Preservation of Human Life
מתני׳ קשרו בעליו במוסרה ונעל בפניו כראוי ויצא והזיק אחד תם ואחד מועד חייב דברי ר"מ רבי יהודה אומר תם חייב ומועד פטור שנאמר (שמות כא, לו) ולא ישמרנו בעליו ושמור הוא זה ר"א אומר אין לו שמירה אלא סכין: גמ׳ מאי טעמא דר"מ קסבר סתם שוורים לאו בחזקת שימור קיימי ואמר רחמנא תם ניחייב דניבעי ליה שמירה פחותה הדר אמר רחמנא ולא ישמרנו גבי מועד דנבעי ליה שמירה מעולה ויליף נגיחה לתם נגיחה למועד ר"י סבר סתם שוורים בחזקת שימור קיימי אמר רחמנא תם נשלם דניבעי ליה שמירה מעולה הדר אמר רחמנא ולא ישמרנו גבי מועד דנעביד ליה שמירה מעולה הוי ריבוי אחר ריבוי ואין ריבוי אחר ריבוי אלא למעט מיעט הכתוב לשמירה מעולה וכי תימא נגיחה לתם נגיחה למועד הא מיעט רחמנא ולא ישמרנו לזה ולא לאחר והא מיבעי ליה ללאו אם כן נכתוב רחמנא ולא ישמור מאי ולא ישמרנו לזה ולא לאחר תניא ר"א בן יעקב אומר אחד תם ואחד מועד ששמרו שמירה פחותה פטור מאי טעמא סבר לה כר"י דאמר מועד בשמירה פחותה סגי ליה ויליף נגיחה לתם ונגיחה למועד אמר רב אדא בר אהבה לא פטר ר"י אלא צד העדאה שבו אבל צד תמות במקומה עומדת אמר רב מועד לקרן ימין אינו מועד לקרן שמאל אמרי אליבא דמאן אי אליבא דר"מ האמר אחד תם ואחד מועד שמירה מעולה בעי אי אליבא דרבי יהודה מאי אריא קרן שמאל אפילו בימין נמי אית ביה צד תמות ואית ביה צד מועדת אמרי לעולם כרבי יהודה ולא סבירא ליה דרב אדא בר אהבה והכי קאמר כי האי גוונא הוא דמשכחת ביה צד תמות ומועדת אבל מועד לגמרי לא משכחת ביה צד תמות כלל: ר"א אומר אין לו שמירה אלא סכין (כו'): אמר רבה מאי טעמא דר"א דאמר קרא (שמות כא, כט) ולא ישמרנו שוב אין לו שמירה לזה א"ל אביי אלא מעתה דכתיב (שמות כא, לג) ולא יכסנו נמי שוב אין לו כיסוי לזה וכי תימא הכי נמי והתנן כסהו כראוי ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת פטור אלא אמר אביי היינו טעמיה דר"א כדתניא ר' נתן אומר מניין שלא יגדל אדם כלב רע בתוך ביתו ואל יעמיד סולם רעוע בתוך ביתו שנאמר (דברים כב, ח) ולא תשים דמים בביתך:
MISHNA: If the ox’s owner tied it with reins to a fence or locked the gate before it in an appropriate manner, but nevertheless the ox emerged and caused damage, whether the ox is innocuous or forewarned the owner is liable, since this is not considered sufficient precaution to prevent damage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says that if the ox is innocuous the owner is liable even if he safeguarded it appropriately, since the Torah does not limit the required safeguarding for an innocuous ox. But if the ox is forewarned, the owner is exempt from paying compensation for damage, as it is stated in the verse describing damage by a forewarned ox: “And the owner has not secured it” (Exodus 21:36), and this ox that was tied with reins or behind a locked gate was secured. Rabbi Eliezer says: An ox has no sufficient safeguarding at all other than slaughtering it with a knife; there is no degree of safeguarding that exempts the ox’s owner from liability.
