Nazir: Greatest Hits

The Gemara answers: That phrase is required by him for that which is taught in a baraita: Shimon HaTzaddik said: In all my days as a priest, I never ate the guilt-offering of a ritually impure nazirite, apart from the offering of one man who came to me from the South, who had beautiful eyes and a fine countenance, and his locks were arranged in curls. I said to him: My son, what did you see to become a nazirite, which would force you to destroy this beautiful hair, as a nazirite must cut off all his hair at the conclusion of his term? He said to me: I was a shepherd for my father in my town, and I went to draw water from the spring, and I looked at my reflection in the water. And my evil inclination quickly rose against me and sought to drive me from the world. I said to my evil inclination: Empty one! For what reason are you proud in a world that is not yours, as your end is to be maggots and worms when you die. I swear by the Temple service that I will become a nazirite and shave you for the sake of Heaven. Shimon HaTzaddik relates: When I heard his response, I arose and kissed him on his head, and said to him: May there be more nazirites like you in Israel, whose intentions are noble, and who would not regret their vow of naziriteship even if they became impure. With regard to you the verse states: “When either a man or a woman shall clearly utter a vow, the vow of a nazirite, to consecrate himself to the Lord” (Numbers 6:2). The verse speaks of a vow that is not undertaken out of anger or spite, but purely for the sake of God. The phrase “to the Lord” in this context means: For the sake of Heaven. It cannot be used to teach that if one declares his intention to become a nazirite like Samson, his statement constitutes a nazirite vow.

GEMARA: The mishna taught that a man can vow that his son should be a nazirite, but a woman cannot do so. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to a nazirite. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said that Reish Lakish said: The purpose is in order to educate him in mitzvot, to teach him how to observe the mitzva of naziriteship. The Gemara asks: If so, even a woman as well should be able to impose naziriteship on her son for educational purposes. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that a man is obligated to educate his son in mitzvot, but a woman is not obligated to educate her son in mitzvot. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to a nazirite, for that reason one can understand the ruling of the mishna, which indicates that for his son, yes, a father can vow that he should be a nazirite, but with regard to his daughter, no, he cannot do so, as a halakha learned by tradition cannot be questioned. However, according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, a father should even be able to impose naziriteship upon his daughter for the sake of her education. Why does the mishna specify a son? The Gemara answers that Reish Lakish holds: A father is obligated to educate his son, whereas he is not obligated to educate his daughter, and for this reason he cannot vow that she should be a nazirite.

