The Guide explains that animals have an inner world of feelings and love.
Noah was commanded to Save every species of animal.
This shows that God cares about every species, but not every individual animal.
This would imply a prohibition on driving a species to extinciton.
We see this implied in Maimonides' writings.
The commandment concerning the killing of animals is necessary, because the natural food of man consists of vegetables and of the flesh of animals: the best meat is that of animals permitted to be used as food. No doctor has any doubts about this. Since, therefore, the desire of procuring good food necessitates the slaying of animals, the Law enjoins that the death of the animal should be the easiest. It is not allowed to torment the animal by cutting the throat in a clumsy manner, by poleaxing, or by cutting off a limb whilst the animal is alive.
The same reason applies to the law which enjoins that we should let the mother fly away when we take the young. The eggs over which the bird sits, and the young that are in need of their mother, are generally unfit for food, and when the mother is sent away she does not see the taking of her young ones, and does not feel any pain. In most cases, however, this commandment will cause man to leave the whole nest untouched, because [the young or the eggs], which he is allowed to take, are, as a rule, unfit for food.
If the Law provides that such grief should not be caused to cattle or birds, how much more careful must we be that we should not cause grief to our fellowmen. When in the Talmud (Ber. p. 33b) those are blamed who use in their prayer the phrase, “Thy mercy extendeth to young birds,” it is the expression of the one of the two opinions mentioned by us, namely, that the precepts of the Law have no other reason but the Divine will. We follow the other opinion.
The Guide also explains that Animals have free will. Free will is not the core distinction between man and animal in the Rambam's view.
וכן כל מיני בעלי חיים שאינם מדברים יתנועעו ברצונם; וכן רצה האלוק ית׳ – רצוני לומר: שמרצונו הקדום באין תחילה – שיהיה כל בעל חיים מתנועע לרצונו, ושיהיה האדם בעל יכולת על מה שירצהו, או שיבחרהו ממה שיוכל עליו.
All species of irrational animals likewise move by their own free will. This is the Will of God; that is to say, it is due to the eternal divine will that all living beings should move freely, and that man should have power to act according to his will or choice within the limits of his capacity.
While cruelty is prohibited, it is not prohibited except by its affect on people.
Why?
ואמנם, אמרם ״צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא״ – מאמרו: ״על מה הכית את אתונך״ – הוא על דרך ההשלמה לנו, שלא נלמד מדת האכזריות ולא נכאיב לבטלה ללא תועלת, אבל נכון אל החמלה והרחמנות, ואפילו באי זה בעל חיים שיזדמן, אלא לעת הצורך: ״כי תאוה נפשך לאכול בשר״ – לא שנשחט על דרך האכזריות או השחוק.
There is a rule laid down by our Sages that it is directly prohibited in the Law to cause pain to an animal, and is based on the words: “Wherefore hast thou smitten thine ass?” etc. (Num. 22:32). But the object of this rule is to make us perfect; that we should not assume cruel habits: and that we should not uselessly cause pain to others: that, on the contrary, we should be prepared to show pity and mercy to all living creatures, except when necessity demands the contrary: “When thy soul longeth to eat flesh,” etc. (Deut. 12:20). We should not kill animals for the purpose of practising cruelty, or for the purpose of play.
The Guide proposes that hashgacha, divine providence or protection exists in two dimensions:
by the species, and by the intellect.
If we assume a correspondance between providence, good and evil, and the commandments, we find that there must be a command to preserve species as Noah does.
