be confusion about whether one is drawing from a Karmelis (the water) or a Reshus ha'Yachid (the ship). The ledge acts as a reminder (Heker) that the water being drawn is from a Karmelis, thus helping to avoid any halachic violations.
3. **Letter of the Law vs. Practical Application**:
- While Rav Huna holds that, according to the letter of the law, one could technically draw water without any ledge, he still requires a ledge for practical reasons. It is meant to ensure that people do not mistakenly think they can draw from a Karmelis without proper boundaries.
4. **Preventing Unintentional Violations**:
- The ledge helps prevent unintentional violations of halacha. If someone were to draw water without a clear boundary, they might inadvertently take from a Karmelis to a Reshus ha'Yachid, which is prohibited.
In summary, Rav Huna requires a ledge to create a clear boundary that helps avoid confusion between different domains and to ensure that the act of drawing water is done in a manner that is consistent with halachic principles. The ledge serves both a practical and a halachic purpose, reinforcing the distinction between the ship and the sea.
--------------------
User prompt 7 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:14:08 AM:
but rav huna hold that Karmelis begins at the sea floor; air is Makom Patur - so no ledge rquired to draw water
GPT-4o mini:
You are correct, and I appreciate your patience. Let's clarify Rav Huna's position regarding the ledge and the drawing of water from the sea.
### Rav Huna's Position:
1. **Karmelis Begins at the Sea Floor**:
- Rav Huna holds that the Karmelis (a semi-public domain) begins at the sea floor. Therefore, the air above the water is considered **Makom Patur** (an exempt area). This means that, according to his view, one could technically draw water from the sea without needing a ledge at all, as the air above the water does not constitute a Karmelis or a Reshus ha'Yachid.
2. **Ledge for Heker**:
- Despite this, Rav Huna still mentions the requirement for a ledge, but this is primarily for the purpose of **Heker** (a reminder or marker). The ledge serves to visually indicate that one is drawing from the sea and not from a Karmelis or a Reshus ha'Yachid. It helps prevent confusion and ensures that people understand the halachic implications of their actions.
3. **Practical Application**:
- The ledge is not strictly necessary according to the letter of the law for drawing water, but it is a safeguard to prevent any potential halachic violations. It serves as a reminder that the water being drawn is from a Karmelis, reinforcing the distinction between the domains.
### Summary:
- **No Ledge Required**: According to Rav Huna's halachic reasoning, a ledge is not required to draw water from the sea because the air above the water is Makom Patur, and Karmelis begins at the sea floor.
- **Purpose of the Ledge**: The ledge is mentioned for practical reasons, serving as a Heker to prevent confusion and ensure that people do not mistakenly think they are drawing from a Karmelis or a Reshus ha'Yachid.
Thank you for pointing out the need for clarification, and I hope this explanation accurately reflects Rav Huna's position.
--------------------
User prompt 8 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:23:28 AM:
what does rav sfara say its confusign
GPT-4o mini:
Rav Safra's contribution to the discussion in the sugya addresses a concern raised about the practical implications of drawing water from the sea, particularly in relation to the depth of the water and the potential for confusion regarding the halachic status of the area.
### Key Points of Rav Safra's View:
1. **Concern About Shallow Water**:
- The question arises regarding the prow (front) of the ship, where the water might be less than 10 Tefachim deep. If someone were to draw water from there, they could potentially be drawing from a Karmelis (a semi-public domain) to a Reshus ha'Yachid (private domain), which would be problematic.
2. **Use of Poles**:
- Rav Safra answers this concern by explaining that people at the prow of the ship use poles to check the depth of the water. They ensure that the ship is not in water that is less than 10 Tefachim deep. This practice helps prevent the situation where one might inadvertently draw from shallow water, which could lead to a halachic violation.
3. **Establishing Safety**:
- By using poles to feel for the ground, the crew ensures that they are operating in water that is deep enough (10 Tefachim or more). This practice establishes a safety measure that aligns with Rav Huna's position, as it prevents the possibility of drawing from a Karmelis to a Reshus ha'Yachid.
### Summary of Rav Safra's Contribution:
- **Rav Safra clarifies** that the concern about drawing from shallow water is mitigated by the practice of using poles to check the depth. This ensures that the water being drawn is always at least 10 Tefachim deep, thus avoiding any halachic issues related to transferring from a Karmelis to a Reshus ha'Yachid.
### Conclusion:
Rav Safra's explanation helps to resolve the confusion regarding the practical application of drawing water from the sea while adhering to halachic principles. His emphasis on the use of poles provides a practical solution to ensure compliance with the halacha, reinforcing the importance of maintaining the correct depth when drawing water.
--------------------
User prompt 9 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:25:54 AM:
great - explain the sod of teh macholkes
GPT-4o mini:
The machloket (dispute) between the sages in this sugya revolves around the halachic status of the area when drawing water from the sea and the requirements for doing so. The core of the disagreement lies in how the concepts of Karmelis, Reshus ha'Yachid, and Makom Patur are understood and applied in the context of transferring items between domains. Here’s a breakdown of the underlying principles and the "sod" (secret or deeper understanding) of the machloket:
### Key Concepts:
1. **Karmelis**:
- A Karmelis is a semi-public domain that has certain restrictions similar to a public domain (Reshus ha'Rabim) but does not have the same level of liability for carrying items. It is defined by its characteristics, such as being less than 10 Tefachim deep.
2. **Reshus ha'Yachid**:
- A Reshus ha'Yachid is a private domain where carrying items is permitted without restrictions. It is defined by having clear boundaries and being enclosed.
3. **Makom Patur**:
- Makom Patur refers to an exempt area where carrying items is not subject to the same halachic restrictions as in a Karmelis or Reshus ha'Yachid. This includes areas above a Karmelis that do not have a defined halachic status.
### The Dispute:
1. **Rav Huna's Position**:
- Rav Huna holds that Karmelis begins at the sea floor, and the air above the water is considered Makom Patur. Therefore, he argues that one can draw water from the sea without needing a ledge, as the air above the water does not impose any halachic restrictions. The ledge is only for Heker (reminder) purposes to prevent confusion.
2. **Rav Chisda and Rabah bar Rav Huna's Position**:
- They require a ledge of four by four Tefachim to draw water, as they believe that Karmelis begins at the surface of the water. For them, the water is treated like a solid surface, and without a defined area, one might inadvertently draw from a Karmelis to a Reshus ha'Yachid, which is prohibited.
### The "Sod" of the Machloket:
The deeper understanding of this machloket can be seen in the following aspects:
1. **Understanding of Domains**:
- The disagreement reflects different interpretations of how halachic domains are defined and how they interact with one another. Rav Huna's view emphasizes the distinction between the physical space of the sea and the air above it, while Rav Chisda and Rabah focus on the practical implications of drawing from a Karmelis.
2. **Practical Application vs. Theoretical Law**:
- Rav Huna's position allows for a more lenient application of the law, emphasizing the practical realities of drawing water from the sea. In contrast, Rav Chisda and Rabah's stricter requirement for a ledge reflects a concern for preventing potential halachic violations in practice.
3. **Preventing Confusion**:
- Both sides are concerned with preventing confusion regarding the halachic status of the area. Rav Huna's ledge serves as a reminder, while Rav Chisda and Rabah's requirement for a defined area aims to eliminate any ambiguity about where one is drawing from.
4. **Halachic Safeguards**:
- The machloket highlights the balance between leniency and stringency in halacha. Rav Huna's approach is more lenient, while Rav Chisda and Rabah's approach is more stringent, reflecting different methodologies in how to safeguard against potential violations.
### Conclusion:
The machloket between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda/Rabah bar Rav Huna regarding drawing water from the sea illustrates the complexities of halachic definitions and the practical implications of those definitions. The "sod" of the machloket lies in the differing interpretations of how domains interact, the importance of preventing confusion, and the balance between leniency and stringency in halachic practice. Understanding these underlying principles provides insight into the broader discussions of halacha and its application in everyday life.This conversation was generated with DuckDuckGo AI Chat (https://duck.ai) using OpenAI's GPT-4o mini Model. AI chats may display inaccurate or offensive information (see https://duckduckgo.com/aichat/privacy-terms for more info).
====================
User prompt 1 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 2:50:56 AM:
INCONVENIENT PLACES TO WALK
(a)
(Mishnah): If one throws four Amos at sea, he is exempt;
(b)
If many people walk through [gravel covered by] a puddle, one who throws four Amos in it is Chayav.
(c)
The puddle discussed is less than 10 Tefachim (Ritva - if it is deeper than 10 it is a Reshus ha'Yachid; Rashi - it is Karmelis; Mishnah Berurah (345 48) - perhaps Rashi agrees that mid'Oraisa it is Reshus ha'Yachid);
(d)
If one throws into a puddle that many people walk through, he is liable.
(e)
(Gemara) Question: We understand why the Mishnah mentions 'walking' twice - this teaches that walking with difficulty is considered walking, but usage with difficulty is not considered usage;
1.
But why does it mention 'puddle' twice?
(f)
Answer #1 (Rava): This is to teach that this applies in summer and winter:
1.
Had it only taught about summer, we would have thought that that is because people often go there to cool off (but in winter it is not Reshus ha'Rabim);
2.
Had it only taught about winter, we would have thought that that is because people's garments are dirty anyway, so people often go there (but in summer it is not Reshus ha'Rabim).
(g)
Answer #2 (Abaye): This is to teach that this is even if it is four Amos:
1.
One might have thought that it is Reshus ha'Rabim only if it is less than four Amos, but if it is four Amos, people go around it and do not go through it - the repetition teaches that this is not so.
(h)
Answer #3 (Rav Ashi): This is to teach that this is even if it is less than four (Rashi - Amos; Rambam - Tefachim):
1.
One might have thought that it is Reshus ha'Rabim only if it is four, but if it is less, people step over it and do not go through it - the repetition teaches that this is not so. (Rashash questions Rashi, for even three Amos is too big to step over. Rashi himself (113B) says that the size of a normal step is one Amah. This is not difficult for the Rambam - since a person's foot is about half an Amah, if the puddle is four Tefachim, if one takes normal steps, part of his foot will be in the puddle.)
(i)
This is like Rav Ashi taught elsewhere:
1.
(Rav Ashi): If one threw something and it landed on a plank of a bridge that is not in line with the others, [even though some people skip over it, since others walk on it] he is liable.
================
Explain this sugya clealy and logicallu
GPT-4o mini:
This sugya discusses the halachic implications of throwing an object into a puddle in a public domain (Reshus ha'Rabim) and the conditions under which one is liable (Chayav) for doing so. The discussion is based on a Mishnah and further elaborated by the Gemara, with various interpretations and explanations provided by different sages.
### Key Points of the Sugya:
1. **Mishnah's Initial Statement**:
- If someone throws an object four Amos (a unit of measure) into the sea, they are exempt from liability. This is because the sea is not a public domain in the same way as a street or a path where people walk.
2. **Puddle with Many People**:
- If there is a puddle that many people walk through, throwing an object into it makes one liable. This indicates that the puddle is considered a public space due to the frequent foot traffic.
3. **Depth of the Puddle**:
- The discussion specifies that if the puddle is less than 10 Tefachim (another unit of measure), it is treated differently than if it were deeper. If it is deeper than 10 Tefachim, it is classified as a private domain (Reshus ha'Yachid), while if it is shallower, it may be considered a Karmelis (a category of semi-public space).
4. **Repetition of 'Walking'**:
- The Mishnah mentions 'walking' twice to clarify that even if walking is difficult (e.g., through mud), it still counts as walking. However, using the puddle (e.g., throwing something) with difficulty does not count as usage.
5. **Repetition of 'Puddle'**:
- The Gemara questions why the term 'puddle' is mentioned twice. Several answers are proposed:
- **Answer #1 (Rava)**: The repetition indicates that the ruling applies in both summer and winter. In summer, people might walk through to cool off, while in winter, they might walk through despite the cold.
- **Answer #2 (Abaye)**: The repetition teaches that the ruling applies even if the puddle is four Amos wide. One might think that if it is four Amos, people would walk around it, but the repetition clarifies that this is not the case.
- **Answer #3 (Rav Ashi)**: The repetition indicates that the ruling applies even if the puddle is less than four Amos. One might think that if it is smaller, people would step over it, but the repetition clarifies that this is not the case.
6. **Comparison to a Bridge**:
- Rav Ashi provides a parallel case: if an object is thrown onto a plank of a bridge that is not aligned with the others, even if some people skip over it, others still walk on it, making one liable for throwing onto it.
### Conclusion:
The sugya illustrates the complexities of halachic definitions of public and private spaces, the implications of foot traffic on liability, and the nuances of how different conditions (like the size of a puddle) affect legal rulings. The discussion emphasizes the importance of context in determining liability and the need for clarity in halachic language.
--------------------
User prompt 2 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 2:56:05 AM:
so i am confused when is a puddle a reshut harabim and one is liable make atable
GPT-4o mini:
To clarify when a puddle is considered a Reshus ha'Rabim (public domain) and when one is liable for throwing an object into it, we can create a table summarizing the conditions discussed in the sugya:
| **Condition** | **Description** | **Liability (Chayav)** |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| **Puddle Depth < 10 Tefachim** | The puddle is shallow enough that it does not constitute a private domain. | Yes, if many people walk through it. |
| **Puddle Depth ≥ 10 Tefachim** | The puddle is deep enough to be considered a private domain (Reshus ha'Yachid).| No, throwing into it is exempt. |
| **Puddle Width < 4 Amos** | The puddle is narrow enough that people can step over it. | No, if people avoid walking through it. |
| **Puddle Width = 4 Amos** | The puddle is wide enough that people may walk around it. | Yes, if many people walk through it. |
| **Puddle in Summer** | People may walk through to cool off. | Yes, if many people walk through it. |
| **Puddle in Winter** | People may walk through despite the cold. | Yes, if many people walk through it. |
### Summary of Key Points:
- A puddle is considered a **Reshus ha'Rabim** (public domain) if it is less than 10 Tefachim deep and many people walk through it.
- If the puddle is **10 Tefachim or deeper**, it is classified as a **Reshus ha'Yachid** (private domain), and one is **exempt** from liability for throwing into it.
- The width of the puddle also matters: if it is **4 Amos or wider**, people may choose to walk around it, but if it is less than 4 Amos, they may step through it.
- The time of year (summer vs. winter) can affect the likelihood of people walking through the puddle, but if many people do walk through it, liability applies regardless of the season.
This table should help clarify the conditions under which a puddle is considered a public domain and when one is liable for throwing an object into it.
--------------------
User prompt 3 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:03:01 AM:
whar does rav asho say
GPT-4o mini:
Rav Ashi's contribution to the discussion in the sugya revolves around the implications of the size of the puddle and how it affects the classification of the area as a Reshus ha'Rabim (public domain). Here’s a summary of what Rav Ashi says:
1. **Repetition of 'Puddle'**: Rav Ashi explains that the repetition of the term 'puddle' in the Mishnah serves to clarify that the halachic ruling applies even if the puddle is less than four Amos wide.
2. **Liability for Smaller Puddles**: He argues that one might think that a puddle is only considered a Reshus ha'Rabim (and thus one is liable for throwing into it) if it is four Amos wide. However, the repetition teaches that even if the puddle is smaller than four Amos, it is still considered a public domain if many people walk through it.
3. **Comparison to a Bridge**: Rav Ashi also provides a parallel case: if someone throws an object onto a plank of a bridge that is not aligned with the others, even if some people skip over that plank, others still walk on it. In this case, the person is still liable for throwing onto it, reinforcing the idea that the presence of foot traffic can establish an area as a public domain.
### Summary of Rav Ashi's Key Points:
- The halachic status of a puddle as a Reshus ha'Rabim applies even if it is less than four Amos wide.
- Liability is determined by the presence of foot traffic, regardless of the puddle's size, as long as many people walk through it.
- The analogy to the bridge illustrates that even if some people avoid a specific area, the overall usage by others can still establish liability.
Rav Ashi's insights emphasize the importance of foot traffic in determining the legal status of an area and the implications for liability in halachic terms.
--------------------
User prompt 4 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:05:02 AM:
amen the table w rav ashi'sb=views
GPT-4o mini:
Certainly! Here’s an updated table that incorporates Rav Ashi's views regarding when a puddle is considered a Reshus ha'Rabim (public domain) and when one is liable for throwing an object into it:
| **Condition** | **Description** | **Liability (Chayav)** | **Rav Ashi's View** |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| **Puddle Depth < 10 Tefachim** | The puddle is shallow enough that it does not constitute a private domain. | Yes, if many people walk through it. | Applicable as a Reshus ha'Rabim if many walk through. |
| **Puddle Depth ≥ 10 Tefachim** | The puddle is deep enough to be considered a private domain (Reshus ha'Yachid).| No, throwing into it is exempt. | Not applicable; considered a private domain. |
| **Puddle Width < 4 Amos** | The puddle is narrow enough that people can step over it. | No, if people avoid walking through it. | Liability may still apply if many walk through. |
| **Puddle Width = 4 Amos** | The puddle is wide enough that people may walk around it. | Yes, if many people walk through it. | Liability applies even if it is exactly 4 Amos. |
| **Puddle in Summer** | People may walk through to cool off. | Yes, if many people walk through it. | Applicable; foot traffic establishes public domain. |
| **Puddle in Winter** | People may walk through despite the cold. | Yes, if many people walk through it. | Applicable; foot traffic establishes public domain. |
### Summary of Key Points with Rav Ashi's Views:
- **Rav Ashi emphasizes** that the presence of foot traffic is crucial in determining whether a puddle is considered a Reshus ha'Rabim, regardless of its width, as long as many people walk through it.
- **For puddles less than 4 Amos wide**, even if some might step over it, if many people are walking through it, it is still considered a public domain, and one is liable.
- **For puddles that are 4 Amos wide**, liability applies regardless of whether people walk around it or through it, as long as there is significant foot traffic.
- **The depth of the puddle** also plays a role: if it is 10 Tefachim or deeper, it is classified as a private domain, and one is exempt from liability.
This table should provide a clear understanding of the conditions under which a puddle is considered a public domain and when one is liable, incorporating Rav Ashi's insights.
--------------------
User prompt 5 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:09:50 AM:
TRANSFERRING BETWEEN A SHIP AND THE SEA
(a)
(Mishnah): If one throws from the sea to the land or vice-versa, or from the sea to a ship or vice-versa, or from one ship to another, he is exempt;
(b)
If ships are tied to each other, one may carry from one to the other; if they are not tied, even if they are near each other, one may not carry from one to the other.
(c)
(Gemara - Rav Huna): If one extends a ledge of any size out of a Sefinah (ship), he may draw water from the sea (this will be explained);
(d)
(Rav Chisda and Rabah bar Rav Huna): He must extend an area four by four [Tefachim, surrounded by short walls] to permit drawing water.
(e)
(All agree that Karmelis extends up to 10 Tefachim, above this is Makom Patur.) Rav Huna says that a ledge of any size suffices - he holds that Karmelis begins at the sea floor, the air above the water is Makom Patur;
1.
Letter of the law, he does not need any ledge to draw water - it is required for a mere Heker (so people will not take from a proper Karmelis).
(f)
Rav Chisda and Rabah require an area four by four - they hold that Karmelis begins at the surface of the water, all the water is like a thick floor;
1.
If he will not make an area four by four, he takes from Karmelis to Reshus ha'Yachid!
(g)
Question (Rav Nachman): Rav Huna says that a ledge of any size suffices - sometimes the water is shallow, i.e. less than 10 Tefachim above the sea floor, and he takes from Karmelis to Reshus ha'Yachid!
(h)
Answer (Rabah bar Avuha): We have a tradition - 'Sefinah' refers to a big ship that does not go in water less than 10 Tefachim.
(i)
Question: The prow (front) of the ship is above the water, there the water can be less than 10 (perhaps one will draw from there)!
(j)
Answer (Rav Safra): People at the prow hold poles in the water and feel for the ground to ensure that the ship will not go into water less than 10 [lest it get stuck].
(k)
Question (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak): Rav Chisda and Rabah require an area four by four - according to them, how may one dump wastewater out of a ship?
1.
Suggestion: Perhaps they spill it out of the four by four area for drawing water!
2.
Rejection: If so, he would despise that place (he would not draw water from there any more)!
(l)
Answer: He pours the water on the side of the ship, it descends to the sea by itself.
(m)
Question: Even though he does not pour it directly into the sea, his Ko'ach (impetus) causes it to go to the sea!
(n)
Answer: Chachamim did not forbid Ko'ach regarding Karmelis.
===========
conmtinue to explain this and make atable
GPT-4o mini:
This sugya discusses the halachic implications of transferring items between a ship and the sea, as well as between ships. It addresses various scenarios and the conditions under which one is liable or exempt from carrying items in these contexts. Below is a summary of the key points followed by a table to clarify the concepts.
### Key Points of the Sugya:
1. **Mishnah's Initial Statement**:
- If one throws an object from the sea to the land, from the sea to a ship, from a ship to the sea, or from one ship to another, they are exempt from liability. This is because these actions occur between different domains.
2. **Carrying Between Ships**:
- If ships are tied together, one may carry items from one to the other. If they are not tied, even if they are close, one may not carry between them.
3. **Drawing Water from the Sea**:
- **Rav Huna**: If a ledge of any size extends from a ship, one may draw water from the sea. He holds that the Karmelis (a semi-public domain) begins at the sea floor, and the air above the water is considered Makom Patur (an exempt area).
- **Rav Chisda and Rabah bar Rav Huna**: They require a ledge that is four by four Tefachim, surrounded by short walls, to draw water. They believe that Karmelis begins at the surface of the water, treating the water as a solid surface.
4. **Questions and Answers**:
- **Rav Nachman's Question**: If Rav Huna allows a ledge of any size, what if the water is shallow (less than 10 Tefachim)? This could lead to taking from Karmelis to Reshus ha'Yachid (private domain).
- **Rabah bar Avuha's Answer**: A "Sefinah" refers to a large ship that does not operate in water less than 10 Tefachim deep.
- **Rav Safra's Clarification**: People at the prow of the ship use poles to check the depth of the water, ensuring it is not less than 10 Tefachim.
5. **Wastewater Disposal**:
- **Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak's Question**: How can one dump wastewater from a ship if Rav Chisda and Rabah require a four by four area?
- **Answer**: They pour the wastewater over the side of the ship, allowing it to descend to the sea by itself. This is permitted because the Chachamim did not forbid the use of Ko'ach (impetus) regarding Karmelis.
### Summary Table:
| **Condition** | **Description** | **Liability (Chayav)** | **Halachic Views** |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| **Throwing Between Domains** | Throwing from sea to land, ship, or between ships. | Exempt | All agree on exemption due to domain transfer. |
| **Carrying Between Tied Ships** | Ships tied together allow carrying items between them. | Permitted | Allowed if ships are tied. |
| **Carrying Between Untied Ships** | Ships not tied together do not allow carrying items between them. | Not permitted | Prohibited even if ships are near each other. |
| **Drawing Water (Rav Huna)** | A ledge of any size from a ship allows drawing water from the sea. | Permitted | Karmelis begins at the sea floor; air is Makom Patur. |
| **Drawing Water (Rav Chisda/Rabah)** | Requires a ledge of four by four Tefachim to draw water. | Permitted | Karmelis begins at the water's surface. |
| **Shallow Water Concern** | Concern about drawing from shallow water (less than 10 Tefachim). | Not applicable | Large ships do not operate in shallow water. |
| **Wastewater Disposal** | How to dispose of wastewater from a ship. | Permitted | Wastewater descends to the sea by itself; Ko'ach is allowed. |
### Conclusion:
This sugya highlights the complexities of transferring items between different domains, particularly in the context of ships and the sea. It emphasizes the importance of the physical conditions (like the depth of water and the size of ledges) in determining liability and the permissibility of certain actions. The discussions among the sages clarify the halachic principles governing these scenarios.
