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The Perils of Option Paralysis: A modern Mussar perspective

I. Mussar: The Art of Minding the Gap

(א) אָמַר הַמְחַבֵּר: הַחִבּוּר הַזֶּה לֹא חִבַּרְתִּיו לְלַמֵּד לִבְנֵי הָאָדָם אֶת אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָדְעוּ, אֶלָּא לְהַזְכִּירָם אֶת הַיָּדוּעַ לָהֶם כְּבָר וּמְפֻרְסָם אֶצְלָם פִּרְסוּם גָּדוֹל. כִּי לֹא תִּמְצָא בְּרוֹב דְּבָרַי, אֶלָּא דְּבָרִים שֶׁרֹב בְּנֵי הָאָדָם יוֹדְעִים אוֹתָם וְלֹא מִסְתַּפְּקִים בָּהֶם כְּלָל.

(ב) אֶלָּא שֶׁכְּפִי רֹב פִּרְסוּמָם וּכְנֶגֶד מַה שֶׁאֲמִתָּתָם גְּלוּיָה לַכֹּל, כָּךְ הַהֶעְלֵם מֵהֶם מָצוּי מְאֹד וְהַשִּׁכְחָה רַבָּה. עַל כֵּן אֵין הַתּוֹעֶלֶת הַנִּלְקָט מִזֶּה הַסֵּפֶר יֹצֵא מִן הַקְּרִיאָה בּוֹ פַּעַם אַחַת, כִּי כְּבָר אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא יִמְצָא הַקּוֹרֵא בְּשִׂכְלוֹ חִדּוּשִׁים אַחַר קְרִיאָתוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הָיוּ בּוֹ לִפְנֵי קְרִיאָתוֹ, אֶלָּא מְעַט. אֲבָל הַתּוֹעֶלֶת יֹצֵא מִן הַחֲזָרָה עָלָיו וְהַהַתְמָדָה. כִּי יִזָּכְרוּ לוֹ הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה הַנִּשְׁכָּחִים מִבְּנֵי הָאָדָם בְּטֶבַע, וְיָשִׂים אֶל לִבּוֹ חוֹבָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר הוּא מִתְעַלֵּם מִמֶּנָּה.

(1) The writer says: I have composed this work not to teach people what they do not know but to remind them of what they already know and which is very familiar to them. For you will find in most of my words only things which most people already know and do not have any doubt about.

(2) But according to their familiarity and to the extent that their truth is evident to all, so too is their neglect very prevalent and forgetfulness of them very great. Therefore, the benefit to be gleaned from this book is not from a single reading, for it is possible that the reader will learn little that he did not already know. Rather the benefit derived [from this book] comes from review and diligent study. For [then] he will be reminded of these things which, by nature, people tend to forget and he will put to heart his duties which he hides from.

(יב) וְהַחֲסִידוּת הָאֲמִתִּי הַנִּרְצֶה וְהַנֶּחְמָד, רָחוֹק מִצִּיּוּר שִׂכְלֵנוּ. כִּי זֶה דָּבָר פָּשׁוּט, מִלְּתָא דְּלָא רַמְיָא עֲלֵהּ דְּאֱינַשׁ, לָאו אַדַּעְתֵּהּ

(יג) וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכְּבָר קְבוּעִים בְּלֵב כָּל הָאָדָם הַיָּשָׁר הַתְחָלוֹתָיו וִיסוֹדוֹתָיו, אִם לֹא יַעֲסֹק בָּהֶם, יִרְאֶה פְּרָטָיו וְלֹא יַכִּירֵם, יַעֲבֹר עֲלֵיהֶם וְלֹא יַרְגִּישׁ בָּם

