And is it correct to say that Rabbi Meir does not maintain that one can be sentenced to the death penalty and to pay for the same act? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If one stole an animal and slaughtered it on Shabbat, or if he stole an animal and slaughtered it for idol worship, or if he stole an ox that is sentenced to be stoned, from which it is prohibited to derive any benefit, and he slaughtered it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis exempt him from this payment. Apparently Rabbi Meir maintains that one can be held liable for monetary payment and for capital punishment for the same act, e.g., slaughtering on Shabbat or slaughtering for idol worship. The Sages say in response: Stand apart from this baraita, i.e., this baraita should not be understood in a straightforward manner, as it was stated concerning it: Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say it was Rabbi Yirmeya who says that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says, and Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Ela and the entire group of disciples of Rabbi Yoḥanan also say in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The baraita is speaking of a thief who slaughters the stolen animal through the agency of another person, i.e., he instructed another to slaughter it, and that agent did so on Shabbat or for idolatrous purposes. The thief pays the fourfold or fivefold payment because he himself did not commit a capital offense. The Gemara asks: How can it be that a thief is liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment if another person slaughters the stolen animal for him? But is it so that this one sins and that one becomes liable? The Gemara provides several reasons why in the case of fourfold or fivefold payment it is possible for the thief to be liable for another’s actions. Rava said: It is different here, as the verse states: “And slaughter it or sell it” (Exodus 21:37), thereby juxtaposing the two acts of slaughtering and selling. It is derived that just as there is liability for the fourfold or fivefold payment through selling, which by definition is performed by means of another party, so too, there is liability for slaughtering when it is performed by means of another party. The school of Rabbi Yishmael teaches: The word “or” in the phrase: “And slaughter it or sell it,” serves to include a case in which the agent slaughters or sells the animal at the behest of the thief. The school of Ḥizkiyya teaches: The separate word “for” [taḥat] in the phrase: “He shall pay five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep,” which could have been avoided by using the mere prefix of the letter beit, serves to include a case in which the agent slaughters the animal on behalf of the thief. Mar Zutra objects to this explanation of the baraita: Is there anything with regard to which if one performs it himself he is not liable, and if his agent performs it on his behalf one is liable? How is it possible for an agent to have more power than the one who appointed him? Can it be that if the thief himself slaughtered the animal on Shabbat he would be exempt, whereas if he has it slaughtered by another he is liable? Rav Ashi said to him: There, in the case of the thief who slaughters a stolen animal on Shabbat, it is not because he is not liable that he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment; rather, he is liable but he is excused from payment because he receives the greater of the two punishments, i.e., execution, for desecrating Shabbat. When he appoints an agent he has no liability for desecrating Shabbat, and therefore he pays for the slaughter. The Gemara asks: But if the baraita is speaking about a thief who slaughters through the agency of another person, what is the reason of the Rabbis, who exempt the thief from payment? The thief did not himself do any act for which he is liable to receive the death penalty. The Sages say in explanation: Who are these Rabbis of the baraita? It is Rabbi Shimon, who said: The legal status of an act of slaughter that is not fit for accomplishing its full ritual purpose is not considered an act of slaughter. Since slaughtering on Shabbat or slaughtering for idolatrous purposes does not render the meat fit for consumption, Rabbi Shimon rules that there is no liability for the fourfold or fivefold payment. The Sages say, questioning this explanation: Granted, slaughtering for idol worship and slaughtering an ox that is sentenced to be stoned are cases of slaughter that is not fit, as in both of these cases it is prohibited to derive any benefit from the animal’s flesh. But slaughtering on Shabbat is a fit slaughter. As we learned in a mishna (Ḥullin 14a): In the case of one who slaughters an animal on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, although he is liable to receive the death penalty for desecrating Shabbat, his slaughter is valid and the meat may be eaten. The Sages say in response: Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar, who disagrees with that mishna and prohibits eating the meat of an animal slaughtered on Shabbat. As we learned in a mishna (Terumot 2:3): In the case of one who cooks food on Shabbat, if he acted unwittingly he may eat the food, but if he acted intentionally he may not eat it; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he acted unwittingly he may eat the food only upon the conclusion of Shabbat, and if he acted intentionally he may not eat it ever, although others may partake of it. Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar says: If he cooked the food unwittingly it may be eaten upon the conclusion of Shabbat by others only, but not by him; and if he acted intentionally it may not be eaten ever, neither by him nor by others. Slaughter, like cooking, is a desecration of Shabbat that entails the death penalty. It follows that Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar maintains that the meat of an animal intentionally slaughtered on Shabbat may never be eaten. If so, this is a slaughter that does not render the meat fit for consumption, and therefore according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon there is no fourfold or fivefold payment. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar? The Gemara explains: This is as Rabbi Ḥiyya taught at the entrance to the house of the Nasi. It is written: “And you shall observe Shabbat, for it is holy [kodesh] to you; one who profanes it shall be put to death” (Exodus 31:14). Just as it is prohibited to eat a sacred item consecrated to the Temple [kodesh], so too is it prohibited to eat food produced though action that desecrates Shabbat. The Gemara asks: If so, perhaps the analogy should be extended: Just as it is prohibited to derive benefit from a sacred item, so too should it be prohibited to derive benefit from a product of an action that desecrates Shabbat. The Gemara answers: The verse states: “It is holy to you” (Exodus 31:14), indicating that it shall be yours for deriving benefit. Although food cooked on Shabbat may not be eaten, it is permitted to benefit from it in other ways. The Gemara further asks: Based on the analogy between a sacred item and the product of an action that desecrates Shabbat, one might have thought that even if the action were performed unwittingly it should be prohibited to consume the product, like a sacred item. To counter this, the verse states: “One who profanes it shall be put to death” (Exodus 31:14), indicating that it is with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat intentionally that I said this analogy to you, as the verse clearly is referring to one who is liable to receive the death penalty, but not one who desecrates Shabbat unwittingly, who is not executed. The Gemara comments: Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to this matter. One said that the product of an action that constitutes a desecration of Shabbat is forbidden by Torah law, and one said that the product of an action that constitutes a desecration of Shabbat is forbidden by rabbinic law. The Gemara elaborates: The one who says it is forbidden by Torah law explains as we said, that the prohibition is based on the verse as interpreted by Rabbi Ḥiyya. And the one who says it is forbidden by rabbinic law would say that the verse states: “It is holy,” from which he infers: It, the day itself, is holy but the products of its prohibited actions are not holy, and therefore they are not compared to sacred items and may be eaten by Torah law.