--------------------
User prompt 6 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:13:14 AM:
why does rav hun rewuire a ledge at all
GPT-4o mini:
Rav Huna's requirement for a ledge, even if it is of any size, when drawing water from the sea is primarily for the purpose of establishing a clear boundary and preventing confusion regarding the halachic status of the area from which one is drawing water. Here are the key reasons for this requirement:
1. **Distinction Between Domains**:
- The ledge serves as a physical demarcation between the ship (which is considered a private domain) and the sea (which is a Karmelis). By having a ledge, it is clear that one is drawing water from the sea and not inadvertently transferring from a Karmelis to a Reshus ha'Yachid (private domain).
2. **Avoiding Confusion with Karmelis**:
- Without a ledge, there could be confusion about whether one is drawing from a Karmelis (the water) or a Reshus ha'Yachid (the ship). The ledge acts as a reminder (Heker) that the water being drawn is from a Karmelis, thus helping to avoid any halachic violations.
3. **Letter of the Law vs. Practical Application**:
- While Rav Huna holds that, according to the letter of the law, one could technically draw water without any ledge, he still requires a ledge for practical reasons. It is meant to ensure that people do not mistakenly think they can draw from a Karmelis without proper boundaries.
4. **Preventing Unintentional Violations**:
- The ledge helps prevent unintentional violations of halacha. If someone were to draw water without a clear boundary, they might inadvertently take from a Karmelis to a Reshus ha'Yachid, which is prohibited.
In summary, Rav Huna requires a ledge to create a clear boundary that helps avoid confusion between different domains and to ensure that the act of drawing water is done in a manner that is consistent with halachic principles. The ledge serves both a practical and a halachic purpose, reinforcing the distinction between the ship and the sea.
--------------------
User prompt 7 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:14:08 AM:
but rav huna hold that Karmelis begins at the sea floor; air is Makom Patur - so no ledge rquired to draw water
GPT-4o mini:
You are correct, and I appreciate your patience. Let's clarify Rav Huna's position regarding the ledge and the drawing of water from the sea.
### Rav Huna's Position:
1. **Karmelis Begins at the Sea Floor**:
- Rav Huna holds that the Karmelis (a semi-public domain) begins at the sea floor. Therefore, the air above the water is considered **Makom Patur** (an exempt area). This means that, according to his view, one could technically draw water from the sea without needing a ledge at all, as the air above the water does not constitute a Karmelis or a Reshus ha'Yachid.
2. **Ledge for Heker**:
- Despite this, Rav Huna still mentions the requirement for a ledge, but this is primarily for the purpose of **Heker** (a reminder or marker). The ledge serves to visually indicate that one is drawing from the sea and not from a Karmelis or a Reshus ha'Yachid. It helps prevent confusion and ensures that people understand the halachic implications of their actions.
3. **Practical Application**:
- The ledge is not strictly necessary according to the letter of the law for drawing water, but it is a safeguard to prevent any potential halachic violations. It serves as a reminder that the water being drawn is from a Karmelis, reinforcing the distinction between the domains.
### Summary:
- **No Ledge Required**: According to Rav Huna's halachic reasoning, a ledge is not required to draw water from the sea because the air above the water is Makom Patur, and Karmelis begins at the sea floor.
- **Purpose of the Ledge**: The ledge is mentioned for practical reasons, serving as a Heker to prevent confusion and ensure that people do not mistakenly think they are drawing from a Karmelis or a Reshus ha'Yachid.
Thank you for pointing out the need for clarification, and I hope this explanation accurately reflects Rav Huna's position.
--------------------
User prompt 8 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:23:28 AM:
what does rav sfara say its confusign
GPT-4o mini:
Rav Safra's contribution to the discussion in the sugya addresses a concern raised about the practical implications of drawing water from the sea, particularly in relation to the depth of the water and the potential for confusion regarding the halachic status of the area.
### Key Points of Rav Safra's View:
1. **Concern About Shallow Water**:
- The question arises regarding the prow (front) of the ship, where the water might be less than 10 Tefachim deep. If someone were to draw water from there, they could potentially be drawing from a Karmelis (a semi-public domain) to a Reshus ha'Yachid (private domain), which would be problematic.
2. **Use of Poles**:
- Rav Safra answers this concern by explaining that people at the prow of the ship use poles to check the depth of the water. They ensure that the ship is not in water that is less than 10 Tefachim deep. This practice helps prevent the situation where one might inadvertently draw from shallow water, which could lead to a halachic violation.
3. **Establishing Safety**:
- By using poles to feel for the ground, the crew ensures that they are operating in water that is deep enough (10 Tefachim or more). This practice establishes a safety measure that aligns with Rav Huna's position, as it prevents the possibility of drawing from a Karmelis to a Reshus ha'Yachid.
### Summary of Rav Safra's Contribution:
- **Rav Safra clarifies** that the concern about drawing from shallow water is mitigated by the practice of using poles to check the depth. This ensures that the water being drawn is always at least 10 Tefachim deep, thus avoiding any halachic issues related to transferring from a Karmelis to a Reshus ha'Yachid.
### Conclusion:
Rav Safra's explanation helps to resolve the confusion regarding the practical application of drawing water from the sea while adhering to halachic principles. His emphasis on the use of poles provides a practical solution to ensure compliance with the halacha, reinforcing the importance of maintaining the correct depth when drawing water.
--------------------
User prompt 9 of 9 - 10/7/2024, 3:25:54 AM:
great - explain the sod of teh macholkes
GPT-4o mini:
### The "Sod" of the Machloket:
The deeper understanding of this machloket can be seen in the following aspects:
1. **Understanding of Domains**:
- The disagreement reflects different interpretations of how halachic domains are defined and how they interact with one another. Rav Huna's view emphasizes the distinction between the physical space of the sea and the air above it, while Rav Chisda and Rabah focus on the practical implications of drawing from a Karmelis.
2. **Practical Application vs. Theoretical Law**:
- Rav Huna's position allows for a more lenient application of the law, emphasizing the practical realities of drawing water from the sea. In contrast, Rav Chisda and Rabah's stricter requirement for a ledge reflects a concern for preventing potential halachic violations in practice.
3. **Preventing Confusion**:
- Both sides are concerned with preventing confusion regarding the halachic status of the area. Rav Huna's ledge serves as a reminder, while Rav Chisda and Rabah's requirement for a defined area aims to eliminate any ambiguity about where one is drawing from.
4. **Halachic Safeguards**:
- The machloket highlights the balance between leniency and stringency in halacha. Rav Huna's approach is more lenient, while Rav Chisda and Rabah's approach is more stringent, reflecting different methodologies in how to safeguard against potential violations.
### Conclusion:
The machloket between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda/Rabah bar Rav Huna regarding drawing water from the sea illustrates the complexities of halachic definitions and the practical implications of those definitions. The "sod" of the machloket lies in the differing interpretations of how domains interact, the importance of preventing confusion, and the balance between leniency and stringency in halachic practice. Understanding these underlying principles provides insight into the broader discussions of halacha and its application in everyday life.==
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק לְרַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין: לְרַב חִסְדָּא וּלְרַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא דְּאָמְרִי עוֹשֶׂה מְקוֹם אַרְבָּעָה וּמְמַלֵּא, שׁוֹפְכִין דִּידֵיהּ הֵיכִי שָׁדֵי לְהוּ? וְכִי תֵּימָא דְּשָׁדֵי לְהוּ בְּאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם — מְאִיסִי לֵיהּ. דְּשָׁדֵי לְהוּ אַדֻּפְנָא דִסְפִינָה. וְהָא אִיכָּא כֹּחוֹ! כֹּחוֹ בְּכַרְמְלִית לָא גְזַרוּ. וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא? דְּתַנְיָא: סְפִינָה אֵין מְטַלְטְלִין לֹא מִתּוֹכָהּ לַיָּם וְלֹא מִן הַיָּם לְתוֹכָהּ,
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin: According to Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna, who say that in order to draw water onto a boat on Shabbat one creates an area of four by four handbreadths and fills a receptacle, how does he throw out his waste water? And if you say he pours it out in the same area from which he draws water, the water that he subsequently draws from there will be disgusting to him. Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin answered him: He pours it onto the side of the boat from which it runs into the sea, and he does not pour it directly into the sea. The Gemara asks: Even so, it is accomplished by means of his power. Although he did not pour it directly, he caused the waste water to enter the sea. The Gemara answers: The Sages did not issue a decree to prohibit an action performed by one’s power in a karmelit. They only prohibited throwing an object directly. And from where do you say that this is so? As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to a ship, one may neither carry from it into the sea, nor from the sea into it.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: תַּרְגּוּם שֶׁכְּתָבוֹ מִקְרָא, וּמִקְרָא שֶׁכְּתָבוֹ תַּרְגּוּם, וּכְתָב עִבְרִית — מַצִּילִין מִפְּנֵי הַדְּלֵיקָה. וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר תַּרְגּוּם שֶׁבְּעֶזְרָא וְשֶׁבְּדָנִיאֵל וְשֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה. תַּרְגּוּם שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה מַאי נִיהוּ? — ״יְגַר שָׂהֲדוּתָא״, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלֵית בַּהּ שְׁמוֹנִים וְחָמֵשׁ אוֹתִיּוֹת! כִּי תַּנְיָא הַהִיא — לְהַשְׁלִים.
Rav Huna bar Ḥaluv raised an objection to his opinion from that which we learned: A verse that is originally written in Aramaic translation that was written in the language of the Bible, and a verse that is originally written in the language of the Bible that was written in Aramaic translation, and a Torah that was written in ancient Hebrew script, one rescues them from the fire on Shabbat. And, needless to say, one saves the verses written in Aramaic translation that are in the book of Ezra, and that are in the book of Daniel, and that are in the Torah. What are the verses originally written in Aramaic translation in the Torah? It is the verse: “And Laban called it Yegar Sahaduta, and Jacob called it Gal Ed” (Genesis 31:47), and apparently, it is rescued, even though there are not eighty-five letters in it. Rav Naḥman answered him: That is no proof, as when that baraita was taught, it was in a case where the Aramaic verse is counted to complete the total of eighty-five letters, but it is not independently significant.
This conversation was generated with DuckDuckGo AI Chat (https://duck.ai) using OpenAI's GPT-4o mini Model.
====================
User prompt 1 of 3 - 10/8/2024, 3:07:57 AM:
SAVING SOMETHING THAT IS NOT A PROPER SEFER
(a)
(Beraisa): [Written] Berachos and Kemi'im, even though they have letters [of Hash-m's name] and verses from many Parshiyos, may not be saved from a fire, one must let them burn;
1.
This is why Chachamim said that one who writes Berachos is like one who burns Torah.
2.
A case occurred, people told R. Yishmael about someone who was writing Berachos. When R. Yishmael was ascending a ladder [to inspect], the man sensed this, and stashed loads of them in a flask of water.
3.
R. Yishmael: You will be punished more for this [putting them in water] than for writing them!
(b)
Question (Reish Galusa): If they were written in Lashon ha'Kodesh in yellow dye, red dye, sap or vitriol, do we save them?
1.
We ask according to Rav Huna and Rav Chisda.
2.
Perhaps Rav Huna forbids saving only when they are written in other languages, but he agrees here, for they are in Lashon ha'Kodesh;
3.
Perhaps Rav Chisda permits saving only when they are written in ink, for they will last, but he agrees here, for they will not last!
(c)
Answer (Rabah bar Rav Huna): We may not save them.
(d)
Reish Galusa: But Rav Hamnuna taught a Beraisa that permits!
(e)
Rabah bar Rav Huna: If a Beraisa permits, I retract.
(f)
Question: Which Beraisa permits?
(g)
Answer (Rav Ashi - Beraisa): The only difference between Megilah [Esther] and [other] Seforim is that Seforim may be written in any language, but Megilah may be written only in Ashuris, in a Sefer, in ink.
(h)
Question (Rav Huna bar Chaluv): If a Sefer Torah [is worn] and does not have 85 intact letters, like the Parashah "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a ha'Aron" may we save it from a fire? (Ran - he asks according to Rebbi (below), who considers this Parashah itself to be a Sefer. Rashba - Rav Huna bar Chaluv knew the Beraisa (o) which requires 85 - he asked because he thought that Beraisa (j) argues with it.)
1.
Rav Nachman: Why don't you ask about saving Parashas "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a ha'Aron", itself, if it is missing a letter?
2.
Rav Huna: Since that Parashah has Hash-m's name, surely we save it even if less than 85 letters remain - I ask about when [less than 85] letters remain [without Hash-m's name].
(i)
Answer (Rav Nachman): One may not save it.
(j)
Question (Beraisa): If Targum (words in Aramaic) were written like Mikra (in Lashon ha'Kodesh), or vice-versa, or if it was written in Ivris, we may save it from a fire - there is no need to say that we may save Targum in Sefer Ezra, Daniel or the Torah (where the text itself is Aramaic)!
1.
Question: Where do we find Targum in the Torah?
2.
Answer: [Lavan called Gal Ed] "Yegar Sahadusa".
3.
We save it, even though it is less than 85 letters!
(k)
Answer: The Beraisa teaches that Targum can complete the Shi'ur of 85 letters.
(l)
Question: Must the 85 letters be near each other, or may they be scattered?
(m)
Answer #1 (Rav Huna): They must be near each other.
(n)
Answer #2 (Rav Chisda): They may be scattered.
(o)
Question (Beraisa): If 85 intact letters can be found in a deteriorated Sefer Torah, like Parashas "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a ha'Aron", we may save it from a fire; if not, not.
1.
['Can be found' connotes that they are scattered] - Rav Huna is refuted.
(p)
Answer (Rav Chisda, on behalf of Rav Huna): The letters are in words (the argument is about scattered letters that do not form words).
=============
clearly explain teh sugya logically and the arguments
GPT-4o mini:
The sugya you presented discusses the halachic (Jewish legal) considerations regarding the saving of texts that contain sacred names or verses from a fire, particularly focusing on the status of various writings and their preservation. Here’s a logical breakdown of the arguments and discussions presented in the text:
### 1. **General Principle:**
- **Berachos and Kemi'im**: These are texts that contain blessings and other sacred writings. The Beraisa states that even though they contain letters of Hash-m's name and verses, they should not be saved from a fire; they must be allowed to burn. This is because they are not considered a proper Sefer (sacred text) like a Sefer Torah.
### 2. **Chachamim's View:**
- The Chachamim (Sages) equate writing Berachos to burning a Torah scroll, emphasizing the seriousness of treating sacred texts with respect.
### 3. **Case of R. Yishmael:**
- R. Yishmael encounters someone writing Berachos and warns that hiding them in water is worse than writing them, indicating that the act of writing such texts is already problematic.
### 4. **Reish Galusa's Question:**
- Reish Galusa questions whether texts written in Lashon ha'Kodesh (the Holy Language, Hebrew) using various dyes should be saved. This raises a debate about the status of these writings based on their language and medium.
### 5. **Rav Huna vs. Rav Chisda:**
- **Rav Huna**: May hold that saving is only forbidden for texts in other languages, implying that Lashon ha'Kodesh might be treated differently.
- **Rav Chisda**: Suggests that saving is only permitted for texts written in ink, as they are more durable.
### 6. **Rabah bar Rav Huna's Conclusion:**
- He concludes that these texts may not be saved, but Reish Galusa counters with a Beraisa that permits saving, leading Rabah to retract his statement.
### 7. **Beraisa on Megilah vs. Seforim:**
- A Beraisa distinguishes between Megilah (the scroll of Esther) and other Seforim, stating that Megilah must be written in Ashuris script, in a Sefer, and in ink, while other Seforim can be written in any language.
### 8. **Rav Huna bar Chaluv's Inquiry:**
- He questions whether a Sefer Torah that is worn and lacks 85 intact letters can be saved. This is based on a Beraisa that requires 85 letters for a text to be considered a valid Sefer.
### 9. **Rav Nachman's Response:**
- Rav Nachman asserts that one cannot save a Sefer Torah that is missing letters, but Rav Huna argues that since the specific Parashah contains Hash-m's name, it should be saved regardless.
### 10. **Targum and Mikra:**
- A Beraisa states that if Targum (Aramaic translation) is written like Mikra (Hebrew text), it can be saved. This leads to a discussion about the presence of Targum in the Torah, specifically referencing Lavan's words "Yegar Sahadusa."
### 11. **85 Letters Requirement:**
- The sugya discusses whether the 85 letters must be contiguous or can be scattered. Rav Huna argues they must be near each other, while Rav Chisda contends they can be scattered.
### 12. **Final Clarification:**
- A Beraisa states that if 85 intact letters can be found in a deteriorated Sefer Torah, it can be saved. This implies that the letters can be scattered, which refutes Rav Huna's position.
### Conclusion:
The sugya navigates complex halachic principles regarding the preservation of sacred texts, emphasizing the importance of language, medium, and the presence of Hash-m's name. The discussions reflect a deep concern for the sanctity of these texts and the conditions under which they may be saved from destruction. The arguments between the sages illustrate the nuances in Jewish law regarding what constitutes a proper Sefer and the criteria for preservation.
--------------------
User prompt 2 of 3 - 10/8/2024, 3:09:18 AM:
make a comparison table all factors
GPT-4o mini:
Here’s a comparison table summarizing the key factors discussed in the sugya regarding the saving of sacred texts from a fire:
| **Factor** | **Description** | **Rav Huna's View** | **Rav Chisda's View** | **Rabah bar Rav Huna's Conclusion** | **Reish Galusa's Input** |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| **Type of Text** | Berachos and Kemi'im (blessings) | Not saved from fire | Not explicitly stated | Not saved | Questions if they can be saved |
| **Language** | Written in Lashon ha'Kodesh (Hebrew) | May allow saving if in Lashon ha'Kodesh | Permits saving only if written in ink | Not saved | Questions if saving is allowed |
| **Medium** | Written in various dyes (yellow, red, sap, vitriol) | May allow saving if in Lashon ha'Kodesh | Permits saving only if written in ink | Not saved | Questions if saving is allowed |
| **Megilah vs. Seforim** | Megilah must be in Ashuris, in a Sefer, in ink; Seforim can be in any language | Not directly addressed | Not directly addressed | Not saved | Not directly addressed |
| **Minimum Letters Requirement**| 85 intact letters for a Sefer Torah to be saved | Must have 85 letters intact | Must have 85 letters intact | Not saved | Not directly addressed |
| **Presence of Hash-m's Name** | If a text contains Hash-m's name, it may be saved regardless of letter count | Yes, it should be saved | Not explicitly stated | Not saved | Not directly addressed |
| **Scattered vs. Contiguous** | Whether the 85 letters must be near each other or can be scattered | Must be near each other | Can be scattered | Not saved | Not directly addressed |
| **Targum and Mikra** | Targum written like Mikra can be saved | Not directly addressed | Not directly addressed | Not saved | Not directly addressed |
| **Final Conclusion** | If 85 letters can be found in a deteriorated Sefer Torah, it can be saved | Not saved | Not saved | Not saved | Not directly addressed |
### Notes:
- The table summarizes the various factors discussed in the sugya, highlighting the differing views of Rav Huna, Rav Chisda, and Rabah bar Rav Huna, as well as the input from Reish Galusa.
- Some factors may not have explicit positions from all sages, as indicated in the table.
- The focus is on the conditions under which sacred texts may or may not be saved from a fire, reflecting the nuances of Jewish law.
============================================
1)
THE PARSHA OF VA'YEHI BINSO'A
(a)
(Beraisa): There are Simanim (an inverted Nun before and after) Parashas "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a ha'Aron", to teach that this is not its proper place;
(b)
Rebbi says, there are Simanim because this Parashah itself is a Sefer.
(c)
Question: Like which Tana is the following teaching?
1.
(R. Shmuel bar Nachmani): "Chatzvah Amudeha Shiv'ah" - these are the seven Seforim of the Torah.
(d)
Answer: It is like Rebbi (from the beginning of Bamidbar until "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a", Parashas "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a", and the rest of Bamidbar count like three Seforim).
(e)
Question: Who is the Tana that argues with Rebbi?
(f)
Answer: It is R. Shimon ben Gamliel:
1.
(Beraisa - R. Shimon ben Gamliel): Ultimately, Parashas "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a" will be uprooted from here and written in its proper place;
2.
It was written here to separate between two punishments of Benei Yisrael - the latter was "Va'Yhi ha'Am k'Mis'onanim" (they complained about the journey, and Hash-m killed some of them] ;
3.
The former was "Va'Yis'u me'Har Hash-m";
i.
(Rav Chama bar Chanina): They veered from Hash-m (Rashi - they started lusting for meat (even though this is written after Va'Yhi ha'Am k'Mis'onanim. Tosfos - they were eager to leave Sinai lest they get more Mitzvos. Maharsha - we expound this, for it is not called Har Hash-m anywhere else. The punishment was that the Aron was distanced three days from Benei Yisrael, corresponding to three days in which they did not learn.)
(g)
Question: What is the proper place for this Parashah?
(h)
Answer (Rav Ashi): It belongs by the Degalim (grouping of the Shevatim into four sets of three).
=============
Kindly give prades explanation of thius sugya
GPT-4o mini:
The sugya you presented discusses the placement and significance of the Parashah "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a ha'Aron" within the Torah, particularly in the context of its proper location and the implications of its current placement. Here’s a detailed breakdown of the key points and arguments:
### 1. **Simanim (Inverted Nuns):**
- The Beraisa states that the Parashah "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a ha'Aron" is marked with inverted Nuns before and after it. This serves as a sign (Siman) indicating that this Parashah is not in its proper place within the Torah.
### 2. **Rebbi's View:**
- Rebbi argues that the presence of the inverted Nuns signifies that this Parashah itself is considered a Sefer (a sacred text). This implies that it holds a significant status, akin to a separate book within the Torah.
### 3. **R. Shmuel bar Nachmani's Teaching:**
- R. Shmuel bar Nachmani mentions "Chatzvah Amudeha Shiv'ah," referring to the seven Seforim of the Torah. The question arises as to which Tana (sage) this teaching aligns with.
### 4. **Connection to Rebbi:**
- The answer is that this teaching aligns with Rebbi, who counts the sections of the Torah in a specific way: from the beginning of Bamidbar until "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a," the Parashah itself, and then the rest of Bamidbar, which together count as three separate Seforim.
### 5. **R. Shimon ben Gamliel's Argument:**
- R. Shimon ben Gamliel argues against Rebbi, stating that ultimately, "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a" will be uprooted from its current position and placed in its proper location. He explains that it was written in its current place to serve as a separation between two punishments that befell the Benei Yisrael (the Children of Israel).
### 6. **Context of the Punishments:**
- The first punishment is linked to the verse "Va'Yis'u me'Har Hash-m," indicating that the people distanced themselves from Hash-m. This is interpreted in various ways:
- **Rav Chama bar Chanina**: They began to lust for meat, leading to their punishment.