(יד) רְאֵה כִּי אֵין דִּבְרֵי הַחֲסִידוּת וְעִנְיְנֵי הַיִּרְאָה וְהָאַהֲבָה וְטָהֳרַת הַלֵּב דְּבָרִים מֻטְבָּעִים בָּאָדָם עַד שֶׁלֹּא יִצְטָרְכוּ אֶמְצָעִים לִקְנוֹתָם. אֶלָּא יִמְצְאוּ אוֹתָם בְּנֵי הָאָדָם בְּעַצְמָם כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּמְצְאוּ כָּל תְּנוּעוֹתֵיהֶם הַטִּבְעִיּוֹת כַּשֵּׁנָה וְהַיְּקִיצָה, הָרָעָב וְהַשֹּׂבַע, וְכָל שְׁאָר הַתְּנוּעוֹת הַחֲקוּקוֹת בְּטִבְעֵנוּ. אֶלָּא וַדַּאי שֶׁצְּרִיכִים הֵם לְאֶמְצָעִים וּלְתַחְבּוּלוֹת לִקְנוֹת אוֹתָם.

(12) Thus the true piety that is acceptable and cherished is far from what our minds conceive to us. For it is obvious "that which a person does not feel a responsibility to do, does not occupy a place on his mind".

(13) Although the beginnings and foundations of [piety] are already implanted in every upright person's heart, nevertheless if he does not engage himself in their study, he will encounter its branches but won't recognize them and he will tread over them without perceiving that he is doing so.

(14) Observe that matters of piety and fear and love [of G-d], and purity of heart are not things innately implanted in a person whereby he would not need means to acquire them such as sleep and wakefulness, hunger and satiation, and all the other responses naturally implanted in our nature. Rather, certainly it is necessary to employ means and strategies to acquire them.

II. Freedom: The Holy Grail of Western Thought

Michael Sandel, Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do

Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion

Barry Schwartz, https://www.ted.com/talks/barry_schwartz_the_paradox_of_choice?language=en

III. The Complex and Holy Jewish Grail: Obligation

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: מֵרֵישׁ הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: מַאן דַּהֲוָה אָמַר לִי הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: סוֹמֵא פָּטוּר מִן הַמִּצְוֹת – עָבֵידְנָא יוֹמָא טָבָא לְרַבָּנַן, דְּהָא לָא מִיפְּקִידְנָא וְהָא עָבֵידְנָא. הַשְׁתָּא דְּשַׁמְעִיתַהּ לְהָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: גָּדוֹל מְצֻוֶּוה וְעוֹשֶׂה יוֹתֵר מִמִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְצֻוֶּוה וְעוֹשֶׂה, אַדְּרַבָּה: מַאן דְּאָמַר לִי דְּאֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה עָבֵידְנָא יוֹמָא טָבָא לְרַבָּנַן.
Rav Yosef, who was blind, said: At first I would say: If someone would tell me that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A blind person is exempt from fulfilling the mitzvot, I would make a festive day for the rabbis, as I am not commanded and yet I perform the mitzvot. This means my reward is very great. Now that I have heard that which Rabbi Ḥanina says: Greater is one who is commanded to do a mitzva and performs it than one who is not commanded to do a mitzva and performs it, on the contrary: If someone would tell me that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and a blind person is obligated in mitzvot, I would make a festive day for the rabbis.

(יב) [יב] "ואבדיל אתכם מן העמים להיות לי" – אם מובדלים אתם מן העמים הרי אתם לשמי ואם לאו הרי אתם של נבוכדנצר מלך בבל וחבריו. ר' אלעזר בן עזריה אומר מנין שלא יאמר אדם "אי אפשי ללבוש שעטנז. אי אפשי לאכול בשר חזיר. אי אפשי לבוא על הערוה" אבל "אפשי ומה אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי כך"? תלמוד לומר "ואבדיל אתכם מן העמים להיות לי" – נמצא פורש מן העבירה ומקבל עליו עול מלכות שמים.