With regard to the dispute concerning the time period for a father’s vow on behalf of his son, the Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the dispute between these tanna’im is like the dispute between those other tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nidda 5:9): An incident occurred involving Rabbi Ḥanina in which his father vowed that he should be a nazirite when he was a minor, and they brought him before Rabban Gamliel, and Rabban Gamliel examined him to discern if he had already developed two pubic hairs, in which case the vow would not take effect, or if he had not developed them, which would mean that the vow was valid. Rabbi Yosei says that Rabban Gamliel examined him to discern whether he had reached the age of vows or not, which he maintains is the decisive factor. The child said to Rabban Gamliel: My teacher, do not go to the trouble of examining me, since if I am a minor I shall be a nazirite due to my father’s vow, and if I am an adult, I shall be a nazirite due to my own vow. Rabban Gamliel arose and kissed the child on his head. He said: I am certain of this child that he will eventually become an authority of halakha for the Jewish people. They said: In fact, it was only a few years later that the child issued rulings for the Jewish people.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Akiva too, he certainly agrees that the halakha of meat cooked in milk is a novelty. How can he derive a general principle from this case? Rather, Rabbi Akiva derives the principle: The legal status of the flavor of forbidden food is like that of the substance itself, from the vessels of gentiles that require purging [gi’ulei], where the Jews were commanded to purge the non-kosher flavor from the vessels they seized from the Midianites. As the Merciful One states in the section of the Torah that deals with the spoils of Midian: “Every thing that passes through the fire, you shall make it pass through the fire” (Numbers 31:23). That is to say that the vessels of gentiles that require purging are forbidden to be used until they have been purged through fire and purified. Isn’t there mere taste absorbed in the vessels through the process of cooking? And even so, these vessels are forbidden if this purging was not performed. Here, too, with regard to other matters of Torah law, it is no different; and the legal status of the flavor is like that of the substance itself. Rav Aḥa further suggested to Rav Ashi: And according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who derive this principle from the verse: “Neither shall he drink anything soaked” (Numbers 6:3), let them also derive it from the vessels of gentiles that require purging, as does Rabbi Akiva. Rav Ashi said to him: The Rabbis maintain that there the halakha of purging vessels of gentiles is also a novelty. What is the novelty of this halakha? As with regard to all dietary laws in the Torah, anything that gives flavor, i.e., contributes taste, that renders the food tainted, is permitted. If the taste added by the forbidden food does not enhance the permitted food, it does not render that food forbidden. But here, with regard to the halakha of vessels of gentiles that require purging, the Torah states that even if they contribute taste that renders the food tainted, nevertheless they are forbidden. If twenty-four hours have passed since food was cooked in a pot, the assumption is that the flavor released from the pot will contribute a deleterious taste to any foods subsequently cooked in the pot. Even so, vessels taken from gentiles remain forbidden until they have been purged, despite the fact that the taste they contribute taints the food. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva too, the case of vessels of gentiles that require purging is apparently a novelty. Rabbi Akiva derives this principle from the required purging of the vessels of gentiles. How then does he respond to the previous claim? Rav Huna, son of Ḥiyya, said: The Torah prohibited the use of unpurged vessels of gentiles only in the case of a pot that was used on that day, which is not a case where the pot gives flavor that renders the food tainted. Accordingly, it is not a novelty that the vessels were forbidden. The Gemara asks: And why don’t the Rabbis derive the halakha from there, as it is no longer a novelty? The Gemara answers: They hold that even in the case of a pot used on that day, it is impossible that the vessel does not slightly taint the food absorbed in the vessel. Consequently, the halakha of purging vessels of gentiles is a novelty, from which general principles cannot be derived.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, what is his reason? From where does he derive the halakha that a leper must use a razor? He derives it from the fact that the verse states with regard to a leper: “He shall shave all his hair off his head and his beard” (Leviticus 14:9). As it is taught in a baraita: Why does the verse state: “His head,” if it already stated: “All his hair”? It is because it is stated with regard to a nazirite: “No razor shall come upon his head” (Numbers 6:5), and therefore one might have thought that the same should also apply to a nazirite who is a leper, i.e., it should be prohibited for him to shave his head even for the purification ritual for his leprosy. Therefore, the verse states: “His head,” to teach that a nazirite who is a leper must shave his head with a razor. Being that a nazirite is prohibited only to use a razor, if a leper could fulfill his obligation to remove his hair using other implements, a nazirite who is a leper would not be permitted to use a razor. Therefore, it can be inferred from the halakha of a nazirite who is a leper that the only way for a leper to remove his hair is with a razor. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: And from where do you know that a leper must shave his head with a razor? Perhaps even if he actually removed it with tweezers or a plane he performs a mitzva. And if you would say: If so, why do I need the verse to teach me that he uses a razor, through the derivation of the superfluous term “his hair,” as above, one can answer: That is to say that he is permitted to shave even with a razor. As, it might enter your mind to say that since with regard to a nazirite, when he performs the act of shaving with a razor he is liable for transgressing the prohibition, with regard to a nazirite who is a leper as well, he should also be liable even if he shaved for his leprosy. The verse therefore teaches us that this is not the case, but it does not teach that a leper must use a razor. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: If it should enter your mind that when a leper performs his hair removal with tweezers or a plane he performs a mitzva, then from the fact that the verse did not explicitly write: Razor, it can be inferred that he is not allowed to use one, in accordance with the aforementioned principle of Reish Lakish that one may not violate a prohibition, even for the sake of a mitzva, if it is possible to perform the mitzva in a different manner. Rather, the verse must be coming to teach that the mitzva of the shaving of a leper can be fulfilled only with a razor. The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, with regard to this term: “His head,” which is referring to a leper, what do they learn from it? The Gemara answers: They require this term to override the prohibition of rounding the corners of the head. As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse “You shall not round the corners of your heads” (Leviticus 19:27): One might have thought that the same should also apply to a leper, that it should also be prohibited for him to round the corners of his head when he shaves. Therefore, the verse states: “His head,” with regard to a leper. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the Torah to write: “His head”? And let one derive this halakha that the mitzva of shaving overrides that prohibition from the term “his beard” (Leviticus 14:9). As it is taught in a baraita: Why does the verse state: “His beard”? It is because the verse states with regard to priests: “Neither shall they shave off the corners of their beards” (Leviticus 21:5), and therefore one might have thought that the same prohibition against shaving one’s beard should also apply to a leper. Therefore, the verse states: “His beard.” The Gemara asks: If so, why do I need the Torah to write: “His head,” and why do I need it to write: “His beard”? One source should suffice to teach that the shaving of a leper overrides any prohibitions that would be violated by that act. The Gemara answers: Both verses are necessary. As, had the Merciful One written only: “His beard,” and not written: “His head,” I would say that the rounding of the entire head, i.e., shaving all the hair off one’s head and not merely the sides, is not called a prohibited rounding. If that were so, the shaving of a leper’s head would not be prohibited by Torah law. For this reason the Merciful One writes: “His head,” to teach that the shaving that the leper performs would be considered a prohibited rounding of the head had the Torah not commanded him to shave. And had the Torah written only: “His head,” and not written: “His beard,” I would say that “his head” teaches two matters. First, that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition. And it also teaches that rounding the entire head is called rounding. And still, from where do we derive that a leper must shave with a razor? For this reason the Merciful One also wrote: “His beard,” and we derive from the prohibition that bars priests from destroying their beards that the removal of the beard involves the use of a razor. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, from where does he derive the general principle that a positive mitzva will come and override a prohibition? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the mitzva of ritual fringes. As it is taught in a baraita: This verse: “You shall not wear diverse kinds of wool and linen” (Deuteronomy 22:11), indicates that fringes in the mitzva stated in the adjacent verse: “You shall make for yourself fringes” (Deuteronomy 22:12), can be from them, wool and linen. By juxtaposing the mitzva of ritual fringes to the prohibition against diverse kinds of cloth, the Torah teaches that the positive mitzva of ritual fringes, which includes dyed blue wool, overrides the prohibition against diverse kinds of cloth, i.e., one may attach woolen ritual fringes to a linen garment. From here one derives the general principle that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition.