- **Tosfos**: They were eager to leave Sinai to avoid receiving more Mitzvos (commandments).
- **Maharsha**: The term "Har Hash-m" is expounded upon, suggesting that the punishment involved the Ark (Aron) being distanced from the people for three days, corresponding to a period in which they did not engage in learning.
### 7. **Proper Placement of the Parashah:**
- The question arises regarding the proper place for the Parashah "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a." Rav Ashi answers that it should be placed among the Degalim, which refers to the grouping of the Shevatim (tribes) into four sets of three.
### Conclusion:
The sugya explores the significance of the Parashah "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a ha'Aron" and its placement within the Torah. The inverted Nuns serve as a marker indicating its improper location, while the discussions between Rebbi and R. Shimon ben Gamliel highlight differing views on the status and future placement of this Parashah. The context of the punishments faced by the Benei Yisrael provides a deeper understanding of why this Parashah is situated where it is and the lessons derived from it. The final resolution suggests that its proper placement is alongside the Degalim, emphasizing the organization of the tribes and their relationship with Hash-m.
--------------------
User prompt 5 of 5 - 10/8/2024, 3:21:44 AM:
TOSFOS DH PURANUS
תוספות ד"ה פורענות
(SUMMARY: Rashi and Tosfos argue regarding the nature of the punishment.)
פי' בקונטרס שמאז התחילו לשאול בשר
(a)
Explanation #1: Rashi explains that this is when they started to ask for meat.
ואומר ר"י דאין נ"ל כן אלא פורענות ראשונה כדאמר במדרש (ילמדנו) ויסעו שנסעו מהר סיני דרך שלשת ימים כתינוק היוצא מבית הספר שבורח לו והולך לו כך היו בורחים מהר סיני דרך שלשת ימים לפי שלמדו הרבה תורה בסיני אמר הקב"ה נסמוך פורענות לפורענות לאו אלא נפסוק פרשת ויהי בנסוע הארון
(b)
Explanation #2: The Ri says that he does not think this is correct. Rather, the first punishment refers to what is said in the Medrash, "And they traveled - they traveled away from Har Sinai for three days like a child who leaves school, he runs away and then he goes away. Similarly, they ran away from Har Sinai for three days because they learned a lot of Torah at Har Sinai. Hash-m remarked, "Should I put punishment next to punishment?! No. Rather, I will interrupt between these two incidents with the Parshah, "va'Yehi b'Nesoa ha'Aron."
GPT-4o mini:
The discussion in Tosfos regarding the term "פורענות" (punishment) presents two interpretations about the nature of the punishment that the Benei Yisrael (Children of Israel) faced after leaving Har Sinai (Mount Sinai). Here’s a breakdown of the key points from the text:
### Summary of the Arguments:
| **Aspect** | **Rashi's Explanation** | **Ri's Explanation** |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Nature of the Punishment** | The punishment is linked to the moment when the Benei Yisrael began to ask for meat. | The first punishment refers to the three days of travel away from Har Sinai. |
| **Context of the Punishment** | This asking for meat is seen as a direct cause of divine displeasure. | The three-day journey is likened to a child running away from school, indicating a lack of commitment. |
| **Medrash Reference** | Rashi does not cite a specific Medrash in this context. | The Ri references a Medrash that describes the behavior of the Benei Yisrael during their journey. |
| **Divine Response** | Implies a direct response to the people's request for meat. | Suggests that Hash-m decided to separate the two punishments with the Parashah "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a ha'Aron." |
| **Purpose of the Interruption**| Not explicitly stated in Rashi's explanation. | The interruption serves to prevent the two punishments from being too closely linked. |
### Detailed Explanation:
1. **Rashi's Explanation:**
- Rashi interprets the term "פורענות" as referring to the punishment that occurred when the Benei Yisrael began to ask for meat. This request is seen as a significant turning point that displeased Hash-m, leading to a divine response.
2. **Ri's Explanation:**
- The Ri disagrees with Rashi's interpretation. He believes that the first punishment refers to the behavior of the Benei Yisrael as they traveled away from Har Sinai for three days. He likens their actions to a child who leaves school and runs away, suggesting a lack of seriousness or commitment to their learning and spiritual growth.
- The Ri cites a Medrash that illustrates this behavior, emphasizing that the Benei Yisrael were distancing themselves from the teachings they received at Sinai. Hash-m, observing this, decided to separate the two punishments (the request for meat and the consequences of their behavior) by placing the Parashah "Va'Yhi bi'Nso'a ha'Aron" in between them. This separation serves to highlight the gravity of their actions and the need for a pause before the next punishment.
### Conclusion:
The discussion in Tosfos highlights a significant debate between Rashi and the Ri regarding the nature and timing of the punishments faced by the Benei Yisrael. Rashi focuses on the immediate consequence of their request for meat, while the Ri emphasizes the behavioral aspect of their journey away from Har Sinai. The Ri's interpretation suggests a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the people's actions and divine response, advocating for a separation between the two punishments to underscore their seriousness.
=============================prohibition against reading Kisvei HaKodesh on Shabbat
===========================
User prompt 8 of 13 - 10/8/2024, 4:30:18 AM:
kindly explain this sugya:
4)
THE PROHIBITION AGAINS READING KISVEI HA'KODESH ON SHABBOS
(a)
(Mishnah): We may not read in them [for this draws people away from the Beis Medrash].
(b)
(Rav): It is forbidden only at the time of [the lecture in] the Beis Medrash - at other times one may read them;
(c)
(Shmuel): It is forbidden even at other times.
(d)
Objection: Shmuel was the Chacham of Neharda'a, and in Neharda'a they would learn Kesuvim on Shabbos afternoon!
(e)
Answer #1 - Correction: Rather, Rav forbids only in a Beis Medrash [where a Chacham teaches] - in other places he permits;
1.
(Shmuel): At the time the Chacham teaches, it is forbidden in the Beis Medrash and outside; when he is not teaching it is permitted everywhere.
2.
This is consistent with the custom in Neharda'a to learn Kesuvim on Shabbos afternoon.
(f)
Answer #2 (Rav Ashi): The original version was correct - Shmuel holds like R. Nechemyah:
1.
(Beraisa): Even though Chachamim forbid reading Kisvei ha'Kodesh, one may expound them; if one needs to see a verse, he may bring the Sefer and read it;
2.
R. Nechemyah says, they forbade reading Kisvei ha'Kodesh in order that people will reason - if it is forbidden to read Kisvei ha'Kodesh, all the more so secular documents are forbidden!
GPT-4o mini:
The sugya you presented discusses the prohibition against reading sacred texts (Kisvei HaKodesh) on Shabbat, focusing on the differing opinions of the sages regarding when and where this prohibition applies. Below is a detailed explanation of the sugya, including the key points and implications.
### Explanation of the Sugya:
1. **Mishnah**: The Mishnah states that reading from Kisvei HaKodesh (sacred texts) is prohibited on Shabbat because it may draw people away from the Beis Medrash (study hall). This establishes the foundational concern that engaging with sacred texts outside of the proper context may lead to a lack of focus on communal learning and worship.
2. **Rav's Opinion**: Rav argues that the prohibition against reading Kisvei HaKodesh applies only during the time of a lecture in the Beis Medrash. Outside of that time, it is permissible to read these texts. This suggests that Rav sees the prohibition as context-dependent, allowing for personal study when it does not interfere with communal learning.
3. **Shmuel's Opinion**: In contrast, Shmuel holds that it is forbidden to read Kisvei HaKodesh even at times when there is no lecture taking place. His stricter stance emphasizes the importance of maintaining a clear boundary around sacred texts, suggesting that any reading could detract from the sanctity of Shabbat and the communal focus on learning.
4. **Objection to Shmuel**: The text raises an objection to Shmuel's position by noting that in Neharda'a, where Shmuel was a prominent sage, it was customary to learn Kesuvim (writings) on Shabbat afternoon. This practice seems to contradict Shmuel's prohibition, indicating that there may be exceptions or differing customs in various communities.
5. **Answer #1 - Correction**: The first answer suggests a correction to the understanding of Rav's position. It clarifies that Rav forbids reading Kisvei HaKodesh only in a Beis Medrash where a Chacham (sage) is teaching. In other places, he permits reading. This distinction allows for the practice in Neharda'a, where learning Kesuvim on Shabbat afternoon is accepted.
6. **Shmuel's Consistency**: Shmuel's view is consistent with the idea that when a Chacham is teaching, it is forbidden to read Kisvei HaKodesh both in the Beis Medrash and outside of it. However, when there is no teaching, it is permitted everywhere. This reflects a nuanced understanding of the communal learning environment and the role of the sage.
7. **Answer #2 (Rav Ashi)**: Rav Ashi presents a second answer, asserting that the original version of the discussion is correct. He explains that Shmuel's position aligns with that of Rabbi Nechemyah, who states that while the Chachamim (sages) forbid reading Kisvei HaKodesh, one may still expound upon them. If someone needs to see a specific verse, they may bring the Sefer (book) and read it.
8. **Rabbi Nechemyah's Reasoning**: Rabbi Nechemyah's reasoning for the prohibition is that it serves as a cautionary measure. If it is forbidden to read Kisvei HaKodesh, people might reason that secular documents should also be forbidden. This highlights a concern for maintaining the sanctity of sacred texts and preventing any potential dilution of their importance.
User prompt 9 of 13 - 10/8/2024, 4:31:30 AM:
kindly produce a factors and opinions on this sugya
User prompt 10 of 13 - 10/8/2024, 4:33:42 AM:
what about rav ashi
GPT-4o mini:
Certainly! Let's include Rav Ashi's perspective in the factors and opinions table regarding the prohibition against reading Kisvei HaKodesh on Shabbat. Here’s the updated table:
| **Factor** | **Rav** | **Shmuel** | **Rabbi Nechemyah** | **Rav Ashi** |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| **General Prohibition** | Prohibits reading Kisvei HaKodesh only during a lecture in the Beis Medrash. | Prohibits reading Kisvei HaKodesh at all times, even outside of a lecture. | Supports the prohibition but allows for expounding and reading specific verses when necessary. | Agrees with the original version that Shmuel holds like Rabbi Nechemyah. |
| **Context of Prohibition** | Context-dependent; permissible outside of lecture times. | Absolute prohibition regardless of context. | Prohibition serves as a cautionary measure. | Clarifies that Shmuel's view aligns with Rabbi Nechemyah's reasoning. |
| **Community Practice** | Allows for reading in other places, not just the Beis Medrash. | Consistent with the prohibition everywhere, including outside the Beis Medrash. | Acknowledges the need for caution regarding secular texts based on the prohibition of sacred texts. | Supports the idea that expounding is allowed, thus accommodating local customs. |
| **Reasoning Behind the Prohibition**| Concern that reading may draw people away from communal learning. | Emphasizes the need to maintain the sanctity of sacred texts. | Aims to prevent the reasoning that if sacred texts are forbidden, secular texts should also be forbidden. | Reinforces the cautionary approach of Rabbi Nechemyah regarding the reading of sacred texts. |
| **Response to Neharda'a Custom** | Adjusts interpretation to allow for Neharda'a's practice of learning Kesuvim on Shabbat afternoon. | Maintains that the prohibition applies even in Neharda'a, despite their customs. | Aligns with the idea that expounding is allowed, thus accommodating local customs. | Confirms that the original understanding of Shmuel's position is correct, aligning with Rabbi Nechemyah. |
| **Implications for Learning** | Encourages individual study when it does not interfere with communal obligations. | Discourages any reading that could detract from the focus on communal learning. | Highlights the importance of maintaining the integrity of sacred texts while allowing for necessary learning. | Emphasizes the need to balance the prohibition with the practical needs of the community. |
User prompt 13 of 13 - 10/8/2024, 4:36:30 AM:
Give teh entore SMT formulation in a succinct way and highlught whether rav ashi makes it solvabel or not
GPT-4o mini:
To formulate the sugya regarding the prohibition against reading Kisvei HaKodesh on Shabbat as a Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) problem, we can define the relevant propositions and constraints succinctly. Here’s how it can be structured:
### SMT Formulation:
**Variables:**
- \( R \): Reading Kisvei HaKodesh is permitted during a lecture in the Beis Medrash.
- \( S \): Reading Kisvei HaKodesh is prohibited at all times.
- \( N \): Expounding on Kisvei HaKodesh is permitted.
- \( C \): Local customs (like those in Neharda'a) allow for reading Kesuvim on Shabbat afternoon.
**Clauses:**
1. **Mishnah Clause**: \( \neg R \) (Reading is prohibited to maintain focus on communal learning).
2. **Rav's Clause**: \( R \lor \neg S \) (Reading is permitted outside of lecture times).
3. **Shmuel's Clause**: \( S \) (Reading is prohibited at all times).
4. **Objection Clause**: \( C \) (In Neharda'a, they learn Kesuvim on Shabbat afternoon).
5. **Rabbi Nechemyah's Clause**: \( S \rightarrow N \) (If reading is prohibited, expounding is permitted under certain conditions).
### Logical Relationships:
- From the Mishnah and Shmuel's Clause, we have a potential contradiction if both \( S \) and \( R \) are true.
- Rav's Clause introduces a condition where \( R \) can be true if \( S \) is false.
- The Objection Clause indicates that local customs may allow for exceptions to the general prohibition.
### Solvability:
- **Rav Ashi's Contribution**: By clarifying that Shmuel's position aligns with Rabbi Nechemyah, allowing for expounding on Kisvei HaKodesh, Rav Ashi introduces a pathway to resolve the contradictions. Specifically, he allows for the coexistence of \( S \) and \( N \) under certain conditions, which can lead to a solution that respects both the prohibition and the need for engagement with sacred texts.
### Conclusion:
Rav Ashi's clarification makes the SMT formulation solvable by providing a logical framework that accommodates different opinions and local customs. His input allows for the integration of the various clauses, enabling a resolution that maintains the integrity of the halachic system while addressing the practical needs of the community. Thus, the SMT problem can be satisfied under the conditions set forth by Rav Ashi.
מַאן תַּנָּא דִּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי — רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הוּא. דְּתַנְיָא: רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: עֲתִידָה פָּרָשָׁה זוֹ שֶׁתֵּיעָקֵר מִכָּאן וְתִכָּתֵב בִּמְקוֹמָהּ. וְלָמָּה כְּתָבָהּ כָּאן — כְּדֵי לְהַפְסִיק בֵּין פּוּרְעָנוּת רִאשׁוֹנָה לְפוּרְעָנוּת שְׁנִיָּיה. פּוּרְעָנוּת שְׁנִיָּיה מַאי הִיא — ״וַיְהִי הָעָם כְּמִתְאוֹנְנִים״. פּוּרְעָנוּת רִאשׁוֹנָה — ״וַיִּסְעוּ מֵהַר ה׳״, וְאָמַר רַבִּי חָמָא בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: שֶׁסָּרוּ מֵאַחֲרֵי ה׳. וְהֵיכָן מְקוֹמָהּ? אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: בַּדְּגָלִים.
Who is the tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? It is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In the future, this portion will be uprooted from here, where it appears, and will be written in its proper place. And why was it written here, even though it discusses the travels of the children of Israel, and the portion before it does not? It is in order to demarcate between the first punishment and the second punishment. What is the second punishment that appears immediately afterward? It is the verse: “And the people complained wickedly in God’s ears, and God heard and became angry, and the fire of God burned in them and it consumed the edge of the camp” (Numbers 11:1). What is the first punishment? It is the verse: “And they traveled from the mountain of God [mehar Hashem] for three days” (Numbers 10:33), and Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: That they turned from after God [me’aḥarei Hashem] and hurriedly fled Mount Sinai. The Gemara asks: And if so, where is the proper place for this paragraph? Rav Ashi said: In the portion of the flags, where there is a description of the manner in which the Jewish people traveled through the desert.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם כְּדַאֲמַרַן מֵעִיקָּרָא, וּשְׁמוּאֵל כְּרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה. דְּתַנְיָא: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרוּ כִּתְבֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ אֵין קוֹרִין בָּהֶן — אֲבָל שׁוֹנִין בָּהֶן וְדוֹרְשִׁין בָּהֶן. נִצְרַךְ לְפָסוּק — מֵבִיא וְרוֹאֶה בּוֹ. אָמַר רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרוּ כִּתְבֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ אֵין קוֹרִין בָּהֶן — כְּדֵי שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ: בְּכִתְבֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ אֵין קוֹרִין, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן בְּשִׁטְרֵי הֶדְיוֹטוֹת.
Rav Ashi said: Actually, the dispute is as we stated initially, and Shmuel said what he said in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya. As it was taught in a baraita: Although the Sages said with regard to sacred writings that they may not be read on Shabbat, one may study the midrash on them and teach them before the congregation; if one requires a verse that is written in the Writings, he brings a book and looks in it. Rabbi Neḥemya said: Why did they say that sacred writings are not read on Shabbat? So that people will say: Sacred writings may not be read, all the more so that is the case with ordinary documents, i.e., contracts and letters. If so, according to Rabbi Neḥemya, reading any sacred writings on Shabbat is prohibited so that people will refrain from reading non-sacred documents on Shabbat. It was not prohibited to encourage attendance the study hall. Shmuel himself does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya.
===================================
The Talmudic discussion regarding the flaying of the Korban Pesach on Shabbat and the case of the Torah scrolls
GPT-4o mini:
The sugya (Talmudic discussion) you provided revolves around the laws of saving items on Shabbat, particularly in the context of the Korban Pesach (Passover sacrifice) and the flaying process associated with it. Here’s a clearer breakdown of the key points and issues involved:
### 1. **Saving Items on Shabbat**
- **Mishnah (a)**: It states that one is allowed to save the case of a Sefer Torah or Tefilin along with the Sefer or Tefilin, even if there are coins inside the case. This indicates a leniency in saving items that are essential for religious observance.
- **Question (b)**: The discussion then raises the question of where one can take these items to save them.
- **Answers (c) and (d)**:
- **Answer #1**: You can take them to a Mavuy that is not Mefulash (an alleyway that is closed on one end).
- **Answer #2 (Ben Beseira)**: You can take them even to a Mavuy Mefulash (an open alleyway).
### 2. **Flaying the Korban Pesach on Shabbat**
- **Context (e)**: The discussion shifts to the Korban Pesach, particularly when Erev Pesach (the day before Passover) falls on Shabbat. R. Yishmael permits flaying the Korban Pesach only to the extent necessary for the Avodah (service), meaning only what is needed to remove the Eimurim (parts of the animal that are burned on the altar).
- **Chachamim's Opinion (f)**: The Chachamim (Sages) argue that the entire Korban Pesach can be flayed on Shabbat. This raises the question of why they allow more than what is strictly necessary.
### 3. **Rationale Behind Flaying Entirely**
- **Rabah bar bar Chanah (g)**: He explains that the principle "Kol Po'al Hash-m la'Ma'anehu" means that we do whatever is necessary to honor God. This implies that honoring the Korban Pesach is a valid reason to allow more extensive actions on Shabbat.
- **Questions and Answers (h - j)**:
- **How does flaying it entirely honor God?**
- **Answer #1 (Rav Yosef)**: Flaying the entire animal cools the meat, preventing it from rotting.
- **Answer #2 (Rabah)**: It would be dishonorable for the sacred offerings to be left half-flayed, resembling a carcass.
### 4. **Differences in Rationale**
- The discussion continues to explore the differences between the two answers regarding the necessity of flaying the entire animal.
- If the animal were on a gold table, it might not be considered dishonorable, but there would still be a concern about it rotting.
- Conversely, on a day with a north wind, there would be no concern about rotting, but it would still be dishonorable to leave it half-flayed.
### 5. **R. Yishmael's Interpretation**
- **R. Yishmael's Position (k - m)**: He interprets the principle to mean that one should not remove the Eimurim before flaying the animal, as this could lead to hairs sticking to the Eimurim, which is undesirable.
### 6. **Chachamim's Response to R. Yishmael**
- **Rav Chisda's Argument (p)**: The Chachamim counter R. Yishmael by saying that if it is permissible to save the case of a Sefer with the Sefer, then it is even more permissible to flay the entire Korban Pesach.
- **Objection (q)**: However, they argue that one cannot learn from the case of the Sefer because moving the case is only a rabbinic prohibition (Tiltul), while flaying is a biblical prohibition (Melachah).
- **Rav Ashi's Clarification (r)**: He suggests that the disagreement is about the nature of Tiltul and Melachah. The Chachamim believe that if saving the case is allowed, then moving the skin (which is still attached to the meat) should also be allowed.
- **Final Objection (s)**: The final objection states that one cannot learn from the Sefer case because the case serves a permitted item, while the skin serves a forbidden item (the Eimurim).
--------------------
User prompt 4 of 9 - 10/9/2024, 2:12:12 AM:
add rav chsida opionion as a columns to teh tabel
GPT-4o mini:
Here’s the updated comparison table that includes Rav Chisda's opinion as an additional column:
| **Aspect** | **R. Yishmael's Opinion** | **Chachamim's Opinion** | **Rav Chisda's Opinion** |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| **General Principle** | Allows only what is necessary for the Avodah. | Permits flaying the entire Korban Pesach on Shabbat. | Supports the Chachamim's view that entire flaying is permitted. |
| **Reason for Flaying** | Only what is needed to remove the Eimurim (parts for burning).| Entire flaying is necessary to honor the Korban. | If saving the case of a Sefer with the Sefer is allowed, then flaying entirely is also allowed. |
| **Supporting Principle** | "Kol Po'al Hash-m la'Ma'anehu" - do what is necessary to honor God. | Same principle, but interprets it to allow more extensive actions. | Agrees with the principle but applies it to justify flaying entirely. |
| **Concerns** | Concern for hairs sticking to the Eimurim if removed before flaying. | Concern for the meat rotting and dishonor if left half-flayed. | Emphasizes the need to honor the Korban by allowing full flaying. |
| **Example of Dishonor** | If the animal is left half-flayed, it resembles a carcass. | Dishonor if Kodshei Hash-m (sacred offerings) are treated improperly. | Same concern for dishonor; supports full flaying to avoid this. |
| **Response to R. Yishmael** | - | Rav Chisda: If we can save the case of a Sefer with the Sefer, we can flay entirely. | - |
| **Objection to Comparison** | Moving the case is a rabbinic prohibition (Tiltul). | Flaying is a biblical prohibition (Melachah). | - |
| **Final Argument** | - | Rav Ashi: They argue about Tiltul and Melachah; if saving the case is allowed, moving the skin should also be allowed. | - |
| **Final Objection** | - | Cannot learn from the Sefer case; the skin is a Bosis for something forbidden. | - |
This table now includes Rav Chisda's opinion, providing a more comprehensive view of the discussion surrounding the flaying of the Korban Pesach on Shabbat.
--------------------
User prompt 5 of 9 - 10/9/2024, 2:13:27 AM:
what talmudic hermeuntics aree used for this werd copairsion orban pesach and casing of torah scroll juxtapositon
GPT-4o mini:
The Talmudic discussion regarding the flaying of the Korban Pesach on Shabbat and the case of the Torah scroll involves several key hermeneutical principles and methods of interpretation. Here are some of the main Talmudic hermeneutics used in this comparison:
### 1. **Gezerah Shavah (Analogy)**
- **Definition**: This principle involves drawing a comparison between two similar cases based on a shared term or concept found in both contexts.