(12) 12) (Vayikra 20:26) "and I have set you apart from the peoples to be Mine": If you are separate from the peoples, you are Mine; if not, you are "Nevuchadnezzar's" and his cohorts'. R. Elazar b. Azaryah says: Whence is it derived that a man should not say: I do not desire to wear sha'atnez; I do not desire to eat the flesh of a pig; I do not desire to cohabit with ervah (illicit relations). I do desire it, but what can I do? My Father in heaven has decreed against it! — From "and I have set you apart from the peoples to be unto Me." It is found, then, that he separates from sin because he accepted upon himself the Kingdom of heaven.

IV. Infinite Responsibility

״וַיִּתְיַצְּבוּ בְּתַחְתִּית הָהָר״, אָמַר רַב אַבְדִּימִי בַּר חָמָא בַּר חַסָּא: מְלַמֵּד שֶׁכָּפָה הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא עֲלֵיהֶם אֶת הָהָר כְּגִיגִית, וְאָמַר לָהֶם: אִם אַתֶּם מְקַבְּלִים הַתּוֹרָה מוּטָב, וְאִם לָאו — שָׁם תְּהֵא קְבוּרַתְכֶם. אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב: מִכָּאן מוֹדָעָא רַבָּה לְאוֹרָיְיתָא. אָמַר רָבָא: אַף עַל פִּי כֵן הֲדוּר קַבְּלוּהָ בִּימֵי אֲחַשְׁוֵרוֹשׁ, דִּכְתִיב: ״קִיְּמוּ וְקִבְּלוּ הַיְּהוּדִים״ — קִיְּימוּ מַה שֶּׁקִּיבְּלוּ כְּבָר.
The Gemara cites additional homiletic interpretations on the topic of the revelation at Sinai. The Torah says, “And Moses brought forth the people out of the camp to meet God; and they stood at the lowermost part of the mount” (Exodus 19:17). Rabbi Avdimi bar Ḥama bar Ḥasa said: the Jewish people actually stood beneath the mountain, and the verse teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, overturned the mountain above the Jews like a tub, and said to them: If you accept the Torah, excellent, and if not, there will be your burial. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: From here there is a substantial caveat to the obligation to fulfill the Torah. The Jewish people can claim that they were coerced into accepting the Torah, and it is therefore not binding. Rava said: Even so, they again accepted it willingly in the time of Ahasuerus, as it is written: “The Jews ordained, and took upon them, and upon their seed, and upon all such as joined themselves unto them” (Esther 9:27), and he taught: The Jews ordained what they had already taken upon themselves through coercion at Sinai.
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 202-203
The ethical relation, the face to face, cuts across every relation one could call mystical....
The face in which the other- the absolutely other- presents himself does not negate the same, does not do violence to it...
This presentation [the face] is preeminently nonviolence, for instead of offending my freedom, it calls it to responsibility and founds it.
The Other that we meet in the face is vulnerable. We can do good or evil to the Other. We can decide to fulfill or not to fulfill the Other’s needs. Thus with the Other breaking in on our alone-ness, this eruption of the infinite into the finite totality of our being, suddenly what we do has meaning. On one hand, welcoming the other is “the commencement of moral consciousness, which calls in question my freedom.” 9 We cannot do just what we like, as there are the needs of another to consider. On the other hand, responsibility to the Other means my choices have meaning. Levinas claims, “The presence of the Other, a privileged heteronomy, does not clash with freedom, but invests it.” 10
Being and Being Taught: Levinas, Ethics, Education, Stephen Hancock

(ג) הַחֵלֶק הָרִאשׁוֹן שֶׁבָּרִאשׁוֹן הוּא בַּמַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבֵּין אָדָם לַמָּקוֹם, וְעִנְיָנוֹ קִיּוּם כָּל הַמִּצְוֹת בְּכָל הַדִּקְדּוּקִים שֶׁבָּהֶם עַד מָקוֹם שֶׁיַּד הָאָדָם מַגַּעַת, וְאֵלֶּה הֵם שֶׁקְּרָאוּם חֲזַ"ל שְׁיָרֵי מִצְוָה, וְאָמְרוּ (סוכה ל"ח): שְׁיָרֵי מִצְוָה מְעַכְּבִים אֶת הַפֻּרְעָנוּת, כִּי אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁגּוּף הַמִּצְוָה נִשְׁלַם זוּלָתָם וּכְבָר יָצָא בָּזֶה יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ, הִנֵּה זֶה לְכָל הֲמוֹן יִשְׂרָאֵל, אַךְ הַחֲסִידִים אֵין לָהֶם אֶלָּא לְהַרְבּוֹת בְּהַשְׁלָמָתָם וְלֹא לְמַעֵט בָּהֶם כְּלָל.