§ Rav Ḥisda said that Rav said: If the head of his father, or any other relative for whom a priest becomes impure, was severed, he may not become impure to bury him. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “None shall become impure for the dead among his people, except…for his father” (Leviticus 21:1–2), which indicates that this applies when his father is whole, and not when he is lacking. Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Ḥisda: If that is so, then in a case where one was walking in the valley [pakta] of Aravot, a place frequented by bandits, and robbers severed his head, will you also say that his son the priest does not become impure to bury him because he is not whole? Rav Ḥisda said to him: Do you speak of a corpse with no one to bury it [met mitzva]? This halakha certainly does not apply to a case of this kind. For now consider, if one can say that to bury others, i.e., non-relatives, he is obligated to become ritually impure, as even priests and nazirites must become impure to bury an unattended corpse, then with regard to a met mitzva who is his father is it not all the more so the case that he must become impure to bury him even if his head is severed? The Gemara asks: And is this a met mitzva? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Which is a met mitzva for whom a priest must become impure? It is anyone who does not have people to bury him apart from this priest. If the corpse is in a place where if he would call, others would answer him, that is not considered a met mitzva. And if this dead father has a son who was with him, it means the father is not classified as a met mitzva, and therefore his son the priest must ensure that others tend to his burial, without doing so himself. The Gemara answers: Since he was walking along the way, he is considered like one who does not have people to bury him. The Gemara raises an objection against Rav Ḥisda’s opinion. The superfluous term “for her” in the verse “And for his sister a virgin who is near to him, who has no husband, for her he becomes impure” (Leviticus 21:3) teaches that it is to bury her in her whole state that he becomes impure, but he does not become impure to bury her limbs. If a limb was severed from her during her lifetime he does not tend to it, because he may not become impure to bury a limb severed from one of his living relatives, including that of his father. However, he may search for a bone that is a barley-grain-bulk. If he was already impure from his father’s body, he may search for and bury a bone that was detached from the corpse, even if it is large enough to impart impurity itself. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: He may search for a bone that is a barley-grain-bulk? Isn’t this to say that if the deceased father is lacking a small part, i.e., a single bone, his son the priest becomes impure to bury him? This would contradict Rav Ḥisda’s statement in the name of Rav that he becomes impure to bury his father only if he is whole. The Gemara answers: No, this presents no difficulty, as that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: “For her he becomes impure” (Leviticus 21:3), this indicates that to bury her he becomes impure but he does not become impure to bury her limbs, as he does not become impure to bury a limb severed from one of his living relatives, including that of his father. However, he does become impure to bury a limb from his dead father. Rav Ḥisda disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and rules in accordance with the Rabbis, who maintain that a priest may become impure only to bury his relative’s whole body. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rav Kahana, son of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, said: The words “for her he becomes impure” (Leviticus 21:3) indicate that to bury her he becomes impure when she is whole, but he does not become impure to bury her limbs. This serves to exclude an olive-bulk of solid material from a corpse, and an olive-bulk of fluid from a corpse, and a full spade of dust from a corpse. One might have thought that he may not become impure for a spine and a skull, or for most of the skeleton or most of the number of bones from his sister’s corpse. Therefore, it is written at the beginning of this passage dealing with the impurity of priests: “Speak to the priests, the sons of Aaron, and say to them” (Leviticus 21:1). The repetition of “speak” and “say” indicates that the verse added a different form of impurity permitted to a priest. One might have thought that he may not become impure to bury a spine, or for a skull, or to bury most of the skeleton or most of the number of bones of other relatives for whom a priest becomes impure. You say in response: Just as his sister is unique in that her body is dependent upon the brother tending to her burial, and he becomes impure to bury a spine, or to bury a skull, or to bury most of her skeleton, or to bury most of her number of bones, so too, with regard to every person whose body is dependent upon him, i.e., his other close relatives, he becomes impure to bury a spine, or to bury a skull, or to bury most of his skeleton, or to bury most of his number of bones. This presents a difficulty for the opinion of Rav that a priest may not become impure to bury any relative whose head has been severed. The Gemara answers: That baraita also represents the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rav stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: An incident occurred in which the father of Rabbi Yitzḥak the priest died in Ginzak, and they came and informed him after three years had passed, and he came and asked Rabbi Yehoshua ben Elisha and four Elders who were with him whether he was permitted to become ritually impure by transferring his father’s remains to his ancestral grave, as was the custom. And they said to Rabbi Yitzḥak that the verse states: “For his father” (Leviticus 21:2), which indicates a priest may become impure only when his father is whole, and not when he is lacking. After three years the father’s body was certainly not whole, and therefore his son, a priest, was no longer permitted to become impure to bury him.

MISHNA: With regard to one on whose behalf the blood of one of his nazirite offerings was sprinkled on the altar, and he became ritually impure before bringing the rest of his offerings, Rabbi Eliezer says: His impurity negates the entire tally, and he remains a nazirite. And the Rabbis say: Let him bring the rest of his offerings and be purified. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Eliezer: An incident occurred involving Miriam of Tarmod who was a nazirite, that the blood of one of her offerings was sprinkled on her behalf, and they came and told her that her daughter was mortally ill. And she went and found that her daughter was dead, and thereby contracted impurity. And the Rabbis said: Let her bring the rest of her offerings and be purified.

MISHNA: A High Priest and a nazirite may not become ritually impure even to bury their deceased relatives. However, they become impure to bury a corpse with no one to bury it [met mitzva]. If one of them comes across the corpse of a Jew, and there is nobody else available to bury it, he must bury the body. If a High Priest and a nazirite were walking along the way and they found a met mitzva, and one of them can tend to the burial by himself, Rabbi Eliezer says: Let the High Priest become impure, and do not let the nazirite become impure. And the Rabbis say: Let the nazirite become impure, and do not let even a common priest become impure. Rabbi Eliezer said to the Rabbis: It is preferable to let the priest become impure, as he does not bring an offering for his impurity, and do not let the nazirite become impure, as he brings an offering for his impurity. The Rabbis said to him: On the contrary, let the nazirite become impure, as his sanctity is not permanent, and do not let a priest become impure, as his sanctity is permanent.