- **Application**: The Chachamim use the case of saving the Sefer Torah and its case to argue that if it is permissible to save the case of a Sefer with the Sefer itself, then it is even more permissible to flay the entire Korban Pesach. They draw an analogy between the leniency shown in saving sacred items and the necessity of honoring the Korban.
### 2. **Kal Vachomer (A Fortiori Argument)**
- **Definition**: This is a form of reasoning that suggests if a leniency applies in a less severe case, it should certainly apply in a more severe case.
- **Application**: The Chachamim argue that if saving the case of a Sefer (which involves a rabbinic prohibition) is allowed, then flaying the entire Korban Pesach (which is a matter of honoring a sacred offering) should certainly be permitted, as it is a more significant act of reverence.
### 3. **Siyag (Protective Fence)**
- **Definition**: This principle involves creating additional prohibitions to safeguard against transgressing a biblical commandment.
- **Application**: R. Yishmael's position reflects a concern for maintaining the sanctity of the Korban Pesach and preventing any dishonor. His interpretation serves as a protective measure to ensure that the Eimurim are treated with the utmost respect.
### 4. **Contextual Interpretation**
- **Definition**: Understanding the broader context of a law or principle by examining its application in various scenarios.
- **Application**: The discussion considers the specific circumstances of Shabbat and the unique status of the Korban Pesach, which is tied to the observance of Passover. The context of the holiday and the significance of the sacrifice inform the interpretations and rulings.
### 5. **Contradictory Evidence and Resolution**
- **Definition**: Addressing apparent contradictions in the text or between different opinions and finding a resolution.
- **Application**: The objections raised against the comparisons (e.g., the difference between moving a case and flaying an animal) demonstrate the Talmudic method of grappling with conflicting interpretations and seeking clarity. The responses to these objections illustrate the dynamic nature of Talmudic discourse.
### 6. **Principle of Honor (Kavod)**
- **Definition**: The importance of honoring sacred items and practices in Jewish law.
- **Application**: Both R. Yishmael and the Chachamim emphasize the need to treat the Korban Pesach with honor. The discussion revolves around what actions are necessary to maintain that honor, reflecting a broader principle in Jewish law regarding the treatment of sacred objects.
### Conclusion
These hermeneutical principles illustrate the complexity of Talmudic reasoning and the careful consideration given to the interplay between different laws and their applications. The juxtaposition of the Korban Pesach and the case of the Torah scroll serves as a rich ground for exploring these principles, highlighting the depth of Jewish legal thought and the importance of context, analogy, and honor in the interpretation of religious law.
--------------------
User prompt 6 of 9 - 10/9/2024, 2:14:05 AM:
trave succinctly teh reasonign chain of comparison jorban pesach and torah scrolls
GPT-4o mini:
Here’s a succinct reasoning chain for the comparison between the Korban Pesach and the case of the Torah scrolls:
1. **Initial Scenario**: The Mishnah states that one may save the case of a Sefer Torah along with the Sefer itself, even if there are coins inside.
2. **Question Raised**: To what extent can we save items on Shabbat, particularly regarding the Korban Pesach when Erev Pesach falls on Shabbat?
3. **R. Yishmael's Position**:
- Allows only what is necessary for the Avodah (service), meaning only the removal of the Eimurim.
- Concerned about maintaining the sanctity of the Korban and preventing dishonor.
4. **Chachamim's Position**:
- Argue that the entire Korban Pesach can be flayed on Shabbat.
- Use the principle of **Kal Vachomer**: If saving the case of a Sefer (a rabbinic prohibition) is permitted, then flaying the entire Korban (a matter of honoring a sacred offering) should certainly be allowed.
5. **Gezerah Shavah**:
- Draw an analogy between the leniency in saving the Sefer Torah and the necessity of honoring the Korban Pesach.
- Both cases involve sacred items, and the treatment of one can inform the treatment of the other.
6. **Conclusion**: The comparison highlights the importance of honoring sacred offerings and the application of leniencies in Shabbat laws, demonstrating how the principles governing one scenario can be applied to another.
This reasoning chain illustrates the logical flow of the discussion and the connections made between the two cases.
--------------------
User prompt 7 of 9 - 10/9/2024, 2:14:52 AM:
Can you graph this in a maximally informative way
### Mind Map Representation
```plaintext
+---------------------------+
| Initial Scenario |
| Saving the case of a Sefer|
| Torah with the Sefer itself|
| is permitted on Shabbat, |
| even with coins. |
+---------------------------+
|
|
v
+---------------------------+
| Question Raised |
| To what extent can we save|
| items on Shabbat, |
| especially regarding the |
| Korban Pesach on Shabbat? |
+---------------------------+
|
|
v
+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| | |
v v v
+-------------------+ +-------------------+ +-------------------+
| R. Yishmael's | | Chachamim's | | Assumptions |
| Position | | Position | | |
| - Allows only | | - Argue that the | | 1. Both the Sefer |
| what is | | entire Korban | | Torah and |
| necessary for | | Pesach can be | | Korban Pesach |
| the Avodah. | | flayed on Shabbat.| | are sacred |
| - Concerned about | | - Use **Kal | | 2. Honoring |
| maintaining the | | Vachomer**: | | sacred items is |
| sanctity of the | | If saving the | | a fundamental |
| Korban and | | case of a Sefer | | principle. |
| preventing | | (rabbinic) is | | 3. Rabbinic |
| dishonor. | | permitted, then | | prohibitions can |
+-------------------+ | flaying the entire| | be overridden for|
| | Korban (honoring | | the sake of |
| | a sacred offering)| | honoring God. |
| +-------------------+ +-------------------+
| |
| |
v v
+-------------------+ +-------------------+
| Gezerah Shavah | | Conclusion |
| - Draw an analogy | | The comparison |
| between the leniency| | highlights the |
| in saving the Sefer | | importance of |
| Torah and the | | honoring sacred |
| necessity of | | offerings and the |
| honoring the Korban| | application of |
| Pesach. | | leniencies in |
| - Both cases involve | | Shabbat laws, |
| sacred items; | | demonstrating how |
| treatment of one | | principles governing |
| informs the other. | | one scenario apply |
| | | to another. |
+-------------------+ +-------------------+
```
### Explanation of the Mind Map:
- **Initial Scenario**: Establishes the context of saving the Sefer Torah.
- **Question Raised**: Introduces the inquiry about saving items on Shabbat.
- **Branches**:
- **R. Yishmael's Position**: Details his restrictive view based on sanctity.
- **Chachamim's Position**: Presents the lenient view and reasoning.
- **Assumptions**: Lists the underlying assumptions that support the reasoning.
- **Gezerah Shavah**: Illustrates the analogy drawn between the two cases.
- **Conclusion**: Summarizes the implications of the comparison.
Let’s break down the concepts of Tiltul and Melachah, and clarify Rav Chisda's position regarding the objection raised in the discussion.
Key Concepts
Tiltul: This term refers to the act of moving or handling an object. In the context of Shabbat, moving certain items can be prohibited, especially if they are classified as Muktzeh (items that cannot be moved on Shabbat). However, there are leniencies regarding moving items that serve a purpose, especially if they are connected to a mitzvah (commandment).
Melachah: This term refers to the types of work that are prohibited on Shabbat according to Jewish law. Flaying an animal is considered a Melachah because it involves a significant action that is explicitly forbidden on Shabbat.
The Objection
In the discussion, there is an objection to the Chachamim's argument that one can learn from the case of saving a Sefer Torah to the act of flaying the Korban Pesach. The objection is based on the following points:
Different Categories: The objection states that saving the case of a Sefer Torah (which involves Tiltul) is fundamentally different from flaying the Korban Pesach (which is a Melachah). The reasoning is that one cannot derive a leniency in a Melachah from a case of Tiltul because they are governed by different rules.
Bosis for Isur vs. Heter: The objection also points out that in the case of the Sefer Torah, the case serves as a Bosis (support) for both Isur (the coins, which are Muktzeh) and Heter (the Sefer Torah). In contrast, the skin of the Korban Pesach serves only as a Bosis for Isur (the Eimurim), which is not permitted.
Rav Chisda's Clarification
Rav Chisda addresses this objection by suggesting that the objection is based on a misunderstanding of the Chachamim's argument:
Validity of the Argument: Rav Chisda argues that the Chachamim's reasoning is still valid in this context. They are not claiming that moving the skin is the same as saving the case; rather, they are drawing a parallel based on the principle of honoring sacred items.
Tiltul vs. Melachah: He acknowledges that there is a distinction between Tiltul and Melachah, but he emphasizes that the Chachamim's argument can still hold. The objection assumes that the case is not intended for flaying, but the Chachamim are making a broader point about the necessity of honoring the Korban Pesach.
Intention and Action: Rav Chisda's clarification implies that even if the case is not directly intended for flaying, the act of moving the skin for the sake of the meat can still be justified. The focus is on the intent to honor the Korban, which can override the typical restrictions associated with Melachah.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר מָר עוּקְבָא: מַאי אַהְדַּרוּ לֵיהּ חַבְרַיָּיא לְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה? הָכִי קָאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: אִם מַצִּילִין תִּיק הַסֵּפֶר עִם הַסֵּפֶר, לֹא נַפְשִׁיט אֶת הַפֶּסַח מֵעוֹרוֹ? מִי דָּמֵי?! הָתָם — טִלְטוּל, הָכָא — מְלָאכָה! אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: בְּתַרְתֵּי פְּלִיגִי, פְּלִיגִי בְּטִלְטוּל וּפְלִיגִי בִּמְלָאכָה, וְהָכִי קָאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: אִם מַצִּילִין תִּיק הַסֵּפֶר עִם הַסֵּפֶר, לֹא נְטַלְטֵל עוֹר אַגַּב בָּשָׂר?!
Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: How did the members of the group respond to Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka? This is what they said to him: If one may save the casing of a Torah scroll along with the Torah scroll, why may one not strip the Paschal lamb of its skin? Here too, in the case of skinning the Paschal lamb, once part of the action is permitted one should be able to perform the entire act. The Gemara is surprised at this: Are they comparable? There, in rescuing the casing of the scroll, only moving is involved, which is prohibited by rabbinic law; whereas here, in the case of the Paschal lamb, the act of flaying is a prohibited labor by Torah law. Rav Ashi said: They are disagreeing with regard to two issues: They disagree with regard to moving the hide along with the flesh, and they disagree with regard to the labor of flaying the animal. And this is what they said to him: If one may rescue the casing of the Torah scroll along with the Torah scroll, will we not move the hide of the Paschal lamb together with the flesh of the sacrifice? The sacrifice should be moved with its skin so it does not putrefy.
=======
Certainly! Below is the updated table that includes Rabbi Yehuda's opinion regarding Mavoy definitions, carrying food, and carrying a Sefer Torah.
### Summary Table: Mavoy Definitions vs. Carrying Food and Sefer Torah
| Opinion | Definition of Mavoy | Requirements for Carrying Food | Requirements for Carrying Sefer Torah | Key Focus/Principles |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| **R. Yishmael** | Mavoy Mefulash (open on both ends) | Requires two Lechayayim to permit carrying. | Requires two Lechayayim to permit carrying. | Emphasizes strict adherence to halachic definitions. |
| **Chachamim** | Distinguishes between Mefulash and Not Mefulash | Mefulash: Requires two Lechayayim. Not Mefulash: Requires three walls and two Lechayayim. | Permits carrying a Sefer Torah with one Lechi. | Balances defined spaces with practicalities of carrying. |
| **Ben Beseira** | Permits saving in Mavoy Mefulash | No specific requirements for Mefulash. | Permits carrying a Sefer Torah even in a Mavoy Mefulash. | Prioritizes preservation of life and sustenance. |
| **R. Yehuda** | Similar to Chachamim, but allows for leniency | Allows for broader leniency in saving food. | Permits carrying a Sefer Torah with one Lechi. | Emphasizes compassion and practical needs. |
| **Rav Chisda** | Clarifies definitions | If there are three walls and two Lechayayim, it is not Mefulash. | Clarifies that a Sefer Torah can be carried with one Lechi. | Ensures consistency in halachic application. |
| **Rav Ashi** | Clarifies definitions | If there are three walls and one Lechi, it is not Mefulash. | Clarifies that a Sefer Torah can be carried with one Lechi. | Emphasizes precise definitions in halachic discourse. |
### Key Points
- **Mavoy Mefulash**: Open on both ends; requires two Lechayayim for carrying food.
- **Mavoy Not Mefulash**: Enclosed on one side; can permit carrying food with three walls and two Lechayayim.
- **Carrying Food**:
- **R. Yishmael**: Requires two Lechayayim for Mefulash.
- **Chachamim**: Requires two Lechayayim for Mefulash; three walls and two Lechayayim for Not Mefulash.
- **Ben Beseira**: No specific requirements for Mefulash.
- **R. Yehuda**: Allows for broader leniency in saving food.
- **Carrying Sefer Torah**:
- **R. Yishmael**: Requires two Lechayayim.
- **Chachamim**: Permits carrying with one Lechi.
- **Ben Beseira**: Permits carrying even in a Mavoy Mefulash.
- **R. Yehuda**: Permits carrying with one Lechi.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: שָׁלֹשׁ מְחִיצּוֹת וְלֶחִי אֶחָד — זֶה מָבוֹי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְפוּלָּשׁ. שָׁלֹשׁ מְחִיצּוֹת בְּלֹא לֶחִי — זֶהוּ מָבוֹי הַמְפוּלָּשׁ. וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דְּאָמַר בָּעֵינַן לְחָיַיִם, הָנֵי מִילֵּי לָאוֹכָלִין וּמַשְׁקִין, אֲבָל לְסֵפֶר תּוֹרָה — בְּחַד לֶחִי סַגִּי.
Rather, Rav Ashi said: The Sages in the mishna disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer: Three walls and one post is an alley that is closed; three walls without a post at all is an open alley. And even according to Rabbi Eliezer, who said we need two posts, one post being insufficient, those words were stated to permit one to move food and drinks, but for the purpose of moving a Torah scroll, one post is sufficient.
### Key Takeaways:
- **Rebbi Eliezer** believes that the importance of the Milah allows for carrying the knife, even in a public space.
- **Chachamim** maintain stricter rules against carrying in public domains and prefer using gentiles when available.
- **R. Shimon** provides a perspective on transferring items between private domains, emphasizing the flexibility within those spaces.
Comparison table that outlines the key points of the sugya regarding carrying a Milah knife on Shabbos, focusing on the different opinions and concepts discussed. This format is designed to be beginner-friendly.
| **Aspect** | **Rebbi Eliezer** | **Chachamim (Sages)** | **R. Shimon** | **General Principles** |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| **Position on Carrying** | Permits carrying the knife for Milah, even through a public domain (Reshus ha'Rabim). | Prohibits carrying the knife through a public domain. | Allows transferring between roofs, Chatzeros, and Karfifos if items were there before Shabbos. | Carrying in a public domain is generally forbidden. |
| **Use of Gentiles** | Does not require a gentile to carry the knife; a Jew can do it. | Would prefer not to have a Jew carry if a gentile is available. | Not specifically addressed in this context. | Amira L'nochri (instructing a gentile) is problematic for melachah d'oreisa. |
| **Basis for Ruling** | Based on a Torah verse that permits melachah for the sake of Milah. | Emphasizes the prohibition of carrying in public domains. | Views roofs, Chatzeros, and Karfifos as one domain for certain items. | Importance of mitzvah can allow for leniencies. |
| **Urgency of Milah** | The urgency of performing Milah justifies carrying the knife quickly. | The urgency does not override the prohibition of carrying in public. | Allows for flexibility in transferring items within private domains. | Mitzvah of Milah is very important, but must be balanced with Shabbos laws. |
| **Halachic Outcome** | A Jew can carry the knife directly for Milah. | A Jew should not carry the knife if a gentile is available. | Allows for carrying within private domains if items were there before Shabbos. | The mitzvah should ideally be performed by a Jew. |
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְצוֹן רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וּמַחְלוּקְתּוֹ, אֶלָּא בִּרְצוֹן רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֶחָד גַּגּוֹת וְאֶחָד קַרְפֵּיפוֹת וְאֶחָד חֲצֵירוֹת — כּוּלָּן רְשׁוּת אֶחָד הֵן לְכֵלִים שֶׁשָּׁבְתוּ בְּתוֹכָן, וְלֹא לְכֵלִים שֶׁשָּׁבְתוּ בְּתוֹךְ הַבַּיִת.
Rather, Rav Ashi said: It means contrary to the wishes of Rabbi Eliezer and his disputants, but in accordance with the wishes of Rabbi Shimon. As we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Shimon says: Roofs, enclosures, and courtyards are all considered as one domain with regard to vessels that rested inside them at the beginning of Shabbat. Therefore, it is permitted to carry vessels that rested inside one to another. However, they are not considered the same domain with regard to vessels that rested inside the house at the beginning of Shabbat. If the homeowners did not join the courtyard by means of an eiruv, it is prohibited to carry vessels from their houses to the courtyard. Even if the houses in a courtyard were joined, it is prohibited to carry from the courtyard to an enclosure unless they were joined by means of an eiruv. In any case, there are circumstances in which Rabbi Shimon allows carrying via roofs, courtyards, and enclosures.
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tl / dr The most surprising part of this table is that despite the different opinions of the various protagonists regarding the relationship between the mitzvah of milah and Shabbos, Tzara'as, and Yom Tov, all of them ultimately come to the same conclusion that milah does override Shabbos, Tzara'as, and Yom Tov. This is surprising because the protagonists use different proofs and objections to support their opinions, yet they all arrive at the same conclusion.
This table shows the different opinions of the various protagonists in the sugya regarding the relationship between the mitzvah of milah and Shabbos, Tzara'as, and Yom Tov, including the main arguments and reasoning brought in the sugya.
| Protagonist | Shabbos | Tzara'as | Yom Tov |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| R. Elazar | Proof: Kal va'Chomer (a fortiori argument) Objection: Tzara'as is more stringent than Shabbos, for Tzara'as overrides Avodah (service in the Temple) and Avodah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Shabbos, Tzara'as, and Yom Tov | Proof: Verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Tzara'as, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Tzara'as and Yom Tov | Proof: Verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Yom Tov, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Yom Tov |
| R. Elazar ben Azaryah | Proof: Kal va'Chomer (a fortiori argument) Objection: Tzara'as is more stringent than Shabbos, for Tzara'as overrides Avodah (service in the Temple) and Avodah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Shabbos, Tzara'as, and Yom Tov | Proof: Verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Tzara'as, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Tzara'as and Yom Tov | Proof: Verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Yom Tov, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Yom Tov |
| R. Akiva | Proof: Kal va'Chomer (a fortiori argument) Objection: Tzara'as is more stringent than Shabbos, for Tzara'as overrides Avodah (service in the Temple) and Avodah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Shabbos, Tzara'as, and Yom Tov | Proof: Verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Tzara'as, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Tzara'as and Yom Tov | Proof: Verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Yom Tov, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Yom Tov |
| Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak | Proof: Verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Yom Tov, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Yom Tov | Proof: Verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Tzara'as, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Tzara'as and Yom Tov | Proof: Verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Yom Tov, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Yom Tov |
| R. Yochanan | Proof: Verse "Uva'Yom ha'Shmini Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Tzara'as, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Shabbos, Tzara'as, and Yom Tov | Proof: Verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Tzara'as, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Tzara'as and Yom Tov | Proof: Verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Yom Tov, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Yom Tov |
| Rav Acha bar Yakov | Proof: Verse "Ha'Shmini Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Tzara'as, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Shabbos, Tzara'as, and Yom Tov | Proof: Verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Tzara'as, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Tzara'as and Yom Tov | Proof: Verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" Objection: If we learn from this verse that milah overrides Yom Tov, then why can't we also learn from it that milah overrides Shabbos Conclusion: Milah does override Yom Tov |
The topic of the relationship between the mitzvah of milah (circumcision) and Shabbos, Tzara'as, and Yom Tov is discussed in the Talmud, specifically in the tractate of Shabbat (132a-132b).
The Talmudic discussion explores the question of whether milah overrides these other mitzvot or if it is forbidden to perform milah on Shabbos, Tzara'as, and Yom Tov.
The first argument brought in the sugya is a kal va'chomer (a fortiori argument) used by R. Elazar, R. Elazar ben Azaryah, and R. Akiva. They argue that if milah can override the more stringent mitzvah of Tzara'as, which overrides Avodah (service in the Temple) and Avodah overrides Shabbos, then milah must certainly override Shabbos, Tzara'as, and Yom Tov.
The second argument is based on the verse "Yimol Besar Arlaso" (Exodus 4:25), which is interpreted as a commandment to perform milah even on Yom Tov. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak and R. Yochanan use this verse to prove that milah overrides Yom Tov, while R. Elazar ben Azaryah and R. Akiva use it to prove that milah overrides Tzara'as and Yom Tov.
R. Yochanan and Rav Acha bar Yakov bring a different proof from the verse "Uva'Yom ha'Shmini Yimol Besar Arlaso" (Leviticus 12:3), which they interpret as a commandment to perform milah on the eighth day even if it falls on Shabbos. They use this verse to prove that milah overrides Shabbos, Tzara'as, and Yom Tov.
However, there are objections raised to these arguments.
Despite these objections, all of the protagonists ultimately come to the same conclusion that milah does override Shabbos, Tzara'as, and Yom Tov. This conclusion is based on a combination of the kal va'chomer argument and the proofs from the verses "Yimol Besar Arlaso" and "Uva'Yom ha'Shmini Yimol Besar Arlaso".
וּמַאי ״אוֹ אֵינוֹ״ דְּקָאָמַר — הֲדַר אָמַר: וּמִמַּאי דְּצָרַעַת חֲמוּרָה? דִילְמָא שַׁבָּת חֲמוּרָה, שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ בָּהּ עוֹנָשִׁין וְאַזְהָרוֹת הַרְבֵּה. אִי נָמֵי: וּמִמַּאי מִשּׁוּם דַּחֲמִירָא צָרַעַת הִיא, דִּילְמָא מִשּׁוּם גַּבְרָא הוּא דְּלָא חֲזֵי. וּמָה אֲנִי מְקַיֵּים ״שְׁמִינִי יִמּוֹל״ — חוּץ מִשַּׁבָּת. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בַּיּוֹם״ — אֲפִילּוּ בְּשַׁבָּת.
And what was the reason the tanna said: Or perhaps, and questioned his previous statement? He reconsidered and said: And from where do we know that leprosy is more stringent than Shabbat? Perhaps Shabbat is more stringent, as it includes the severe punishments of karet and execution by stoning, and numerous warnings pertaining to it throughout the Torah. Alternatively, and from where do we know that the reason the Temple service does not override the prohibition of leprosy is specifically because leprosy is more stringent than the Temple service? Perhaps the Temple service does not override the prohibition of leprosy because a man afflicted with leprosy is unfit to perform the Temple service and not due to the stringency of the prohibition to remove symptoms of leprosy from one’s body. And if so, how do I establish the verse: “And on the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (Leviticus 12:3)? That it applies to days other than Shabbat. Consequently, the tanna cited additional proof from that which the Torah states: “On the day,” indicating that circumcision is performed even on Shabbat.
This conversation was generated with DuckDuckGo AI Chat (https://duck.ai) using OpenAI's GPT-4o mini Model.
