רד"ק, בראשית ט:ו
וכן ציווה האל לשפוך דם האדם לחטאו, כמו שציווה בתורת משה רבנו, בראויים לעונש מיתה לפי חטאם, כל חוטא כראוי לו; לפי שהוא השחית צלמו תחילה בעברו מצוות האל.
Radak, Bereishit 9:6
God also commanded that a man's blood be shed when he sins, as He [later] commanded in the Torah of Moshe Rabbenu, with respect to those deserving the death penalty according to their sin, each sinner according to what he deserves. For [the sinner] first corrupted his image when he transgressed God's commandment.
רמב״ן דברים כא:יט
וזה טעם וכל ישראל ישמעו ויראו -
כי לא הומת בגודל חטאו, אלא לייסר בו את הרבים ושלא יהיה תקלה לאחרים:
Ramban on Devarim 21:19
And the reason that "all of Israel shall hear and fear," is that the sinner is not put to death because of the gravity of his sin, but to warn the masses and so that there should not be a problem for others.
שו״ת חוות יאיר סי׳ קמא
"שאלה ששאלת, פלוני שפקר ביין-נסך, וביקשו הקהל לעונשו בממון ולעשות כרוז עליו, והרב מורה צדק שלהם מיחה בידם באומרו דאיכא למיחש דפקר טפי (=יש לחשוש שמחמת העונש יחטא יותר), ויאכל גם כן דבר איסור, ויצא חוץ לדת, וקולר העוון יהיה תלוי בקהל שהביאו לידי כך...
שהרב המורה לא לצדקה מיחה בהקהל, וחוששני לו מחטאת. אדרבא, לו נאה היה ללבוש קנאת ה' צבאות לנדותו ולענשו, עד כי יבוא לקבל תשובה ולא יוסף סרה. ואם ניחוש לזה ח"ו יוסיפו בני עוולה לעשות כל איש הישר בעיניו, גם הדיין יחוש לגיזום ולחשש כזה, ולא יצדיק צדיק וירשיע רשע לאשר חמוץ ולהשליך טרף משיני רשעים, ותושלך אמת ארצה, ומשפטי ה' בטלים... ומעולם לא חשו סנהדרין בזמן הבית לזה, פן על ידי חשש זה ירבו בעלי עבירה, ועל בכהאי גוונא אמרו 'אף הם מרבים שופכי דמים בישראל'... דחוששין לתקנת הכלל, אף שהוא נגד תקנת היחיד... הכי נמי עבדינן אנן, לעשות כדין וכדת תורתנו, ולא נחוש לקלקול המקולקל שפשע, אף ביחיד נגד יחיד, כל שכן בשיש חשש קלקול הנשארים, אשר עיקר עונש הרשע מכוון לזה, כמו שכתבה התורה כמה פעמים 'והנשארים ישמעו ויראו'... ומה מאוד צריכין אנו לחוש לקלקול הדור, אף להמית נפש נקי צדיק מדין שנעשה בו, כמו שכתבו שאחד רכב על הסוס בשבת, וסקלוהו מפני שהשעה הייתה צריכה לכך; כל שכן שלא נצא חוץ מקו המשפט מחשש קלקול המקולקל שפשע" (חוות יאיר, סי' קמ"א).
Chavot Ya'ir, no. 141
As for the question you raised, regarding a certain person who conducted himself irreverently with respect to Gentile wine, and the community sought to punish him with a monetary fine and proclaim a ban upon him, and the local rabbinic authority objected, arguing that we should be concerned that he will act even more irreverently (= punishment will bring him to sin more), and eat forbidden foods, and leave the religion, and the collar of his sin will hang on the community that brought him to it …
The Rabbinic authority incorrectly objected to the community's conduct, and I am afraid that he may have sinned. On the contrary, it would be fitting for him to don zealotry for the God of hosts, and excommunicate and punish [the sinner], until he comes to do penance and sin no more. Were we to be concerned about this, God forbid, evil people would continue to act as they pleased. Even judges would fear such a threat and concern; they would never vindicate the righteous, nor convict the wicked to relieve the oppressed and pluck the prey out of the teeth of the wicked. Truth would be cast to the ground, and God's laws would be nullified … The Sanhedrin were never concerned about this while the Temple stood, lest because of this concern the number of sinners would grow. Regarding such a case, the Sages said: "They too cause the number of murderers in Israel to grow" … for we should be concerned about the benefit to the community, even when it is detrimental to the individual … We should also conduct ourselves in this manner, acting in accordance with the law and the rules of our Torah. We should not be concerned about the deterioration of the corrupt who has sinned, even in the case of one individual against another. All the more so when there is concern about the corruption of others. The punishment administered to the wicked is directed primarily at [the prevention of such corruption], as the Torah has written in several instances: "And the others will hear, and fear" … How very much must we be concerned about the corruption of the generation, to the point that we execute an innocent man … as they have written that someone rode a horse on Shabbat, and they stoned him because the hour demanded such a punishment. We should certainly not cross the border of justice because of a concern that the corrupt person who sinned will be further corrupted.
