Women in Rabbinic Positions

Rabbi Daniel Sperber

Posek HaYeshiva

Question: Can a woman answer halachic questions, that is to say be a halachic decisor?

Response: In Mishnah Nidah 6:4 it is said: Whosoever is eligible to judge is eligible to bear witness. And in Yerushalmi Yoma 6:1 it is explicitly stated that since a woman may not bear witness she cannot judge. The Tosafot (Niddah ibid. 50a) asked: How then did Deborah the Prophetess serve as a judge? For in Judges 4:4-5 it is stated: "And Deborah, a prophetess, the wife of Lapidoth, she judged Israel at that time... and the children of Israel came up to her for judgement." And one of their answers is that what the Mishnah means to teach us is only that he who is eligible to give witness may judge, i.e. that he who for some specific reason is ineligible to bear witness, may not judge. That does not mean that there is an overall prohibition against a woman acting as a judge. This answer takes no account of the Yerushalmi's formulation.

In an additional answer offered by the Tosafot ibid., it is stated: "She [Deborah] did not herself give judgement, but taught [the judges] the laws; and the Yerushalmi declare that women are ineligible to judge. From this answer we learn that a woman may give halachic rulings, for that is the real meaning of teaching halachah to others."

Yet another solution to this apparent contradiction is found in the Ritba to Kiddushin 35a, (ed. A. Dinin, Jerusalem 1985, p. 373), and in the Rashba to Bava Kama 15a. (ed. A. Lichtenstein, Jerusalem 1987, p. 21), namely that the statement in Niddah refers only to a man, meaning that only a man who is unfit to bear witness is unfit to give judgement. But women, though they are unfit to bear witness, may act as judges, as we learn from Deborah the prophetess.

Quite a different reply is given by the Ran (R. Nissim) to Shavuot 30a (13a in the Rif's pagination), and the Rashba to Shavuot ibid. Concerning Deborah's position as a judge they write, in their second response:

....Or perhaps she did judge and did give rulings, because they accepted her, just as a person can accept one of his [close] relatives [as a judge]. (even though a close relative is legally disqualified from being a judge).

What the Ran is saying is that just as one can take upon oneself to accept the ruling of one who is legally disqualified from serving as a judge, (such as a close relative or a non-Jew), so too, since "the children of Israel came up to her for judgement," - agreeing to accept her ruling - her rulings were binding upon them. Hence, if a woman is approached for a halachic ruling, it may be presumed that the questioner will accept her reply as authoritative.

Further proof for this, if at all necessary, may be found in R. Ovadiah Yosef's discussion in Yabia Omer 2nd edition vol.1, Jerusalem 1986, Orah Hayyim sect. 41:16, p.146. he refers us to R. Yonatan Eibeschutz's Tiferet Yonatan, Lvov 1860, to Yitro (Exodus 18:16) who raised the question how could Deborah give judgement alone. Surely we have learned from R. Yishmael be-R. Yossi, "Judge not alone, for none may judge alone save One" (M. Avot 4:8). His answer is that many poskim wrote that when the plaintiff comes to the judge requesting his judgement, a single judge is permitted. This is also his ruling in Urim ve-Tumim, Warsaw 1882, to Hoshen Mishpat 3:5. R. Ovadia strengthened this position by referring us to Y. Sanhedrin 1:1, where we read as follows:

R. Abbahu sat in judgement alone in Kenishta Maradeta in Caesarea. His disciples asked him, Rabbi, did you not teach us not to give judgement alone?!" He replied to them, "Since they see me sitting alone in judgement, and [nonetheless] they come to me, they are as those who have accepted upon themselves [a solitary judge]. And so indeed have we learned: When are we referring to [that one may not judge alone]? When the plaintiffs did not accept [such an arrangement]. But if they did accept [such an arrangement] upon themselves, even a single judge may give judgement.

To the above we may add what we find in Ruth Rabbah 1:1, according to which both Devorah and Yael were judges, (see Redal, R. David Luria's note ad loc.). Likewise, Ecclesiastes Rabbah, commenting on the verse in Ecclesiastes 2:8 עשיתי לי שרים ושרות, explains דיינים זכרים ודינות נקבות, male and female judges.