GEMARA: The Sages taught: After Rabbi Meir’s death, Rabbi Yehuda said to his students: Do not let the students of Rabbi Meir enter here, into the house of study, because they are vexatious and they do not come to study Torah, but they come to overwhelm me with their halakhot. Nevertheless, Sumakhos, a student of Rabbi Meir, forced his way and entered the house of study. When they reached the topic of the mishna, Sumakhos said to them: Rabbi Meir taught me like this: A nazirite shaves for becoming impure from these following sources of ritual impurity: For impurity imparted by a corpse and for impurity imparted by an olive-bulk from a corpse. Rabbi Yehuda grew angry and said to his disciples: Didn’t I say to you like this: Do not let the students of Rabbi Meir enter here because they are vexatious? He explained his annoyance. The clause: For a corpse, is unnecessary, as, if a nazirite must shave for impurity imparted by an olive-bulk from a corpse, is it not all the more so that he must shave for impurity imparted by an entire corpse? Rabbi Yosei said: Now they will say: Meir is dead, Yehuda is angry, and Yosei remained silent and did not respond. If so, what will become of the Torah? Rabbi Yosei therefore said: It is not necessary to teach that a nazirite must shave for impurity imparted by a corpse, but only that he must shave even for impurity imparted by a corpse upon which there is not an olive-bulk of flesh. The Gemara asks: But one could still say: If he must shave for impurity imparted by a limb from a corpse, even if it is less than an olive-bulk, as stated in the mishna, is it not all the more so that he must shave for impurity imparted by all of a corpse, even if it does not contain an olive-bulk of flesh? Rather, the mishna should be explained as Rabbi Yoḥanan said, with regard to a different issue: It is necessary only for a miscarried fetus whose limbs had not yet become joined to its sinews. Here too, one can say that the mishna’s statement that a nazirite must shave for impurity imparted by a corpse is referring to a miscarried fetus whose limbs had not yet become joined to its sinews. Although it does not impart impurity through one of its limbs, as the limbs lack sinews and bones, this corpse itself does impart impurity.

The Gemara cites a further statement with regard to dust of a corpse. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one cut the hair of a corpse and buried the hair with it, the hair becomes part of the mixture for the dust, and it does not impart impurity. In relation to the above, the Gemara states: We learned in a mishna there (Oholot 3:3): Everything that is in a corpse is impure, except for the teeth, the hair, and the nails, which do not impart impurity as part of the body. But when they are attached to the corpse, they are all impure.

§ Rabbi Yirmeya raised yet another dilemma: Does a dead fetus in its dead mother’s womb form a mixture with regard to her, so that the bodies are considered like two corpses buried together, or not? The Gemara explains the two sides of the dilemma: Do we say that since the Master said that a fetus is considered as the thigh of its mother, it is therefore like her body and it does not form a mixture with it? Or perhaps one should maintain: Since in most cases a fetus will ultimately emerge from the womb at birth, it is already considered separated from her, and it is like any other corpse buried with the woman. And if you say that a fetus, which will ultimately emerge, is considered separated from her and is not part of her body, one must still ask this question with regard to semen in a dead woman’s womb. What is the halakha in this case? Does it form a mixture with respect to the woman’s body? The Gemara explains the two sides of this dilemma: Do we say that since no fetus was formed from the semen, it is considered like her body? Or, perhaps one should argue that since it comes from outside, it is not considered part of her body. Rav Pappa raised a similar dilemma: With regard to her excrement, the food waste that remains in a woman’s intestines, what is the halakha? Once again, the Gemara explains the two sides of this dilemma: Do we say that since she cannot subsist without food it is considered her life, which means that the food left inside her body is part of her and does not form a mixture with the corpse? Or perhaps this too comes from outside and is therefore not part of her body, and does form a mixture with her corpse. Similarly, Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, raised a dilemma concerning a corpse: With regard to its skin, what is the halakha? Rav Huna bar Manoaḥ likewise raised a dilemma: With regard to its phlegm and its spittle, what is the halakha? Rav Shmuel bar Aḥa said to Rav Pappa: But if it enters your mind that all these cases of which they spoke form a mixture, under what circumstances do you find this case of dust that imparts impurity? Dust from a corpse will always include some components of the aforementioned elements. The Gemara answers: It is possible. For example, if someone was given palm water [mei dekalim], a powerful laxative, to drink before he died, and was rubbed with a depilatory agent to remove his hair, and was boiled after death in the hot waters of Tiberias until the skin came off, this would remove all matter that is not part of the corpse itself.

§ In relation to the above discussion concerning a body without a limb, Rava raised a dilemma: If someone eats an entire ant, even if it is less than an olive-bulk in volume, he is liable for eating a creeping animal because it is a whole creature. Rava’s dilemma was as follows: If one eats an ant that lacks a part, e.g., a leg, what is the halakha? Is this individual liable to receive lashes? The two possibilities are as follows: Is it learned as tradition that the amount for which one is liable is a whole ant, and this one is lacking? Or did we learn that he is punished for a viable entity, and there is a viable entity here, despite the missing limb? Rav Yehuda from Diskarta said: Come and hear the following halakhic midrash concerning the ritual impurity of creeping animals. The verse states: “Whoever touches them when they are dead shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:31). One might have thought this halakha applies only to all of them, i.e., to complete creatures. Therefore, the verse states: “And upon whatever any of them, when they are dead, fall, it shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:32), which indicates that part of these creatures also imparts impurity. If the halakha were derived solely from the phrase “of them,” one might have thought that it applies even to a small part of them. The verse therefore states: “Them,” which means all of them. How so? How can one reconcile the two verses? He does not become ritually impure unless he touches at least part of them that is equal in measure to all of them, i.e., a large part. And the Sages calculated that this is the volume of a lentil-bulk. Why is this? As the start of the formation of a skink, one of the eight impure creeping animals, is the size of a lentil-bulk. This concludes the halakhic midrash. With regard to the issue at hand, one can learn from here that it is learned as a tradition that the amount for a creature to be considered whole is a lentil-bulk. If so, an ant missing a limb should likewise not have the status of a creature.

