Bava Kamma: Greatest Hits

§ Rabbi Zeira says that Rav Huna says: For the purchase of an object with which to fulfill a mitzva, one should spend up to one-third. The Gemara asks: To what does this one-third refer? If we say it means that one should spend up to one-third of his estate to perform a mitzva, but if that is so, and if it happened to him that he became obligated in three mitzvot at the same time, should he give his entire estate away in order to fulfill those mitzvot? One is certainly not required to do so. Rather, what Rabbi Zeira said is that for the embellishment of the performance of a mitzva, e.g., to purchase a more beautiful item used in the performance of a mitzva, one should spend up to one-third more than the cost of the standard item used to perform the mitzva. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: How is this one-third calculated? Is it one-third from within, i.e., he calculates the cost of a standard item, adds one-third of that value, and spends the total on purchasing a more beautiful item; or is it one-third from without, i.e., one-third of the sum he ultimately spends should be the additional sum added in order to purchase a more beautiful item? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved. In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say in the name of Rabbi Zeira: Of the money one spends on purchasing a more beautiful item to perform a mitzva, up to one-third more than the cost of a standard item comes from his own finances, but from this point forward, any additional sum spent on purchasing a more beautiful item comes from the largesse of the Holy One, Blessed be He, i.e., God will reimburse him for spending that additional sum.

The Gemara continues to consider the possibility that there are additional cases covered by the mishna’s ruling aside from the one listed in the baraita: And are there not more cases? But isn’t there also the case of that which is taught in a baraita: If one was beaten by ten people with ten sticks, whether they beat him simultaneously or one after the other, and he died, they are all exempt from liability for killing him. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Where they beat him sequentially, the last individual to beat him alone is liable, because he hastened his death. In this case, the other individuals contributed to the man’s death, but the last one alone is liable. Why didn’t the baraita also mention this case?

The Gemara presents three sources for this halakha. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, and similarly, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The verse states with regard to the liability of one who takes a false oath that he had not stolen: “When a man or woman shall commit any of the sins of a person” (Numbers 5:6). The verse equates a woman with a man with regard to all punishments in the Torah. The school of Rabbi Elazar taught: The verse states with regard to the civil laws given following the revelation at Sinai: “And these are the civil laws that you shall set before them” (Exodus 21:1). The reference to “them” in the verse is referring to all those who stood at the revelation, both men and women. The verse thereby equates a woman with a man with regard to all civil laws in the Torah. The school of Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili taught: The verse states with regard to liability in a case where one’s ox kills a person: “And it killed a man or a woman” (Exodus 21:29). The verse thereby equates a woman with a man with regard to all killings in the Torah, i.e., the liability incurred is the same whether the person killed was a man or a woman. The Gemara notes: And all three sources are necessary, as had the Torah taught us only the first source, one might have said that it is there that men and women are equated, as the Merciful One had pity upon a woman and made her liable in order that she should achieve atonement through paying restitution. But with regard to civil law, one might say that for a man, who is involved in business dealings, yes, the civil laws apply to him, but to a woman, who generally is not involved in business dealings, the laws do not apply. And had the Torah taught us only that men and women are equated in civil law, one might have said that this is in order that she should be able to sustain herself by engaging in business dealings. If civil laws did not apply to a woman, one would be wary about conducting business with her. But with regard to obligating a woman to achieve atonement, one might have said that a man, who is obligated in mitzvot, yes, he is similarly obligated to achieve atonement; but a woman, who is not obligated in all the mitzvot to the same extent as a man, no, the obligation does not apply to her. And had the Torah taught us only these first two sources, one might have limited the fact that a woman and man are equated to these two cases, here due to the fact that she also needs atonement, and there due to the fact that she needs to be able to sustain herself. But with regard to one’s liability for his ox killing a person, one might have said that only for killing a man, who is obligated in all mitzvot, yes, the owner of the ox is liable to pay a ransom; but for killing a woman, who is not obligated in all mitzvot, one might say he is not liable. And had the Torah taught us only the equivalence of a man and woman with regard to a ransom, one might have thought that this is because it is a very serious matter as there is a loss of life, but in these first two sources, where there is not a loss of life, I would say no, a woman is not included. Accordingly, it is necessary to have all three sources.