GEMARA: [...] The mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer says: An ox has no sufficient safeguarding at all other than slaughtering it with a knife. Rabba said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? It is as the verse states with regard to a forewarned ox: “And the owner has not secured it” (Exodus 21:36), meaning that once it is rendered forewarned the owner no longer has any sufficient manner of safeguarding this animal, and the owner is responsible for all damage it causes. Abaye said to Rabba: If that is so, does that which is written with regard to a pit: “And if a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit and not cover it” (Exodus 21:33), also mean that once a pit has been dug the owner no longer has any adequate way of covering this pit, which would exempt its owner from paying damages? And if you would say that indeed that is the halakha, but didn’t we learn in a mishna (52a) that if he covered the pit appropriately, and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died, he is exempt? Evidently, a pit can be covered adequately. Rather, Abaye rejected Rabba’s explanation of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, and said that this is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer: As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that one may not raise a vicious dog in his house, and that one may not set up an unstable ladder in his house? As it is stated: “You shall not bring blood into your house” (Deuteronomy 22:8), which means that one may not allow a hazardous situation to remain in his house.
מתני׳ לא יצא האיש לא בסייף ולא בקשת ולא בתריס ולא באלה ולא ברומח ואם יצא חייב חטאת רבי אליעזר אומר תכשיטין הן לו וחכמים אומרים אינן אלא לגנאי שנאמר וכתתו חרבותם לאתים וחניתותיהם למזמרות ולא ישא גוי אל גוי חרב ולא ילמדו עוד מלחמה בירית טהורה ויוצאין בה בשבת כבלים טמאים ואין יוצאין בהן בשבת: גמ׳ מאי באלה קולפא: רבי אליעזר אומר תכשיטין הן לו: תניא אמרו לו לרבי אליעזר וכי מאחר דתכשיטין הן לו מפני מה הן בטלין לימות המשיח אמר להן לפי שאינן צריכין שנאמר לא ישא גוי אל גוי חרב ותהוי לנוי בעלמא אמר אביי מידי דהוה אשרגא בטיהרא
MISHNA: [...] the Sages said that a man may neither go out on Shabbat with a sword, nor with a bow, nor with a shield [teris], nor with an alla, nor with a spear. And if he unwittingly went out with one of these weapons to the public domain he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: These weapons are ornaments for him; just as a man is permitted to go out into the public domain with other ornaments, he is permitted to go out with weapons. And the Rabbis say: They are nothing other than reprehensible and in the future they will be eliminated, as it is written: “And they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation will not raise sword against nation, neither will they learn war anymore” (Isaiah 2:4).
GEMARA:...We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: These weapons are ornaments for him. It was taught in a baraita that elaborates on this subject: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Eliezer: And since, in your opinion, they are ornaments for him, why are they to be eliminated in the messianic era? He said to them: They will not be needed anymore, as it is stated: “Nation will not raise sword against nation” (Isaiah 2:4). The Gemara asks: And let the weapons be merely for ornamental purposes, even though they will not be needed for war. Abaye said: It is just as in the case of a candle in the afternoon. Since its light is not needed, it serves no ornamental purpose. Weapons, too; when not needed for war, they serve no ornamental purpose either.
What links these texts? What differentiates them?
What values might we derive from the text?
When may a life be taken?
If the thief is seized while tunneling, and he is beaten to death, there is no bloodguilt in his case.
גמ׳ אמר רבא מאי טעמא דמחתרת חזקה אין אדם מעמיד עצמו על ממונו והאי מימר אמר אי אזילנא קאי לאפאי ולא שביק לי ואי קאי לאפאי קטילנא ליה והתורה אמרה אם בא להורגך השכם להורגו
GEMARA: Rava says: What is the reason for this halakha [law] concerning a burglar who breaks into a house? He explains: There is a presumption that a person does not restrain himself when faced with losing his money, and therefore this burglar must have said to himself: If I go in and the owner sees me, he will rise against me and not allow me to steal from him, and if he rises against me, I will kill him. And the Torah stated a principle: If someone comes to kill you, rise and kill him first.
מתני׳ ואלו הן שמצילין אותן בנפשן הרודף אחר חבירו להרגו ואחר הזכר ואחר הנערה המאורסה [...]
