"המזיק את אשתו": אלימות כנורמה וכהפרת נורמה

יד) החובל באשתו, בין שחבל בה הוא, בין שחבלו בה אחרים, מוציאין מידו וילקח בהן קרקעות, והוא אוכל פירות. ר' יהודה בן בתירה אומ' בושת שבסתר לה שני חלקים ולו אחד, בושת שבגלוי לו שני חלקים ולה אחד. שלו נותנין לו מיד, ושלה ילקח בהן קרקע והוא אוכל פירות.

Tosefta Bava Kamma (Lieberman) 9

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בבא קמא ל״ב א

בעא מיניה רבה בר נתן מרב הונא: המזיק את אשתו בתשמיש המטה, מהו? כיון דברשות קעביד פטור או דלמא איבעי ליה לעיוני?

א"ל: תניתוה, "שלזה רשות להלך ולזה רשות להלך".

אמר רבא: ק"ו, ומה יער שזה לרשותו נכנס וזה לרשותו נכנס, נעשה כמי שנכנס לרשות חבירו וחייב, זה שלרשות חבירו נכנס לא כל שכן?!

אלא הא קתני, "שלזה רשות להלך ולזה רשות להלך"?!

התם תרוייהו כהדדי נינהו, הכא איהו קעביד מעשה.

והיא לא? והכתיב (ויקרא יח, כט) "ונכרתו הנפשות העושות מקרב עמם"!

הנאה לתרוייהו אית להו, איהו מעשה הוא דקעביד.

