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Yibbum vs. Chalitzah
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What is Halachically preferable? Yibbum vs. Chalitzah

(ה) כִּֽי־יֵשְׁב֨וּ אַחִ֜ים יַחְדָּ֗ו וּמֵ֨ת אַחַ֤ד מֵהֶם֙ וּבֵ֣ן אֵֽין־ל֔וֹ לֹֽא־תִהְיֶ֧ה אֵֽשֶׁת־הַמֵּ֛ת הַח֖וּצָה לְאִ֣ישׁ זָ֑ר יְבָמָהּ֙ יָבֹ֣א עָלֶ֔יהָ וּלְקָחָ֥הּ ל֛וֹ לְאִשָּׁ֖ה וְיִבְּמָֽהּ׃ (ו) וְהָיָ֗ה הַבְּכוֹר֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר תֵּלֵ֔ד יָק֕וּם עַל־שֵׁ֥ם אָחִ֖יו הַמֵּ֑ת וְלֹֽא־יִמָּחֶ֥ה שְׁמ֖וֹ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵֽל׃ (ז) וְאִם־לֹ֤א יַחְפֹּץ֙ הָאִ֔ישׁ לָקַ֖חַת אֶת־יְבִמְתּ֑וֹ וְעָלְתָה֩ יְבִמְתּ֨וֹ הַשַּׁ֜עְרָה אֶל־הַזְּקֵנִ֗ים וְאָֽמְרָה֙ מֵאֵ֨ן יְבָמִ֜י לְהָקִ֨ים לְאָחִ֥יו שֵׁם֙ בְּיִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל לֹ֥א אָבָ֖ה יַבְּמִֽי׃ (ח) וְקָֽרְאוּ־ל֥וֹ זִקְנֵי־עִיר֖וֹ וְדִבְּר֣וּ אֵלָ֑יו וְעָמַ֣ד וְאָמַ֔ר לֹ֥א חָפַ֖צְתִּי לְקַחְתָּֽהּ׃ (ט) וְנִגְּשָׁ֨ה יְבִמְתּ֣וֹ אֵלָיו֮ לְעֵינֵ֣י הַזְּקֵנִים֒ וְחָלְצָ֤ה נַעֲלוֹ֙ מֵעַ֣ל רַגְל֔וֹ וְיָרְקָ֖ה בְּפָנָ֑יו וְעָֽנְתָה֙ וְאָ֣מְרָ֔ה כָּ֚כָה יֵעָשֶׂ֣ה לָאִ֔ישׁ אֲשֶׁ֥ר לֹא־יִבְנֶ֖ה אֶת־בֵּ֥ית אָחִֽיו׃ (י) וְנִקְרָ֥א שְׁמ֖וֹ בְּיִשְׂרָאֵ֑ל בֵּ֖ית חֲל֥וּץ הַנָּֽעַל׃

(1) When there is a dispute between two parties and they go to law, and a decision is rendered declaring the one in the right and the other in the wrong— (2) if the guilty one is to be flogged, the magistrate shall have the person lie down and shall supervise the giving of lashes, by count, as warranted by the offense. (3) The guilty one may be given up to forty lashes, but not more, lest being flogged further, to excess, your peer be degraded before your eyes. (4) You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing. (5) When brothers dwell together and one of them dies and leaves no offspring,*offspring Lit. “son,” but daughters are also in view; cf. Num. 27.1–11. the wife of the deceased*Apparently a type of widow whose late husband had a share in his lineage’s patrimony, and whose access to support from that patrimony is now stymied by her lack of offspring; cf. Ruth 4.5. shall not become that of another party, outside the family. Her husband’s brother shall unite with her: he shall take her as his wife and perform the levir’s duty. (6) The first child that she bears shall be accounted to the dead brother, that his name may not be blotted out in Israel. (7) But if that party does not want to take his brother’s widow [to wife], his brother’s widow shall appear before the elders in the gate and declare, “My husband’s brother refuses to establish a name in Israel for his brother; he will not perform the duty of a levir.” (8) The elders of his town shall then summon him and talk to him. If he insists, saying, “I do not want to take her,” (9) his brother’s widow shall go up to him in the presence of the elders, pull the sandal off his foot, spit in his face, and make this declaration: Thus shall be done to the man*man Lit. “participant whose involvement defines the depicted situation.” See the Dictionary under ’ish. who will not build up his brother’s house! (10) And he shall go in Israel by the name of “the family of the unsandaled one.” (11) If two parties are fighting—one man with another—and the wife of one comes up to save her husband from his antagonist and puts out her hand and seizes him by his genitals, (12) you shall cut off her hand; show no pity. (13) You shall not have in your pouch alternate weights, larger and smaller. (14) You shall not have in your house alternate measures, a larger and a smaller. (15) You must have completely honest weights and completely honest measures, if you are to endure long on the soil that your God יהוה is giving you. (16) For everyone who does those things, everyone who deals dishonestly, is abhorrent to your God יהוה. (17) Remember what Amalek did to you on your journey, after you left Egypt— (18) how, undeterred by fear of God, he surprised you on the march, when you were famished and weary, and cut down all the stragglers in your rear. (19) Therefore, when your God יהוה grants you safety from all your enemies around you, in the land that your God יהוה is giving you as a hereditary portion, you shall blot out the memory of Amalek from under heaven. Do not forget!