Rav Eina raises a dilemma: If an animal swung its penis and caused damage, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Do we say just as it is with regard to Goring: Is it not so in a case of Goring that the animal’s inclination overcame it and caused it to gore? Here too, it is no different: The animal’s inclination overcame it and that is why it caused damage. Or perhaps the cases are different, as in the case of damage in the category of Goring the objective of its action is to cause damage, whereas in this case the objective of its action is not to cause damage. The Gemara concludes: This dilemma shall stand unresolved.

MISHNA: The legal status of a person is always that of one forewarned. Therefore, whether the damage was unintentional or intentional, whether he was awake while he caused the damage or asleep, whether he blinded another’s eye or broke vessels, he must pay the full cost of the damage.

§ Rabba says another similar halakha: If a man fell from a roof and while falling was inserted into a woman due to the force of the fall, but he did not have the intention to engage in sexual intercourse, he is liable to pay the four types of indemnity. And if this woman was his yevama waiting for him to perform levirate marriage, he has not acquired her as his wife through this act of intercourse. This is true even though a levirate marriage is ordinarily effected through sexual intercourse, even if unintentional, i.e., if he thought she was someone else. Nevertheless, since in this case he did not intend to engage in intercourse at all, the levirate marriage is not effected. The Gemara explains: What are the four types of indemnity that he is liable to pay? He is liable to pay for the damage, for the pain, for the medical costs, and for the loss of livelihood. But he is not liable to pay compensation for humiliation, as we learned in a mishna (86a): One is not liable to pay compensation for humiliation unless he intends to humiliate the injured party, and that was certainly not the case in this situation. And Rabba says another, similar halakha: If one fell from a roof due to an atypical wind, such that it could not have been anticipated in advance that he would fall, and while falling he caused damage and humiliated the injured party, he is liable for the damage but exempt from paying the four types of indemnity, as he did not intend to fall. If he fell due to a typical wind and caused damage and humiliated the injured party while falling, he is liable to pay the four types of indemnity, as his fall was caused by negligence. But he is nevertheless exempt from paying compensation for humiliation, as he did not intend to fall. But if he tumbled while falling so he could fall on this person in order to protect himself from the impact with the ground, he is liable to pay compensation for humiliation as well, because although he did not intend to cause shame he did intend to land on the person. The halakha that one is exempt from paying compensation for humiliation unless he intended to strike his victim is as it is taught in a baraita: From the fact that it is stated: “And she extended her hand” (Deuteronomy 25:11), do I not know that she took hold of something? Consequently, what is the meaning when further on in the verse it states: “And she took him by his genitals”? It is to teach you that one who intends to cause damage, even if he does not intend to humiliate the injured party, is nevertheless liable to pay compensation for humiliation. And Rabba says: If one placed a hot coal over another’s heart and the latter was burnt and died, the one who placed the coal is exempt because the victim should have removed the coal from himself, and the one who placed it there did not need to assume that the victim might not remove it. If he placed the coal on the other’s garment and the garment was burnt, he is liable to pay for the damage, as it is possible that the one whose garment was burnt thought to sue the one who placed the coal on his clothes for the cost of the garment, and that is why he did not bother to remove it.

§ Rav Ḥisda sent the following question to Rav Naḥman: The Sages said that when one strikes another, humiliating him, the judges determine liability according to the following formula: For kneeing [rekhuva] him, he must pay three sela; for kicking, five; and for punching [velisnokeret] him, thirteen. The Gemara asks: If so for hitting him with the handle of a hoe [demara] and for hitting him with the top [ulkofina] of a hoe, what amount is one liable to pay him? Rav Naḥman sent him the following response: Ḥisda, Ḥisda, are you collecting a fine for humiliation in Babylonia, where judges are not authorized to collect fines? Tell me how the incident itself transpired. Rav Ḥisda sent him in response: There is a certain cistern belonging to two people whose arrangement was to alternate its use so that every day one of them would draw from it in turn. It happened that one of them came and was drawing water on a day that was not his turn. His co-owner said to him: This is my day to draw, not yours. His colleague did not pay attention to him. The person whose turn it was therefore took the handle of a hoe and struck the person who was stealing his water, who then sued for damages. Rav Naḥman said to him: In that case, he was right to do so, and he should have hit him even a hundred times with the hoe. Even according to the one who says that a person may not take justice into his own hands but should go to court, in a case where there would be a loss involved if no immediate action is taken, a person may take justice into his own hands. This is as it was stated, that Rav Yehuda says: A person may not take justice into his own hands, whereas Rav Naḥman says: A person may take justice into his own hands. Where there is an imminent loss that will be suffered if the injured party does not take action, everyone agrees that a person may take justice into his own hands. They disagree only when there is no imminent loss that will be suffered. Rav Yehuda says that a person may not take justice into his own hands, because since there is no loss, he should go before the judge to have him enforce the law. Rav Naḥman says that a person may take justice into his own hands. Since he is acting lawfully, as he is clearly in the right, he need not trouble himself to go before the judge to have him enforce the law. Rav Kahana raises an objection to Rav Yehuda’s opinion based on a baraita: Ben Bag Bag says: Do not enter another person’s courtyard secretly to take what is rightfully yours without permission, lest you appear to him as a thief trying to steal his property. Rather, break his teeth, i.e., take it by force, and say to him: I am taking what is mine. Evidently one may take justice into his own hands. Rav Yehuda said to him: You can keep this question to yourself, as it poses no difficulty at all. Ben Bag Bag states an individual opinion in this regard, and the Rabbis disagree with him. Rabbi Yannai says an alternative response to Rav Kahana’s objection: What does the baraita mean by the phrase: Break his teeth? It means sue him in judgment. The Gemara asks: If so, the subsequent statement in the baraita: And say to him, is inaccurate. It should have stated: And they, the court, say to him. Likewise, the wording: I am taking what is mine, is inaccurate. Since it is the court who makes this statement, the baraita should have stated: He is taking what is his. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this poses a difficulty for Rav Yehuda’s version of the response.

Rav Yehuda says: One who wants to be pious should observe the matters of tractate Nezikin, so as to avoid causing damage to others. Rava said he should observe the matters of tractate Avot. And some say he should observe the matters of tractate Berakhot.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to an ox of a Jew that gored the ox of a gentile, the owner of the belligerent ox is exempt from liability; whereas if a gentile’s ox gores a Jew’s ox, the owner is liable to pay the full cost of the damage. The Sages said: This statement is difficult whichever way you look at it. If the phrase “of another” is meant in a precise manner, and therefore the liability applies only if his ox gores the ox of another Jew, when a gentile’s ox gores that of a Jew he should also be exempt from liability. And if the phrase “of another” is not meant in a precise manner, then even when a Jew’s ox gores that of a gentile the owner of the belligerent ox should be liable. Rabbi Abbahu said that the reason for this ruling is that the verse states: “He stood and shook the earth; He beheld, and made the nations tremble [vayyatter]” (Habakkuk 3:6). This is homiletically interpreted to mean that God saw the seven mitzvot that the descendants of Noah accepted upon themselves to fulfill, and since they did not fulfill them, He arose and permitted [vehittir] their money to the Jewish people, so that in certain cases Jews are not liable for damage caused to gentiles. Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the source for this halakha is from here: It is stated in reference to the giving of the Torah: “The Lord came from Sinai and rose from Seir unto them; He appeared from Mount Paran” (Deuteronomy 33:2), which is homiletically interpreted to mean: From the time God came from Mount Paran, when giving the Torah, the money of the gentile nations appeared, i.e., it was revealed and granted to the Jewish people. This is also taught in a baraita: With regard to an ox of a Jew that gored the ox of a gentile, the owner of the belligerent ox is exempt from liability. By contrast, with regard to an ox of a gentile that gored the ox of a Jew, whether it was innocuous or forewarned, the owner of the belligerent ox pays the full cost of the damage, as it is stated: “He stood and shook the earth; He beheld, and made the nations tremble.” And another verse states: “He appeared from Mount Paran.” The Gemara asks: What is the reason the baraita adds: And another verse states, indicating that the first verse is not a sufficient source? The Gemara explains that this is how the baraita is to be understood: And if you would say that this verse: “He stood and shook the earth” is necessary to express that which Rav Mattana and Rav Yosef derived from the verse, come and hear another source: “He appeared from Mount Paran,” meaning: From Paran their money appeared to the Jewish people. What is Rav Mattana’s exposition? It is as Rav Mattana says: “He stood and shook the earth.” What did He see? He saw the seven mitzvot that the descendants of Noah were commanded but did not fulfill, and He arose and exiled them from their land on account of their transgressions. And from where may it be inferred that this term vayyatter is a term of exile? It is written here: “And made the nations tremble [vayyatter]” (Habakkuk 3:6), and it is written there: “Lenatter upon the earth” (Leviticus 11:21), which is translated into Aramaic as: “To leap upon the earth.” Apparently, the root nun, tav, reish, common to both words, indicates uprooting from one place to another. What is Rav Yosef’s exposition? It is as Rav Yosef says: “He stood and shook the earth; He beheld.” What did He see? He saw the seven mitzvot that the descendants of Noah accepted upon themselves and did not fulfill, so He arose and permitted their prohibitions to them. The Gemara asks: Did they thereby profit, in that their prohibitions became permitted to them? If so, we have found a transgressor who is rewarded. Mar, son of Rabbana, says: This is not to say that for them to transgress their mitzvot is no longer a sin; rather, it is to say that even if they fulfill them, they do not receive reward for fulfilling them. The Gemara asks: But do they not receive reward for fulfilling those mitzvot? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir says: From where is it derived that even a gentile who engages in Torah is considered like a High Priest? The verse states with regard to the mitzvot: “Which if a person does, he shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5). It is not stated: Which if priests and Levites and Israelites do, they shall live by them, but rather: A person, indicating that all people are included. You have therefore learned that even a gentile who engages in Torah study is considered like a High Priest. The Sages said in response: Rav Yosef meant that they do not receive the reward as does one who is commanded to perform a mitzva and performs it, but as does one who is not commanded to perform a mitzva and performs it anyway. As Rabbi Ḥanina says: One who is commanded and performs a mitzva is greater than one who is not commanded and performs it. The Sages taught the following story in the context of the aforementioned halakha: And the Roman kingdom once sent two military officials [sardeyotot] to the Sages of Israel, and ordered them in the name of the king: Teach us your Torah. The officials read the Torah, and repeated it, and repeated it again, reading it for the third time. At the time of their departure, they said to the Sages: We have examined your entire Torah and it is true, except for this one matter that you state, i.e., that with regard to an ox of a Jew that gored the ox of a gentile, the owner is exempt from liability, whereas with regard to the ox of a gentile that gored the ox of a Jew, whether it was innocuous or forewarned, the owner pays the full cost of the damage. The officials’ reasoning was that this halakha is difficult whichever way you look at it. If the phrase “of another” is meant in a precise manner, that the owners of both oxen must both be Jewish, then even when the ox of a gentile gores the ox of a Jew the owner of the ox should be exempt from liability. And if the phrase “of another” is not meant in a precise manner, and the oxen of all are included, then even when the ox of a Jew gores the ox of a gentile the owner should be liable. They added: But we will not inform this matter to the kingdom; having acknowledged that the entire Torah is true, we will not reveal this ruling, as it will displease the kingdom. § Incidentally, it is related that the daughter of Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda died. The Sages said to Ulla: Arise; let us go console him. Ulla said to them: What business do I have with the consolation of Babylonians, which is actually heresy? As, they say while consoling mourners: What can be done? This seems to suggest that if it were possible to do something, acting against the Almighty’s decree, they would do so, which is tantamount to heresy. Therefore, Ulla declined to accompany the Babylonian Sages. Ulla therefore went to console Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda by himself, and said to him: The verse states: “And the Lord said to me, do not be at enmity with Moab, neither contend with them in battle” (Deuteronomy 2:9). What entered Moses’s mind, that God had to warn him not to undertake a particular action? Did it enter his mind to wage war with the Moabites without permission? Rather, Moses reasoned an a fortiori inference by himself, saying: And if with regard to the Midianites, who came only to help the Moabites harm the Jewish people (see Numbers, chapter 22), the Torah said: “Harass the Midianites and smite them” (Numbers 25:17), with regard to the Moabites themselves, is it not clear all the more so that they should be attacked? To counter this, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to him: That which has entered your mind has not entered Mine, because I have two virtuous fledglings [feridot], i.e., girls, to extract from them: Ruth the Moabite, who will be the foremother of the dynasty of David, and Naamah the Ammonite, Solomon’s wife, from whom the continuation of that dynasty will emerge. For the sake of these women, the Moabites and Ammonites must not be destroyed. Ulla continued: And are these matters not inferred a fortiori? If for the sake of two virtuous fledglings the Holy One, Blessed be He, had pity on two large nations and did not destroy them, then if the daughter of my teacher, Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda, was righteous, and she had the potential for something good to emerge from her, it is all the more so clear that she would have lived. § Having mentioned the Moabites and Ammonites, the Gemara cites that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, does not deprive any creature of its reward. He rewards every person for his good deeds, and provides reward even for using pleasant speech by using euphemisms. As with regard to the descendants of the elder of the two daughters of Lot, who said that the name of her son, whom she conceived with her father, would be Moab, meaning: From father, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: “Do not be at enmity with Moab, neither contend with them in battle,” indicating that specifically a full-fledged battle was not authorized but that the Jewish people could impose forced labor [angarya] on them. By contrast, with regard to the descendants of the younger daughter, who said her son’s name would be ben Ami, meaning: Son of my nation, merely alluding to the fact she conceived