(3) The first subdivision of the first division, namely, piety in deed between man and G-d, its matter is for a person to fulfill the mitzvot in all their fine details to the furthest extent of one's ability. Our sages, of blessed memory, called these "the remnants of a mitzva". They said: "the remnants of the mitzvot prevent divine punishment" (Sukkah 38a). For even though the body of a mitzvah is fulfilled without them and one has already discharged his obligation, nevertheless, this is sufficient for the general masses of the Jewish people. But those who are Pious must only increase fulfillment in the mitzvot and not omit any detail whatsoever of them.

Rabbi Ira Stone, Commentary to Mesillat Yesharim p. 195
Hasidut, love as expressed in deeds…
The first distinction, between mitzvot bein adam l'makom (mitzvot between a
person and God) and mitzvot bein adam v'havero (mitzvot between one person and
another), requires little comment by this time. These are better understood
in a contemporary context as Interrupuve mitzvot, those that continually call us back
to wakefulness of our responsibility for another, and instantiative mitzvot, those that realize this responsibility in action.

(ה) בַּגּוּף, שֶׁיִּהְיֶה מִשְׁתַּדֵּל לַעֲזֹר כָּל אָדָם בְּמָה שֶׁיּוּכַל וְיָקֵל מַשָּׂאָם מֵעֲלֵיהֶם, וְהוּא מָה שֶׁשָּׁנִינוּ (אבות פ"ו): וְנוֹשֵׂא בְעֹל עִם חֲבֵרוֹ, וְאִם מַגִּיעַ לַחֲבֵרוֹ אֵיזֶה נֶזֶק בְּגוּפוֹ, וְהוּא יוּכַל לִמְנֹעַ אוֹתוֹ אוֹ לַהֲסִירוֹ, יִטְרַח כְּדֵי לַעֲשׂוֹתוֹ.

(5) Body: that one strives to help all men however he can, and lighten the burden that is upon them. As we learned: "bearing the yoke with one's fellow" (Avot 6:6). If his fellow is about to be struck by some bodily harm and he can prevent it or remove it, he should exert himself to do so.

Rav Ira Stone, Commentary to Mesillat Yesharim, p. 197
How is the abundance of good expressed? As we learned earlier, through obligations to the body, belongings, and soul of the other. Addressing the body first, Ramchal quotes the famous verse in chapter a of Pirke Avot, which is at heart of the Mussar of Rabbi Simcha Zissel of Kelm, who was a primary student of Mussar's founder, Rabbi Israel Salanter. In his Hochma UMussar, Rabbi Zissel defines "bearing a burden with one's neighbor” (chapter 1- Paragraph 1) as the functional equivalent of loving one's neighbor as oneself. This means undertaking to provide for everything and anything that another person accurately perceives to be his or her burden: lightening person's physical burden, protecting the person against oppression, or rising to defend the person when he or she is threatened.
וְאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: הַכֹּל בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם, חוּץ מִיִּרְאַת שָׁמַיִם. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְעַתָּה יִשְׂרָאֵל מָה ה׳ אֱלֹקֶיךָ שׁוֹאֵל מֵעִמָּךְ כִּי אִם לְיִרְאָה״.
Tangentially, the Gemara cites an additional statement by Rabbi Ḥanina concerning principles of faith. And Rabbi Ḥanina said: Everything is in the hands of Heaven, except for fear of Heaven. Man has free will to serve God or not, as it is stated: “And now Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you other than to fear the Lord your God, to walk in all of His ways, to love Him and to serve the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul” (Deuteronomy 10:12). The Lord asks man to perform these matters because ultimately, the choice is in his hands.