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Kindly expolain thius question sugya kashyot machlokes clearly https://dafyomi.co.il/discuss_daf.php?gid=2&sid=20&daf=133&n=2
GPT-4o mini:
The question you raised involves a comparison between two Gemaras: one in Menachos regarding the offering of a Korban on Shabbos and another in Shabbos concerning the act of Milah (circumcision). The core of your inquiry is whether there is a Machloket (dispute) between these two Gemaras regarding the permissibility of returning to a Mitzvah after it has been completed, particularly in the context of enhancing the Mitzvah.
The two Gemaras do not necessarily represent a direct Machloket but rather highlight different applications of the principles of "Zeh Keli" and the nature of the Mitzvah's permissibility on Shabbos. The Sha'agas Aryeh and the Teshuvos Ein Yitzchak provide frameworks to understand these differences, emphasizing that the context and nature of the Mitzvah play crucial roles in determining whether one can return to enhance it after completion.
### Summary of the Two Gemaras:
1. **Menachos 64a**: The Gemara discusses a scenario where a person has already brought a thinner Korban but has a fatter one available. Rabah states that he may bring the fatter one on Shabbos, as the principle of "Zeh Keli" (this is my God) allows for enhancing the Mitzvah even on Shabbos.
2. **Shabbos 133b**: This Gemara discusses a Mohel who has completed the Milah. If he has already "Piresh" (removed his hands) from the act, he may not return to enhance the Mitzvah, even if he could do it in a nicer way.
### Analysis of the Machloket:
The question arises whether these two Gemaras represent a Machloket or if they can be reconciled. The responses provided by the Sha'agas Aryeh and the Teshuvos Ein Yitzchak offer insights into this issue.
1. **Sha'agas Aryeh's Explanation**:
- The Sha'agas Aryeh posits that "Zeh Keli" applies only while one is in the process of performing a Mitzvah. Once the Mitzvah is completed, the opportunity to enhance it no longer exists. Therefore, in the case of Milah, since the Mohel has completed the act, he cannot return to enhance it, while in the case of the Korban, the act of slaughtering is still permissible on Shabbos, allowing for the enhancement.
2. **Teshuvos Ein Yitzchak's Explanation**:
- Rav Yitzchak Elchanan Spector suggests that the difference lies in the nature of the Mitzvah's permissibility on Shabbos. Korbanos are considered "Hutrah" (entirely permitted) on Shabbos, allowing for enhancements without limitations. In contrast, Milah may be viewed as "Dechuyah" (permitted under duress) and thus has more restrictions. This distinction explains why one may enhance a Korban but not return to enhance a completed Milah.
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User prompt 3 of 3 - 11/8/2024, 4:51:56 AM:
which specific Talmudic hermeneutical principlesspecifically weer used? Kindly draw up a comparison table factors opiniosn and primcples
GPT-4o mini:
Certainly! Below is a comparison table that outlines the specific hermeneutical principles used in the discussion, along with the factors, opinions, and conclusions drawn from the two Gemaras in Menachos and Shabbos.
This table summarizes the key factors, opinions, and hermeneutical principles involved in the discussion of the two Gemaras, illustrating how Talmudic reasoning is applied to derive halachic conclusion
| **Factor** | **Menachos 64a (Korban)** | **Shabbos 133b (Milah)** | **Hermeneutical Principles** |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| **Context of Mitzvah** | Offering a Korban on Shabbos, even if a better one is available. | Performing a Milah after it has been completed. | Contextual Analysis |
| **Permissibility on Shabbos** | Korbanos are considered "Hutrah" (entirely permitted). | Milah may be viewed as "Dechuyah" (permitted under duress). | Hutrah vs. Dechuyah |
| **Enhancement of Mitzvah** | One is encouraged to enhance the Mitzvah by bringing a fatter Korban. | Once the Milah is completed, one cannot return to enhance it. | Zeh Keli |
| **Completion of Mitzvah** | The act of slaughtering is still ongoing, allowing for enhancement. | The Mohel has completed the act, thus cannot return. | Kal V'Chomer (implied) |
| **Halachic Conclusion** | It is permissible to bring a better Korban on Shabbos. | It is not permissible to return to enhance the Milah. | Contextual Analysis, Sefek Sefeka (implied) |
| **Authority Cited** | Rabah's opinion supports the enhancement of Korbanos. | The Mohel's completion of the Mitzvah is emphasized. | Mikra (Scriptural Interpretation) |
| **Underlying Reasoning** | The Torah explicitly allows for Korbanos on Shabbos. | Not every Milah is on Shabbos; only specific cases apply. | Gezerah Shavah (implied) |
### Summary of Principles Used:
1. **Contextual Analysis**: Both Gemaras are analyzed within their specific contexts, leading to different halachic outcomes.
2. **Hutrah vs. Dechuyah**: The distinction between what is entirely permitted (Korbanos) versus what is permitted under certain conditions (Milah) is crucial.
3. **Zeh Keli**: The principle of enhancing a Mitzvah is applied differently based on whether the Mitzvah is ongoing or completed.
4. **Kal V'Chomer**: While not explicitly stated, the reasoning implies that if one can enhance a Korban, one might think the same applies to Milah, but the completion of the Mitzvah changes the application.
5. **Mikra**: The scriptural basis for the permissibility of Korbanos on Shabbos is referenced, while the limitations on Milah are derived from its specific circumstances.
6. **Sefek Sefeka**: Although not directly mentioned, the underlying reasoning may involve considerations of uncertainty regarding the status of the Mitzvah.
7. **Gezerah Shavah**: The comparison between the two cases may implicitly draw on this principle, as both involve the performance of Mitzvot on Shabbos.
מַאן תַּנָּא פֵּירַשׁ אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר? אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: אַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר שֶׁחָל לִהְיוֹת בְּשַׁבָּת — מַפְשִׁיט אָדָם הַפֶּסַח עַד הֶחָזֶה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מַפְשִׁיטִין אֶת כּוּלּוֹ.
With regard to this law, the Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who holds that if one has already withdrawn from a mitzva he may not return to engage in its performance? Which tanna asserts that as long as a person is involved in a mitzva whose performance overrides Shabbat, he may complete it; however, if he is no longer involved in the mitzva, he may not exceed the minimum requirements if doing so would desecrate Shabbat? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, as it was taught in a baraita: In a case of the fourteenth of Nisan, the day the Paschal lamb is sacrificed, that occurs on Shabbat, one flays the Paschal lamb until he exposes the breast, in order to remove the portions that are offered on the altar, but one does not flay anymore, as it is not necessary for the mitzva of the day; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. And the Rabbis say: One may even flay the entire hide.
This conversation was generated with DuckDuckGo AI Chat (https://duck.ai) using Mistral AI's Mixtral 8x7B Model.
For shabbat 135b crystallize all cases in the sugya and factor in a table, especially teh hiddush and the kashyots
Mixtral 8x7B:
The hiddush (novel idea) in this sugya is that the first Tana holds that even if the Yelid Bayis is not Teme'ah Leidah (impure due to childbirth), he is circumcised on day eight. The kashyot (difficulties) arise in finding cases where Yelid Bayis is circumcised on day one.
The table below summarizes the cases and the timing of circumcision:
| Case | Circumcision Day |
| --- | --- |
| Yotzei Dofen | 8th day |
| Baby with two foreskins | 8th day |
| Miknas Kesef (full Kinyan) | 8th day |
| Miknas Kesef (purchased fetus) | 1st day |
| Yelid Bayis (bought with baby) | 1st day |
| Yelid Bayis (pregnant after purchase) | 8th day |
| Yelid Bayis (R. Chama, gave birth before immersing) | 1st day |
| Yelid Bayis (R. Chama, gave birth after immersing) | 8th day |
| Yelid Bayis (first Tana, gave birth before or after immersing) | 8th day |
1. Yotzei Dofen (a baby born through Caesarian section) and a baby with two foreskins are circumcised on the eighth day, regardless of whether there is Tum'as Leidah (impurity associated with childbirth) or not.
2. A slave (Miknas Kesef) is circumcised on the eighth day if his master also had a full Kinyan (ha'Guf) in the mother.
3. Yelid Bayis (a baby born to a Shifchah Kena'anis of a Yisrael) is circumcised on day one if the Shifchah was bought with her baby, and on day eight if the Shifchah became pregnant after being bought.
4. R. Chama states that if the Shifchah gave birth before immersing, her son is Yelid Bayis that is circumcised on day one, and if she gave birth after immersing, her son is Yelid Bayis that is circumcised on day eight.
אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: בְּלוֹקֵחַ שִׁפְחָה לְעוּבָּרָהּ.
Rabbi Yirmeya said: It can be found in the case of one who purchases a maidservant for the purpose of purchasing rights to her fetus without purchasing the maidservant herself.
In the sugya you provided, there are specific conditions outlined by Rav Sheshes brei d'Rav Idi regarding the permissibility of creating an Ohel (tent or covering) on Shabbat. These conditions are crucial for understanding when a structure is considered an Ohel and when it is not. Let's break down these conditions and visualize them for clarity.
### Conditions for Permissibility of an Ohel
1. **The Top Must Not Be a Tefach Wide**:
- **Condition**: If the top of the structure (e.g., a canopy) is a Tefach (approximately 3-4 inches, depending on the measurement used) wide, it is forbidden to create an Ohel.
- **Visualization**: Imagine a canopy that is stretched over a bed. If the top of this canopy is wider than a Tefach, it is considered a proper Ohel, and thus, spreading it on Shabbat would be prohibited.
2. **Width Between the Sides**:
- **Condition**: Even if the top is not a Tefach wide, if within three Tefachim (approximately 9-12 inches) of the top, the width between the sides is a Tefach, it is forbidden.
- **Visualization**: Picture a slanted canopy. If the distance between the two sides of the canopy is a Tefach or more within three Tefachim of the top, it creates a space that resembles an Ohel. This means that even if the top itself is narrow, the sides can create a tent-like structure, which is also prohibited.
3. **Sides Must Not Be a Tefach Apart at the Bottom**:
- **Condition**: The sides of the structure must not be a Tefach apart at the bottom. If they are, it is forbidden because a slanted Ohel is considered an Ohel.
- **Visualization**: Imagine the same canopy again. If the sides of the canopy are a Tefach apart at the bottom, it creates a triangular shape that can be viewed as a tent. This configuration is problematic because it resembles a proper Ohel, which is not allowed on Shabbat.
4. **Hanging Below the Bed**:
- **Additional Condition**: The canopy must not hang a Tefach below the sides of the bed. If it does, it is forbidden because it effectively creates a roof with walls on two sides.
- **Visualization**: If the canopy hangs down more than a Tefach below the sides of the bed, it creates a situation where the bed is covered like a tent, which is also considered an Ohel.
### Summary of Visualizations
- **Tefach Width**: A flat top of a canopy wider than a Tefach is prohibited.
- **Width Between Sides**: If the distance between the sides is a Tefach within three Tefachim of the top, it is prohibited.
- **Bottom Width**: If the sides are a Tefach apart at the bottom, it is prohibited.
- **Hanging Below**: If the canopy hangs down a Tefach below the sides of the bed, it is prohibited.
אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי: לָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין בְּגַגָּהּ טֶפַח, אֲבָל יֵשׁ בְּגַגָּהּ טֶפַח — אֲסוּרָה. וְכִי אֵין בְּגַגָּהּ טֶפַח נָמֵי לָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין בְּפָחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה סָמוּךְ לְגַגָּהּ טֶפַח, אֲבָל יֵשׁ בְּפָחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה סָמוּךְ לְגַגָּהּ טֶפַח — אָסוּר. וְלָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין בְּשִׁיפּוּעָהּ טֶפַח, אֲבָל יֵשׁ בְּשִׁיפּוּעָהּ טֶפַח — שִׁפּוּעֵי אֹהָלִים כְּאֹהָלִים דָּמוּ. וְלָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא דְּלָא נָחֵית מִפּוּרְיָא טֶפַח, אֲבָל נָחֵית מִפּוּרְיָא טֶפַח — אָסוּר.
Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, said: We only said that it is permitted in a case where its roof is not a handbreadth wide; however, if its roof is a handbreadth wide, it is prohibited. Furthermore, even when its roof is not a handbreadth wide, we only said that it is permitted where there is not the width of a handbreadth within three handbreadths of its roof; however, if it expands to the width of a handbreadth within three handbreadths of its roof, it is prohibited. And we only stated that it is permitted where there is not in its incline the width of a handbreadth; however, if there is in its incline the width of a handbreadth, it is prohibited. This halakha is in accordance with the principle that the inclines of tents, even though they are not actual roofs, are considered like tents. And we only said that this canopy is permitted where no part of the canopy descends to a handbreadth below the bed; however, if part of the canopy descends to a handbreadth below the bed, it is prohibited, as the bed itself becomes a roof, and the curtain is considered a wall.
Shabbat 143a:6
The four opinions that Rashi was trying to reconcile in his commentary on the Mishnah regarding the removal of bones and shells on Shabbos.
### The Four Opinions Rashi Tried to Reconcile
1. **Beis Hillel's Opinion**:
- **Position**: Beis Hillel generally follows the view of Rebbi Shimon, who permits moving items that are fit for animals, even if they were originally designated for human use.
- **Context in the Mishnah**: In the Mishnah, Beis Hillel prohibits moving certain bones and shells. Rashi initially interpreted this prohibition as applying to bones that are completely unfit for any use, which would align with Rebbi Yehudah's stricter view on Muktzah.
2. **Beis Shamai's Opinion**:
- **Position**: Beis Shamai permits moving bones and shells, even if they are not fit for human or animal use. This is a unique stance that diverges from both Rebbi Shimon and Rebbi Yehudah.
- **Rashi's Initial Interpretation**: Rashi's first explanation suggested that Beis Shamai's leniency was based on the idea that there is no prohibition of Muktzah for these bones, as they are not considered completely unfit for use. However, this created a contradiction since Rebbi Shimon only allows moving items that are fit for animals.
3. **Rebbi Shimon's Opinion**:
- **Position**: Rebbi Shimon allows moving items that are fit for animals, even if they were designated for human use. However, he does not permit moving items that are completely unfit for any use.
- **Conflict with Rashi's Interpretation**: Rashi's original interpretation conflicted with Rebbi Shimon's view because if the bones are not fit for dogs, they should be considered Muktzah, and Rebbi Shimon would not permit moving them.
4. **Rebbi Yehudah's Opinion**:
- **Position**: Rebbi Yehudah is stricter and prohibits moving items that are not fit for human use, including those that have become unfit due to spoilage or other reasons.
- **Rashi's Reconciliation**: Rashi's initial interpretation suggested that Beis Hillel's prohibition aligns with Rebbi Yehudah's view, which would mean that Beis Hillel is not following Rebbi Shimon in this case. This created a tension in understanding the Mishnah, as it seemed to contradict the established positions of Beis Hillel and Rebbi Shimon.
### Rashi's Thought Process
- **Initial Confusion**: Rashi was likely confused by the apparent contradiction between the Mishnah and the Gemara's later discussions, particularly when Rav Nachman reversed the opinions of Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai. This reversal raised questions about the consistency of the halachic rulings.
- **Revising the Explanation**: To resolve this confusion, Rashi later revised his commentary to clarify that Beis Hillel's prohibition is based on the bones being unfit for use, while Beis Shamai's leniency represents a new perspective that does not align with the traditional views of Rebbi Shimon or Rebbi Yehudah.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: אָנוּ אֵין לָנוּ אֶלָּא: בֵּית שַׁמַּאי כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וּבֵית הִלֵּל כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.
GEMARA: Rav Naḥman said: Reverse the two opinions, as we have only Beit Shammai in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits moving set-aside items, and Beit Hillel in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who permits doing so.
The question you presented revolves around the halachic status of liquids that come out "Stam" (without intention) and how this relates to the opinions of R. Yehudah and the Chachamim in the context of the Mishnah regarding the Tamei (ritually impure) status of milk.
The crux of the question is whether the Chachamim's ruling on the Tamei status of liquids that come out Stam aligns with R. Yehudah's more lenient approach.
### Breakdown of the Mishnah and the Question
1. **Mishnah Overview**:
- **Human Milk**: Tamei whether it comes out willingly (l'Ratzon) or unwillingly (Lo l'Ratzon).
- **Animal Milk**: Tamei only when it comes out willingly (l'Ratzon).
2. **R. Akiva's Kal va'Chomer**:
- He argues that since human milk is specifically for babies and is Tamei in both cases, animal milk, which can be consumed by adults, should also be Tamei in both cases.
3. **Chachamim's Response**:
- They assert that a woman's milk is Tamei even when it comes out unwillingly, as it is derived from her blood, which is Tamei. However, they argue that animal blood is Tahor, thus the comparison does not hold.
4. **R. Akiva's Counterargument**:
- He states that milk is more stringent than blood because milk can be Tamei even when milked for medicinal purposes, while blood drawn for healing is Tahor.
5. **Chachamim's Example**:
- They bring the example of olives and grapes, where liquid that comes out willingly is Tamei, but liquid that comes out Stam (without intention) is Tahor.
6. **Assumption**:
- The assumption is that "l'Ratzon" means the person intended for the liquid to exude, while "Lo l'Ratzon" means it came out without intention (Stam).
7. **Summation of the Question**:
- The question arises regarding the status of liquids that come out Stam. If the Chachamim hold like R. Yehudah, who does not forbid Stam, then the liquid from olives and grapes should be Tahor. If they hold like the Chachamim who argue with R. Yehudah, then they should consider Stam as a liquid, and thus it should also be Tahor.
### Key Points of the Question
- **R. Yehudah's Position**: R. Yehudah is known for being lenient regarding the status of liquids that come out Stam. He does not consider them Tamei unless there is a specific reason to do so.
- **Chachamim's Position**: The Chachamim, on the other hand, have a more stringent view regarding the Tamei status of liquids, especially in the context of human and animal milk.
- **Implication of the Example**: The example of olives and grapes serves to illustrate that even when liquid comes out without intention, it is not automatically considered Tamei. This raises the question of how the Chachamim reconcile their position with R. Yehudah's leniency.
שֶׁלֹּא לְרָצוֹן, שֶׁדַּם מַגֵּפָתָהּ טָהוֹר?! אָמַר לָהֶן: מַחְמִיר אֲנִי בֶּחָלָב מִבַּדָּם, שֶׁהַחוֹלֵב לִרְפוּאָה — טָמֵא, וְהַמַּקִּיז לִרְפוּאָה — טָהוֹר. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: סַלֵּי זֵיתִים וַעֲנָבִים יוֹכִיחוּ, שֶׁהַמַּשְׁקִין הַיּוֹצְאִין מֵהֶן לְרָצוֹן — טְמֵאִין, שֶׁלֹּא לְרָצוֹן — טְהוֹרִים.
if it was expressed unintentionally, as the blood of its wound is ritually pure, meaning that it does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity. Rabbi Akiva said to them: I am more stringent with regard to milk than with regard to blood, as if one milks an animal for medicinal purposes, the milk renders food susceptible to ritual impurity, and if one lets blood for medicinal purposes, the status of the blood is not that of a liquid and is ritually pure, in the sense that it does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity. They said to him: The case of baskets of olives and grapes will prove that there is a difference between liquids that emerge of his own volition and those that do not, as liquid that seeps from them volitionally renders food susceptible to ritual impurity. However, liquid that seeps from them unvolitionally is ritually pure, i.e., it does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity. Apparently, liquid renders food susceptible to ritual impurity only if it emerged of its own volition.
THE MILK OF A WOMAN IS "METAMEI" EVEN WITHOUT INTENT
### Question Raised
- Why does Rebbi Akiva mention that milk drawn for **Refu'ah** (curative purposes) is **Machshir** when animal milk is generally considered **Machshir**?
### Key Points
1. **Rebbi Akiva's Position**:
- Both a woman's milk and an animal's milk are considered **Machshir** (able to render something susceptible to Tum'ah) even without intent to drink them.
- Milk has a greater ability to be **Machshir** than blood.
2. **Chachamim's Position**:
- A woman's milk is **Machshir** without intent, while an animal's milk is only **Machshir** when there is intent to drink it.
- They argue that animal blood cannot be **Machshir** (except for the blood of Shechitah), while human blood can be.
3. **Proofs and Counterproofs**:
- The Chachamim use the fact that animal blood is not **Machshir** to argue that animal milk is also less capable of being **Machshir**.
- Rebbi Akiva counters that milk, even from animals, is more potent than blood in this regard.
### Answers
1. **Tosfos' Explanation**:
- Tosfos asserts that Rebbi Akiva does not need to specify that the milk was drawn for **Refu'ah** since all animal milk is inherently **Machshir** for Tum'ah.
2. **Tosfos Yom Tov's Explanation**:
- The Tosfos Yom Tov, referencing the Rash, explains that Rebbi Akiva's mention of milk drawn for **Refu'ah** is to highlight that animal milk can be **Machshir** even when it is not specifically intended for consumption.
- In contrast, animal blood that is not intended for drinking (e.g., blood drawn for health reasons) is not **Machshir**.
3. **Chazon Nachum's Perspective**:
- Some suggest that Rebbi Akiva emphasizes that even milk drawn for curative purposes can be **Machshir**, while animal blood, even when drawn for a curative purpose, is not **Machshir**. This distinction underscores the unique status of milk compared to blood.
. Shabbat 146b:2
"We know that Stirah (demolishing) for the sake of building is a Melachah d'Oraisa, and Stirah not for the sake of building is prohibited mid'Rabanan. Why should one be permitted l'Chatchilah to break open a barrel on Shabbos? The act should be prohibited mid'Rabanan."
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/shabbos/insites/sh-dt-146.htm
1) HALACHAH: BREAKING A UTENSIL TO GET AT THE FOOD INSIDE
OPINIONS: The Mishnah states that one may break a barrel on Shabbos in order to eat the figs that are inside of it. RASHI (DH Shover) explains that this is permissible because one performs a destructive act (Mekalkel) when he breaks the barrel, "and it is not forbidden whatsoever to be Mekalkel on Shabbos."
We know that Stirah (demolishing) for the sake of building is a Melachah d'Oraisa, and Stirah not for the sake of building is prohibited mid'Rabanan. Why should one be permitted l'Chatchilah to break open a barrel on Shabbos? The act should be prohibited mid'Rabanan.
(a) The RASHBA explains that Rashi follows his opinion elsewhere (47a, DH Chayav Chatas), where he says that the Melachos of Binyan and Stirah (building and demolishing) do not apply to utensils. They apply only to structures that are attached to the ground. Therefore, if a person makes a utensil on Shabbos, he is not Chayav for Binyan. Rather, he is Chayav for Makeh b'Patish ("the final hammer-blow"). Breaking a utensil, therefore, is not forbidden, because Makeh b'Patish has no destructive counterpart.
(b) TOSFOS (DH Shover) argues and maintains that the Melachos of Binyan and Stirah apply to utensils. The only time that one is permitted to make or break a utensil, according to Tosfos (102b, DH Hai), is when that utensil is made to be assembled and disassembled. Why, then, is one permitted to break the barrel in the case of the Mishnah here?
Tosfos explains, based on the Gemara in Beitzah (33b), that the Gemara here refers to a barrel that was once broken, and one fixed it by gluing together the broken parts. The repaired barrel is no longer considered a complete utensil, and therefore one is permitted to break it open to obtain its contents. Any other barrel, though, may not be broken on Shabbos.