Furthermore, even a blind person, who according to many Rishonim is not qualified to act as a judge, since he cannot give evidence (cf. Nidah ibid.), and so rules the Shulhan Aruch, Hoshen Mishpat 7:2, nonetheless, if he is accepted by the community or the plaintiffs, he may do so, and the defendant can even force the plaintiff (claimant) to accept his judgement, since the defendant has the upper hand in these matters.

And returning to our main subject, even according to those who do not follow the lines of interpretation we have cited above, there are numerous areas in which a woman is eligible to give testimony, such as in the cases of Yibum and Halitzah (Shulchan Aruch, Even ha-Ezer, Seder Halitzah 21-24. Rambam, Hilchot Yibum ve-Halitzah 4:31), issues between a man and his wife (Rambam, Ishut 21:10), establishing that a captive woman was not raped and is permitted to marry a Cohen (Rambam, Issurei Biah 18:17), establishing ownership (Baba Kama 104b), issues both monetary and otherwise (Ketubot 85b, Responsa Rivash 182), in cases where the testimony of a single witness suffices (Rambam, Edut 5:3), Kashrut, separating hallah, Shabbat, and menstrual purity and impurity – Nidah - (Responsa Tzitz Eliezer vol.4, 20), everything that a person can of his own accord correct (Shulhan Aruch, Even ha-Ezer 17:3, based on M. Yevamot 16:7), etc. It follows that in all these areas a woman is eligible not merely to give testimony, but also to give judgement.

And incidentally I would like to bring a quotation from the response of R. Eliyahu Katz, of Beer Sheva, in his Beer Eliyahu, vol.3, Beer Sheva 1961, Even ha-Ezer no.2, pp.11-12:

Those people for whom there was evidence from kosher witnesses, in the testimony of a woman, in accordance with the law of the Torah, whose wives were sent by the accused [Nazis], may their names be erased, to the left (i.e. to the extermination centers), and it is close to certainty that they did not survive, permission is granted to the Beit Din in their city, or to that which is close to their city, after hearing testimonies and clarifying them and arriving at an opinion, to permit them to get married, and loosen their enchainedness (igun) from their first wife, as is expounded in the Kuntres ha-heter of the Rabbi of Riskeve... and the Rabbi of Brashov. [my grandfather, R. David Sperber, of blessed memory]

This is merely to highlight the eligibility of women giving testimony in certain cases, and even extremely serious ones.

According to all the above replies, the upshot of the passage in Bavli Nidah is that a woman may give halachic rulings. This, indeed, is how one may understand a statement in Sefer ha-Hinuch (158), where we read concerning the prohibition that one who is enebriated may not give judgement: "[This prohibition] prevents giving judgement in any place and at all times on the part of males and of a wise woman who is suited to give ruling." That is to say, "a wise woman who is suited to give rulings" may not do so if she is inebriated, but may do so if she is not. And this is how the Hida (R. Hayyim Yosef David Azulai) in his Birkei Yosef, Hoshen Mishpat 7:12, (and thence in Pithei Teshuvah ibid. sect. 5) understood the situation: "Namely that a woman is ineligible to judge; however, a wise woman may give rulings. So is it apparent from one of the Tosafot's answer, namely that Deborah taught them the laws. And see that this is so in Sefer ha-Hinuch, for in sect. 83 he agreed that a woman is ineligible to judge, while in sect. 158, concerning drunkards he wrote: "and so a wise woman who is suited to give rulings..."

Furthermore, the Rambam in Hilchot Talmud Torah chapter 4 ad fin., wrote of:

"the need to understand the forbidden and the permitted and the rest of the commandments... which constitute the great goodness the Lord bestowed [upon us] to the betterment of this world so that we may merit the World to Come, for these are subjects that all have to know. And they may be known to all – old and young, man and woman, one with a broad heart and one with a narrow."

From here we infer that an adult woman, with a broad heart, may well "understand what is forbidden and what is permitted." Indeed, continues the Rambam, "the crown of Torah stands waiting for all, as it is said 'Moses commanded us a law, even the inheritance of the congregation of Jacob' (Deut. 33:4) – everyone who wishes may come and take" (Talmud Torah 3:1).