V. Responsibility as Privilege

רַבִּי חֲנַנְיָא בֶּן עֲקַשְׁיָא אוֹמֵר, רָצָה הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא לְזַכּוֹת אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל, לְפִיכָךְ הִרְבָּה לָהֶם תּוֹרָה וּמִצְוֹת, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה מב) ה׳ חָפֵץ לְמַעַן צִדְקוֹ יַגְדִּיל תּוֹרָה וְיַאְדִּיר:

Said Rabbi Hananiah ben Akashya: It pleased the Holy Blessed One to grant merit to Israel, that is why He gave them Torah and commandments in abundance, as it is said, “The Lord was pleased for His righteousness, to make Torah great and glorious” (Isaiah 42:21).

לֹ֥א תַחְמֹ֖ד בֵּ֣ית רֵעֶ֑ךָ לֹֽא־תַחְמֹ֞ד אֵ֣שֶׁת רֵעֶ֗ךָ וְעַבְדּ֤וֹ וַאֲמָתוֹ֙ וְשׁוֹר֣וֹ וַחֲמֹר֔וֹ וְכֹ֖ל אֲשֶׁ֥ר לְרֵעֶֽךָ׃ (פ)
You shall not covet your neighbor’s house: you shall not covet your neighbor’s wife, or male or female slave, or ox or ass, or anything that is your neighbor’s.

לא תחמוד. אנשים רבים יתמהו על זאת המצוה. איך יהיה אדם שלא יחמוד דבר יפה בלבו כל מה שהוא נחמד למראה עיניו. ועתה אתן לך משל. דע כי איש כפרי שיש לו דעת נכונה והוא ראה בת מלך שהיא יפה לא יחמוד אותה בלבו שישכב עמה. כי ידע כי זה לא יתכן. ואל תחשוב זה הכפרי שהוא כאחד מן המשוגעים שיתאוה שיהיו לו כנפים לעוף השמים. ולא יתכן להיות כאשר אין אדם מתאוה לשכב עם אמו אע"פ שהיא יפה. כי הרגילוהו מנעוריו לדעת שהיא אסורה לו. ככה כל משכיל צריך שידע כי אשה יפה או ממון לא ימצאנו אדם בעבור חכמתו ודעתו. רק כאשר חלק לו השם. ואמר קהלת (לאשר) [ולאדם שלא עמל בו] יתננו חלקו. ואמרו חכמים בני חיי ומזוני לאו בזכותא תליא מלתא אלא במזלא. ובעבור זה המשכיל לא יתאוה ולא יחמוד. ואמר שידע שאשת רעהו אסרה השם לו יותר היא נשגבה בעיניו מבת מלך בלב הכפרי על כן הוא ישמח בחלקו ולא ישים אל לבו לחמוד ולהתאוות דבר שאינו שלו. כי ידע שהשם לא רצה לתת לו. לא יוכל לקחתו בכחו ובמחשבותיו ובתחבולותיו. על כן יבטח בבוראו שיכלכלנו ויעשה הטוב בעיניו.