(c) The RITVA explains that breaking a barrel indeed should be prohibited mid'Rabanan, because it is an act of Stirah without intent to build. The only reason the Mishnah here says one is permitted to break the barrel is because the Rabanan permitted it for the sake of Oneg Shabbos (since one wants to use the food inside the barrel to enhance his Shabbos pleasure). However, they only permitted this in the case of breaking a barrel, but not other types of vessels. A barrel is usually not put back together again and therefore it is uncommon for such a Stirah to be "Al Menas Livnos," in order to eventually use the materials to rebuild something.
(d) The YERUSHALMI here, cited by the SHITAH L'RAN, explains that opening a barrel to get the food inside is comparable to opening the shell of a nut to remove the nut inside. Since the barrel is the normal container for the food inside, opening it is not considered Stirah. Rather, it is considered as though one is merely taking food out of its container.
HALACHAH: The Halachah (SHULCHAN ARUCH OC 314:1) follows the opinion of Tosfos (b), that Binyan and Stirah do apply to utensils and the only type of barrel that one may break open on Shabbos is one that was broken and glued together. A complete, unbroken barrel may not be broken in order to get the food inside of it.
However, one is permitted to open plastic bags and containers that contain food, because those containers are made for temporary use and thus they are comparable to a broken barrel that was repaired with glue, which is not considered a real utensil. (See Insights to Beitzah 32:1 for a comprehensive discussion of the topic of opening food containers on Shabbos.)
וְשָׁוִין שֶׁנּוֹקְבִין נֶקֶב יָשָׁן לְכַתְּחִלָּה. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בִּמְקוֹם הֶעָשׂוּי לְשַׁמֵּר, אֲבָל לְחַזֵּק — אָסוּר. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי לְשַׁמֵּר, הֵיכִי דָּמֵי לְחַזֵּק? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: לְמַעְלָה מִן הַיַּיִן — זֶהוּ לְשַׁמֵּר, לְמַטָּה מִן הַיַּיִן — זֶהוּ לְחַזֵּק. רָבָא אָמַר: לְמַטָּה מִן הַיַּיִן נָמֵי זֶהוּ לְשַׁמֵּר. וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי לְחַזֵּק — כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּיקְּבָה לְמַטָּה מִן הַשְּׁמָרִים.
We learned in the baraita: And everyone agrees that one may perforate an old hole that was sealed ab initio. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They only taught this in a place where the hole is made to strain the wine from the sediment; however, if it was made to reinforce the barrel, it is prohibited (ge’onim). The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which a hole is considered to have been made to strain and what are the circumstances in which a hole is meant to reinforce the barrel? Rav Ḥisda said: If one perforates the barrel above the level of the wine, that is a hole designated to strain the wine, and if one perforates the barrel below the level of the wine, that is a hole designated to reinforce the barrel. Rava said: A hole made below the level of the wine is also designated to strain the wine, and what are the circumstances in which a hole is meant to reinforce the barrel? It is in a case where one perforated it below the sediment.
next: 149
### Summary of Rationale
- **Height of Writing**: The height of the writing affects the likelihood of erasure. High writing is less likely to be erased, while low writing poses a greater risk.
- **Medium of Writing**: The type of medium (wall vs. tablet/ledger) influences the concerns about reading and erasing. Walls are seen as less formal, while tablets and ledgers are more likely to be associated with secular documents.
- **Context of Shabbos**: The overarching principle is to avoid activities that could lead to work (melacha) on Shabbos, including erasing or reading secular texts. The opinions reflect different interpretations of how these concerns manifest based on the specific circumstances..
| **Concern** | **High on Wall** | **Low on Wall** | **Tablet/Ledger** |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| **Reading** | Rav Bivi: Allowed (no concern for erasing) R. Acha: Permitted (high wall) | Abaye: Concern for reading secular documents | R. Acha: Concern for reading (not confused with wall) |
| **Erasing** | Rav Bivi: No concern (high) R. Acha: No concern (high) | Abaye: Concern for erasing (low) | R. Bivi: No concern (etched, difficult to erase) |
| **General Opinion** | Tana'im argue about Rabah's concern for adjusting lamps | R. Acha permits reading from a high wall | One may read from a wall but not from a tablet/ledger |
| **Objections** | Abaye: Should be concerned for erasing (in general) | Rav Bivi: Should be concerned for reading | R. Acha: Concern for reading (not confused with wall) |
### Notes:
- **High on Wall**: Generally, there is no concern for erasing, but there may be a concern for reading secular documents.
- **Low on Wall**: There is a concern for erasing, but not for reading secular documents.
- **Tablet/Ledger**: There is a concern for reading, but not for erasing since it is difficult to erase and one would remember it is Shabbos.
Certainly! Here’s an explanation of the rationale behind the opinions regarding reading and erasing on Shabbos, as presented in the sugya:
### 1. **Rav Bivi's Opinion**
- **Concern for Erasing**: Rav Bivi holds that reading from a list is forbidden primarily due to the concern that one might erase a name. However, he argues that if the list is high on a wall, the concern for erasing is minimal because it is less likely that someone would attempt to erase something that is out of reach.
- **Concern for Reading Secular Documents**: Rav Bivi does not express a strong concern for reading secular documents in this case, as he believes that the primary issue is the potential for erasure.
### 2. **Abaye's Opinion**
- **Concern for Erasing**: Abaye emphasizes the concern for erasing regardless of the height of the writing. He believes that even if the list is high, one might still be tempted to erase it, especially if it is within reach.
- **Concern for Reading Secular Documents**: Abaye is also concerned that reading from a list could lead to reading secular (business) documents, which is not permitted on Shabbos. He believes that the potential for confusion between a list and a secular document is significant.
### 3. **R. Acha's Opinion**
- **High on Wall**: R. Acha permits reading from a list that is high on a wall, arguing that the concern for erasing is not applicable in this case. He believes that people do not confuse a high wall with a document, thus minimizing the risk of reading secular material.
- **Low on Wall**: If the list is low on the wall, R. Acha acknowledges the concern for erasing, as it is more accessible. However, he still maintains that the risk of reading secular documents is less significant in this context.
### 4. **Tablet/Ledger**
- **Rationale for Reading and Erasing**: When it comes to a tablet or ledger, the concern shifts. The writing is more permanent (etched), making it difficult to erase. Therefore, the concern for erasing is less relevant, as one would likely remember it is Shabbos before attempting to erase anything. However, there remains a concern for reading, as people might confuse it with secular documents.
- **Beraisa's Position**: The Beraisa states that one may read from a wall but not from a tablet or ledger, indicating that the nature of the medium influences the halachic ruling. The concern for reading secular documents is stronger with tablets and ledgers because they are more formal and resemble business documents.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דִּכְתִיב וּמִתַּתַּאי — לִיחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא יִמְחוֹק! אֶלָּא לָאו דִּכְתִיב וּמִידְּלֵי, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דְּרַבָּה תַּנָּאֵי הִיא. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara attempts to clarify this: What are the circumstances in which Rabbi Aḥa permits this? If you say that it is written below, low down on the wall, we should be concerned that perhaps one will erase it. Rather, is it not referring to a case in which it is written and the location of the writing is raised such that it is high up on the wall, and conclude from this that the statement of Rabba is the subject of dispute among the tanna’im? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from this that it is so.
This sugya discusses the various forms of feeding animals on Shabbos, particularly focusing on the distinctions between different methods of feeding and the associated halachic implications. The discussion is rooted in the Mishnah and further elaborated upon in the Gemara, where different opinions are presented regarding the definitions and permissibility of certain actions.
### Key Terms and Concepts
1. **Oves**: Refers to force-feeding an animal in a way that it cannot spit out the food.
2. **Ma'amir**: A method of feeding where food is placed in the throat of the animal in a way that it cannot spit it out.
3. **Mal'it**: A method of feeding where food is placed in the throat but can be spit out.
4. **Mehalket**: Refers to putting food in front of the animal, allowing it to eat at its own discretion.
5. **Malkit**: Putting food directly into the animal's mouth.
### Main Points of the Sugya
1. **Prohibition of Oves**: The Mishnah states that one may not force-feed animals in a way that they cannot expel the food. This is a general prohibition on Shabbos, as it involves a form of work (feeding) that is not permitted.
2. **Distinction Between Ma'amir and Mal'it**: The Gemara explores the difference between these two methods of feeding. Rav Yehudah explains that Ma'amir involves placing food in a way that it cannot be expelled, while Mal'it allows for the possibility of expulsion. Rav Chisda offers a different interpretation, suggesting that both methods involve food being placed in a way that it cannot be expelled, but the distinction lies in the tools used (a Kli for Ma'amir and hands for Mal'it).
3. **Feeding Different Animals**: The Mishnah also discusses the permissibility of feeding various animals. For example, one may not feed doves in a dovecote but may feed geese and chickens. The reasoning is based on the responsibility one has for the animals. One is responsible for feeding dogs but not for pigs, which are forbidden to raise.
4. **Water vs. Food**: The Mishnah prohibits putting water in front of certain animals (like bees and doves) but allows it for others (like geese and chickens). The rationale is that some animals can find water on their own, while food may not be as readily available.
5. **Duration of Tum'ah**: The discussion also touches on the concept of Tum'ah (ritual impurity) in animals, particularly regarding how long the impurity remains after consumption. For dogs, it is stated that the Tum'ah remains for three days, while for birds and fish, it is for a shorter duration.
### Machloket (Dispute)
The primary machloket revolves around the definitions and implications of the different feeding methods (Ma'amir vs. Mal'it) and the responsibilities associated with feeding different animals. The Gemara presents various opinions on what constitutes each method and the conditions under which they are permissible or forbidden.
- **Rav Yehudah vs. Rav Chisda**: The disagreement between these two sages highlights the complexity of the definitions and the practical implications for feeding animals on Shabbos. Rav Yehudah focuses on the ability to expel food, while Rav Chisda emphasizes the tools used for feeding.
- **Feeding Responsibilities**: The discussion also reflects differing views on the responsibilities one has towards different animals, which influences the permissibility of feeding them on Shabbos.
Here's a factor comparison table im marldown that outlines the different animals, methods of feeding, and the various opinions regarding their permissibility on Shabbos:
| **Animal** | **Oves** (Force Feeding) | **Ma'amir** (Feeding in a way it can't spit out) | **Mal'it** (Feeding in a way it can spit out) | **Mehalket** (Putting food in front) | **Malkit** (Putting food directly in mouth) | **Responsibility to Feed** |
|--------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| **Camel** | Forbidden | Forbidden | Forbidden | Not explicitly mentioned | Not explicitly mentioned | Not responsible |
| **Calves** | Forbidden | Forbidden | Forbidden | Allowed | Not explicitly mentioned | Responsible |
| **Chickens** | Forbidden | Forbidden | Allowed | Allowed | Allowed | Responsible |
| **Doves** | Forbidden | Forbidden | Forbidden (in dovecote) | Forbidden (in dovecote) | Allowed (outside dovecote) | Responsible |
| **Geese** | Forbidden | Forbidden | Allowed | Allowed | Allowed | Responsible |
| **Bees** | Forbidden | Forbidden | Forbidden | Not allowed | Not allowed | Not responsible |
| **Dogs** | Forbidden | Forbidden | Allowed | Allowed | Allowed | Responsible |
| **Pigs** | Forbidden | Forbidden | Forbidden | Not allowed | Not allowed | Not responsible |
### Notes on Opinions:
- **Oves**: All opinions agree that force-feeding is forbidden for all animals.
- **Ma'amir**: Rav Yehudah and Rav Chisda agree that this method is forbidden for all animals, but they differ on the specifics of how it is defined.
- **Mal'it**: Rav Yehudah allows this method for chickens and geese, while Rav Chisda allows it for all animals but emphasizes the method of feeding.
- **Mehalket**: Generally allowed for chickens and geese, but forbidden for doves in a dovecote.
- **Malkit**: Allowed for chickens and geese, but the permissibility for doves depends on the context (dovecote vs. outside).
- **Responsibility to Feed**: There is a clear distinction between animals one is responsible for (like dogs and chickens) versus those one is not (like pigs).
This table summarizes the key points of the sugya regarding the different animals and methods of feeding, along with the opinions of the sages.
אָמַר לְךָ רַב יְהוּדָה: לְעוֹלָם ״מְהַלְקְטִין״ דְּסָפֵי לֵיהּ בִּידֵיהּ, ״מַלְקִיטִין״ דְּשָׁדֵי לֵיהּ קַמַּיְיהוּ, וּדְקָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ יוֹנֵי שׁוֹבָךְ וְיוֹנֵי עֲלִיָּיה לְמִישְׁדֵּא קַמַּיְיהוּ נָמֵי לָא? הָנֵי מְזוֹנוֹתָן עָלֶיךָ, וְהָנֵי אֵין מְזוֹנוֹתָן עָלֶיךָ. כִּדְתַנְיָא: נוֹתְנִין מְזוֹנוֹת לִפְנֵי כֶלֶב, וְאֵין נוֹתְנִין מְזוֹנוֹת לִפְנֵי חֲזִיר. וּמָה הֶפְרֵשׁ בֵּין זֶה לָזֶה? זֶה מְזוֹנוֹתָיו עָלֶיךָ, וְזֶה אֵין מְזוֹנוֹתָיו עָלֶיךָ.
Rav Yehuda could have said to you: Actually, mehalketin means that one feeds the bird by hand, and malkitin mean that one throws the food before them. And that which was difficult for you: Is throwing food before doves in a dove-cote or doves in an attic also not permitted on Shabbat? This is not difficult because with regard to these chickens and geese that were mentioned, sole responsibility for their sustenance is incumbent upon you as they are incapable of providing for themselves. However, in the case of these doves, responsibility for their sustenance is not incumbent upon you, and therefore, it is prohibited to place food before them, as it was taught in a baraita: One may place sustenance before a dog on Shabbat, but one may not place sustenance before a pig. And what is the difference between this and that? In this case of the dog, responsibility for its sustenance is incumbent upon you, and in that case of the pig, responsibility for its sustenance is not incumbent upon you, as no Jew raises pigs.
Shabbat 157 mukzeh setaside shabbat erev
Rabbi Shimon: Generally adopts a more lenient approach, allowing for practical needs and considering the value and intended use of items.
Rabbi Yehudah: Tends to be stricter, emphasizing the designated status of items and their value, leading to a broader application of Muktzeh.
Other Opinions: Often provide a middle ground or specific exceptions based on practical needs, emphasizing the importance of Shabbat observance while allowing for necessary actions.
This table provides a detailed overview of various Muktzeh scenarios, the factors involved, the opinions of the sages, and the rationale behind each opinion.
| **Muktzeh Scenario** | **Factors** | **Rabbi Shimon's Opinion** | **Rabbi Yehudah's Opinion** | **Other Opinions** |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| **1. Chopping wood from beams for cooking** | Designated for building | Forbids (Muktzeh) because he views it as a valuable item that cannot be used on Shabbat. | Forbids (Muktzeh) for similar reasons, emphasizing its designated status. | R. Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah permits it for practical needs on Yom Tov. |
| **2. Burning straw from a pile** | Unfit for animals, destined to burn | Permits, as straw is not valuable and is considered fit for burning. | Permits, since straw is not Muktzeh due to its unfit status. | R. Shimon permits straw but forbids valuable wood, as straw is not designated for a specific use. |
| **3. Burning wood from a storage area** | Saved for winter (Chisaron Kis) | Forbids (Muktzeh) because it is considered valuable and set aside for future use. | Forbids (Muktzeh) for the same reason, emphasizing its value. | R. Yosi permits other wood types that are not set aside. |
| **4. Giving drink to wilderness animals** | For slaughtering | Forbids, viewing wilderness animals as less significant for Shabbat needs. | Forbids, holding that all animals should be treated equally. | R. Yochanan relies on a Stam Mishnah permitting this for domestic animals, allowing for practical needs on Shabbat. |
| **5. Used earthenware lamp (Mi'us)** | Disgusting item | Forbids (Muktzeh) because it is considered repulsive and not suitable for use. | Forbids (Muktzeh) for similar reasons, emphasizing its disgusting nature. | Generally, all agree on Mi'us, recognizing the consensus on the repulsive nature of the item. |
| **6. Moving a big saw or plow blade** | Valuable tools | Forbids (Muktzeh) as these tools are essential for work and thus cannot be moved. | Forbids (Muktzeh) for the same reason, emphasizing their intended use. | All agree on this prohibition, recognizing the value and intended use of the tools. |
| **7. Items set aside for a specific purpose**| Designated for non-Shabbat use | Forbids (Muktzeh) because items set aside cannot be used on Shabbat. | Forbids (Muktzeh) as designated items remain Muktzeh. | R. Shimon allows some leniency, permitting exceptions based on necessity. |
| **8. Items that are not disgusting (non-Mi'us)** | General use | Permits, as non-disgusting items can be used on Shabbat. | Forbids, holding that even non-disgusting items may still be Muktzeh. | R. Yehudah forbids, while R. Shimon permits, allowing for practical use. |
פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַב אַחָא וְרָבִינָא, חַד אָמַר: בְּכׇל הַשַּׁבָּת כּוּלָּהּ הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, לְבַר מִמּוּקְצֶה מֵחֲמַת מִיאוּס, וּמַאי נִיהוּ? — נֵר יָשָׁן. וְחַד אָמַר: בְּמוּקְצֶה מֵחֲמַת מִיאוּס נָמֵי הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, לְבַר מִמּוּקְצֶה מֵחֲמַת אִיסּוּר, וּמַאי נִיהוּ? — נֵר שֶׁהִדְלִיקוּ בָּהּ בְּאוֹתָהּ שַׁבָּת, אֲבָל מוּקְצֶה מֵחֲמַת חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס, אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מוֹדֶה. דִּתְנַן: כׇּל הַכֵּלִים נִיטָּלִין בַּשַּׁבָּת, חוּץ מִמַּסָּר הַגָּדוֹל וְיָתֵד שֶׁל מַחֲרֵישָׁה.
Rav Aḥa and Ravina disputed this matter. One said: In all of the halakhot of Shabbat in which there is a tannaitic dispute involving Rabbi Shimon, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, except for the case of an item set aside due to repulsiveness. And what is that case? It is the case of an old oil lamp, which may not be moved on Shabbat, contrary to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion. And one said: In the case of an item set aside due to repulsiveness, the halakha is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon except for the case of set aside due to prohibition. And what is that case? It is the case of moving an oil lamp that one kindled for that very Shabbat. However, with regard to an item set aside due to monetary loss, even Rabbi Shimon concedes that it is prohibited to move that item, as we learned in a mishna according to his position: All vessels may be moved on Shabbat except for a large saw and the blade of a plow, both of which are prohibited. Due to their significance, their owners make certain that they will not be damaged.
Beitzah 2 table Introduction to the halachot of Muktzah, including scenarios, opinions, rationale, and factors. This table provides a structured overview of the halachot of Muktzah, illustrating the complexity and nuances of the laws as discussed in the Gemara.
| **Category of Muktzah** | **Scenario** | **Opinion** | **Rationale** | **Factors** |
|----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Hiktzehu Mi'Da'ato** | A person set aside fruit before Shabbos, intending not to use it. | Rebbi Yehudah: Prohibited | Objects not intended for use are Muktzah. | Intention at onset of Shabbos; conscious decision to set aside. |
| | | Rebbi Shimon: Permitted | If it has a permitted use, it can be used. | Object's potential for use on Shabbos. |
| **Nolad** | A utensil breaks on Shabbos. | Rebbi Yehudah: Prohibited | It did not exist in its current form before Shabbos. | Existence of the object during Bein ha'Shemashos. |
| | | Rebbi Shimon: Permitted | Advance intention is not necessary; it can be used if it becomes usable. | Change in status of the object on Shabbos. |
| **Muktzah Machmas Isur** | A tool used for a prohibited task is left aside. | Rebbi Yehudah: Prohibited | Remains Muktzah for the entire day if set aside at onset. | Status during Bein ha'Shemashos; intention to use it later. |
| | | Rebbi Shimon: Permitted | If it becomes usable, it can be moved. | Awareness of potential usability during Shabbos. |
| **Muktzah Machmas Mi'us** | A repulsive object (e.g., spoiled food) is present. | Rebbi Yehudah: Prohibited | Automatically considered Muktzah due to its repulsiveness. | Nature of the object; inherent uncleanliness. |
| **Kli She'Melachto Eino Ela L'Isur** | A tool used primarily for prohibited work is available. | Rebbi Yehudah: Prohibited | Considered Muktzah due to its primary use for prohibited tasks. | Exclusivity of the tool's use; potential for permitted use. |
| | | Rebbi Shimon: Permitted | Can be used for a permitted purpose, but not moved for protection. | Context of use; intention behind moving the object. |
| **Muchan L'Adam Eino Muchan L'Kelavim** | A live animal designated for slaughter is present. | Rebbi Yehudah: Prohibited | Designated for human use, thus Muktzah on Shabbos. | Designation of the object; potential for use after Shabbos. |
| | An animal dies on Yom Tov. | Rebbi Yehudah: Prohibited | It becomes unfit for human use, thus Muktzah. | Change in status of the object; original designation. |
| | | Rebbi Shimon: Permitted | Can be fed to dogs as it is no longer designated for human use. | Change in usability; context of the object's designation. |
| **Muktzah Machmas Gufo** | A rock or similar object is present. | Both: Prohibited | Intrinsically has no use; considered Muktzah. | Nature of the object; lack of designated purpose. |
| **Huktzah L'Mitzvaso** | An object designated for a Mitzvah is present. | Both: Prohibited | Cannot be used for other purposes that detract from the Mitzvah. | Designation for Mitzvah; status during Shabbos. |
| **Davar She'Eino Ra'uy She'Decha'o B'Yadayim** | Fruit set aside to dry before Shabbos. | Both: Prohibited | Consciously rendered unfit for use; remains Muktzah. | Intentional action to render unfit; status during Shabbos. |
| **Davar He'Asur Bein Ha'Shemashos** | Produce still attached to the ground. | Both: Prohibited | Remains prohibited even if the Isur is removed; not intended for use. | Status during Bein ha'Shemashos; original prohibition. |
| **Muktzah Machmas Chisaron Kis** | A fragile object (e.g., a Mohel's scalpel) is present. | Both: Prohibited | Set aside from use due to its fragility; using it may cause damage. | Nature of the object; risk of damage during use. |
| **General Prohibition of Muktzah** | Moving any Muktzah object on Shabbos. | Generally Mid'Rabanan | Instituted to prevent carrying between domains and to maintain the sanctity of Shabbos. | Context of use; intention behind the prohibition; historical reasons for the enactment. |
| | Eating Muktzah items (e.g., certain fruits) on Shabbos. | Rashi: Torah Prohibition | Eating Muktzah is considered a more severe violation. | Nature of the object; intentional exclusion from use. |
| | Moving a Kli she'Melachto l'Isur for protection. | Rebbi Yehudah: Prohibited | To prevent accidental use in a prohibited manner. | Context of the object's use; potential for misuse. |
| | Moving a Kli she'Melachto l'Isur for a permitted purpose. | Rebbi Shimon: Permitted | Allowed if it is for a permitted purpose or to make space. | Intention behind the movement; context of use. |
Summary and structured overview of the key points regarding the removal of Muktzah items due to concerns for **Kavod HaBeriyos** (human dignity) and the associated halachic rulings:
### Overview of Muktzah Movement for Kavod HaBeriyos
| **Aspect** | **Details** |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Definition** | Muktzah items are generally prohibited from being moved on Shabbos. However, exceptions exist for items that may offend sensibilities. |
| **Kavod HaBeriyos** | The Rabbis permit the removal of certain Muktzah items to avoid discomfort or embarrassment to people. |
| **Permitted Items** | - Soiled diapers- Bedpans- Dead or live bugs/roaches/mice- Dirty pots and pans- Organic waste (bones, shells, pits)- Overflowing or smelly garbage cans- Open gas valves- Sweeping a dirty floor- Leaks from pipes or air conditioners |
| **Conditions for Removal** | - Items must be in living areas or frequently used spaces.- Items in unused areas may not be removed unless they emit a foul smell causing discomfort. |
| **Method of Removal** | - Ideally, Muktzah items should be moved in an abnormal manner (e.g., using a knife or spoon) if possible.- Some poskim allow normal removal, especially for offensive items. |
| **Use of Non-Jew** | - Some poskim recommend having a non-Jew remove the items if available, while others do not require this. |
| **Examples of Offensive Items** | - Bedpans, soiled diapers, bugs, dirty pots, organic waste, overflowing garbage, open gas valves, dirty floors, and leaks. |
| **Covering Up** | - If removal is not possible, it is permitted to use a Muktzah item to cover up the offensive matter. |
| **Assisting in Removal** | - It is also permitted to use a Muktzah item to assist in the removal of foul-smelling items. |
### Halachic Sources
- **Igros Moshe**: Discusses the permissibility of moving Muktzah items for reasons of human dignity.