Bava Kamma 32a

But if the owner of the cross beam stopped, causing the barrel to collide with the beam and break, the former is liable, since the latter had no way of anticipating that he would stop. And if he said to the owner of the barrel: Stop, he is exempt from liability for breaking the barrel. Conversely, if the owner of the barrel was walking first and the owner of the cross beam last, and the barrel was broken by the cross beam, the owner of the cross beam is liable. But if owner of the barrel stopped, the owner of the cross beam is exempt from liability for breaking the barrel. And if he said to the owner of the cross beam: Stop, the owner of the cross beam is liable. And similarly, these halakhot apply in a case where this one came with his lamp and that one came with his flax, and the lamp set fire to the flax. GEMARA: Rabba bar Natan asked Rav Huna: With regard to one who causes injury to his wife during sexual intercourse, what is the halakha? Is he liable to pay damages? Is it reasoned that since he is acting in a permitted manner he is exempt, or perhaps he should pay attention and be more careful? Rav Huna said to Rabba bar Natan: You learned this halakha in the mishna concerning one person walking with a cross beam and another with a barrel, which rules that the owner of the cross beam is exempt because this one had permission to walk and that one also had permission to walk. Similarly, since the husband has permission to engage in intercourse with his wife, if he injures her in the process he is exempt. Rava disagreed with Rav Huna’s opinion and said: The husband is liable due to an a fortiori inference from the halakha with regard to manslaughter, as it is stated in the Torah: “As when a man goes into the forest with his neighbor to chop wood…and the head slips off the helve, and finds his neighbor, and he dies; he shall flee to one of these cities and live” (Deuteronomy 19:5). And just as in the forest, where this person entered his domain and that person entered his domain, as it is the domain of the public, and nevertheless the one who kills unintentionally is considered like one who entered another’s domain and is therefore liable to be exiled to a city of refuge, then with regard to this husband, who actually enters another’s domain, all the more so is it not clear that he should be liable for the injury he causes her? The Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s opinion: But what of this mishna, which teaches that the owner of the cross beam is exempt, as this one had permission to walk and that one had permission to walk, and Rav Huna inferred from here that the husband is likewise exempt. The Gemara answers: The two cases are different. There, in the case in the mishna, both sides were similarly walking, and the one who caused the damage is therefore exempt due to his right to walk there. By contrast, here, the husband is the only active participant in the intercourse. Therefore, since he is the one performing an action, he is liable even though he is acting with permission. The Gemara asks: And is she not considered an active participant? But isn’t it written with regard to forbidden sexual intercourse: “Even the souls that do them shall be cut off from among their people” (Leviticus 18:29), indicating that both the man and woman are considered to be performing an action? The Gemara answers: The verse is referring to the fact that they both have pleasure from the act. The woman’s pleasure is tantamount to active transgression, and she is therefore punished if she participates willfully. But with regard to a wife’s injury, he is the one who is considered to be performing an action, and he is therefore liable. § The mishna teaches: In a case where the owner of the cross beam was walking first and the owner of the barrel was walking behind him, if the barrel was broken by the cross beam, the owner of the cross beam is exempt. Reish Lakish says: If two cows were in the public domain, one of them prone and one walking, and the cow that was walking kicked the cow that was prone, its owner is exempt. If the prone cow kicked the cow that was walking, its owner is liable to pay. Let us say that the mishna supports this statement, as it states: If the owner of the cross beam was first and the owner of the barrel was last, and the barrel was broken by the cross beam, he is exempt. But if the owner of the cross beam stopped, the owner of the cross beam is liable. The Gemara explains the proof: But here, it is clear that it is like a case where the prone cow kicked the cow that was walking, since the one carrying the barrel was walking and the one carrying the cross beam stopped in the public domain, causing damage to the former. And the mishna teaches in this case that the owner of the cross beam is liable. The Gemara responds: And how can you understand that reasoning? You wanted to support the statement of Reish Lakish from the mishna. Not only does it not support Reish Lakish; it even raises a difficulty to his opinion. The reason Reish Lakish stated that the owner of the prone cow is liable is that it kicked the walking cow; but if the walking cow was damaged because by itself it collided with the prone cow, he would be exempt. But the mishna discusses a case where the one carrying the barrel ran into the cross beam by himself, without the one carrying the cross beam actively hitting it, and it teaches that the owner of the cross beam is nevertheless liable. The Gemara explains: The mishna is referring to a case where the cross beam blocked the entire width of the road like a carcass. Since the one carrying the barrel could not avoid it, the one carrying the cross beam is liable although he did not actively break the barrel. By contrast, here, Reish Lakish’s statement is referring to a case where the cow was lying down on one side of the public domain, and the other cow should have walked on the other, unobstructed side. Therefore, if the damage is caused only as a result of their collision, the owner of the prone cow is exempt. The Gemara suggests: Rather, it is the latter clause of the mishna that supports Reish Lakish’s statement, as it teaches: Conversely, if the owner of the barrel was walking first and the owner of the cross beam last, and the barrel was broken by the cross beam, the owner of the cross beam is liable. But if the owner of the barrel stopped, the owner of the cross beam is exempt from liability for breaking the barrel. But here, it is clear that it is like a case where the walking cow kicked the prone cow. And the mishna teaches that the owner of the cross beam is exempt, lending support to Reish Lakish’s ruling. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: The mishna exempts the one carrying the cross beam because he was walking in his normal manner when he hit the barrel. Here, perhaps the owner of the prone cow can say to the owner of the walking cow: Although you have permission to walk over me, i.e., for your cow to walk over my cow, you have no permission to kick me, i.e., for your cow to kick my cow. MISHNA: With regard to two people who were walking in the public domain, or one who was running and another one who was walking, or who were both running, and they damaged one another, both of them are exempt. GEMARA: The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Isi ben Yehuda. As it is taught in a baraita: Isi ben Yehuda says that one who runs in the public domain and causes damage is liable to pay for any damage he causes because his behavior is unusual in the public domain. And Isi concedes with regard to one who runs and causes damage at twilight on the eve of Shabbat that he is exempt, because he is running with permission. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Isi ben Yehuda. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this, that if one runs and causes damage he is liable? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say, as a principle, that the halakha is in accordance with an unattributed mishna? And we learned in this mishna that if one was running and the other one was walking, or if they were both running, they are exempt. The Gemara answers: The mishna, which exempts one who was running, is referring to twilight on the eve of Shabbat, when people are permitted to run in the public domain. The Gemara explains: From where is it inferred that the mishna is referring to twilight on the eve of Shabbat? It is inferred from the fact that it teaches: Or who were both running, they are exempt. Why do I need this case as well? Now that the mishna teaches that if one was running and the other one was walking, the one running is exempt, is it necessary to state that he is exempt when both of them were running? Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: If one was running and the other one was walking, he is exempt. In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to twilight on the eve of Shabbat, when running in the public domain is permitted. But on a weekday, if one was running and the other one was walking, the one who was running is liable. If both were running, even on a weekday, they are exempt. This emendation explains the need to mention the case where both were running. The Master said above: And Isi concedes with regard to one who runs and causes damage at twilight on the eve of Shabbat that he is exempt, because he is running with permission. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that running at twilight on the eve of Shabbat is considered to be with permission? The Gemara answers: It is like that which Rabbi Ḥanina would say, as Rabbi Ḥanina would say at twilight on the eve of Shabbat:

משנה תורה, הלכות חובל ומזיק ד׳

(טו) הַחוֹבֵל בְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ הַשֶּׁבֶת וְהָרִפּוּי לְבַעֲלָהּ וְהַצַּעַר שֶׁלָּהּ. וְהַבּשֶׁת וְהַנֵּזֶק אִם בְּגָלוּי הוּא כְּגוֹן שֶׁחָבַל בְּפָנֶיהָ וּבְצַוָּארָהּ אוֹ בְּיָדֶיהָ וּזְרוֹעוֹתֶיהָ הַשְּׁלִישׁ שֶׁלָּהּ וּשְׁנֵי שְׁלִישִׁים לַבַּעַל. וְאִם בַּסֵּתֶר הוּא הַנֵּזֶק הַשְּׁלִישׁ לַבַּעַל וּשְׁנֵי שְׁלִישִׁים לָאִשָּׁה. שֶׁל בַּעַל נוֹתְנִין לוֹ מִיָּד וְשֶׁל אִשָּׁה יִלָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע וְהַבַּעַל אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת:

(טז) בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים שֶׁחָבְלוּ בָּהּ אֲחֵרִים. אֲבָל הַבַּעַל שֶׁחָבַל בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם לָהּ מִיָּד כָּל הַנֵּזֶק וְכָל הַבּשֶׁת וְהַצַּעַר וְהַכּל שֶׁלָּהּ וְאֵין לַבַּעַל בָּהֶן פֵּרוֹת. וְאִם רָצְתָה לִתֵּן הַדָּמִים לְאַחֵר נוֹתֶנֶת. וְכָזֶה הוֹרוּ הַגְּאוֹנִים. וְהַבַּעַל מְרַפֵּא אוֹתָהּ כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁמְּרַפֵּא כָּל חָלְיָהּ:

(יז) וְהַמַּזִּיק אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּתַשְׁמִישׁ הַמִּטָּה חַיָּב בִּנְזָקֶיהָ:

(יח) הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁחָבְלָה בְּבַעְלָהּ אִם הָיָה תּוֹסֶפֶת בִּכְתֻבָּתָהּ מְחַיְּבִין אוֹתָהּ לִמְכֹּר הַתּוֹסֶפֶת לְבַעֲלָהּ בְּטוֹבַת הֲנָאָה וְגוֹבֶה מִמֶּנָּה אִם רָצָה הַבַּעַל. וְאִם רָצָה לְגָרְשָׁהּ וְלִגְבּוֹת מִן הַכּל גּוֹבֶה. וְאִם לֹא הָיָה לָהּ תּוֹסֶפֶת אֵינָהּ יְכוֹלָה לִמְכֹּר לוֹ עִקַּר כְּתֻבָּתָהּ. שֶׁאָסוּר לוֹ לָאָדָם לַשְׁהוֹת אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שָׁעָה אַחַת בְּלֹא כְּתֻבָּה כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא קַלָּה בְּעֵינָיו לְהוֹצִיאָהּ. אֶלָּא אִם רָצָה הַבַּעַל כּוֹתֵב עָלֶיהָ שְׁטָר בִּדְמֵי חֲבָלוֹ אוֹ מְגָרְשָׁהּ וְנוֹטֵל מִכְּתֻבָּתָהּ הָרָאוּי לוֹ:

Mishneh Torah, One Who Injures a Person or Property 4

(1) A person who strikes a woman and causes her to miscarry is liable, even if her injury was caused unintentionally. He must compensate the woman's husband for the value of the fetus, and the woman for the injury and the pain.

(2) How is the payment for the fetus assessed? We evaluate how much the woman would be worth before she gave birth, and how much she would be worth had she given birth. The difference between these two figures should be given to her husband.
If her husband died after she miscarried, the assessment should be given to his heirs. If a woman was struck after her husband died and she miscarried, the assessment for the fetus should also be given to the woman.

(3) If the woman who miscarries was married to a convert, and a person injures her during the convert's lifetime, he must pay the assessment for the fetus to the husband. If the convert dies without leaving any heirs, he is not liable. If the woman is injured after the convert dies, she acquires the right to the assessment for the fetus.

(4) If the woman was a maidservant or a gentile at the time of conception, and was freed or converted before the accident took place, the assessment for the fetus belongs to her.

(5) When a person strikes a woman, and she miscarries and dies, he is not liable for payment, even if he struck her unintentionally.This law is derived as follows. Exodus 21:22 states: "If there will not be a fatal injury, he must certainly be punished financially." Thus, we see that Scripture did not distinguish between unintentional and intentional conduct with regard to an act punishable by execution by the court, and freed the perpetrator from financial liability in all instances.

(6) When does the above apply? When the person intended to strike the woman. When, however, he intended to strike his colleague, but instead struck the woman - although she died - since he killed her without intention, this is considered a matter that does not involve capital punishment, and he is liable for the assessment for the fetus.

(7) A person who strikes his father or his mother, but does not draw blood, is liable to pay the five assessments. If, however, he drew blood while striking his parents or injured a colleague on the Sabbath - even if he did so unintentionally - he is not liable for a financial penalty, because these sins are punishable by execution by the court. And as we explained, Scripture did not distinguish between unintentional and intentional conduct with regard to an act punishable by execution by the court, and freed the perpetrator from financial liability in all instances.

(8) With regard to causing injury on the Sabbath, one might ask: "A person who causes injury is considered to be performing destructive activity, and one who performs destructive activity on the Sabbath is not liable for execution. Why then is the person who causes injury considered to be transgressing a sin punishable by execution by the court?"
The resolution is: since the person is satisfying his evil inclination by injuring his colleague, he is considered to be performing constructive activity. Thus, he is performing an act that is punishable by execution. Therefore, he is not liable for a financial penalty.

(9) When a person injures a colleague on Yom Kippur, he is liable to pay financial compensation, even though he did so intentionally.
This is the halachah although he transgressed a sin that is punishable by lashes. Generally, whenever a deed that a person commits obligates the person to receive lashes and pay a financial penalty, he should be lashed and is not required to pay a financial penalty, for a person is never obligated for both lashes and a financial penalty. Although this is the general rule, an exception is made with regard to a person who injures a colleague. For the Torah specifically stated that a person who injures a colleague should pay compensation, as Exodus 21:19 states: "He shall pay unemployment compensation."

(10) A person who injures a Canaanite servant whom he owns is not liable for any penalty. If he injures a Hebrew servant whom he owns, he is liable for all the assessments, with the exception of unemployment compensation.
When a person injures a Canaanite servant belonging to a colleague, the owner of the injured servant receives the five assessments. Even if he gave him powerful medication that caused the servant pain but healed him quickly, the owner is entitled to payment for all medical expenses.