THOU SHALT NOT COVET. Many people are amazed at this commandment. They ask, how is it possible for a person not to covet in his heart all beautiful things that appear desirable to him? I will now give you a parable. Note, a peasant of sound mind who sees a beautiful princess will not entertain any covetous thoughts about sleeping with her, for he knows that this is an impossibility. This peasant will not think like the insane who desire to sprout wings and fly to the sky, for it is impossible to do so. Now just as a man does not desire to sleep with his mother, although she be beautiful, because he has been trained from his childhood to know that she is prohibited to him, so must every intelligent person know that a person does not acquire a beautiful woman or money because of his intelligence or wisdom, but only in accordance with what God has apportioned to him. Indeed, Koheleth states, yet to a man that hath not labored therein shall he leave it for his portion (Eccles. 2:21). Furthermore, our sages taught, children, life, and sustenance are not dependent upon a person’s merits but upon the stars. The intelligent person will therefore neither desire nor covet. Once he knows that God has prohibited his neighbor’s wife to him she will be more exalted in his eyes than the princess is in the eyes of the peasant. He will therefore be happy with his lot and will not allow his heart to covet and desire anything which is not his. For he knows that that which God did not want to give him, he cannot acquire by his own strength, thoughts, or schemes. He will therefore trust in his creator, that is, that his creator will sustain him and do what is right in His sight.

Steven Greenberg, A Jewish Ritual of Same-Sex Union, 93-94
The erusin is the decisive act of marriage. It is about the closing off of options. For some people, the choice of marriage is an act of determined ferociousness, a killing off of a myriad of potential lives in order to actually live one life. Erusin is the formal relinquishing of the infinite possibilities that loving one person uniquely demands. This sort of commitment entails a reckoning with mortality and a welcoming of finitude. Of course, a new—and in its own way infinite—territory is born by the decision to love one person. The joy of this new world is at the center of the nisuin.
(יט) הַעִדֹ֨תִי בָכֶ֣ם הַיּוֹם֮ אֶת־הַשָּׁמַ֣יִם וְאֶת־הָאָ֒רֶץ֒ הַחַיִּ֤ים וְהַמָּ֙וֶת֙ נָתַ֣תִּי לְפָנֶ֔יךָ הַבְּרָכָ֖ה וְהַקְּלָלָ֑ה וּבָֽחַרְתָּ֙ בַּחַיִּ֔ים לְמַ֥עַן תִּֽחְיֶ֖ה אַתָּ֥ה וְזַרְעֶֽךָ׃ (כ) לְאַֽהֲבָה֙ אֶת־ה׳ אֱלֹקֶ֔יךָ לִשְׁמֹ֥עַ בְּקֹל֖וֹ וּלְדׇבְקָה־ב֑וֹ כִּ֣י ה֤וּא חַיֶּ֙יךָ֙ וְאֹ֣רֶךְ יָמֶ֔יךָ לָשֶׁ֣בֶת עַל־הָאֲדָמָ֗ה אֲשֶׁר֩ נִשְׁבַּ֨ע ה׳ לַאֲבֹתֶ֛יךָ לְאַבְרָהָ֛ם לְיִצְחָ֥ק וּֽלְיַעֲקֹ֖ב לָתֵ֥ת לָהֶֽם׃ {פ}
(19) I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day: I have put before you life and death, blessing and curse. Choose life—if you and your offspring would live— (20) by loving your God ה׳, heeding God’s commands, and holding fast to [God]. For thereby you shall have life and shall long endure upon the soil that ה׳ swore to your fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to give to them.

VI. Mussar: From Theory to Practice

הרב אליהו דסלר

נקודת הבחירה

כששני עמים נלחמים, הנה המלחמה היא במקום מערכתה, כל מה שאחורי צבא העם האחד הוא כולו תחת רשומו ואין לו שום ניגוד כלל. וכן מה שהוא מאחורי השני כולו ברשות השני. אם האחד ינצח פעם בקרב, וידחה את השני מרחק מה, אזי בהתחדש הקרב יהיה במקום שיעמדו שניהם אז, אבל במקום שרכש לו הראשון שם אין עוד מלחמה כי הוא ברשותו. הרי שבפעל יש רק חזית אחת, ובכח, כל שטח שתי המדינות הוא מקום הקרב.

