{ Human Dignity vs. The Commandments } Which takes priority? [Rabbi's Version]

(2) After they buried the deceased and returned:

If they have time to begin to recite Shema and conclude before they arrive at the row, formed by those who attended the burial, through which the bereaved family will pass in order to receive consolation, they should begin.

If they do not have sufficient time to conclude reciting the entire Shema, then they should not begin.

Those standing in the row, those in the inner row, directly before whom the mourners will pass and who will console them, are exempt from reciting Shema, while those in the outer row, who stand there only to show their respect, are obligated to recite Shema.

We learned in the mishnah that, in a case when "They buried the deceased and returned..."(see above).

Here, the Gemara clarifies: This is the case only if they can begin and complete saying the Shema in its entirety. However, if they can only complete one chapter or one verse, they should not stop to do so; rather they should go an console the mourners.

A Contradictory Source

The Gemara raises a contradiction from that which we learned in the baraita: After they buried the deceased and returned, if they can begin saying the Shema and finish even a single chapter or verse, they should begin.

The Gemara responds: That is also what the tanna of the mishna said and this is the conclusion drawn from his statement: If one can begin and conclude even one chapter or one verse before they arrive at the row of consolers, they should begin. And if not, they should not begin.

"Those standing in the row...."

The Sages taught this more expansively: Those comforting the mourners standing in a row from which one sees inside the area where the mourners are passing are exempt (i.e. they don't have to say the Shema), and those standing in a row from which one does not see inside are obligated.

And Rabbi Yehuda elaborates and says: The consolers standing in the row who come on account of the bereaved are exempt, while those who come on account of their own curiosity are obligated to recite Shema.

(19) You shall observe My laws. You shall not let your cattle mate with a different kind (kilayim); you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed (kilayim); you shall not put on cloth from a mixture of two kinds of material.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: One who discovers diverse kinds [kilayim, in other words a forbidden mixture of wool and linen], in their garment, must remove them even in the public marketplace. They may not wait until they get home.

What is the reason for this? As it is stated: “There is neither wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against God” (Proverbs 21:30). From here, the general principle: Anywhere that there is desecration of God's name, one does not show respect to the teacher, is derived.

The Gemara raised an objection from a baraita, a source outside the mishnah:

After they buried the deceased and returned, and on their way there are two paths before them, one ritually pure and one ritually impure, e.g., it passes through a cemetery.

If the mourner comes on the pure path, they come with them on the pure path; if they come on the impure path, all of the funeral participants accompany them on the impure path in order to show them respect.

Why would they do this? Let us say here too that, “There is neither wisdom, nor understanding…against God!”

Rabbi Abba explained that this source is referring to a path that passes through an area where there is uncertainty with regard to the location of a grave or a corpse, For example, with regard to a field in which there is a grave that was plowed and no longer intact, the entire field is deemed impure due to concern that the plow scattered bones throughout the field. The field is impure only by rabbinic law but not according to Torah law. Since it is only prohibited by rabbinic law, one is permitted to walk through the field to show the mourner respect.

The Gemara has more proof about when human dignity overrides mitzvot in the Torah.

Come and hear, as Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok the priest said: I and my fellow priests would jump over coffins of the deceased in order to hurry towards kings of Israel to greet them....

The priest violated the Torah prohibition to become ritually impure through contact with the dead, in order to show respect for a king. And why is this? Let us say here too: “There is neither wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against God.”

This must be understood in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: By Torah law, a tent over a corpse, as long as there is a handbreadth of space between the corpse and the tent over it, it constitutes a barrier to the spread of impurity and nothing above the tent can become ritually impure due to impurity imparted by the corpse. And when there is not a handbreadth of space between the corpse and the tent over it, the tent does not constitute a barrier before the spread of impurity and the “pressed” ritual impurity, can reach the heavens.

Most coffins have a handbreadth of space. Consequently, their ritual impurity does not spread above the coffin. However, the Sages issued a decree about coffins in which there is a handbreadth of space because of those coffins in which there is not.

Nevertheless, due to respect for kings, the Sages did not issue a decree in a case involving them and the priests were permitted to jump over the coffins, as it is permitted by Torah law. Therefore, there is no proof from here regarding the question of whether or not human dignity overrides Torah law.

The Gemara cites an additional proof from a baraita: Come and hear: Great is human dignity, as it overrides a prohibition in the Torah.

The Gemara asks: Why? Let us also say here: “There is neither wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against God.”