§ In relation to the above discussion concerning a body without a limb, Rava raised a dilemma: If someone eats an entire ant, even if it is less than an olive-bulk in volume, he is liable for eating a creeping animal because it is a whole creature. Rava’s dilemma was as follows: If one eats an ant that lacks a part, e.g., a leg, what is the halakha? Is this individual liable to receive lashes? The two possibilities are as follows: Is it learned as tradition that the amount for which one is liable is a whole ant, and this one is lacking? Or did we learn that he is punished for a viable entity, and there is a viable entity here, despite the missing limb? Rav Yehuda from Diskarta said: Come and hear the following halakhic midrash concerning the ritual impurity of creeping animals. The verse states: “Whoever touches them when they are dead shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:31). One might have thought this halakha applies only to all of them, i.e., to complete creatures. Therefore, the verse states: “And upon whatever any of them, when they are dead, fall, it shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:32), which indicates that part of these creatures also imparts impurity. If the halakha were derived solely from the phrase “of them,” one might have thought that it applies even to a small part of them. The verse therefore states: “Them,” which means all of them. How so? How can one reconcile the two verses? He does not become ritually impure unless he touches at least part of them that is equal in measure to all of them, i.e., a large part. And the Sages calculated that this is the volume of a lentil-bulk. Why is this? As the start of the formation of a skink, one of the eight impure creeping animals, is the size of a lentil-bulk. This concludes the halakhic midrash. With regard to the issue at hand, one can learn from here that it is learned as a tradition that the amount for a creature to be considered whole is a lentil-bulk. If so, an ant missing a limb should likewise not have the status of a creature.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Eliezer learn this halakha in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya? But didn’t he learn it in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua bar Memel? As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer said: When I went to a place called Ardaskeya, I found Rabbi Yehoshua ben Petter Rosh sitting and discussing the following halakha before Rabbi Meir: With regard to any ritual impurity from a corpse for which a nazirite must shave, one is liable due to the prohibition of entering the Temple after contracting it. And with regard to any impurity from a corpse for which a nazirite does not shave, one is not liable due to the prohibition of entering the Temple after contracting it. Rabbi Meir said to him: This impurity of a corpse that does not obligate a nazirite to shave should not be more lenient than the impurity of a creeping animal. Rabbi Eliezer continued: I said to Rabbi Meir: Are you at all familiar with Rabbi Yehoshua bar Memel? He said to me: Yes. I continued: Rabbi Yehoshua bar Memel said this to me in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya: With regard to any ritual impurity from a corpse for which a nazirite must shave, one is liable due to the prohibition of entering the Temple after contracting it. And with regard to any impurity from a corpse for which a nazirite does not shave, one is not liable due to the prohibition of entering the Temple after contracting it. This concludes the baraita. The Gemara comments: This is proof that Rabbi Eliezer learned this halakha in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua bar Memel, not directly from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya. They said: Learn from this case the following principle: With regard to any statement of halakha that was stated as a tradition of three scholars, we say the first and the last names in the chain but we do not say the middle one. Therefore, the mishna mentions the name of Rabbi Eliezer, the last link in the tradition, and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya, the first scholar, but it omits that of Rabbi Yehoshua bar Memel, the middle scholar in the chain. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We, too, learn in a mishna (Pe’a 2:6): Naḥum the Scribe [lavlar] said: This is the tradition that I received from Rabbi Meyasha, who received it from father, who received it from the pairs of Sages who served during the period of the Second Temple, who received it from the Prophets: It is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to one who sows the plants of dill and mustard in two or three separate locations in a single field, that he leaves a corner to the poor for each and every one of these plots on its own, rather than one corner for all of them. The Gemara explains the proof from this source: And yet Naḥum the Scribe does not mention the names of Joshua and Caleb, despite the fact that they were the Elders who passed down this halakha from Moses to the Prophets. Learn from this that the middle links in a tradition are not necessarily listed.

MISHNA: The mishna continues to address the sources of ritual impurity for which a nazirite must shave. Rabbi Akiva said: I discussed this matter before Rabbi Eliezer and suggested the following a fortiori inference: If, with regard to a bone that is a barley-grain-bulk, which does not render a person impure in a tent, a nazirite must nevertheless shave for touching it or carrying it, then in the case of a quarter-log of blood, which is more stringent in that it renders a person impure in a tent, is it not logical that a nazirite should shave for touching it or carrying it? Rabbi Eliezer said to me: What is this, Akiva? One cannot argue by means of an a fortiori inference here, in this particular case. However, Rabbi Eliezer did not provide a reason for this response. Rabbi Akiva continued: And when I came and presented these matters before Rabbi Yehoshua, he said to me: You spoke well, i.e., your logic is flawless, but they indeed said that this is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, which cannot be refuted by means of an a fortiori inference.

§ The mishna taught that the two nazirites shave and cut their hair and bring an offering of impurity and an offering of purity. The Gemara asks: But why are they permitted to shave? Perhaps both of them are not impure, and therefore one of them violates the prohibition against rounding the head, i.e., shaving the hair on the sides of the head (see Leviticus 19:27), when he shaves his hair unnecessarily. Since one of them does not need to shave, he thereby transgresses a mitzva by Torah law. Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a case where each nazirite was a woman, who is not prohibited from rounding the hair of her head, or a minor boy, who is not obligated in the observance of mitzvot. The Gemara analyzes Shmuel’s answer: And let Shmuel establish the mishna as referring to a male who reached majority, and the reason it is permitted is because rounding the entire head, not merely its corners, is not called rounding as prohibited by the Torah. From the fact that he does not establish the mishna in this manner, conclude from it that Shmuel maintains that rounding the entire head is called rounding.