- **Mishnah Berurah**: Provides guidance on specific scenarios involving Muktzah items and their removal.
- **Aruch HaShulchan**: Mentions the option of using a non-Jew for the removal of Muktzah items.
Vows: clear and logical explanation of the laws regarding the annulment of vows (Nedarim) on Shabbat, including the factors involved, sourced opinions, and various scenarios.
### Overview of Key Concepts
1. **Mefirim (Annulment of Vows)**: A husband or father can annul vows made by a wife or daughter.
2. **Nish'alim (Requesting Permission for Vows)**: One can ask a Chacham (wise person) or Beis Din (Jewish court) to permit a vow.
3. **Need for Shabbat**: Certain actions regarding vows can only be performed if they are necessary for Shabbat.
### Key Opinions and Sources
1. **Mefirim on Shabbat**:
- **Mishnah**: States that a husband or father may annul vows on Shabbat, specifically if it is for the need of Shabbat.
- **Zuti d'vei Rav Papa's Beraisa**: Clarifies that Mefirim is permitted only for the need of Shabbat. If it is not for Shabbat, it is forbidden.
2. **Nish'alim on Vows**:
- **Mishnah**: Indicates that one can request permission for a vow on Shabbat, but this request must also be for the needs of Shabbat.
3. **Timing of Annulment (Hafarah)**:
- **Version #1 (Gemara)**: Discusses whether Mefirim is allowed regardless of the need for Shabbat. It suggests that Mefirim is only valid until nightfall on the day the vow was heard.
- **Ramban**: Suggests that even if one has 24 hours to annul a vow, if the vow was heard on Erev Shabbat, it can be annulled even if not for the sake of Shabbat, since it cannot be annulled after Shabbat.
4. **Debate on Timing**:
- **Rav Ashi (Mishnah)**: Raises a question about the timing of Hafarah, noting that it can be lenient or stringent depending on when the vow was made.
- **Tana'im (Beraisa)**:
- One opinion states that Hafarah is valid all day until nightfall.
- **R. Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah and R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon**: Argue that it is valid for 24 hours.
5. **Specific Cases**:
- **Mishnah**: Discusses specific scenarios regarding vows made on Shabbat night or shortly before dark, indicating the timeframes for annulment.
- **Rabanan**: Permitted a vow for Rav Zutra brei d'Rav Zeira even though he had time before Shabbat, indicating flexibility in the application of these laws.
### Scenarios
1. **Annulment for the Need of Shabbat**:
- If a husband hears a vow made by his wife on Shabbat and it is for the need of Shabbat (e.g., it affects their Shabbat meal), he can annul it.
2. **Annulment Not for the Need of Shabbat**:
- If the vow is not related to Shabbat (e.g., a personal vow that does not impact Shabbat), the husband cannot annul it on Shabbat.
3. **Timing of Vows**:
- **Vow Heard on Shabbat Night**: The husband can annul it until nightfall of that Shabbat.
- **Vow Heard Shortly Before Dark on Shabbat**: The husband can annul it until dark.
- **Failure to Annul Before Dark**: If he does not annul it before dark, he can never annul it.
4. **24-Hour Rule**:
- There is a debate about whether a husband has a full 24 hours to annul a vow or just until nightfall.
- **Option A**: Some opinions hold that he has until nightfall of the day he heard the vow.
- **Option B**: Others argue that he has a full 24 hours, allowing for annulment even after Shabbat if the vow was heard before Shabbat.
5. **Rabanan's Ruling**:
- In a specific case, Rabanan permitted a vow for Rav Zutra brei d'Rav Zeira even though he had time before Shabbat, indicating that there can be leniency in certain situations.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: וְהָאֲנַן תְּנַן: הֲפָרַת נְדָרִים כׇּל הַיּוֹם, וְיֵשׁ בַּדָּבָר לְהָקֵל וּלְהַחֲמִיר. כֵּיצַד? נָדְרָה לֵילֵי שַׁבָּת — מֵיפֵר לֵילֵי שַׁבָּת וְיוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת עַד שֶׁתֶּחְשַׁךְ. נָדְרָה עִם חֲשֵׁכָה — מֵיפֵר עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֶּחְשַׁךְ, שֶׁאִם לֹא הֵפֵר מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁכָה, אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר. תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: הֲפָרַת נְדָרִים כׇּל הַיּוֹם. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אָמְרוּ: מֵעֵת לְעֵת.
Rav Ashi said: Didn’t we learn in a mishna that one may nullify vows for the entire day, and there is both a leniency and a stricture in this matter to extend or curtail the period during which the vow may be nullified. How so? If the woman vowed on Shabbat evening, her father or husband may nullify the vow on Shabbat evening and on Shabbat day until dark. However, if she vowed before Shabbat at nightfall, her father or husband may only nullify the vow until nightfall, as if he did not nullify the vow before nightfall, he can no longer nullify it because the day ended. The Gemara answers that this issue is subject to a tannaitic dispute, as it was taught in a baraita: One may nullify vows for the entire day. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: For a twenty-four hour period.
The sugya (Talmudic discussion) you provided deals with the laws surrounding the annulment of vows (Nedarim) on Shabbat, focusing on the conditions under which a husband or father can annul vows, the timing of such annulments, and the specific needs related to Shabbat
### Key Concepts
1. **Mefirim (Annulment of Vows)**: A husband or father can annul vows made by a wife or daughter.
2. **Nish'alim (Requesting Permission for Vows)**: One can ask a Chacham (wise person) or Beis Din (Jewish court) to permit a vow.
3. **Need for Shabbat**: Certain actions regarding vows can only be performed if they are necessary for Shabbat.
### Breakdown of the Sugya
#### A. **Mefirim and Nish'alim on Shabbat**
- **Mishnah (a)**: States that a husband or father may annul vows on Shabbat (Mefirim) and can request permission for vows (Nish'alim) if it is for the need of Shabbat.
- **Implication**: The annulment of vows is permitted on Shabbat, but only if it serves a purpose related to Shabbat.
#### B. **Permissible Actions on Shabbat**
- **Examples (b-d)**: The text provides examples of permissible actions on Shabbat, such as plugging a hole for light and measuring, which illustrate that practical needs can justify certain actions on Shabbat.
#### C. **Questions and Interpretations**
1. **Version #1 (e)**:
- **Question**: Is Mefirim allowed regardless of the need for Shabbat, while Nish'alim is only permitted if needed for Shabbat?
- **Interpretation**: This suggests that Mefirim might be more lenient, but the distinction between Mefirim and Nish'alim is important.
2. **Answer (f)**:
- **Zuti d'vei Rav Papa's Beraisa**: Clarifies that Mefirim is permitted only for the need of Shabbat, leading to the inference that if it is not for Shabbat, it is forbidden (g).
3. **Version #2 (h)**:
- **Question**: Does "for the need of Shabbat" apply to both Mefirim and Nish'alim?
- **Interpretation**: This version explores whether Mefirim can be done even if not for Shabbat, as long as it is done before nightfall.
4. **Answer (i)**:
- **Zuti d'vei Rav Papa's Beraisa**: Again states that Mefirim is for the need of Shabbat, reinforcing the idea that the annulment must be relevant to Shabbat.
#### D. **Timing of Annulment (k)**
- **Hafarah Timing**:
- The discussion includes the timing of annulment (Hafarah) and whether it is valid until nightfall.
- **Scenarios**:
1. If a vow was made on Shabbat night, it can be annulled until nightfall.
2. If made shortly before dark, it can be annulled until dark.
3. If not annulled before dark, it cannot be annulled afterward.
#### E. **Debate Among Tana'im (l)**
- **Different Opinions**:
- The text notes a debate about whether Hafarah is valid all day until nightfall or for 24 hours.
- **R. Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah and R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon**: They argue that it is valid for 24 hours, suggesting a more lenient approach.
#### F. **Nish'alim on Vows (m-n)**
- **Question**: Is the ability to request permission for a vow only if there was no chance to do so before Shabbat?
- **Answer (o)**: Rabanan permitted a vow for Rav Zutra brei d'Rav Zeira even though he had time before Shabbat, indicating flexibility in the application of these laws.
Here's a factor table that outlines the key factors, scenarios, opinions, and rationales discussed in the sugya regarding the annulment of vows (Nedarim) on Shabbat:
| **Factor** | **Scenario** | **Opinions** | **Rationale** |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Mefirim (Annulment)** | Annulment of vows on Shabbat | 1. Mefirim is permitted for Shabbat needs (Zuti d'vei Rav Papa) | Annulment must serve a purpose related to Shabbat; otherwise, it is forbidden. |
| | | 2. Mefirim may be more lenient than Nish'alim (Version #1) | Suggests a distinction in the application of laws between Mefirim and Nish'alim. |
| **Nish'alim (Requesting Permission)** | Requesting permission for vows on Shabbat | 1. Nish'alim is only permitted if needed for Shabbat | Emphasizes the necessity of Shabbat in permitting requests for annulment. |
| | | 2. Rabanan permitted a vow for Rav Zutra brei d'Rav Zeira | Indicates flexibility in the application of the laws regarding requests for annulment. |
| **Timing of Annulment (Hafarah)** | Vow made on Shabbat night | 1. Can be annulled until nightfall | Timing is crucial; if made on Shabbat night, annulment is valid until nightfall. |
| | Vow made shortly before dark | 2. Can be annulled until dark | Reflects the importance of timing in the validity of annulments. |
| | Vow not annulled before dark | 3. Cannot be annulled afterward | Reinforces the strict timing rules regarding annulments. |
| **Debate Among Tana'im** | Duration of validity for Hafarah | 1. R. Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah: Valid for 24 hours | Suggests a more lenient approach to the duration of annulments. |
| | | 2. R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon: Valid all day until nightfall | Indicates differing opinions on the duration of annulment validity. |
| **Need for Shabbat** | Actions taken regarding vows | 1. Actions must be for the need of Shabbat | Establishes the principle that actions related to vows are only permissible if they serve Shabbat.|
| | | 2. Mefirim and Nish'alim both require relevance to Shabbat | Reinforces the necessity of Shabbat in both annulment and requests for permission. |
This table summarizes the key factors, scenarios, opinions, and rationales discussed in the sugya, providing a clear and organized overview of the complex Talmudic discussion surrounding the annulment of vows on Shabbat.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: וְהָאֲנַן תְּנַן: הֲפָרַת נְדָרִים כׇּל הַיּוֹם, וְיֵשׁ בַּדָּבָר לְהָקֵל וּלְהַחֲמִיר. כֵּיצַד? נָדְרָה לֵילֵי שַׁבָּת — מֵיפֵר לֵילֵי שַׁבָּת וְיוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת עַד שֶׁתֶּחְשַׁךְ. נָדְרָה עִם חֲשֵׁכָה — מֵיפֵר עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֶּחְשַׁךְ, שֶׁאִם לֹא הֵפֵר מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁכָה, אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר. תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: הֲפָרַת נְדָרִים כׇּל הַיּוֹם. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אָמְרוּ: מֵעֵת לְעֵת.
Rav Ashi said: Didn’t we learn in a mishna that one may nullify vows for the entire day, and there is both a leniency and a stricture in this matter to extend or curtail the period during which the vow may be nullified. How so? If the woman vowed on Shabbat evening, her father or husband may nullify the vow on Shabbat evening and on Shabbat day until dark. However, if she vowed before Shabbat at nightfall, her father or husband may only nullify the vow until nightfall, as if he did not nullify the vow before nightfall, he can no longer nullify it because the day ended. The Gemara answers that this issue is subject to a tannaitic dispute, as it was taught in a baraita: One may nullify vows for the entire day. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: For a twenty-four hour period.
From a q and answer for the kollel on BT shabbat 153 we learn Bava Kama (74b), namely "Lo Saneh," that a Pasuk can be used for both Misa and Malkos) https://www.dafyomi.co.il/bkama/tosfos/bk-ts-074.htm
LLM f-1 preview:
tl/dr:
+ The sugya demonstrates that a single biblical verse (Pasuk) can be the basis for both capital punishment (Misah) and lashes (Malkos), depending on the context of its application.
+ The key factor is often the Torah's explicitness in mentioning punishment types for specific violations, as seen with **Lo Sa'aneh**.
**Background**
* The discussion revolves around the laws of **Eidim Zom'min** (conspiring witnesses) and the application of **Misah** (capital punishment) versus **Malkos** (lashes).
* **La'av she'Niten le'Azharas Misas Beis-Din**: A biblical prohibition that, when violated, typically warrants capital punishment by a court (Beis Din). However, the sugya explores cases where such a prohibition might also lead to Malkos (lashes) under certain conditions.
**Key Points and Explanation**
1. **Initial Question**: If witnesses are not sentenced to death (Misah) for their false testimony, why are they not considered to have violated a **La'av she'Niten le'Azharas Misas Beis-Din**, which would normally imply a possibility of Misah but in this context might suggest they should receive Malkos instead?
2. **Reconciliation with Other Sugyos**:
- **Mechamer (Shabbos 154a/b)**: A law where the primary prohibition doesn't directly lead to Misah, yet it's considered a **La'av she'Niten le'Azharas Misas Beis-Din** for other related actions, showing a Pasuk can serve multiple punitive purposes.
- **Techumin (Eruvin 17b)**: Here, the same Pasuk warns against both a Misah-related offense (carrying on Shabbos) and a non-Misah offense (Techumin), illustrating a single Pasuk's dual application.
3. **Ri's Answer**:
- **Lo Sa'aneh (Deuteronomy 19:18-19)**: This verse is unique because it explicitly mentions punishment (Malkos) for conspiring witnesses, even though they might not face Misah in all scenarios.
- **Establishing the Pasuk in a Non-Misah Context**: Since the Torah explicitly mentions Malkos for **Lo Sa'aneh**, we apply this Pasuk in situations where Misah is not applicable (e.g., testifying about a ben Gerushah or ben Chalutzah), showing the Pasuk's dual utility.
4. **Addressing Counterpoints**:
- **Rebbi Meir vs. Rebbi Yehudah**: The discussion navigates differences in opinion regarding **La'av she'Ein bo Ma'aseh** (a prohibition without an action). The resolution involves understanding that even Rebbi Yehudah might agree in specific contexts where the Torah's explicitness (like in **Lo Sa'aneh**) dictates the application of Malkos.
- **Learning from Motzi-Shem-Ra**: The sugya clarifies that while we learn about punishments from **Motzi-Shem-Ra**, the explicit mention of Malkos in **Lo Sa'aneh** is crucial for understanding its application in non-Misah scenarios.
**Conclusion**
* **A Pasuk Can Serve Both Misah and Malkos Purposes**:
+ The sugya demonstrates that a single biblical verse (Pasuk) can be the basis for both capital punishment (Misah) and lashes (Malkos), depending on the context of its application.
+ The key factor is often the Torah's explicitness in mentioning punishment types for specific violations, as seen with **Lo Sa'aneh**.
+ This principle allows for flexibility in applying biblical laws to various scenarios, ensuring that justice is served according to the nuances of each case.
הוה ליה לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד - אבל אי אין נהרגין לא חשיב לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד ותימה לר"י דבכל גמרא משמע אפי' התרו בו למלקות ולא למיתה דאע"ג שלעולם לא יבא לידי חיוב מיתה כיון שלא התרו בו למיתה חשיב לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד ובפרק מי שהחשיך (שבת דף קנד. ושם ד"ה בלאו) אמר דאין לוקין על לאו דמחמר . משום דהוי לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד לשאר מלאכות אע"ג דבמחמר אין בו חיוב מיתה ובפ"ק דעירובין (דף יז:) אמר דאין לוקין בתחומין דהוי אזהרה נמי להוצאה ואפי' מאן דפליג נמי לא קאמר אלא משום דמי כתיב אל יוציא אל יצא כתיב אע"פ שאין מיתה בתחומין אפילו למ"ד דאורייתא ותי' ר"י דשאני לאו דלא תענה דגלי ביה קרא דלקי מוהיה אם בן הכות הרשע כדאמרינן בריש מכות (דף ב: ושם) ובפ"ק דסנהדרין (דף י. ושם) וכיון דגלי קרא מוקמינן ליה לקרא במקום שאין יכול לבא לידי חיוב מיתה כי ההיא דהתם דמעידין שהוא בן גרושה או בן חלוצה או כמו עדים שהוכחשו בנפש למ"ד אין נהרגין כשהוזמו לבסוף אבל למ"ד נהרגין אין סברא להעמיד בו הפסוק כיון שיכול לבא לידי חיוב מיתה וכי פריך התם דת"ל מלא תענה פי' ולמ"ל קרא דוהיה אם בן הכות הרשע ומשני משום דה"ל לאו שאין בו מעשה הוה מצי לשנויי דהוה לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד כה"ג בעלמא לא לקי אלא דבעי לשנויי לכ"ע אפי' אליבא דר"מ דנפקא ליה אזהרה לעדים זוממים מקרא אחרינא בפ"ק דמכות (ד' ד:) וא"ת והשתא דמשני משום דה"ל לאו שאין בו מעשה לא אתי אליבא דר' יהודה דאמר (שם) לאו שאין בו מעשה לוקין עליו וי"ל דדחיק טפי לשנויי כר"מ משום דאיירי התם (שם.) בסיפא גבי מאתים זוז וגבי מלקות משמע דבבן גרושה או בן חלוצה מודה א"נ אתי ההוא שינויא כרבי יהודה דהא טעמא דרבי יהודה דאמר לאו שאין בו מעשה לוקין עליו משום דגמר ממוציא ש"ר ומעדים זוממין בבנין אב ואי לאו דגלי בעדים זוממין מוהיה אם בן הכות הרשע הוה אמרי' בכל דוכתי דלאו שאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו וא"ת דההיא שינויא היכי אתי אליבא דר"מ והא לר"מ בלא והיה אם בין הכות הרשע ידעינן דלקו עדים זוממין אע"פ שאין בו מעשה דגמרינן ממוציא ש"ר כי היכי דגמר בפ"ק דמכות (שם:) ממוציא ש"ר דעדים זוממין לוקין ומשלמין וי"ל דאע"ג דגמר ממוציא ש"ר היינו דוקא לענין שלוקין ומשלמין משום דאיכא לאוקמי כדי רשעתו לדרשה אחריתי כדאיתא באלו נערות (כתובות דף לב.) אבל לענין לאו שאין בו מעשה דילפינן מלעשות באלו הן הלוקין (מכות ד' יג.) דבעינן לאו שיש בו מעשה לא הוה גמרינן ממוציא ש"ר אי לאו דגלי קרא בהדיא ועוד י"ל דמוציא ש"ר גופיה לא נפקא לן דלקי אלא מוהיה אם בן הכות הרשע כדאמר בכתובות פרק נערה (כתובות ד' מו.) דגמר ויסרו מויסרו כו' והא דאמר בפ"ק דמכות (ד' ד:) ורבנן האי לא תענה מאי דרשי ביה ההוא מיבעי ליה לאזהרת עדים זוממין פי' ולהכי לא לקי אלא ארבעים במעידים על פלוני שחייב מלקות לא בעי למימר דלא לקי אלא תענה משום דהוי לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד דהא במעידים עליו שהוא בן גרושה אמרי רבנן דלקי ובמעידים שחייב לפלוני מאתים זוז אי לאו כדי רשעתו היו לוקין ומשלמין אלא ה"פ ההוא מבעי ליה לאזהרת עדים זוממין דמשום כאשר זמם לא לקו כשמעידים על פלוני שחייב מלקות אלא משום לא תענה דלא ענש הכתוב אא"כ הזהיר הלכך אלאו דלא תענה לא לקי שמונים פי' שילקו משום עדות שקר שהעידו ומשום כאשר זמם ותרוייהו משום לאו אחד אבל במעידים שחייב מאה זוז דבלאו קרא דלא תענה היה מתחייב לשלם משום כאשר זמם דממון לא בעי אזהרה התם ודאי אי לאו כדי רשעתו הוה לקי מלא תענה וכן במעידים שהוא בן גרושה או בן חלוצה:
from f1-mini-preview
I'll break down the sugya (Talmudic discussion) into its components, explain the reasoning, and highlight the **Kashyot (Questions/Challenges)** and **Makchishim (Confusing/Counterintuitive) aspects**:
**Topic:** Carrying items on Shabbos using a donkey or another person, and related Shabbos labor laws.
**Sugya Breakdown:**
1. **Initial Scenario (a-b)**
* **Mishnah:** If no non-Jew is around, one can put an item on a donkey to carry it home on Shabbos.
* **Question (b):** Isn't this "Machemer" (making an animal work), violating "Lo Sa'aseh Chol Melachah... u'Vhemtecha" (not doing any labor, including through your animals)?
2. **First Resolution (c-e)**
* **Answer (Rav Ada bar Ahavah):** Put the item on the donkey while it's walking (no "Akirah," initial labor acquiring).
* **Follow-up Question (d):** What about when the donkey stops to urinate or defecate and then resumes walking (implying "Hanachah," or placing, when it stops again)?
* **Response (e):** Remove the item when the donkey stops and replace it when it starts walking again.
3. **Expansion and Challenge (f-g)**
* **Question (f):** Why not allow a Jew to carry another's item in a similar manner, or to carry non-Muktzeh (non-restricted) items this way?
* **Answer (Rav Papa):** Introduces a principle: if one is liable for an action done alone, doing it with another person is exempt but forbidden; however, if one is exempt for an action with another person, doing it with a donkey is permitted.
4. **Related Scenario (h-j)**
* **Statement (Rav Ada bar Ahavah):** One carrying a load from before Shabbos may run home with it.
* **Clarification:** Only running is permitted, not walking, to avoid inadvertently stopping (which would be "Akirah" and "Hanachah").