גמ׳ ת"ר מניין לרודף אחר חבירו להרגו שניתן להצילו בנפשו ת"ל (ויקרא יט, טז) לא תעמוד על דם רעך והא להכי הוא דאתא האי מיבעי ליה לכדתניא מניין לרואה את חבירו שהוא טובע בנהר או חיה גוררתו או לסטין באין עליו שהוא חייב להצילו ת"ל לא תעמוד על דם רעך אין ה"נ.
MISHNA: And these are the ones who are saved from transgressing even at the cost of their lives; that is to say, these people may be killed so that they do not perform a transgression: One who pursues another to kill him, or pursues a male to sodomize him, or pursues a betrothed young woman to rape her. [...]
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that with regard to one who pursues another in order to kill him, the pursued party may be saved at the cost of the pursuer’s life? The verse states: “You shall not stand idly by the blood of another” (Leviticus 19:16); rather, you must save him from death. The Gemara asks: But does this verse really come to teach us this? This verse is required for that which is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that one who sees another drowning in a river, or being dragged away by a wild animal, or being attacked by bandits [listin], is obligated to save him? The Torah states: “You shall not stand idly by the blood of another.” The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so that this verse relates to the obligation to save one whose life is in danger.
When is a person justified in taking the life of another?
When are they not?
Buying, Selling, and Carrying
(ז) אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶם דֻּבִּין וַאֲרָיוֹת וְכָל דָּבָר שֶׁיֶּשׁ בּוֹ נֵזֶק לָרַבִּים. אֵין בּוֹנִין עִמָּהֶם בָּסִילְקִי, גַּרְדּוֹם, וְאִצְטַדְיָא, וּבִימָה. אֲבָל בּוֹנִים עִמָּהֶם בִּימוֹסְיָאוֹת וּבֵית מֶרְחֲצָאוֹת. הִגִּיעוּ לַכִּפָּה שֶׁמַּעֲמִידִין בָּהּ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, אָסוּר לִבְנוֹת:
(7) One may not sell bears, or lions, or any item that can cause injury to the public, to gentiles. One may not build with them a basilica [basileki], a tribunal [gardom], a stadium [itztadeyya], or a platform. But one may build with them small platforms [bimmusiot] and bathhouses. Even in this case, once he reaches the arched chamber in the bath where the gentiles put up objects of idol worship, it is prohibited to build it.
http://www.jewishideasdaily.com/5893/features/the-halakhah-of-selling-arms/
By the 5th century, it seems, Jews in Babylonia were selling arms to local [non-Jewish] authorities, reflecting a generally cooperative relationship with them. Christine Hayes has argued that exceptions to the gun sale ban might have already existed in the land of Israel in the 3rd century, as a parallel text in the Jerusalem Talmud (Yerushalmi Avodah Zarah 2:1) seems to indicate. In that text, the Talmud asserts that the prohibition applies only to cities where no Jews live. Once Jews live there, weapons sales remain permissible either because they will serve to protect Jewish as well as non-Jewish residents or, alternatively, because the peaceful habitation of Jews within the city shows that these Gentiles are not hostile to them.
Medieval commentators explained this Persian dispensation differently, possibly in partial reflection of their position within their own society. Rabbi Menachem Ha-Meiri took a moral approach. We need to do our share to help our society, he maintained, arguing that the original prohibition applied only to the godless barbarians of yesteryear. (-by Rachael Kasten)
This debate is summarized by Rabbi Hayyim David Halevy (d. 1998), the chief S’fardic rabbi of Tel-Aviv-Yafo, cited in,"Halakha and the Regulation of Firearms," Freehof Institute of Progressive Halakhah, 2022, as follows:
נמצא יסוד ההיתר כפול. א) שכל שאדם חוסה בצילו ראוי לעזור לו כפי האפשר. ב) שאנו נעזרים בהם באותם הדברים שאנו מוכרים להם.
The halakhah, he concludes, permits weapons sales on the basis of two arguments.
• An ethical argument: it is proper (ra’ui) to help those who protect us.
• A pragmatic argument: providing weapons is useful to us, in terms of both security and
economics.
נכון הדבר, וכך מבואר במשנה שהזכרת, ויותר מבואר הדבר בברייתא (מסכת ע"ז טו ב) אין מוכרים להם לא זיין ולא כלי זיין ואין משחיזין להם כלי זיין וכו', ואין אדם מישראל רשאי למכור שום כלי נשק למי שחשוד להשתמש בו לרעה ולהביא נזק לרבים.