והדעת השני – דעת מי שיחשוב, שקצת הדברים יש בהם השגחה והם בהנהגת מנהיג וסדר מסדר, וקצתם נעזב ומונח אל המקרה – וזה דעת אריסטו. ואני אבאר לך דעתו בהשגחה. הוא רואה שהאלוה ית׳ משגיח בגלגלים ומה שבהם – ומפני זה התמידו אישיהם על מה שהם עליו. וכבר כתב אלכסנדר ואמר שדעת אריסטו – שהשגחת האלוק תכלה ותפסק אל גלגל הירח. וזה סעיף משרשו בקדמות העולם – שהוא חושב שההשגחה היא כפי טבע המציאות – אם כן אלה הגלגלים ומה שבהם אשר אישיהם מתמידים, ענין ההשגחה בהם הוא התמדתם על ענין שלא ישתנה; וכמו שהתחיב ממציאותם מציאות דברים אחרים אין אישיהם מתמידי המציאות אבל מיניהם, שפע גם כן מן ההשגחה ההיא מה שחייב השאר המינים והתמדתם ואי אפשר השאר אישיהם. ולא נעזבו גם כן אישי כל מין עזיבה גמורה, אבל כל מה שנזדכך וזוקק מן החומר ההוא, עד שקיבל צורת הצמיחה, נתנו בו כוחות שישמרוהו זמן קצוב, ימשכו עליו מה שיאות לו וידחו מעליו מה שאין תועלת לו בו; ומה שנזדכך ממנו יותר מן הראשון, עד שקיבל צורת ההרגשה, הושמו בו כוחות אחרים לשמרו ולנצרו, והושמה לו יכולת אחרת להתנועע – לכון למה שיאות לו ולברוח ממה שהוא כנגדו – ואחר כך נתן לכל איש כפי מה שיצטרך לו המין ההוא; ומה שנזדכך יותר עד שקיבל צורת השכל, נתן לו כח אחר. ינהיג בו, ויחשוב ויסתכל במה שאפשר בו עמידת אישו ושמירת מינו, כפי שלמות האיש ההוא. אמנם שאר התנועות הנופלות באישי המין הם נופלות במקרה, ואין זה אצל אריסטו בהנהגת מנהיג ולא בסידור מסדר. והמשל בו: אם נשב רוח סוער או בלתי סוער, אין ספק שיפיל קצת עלי זה האילן, וישבור סעיפים מאילן אחר, וישליך אבן מתל של אבנים, ויעלה עפר על עשבים ויפסידם, ויסעיר המים ותטבע הספינה שהיתה שם, ויטבעו כל מי שבה או קצתם – ואין הפרש אצלו בין נפילת העלה ההוא ונפילת האבן, או טביעת החסידים החשובים ההם אשר היו בספינה; כן לא יפריש בין שור שהטיל רעי על עם מן הנמלים ומתו, או בנין שנהרסו שתותיו ונפל על מי שבתוכו מן המתפללים ומתו; ואין הפרש אצלו בין חתול שנזדמן לו עכבר וטרפו, או עכביש שטרף זבוב, או אריה שרעב ופגש בנביא וטרפו. סוף דבר, עיקר דעתו שכל מה שיראהו נמשך לא יפסד ולא ישתנה לו מנהג כלל כענינים הרקיעיים, או ימשך על סדר לא יעדר ממנו דבר כי אם לעיתים רחוקות ועל דרך זרות כענינים הטבעיים, הוא אומר שהוא בהנהגה – כלומר: שההשגחה האלהית מחוברת אליו; וכל מה שיראהו בלתי נמשך על הקש ולא שוקד על סדר, כעניני אישי כל מין מן הצמחים ובעלי החיים מדברים ושאינם מדברים יאמר שהוא במקרה לא בהנהגת מנהיג – רצוני לומר: שלא תחובר אליו ההשגחה האלהית – והוא רואה גם כן שחיבור ההשגחה באלה הענינים נמנע, וזה נמשך אחר דעתו בקדמות העולם ושכל מה שנמצא עליו זה המציאות – חלופו נמנע. ואשר האמינו זה הדעת ממי שיצא מכלל תורתנו – הם האומרים ״עזב ה' את הארץ״.