(11) Whenever a servant has been freed, but his bill of release has not been given to him yet, the penalty granted to the owner if the servant is killed by an ox is not paid because of him. If others injure him, he cannot collect the money for himself, because he is not a totally free man yet. Nor may his owner collect that money, because he no longer owns him.
For this reason, if an owner knocks out one of his servant's teeth, and then blinds his eye, he must free him because of his tooth, but he is not required to pay him because of the eye. If, however, the servant seizes the assessment that would be due him, it is not expropriated from him.

(12) When a servant has been half-freed, he must work for his master one day, and may work for himself the next day.
The following rules apply if such a servant was embarrassed by a person, or one caused him pain, or he was gored by an ox, or the like. If this took place on the day on which he must work for his master, the master is entitled to the payment. If this took place on the day when he works for himself, he is entitled to the payment.

(13) When a person injures a Hebrew servant belonging to another person, he is liable for all five assessments. Land should be purchased with the money, and the servant's master is entitled to the profits. When the servant is freed, the land is released from his owner's control.
If the servant was injured in a way that does not impair his work at all - e.g., the tip of his ear or the tip of his nose was cut off - the entire payment should be given to the servant, and his owner is not entitled to the benefit.

(14) The following rules apply when a person injures a girl below the age of majority who is not his own daughter. If the injuries reduce the money her father would receive for consecrating her, the assessment should be given to her father. Similarly, the unemployment assessment should be given to her father, for her wages belong to him, and the money received for selling her as a servant belongs to him.
The assessments for pain, embarrassment and medical attention, by contrast, belong to the girl herself. Similarly, if the injuries do not reduce the money he would receive for consecrating her, the assessment should be given to [the daughter].
When a person injures his own daughter, he must pay her only the assessments for pain, medical attention and embarrassment.

(15) The following rules apply when a person injures a married woman. The unemployment benefits and medical assessment should be given to her husband. With regard to shame and damages, the rules are: If the damage is plainly evident - e.g., he injured the woman's face, her neck, her hands or her arms - a third is given to her, and two thirds are given to her husband. If the damages are in concealed places, a third is given to her husband, and two thirds are given to her.
The assessment for the husband should be given to him immediately. The assessment for the woman should be used to purchase land, from which the husband is entitled to the profits.

(16) When does the above apply? When others injured her. When, however, a husband injures his wife, he is required to pay her the entire assessment for the damages, the embarrassment and the pain. This money is hers entirely. The husband has no rights to the profits. If she desires to give the money to another person, she may. This is the ruling rendered by the geonim. The husband must pay for her medical expenses, as he pays for all her other medical expenses.

(17) When a person injures his wife through sexual intercourse, he is liable for the damages.

(18) The following rules apply when a woman injures her husband. In a case where he had added an amount above the minimum to her marriage contract, if the husband desires, we require her to sell the right to this additional amount to her husband for the price she would receive for it, and her husband is entitled to collect the damages from these funds. If he desires, he may divorce her and collect the damages from the entire sum of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
If he had not added an amount above the minimum to her marriage contract, she may not sell him the rights to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah itself, for it is forbidden for a person to remain married to a woman for one moment without a marriage contract. Thus, if the husband desires, he may have a promissory note written obligating her to pay for the damages, or he may divorce her and collect the amount due him from the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

(19) The following rules apply when a person injures his sons who have attained majority. If they are not dependent on him for their livelihood, he must pay them the damages immediately. If they are below the age of majority, he should purchase land for them with the money due them for the damages,and they are entitled to the benefits. The same rules apply if they are injured by others.
If a father injures sons who are dependent on him for their livelihood, he is not liable. This applies whether or not they are above majority. If others injure them, the person who causes the injury must compensate them immediately if they are above majority. If they are below majority, the damages should be used to purchase landed property. They are entitled to its profits until they reach majority at which time the property becomes theirs without limitation.