On the basis of these sources several great authorities of recent times agreed that a "wise woman", who took upon herself to study the Torah in depth, and who could be said to be crowned with the "crown of Torah", and who achieved a standard of learning such that she could give halachic rulings, may indeed do so. Rav Yitzhak Isaac Herzog z"l, (in his Tehukah le-Yisrael al-Pi ha- Torah, vol.1, Jerusalem 1989, p.110), and Rav Bakshi Doron, (Binyan Av. Jerusalem 1982, 65:5, p.287), wrote that women can be "of the great ones of the generation and serve as decisors, teaching Torah and halachic rulings, for which the authority stems from personal abilities."

And this, indeed, is the conclusion of R. Meshulam Roth, in his responsum in Sheelot-ve-teshuvot Kol Mevasser, vol.1, Jerusalem 1955, sect.12, p.29b.

And because of the clarity of Rav Bakshi Doron's formulation, it is worth citing his summation in full:

From all that has been said above it appears that a woman (and a convert) can serve in leadership positions, and even as the great ones on the generation for the power of their leadership mandates the authority. A woman (and a convert) can serve as decisors and teach Torah and halachic rulings. Positions the authority of which is determined by the candidate's qualifications and this authority is based on those qualifications – such positions may be filled by a woman (and a convert.) They can judge without coercion. There is some doubt whether they can accept authority though a democratic vote, which has the halachic status comparable to their acceptance of by the congregation. In the opinion of many authorities this is permitted. Therefore, in the case of a woman one should rule leniently in this direction, since the actual prohibition is the subject of controversy among the Rishonim. In all such positions one must make a clear distinction between the power of authority and the power of leadership.

We stated above that if a woman is approached for halachic ruling, it presumes that the questioner will accept her reply as authoritative and if the congregation appoints her, accepts and trusts her, its acceptance gives her position legitimacy – kabbalah mehania. Indeed trust and acceptance are obviously a key element in leadership.

In actual fact, many questions put before a rabbi are of a technical nature, and the questioner could easily find the answer in a halachic book, if he were competent to deal with such literature. And so in all so many cases, the rabbi's answer is almost the equivalent of opening a book, but for some people easier and more readily available. Clearly, the element of trust again clearly comes into play, and the answer is much in the nature of a testimony. And since the answer can always be checked out, such a class of testimony is acceptable from a woman too.

Furthermore, this position would seem to be borne out by an early responsum of Ri Migash (R. Yosef Ibn Megas, 1077-1141), Jerusalem 1959, sect. 114 (fol.17ab). He was asked:

What would you say, Our Master, about a man who has never in his life studied halachah under a Rabbi, and does not know the way of halachah and its ways of interpretation, on how to read [such literature], but he saw many responsa of the Geonim and books of regulations (dinim)?

The answer he gives is as follows:

Know that this person is more suited to be given permission to give rulings than many other people who have given themselves authority to give rulings in our time; for most of them have neither of two requirements, that is to say: an understanding of halachah, and a knowledge of the opinions of the Geonim. And those who think they can rule out of their own study of halachah and because of the strength of this study of Talmud, it is they who should be prevented from [giving rulings], as in our times there are more individuals who are worthy of this, and [even] one who has reached the wisdom of the Talmud may not rule out of the results of his personal study unless he be acquainted with the view of the Geonim. But, on the other hand, he who rules out of a knowledge of the Geonim and relies upon them, even if he does not understand Talmud, he is more suitable and praiseworthy, than he who thinks he knows Talmud and relies upon himself.

This remarkable statement clearly expresses the preference for one acquainted with the writings of the authoritative sources, to one who relies on his own judgement, but does not base himself on the authorities. In our days, the authoritative sources are readily available in books and other media, so that provided the answers given are based on and consonant with those sources, they may be given even by a less learned individual.

See further Shut Maharshdam (R. Shmuel de-Medina, Salonika 1506-1589), Hoshen Mishpat 1:

...In our days the scholar only rules in accordance with the book. And if we see that he is expert and experienced in studying [the sources] and has a healthy sense of reason (u-baal sevara yodea daat u-meivin), it is obvious that he can give rulings... even when there is someone greater [in learning] than him in his locale.

However, it must also be borne in mind that one has to choose the books upon which one bases one’s ruling with the utmost care. One must be clear as to the status of the author, and the accuracy of the traditions cited, etc (See Yitzhak Yosef, Maarechet ha-Shulhan vol.2, Jerusalem 2010, pp.412-420).

