אתי דובור ומבטל דיבור

Learn the גמ׳ לא בא אחר וקידשה בה with רש״י
Is there any case you think that everyone would agree that your words can be מבטל your original words? Is there any circumstance that you think everyone would agree your words cannot be מבטל your original words?
Why does the גמ׳ only ask about the halacha if the אשה is חוזר why don't we have the same discussion about the איש ?
After the גמ׳ tells us that נתינת המעות is like a מעשה, how do we understand the מח׳ between ר״י and ר״ל ?
If it is a מעשה why does ר״ל call it דיבור ?
Why does ר״י hold that you can be מבטל such a מעשה ?

קידושין נ״ט א:י״ב-ט״ו

לֹא בָּא אַחֵר וְקִידְּשָׁהּ, וְחָזְרָה בָּהּ, מַהוּ? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חוֹזֶרֶת – אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר, וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת – לָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בִּיטֵּל, אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא תָּרַם בִּיטֵּל – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה. וְהָא הָכָא דְּדִיבּוּר וְדִיבּוּר הוּא, וְקָאָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר! שָׁאנֵי נְתִינַת מָעוֹת לְיַד אִשָּׁה, דְּכִי מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמוּ, וְלָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל מַעֲשֶׂה. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְהִגִּיעַ בַּשָּׁלִיחַ אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁלַח אַחֲרָיו שָׁלִיחַ וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״גֵּט שֶׁנָּתַתִּי לְךָ בָּטֵל הוּא״ – הֲרֵי זֶה בָּטֵל. וְהָא נְתִינַת גֵּט לְיַד שָׁלִיחַ, דְּכִי נְתִינַת מָעוֹת לְיַד אִשָּׁה דָּמֵי, וְקָתָנֵי הֲרֵי זֶה בָּטֵל! הָתָם נָמֵי, כֹּל כַּמָּה דְּלָא מְטָא גִּיטָּא לִידַהּ – דִּיבּוּר וְדִיבּוּר הוּא, אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל הַכֵּלִים יוֹרְדִין לִידֵי טוּמְאָתָן בְּמַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵין עוֹלִים מִידֵּי טוּמְאָתָן אֶלָּא בְּשִׁינּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה.

Kiddushin 59a:12-15

The Gemara asks: If another did not come and betroth her, and she retracted her consent to the betrothal within thirty days, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: She can retract her consent. Why? This statement, by which she changes her mind, comes and nullifies her previous statement when she agreed to the betrothal. Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract her consent, as her second statement does not come and nullify her previous statement. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a mishna (Terumot 3:4): In a case where someone appointed an agent to separate teruma from his produce on his behalf, and he subsequently canceled the agency, the halakha depends on the following: If he canceled the appointment before the agent separated the teruma, his teruma is not teruma. And here it is a case involving one statement and a second statement, as the owner of the produce appointed the agent and rescinded his appointment by speech. This shows that a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement. Reish Lakish replied: Giving money to a woman is different, as it is considered like an action, and a mere statement does not come and nullify the action of the transfer of money. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a further objection to Reish Lakish: With regard to one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, and later the husband encountered the agent or sent another agent after him and in this manner said to him: The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified, it is thereby nullified. And giving a bill of divorce to an agent is considered to be like giving money to a woman, and yet this baraita teaches that it is nullified, which indicates that speech can override even an action. Reish Lakish answered: There too, as long as the bill of divorce has not reached the woman’s hand it is considered a case of one statement and a second statement. There is no halakhic significance to the transmitting of a bill of divorce to an agent, as only its delivery to the wife is considered an action. Therefore, the act of transferring the bill of divorce to the agent is of no consequence and in this particular case a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement. raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan: All vessels descend into their state of contracting ritual impurity by means of thought. Although an unfinished vessel cannot become ritually impure, if the craftsman decided not to work on it any further, it immediately assumes the status of a completed vessel and can become ritually impure. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. A ritually impure vessel, once it undergoes physical change, is no longer ritually impure.

קידושין נ״ט ב:א׳-ג׳

מַעֲשֶׂה מוֹצִיא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וּמִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה, מַחְשָׁבָה אֵין מוֹצִיאָה לֹא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וְלֹא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה. בִּשְׁלָמָא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה לָא מַפְּקָה, דְּלָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל מַעֲשֶׂה, אֶלָּא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה מִיהָא תַּפֵּיק! שָׁאנֵי מַחְשָׁבָה דְּטוּמְאָה, דְּכִי מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, וְכִדְרַב פָּפָּא. דְּרַב פָּפָּא רָמֵי: כְּתִיב: ״כִּי יִתֵּן״, וְקָרֵינַן: ״כִּי יוּתַּן״. הָא כֵּיצַד? ״כִּי יוּתַּן״ דֻּומְיָא ״דְּכִי יִתֵּן״. מָה ״יִתֵּן״ דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ, אַף ״יוּתַּן״, דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ.

Kiddushin 59b:1-3

An action undertaken to improve the vessel negates both the status created by an earlier action that supposedly completed the vessel and the status created by the thought not to perform more work on the vessel. In that case the vessel cannot contract ritual impurity until the craftsman has finished working on it. By contrast, a thought to improve the vessel negates neither status created by action nor status created by thought. Reish Lakish finds this difficult for the following reason: Granted, thought does not negate action, as a statement does not come and nullify action. But it should at least offset thought. This halakha indicates that a statement does not nullify a previous statement. The Gemara answers: Thought in the case of ritual impurity is different, as it is considered like action, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa raises a contradiction: With regard to the halakha that produce must become wet in order for it to contract ritual impurity, the verse states: “But if water is placed [vekhi yuttan] upon the seed, and any part of a carcass falls upon it, it is impure” (Leviticus 11:38). The word yuttan is written defective, and is written as if it says ki yitten. Accordingly, this would mean that one must actively place the water on the produce. Yet we read it, based on the tradition as to its correct pronunciation, “ki yuttan,” which includes any situation where the produce becomes wet. How so? How can the way the verse is written and the way it is read be reconciled? Rav Pappa explains that the standard of “if water is placed [ki yuttan]” is similar to: If one places [ki yitten]; just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is satisfactory to the owner for the produce to become wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term “is placed [yuttan]” means that it is satisfactory to the owner that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself. This is proof that thought is equivalent to action with regard to ritual impurity, as if one is satisfied with the produce becoming wet it is considered as though he actively placed the water himself. By the same reasoning, thought which renders a vessel susceptible to ritual impurity is powerful enough to require an action to counteract its effect.