Rav bar Shaba explained this prohibition, which is overridden by human dignity, before Rav Kahana as referring to the prohibition of: “According to the Torah taught to you and the ruling handed down to you, you shall do, you shall not deviate to the left or the right from that which they tell you” (Deuteronomy 17:11).

The students laughed at him, as the prohibition of “you shall not deviate” is by Torah law, like all other Torah prohibitions. Why should human dignity override it any more than any other Torah prohibition?

Rav Kahana replied to them: A great man has spoken, do not laugh at him. The Sages based all rabbinic law on the prohibition of “you shall not deviate”; however, due to concern for human dignity, the Sages permitted suspension of rabbinic law in cases where the two collide.

Come and hear: With regard to the laws of returning a lost object, it is stated: “You shall not see the ox of your brother or his sheep go astray and ignore them; return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1). The baraita explains that the seemingly extraneous expression and disregard them must be understood to give license that at times you disregard lost objects and at times you do not disregard them.

How so? If he was a priest and the lost object was in the cemetery, or if he was an elder and it is beneath his dignity to tend to a lost object of that kind, or if he had more work to do than another person and he does not want to set it all aside when another person is available to tend to the lost object. Therefore, with regard to those cases it is stated: "And disregard them" to permit one to refrain from returning the object.

Challenge to the Proof

Why? Let us say here, too: Although handling the lost object would be beneath his dignity, “there is neither wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against God.”

There it is different, as it is written: “And disregard them,” indicating that under certain circumstances one is permitted to disregard a lost object. In that case, there is a biblical directive that creates an exception to the prohibition: “You may not disregard” (Deuteronomy 22:3). We found a case in which human dignity overrides a Torah prohibition.

Suggestion

The Gemara suggests: Let us derive a general principle that human dignity takes precedence over all mitzvot in the Torah from this case.

Rejection

This possibility is rejected: We do not derive halakhot pertaining to prohibitions from monetary laws, and the case of the lost object merely entails a monetary loss, unlike other prohibitions.

Come and hear what was said in the Torah with regard to the Nazirite, and person who has taken a kind of vow, which includes not attending to a funeral for anyone in their family, including their parents and their sister. Since it was already written about any Nazirite: “They shall not come upon a dead body” (Numbers 6:6), why is it necessary to specify his parents and siblings?

They learned: To what purpose did the verse state: "And his sister"?

To teach that one who was going to slaughter his Paschal lamb and to circumcise his son, both of which are positive mitzvot that if he fails to fulfill them, he is punished with karet, the most severe consequence, and he heard that a relative of his died, I might have thought that he should return and become ritually impure with the impurity imparted by a corpse. You said: “He shall not become impure”; the death of his relative will not override so significant a mitzvah from the Torah.

I might have thought: Just as they do not become impure for their relatives, so they does not become impure for a corpse with no one to bury it [called a met mitzva]. The verse states: “And their sister”; they may not become impure for their sister, as someone else can attend to her burial,

but they do become impure for a met mitzva. Let us say that the obligation to bury a met mitzva, which is predicated on the preservation of human dignity, should not override mitzvot explicitly written in the Torah, as it is stated: “There is neither wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against God.”

The Gemara answers: There it is different, as it is explicitly written: “And their sister,” from which we derive that although they may not become ritually impure to bury their sister, they must do so for a met mitzva.

The Gemara suggests: Let us derive a general principle that human dignity takes precedence over all mitzvot in the Torah from this case.

Rejection!

This is a special case, because a case of “sit and refrain from action” [shev ve’al ta’aseh] is different. Engaging in the burial of a met mitzva is not actually in contravention of a mitzvah. Rather, by doing so they become ritually impure and are then rendered incapable of fulfilling the mitzvah of the Nazir. We cannot derive a general principle from here that human dignity would also override a Torah prohibition in a case where that prohibition off a Nazir avoiding a corpse is directly contravened.

Abaye said to Rav Pappa: The previous generations were wholly dedicated to the sanctification of God’s name, while we are not as dedicated to the sanctification of God’s name.

Typical of the earlier generations’ commitment, the Gemara relates: Like this incident involving Rav Adda bar Ahava who saw a non-Jewish woman who was wearing a garment made of a forbidden mixture of wool and linen [karbalta] in the marketplace. Since he thought that she was Jewish, he stood and ripped it from her. It was then divulged that she was a not Jewish and he was taken to court due to the shame that he caused her, and they assessed the payment for the shame that he caused her at four hundred zuz. Ultimately, Rav Adda said to her: What is your name? She replied: Matun. In a play on words, he said to her: Matun, her name, plus matun, the Aramaic word for two hundred, is worth four hundred zuz.