Second Theory.—Whilst one part of the Universe owes its existence to Providence, and is under the control of a ruler and governor, another part is abandoned and left to chance. This is the view of Aristotle about Providence, and I will now explain to you his theory. He holds that God controls the spheres and what they contain: therefore the individual beings in the spheres remain permanently in the same form. Alexander has also expressed it in his writings that Divine Providence extends down to, and ends with, the sphere of the moon. This view results from his theory of the Eternity of the Universe; he believes that Providence is in accordance with the nature of the Universe: consequently in the case of the spheres with their contents, where each individual being has a permanent existence, Providence gives permanency and constancy. From the existence of the spheres other beings derive existence, which are constant in their species but not in their individuals: in the same manner it is said that Providence sends forth [from the spheres to the earth] sufficient influence to secure the immortality and constancy of the species, without securing at the same time permanence for the individual beings of the species. But the individual beings in each species have not been entirely abandoned, that portion of the materia prima which has been purified and refined, and has received the faculty of growth, is endowed with properties that enable it to exist a certain time, to attract what is useful and to repel what is useless. That portion of the materia prima which has been subject to a further development, and has received the faculty of sensation, is endowed with other properties for its protection and preservation; it has a new faculty of moving freely toward that which is conducive to, and away from that which is contrary to its well-being. Each individual being received besides such properties as are required for the preservation of the species to which it belongs. The portion of the materia prima which is still more refined, and is endowed with the intellectual faculty, possesses a special property by which each individual, according to the degree of his perfection, is enabled to manage, to calculate, and to discover what is conducive both to the temporary existence of the individual and to the preservation of the species. All other movements, however, which are made by the individual members of each species are due to accident; they are not, according to Aristotle, the result of rule and management; e.g., when a storm or gale blows, it causes undoubtedly some leaves of a tree to drop, breaks off some branches of another tree, tears away a stone from a heap of stones, raises dust over herbs and spoils them, and stirs up the sea so that a ship goes down with the whole or part of her contents. Aristotle sees no difference between the falling of a leaf or a stone and the death of the good and noble people in the ship; nor does he distinguish between the destruction of a multitude of ants caused by an ox depositing on them his excrement and the death of worshippers killed by the fall of the house when its foundations give way; nor does he discriminate between the case of a cat killing a mouse that happens to come in her way, or that of a spider catching a fly, and that of a hungry lion meeting a prophet and tearing him. In short, the opinion of Aristotle is this: Everything is the result of management which is constant, which does not come to an end and does not change any of its properties, as e.g., the heavenly beings, and everything which continues according to a certain rule, and deviates from it only rarely and exceptionally, as is the case in objects of Nature. All these are the result of management, i.e., in a close relation to Divine Providence. But that which is not constant, and does not follow a certain rule, as e.g., incidents in the existence of the individual beings in each species of plants or animals, whether rational or irrational, is due to chance and not to management; it is in no relation to Divine Providence. Aristotle holds that it is even impossible to ascribe to Providence the management of these things. This view is closely connected with his theory of the Eternity, of the Universe, and with his opinion that everything different from the existing order of things in Nature is impossible. It is the belief of those who turned away from our Law, and said: “God hath forsaken the earth” (Ezek. 9:9).
My opinion on this principle of Divine Providence I will now explain to you. In the principle which I now proceed to expound I do not rely on demonstrative proof, but on my conception of the spirit of the Divine Law, and the writings of the Prophets. The principle which I accept is far less open to objections, and is more reasonable than the opinions mentioned before.
It is this: In the lower or sublunary portion of the Universe Divine Providence does not extend to the individual members of species except in the case of mankind.
It is only in this species that the incidents in the existence of the individual beings, their good and evil fortunes, are the result of justice, in accordance with the words, “For all His ways are judgment.” But I agree with Aristotle as regards all other living beings, and à fortiori as regards plants and all the rest of earthly creatures. For I do not believe that it is through the interference of Divine Providence that a certain leaf drops [from a tree], nor do I hold that when a certain spider catches a certain fly, that this is the direct result of a special decree and will of God in that moment; it is not by a particular Divine decree that the spittle of a certain person moved, fell on a certain gnat in a certain place, and killed it; nor is it by the direct will of God that a certain fish catches and swallows a certain worm on the surface of the water. In all these cases the action is, according to my opinion, entirely due to chance, as taught by Aristotle.
Divine Providence is connected with Divine intellectual influence, and the same beings which are benefited by the latter so as to become intellectual, and to comprehend things comprehensible to rational beings, are also under the control of Divine Providence, which examines all their deeds in order to reward or punish them. It may be by mere chance that a ship goes down with all her contents, as in the above-mentioned instance, or the roof of a house falls upon those within; but it is not due to chance, according to our view, that in the one instance the men went into the ship, or remained in the house in the other instance: it is due to the will of God, and is in accordance with the justice of His judgments, the method of which our mind is incapable of understanding.