One should further take note of the fact that the institution of Semichah ordination) was suspended, or even abolished, close to one thousand seven- hundred years ago, and as a result the notion and character of ordination underwent a radical change. From that time onwards the practice is that a learned scholar, rich in experience and accepted by his congregation, after becoming acquainted with a candidate for ordination, and examining him in one way or another, gives him a "document of ordination" (ketav hasmacha) which bears witness to his knowledge and competence in certain areas of halachah (either Orah Hayyim and Yoreh Deah – "Yoreh Yoreh", or Hoshen Mishpat and Even ha-Ezer – "Yadin Yadin"). This does not constitute a transfer of authority but rather a testimony as to the candidate's abilities and suitability to respond to questions in specific areas of halachah.

Indeed this was very clearly elucidated by Blu Greenberg, in her article in Moment, December 1992, (pp.50-53, 74), entitled "Is Now the Time for Orthodox Women Rabbis?" There she wrote:

A close look at the convention of ordination reveals that it is not the conferral of holy status nor a magical loging of hands to transmit authority. Nor does the process uniquely empower a rabbi to perform special sacramental functions that a knowledgeable layperson, cannot. Ordination is the confirmation of an individual's mastery of texts (largely from the Talmud and codes); familiarity with precedents; the ability to reason analogically and apply precedents to contemporary questions. Conferring the title "rabbi" is a guarantee to the community that this person has been judged fit by a collective of rabbis or by a single great scholar to give guidance on matters of issur v'heter, the forbidden and the permitted, primarily as it concerns the laws of kashrut, Shabbat and family purity. The smicha process assumes but does not even test for personal piety, good character or spiritual bent. The formal criteria are almost wholly intellectual."

More recently, in certain communities there have been established a series of examinations, not necessarily individually tailored, but formalized and covering a broad spectrum of halachic issues. These are offered by institutions which prepare and vet them, and then give documents of ordination which are widely accepted by their communities. Such is the case of the Israeli rabbinate and Yeshivah University in New York, etc. But, as stated above, this is a relatively modern phenomenon. Even up to the present day the traditional practice that has been in use for so many generations since the abolishment of the original semichah, has been the granting of a testimony of competence given by a rabbi who was ordained, and accepted by the community as a decisor (posek, baal horaah), to one whom he has personally examined in a detailed, systematic manner. The document specifies and defines the areas of competence. Thus the nature of such ordination and the ultimate source of authority for the ordained person is the level of competence he has demonstrated. Today, such competence is not gender limited, and may well be demonstrated and proven by women as well as by men.

Indeed, there is now an accepted institution of women who are qualified to act as pleaders in rabbinic courts (toanot rabbaniyot) and there are women advisors on halachic issues concerning niddah etc., (yoatzot hilchatiyot). The latter are, in effect, offering halachic rulings. The authority and recognition of such women is based solely on their proven competence.

Furthermore, there are additional examples of women giving piskei halachah. For the Magen Avraham in Orah Hayyim 263:5, in note 12 cites the view of the mother of the Derishah that on Yom Tov a woman should bless the candles and only afterwards light them. "And so is written at the end of Sefer ha-Derishah, by R. Yehoshua Falk (1550-1614), on Even ha-Ezer (in the Derishah's son's introduction), in the name of his mother, (i.e. the Derishah's wife, Baila). It is true that the Magen Avraham rejects this ruling, adding that "there is no wisdom in a woman [except regarding the spindle]" (Y. Sotah 3:3 B. Yoma 66b), ruling that Shabbat and Yom Tov candles should be lit in on identical fashion, however, that same son, R. Yosef Yuzpa Falk accepts her ruling, adding '"and her counsel is blessed and her reason is excellent, and I decided to print this in a book in her name, and shouts of beautiful beautiful to her'", (Zechariah 4:7; preface to Tur Yoreh Deah, Lublin 1596, nowadays printed at the beginning of Tur Orah Hayyim). So too, R. Yehezkel Landau, in his Dagul Mi-Revavah to Orah Hayyim 263, accepted her ruling, adding "she is a woman who excelled in wisdom" (Cf. Exodus 35:26; see Golinkin ibid. pp.288-289, 301-302, and see ibid. for additional examples.)