Plato, Protagoras
No one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong, only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again.
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
When any man, even in political society, renders himself by his crimes, obnoxious to the public, he is punished by the laws in his goods and person; that is, the ordinary rules of justice are, with regard to him, suspended for a moment, and it becomes equitable to inflict on him, for the benefit of society, what otherwise he could not suffer without wrong or injury.
הראי"ה קוק, 'טעמי המצוות', נצני ארץ יב, עמ' 12-13
"בעניין 'לא יוקם כי כספו הוא'. רבים ישאלו במה הפסיד העבד במה שהוא קניין האדון את זכות נפשו וחייו, כי ישתנה דינו מדין הבן חורין בזה. ולדעתי דין זה אף הוא נשען על אדני החמלה האמיתית למין האדם, שמוחלט הוא מדין תורה"ק שאין לנו משפט בדרך נקמה מהחוטא היותר כבד, רק כדי לגדור פרץ שלא יתפשט הרע עוד. וא"כ במה שיש גדר אחר, אין הכרח להחמיר בגדר העונש, שלא יישאר ממנו כ"א תועלת הנקמה הפחותה. ע"כ איש המכה רעהו, אם לא יגדר הדבר ע"י עונש מיתה, ירבו החוטאים אשר יתנכלו להמית רעיהם, ע"י איזה טובה אשר תבוא להם בגלל מיתתו; אבל להרוג איש עבדו, שהוא כספו ונכסיו, דרך אדם להיות חס על נכסיו... על כן אמרה תורה אם יום או יומיים יעמוד לא יומת, כי יישאר העונש לא בגדר תיקון עולם רק נקמה, וזה לא נכון בחק הרחמן על כל מעשיו, גם החוטאים. ונותן טעם, כי גדר אינו נחוץ בזה, כי כספו הוא ונפשו תחוס, ע"כ מעט מאוד אשר יקרה כזה להכות ביישוב הדעת קניין כספו להפסיד ממונו, עד שאין לחוש פן יתפשט הרע יותר"
Rav Avraham Yitzchak Kook, Ta'amei ha-Mitzvot, Nitzanei Eretz XII, pp. 12-13
Regarding "He shall not be punished, for he is his money" (Shemot 21:21) – many ask: Why does a slave lose his right to life by virtue of his being his master's chattel, so that the law applying to a slave differs from the law applying to a free man? In my opinion, this law too rests on the pillars of true compassion for the human species. For it is clearly the law of our holy Torah that we do not administer justice in order to take revenge even in the case of the most heinous sinner, but only to fill in the breach so that the evil will spread no further. If so, in a matter that has another "fence," it is unnecessary to be stringent regarding the "fence" of punishment, for nothing will remain of it aside from the benefit of lowly revenge. Therefore, regarding a person who strikes his neighbor, were the matter not controlled by way of the death penalty, sinners wishing to kill their neighbors because of a certain benefit that may accrue to them as a result of their deaths would multiply. But as for a person killing his own slave, who is his money and property – it is man's way to care for his property … Therefore the Torah states that if the slave continues a day or two, his owner shall not be put to death. For in such a case punishment would constitute revenge, not something leading to the perfection of the world. And this would not be right according to the law of He who is merciful over all his works, including sinners. And [the Torah] offers the rationale that there is no need for a fence, for [the slave] is his money and he will have compassion. Very rarely, therefore, will a person strike his own possession with composure, losing money thereby, to the point that there is no reason for concern that the evil will spread further.
Derashot ha-Ran, no. 11
Surely, we have learned in chapter "Hayu bodekin": Our Sages have taught us: "Do you recognize him? Did you warn him? Did he accept the warning? Did he surrender himself to death? Did he kill within as much time as is needed for an utterance?" All this is undoubtedly appropriate for true justice, for why should a person be put to death unless he was aware that he was entering upon something that carries the death penalty and nevertheless he committed the offense? For this it is necessary that he accept the warning, and all the rest of what is mentioned in that Baraita. This is true justice itself that is handed over to the judges. But if an offender could only be punished in this manner, the social order would be entirely destroyed. For murderers would multiply and they would not fear punishment.
Kant, Philosophy of Law
Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. For one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another … Even if a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members - as might be supposed in the case of a people inhabiting an island resolving to separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world - the last murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out. This ought to be done in order that every one may realize the desert of his deeds, and that blood-guiltiness may not remain upon the people.
C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment
According to the Humanitarian theory, to punish a man because he deserves it, and as much as he deserves, is mere revenge, and, therefore, barbarous and immoral. It is maintained that the only legitimate motives for punishing are the desire to deter others by example or to mend the criminal. When this theory is combined, as frequently happens, with the belief that all crime is more or less pathological, the idea of mending tails off into that of healing or curing and punishment becomes therapeutic. Thus it appears at first sight that we have passed from the harsh and self-righteous notion of giving the wicked their deserts to the charitable and enlightened one of tending the psychologically sick. What could be more amiable? One little point which is taken for granted in this theory needs, however, to be made explicit. The things done to the criminal, even if they are called cures, will be just as compulsory as they were in the old days when we called them punishments. If a tendency to steal can be cured by psychotherapy, the thief will no doubt be forced to undergo the treatment. Otherwise, society cannot continue.