him through an incestuous union, the Holy One, Blessed be He said to Moses: “And when you come near against the children of Ammon, do not harass them, nor contend with them” (Deuteronomy 2:19). In other words, do not contend with them at all; do not even impose forced labor on them. This additional prohibition was a reward for her employing a euphemism when naming her son. And with regard to the daughters of Lot, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: A person should always hasten to perform a mitzva, as due to the one night by which the elder daughter of Lot preceded the younger daughter, with the intention of performing a mitzva by bringing children into the world, she preceded her by four generations in having her descendants enter into the Jewish people. They are: Obed, son of Ruth the Moabite, Yishai, David, and Solomon. Whereas, the descendants of the younger daughter did not join the Jewish people until Rehoboam, Solomon’s son, was born, as it is written: “And his mother’s name was Naamah the Ammonite” (I Kings 14:31). § The Sages taught: With regard to the ox of a Jew that gored the ox of a Samaritan, the owner is exempt from liability. But with regard to the ox of a Samaritan that gored the ox of a Jew, if the Samaritan’s ox was innocuous he pays half the cost of the damage, and if it was forewarned, he pays the full cost of the damage. Accordingly, the halakha with regard to Samaritans is not identical to that of a gentile, who is liable to pay the full cost of the damage even for the act of an innocuous ox. Rabbi Meir says: With regard to the ox of a Jew that gored the ox of a Samaritan, the owner of the ox is exempt from liability. And with regard to the ox of a Samaritan that gored the ox of a Jew, whether it was innocuous or forewarned, the owner pays the full cost of the damage, like a gentile. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Meir holds that Samaritans are converts who had converted due to fear of lions, i.e., the original conversion of the Samaritans was under duress and consequently meaningless, and therefore he assigns to them the same status as gentiles with regard to liability for damages? And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this suggestion from a mishna (Nidda 56b): All bloodstained clothes, presumably from menstrual blood, that come from the city of Rekem are ritually pure, since most of the residents there are gentiles, and the bloodstains of gentile women are not ritually impure. Nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda deems them impure because, in his opinion, the inhabitants of Rekem are converts who are mistaken, i.e., they converted, and they do not observe the mitzvot because they have forgotten Judaism. He holds that since they are halakhically Jewish, their blood is ritually impure. Bloodstained clothes that come from among gentiles are considered pure. With regard to bloodstained clothes that come from among Jews or from among Samaritans, Rabbi Meir deems them impure, as he suspects them of not taking care to keep impure clothes out of the public domain. And the Rabbis deem them pure, as Jews and Samaritans are not suspected of not being careful about their bloodstains. Apparently, Rabbi Meir holds that Samaritans are true converts; otherwise the halakha concerning them would be the same as for gentiles, whose bloodstains are not impure at all. This being the case, why does Rabbi Meir regard them as gentiles with regard to liability to pay damages? Rabbi Abbahu says: They are true converts, and are therefore considered Jews by Torah law inasmuch as in the event that a Jew’s ox causes damage to them, the owner of the ox is liable to pay damages, and if an innocuous ox belonging to them gores a Jew’s ox, the owner pays only half the cost of the damage. Nevertheless, Rabbi Meir imposed a monetary fine on them, giving them the status of gentiles, so that Jews would not assimilate with them. Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to this answer from a mishna (Ketubot 29a): And these are the cases of young women for whom there is a fine paid to their fathers by one who rapes them. Not only is one who rapes a Jewish young woman of unflawed lineage liable to pay this fine, but so is one who engages in intercourse with a mamzeret, or with a female Gibeonite, or with a female Samaritan. Rabbi Zeira states his objection: And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Meir imposed a monetary fine on them to render them like gentiles, so too, let us fine a female Samaritan who is raped, by rendering her ineligible to receive the fine for rape, so that people will not consider them regular Jews and will not assimilate with them. Abaye said: According to Rabbi Meir, the reason the Sages did not revoke this fine is in order that the sinner, i.e., the rapist, should not be rewarded. The Gemara suggests: But if that is the reason, let him give the fine to the poor instead of to the Samaritan who he raped, to prevent assimilation. Rav Mari said: This is not done, because it is money that has no claimants. Since one would not be liable to give it to a specific poor person, the rapist could evade payment by responding to any claimant that he wants to give it to a different poor person. The Sages upheld the Torah law as it stands, and the fine is given to the Samaritan so that the sinner will not benefit. MISHNA: If an ox of a halakhically competent person gored an ox of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, all of whom are not considered halakhically competent, the owner is liable for damages. But if an ox of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor gored an ox of a halakhically competent person, the owner of the ox is exempt from liability.