§ Rav said: A person who is not a nazirite may lighten his burden by removing all the hair of his body with a razor. One who feels he has too much hair may shave all of it off with a razor, apart from his beard and the corners of his head. The Gemara raises an objection against this from a baraita: A man who removes the hair of the armpit or the pubic hair is flogged for transgressing the prohibition: “A man shall not put on a woman’s garment” (Deuteronomy 22:5), as this behavior is the manner of women. The Gemara answers: In this case he is flogged because he shaved with a razor, whereas in that case Rav said it is permitted because he was referring to one who removes hair with scissors, an act that is not considered a prohibition. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But Rav said it is permitted with a razor as well. The Gemara answers: He did not mean an actual razor; rather, he said that one may use an implement that is similar to a razor, i.e., scissors that cut very close to the skin, in the manner of a razor. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A man who removes the hair of the armpit or the pubic hair is flogged. The Gemara raises an objection against this ruling: The removal of hair is not prohibited by Torah law but by rabbinic law. Why, then, is he liable to receive lashes? The Gemara explains: What does it mean that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he is flogged? This means that he is flogged by rabbinic law, a punishment known as lashes for rebelliousness, for disobeying a rabbinic decree. Some say a different version of this statement: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A man who removes the hair of the armpit or the pubic hair is flogged, due to the prohibition: “A man shall not put on a woman’s garment” (Deuteronomy 22:5). The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: The removal of hair is not prohibited by Torah law but by rabbinic law. How then does Rabbi Yoḥanan say that he is flogged, which by definition is a punishment for individuals who have transgressed a Torah law? The Gemara answers: It was he who said this halakha in accordance with the opinion of that tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: A man who removes the hair of the armpit or the pubic hair violates the prohibition of: “A man shall not put on a woman’s garment.” The Gemara asks: And what does the first tanna, who holds that the prohibition is by rabbinic law, learn from this verse: “A man shall not put on a woman’s garment”? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in the baraita, where it states: “A woman shall not wear that which pertains to a man, and a man shall not put on a woman’s garment, for whoever does these things is an abomination to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 22:5). What is the meaning when the verse states this? If it teaches only that a man may not put on a woman’s garment, and a woman may not wear a man’s garment, it is already stated in explanation of this prohibition that “it is an abomination to the Lord your God,” and there is no abomination here in the mere act of wearing a garment. Rather, it means that a man may not wear a woman’s garment and thereby go and sit among the women; and a woman may not wear a man’s garment and sit among the men. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: From where is it derived that a woman may not go out with weapons to war? The verse states: “A woman shall not wear that which pertains to a man, and a man shall not put on a woman’s garment,” which indicates that a man may not adorn himself with the cosmetics and ornaments of a woman, and similarly a woman may not go out with weapons to war, as those are for the use of males. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling follows this opinion.

§ Rav Naḥman said: For a nazirite, it is permitted to shave armpit hair. The Gemara comments: And the halakha is not in accordance with his opinion. The Gemara reports that the Sages said to Rabbi Shimon bar Abba: We have observed that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not have armpit hairs, despite his own ruling that it is prohibited to shave them. He said to them: They fell out due to old age. The Gemara relates: There was a certain person who committed a transgression and was found liable to receive lashes before Rabbi Ami. When they removed his clothes to flog him, his armpit was exposed, and Rabbi Ami saw that he had not shaved his armpit hair. Rabbi Ami said to his attendants: Leave him; this is one of those who are meticulous in observance of mitzvot. We can see this is so, as he is particular about prohibitions that ordinary people do not observe. Rav raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ḥiyya: What is the halakha with regard to shaving armpit hair? He said to him: It is prohibited. Rav said to him: But it grows and is uncomfortable. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: Son of nobles [bar paḥtei], this hair has a limited time. Whenever a hair grows too long it falls out, and therefore there is no concern that one’s armpit hair will become too long. Rav raised another dilemma before Rabbi Ḥiyya: What is the halakha with regard to rubbing armpit hair and thereby removing it manually? Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: It is prohibited. Rav continued to ask: What is the halakha with regard to rubbing armpit hair indirectly with one’s garment? Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: It is permitted. Some say that this was not Rav’s question; rather, he raised the following dilemma before him: What is the halakha with regard to rubbing the armpit with one’s garment during prayer? Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: It is prohibited. The Gemara comments: And the halakha is not in accordance with his opinion in this case.