Rabbi Halevy answers that the mishnah in Avodah Zarah indeed prohibits the sale of “dangerous objects” to Gentiles. Indeed, he points out, a baraita in B. Avodah Zarah 16b explicitly extends the ban to weapons (3.)כלי זיין And he draws the more general conclusion that “a Jew is not entitled to sell any weapon to any person” – that is, not only to a Gentile – “whom one suspects will use it for a nefarious purpose and cause a public danger.” Clearly, then, the prohibition against the sale of weapons applies domestically as well as to commerce between nations.
אלא שהגמרא עצמה שואלת בהמשך הדברים: והאידנא דקא מזבנינן (ועכשיו שאנו מוכרים, ומשיבה) א"ר אשי לפרסאי דמגני עלן (ע"ז טז א).
In reality, though – and here is what the sho’el misses by relying on the Mishnah without reading the Talmud – we learn in B. Avodah Zarah 16a that “nowadays” (האידנא), at least in Babylonia, the ban on weapons sales has been lifted. The custom is to sell weapons to “our” Gentiles, the Persians. As Rav Ashi explains it, we sell them weapons because they are the ruling power and “they defend us.” We depend on them for protection and security.
https://www.freehofinstitute.org/uploads/1/2/0/6/120631295/regulation_of_firearms1.pdf
What do you make of the changing laws around selling weapons? How might this inform our current discussion?
...ויש אוסרים ליכנס בו בסכין ארוך או בראש מגולה:
There are those who forbid one from entering [into a synagogue] with a long knife or uncovered head.
בסכין ארוך. לפי שהתפלה מארכת ימיו של אדם וסכין מקצרת וק"ל דכאן משמע דבסכין שאינו ארוך אין חשש זה שהסכין מקצר ימי אדם...
"A long knife." Since prayer lengthens one's days, and a knife shortens. And we rule that, here, it implies that with regard to a knife that is not long, there is no concern that the knife will shorten one's days...
"Halakha and the Regulation of Firearms," Freehof Institute of Progressive Halakhah, 2022, concludes:
Halevy’s second responsum [regarding an Israeli soldier and kohen carrying his weapon while blessing the community] is an example of this sort of practical reasoning. The dominant consideration is that of public security: Israelis live in an ongoing state of alert. (We hardly need to add that outside of Israel, too, Jewish communities increasingly face threats of violence and terrorism.) It is therefore essential to interpret permissively the halakhic rules that would prohibit weapons in the synagogue. We have to read those rules in such a way as to permit individuals required to carry firearms to keep those weapons on their person during t’filot. That’s not so hard to do. If you are persuaded, as Rabbi Halevy and most Israelis certainly are persuaded, that the situation for all intents and purposes is one of pikuaḥ nefesh, preservation of human life obviously takes precedence over the minhag that prohibits “long knives” in the synagogue.
At the same time, Halevy will not have us lose sight of the moral demand of the halakhah. He acknowledges that there is no rational basis for the distinction between “short knives” – i.e., concealed weapons – and long, visible firearms. A weapon is a weapon; they all shorten human life, and they do not belong in a synagogue. For this reason, he draws the line at birkat kohanim: while a kohen may be required to bring his gun into the synagogue, he shouldn’t carry it while blessing the congregation and asking God to “grant you peace.” The point is that firearms are at best a necessary evil: necessary at times but evil just the same. Guns in our midst are a measure we permit only because we have no choice. Halakhah permits the carrying of firearms to ensure our physical safety, but it also forbids us to glorify these weapons – the agent of so much death and misery in our world - as though they are something beautiful, a symbol of macho toughness or other such nonsense. It forbids us, in short, to join the cult of the gun.
Halakhah would have us talk and argue about firearms regulation within the boundaries set by Rabbi Halevy’s responsa. We may permit the carrying of firearms in situations where they are necessary to preserve public safety. Our argument should focus upon carefully defining just what those situations are. At the same time, we may adopt whatever controls, limits, or regulations upon the use of firearms that we deem proper.