Having mentioned the deeds of Neḥunya, the Gemara relates that the Sages taught: An incident occurred involving the daughter of Neḥunya the ditchdigger, where she fell into a large cistern and no one could extricate her from it. They came and informed Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa so that he would pray on her behalf. When the first hour had passed from the time of her fall, he said to them: She is at peace and unharmed. After the second hour, he said to them: She is at peace. After the third hour, he said to them: She has ascended from the well, and indeed this was the case. They said to her: Who brought you up out of the well? She said to them: A male sheep, i.e., a ram, happened to come to me, and a certain old man, i.e., Abraham, was leading it, and he pulled me out. They said to Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa: Are you a prophet? How did you know she had ascended? Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa said to them: “I am no prophet, neither am I a prophet’s son” (Amos 7:14), but this is what I said to myself: Shall the offspring of Neḥunya stumble by means of the very matter which distressed that righteous man? Rabbi Aḥa says: Although Neḥunya ensured that others would have water, even so, his son died of thirst, fulfilling that which is stated: “And around Him it storms [nisara] mightily” (Psalms 50:3). This teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, is scrupulous with those around Him, i.e., the righteous, even to the extent of a hairsbreadth [hasa’ara], so that even minor transgressions elicit a severe punishment. Rabbi Neḥunya says: The same idea may be learned from here, in the following verse: “A God dreaded in the great council of the holy ones, and feared by all those that surround Him” (Psalms 89:8), indicating that God is most careful and exacting with those that surround Him, i.e., the righteous. Rabbi Ḥanina says: Anyone who states that the Holy One, Blessed be He, is forgiving [vateran] of transgressions, his life will be relinquished [yivatru], as it is stated: “The Rock, His work is perfect, for all His ways are justice” (Deuteronomy 32:4). In other words, God does not waive heavenly justice. Rabbi Ḥana says, and some say that Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says: What is the meaning of that which is written in the verse that recounts the thirteen attributes of mercy: “Long-suffering [erekh appayim]” (Exodus 34:6), using the plural form, and it is not written as erekh af, in the singular? In order to teach that He is long-suffering for both the righteous and for the wicked and does not punish them immediately for their transgressions.

§ The Gemara cites an aggadic midrash based on this verse: Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: Calamity befalls the world only when wicked people are in the world, but the calamity begins only with the righteous first, as it is stated in the verse: “If a fire breaks out, and catches in thorns, so that a stack of grain, or standing grain, or the field, is consumed” (Exodus 22:5). When does the fire, i.e., calamity, emerge? At a time when the thorns, i.e., the wicked, are found with it. But calamity begins only from the righteous first, as it is stated in the continuation of the verse: “And a stack of grain is consumed [vene’ekhal].” It is not stated: If a fire breaks out, and catches in thorns, and consumes [ve’akhal] the stack of grain; rather, it states: “A stack of grain is consumed,” meaning that the stack, i.e., the righteous, has already been consumed before the thorns. Rav Yosef taught a baraita: What is the meaning of that which is written with regard to the plague of the firstborn: “And none of you shall go out of the opening of his house until the morning” (Exodus 12:22)? If the plague was not decreed upon the Jewish people, why were they not permitted to leave their homes? Once permission is granted to the destroyer to kill, it does not distinguish between the righteous and the wicked. And not only that, but it begins with the righteous first, as it is stated in the verse: “And will cut off from you the righteous and the wicked” (Ezekiel 21:8), where mention of the righteous precedes the wicked. Rav Yosef cried and said: Are all these righteous people also compared to nothing when calamity strikes? Abaye said to him: It is goodness for the righteous that they die first, as it is written: “The righteous is taken away because of the evil to come” (Isaiah 57:1), so that he will not have to endure the suffering that will befall the people.