(ח) ואמנם טעם ה׳יבום׳ כתוב: כי היה מנהג קדום קודם ׳מתן תורה׳ והשאירתו התורה. וציותה לעשות ה׳חליצה׳ מפני שהמעשים ההם היו מגונים במנהגי הזמנים ההם, ואולי יברח מן הגנות ההיא ו׳ייבם׳ – מבואר הוא זה ב׳תורה׳: ״ככה יעשה לאיש וגו׳ ונקרא שמו בישראל וגו׳״.

(8) The reason of the law concerning marrying the deceased brother’s wife is stated in the Bible (Deut. 25:5). It was a custom in force before the Law was given, and the Law perpetuated it. The ceremony of haliẓah (ibid. 6, seq.), “taking off the shoe,” has been introduced, because in those days it was considered disgraceful to go through that ceremony, and in order to avoid the disgrace, a person might perhaps be induced to marry his deceased brother’s wife. This is evident from the words of the Law: “So shall it be done unto that man that will not build up his brother’s house. And his name shall be called in Israel, The house of him that hath his shoe loosed” (Deut. 25:9).

(כא) התועלת הי"ט הוא במצו' והוא מה שצונו ליבם אשת האח שמת בלא בנים כדי שלא ימחה שמו מישר' ומה שצוה מענין החליצה אם לא חפץ ליבם מה שיש בו מהבשת והזרות ומה שיביאהו להסכים ליבם:
רבינו בחיי דברים פרשת כי תצא פרק כה
וע"ד הפשט: בטעם מצות היבום כדי שישאר הממון בבית המת ולא ימשול זר על אשתו ועל נכסיו, כענין שכתוב: לא תהיה אשת המת החוצה לאיש זר, כי בזה אומדין דעתו של מת כי הוא רוצה שימשול אחיו על נכסיו ועל אשתו יותר מאחר כיון שאין לו זרע שיירשנו, זה טעם היבום. וטעם החליצה, כי כל זמן שהיבם רוצה ליבם הנה הוא מקיים זרע לאחיו ונראה כאילו אחיו חי, וכשאינו מיבם ואינו מקיים זרע לאחיו נראה שאחיו מת וצריך הוא שיתאבל עליו, ולכך היבמה תחלוץ המנעל שהוא סימן אבלות כאילו מתאבל על אחיו המת.

תְּנַן הָתָם: מִצְוַת יִבּוּם קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת חֲלִיצָה. בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה, שֶׁהָיוּ מִתְכַּוְּונִין לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה. עַכְשָׁו שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוְּונִין לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה, אָמְרוּ: מִצְוַת חֲלִיצָה קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת יִבּוּם. אָמַר רַב: אֵין כּוֹפִין.

[...]

בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה, שֶׁהָיוּ מִתְכַּוְּונִין לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה — מִצְוַת יִבּוּם קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת חֲלִיצָה. וְעַכְשָׁיו שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוְּונִין לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה, אָמְרוּ: מִצְוַת חֲלִיצָה קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת יִבּוּם. אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: חָזְרוּ לוֹמַר מִצְוַת יִבּוּם קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת חֲלִיצָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אִכַּשּׁוּר דָּרֵי? מֵעִיקָּרָא סָבְרִי לַהּ כְּאַבָּא שָׁאוּל, וּלְבַסּוֹף סָבְרִי לַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן. דְּתַנְיָא, אַבָּא שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר: הַכּוֹנֵס אֶת יְבִמְתּוֹ לְשֵׁם נוֹי, וּלְשׁוּם אִישׁוּת, וּלְשׁוּם דָּבָר אַחֵר — כְּאִילּוּ פּוֹגֵעַ בְּעֶרְוָה. וְקָרוֹב אֲנִי בְּעֵינַי לִהְיוֹת הַוָּלָד מַמְזֵר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.

There are those who say that the dispute is more limited: When there is the possibility of consummating the levirate marriage, everyone agrees that the consummation of the levirate marriage by a younger brother is preferable to the ḥalitza of the eldest brother. When they disagree it is with regard to the significance of the ḥalitza of a younger brother. And this is how the dispute was stated: Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree with regard to a case in which there is choice between the ḥalitza of a younger brother or the ḥalitza of the eldest brother. One said: The ḥalitza of the eldest brother is preferable. And the other one said: The two options are equivalent. The Gemara explains: With regard to the one who said that the ḥalitza of the eldest brother is preferable, this is due to the fact that the mitzva of levirate marriage and ḥalitza is incumbent upon the eldest brother. And the other Sage would respond to this claim by saying that when we say that the mitzva is incumbent upon the eldest brother, that is only with regard to the consummation of the levirate marriage; however, with regard to performing ḥalitza, all the brothers are equivalent. The Gemara suggests a proof for the first opinion: We learned in the mishna: If the younger brothers do not want to consummate the levirate marriage, the court returns to the eldest brother and demands that he at least perform ḥalitza. The Gemara suggests: What, is it not that the other brothers did not want to consummate the levirate marriage but are willing to perform ḥalitza? And yet the mishna teaches: The court returns to the eldest brother so that he can perform ḥalitza. If so, conclude from here that the ḥalitza of the eldest brother is preferable. The Gemara rejects the proof: No, the mishna might concern a case where the other brothers did not want either to perform ḥalitza or to consummate the levirate marriage, and it is only because they are unwilling to do either that the court returns to the eldest brother. The Gemara asks: If this is so, then in the corresponding situation in which the mishna states: The eldest brother does not want to do so, the case must be that he does not want either to perform ḥalitza or to consummate the levirate marriage. But if so, when the younger brothers also refuse, why should the court invest the extra effort to return to the eldest brother to force him to fulfill his duty? Let the court force them, i.e., the younger brothers, to fulfill their duty. The Gemara responds: Since the mitzva is incumbent upon the eldest brother ab initio, it is he who is forced. Come and hear another proof from the mishna: If a younger brother makes his decision dependent upon the eldest brother, who is currently unavailable, suggesting that the yevama wait until he comes from overseas, the court does not listen to him. And if it enters your mind to suggest that the ḥalitza of the eldest brother is preferable, why doesn’t the court listen to him? Let the court wait, as perhaps he will come and perform ḥalitza. Rather, it would appear that the mishna assumes that with regard to performing ḥalitza, all the brothers are equivalent. The Gemara challenges this: But even according to your reasoning, you certainly agree that the possibility of consummating the levirate marriage is always preferable. If so, what about the previous case in the mishna, where the eldest brother asks to wait until his brother who is a minor will mature? In that case as well the mishna rules: The court does not listen to him; but why shouldn’t the court listen to him? Let the court wait, as perhaps he will come and consummate the levirate marriage. Alternatively, in the case where the eldest brother is overseas, let the court wait, as perhaps he will come and consummate the levirate marriage with her. Rather, it is clear that the reason for the mishna’s ruling is that we do not delay the performance of a mitzva. Therefore, if one of the brothers is currently unable to perform the mitzva, he is not considered at all. Consequently, no proof can be derived from the mishna. § We learned in a mishna there (Bekhorot 13a): The mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage takes precedence over the mitzva of performing ḥalitza; this applied initially, when yevamin would have intent for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva. Now, that they do not have intent for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva, the Sages say: The mitzva of performing ḥalitza takes precedence over the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage. Rav said: Nevertheless, the court does not force a yavam to perform ḥalitza, and if he wishes it is still permitted to consummate the levirate marriage. The Gemara relates: When a yavam and a yevama would come before Rav, he would say to them: If you want, perform ḥalitza, and if you want, consummate the levirate marriage, as the Merciful One makes the matter dependent upon your will, as it is stated: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama” (Deuteronomy 25:7) then he should perform ḥalitza. This implies that the Torah requires him to perform ḥalitza only if he does not wish to consummate the levirate marriage, but if he wishes to do so, then the matter is dependent upon him, and if he wants, he performs ḥalitza, or if he wants, he consummates the levirate marriage. The Gemara notes: And even Rav Yehuda holds that the court does not force a yavam to perform ḥalitza if he wishes to consummate the levirate marriage. This is apparent from the fact that Rav Yehuda enacted in his court that the following formulation should be used in the bill of ḥalitza: That so-and-so, daughter of so-and-so, brought so-and-so, her yavam, before the court; and we identified him, that he was indeed the paternal brother of the deceased, and we said to him: If you desire to consummate the levirate marriage, then consummate the levirate marriage, and if not, extend your right foot toward your yevama so that she may perform ḥalitza by removing your shoe. The bill of ḥalitza would continue with the account of what transpired: And he extended [itla] his right foot toward her and she removed his shoe from upon his foot and she spat toward his face spittle, which was visible to the court, and which landed upon the ground. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avya in the name of Rav Yehuda would conclude the formulation of the bill of ḥalitza with an additional sentence: And we dictated to the yavam that which is written in the book of the Torah of Moses, i.e., those declarations that the yavam and the yevama are required to make. The Gemara clarifies the intention of the phrase: And we identified him as the brother of the deceased. Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree concerning this phrase: One said that this identification must be made through legally valid witnesses, and the other one said that even the testimony of a relative and even the testimony a woman is accepted in this case. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that the identification of the brother is considered to be merely revealing the facts of the matter, and therefore, even a relative and even a woman may tender this information. The Gemara paraphrases the mishna from tractate Bekhorot: Initially, when yevamin would have intent for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage, the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage took precedence over the mitzva of performing ḥalitza. And now that they do not have intent for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva, the Sages say: The mitzva of performing ḥalitza takes precedence over the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage. Rami bar Ḥama said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said: In later generations they went back to once again saying that the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage takes precedence over the mitzva of performing ḥalitza. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him in wonderment: Could it be that the later generations improved their spiritual level and now intend to consummate the levirate marriage solely for sake of fulfilling the mitzva? The Gemara explains that this does not mean that the later generations improved themselves; rather, initially they held in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, and so the mitzva of performing ḥalitza took precedence, and in the end they held in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and so the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage took precedence. As it is taught in a baraita: Abba Shaul says that one who consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama for the sake of her beauty, or for the sake of marital relations, or for the sake of another matter, e.g., he wishes to inherit her husband’s estate, it is considered as though he encountered a forbidden relation, and I am inclined to view the offspring born from such a union as a mamzer. Since the prohibition against engaging in relations with one’s brother’s wife is overridden only for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage, when one does not have the intention to fulfill that mitzva, the baseline prohibition applies, and so any offspring from the union will be mamzerim. The Rabbis say: The Torah states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that he should do so in any case, even if his intentions are not solely for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught the following baraita that the Sages taught: The Torah states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5); this is to be considered a mitzva, as initially, before she was married to his brother, she was among all other women who are permitted to him, and then when she married his brother she became forbidden to him, and when his brother died without offspring she reverted from her forbidden status and became permitted to him. One might have thought that she would revert to her original permitted status; therefore, the verse states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” to teach that it is in fact a mitzva to do so. Who is the tanna who taught this baraita? Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: It is Abba Shaul, and this is what the baraita is saying: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” teaches that it is permitted to engage in intercourse with her only when his intention is to fulfill a mitzva, as initially, before she was married to his brother, she was among all other women who are permitted to him, and so, if he wished, then even for the sake of her beauty he was permitted to marry her, or similarly, if he wished, then even for the sake of marital relations he was permitted to marry her. When she married his brother she became forbidden to him, and when his brother died without offspring she reverted from her forbidden status and became permitted to him. One might have thought that she would fully revert to her original permitted status; therefore, the verse states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” to teach that he is permitted to marry her only when his intention is for the mitzva. Rava said: You can even say that the baraita is in accordance with the Rabbis, and this is what the baraita is saying: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” indicates that it is a mitzva to consummate the levirate marriage, as initially, before she was married to his brother, she was among all other women who are permitted to him, and so if he wished, he was permitted to marry her, or if he wished, he was permitted to choose not to marry her. When she married his brother she became forbidden to him, and when his brother died without offspring she reverted from her forbidden status and became permitted to him. One might have thought that she would fully revert to her original permitted status, so that if he wishes, he may marry her, or if he wishes, he may choose not to marry her. The Gemara interjects that the logic of this last statement seems implausible: Does he really have the option to do as he wishes? Isn’t she bound to him with a levirate bond? Could it be that she will be released from that bond without doing anything? Rather, emend the previous argument and instead say: One might think that if he wishes, he may marry her, or if he wishes not to do so, he performs ḥalitza with her. Therefore, the verse states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her,” to teach that it is now a mitzva to consummate the marriage, and doing so is preferable to performing ḥalitza. The baraita under discussion also presents another case that follows a similar model of initially being permitted, then prohibited, and then once again permitted. The Gemara analyzes the explanations of Rav Yitzḥak and Rava based on that clause of the baraita: Say the first clause and try to explain it in a way consistent with the various explanations of the latter clause: The Torah states concerning the meal-offerings eaten by the priests: “It shall be eaten unleavened in a sacred place” (Leviticus 6:9); this indicates that doing so is a mitzva,