My contention is that this doctrine, merciful though it appears, really means that each one of us, from the moment he breaks the law, is deprived of the rights of a human being.
The reason is this. The Humanitarian theory removes from Punishment the concept of Desert. But the concept of Desert is the only connecting link between punishment and justice. It is only as deserved or undeserved that a sentence can be just or unjust. I do not here contend that the question ‘Is it deserved?’ is the only one we can reasonably ask about a punishment. We may very properly ask whether it is likely to deter others and to reform the criminal. But neither of these two last questions is a question about justice. There is no sense in talking about a ‘just deterrent’ or a ‘just cure’. We demand of a deterrent not whether it is just but whether it will deter. We demand of a cure not whether it is just but whether it succeeds. Thus when we cease to consider what the criminal deserves and consider only what will cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed him from the sphere of justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject of rights, we now have a mere object, a patient, a ‘case ’.
דברים כ"א, יח-כא
כִּי יִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה אֵינֶנּוּ שׁמֵעַ בְּקוֹל אָבִיו וּבְקוֹל אִמּוֹ וְיִסְּרוּ אתוֹ וְלא יִשְׁמַע אֲלֵיהֶם. וְתָפְשׁוּ בוֹ אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ וְהוֹצִיאוּ אתוֹ אֶל זִקְנֵי עִירוֹ וְאֶל שַׁעַר מְקומו. וְאָמְרוּ אֶל זִקְנֵי עִירוֹ בְּנֵנוּ זֶה סוֹרֵר וּמרֶה אֵינֶנּוּ שׁמֵעַ בְּקלֵנוּ זוֹלֵל וְסבֵא. וּרְגָמֻהוּ כָּל אַנְשֵׁי עִירוֹ בָאֲבָנִים וָמֵת וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ וְכָל יִשְרָאֵל יִשְׁמְעוּ וְיִרָאוּ
Devarim 21:18-21
If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son who will not obey the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and that, when they have chastened him, will not hearken to them: then shall his father and his mother lay hold of him, and bring him out to the elders of the city, and to the gate of his place; and they shall say to the elders of his city, This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our voice; he is a glutton, and a drunkard. And all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that he die: so shall you put evil away from among you; and all Israel shall hear, and fear.
דרשות הר״ן דרוש י׳
דמיון זה הוא, כי השם יתברך שומר ביסרו אותנו שני דברים, כאשר ישמרם האב ביסרו בנו… השני הוא, שאין העונש שמעניש את בנו מכוון לעצמו, אבל הוא להיישיר את בנו, עד שאם יראה לאב שהבן נתחרט על אשר עשה, ושלא ישוב בדרך ההיא עוד, לא יענישנו עליו, אבל ישמח בשאינו צריך להלקותו...
כי העונש מצד עצמו אינו דבר משובח, שאילו היה כן, לא הזהירה התורה עליו, כמו שכתוב (ויקרא יט יח) לא תקום ולא תטור את בני עמך, כי התורה לא תמנע הפעולות הטובות מצד עצמן. ומהשיתואר השם יתברך עליה, באמרו (נחום א ב) אל קנא ונוקם, איננו מתואר בה מצד הנקמה בעצמה, אבל מצד הטוב הנמשך ממנה. ולפיכך אמרו רבותינו ז"ל אין רע יורד מן השמים, שאי אפשר שמי שהוא הטוב הגמור ומקור הטובות כולם, ימשך ממנו רע בעצם, אבל כל מה שנמשך ממנו יבא לתכלית טוב. ולכן כל מה שיעניש השם יתברך האדם בעולם הזה, הוא על זה הדרך, אם להישיר החוטא בעצמו שישוב מדרכו הרעה, ואם אינו מקבל הישרה, לישר אחרים שלא יהיו רעים כמוהו.
Derashot HaRan Sermon 10
This similarity is that Hashem ensures when afflicting us two things, just as a father ensures when afflicting his son… The second is that the penalty that he afflicts upon his son is not directed toward the son himself, but rather is to straighten his son, to the point that if the father sees that the son has recanted for that which he did, and will not return to that path again, he will not punish him for it, but will rejoice inasmuch as he no longer needs to smite him….
For the punishment in itself is not praiseworthy, for if it was so, the Torah would not have warned against taking vengeance, for the Torah would not withhold actions that are intrinsically good. And from the fact that God is described as a vengeful God, not in terms of the vengeance per say but due to the good that issues from it. And therefore the rabbis said that no evil descends from heaven, for it is impossible that One who is the quintessential good and the source of all goodness would be the source of evil; rather, all that issues from him will ultimately lead to a good outcome. And therefore all that which God punishes man in this world, is along these lines, whether to straighten the sinner himself to repent from his evil path; or, if he does not accept that straightening, to straighten others that they not be evil like he.