MISHNA: Gentiles do not have naziriteship, i.e., the halakhot of naziriteship do not apply to gentiles. They are not subject to the prohibitions of a nazirite, nor does one accept their offerings at the end of naziriteship. However, women and Canaanite slaves do have naziriteship. The mishna adds: There is a greater stringency in the case of women than in the case of slaves, as a master may force his slave to drink wine, shave his hair, or become ritually impure from a corpse, despite the slave’s vow of naziriteship, but a husband cannot force his wife to transgress her naziriteship. GEMARA: The mishna teaches that gentiles do not have naziriteship, whereas women and slaves can be nazirites. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? It is as the Sages taught, that the beginning of the passage about naziriteship, which states: “Speak to the children of Israel” (Numbers 6:2), serves to emphasize that these halakhot apply to Jews, but not to the gentiles. Furthermore, the continuation of the verse: “And say to them, when a man or woman shall clearly utter a vow,” serves to include slaves. The Gemara asks: Why do I need a verse to include slaves? Haven’t you said the following principle: Any mitzva that a woman is obligated in its performance, a slave is also obligated in its performance? Since the halakhot of naziriteship apply to a woman, they should likewise apply to slaves. Rava said: Here it is different, as with regard to vows the verse states: “To bind his soul with a bond” (Numbers 30:3), and the Sages expounded that this is referring only to one whose soul is in his possession, i.e., who is under his own jurisdiction. This excludes a slave, whose soul is not in his possession, but who is under his master’s control. The verse from Leviticus is necessary, lest you say that since a slave’s soul is not in his possession, one should say that with regard to the halakhot of a nazirite as well, he cannot undertake this vow notwithstanding the principle that slaves have similar halakhot to women with regard to obligations, who can become nazirites. The aforementioned verse teaches us that a slave can in fact take a vow of naziriteship. The Gemara returns to the earlier exposition of the verse. The Master said in the baraita that the verse specifies: “Speak to the children of Israel,” but not to the gentiles. The Gemara asks: And anywhere that “Israel” is written, are gentiles not included in that verse? But there is a counterexample in the verse written with regard to the halakhot of valuations, as it is written: “Speak to the children of Israel” (Leviticus 27:2), and it was taught in a baraita: The children of Israel can take a valuation vow but gentiles cannot take a valuation vow. If a gentile declares: I undertake to donate the value of so-and-so, his vow does not take effect. The baraita continues: One might have thought that this means that gentiles cannot be the subject of a valuation either, i.e., if a Jew says: I am obligated to give the value of so-and-so the gentile, his vow would not take effect. Therefore, the verse states the inclusive expression: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation” (Leviticus 27:2), to teach that in this regard, every “man,” even a gentile, is included in halakhot of valuations. Inasmuch as the Torah also states with regard to a nazirite: “When a man or woman shall clearly utter a vow, the vow of a nazirite” (Numbers 6:2), perhaps one should include gentiles in the halakhot of naziriteship as well. The Gemara answers: Here, in the case of naziriteship, it is different, as the verse states: “For his father, or for his mother, for his brother, or for his sister, he shall not defile himself” (Numbers 6:7). From here it is derived that this mitzva applies only to one who has a father. This excludes a gentile, who does not have a father. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha does a gentile lack a father? If we say it is with regard to inheritance, but didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A gentile inherits the estate of his father by Torah law, as it is stated: “Because I have given Mount Seir to Esau as an inheritance” (Deuteronomy 2:5)? Rather, this mitzva of naziriteship applies to one who is warned concerning the honor of his father, and as the mitzva to honor one’s father does not apply to a gentile, it is as though he has no father. The Gemara asks: Is it written: Honor your father, in the context of a nazirite? What is the connection between these two issues? Rather, the verse states with regard to a nazirite: “For his father, or for his mother, for his brother, or for his sister, he shall not defile himself” (Numbers 6:7), and it should be understood as referring to one who has the potential to become ritually impure, which excludes a gentile, who has no potential to become ritually impure. A gentile is not rendered impure even if he touches a corpse. An individual of this kind cannot become a nazirite. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that gentiles do not have the ability to become ritually impure? It is as the verse states with regard to one who enters the Temple in a state of impurity: “But the man who shall be impure and shall not purify himself, that soul shall be cut off from the midst of the assembly” (Numbers 19:20). This indicates that the halakhot of ritual impurity apply only to one who has membership in the assembly of the Jewish people and excludes this gentile, who has no membership in the assembly, i.e., he is not part of the Jewish people. The Gemara asks: From where is it derived that this verse teaches that ritual impurity does not apply to a gentile at all? Perhaps the verse is referring merely to excision from the World-to-Come [karet], i.e., it is teaching that he is not liable to receive karet for entering the Temple when impure, but that perhaps a gentile does become impure. The Gemara answers that the previous verse states: “And the pure person shall sprinkle upon the impure”; this indicates that anyone who has the possibility of attaining ritual purity by means of the waters of purification also has the potential for ritual impurity, and anyone who does not have the possibility of attaining purity by means of the waters of purification does not have the potential for impurity either. The Gemara asks: But one can say that it is only purity by means of the waters of purification that he does not have, but he does have the potential for impurity. The Gemara answers: It is for this reason that the verse states: “But the man who shall be impure and shall not purify himself” (Numbers 19:20), to teach that these two statuses are interdependent. One who cannot be purified by the waters of purification cannot become impure in the first place. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said a different reason why a gentile cannot become a nazirite, despite the fact that the term “man” does include gentiles in the case of valuations. Here, with regard to naziriteship, it is different, as the verse prohibits a nazirite from becoming impure for his father and mother. This prohibition is not relevant for gentiles because the verse states: “And you shall make them an inheritance for your children after you” (Leviticus 25:46). This verse establishes a child as one to whom a person can bequeath his slaves, the subject of this verse. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov explains: This verse teaches that anyone who has inheritance, i.e., he has the ability to bequeath his slaves to his children, also has the status of a father with regard to impurity, and the verse prohibiting a nazirite from becoming impure to bury his father can be addressing him. But anyone who does not have inheritance does not have the status of a father with regard to impurity. Since a gentile cannot bequeath slaves to his child (see Gittin 38a), the status of a father with regard to impurity also does not apply to him. Consequently, the verse prohibiting a nazirite from becoming impure to bury his father cannot be addressing him. The Gemara asks: If so, slaves should also not be included in the halakhot of ritual impurity or naziriteship, as they too cannot bequeath slaves to their children. Rather, Rava said a different reason why a gentile cannot become a nazirite, even though he is included in the halakhot of valuations, and despite the fact that the term “man” appears in both passages. Granted, with regard to valuations, as it is stated: “Speak to the children of Israel” (Leviticus 27:2), one can derive that the children of Israel can take a valuation vow but gentiles cannot take a valuation vow. One might have thought that gentiles cannot be valuated either. Therefore, the verse states: “Man” (Leviticus 27:2), so as to include a gentile in only one aspect of the halakhot of valuations, i.e., that a gentile can be the subject of a valuation. This does not negate the derivation from “the children of Israel” that gentiles are generally excluded. Rava continues his explanation: However, here, in the case of naziriteship, there is no possibility of interpreting the word “man” to include a gentile in only one aspect of the halakhot of naziriteship. Rava explains: If one would suggest the following derivation: From the phrase “the children of Israel” (Numbers 6:2) derive that the children of Israel can both take a vow of naziriteship and bring the nazirite offering, but gentiles cannot both take a vow of naziriteship and bring the nazirite offering, one might have thought that gentiles cannot be nazirites at all; therefore, the verse states: “Man,” which includes gentiles in one aspect of the halakhot of naziriteship, i.e., that they can become nazirites. Rava continues his explanation: However, the Sages would say in response to this suggestion: If the phrase “the children of Israel” is written due to the need to exclude a gentile from bringing a nazirite offering, one does not need to derive this halakha from here, and this is because it is already derived from there, as a baraita teaches that the verse: “Any man from the house of Israel, or of the strangers in Israel, who sacrifices his offering, whether it be any of their vows, or any of their gift offerings, which are sacrificed to the Lord as a burnt-offering” (Leviticus 22:18), excludes a gentile from the offering of naziriteship; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Therefore, the phrase “the children of Israel” must exclude gentiles from the entire passage of naziriteship, and not just from bringing the offerings. The Gemara asks: But it can still be argued that “the children of Israel” is excluding a gentile from only some aspects of naziriteship, as one can say that this phrase teaches that the children of Israel can take a vow of permanent naziriteship, but gentiles cannot take a vow of permanent naziriteship, and one might have thought that gentiles cannot be nazirites at all. The verse therefore states: “Man,” to teach that they can become nazirites. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Is it written: A permanent nazirite? Since the verse does not specify a particular type of naziriteship, it excludes gentiles from all types. The Gemara offers another suggestion: But it can still be argued that “the children of Israel” is excluding a gentile from only some aspects of naziriteship, as one can say that this phrase teaches that “the children of Israel” can vow that their minor sons be nazirites, but gentiles cannot vow that their minor sons be nazirites; and one might have thought that gentiles cannot be nazirites at all. The verse therefore states: “Man,” to teach that they can become nazirites. The Gemara answers: Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that the fact that a father can take a vow that his minor son will be a nazirite is a halakha transmitted to Moses at Sinai with regard to a nazirite? Since this halakha is not stated in the Torah, it cannot be excluded by a verse. The Gemara offers another suggestion: But it can still be argued that “the children of Israel” is excluding a gentile from only some aspects of naziriteship, as one can say that this phrase teaches that “the children of Israel” can shave and cut their hair by means of the offerings of their fathers’ naziriteships, but gentiles cannot shave and cut their hair by means of their fathers’ naziriteships. In other words, if the father of a nazirite, who was himself a nazirite, died after having separated his nazirite offerings, the son is able to bring those offerings at the close of his own naziriteship. One might have thought that gentiles cannot be nazirites at all. The verse therefore states: “Man,” to teach that they can become nazirites. The Gemara answers: Wasn’t it stated that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the halakha that a son may use his father’s nazirite offerings is a halakha transmitted to Moses at Sinai with regard to a nazirite? Since this halakha does not appear in the Torah, the verse cannot be coming to exclude it.