אמר רב אין כופין - ואי ניחא לתרוייהו לייבומי אין כופין אותו לחלוץ דנימא לאו למצוה מכווני ופגע באיסור אשת אח אלא אי בעי מייבם. ומיהו היכא דהוא צבי לייבומי ואיהי אמרה לא בעינא ליה ואמרה דברים ניכרים אי מצינו לאטעוייה ולומר לו חלוץ לה ע"מ שתתן לך מאתים זוז מטעינן ליה ואי לא כפינן ליה וחליץ דאמר רב ששת (לעיל יבמות ד.) מנין ליבמה שנפלה לפני מוכה שחין שאין חוסמין אותה ולא תימא מוכה שחין דוקא אלא כל אמתלא שתתן לדבריה דאמר בהמדיר (כתובות עז.) מעשה בציידן בבורסי שמת ולו אח בורסי ואמרו חכמים יכולה שתאמר לאחיך הייתי יכולה לקבל ולך איני יכולה לקבל ועוד פסקינן הלכתא באע"פ (שם סד.) כותבין אגרת מרד על ארוסה ואין כותבין אגרת מרד על שומרת יבם ומכל הלין טעמי כפינן ליה דחליץ ושקלה כתובה. וכל הני אין כופין דהכא היכא דתרוייהו ניחא להו:

אמר רב אין כופין - פירש בקונטרס כי ניחא לתרוייהו לייבם אין כופין לחלוץ משום מצוה דנימא דלאו למצוה מכווני אבל אם לא תרצה לייבם מחמת שתתן אמתלא לדבריה אם אין יכולין להטעותו כפינן ליה וחליץ וממוכה שחין ובורסי שהביא בקונט' נראה דאין ראיה שהן מאותם שכופין להוציא מן הבעל אבל בשאר אמתלא אין נראה לומר דכופין דאל"כ למה היו טורחין לקמן בפרק מצות חליצה (יבמות דף קו.) להטעותו יכפוהו לחלוץ ומאגרת מרד אין ראיה דא"כ בלא אמתלא נמי והתם הוי טעמא משום דמצות חליצה קודמת כדמסיק ועוד דקאמר התם רבי יוחנן תבע לייבם אין נזקקין לו השתא לחלוץ כופין ואין נזקקין לייבם מבעיא ועוד מדקאמר בדידך תלה רחמנא משמע אפי' בזמן הזה דמצות חליצה קודמת ור"ת גריס מצות יבום קודמת למצות חליצה אמר רב אין כופין וקאי אבראשונה שהיו מתכוונין לשם מצוה וקאמר דאין כופין לייבם וכי הוו אתו לקמיה דרב אותן שהיו מתכוונים לשם מצוה ורב יהודה נמי דאתקין אי צבית לייבומי באותן שבאין לפנינו לחלוץ איירי שאותן אם היו מייבמין היו מכוונים לשם מצוה שהרי לא היו מתכוונים לשם נוי ולשם אישות שלא היו חוששים לייבם אלא לחלוץ אבל אחריני אין מניחין לייבם אלא אדרבה כופין לחלוץ ואר"ת דהלכה כאבא שאול כסתם מתני' דבכורות (דף יג.) ולא כרמי בר חמא דאמר חזרו לומר דמצות ייבום קודמת כרבנן ועוד דבריש מכילתין אוקי מתניתין דפ"ק (דף ג. ושם) כאבא שאול ובפרק בית שמאי (לקמן יבמות דף קט. ושם) תני בר קפרא לעולם ידבק אדם בחליצה כאבא שאול וסתמא דגמרא בפרק אע"פ (כתובות דף סד. ושם) כאבא שאול ולעיל בשמעתין דמשמע דביאה עדיפא במתכוין לשם מצוה איירי ור"ח פסק כאן דמצות יבום קודמת וחזר בו בפ' מצות חליצה ופסק דמצות חליצה קודמת:

(ב) [...] וּמִצְוַת יִבּוּם קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת חֲלִיצָה:

(2) If the yavam does not want to perform the rite of yibbum, or if the woman does not consent,4According to the Rambam's conception, the woman cannot be compelled to marry her brother-in-law against her will. See Chapter 2, Halachah 10 and notes. he should [free her from this obligation through the rite of] chalitzah. [Only] afterwards is she permitted to marry another man.
It is a positive commandment5Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 217) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 599) include this mitzvah as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. of Scriptural law for [a brother] to perform chalitzah for [the deceased's widow], if he does not want to perform the rite of yibbum, as [Deuteronomy 25:9] states: "She shall... remove his shoe."6The woman also participates - indeed she plays a more active role - in the rite of chalitzah. Nevertheless, the mitzvah is considered to be incumbent on the brother of the deceased, because the effect of this mitzvah is that he foregoes a right - the right to marry the woman - that belongs to him. Until he performs chalitzah, the woman is bonded to him, and through performing chalitzah he severs this connection. Therefore, the mitzvah is considered his.
Moreover, chalitzah is a means to dissolve the connection established by kiddushin. Since kiddushin are established by the man, chalitzah is also his initiative. See the Kovetz who questions whether the man is obligated to perform chalitzah or he merely has the opportunity of doing so.

The mitzvah of yibbum takes precedence over the mitzvah of chalitzah.7The concluding mishnah of the first chapter of Bechorot states:

The mitzvah of yibbum takes precedence over the mitzvah of chalitzah. [This applied] originally, when the participants [in the rite] intended to perform a mitzvah. In the present age, when they do not intend to perform a mitzvah, the mitzvah of chalitzah takes precedence over the mitzvah of yibbum.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that the Mishnah follows the opinion of Abba Shaul, who maintains that the prohibition against marrying one's brother's wife is not removed entirely by the mitzvah of yibbum. Instead, it is merely temporarily superseded. And therefore, if the couple have any intentions other than the fulfillment of the mitzvah, they transgress this prohibition. As such, rather than involve oneself in such a challenge, one should perform the mitzvah of chalitzah.
In that commentary, and in a subsequent responsum, the Rambam explains that the halachah follows the opinion of the Sages who differ with Abba Shaul. These Sages maintain that when a man dies childless, the prohibition against his brother's marrying his wife is lifted entirely. Even if the brother marries the widow because of her looks, or because of her money, there is no prohibition involved. For that reason, the mitzvah of yibbum takes precedence.
The Ashkenazic community, following the rulings of Rabbenu Tam and the authorities who succeeded him, do not accept this ruling and follow Abba Shaul's opinion. Accordingly, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 165:1) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ramah states that chalitzah is preferable, and that a couple should not be allowed to perform yibbum unless the court is certain that their intent is solely to perform the mitzvah.
There is some discussion of the Rambam's intent by the commentaries, for his ruling in Hilchot Gerushin 10:16 implies a recognition of the importance of chalitzah. Nevertheless, the clarity of his statements in his Commentary on the Mishnah and in Sefer HaMitzvot makes it obvious that he follows the opinion of the Sages who differ with Abba Shaul. At present, even within the Sephardic community, the mitzvah of chalitzah is generally observed.
[Note also the opinion of the Beit Shmuel 174:3, who states that even according to the Ashkenazic authorities, by Scriptural law yibbum takes precedence, and that the primacy given to chalitzah is a Rabbinic institution.]