כן הוא גם בענין הבחירה. כל אדם יש לו בחירה, היינו בנקודת פגישת האמת שלו עם האמת המדומה תולדת השקר, חבל רוב מעשיו הם במקום שאין האמת והשקר נפגשים שם כלל. כי יש הרבה מן האמת שהאדם מחונך לעשותו, ולא יעלה על דעתו כלל לעשות ההיפך, וכן הרבה אשר יעשה מן הרע והשקר, שלא יבחין כלל שאין ראוי לעשותו, אין הבחירה שייכת אלא בנקודה שבין צבאו של היצה"ט לצבאו של היצה"ר. הרבה נכשלים תמיד בלשון הרע, מפני שהורגלו בו, ולא יעלה על דעתם כלל כי רע הוא, ואותם אנשים לא יבוא לפניהם יצר הרע להציע להם מחשבת חילול שבת, ביטול תפלה, וציצית ותפלין, וכדומה, והיינו משום שבשבת, ותפלין, וציצית, נתחנכו והורגלו כל כך עד שאין כניסה שם ליצר הרע.

אמנם נקודה זו של הבחירה אינה עומדת תמיד על מצב אחד, כי בבחירות הטובות האדם עולה למעלה, היינו שהמקומות שהיו מערכת המלחמה מקודם, נכנסים לרשות היצה"ט, ואז המעשים הטובים שיוסיף לעשות בהם יהיה בלי שום מלחמה ובחירה כלל, וזהו "מצוה גוררת מצוה"; וכן להיפך, הבחירות הרעות מגרשות היצה"ט ממקומו, וכשיוסיף לעשות מן הרע ההוא יעשנו בלי בחירה, כי אין עוד אחיזה ליצה"ט במקום ההוא. וזהו אז"ל (אבות ד', ב') "עבירת גוררת עבירה", וכן "כיון שעבר אדם עבירה ושנה בה הותרה לו" (יומא פ"ו).

Miktav M'Eliyahu (Trans. RA Carmel) p. 52

R. Eliyahu Dessler

Koln, England, Bnai Brak 1892-1953

The Behira-Point

When two armies are locked in battle, fighting takes place only at the battlefront. Territory behind the lines of one army is under that army's control and little or no resistance need be expected there. A similar situation prevails in respect of territory behind the lines of the other army. If one side gains a victory at the front and pushes the enemy back, the position of the battlefront will have changed. In fact, therefore, fighting takes place only at one location, though potentially the line could be drawn anywhere in territories of the two contending countries

The Moral Battlefront

The situation is very similar with regard to behira. Everyone has free choice -- at the point where truth meets falsehood. In other words behira takes place at that point where the truth as the person sees it confronts the illusion produced in him by the power of falsehood. But the majority of a person's actions are undertaken without any clash between truth and falsehood taking place. Many of a person's actions may happen to coincide with what is objectively right because he has been brought up that way and it does not occur to him to do otherwise, and many bad and false decisions may be taken simply because the person does not realize that they are bad. In such cases no valid behira, or choice, has been made. Free will is exercised and a valid behira made only on the borderline between the forces of good and the forces of evil within that person.

OBSERVANT JEWS AND BEHIRA

For example, many otherwise observant Jews are prone to speak evil of others, thus transgressing the prohibition against lashon ha-ra' without even realizing that it is a grave sin. Yet these same people would not dream of transgressing the laws of Shabbat; their yetzer ha-ra' does not even tempt them to do this or to miss prayers or not to don tzitzit or tefillin, because they have been brought up to do these things without question. |There is thus no behira involved in any of these cases. Behira comes into play only when one is tempted to go against the truth as one sees it, and the forces on either side are more or less equally balanced. The point at which this equilibrium is reached obviously varies with the individual and depends on many factors, such as heredity, environment, education, etc. But there is no human being who does not have a "behira-point" somewhere along the scale.

FLUID FRONT

It must be realized that this behira-point does not remain static in any given individual. With each good behira successfully carried out, the person rises higher in spiritual

level: that is, things that were previously in the line of battle are now in the area controlled by the yetzer ha-tov and actions done in that area can be undertaken without struggle and without behira. In this sense we can understand the saying that “one mitzvah leads to another.' And “as soon as one has committed a sin twice, it is no longer a sin for him”