MISHNA: The tractate concludes with an aggadic statement about nazirites. Samuel the prophet was a nazirite, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Nehorai, as it was stated that when Hannah, his mother, prayed for a son, she vowed: “And no mora shall come upon his head” (I Samuel 1:11). How is it derived that mora is an expression of naziriteship? It is stated with regard to Samson: “And no razor [mora] shall come upon his head, for the child shall be a nazirite to God” (Judges 13:5), and it is stated: “And no mora,” with regard to Samuel. Just as the term “mora” that is stated with regard to Samson means that he was a nazirite, so too the term “mora” that is stated with regard to Samuel indicates that he was a nazirite. Rabbi Yosei said: But doesn’t the word “mora” mean nothing other than the fear of flesh and blood? The word should be read as though it were written with an alef, and not a heh, so that it means fear. Rabbi Nehorai said to him: But isn’t it already stated: “And Samuel said: How can I go; if Saul hears it he will kill me” (I Samuel 16:2). This verse indicates that there was fear of flesh and blood upon Samuel. Consequently, the term mora must be understood in accordance with its plain meaning of a razor. If so, Samuel was indeed a nazirite. GEMARA: Rav said to his son Ḥiyya: Seize the opportunity and quickly recite a blessing over the cup of blessing for the Grace after Meals. And similarly, Rav Huna said to his son, Rabba: Seize the opportunity and recite a blessing. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that one who recites a blessing is preferable to one who answers amen? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: The one who answers amen is greater than the one who recites the blessing? And Rabbi Nehorai said to him: By Heavens, it is so. Know that this is true, as the military assistants [gulyarim] descend to the battlefield and initiate the war and the mighty follow them and prevail. The amen that follows a blessing is compared to the mighty who join the war after the assistants, illustrating that answering amen is more significant than reciting the initial blessing. The Gemara responds: This is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: Both the one who recites a blessing and the one who answers amen are included among those who “stand up and bless” (Nehemiah 9:5), but one hurries to first reward the one who recites the blessing. This baraita apparently holds that reciting the blessing is greater than answering amen. Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: Torah scholars increase peace in the world, as it is stated: “And all your children [banayikh] shall be taught of the Lord, and great shall be the peace of your children” (Isaiah 54:13). The Sages interpreted this verse homiletically: Do not read it as: “Your children [banayikh],” but as: Your builders [bonayikh]. Torah scholars are those who build peace for their generation.