ספר המצוות לרמב"ם מצות עשה ריז
וכבר ידעת לשון אמרם מצות יבום קודמת למצות חליצה. ולכן נקראת המסכתא יבמות ואף על פי שהיא כוללת דין היבום והחליצה בשוה:
טור אבן העזר הלכות יבום סימן קסה

רב אלפס פסק שמצות יבום קודמת למצות חליצה וכ"כ הרמב"ם ורש"י כתב שמצות חליצה קודמת ומכל מקום אם שניהם לפנינו ורוצין לייבם שומעין להם ולא חיישינן שמא אינם מכוונים לשם מצוה אבל אם אמרה לא בעינא ליה ואמרה דברים הנכרים אם יכולין להטעותו שיאמרו לו חלוץ לה על מנת שתתן לך מנה מטעינן ליה ואי לא כייפינן ליה וחליץ בכל אמתלא שתתן לדבריה
ורבינו תם כתב דמצות חליצה קודמת ואפילו אם שניהם רוצים לייבם אין שומעין להן אא"כ ידוע שמכווני' לשם מצוה כגון שבא לב"ד לחלוץ ואמרו לו אי צבית ליבומי יבם מאז ודאי אי מייבמים מכוונין לשם מצוה כיון שבא לחלוץ מתחלה וכיוצא בזה אם רוצה לייבם וידוע שמכוין לשם מצוה והיא ממאנת אם יש לה טענה שהיתה מועלת לה אפילו כנגד בעלה כגון שהוא מאותן שכופין אותו להוציא כופין אותו נמי לחלוץ ואם לאו אם יכולין להטעותו שיחלוץ לה הרי טוב ואם אין יכולים להטעותו אין כופין לחלוץ וכן הוא מסקנת א"א הרא"ש ז"ל
וכתב עוד בתשובה על יבמה שנפלה לפני יבם נער ולא רצתה להתייבם בטענה שאמרה שהוא נער ובער ואין לו במה לפרנסה והוא לא רצה לחלוץ עד שיתנו לו דבר קצוב וכתב שאם יכולים להטעותו שיחלוץ מטעין ליה ואם לאו כופין אותו לחלוץ בחנם ובספר המצות כתב שאם יש לו אשה אחרת שכופין אותו ומנדין אותו עד שיחלוץ.

מצות יבום קודמת למצות חליצה ואם אינה רוצה להתייבם לשום אחד מהאחים (או בגדול כשרוצה לייבם) בלא טענה מספקת דינה כמורדת וי"א שמצות חליצה קודמת:

הגה: ואין לה דין מורדת אם אינה רוצה להתייבם ומ"מ אין כופין אותו לחלוץ אלא מטעין אותו אם יכולין להטעותו כגון שאומרים לו חלוץ ע"מ שתתן לך מנה (טור בשם ר"ת והרא"ש) ודוקא אם אינו מאותן שכופין להוציא גבי בעל כמו שנתבאר לעיל סי' קנ"ד ואם שניהם רוצים ביבום אין מניחים אותם לייבם אא"כ ניכר וידוע שמכוונים לשם מצוה (טור בשם ר"ת) וי"א דאם יש לו אשה אחרת שכופין אותו ומנדין אותו עד שיחלוץ (טור בשם סמ"ג) וי"א אפילו בלא אשה אחרת אם אינם מכוונים לשם מצוה והיא אינה רוצה להתייבם ואין יכולים להטעותו כופין אותו לחלוץ