* **Question (i):** What about stopping to open the door upon arriving home (which involves transferring from a public to a private domain)?
* **Answer (j):** Throw the load into the house in an awkward manner (which is exempt).
5. **Punishment for Violating Mechamer (k-m)**
* **Version #1 (Rami bar Chama):** One who violates "Mechamer" (making an animal work) on Shabbos is liable for a sin offering if done unintentionally and stoning if done intentionally.
* **Explanation (Rabah):** The Torah equates the animal's labor to the person's labor in terms of liability.
6. **Challenges to the Punishment Explanation (n-p)**
* **Objection #1 (Rava):** If the Torah equates all sins in severity (comparing to idolatry), why differentiate punishments for "Mechamer"?
* **Objection #2 (Rava):** A Mishnah implies there's a Shabbos violation not punishable by sin offering or stoning; could this be "Mechamer"?
* **Answers #1 & #2:** No, it refers to other violations (leaving the Techum or burning, depending on the interpretation).
**Kashyot (Questions/Challenges) and Makchishim (Confusing/Counterintuitive Aspects):**
* **Kashya:** Why differentiate between carrying an item on a donkey based on whether it's walking or stopped? (Resolved through the concept of Akirah and Hanachah.)
* **Makchish:** The initial permission to use a donkey seems to contradict the principle of not making animals work on Shabbos. (Addressed by the specific conditions under which it's allowed, i.e., no Akirah.)
* **Kashya:** The distinction between running and walking with a load to avoid Akirah and Hanachah seems arbitrary. (Understood through the practical application of avoiding inadvertent labor.)
* **Makchish:** The principle introduced by Rav Papa about actions with another person versus with a donkey might seem unclear or overly nuanced. (Clarified by understanding the exemptions and prohibitions in the context of shared labor and animal labor.)
* **Kashya:** The punishment for Mechamer and its explanation might raise questions about consistency in Torah punishments. (Challenged and addressed through comparisons with other sins and the specific interpretations of different violations.)
וְעוֹד, תְּנַן: הַמְחַלֵּל אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת בְּדָבָר שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת וְעַל זְדוֹנוֹ סְקִילָה. מִכְּלָל דְּאִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּאֵין חַיָּיבִין עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת וְלֹא עַל זְדוֹנוֹ סְקִילָה,
And furthermore, with regard to the statement that if he drove the laden donkey he is liable to be executed by stoning, we learned in a mishna that enumerates those who are executed by stoning: One who desecrates Shabbat by performing a matter that for its unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and for its intentional performance one is liable to be executed by stoning. By inference, there is another matter, another prohibition, that for which its unwitting performance one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, and for which its intentional performance one is not liable to be executed by stoning.
from f1-mini-preview
I'll break down the sugya (Talmudic discussion) into its components, explain each part, address the **Kashiot (Questions/Concerns)**, and provide logical connections between the ideas. the three shitas
**Initial Statements**
* **(a) Rav Zevid (Rami bar Chama)**:
+ **Shabbos b'Shogeg (unintentional Sabbath violation)**: No **Chatas (Sin Offering)**
+ **Shabbos b'Mezid (intentional Sabbath violation)**: **Skilah (Stoning)**
* **Focus**: Mechamer (one who has an animal perform a forbidden labor on Shabbos)
**First Question and Answer**
* **(b) Rava's Question (on a Mishnah)**:
+ If someone violates Shabbos and does something that would normally warrant a **Chatas b'Shogeg**, they are liable for **Skilah b'Mezid**.
+ **Inference (Kashia)**: If no **Chatas b'Shogeg**, then no **Skilah b'Mezid**?
* **(c) Answer**:
+ The Mishnah doesn't explicitly state this rule applies to all cases.
+ **Explanation**: There might be exceptions (like Mechamer) where the rule doesn't apply as inferred.
**Second Version and Its Implications**
* **(d) Rava (brother of Rav Mari bar Rachel) - R. Yochanan**:
+ **Mechamer on Shabbos**:
- **B'Shogeg**: No **Chatas** (since the Torah's prohibition is likened to idolatry, requiring personal action).
- **B'Mezid**: No **Skilah** (citing the Mishnah that implies if no **Chatas b'Shogeg**, then no **Skilah b'Mezid**).
**Kashiot and Answers Within This Version**
* **Kashia (e)**: Why no **Malkot (Lashes)** for the Lav (prohibition)?
+ **Answer**: The warning is for **Misas Beis Din (Court-imposed death penalty)**, which applies to personal actions, not indirect ones like Mechamer.
* **Counter Opinion (f) - R. Yishmael** (who might obligate lashes for such a Lav):
+ **Question**: Why does the Torah specify "Ata ...u'Vhemtecha" (you and your animal) instead of just warning against all Melachah (work)?
+ **Answer**: To teach liability is for one's own actions, not those of their animal.
**Clarification of All Kashiot and Logical Connections**
1. **Initial Kashia (b)**: If no **Chatas b'Shogeg**, then no **Skilah b'Mezid**?
* **Logical Connection**: This question challenges the universality of the rule. The answer (c) suggests exceptions might exist, like Mechamer, where the direct action requirement (for both Chatas and Skilah) isn't met.
2. **Kashia in (e)**: No **Malkot** for Mechamer?
* **Logical Connection**: The prohibition's warning is tied to Misas Beis Din, which doesn't apply to indirect actions (Mechamer), thus no lashes.
3. **Counter Opinion Kashia (f)**: Why specify "Ata ...u'Vhemtecha"?
* **Logical Connection**: This specification limits liability to personal actions, aligning with why Mechamer doesn't incur Chatas, Skilah, or Malkot - it's not a direct violation by the person.
**Summary of Mechamer's Status on Shabbos Across Opinions**
* **Rav Zevid (a)**: Doesn't directly address Mechamer's status.
* **Rava - R. Yochanan (d)**:
+ **B'Shogeg**: No Chatas
+ **B'Mezid**: No Skilah
+ **Additional (e & f)**: No Malkot, due to the nature of the prohibition and the requirement for direct personal action.
further analysis
I'll break down the sugya (Talmudic discussion) step by step, explaining each part, the questions, and the various opinions (Shittos) presented. This will cover the topic of liability for "Mechamer" (one who has his animal perform labor) on Shabbos.
**Topic:** Liability for Mechamer on Shabbos (Shabbat)
**Text Structure:**
- **(a)**: Opinion of Rav Zevid (Rami bar Chama)
- **(b)**: Question by Rava based on a Mishnah
- **(c)**: Answer to Rava's Question
- **(d)**: Opinion of Rava (brother of Rav Mari bar Rachel) - R. Yochanan
- **(e & f)**: Further Analysis on Lashes for Mechamer
### **(a) Rav Zevid (Rami bar Chama)**
* **Shogeg (Unintentional)**: Not Chayav (liable) for Chatas (Sin Offering)
* **B'Mezid (Intentional)**: Stoned
**Implication:** Intentional violation leads to severe punishment, but unintentional does not warrant a Sin Offering.
### **(b) Rava's Question (Based on a Mishnah)**
* **Mishnah's Statement:** If someone desecrated Shabbos and did something that would normally warrant a Chatas if done unintentionally, they are liable for Skilah (Stoning) if done intentionally.
* **Rava's Inference:** If an action isn't Chayav Chatas b'Shogeg, it shouldn't lead to Skilah b'Mezid.
**Question's Focus:** Challenging the implication that Mechamer might not fit the typical liability pattern.
### **(c) Answer to Rava's Question**
* **Clarification:** The Mishnah doesn't explicitly state the inference Rava made.
* **Alternative Explanation:**
1. Actions Chayav Chatas b'Shogeg indeed lead to Skilah b'Mezid.
2. **Mechamer is a Special Case:** Not Chayav Chatas b'Shogeg but still Chayav Skilah b'Mezid, differing from the typical pattern.
**Resolution:** Mechamer's liability doesn't necessarily follow the standard Shabbos violation liability structure.
### **(d) Rava (brother of Rav Mari bar Rachel) - R. Yochanan**
* **Mechamer on Shabbos is Exempt:**
1. **B'Shogeg:** No Chatas, as the Torah's prohibition is akin to idolatry, requiring personal action.
2. **B'Mezid:** No Stoning, based on Rava's earlier question and the special nature of Mechamer.
**Additional Point:** No lashes for the Lav (prohibition) because:
- The warning pertains to Misas Beis Din (court-imposed death penalty) for personal Melachah (work), not applicable to Mechamer.
- **Even R. Yishmael,** who might otherwise obligate lashes for such a Lav, would exempt here due to the specific phrasing of the Torah ("Ata ...u'Vhemtecha"), emphasizing personal responsibility.
### **(e & f) Further Analysis on Lashes**
* **(e):** Reiterates no lashes due to the nature of the prohibition and punishment.
* **(f):** Explains R. Yishmael's potential exemption for Mechamer:
1. **Torah's Phrasing:** "Ata ...u'Vhemtecha" (You...and your animal) could imply liability only for one's own actions.
2. **Conclusion:** Even a stricter opinion (R. Yishmael) would agree Mechamer doesn't warrant lashes.
**Shittos (Opinions) Summary:**
1. **Rav Zevid (Rami bar Chama):**
* Shogeg: No Chatas
* B'Mezid: Stoned
2. **Rava (brother of Rav Mari bar Rachel) - R. Yochanan:**
* Shogeg: No Chatas
* B'Mezid: No Stoning, No Lashes
3. **R. Yishmael (as discussed in the context of lashes):**
* Would typically consider lashes for certain prohibitions but agrees to exempt Mechamer due to the Torah's phrasing emphasizing personal action.
וַאֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לוֹקִין, לִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה כׇל מְלָאכָה וּבְהֶמְתֶּךָ״, ״אַתָּה״ לְמָה לִי? הוּא נִיהוּ דְּמִיחַיַּיב, בִּבְהֶמְתּוֹ לָא מִיחַיַּיב.
And even according to the one who said that one is flogged for violating a prohibition that was given as a warning of court-imposed capital punishment, the halakha with regard to driving a laden animal can be derived by means of an inference from the language of the verse. Let the Torah write: “You shall not perform any manner of labor…and neither shall your animal.” Why do I need the superfluous word you in the phrase: You and your animal? Rather it is to teach that it is he himself who is liable for performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat; however, for a prohibited labor performed by his animal, he is not liable.
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/shabbos/points/sh-ps-155.htm
From f1-preview the discussion about Tzedadim (sides) and Tzidei Tzedadim (sides of sides) in simpler terms, focusing on the key points and their implications.
### Tzedadim and Tzidei Tzedadim
#### (a) Rava's Statement
- **Opinion**: Rava states that the opinion which forbids Tzedadim (using the sides of something) also forbids Tzidei Tzedadim (using the sides of the sides). Conversely, the opinion that permits Tzidei Tzedadim also permits Tzedadim.
- **Implication**: There is a consistent stance on both concepts; if one is forbidden, the other is too, and vice versa.
#### (b) Question from Beraisa
- **Scenario**: A peg is inserted into a tree, and a basket (four by four Tefachim wide) is hung above 10 Tefachim. The Eiruv (a boundary marker for carrying on Shabbos) is invalid (Pasul) in this case.
- **Contrast**: If the basket is hung below 10 Tefachim, the Eiruv is valid (Kosher).
- **Inference**: Below 10 Tefachim, the basket is valid because it rests on a peg in the tree. If it hung directly on the tree itself, it would be invalid in any case.
- **Question**: The Tana (teacher in the Beraisa) seems to forbid Tzedadim (using the tree itself) but permit Tzidei Tzedadim (using a peg in the tree). This contradicts Rava's statement.
#### (c) Answer from Rav Papa
- **Clarification**: The basket has a narrow opening. If it were attached directly to the tree, one would not be able to remove the food without moving the tree, which is forbidden.
- **Resolution**: The Beraisa is not contradicting Rava. The basket resting on a peg is permissible because it avoids the issue of moving the tree itself.
#### (d) Halachah (Final Ruling)
- **Ruling**: Tzedadim are forbidden, and Tzidei Tzedadim are permitted.
- **Implication**: The final ruling aligns with Rava's statement, confirming that Tzedadim are indeed forbidden, while Tzidei Tzedadim are allowed.
#### (e) Rav Ashi's Application
- **Scenario**: Resting a ladder against a date tree to climb it.
- **Prohibition**: Since Tzedadim are forbidden, one may not rest a ladder directly against the tree.
- **Solution**: Insert a peg into the tree and rest the ladder against the peg.
- **Additional Rule**: When climbing, one may not step on the peg; only on the rungs of the ladder.
- **Implication**: This practical application ensures that one avoids using the tree itself (Tzedadim) while still achieving the necessary task.
### Simplified Summary
1. **Rava's Principle**:
- **Forbids Tzedadim**: If an opinion forbids using the sides of something, it also forbids using the sides of those sides.
- **Permits Tzidei Tzedadim**: If an opinion permits using the sides of the sides, it also permits using the sides.
2. **Beraisa Example**:
- **Above 10 Tefachim**: Hanging a basket on a peg in a tree is invalid for an Eiruv.
- **Below 10 Tefachim**: Hanging a basket on a peg in a tree is valid for an Eiruv.
- **Inference**: The basket on a peg is valid because it avoids direct use of the tree, which is forbidden.
3. **Rav Papa's Clarification**:
- **Narrow Opening**: The basket has a narrow opening, making it impossible to remove food without moving the tree if it were directly attached.
- **Resolution**: The Beraisa is consistent with Rava's principle because the peg avoids the issue of moving the tree.
4. **Halachah**:
- **Final Ruling**: Tzedadim (using the sides of something) are forbidden, while Tzidei Tzedadim (using the sides of the sides) are permitted.
5. **Practical Application (Rav Ashi)**:
- **Resting a Ladder**: One may not rest a ladder directly against a date tree.
- **Insert a Peg**: Instead, insert a peg into the tree and rest the ladder against the peg.
- **Climbing**: When climbing, step only on the rungs of the ladder, not on the peg.
.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ צְדָדִין אֲסוּרִין, הַאי דַּרְגָּא דְּמִדַּלְיָא — לָא לַינְּחֵיהּ אִינִישׁ אַדִּיקְלָא, דְּהָווּ לְהוּ צְדָדִין. אֶלָּא, לַינְּחֵיהּ אַגְּווֹאזֵי לְבַר מִדִּיקְלָא, וְכִי סָלֵיק — לָא לַינַּח כַּרְעֵיהּ אַגְּווֹאזֵי, אֶלָּא לִיתְּנַח אַקָּנִין.
Rav Ashi said: Now that you said that the halakha is that use of the sides is prohibited, with regard to this ladder that one climbs to an elevated area, a person may not lean it against the palm tree itself because it is considered use of the sides of the tree on Shabbat. Rather, he should lean it on stakes that are external to the trunk of the palm tree. And when one climbs the ladder, he should not place his foot on the stakes. Rather, he should place it on the rungs of the ladder because it is prohibited to use the sides of the tree.
Certainly! Let's break down the key issues and the main disagreement (machlokes) in the sugya (Talmudic discussion) about making and improving food on Shabbos.
### Key Issues:
1. **Tirchah (Exertion for Improvement):**
- **Definition:** Actions that improve food that is already edible.
- **Example:** Cutting fodder or carobs for animals.
2. **Shivuy Ochel (Making Food):**
- **Definition:** Actions that transform something inedible into edible food.
- **Example:** Crushing straw to make it edible for animals.
### Main Disagreement (Machlokes):
#### **Rav Huna vs. Rav Yehudah:**
- **Rav Huna:**
- **Stance:** Tirchah (improving food) is **permitted** on Shabbos.
- **Stance:** Shivuy Ochel (making food) is **forbidden** on Shabbos.
- **Supporting Evidence:**
- The Mishnah allows untying and spreading out **Peki'in** (two-straw bundles) and **Kipin** (three-straw bundles) but not **Zirin** (cedar branches).
- The Mishnah forbids cutting fodder or carobs for both big (Gasah) and small (Dakah) animals, suggesting that even improving soft, edible food is not considered Tirchah.
- **Rav Yehudah:**
- **Stance:** Shivuy Ochel (making food) is **permitted** on Shabbos.
- **Stance:** Tirchah (improving food) is **forbidden** on Shabbos.
- **Supporting Evidence:**
- The Mishnah allows cutting gourds in front of animals and a Nevelah (carcass) in front of dogs, suggesting that making hard, inedible items edible is allowed.
- A Beraisa (ancient teaching) allows crushing straw and mixing it with fodder, which could be seen as making inedible straw edible.
### Specific Challenges and Resolutions:
1. **Challenge to Rav Huna (h-i):**
- **Issue:** The Mishnah forbids cutting carobs for animals, even though carobs are soft and edible. This seems to contradict Rav Huna's view that Tirchah is permitted.
- **Resolution:** The carobs in question are actually hard, like fodder that is too hard for young donkeys to eat. Therefore, this is not a case of improving soft, edible food but rather dealing with hard, inedible food.
2. **Challenge to Rav Yehudah (l-m):**
- **Issue:** R. Yehudah permits cutting carobs for a small animal (Dakah). If the first Tana (author of the Mishnah) forbids Shivuy Ochel but permits Tirchah, then R. Yehudah's permission for a small animal should apply to a big animal as well, since the carobs are already edible.
- **Resolution:** There is a suggestion that "Dakah" might refer to a fussy big animal, not a small one. However, this is rejected because the term "Dakah" in the Mishnah clearly refers to a small animal. This point remains unresolved.
3. **Challenge to Rav Yehudah (n-o):**
- **Issue:** The Mishnah allows cutting gourds for animals and a Nevelah for dogs. If gourds are soft and edible, this suggests that Tirchah is permitted, contradicting Rav Yehudah's view.
- **Resolution:** The Nevelah is hard, like elephant meat or too hard for young puppies. Therefore, this is a case of making inedible food edible (Shivuy Ochel), not improving edible food (Tirchah).
4. **Challenge to Rav Yehudah (s-t):**
- **Issue:** A Beraisa allows crushing straw and mixing it with fodder for young donkeys. This seems to permit Tirchah.
- **Resolution:** The straw is spoiled and inedible, so this is a case of Shivuy Ochel, not Tirchah.
### Summary of the Machlokes:
- **Rav Huna** believes that improving food (Tirchah) is permitted, but transforming inedible items into food (Shivuy Ochel) is forbidden.
- **Rav Yehudah** believes that transforming inedible items into food (Shivuy Ochel) is permitted, but improving food (Tirchah) is forbidden.
### Unresolved Points:
- The exact meaning of "Dakah" in R. Yehudah's statement remains unclear. Is it a small animal or a fussy big animal? This ambiguity leaves a part of the discussion open to further interpretation.
מַתְנִי׳ מַתִּירִין פְּקִיעֵי עָמִיר לִפְנֵי בְּהֵמָה, וּמְפַסְפְּסִין אֶת הַכִּיפִין, אֲבָל לֹא אֶת הַזִּירִין. אֵין מְרַסְּקִין לֹא אֶת הַשַּׁחַת וְלֹא אֶת הֶחָרוּבִין לִפְנֵי בְּהֵמָה, בֵּין דַּקָּה וּבֵין גַּסָּה. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַתִּיר בֶּחָרוּבִין לַדַּקָּה.
MISHNA: One may untie peki’in of grain before an animal on Shabbat, and one may spread the kifin but not the zirin. These terms will be explained in the Gemara. One may not crush hay or carobs before an animal on Shabbat in order to facilitate its eating. He may do so neither for a small animal [daka] nor for a large one. Rabbi Yehuda permits to do so with carobs for a small animal, because it can swallow the hard carobs only with difficulty.
Let's re-examine the challenge to Rav Yehudah in a more detailed and clear manner. This point remains difficult because the Talmud cannot fully explain the distinction R. Yehudah makes between small and big animals in the context of cutting carobs, given the broader rules of **Tirchah** and **Shivuy Ochel**.
### Challenge to Rav Yehudah (l-m):
#### **Issue:**
- **R. Yehudah's Statement:** R. Yehudah permits cutting carobs for a small animal (Dakah).
- **First Tana's Statement:** The Mishnah forbids cutting fodder or carobs for both big (Gasah) and small (Dakah) animals.
The challenge arises from the following logic:
- If the first Tana (author of the Mishnah) forbids **Shivuy Ochel** (making inedible food edible) but permits **Tirchah** (improving food that is already edible), then cutting carobs, which are already edible, should be considered **Tirchah**.
- Since **Tirchah** is permitted, cutting carobs should be allowed for both big and small animals.
- However, R. Yehudah only permits cutting carobs for a small animal (Dakah), not for a big animal (Gasah).
#### **Resolution:**
1. **Suggestion:**
- **Interpretation of "Dakah":** Perhaps "Dakah" does not mean a small animal but rather a big animal that is fussy (Daika) about its food.
- **Logic:** If "Dakah" means a fussy big animal, then R. Yehudah's permission would only apply to a specific type of big animal that is particular about its food, not to all small animals.
2. **Rejection:**
- **Textual Evidence:** The Mishnah in the beginning (Reisha) uses "Dakah" in contrast to "Gasah" (big animal), clearly indicating that "Dakah" means a small animal.
- **Consistency:** If the first Tana uses "Dakah" to mean a small animal, it is reasonable to assume that R. Yehudah is using the term in the same way.
- **Conclusion:** Since "Dakah" consistently refers to a small animal, R. Yehudah's permission for cutting carobs for a small animal does not logically extend to big animals.
#### **Why This Point Remains Unresolved:**
- **Logical Inconsistency:** If the first Tana forbids **Tirchah** (improving food) and R. Yehudah permits cutting carobs for a small animal, it implies that cutting carobs for a small animal is not considered **Tirchah**.
- **Contradiction:** If cutting carobs for a small animal is not **Tirchah**, then it should also be permitted for a big animal, which contradicts the Mishnah's blanket prohibition.
- **Ambiguity:** The Talmud cannot reconcile why R. Yehudah would permit cutting carobs for a small animal but not for a big animal if both actions are considered **Tirchah**.
### Simplified Explanation:
- **First Tana's View:** Forbids **Tirchah** (improving food) and permits **Shivuy Ochel** (making inedible food edible).
- **R. Yehudah's View:** Permits **Shivuy Ochel** and forbids **Tirchah**.
- **Challenge:** If cutting carobs is **Tirchah** (improving edible food), and **Tirchah** is generally forbidden, why does R. Yehudah allow it for a small animal but not for a big animal?
- **Resolution Attempt:** Suggest that "Dakah" might mean a fussy big animal, but this is rejected because the Mishnah clearly uses "Dakah" to mean a small animal.
- **Unresolved Question:** Why is cutting carobs for a small animal permitted by R. Yehudah if it is considered **Tirchah** and **Tirchah** is generally forbidden?
מִי סָבְרַתְּ ״דַּקָּה״ — דַּקָּה מַמָּשׁ? מַאי ״דַּקָּה״ — גַּסָּה, וּמַאי קָרֵי לַהּ ״דַּקָּה״ — דְּדָיְיקָא בְּאוּכְלָא.
The Gemara rejects this: Do you hold that the small animal [daka] mentioned here is referring to an actual small animal? No; rather, what is the meaning of daka here? It is referring to a large animal. And what is the reason that the mishna calls it daka? Because it is particular [dayka] about its food. Since this animal can eat uncrushed carobs when there is no alternative, one may exert himself and crush them for it.