(20) An encounter with a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent individual or a minor is undesirable. For if a person injures them, he is liable, but if they injure another person, they are not.
Even if the deaf mute gains the ability to speak and hear, the mentally incompetent person attains competency, and the minor comes of age, they are not obligated to pay for injuries they caused previously. For at the time they caused the injuries, they were not fully mentally competent.

(21) An encounter with a servant or a married woman is undesirable. For if a person injures them, he is liable, but if they injure another person, they are not liable to pay immediately.
They must, however, pay afterwards - i.e., if the woman is divorced or if her husband dies and if the servant is freed. They are held responsible because they are mentally competent. They are considered as a creditor who has no resources with which to pay, and who is thus held liable with regard to damages if he becomes wealthy.

(22) A servant belonging to a man is considered as his own person, and an animal as one of his possessions.
What is implied? If a person places a burning coal on the heart of a servant belonging to a colleague and causes him to die, or if he pushes him into the sea or into a fire from which the servant could ascend, but the servant fails to do so and died instead, the person who caused his death is not obligated to pay financial compensation. If, however, he does this to an animal belonging to a colleague, it would be considered as if he had placed a coal on a garment and burned it, in which case he would be liable for damages. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

משנה תורה, הלכות אישות כ״א:י׳

(י) כָּל אִשָּׁה שֶׁתִּמָּנַע מִלַּעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה מִן הַמְּלָאכוֹת שֶׁהִיא חַיֶּבֶת לַעֲשׂוֹתָן כּוֹפִין אוֹתָהּ וְעוֹשָׂה אֲפִלּוּ בְּשׁוֹט.

Mishneh Torah, Marriage 21:10

(10) Whenever a woman refrains from performing any of the tasks that she is obligated to perform, she may be compelled to do so, even with a rod. When a husband complains that [his wife] does not perform [her required tasks], and [the wife] claims that she does, [the dispute should be clarified by having] a [neutral] woman dwell with them or [by asking] the neighbors. The judges should clarify the matter in the best way they see fit.

השגות הראב"ד על משנה תורה, הלכות אישות כ״א:י׳:א׳

כל אשה שתמנע וכו'. כתב הראב''ד ז''ל מעולם לא שמעתי יסור שוטים לנשים אלא שממעט לה צרכיה ומזונותיה עד שתכנע עכ''ל:

Hasagot HaRa'avad on Mishneh Torah, Marriage 21:10:1

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אור זרוע, חלק ג, פסקי בבא קמא קס״א:א׳

בעא מיניה רבה בר נתן מרב הונא. המזיק את אשתו בתשמיש המטה...

מיכן יש ללמוד שאסור לאדם להכות את אשתו וגם חייב בנזקיה אם הזיקה. ואם הוא רגיל תדיר להכותה ולהבזותה ברבים כופין אותו להוציאה. וכבר היה מעשה באחד שהיה רגיל תדיר להכות את אשתו. ונשאל מו"ר רבינו שמחה זצ"ל והשיב שכופין אותו להוציאה זה לשונו:

אחר כותבי כתב ראשון קבל לפנינו ר' ירמיה על חתנו שהיה מכה את בתו תדיר ומבזה אותה בפריעת ראשה שלא כדת יהודים, דלחיים נתנה ולא לצער. ואפי' קונה אמה העבריה כקונה אדון לעצמו כל שכן אשתו ועל כל הכאה עובר ב"פן לא יוסיף". ועונשו גדול ממכה חבירו, כי היא יושבת לבטח אתו ודמעתה מצויה. "המזיק אשתו בתשמיש המטה" קא מיבעי לן בפ' "המניח את הכד", אבל בכל מילי דהיזקות אחריני פשיטא לן דלא גרע מאחר. ואם דבריו אמתים תקנסהו קנס חמור בין בגופו בין בממונו על מה שעבר. אמנם צריך כפרה גדולה ותכבידו עליו להבא לפי הנראה בעיניכם שיכול לעמוד שיהא מותרה ועומד מיכן ולהבא. ותטילו שלום ביניהם שלום מקויים ומסויים ותבררו שנים או שלשה שיהיו מוכיחים ביניהם. וכל קבלה שיהיה להם זה על זה ישפטו הם. ואם לא יעמוד הבעל בקיום השלום שיוסיף להכותה ולבזותה, אנו מסכימים אחריכם להיות מנודה בב"ד העליון ובב"ד התחתון ויעשוהו על ידי גוים לתת גט עשה מה שישראל אומר לך כי כן הסכמתי עם חביריי שיהא גט מעושה בגוים בזה כדין, אפילו לשמואל דאמר בפ' "המדיר", "עד שכופין אותו להוציא יכפוהו לזון", הני מילי מזונות שיש בידינו לעשות תקנה לדבר דיורדין לנכסיו וזנין אותה, אבל להכותה ולבזותה שענייה זו אסורה בידו ואין בידינו לעשות תקנה לדבר, אפילו שמואל מודה, דאין אדם דר עם נחש בכפיפה. ואפילו בההיא גופא "דאיני זן ואיני מפרנס" סבורני דקיימא לן כרב, כיון דר' יוחנן סבירא ליה כוותיה ומ"דאכסוה שערי לאלעזר" ליכא ראיה, דשמואל לטעמיה לפי סברתו קאמר והכאות קשה לסובלן, מה"היא דהמדיר את אשתו מלהנאות עד ל' יום יעמיד פרנס מכאן ואילך יוציא ויתן כתובה", באמתלא מועטת משום דברים קטנים שאינה מספקת קאמרה השתא דאדרתן לא מצינא דאגלגל בהדך. אע"ג דבירושלמי פ' "אלמנה ניזונית" ובירושלמי ד"יש מותרות" דחינן ליה לשמואל דאמר אין מעשין אלא לפסולות שמענו שמוציא שמענו שכופין בתמיה פי' יוציא דתנן במתני' ובברייתא יש יוציא שמשמע בלא כפייה גם יש יוציא שהוא בכפייה, "הכונס את יבמתו ונמצאת מעוברת בזמן שהולד של קיימא יוציא", מיהו רב תחליפא אמר שמואל הוה מפרש "יוציא" - בכפייה ועישוי. ואפילו קבלה עליה יכול סבורה הייתי שהייתי יכולה לקבל שהן הכאות שאין להם קצבות, שהרי אמרו חכמים באגרוף שיש בו כדי להמית. אם יעלה חפץ השם בידכם להשלים ביניהם תתירו לו החרם שקיבל עליו לגרשה עד זמן מרווח. אם תראו בתוך הזמן שינהוג עמה כשורה תתירו לו לגמרי. ואם נראה בעיניכם שאין עצת שלום מתקיים ביניהם תפייסוהו כחכמתכם לגרש מרצונו. ואם לא יאבה יקוב הדין את ההר ותעסוהו כתורת "יעשה מה שכתבנו" ב"איני זן ומפרנס". דקיימא לן כרב וכר' יוחנן לפי ראות עינינו כתבנו. ובפר"ח לא כתב כן. שמחה בר שמואל:

Ohr Zarua, Volume III, Piskei Bava Kamma 161:1

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לקריאה נוספת:

מיכל וולף, "הפעלת כוח מצד בעל כלפי אשתו", עין טובה: דו-שיח ופולמוס בספרות ישראל, עין צורים, תשנ"ט, עמ' 663-639.

אברהם גרוסמן, חסידות ומורדות, ירושלים, תשס"א, פרק י: אלימות כלפי נשים, עמ' 397-373.

הפרק "על אלימות במשפחה ועל בית הדין הרבני" בפודקאסט "מבקרות ברבנות" של טו"ר רבקה לוביץ ועו"ד ניצן כספי-שילוני.