(1) The mitzvah of yibum comes before the mitzvah of chalitzah. And if she does not want to do yibum with another one of his [her husband's] brothers, or with the eldest who wants to do yibum, but without a satisfactory claim, she is considered rebellious. There are those who say that the mitvah of chalitzah is more important. The Rem"a comments: She is not considered rebellious if she does not want to perform yibum. Nevertheless, we do not force him to do chalitzah, rather they try to trick him if they are able to, for example that they say to him: do chalitzah on the condition that she give you a maneh [a coin equal to 100 zuz] (Tur in the name of Rabeinu Tam and the Ros"h). Specifically, if they are not among those who force him to divorce her, like was explained earlier in siman 154). If the two of them want to do yibum, we do not allow them to unless it is known that they both have intention to fulfill the mitzvah (Tur in the name of Rabeinu Tam). Some say that if he has another wife, we force him and pressure him until he does chalitzah (Tur in the name of the Sma"g). There are those who say that even if he doesn't have another wife, if the intention isn't for a mitzvah, and she does not want to do yibum, and they are not able to trick him, they force him to do chalitzah. The custom like the first opinion, that we do not force chalitzah at all, even if we know that his intentions are for money (Maharim Padvoah siman 18). But we appease between them like the communal institutions, like explained below. All this is when he wanys to perform yibum, and it is possible to do yibum without worrying about it being forbidden. But if he says he wants to do neither yibum nor chalitzah, we force him (Beit Yoseif in the name of Rabeinu Tam). Specifically, when she came with a reasonable claim, like explained in siman 154 (Truma Hadeshen siman 220). However, if it is possible to make him make a mistake by saying to him, take a lot of money for the chalitzah, we make him make a mistake so we don’t need to force him (N”Y M”K). They should be careful so they don’t plant money in the hands of a third person, because then they cannot say to him: we were just kidding with you (Mordechai Perek Hacholeitz). See later on siman 169 seif 50).

ערוך השולחן אבן העזר סימן קסה
ואמת שלא ראינו יבום במדינתינו אבל מ"מ אי מיקלע כה"ג נלע"ד שאין למחות בידם ובפרט לפמ"ש דאם מכוין לשם מצוה אף שמכוין ג"כ לשם נוי אין איסור וכ"ש לפי דעת י"א שבסעיף ד' דזהו רק מדרבנן פשיטא שאין לנו לעכבן לייבם
Decree published by the Israeli Rabbinate, March 1950
ברוב קהלות ישראל וכן בקהילות האשכנזים שבארץ, קבלו עליהם להלכה שמצות חליצה קודמת למצות יבום, וגם כששניהם, היבם והיבמה, רוצין ביבום, אין מניחים אותם ליבם. ובמקום שהיבם נשוי אשה, נהגו בכל המקומות שאין מניחים אותם ליבם. ובהיות ובזמננו ברור הדבר שרוב יבמים אינם מכוונים לשם מצוה, ומשום דרכי שלום ואחדות במדינת ישראל, שלא תהיה התורה כשתי תורות, הננו גוזרים על תושבי ארץ ישראל ועל אלה שיעלו ויתישבו מעתה והלאה, לאסור עליהם מצות יבום לגמרי, וחייבים לחלוץ. וחייבים במזונות יבמתם כפי מה שיפסקו עליו בי”ד עד שיפטרו את יבמתם בחליצה. איסור זה אפשר להתירו רק במסבות מיוחדות, ועפ"י החלטות המועצה המורחבת בחתימת הרבנים הראשיים לישראל.
שו"ת יביע אומר חלק ו - אבן העזר סימן יד
סוף דבר הכל נשמע שלפע"ד נראה ברור שלגבי דידן דנקטינן בשפולי גלימיה דמרן ז"ל, וכל קדושים שעמו, רוב מנין ורוב בנין מגדולי הפוסקים אשר מפיהם אנו חיים, מצות יבום קודמת לחליצה גם בזמן הזה, ואין כל תוקף להסכמת נשיאי וחברי הרבנות הראשית לישראל שגזרו אומר לבטל לגמרי מצות יבום, גם מהספרדים ועדות המזרח, ואין להם כל סמכות לכך.