וכבר זכרה התורה ההשגחה בבני אדם והפקד מעשיהם, אמר ״וביום פקדי ופקדתי עליהם חטאתם״, ואמר: ״מי אשר חטא לי אמחנו מספרי״, ואמר: ״והאבדתי את הנפש ההיא״, ואמר: ״ונתתי את פני בנפש ההיא״ – וזה הרבה. וכל מה שבא מעניני אברהם יצחק ויעקב – ראיה גמורה על שההשגחה האישית נמצאת בבני אדם. אמנם שאר אישי בעלי החיים – הענין בהם כמו שיראה אריסטו באין ספק; ומפני זה היתה שחיטתם מותרת וגם מצווה בה, והותר להשתמש בהם בתועלותינו ככל אשר נרצה.
In the Law there occur instances of the fact that men are governed by God, and that their actions are examined by him. Comp. “In the day when I visit I will visit their sin upon them” (Exod. 32:34) “I will even appoint over you terror” (Lev. 26:16); “Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book” (Exod. 32:33); “The same soul will I destroy” (Lev. 23:30); “I will even set my face against that soul” (ibid. 20:6). There are many instances of this kind.
All that is mentioned of the history of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is a perfect proof that Divine Providence extends. to every man individually. But the condition of the individual beings of other living creatures is undoubtedly the same as has been stated by Aristotle.
On that account it is allowed, even commanded, to kill animals; we are permitted to use them according to our pleasure.
Our opinion is not contradicted by Scriptural passages like the following: “He giveth to the beast his food” (Ps. 147:9); “The young lions roar after their prey, and seek their meat from God” (ibid. 104:2 1);” Thou openest thine hand, and satisfiest the desire of every living thing” (ibid. 145:16); or by the saying of our Sages: “He sitteth and feedeth all, from the horns of the unicorns even unto the eggs of insects.” There are many similar sayings extant in the writings of our Sages, but they imply nothing that is contrary to my view.
All these passages refer to Providence in relation to species, and not to Providence in relation to individual animals. The acts of God are as it were enumerated; how He provides for every species the necessary food and the means of subsistence. This is clear and plain. Aristotle likewise holds that this kind of Providence is necessary, and is in actual existence. Alexander also notices this fact in the name of Aristotle, viz., that every species has its nourishment prepared for its individual members; otherwise the species would undoubtedly have perished. It does not require much consideration to understand this.
There is a rule laid down by our Sages that it is directly prohibited in the Law to cause pain to an animal, and is based on the words: “Wherefore hast thou smitten thine ass?” etc. (Num. 22:32). But the object of this rule is to make us perfect; that we should not assume cruel habits: and that we should not uselessly cause pain to others: that, on the contrary, we should be prepared to show pity and mercy to all living creatures, except when necessity demands the contrary: “When thy soul longeth to eat flesh,” etc. (Deut. 12:20). We should not kill animals for the purpose of practising cruelty, or for the purpose of play.
It cannot be objected to this theory, Why should God select mankind as the object of His special Providence, and not other living beings? For he who asks this question must also inquire, Why has man alone, of all species of animals, been endowed with intellect? The answer to this second question must be, according to the three afore-mentioned theories: It was the Will of God, it is the decree of His Wisdom, or it is in accordance with the laws of Nature. The same answers apply to the first question.
Finally, we see that the notion of God "resting" applies to his providence of species but not individuals.
ואמר: ״יי למבול ישב״ – רצונו לומר: שעם השתנות עניני הארץ והפסדם לא יהיה אצלו ית׳ שינוי יחס. אבל היחס ההוא שיש לו אל כל אחד מן הענינים ההם – והם הווים או נפסדים – יחס אחד קיים עומד, כי היחס ההוא למיני הנמצאות, לא לאישיהם. והתבונן כי כל ׳לשון ישיבה׳ שתמצאה לאלוק ית׳ – תמצאה בזה הענין.
Again, “The Lord sitteth upon the flood” (Ps. 29:10), i.e., despite the change and variation of earthly objects, no change takes place with respect to God’s relation (to the earth): His relation to each of the things which come into existence and perish again is stable and constant, for it concerns only the existing species and not the individuals. It should therefore be borne in mind, that whenever the term” sitting” is applied to God, it is used in this sense.