These are but some of the women listed by Ashkenazi. It should be noted that already in 1942 Shlomoh Ashkenazi had published (in Tel-Aviv) a small booklet entitled Nashim Lamdaniyot: (Skirah Historit). It is somewhat more extensive than the material in that section of his Ha-Ishah etc. In his concluding remarks (p.69) he wrote that we may learn from his list that there were Jewish woman "who were learned, and with book-knowledge, who at times reached the status of Roshat yeshivah and preachers (darshaniyot) and those who gave halachic rulings (poskot sheelot). So there, are precedents for women in positions of halachic authority.

We may further add a comment by Cecil Roth in his article "Outstanding Jewish Women in Western Europe," which appeared in R. Leo Jung's anthology, Women: The Jewish Library", London and New York 1970, note 2 to pp.152-153. He writes as follows:

In this connection, the present writer may be excused for mentioning a family legend relating to his grandmother, Miriam, daughter of Rabbi Joseph Lissa and wife of Rabbi David Roth. It is recounted that on one occasion, when she was a girl, a dispute arose in the Bet Hamidrash, and she was asked to go fetch her father, the rabbi of the town, to decide it. She replied that it was not worth while to trouble him about it, as the solution was quite simple; her explanation was afterwards confirmed by her father. Another time, she is said to have heard one of the local scholars give an inaccurate opinion about some complicated question. She told him, in all humility, that her father would not have concurred, as indeed he did not. It is obvious, from these anecdotes, that knowledge of the Talmud was no male prerogative.

Women in Positions on Communal Authority

As to the question of whether a woman can serve in position of communal authority, the view of the Ramban (Melachim 1:5) is known, forbidding women from having any position of authority. However, later authorities stated that they know no source for this opinion (Igrot Mosheh, Yoreh Deah vol.2, 44-45), and that it is "a rejected ruling "(Mishpetei Uziel vol.3, Hoshen Mishpat 6). In addition Rav Uziel wrote (in Piskei Uziel 44 p.232):

This ruling only refers to an appointment by the Sanhedrin. But when the appointment is by the consent of the community, where through a majority vote the public voices its opinions, the agreement and trust of the public in its appointees, who will be supervising their communal affairs – in such a case even the Rambam would agree that there is no hint of a prohibition [i.e. for a woman to so serve].

In other words, since the appointment of the leader of a community, be it in a position of spiritual leadership (or administrative, financial and/or political) is dependent upon the congregation's agreement, or that of their elected representatives, the authority vested in such a leader stems from the community which has the halachic right to vest its authority in its leaders.

This view may find further support from the following discussion. The Tosafot Yom Tov in his commentary to Mishnah Avot 1:10, raises the following question related to Rambam's statement (in his introduction to his commentary in the Mishnah), namely that Shemaya and Avtalion were converts and rose to be Nasi and Av Beit Din (head of the court.) But surely we have learned (Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:2 and Horayot 1:4) that converts cannot receive such appointments! His reply is that they themselves were not converts but perhaps born of a non-Jewish father and a Jewish mother (from "Kehal gerim"). However, the Hida (in his Birkei Yosef, Hoshen Mishpat 7:6; quoting R. Hayyim Benveniste [1603-1673. Chief Rbbi of Smyrna] in his Knesset ha-Gedolah) has a different solution. He asserts that "kabbalah mehania" – acceptance has legal effect, "as we have learned from Shemaya and Avtalion... In every case where the community accepts and is satisfied with an appointment, the appointee can judge even on matters of authority and enforcement (be-milei de sevarah u-kefiah)."

There is, as it were, a contract of agreement that the congregation accept the rulings of its appointee, similar to the case of court arbitration, borerut. And when a great and accepted authority appoints an individual to such a position of leadership, the community assents to such appointment.

Moreover, we see that R. Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, YorehDeah vol.4, sect.24.) states that a woman is in no way prohibited from accepting a position of authority. Indeed, he permitted a woman to serve as a kashrut supervisor, even though this is a position of communal authority and can have serious financial implications, should she, for example, annul a kashrut certificate from a given institution, as R. Mosheh explicitly states. (Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah vol.2, 44).

Rav Herzog went even further (Tekumah le-Yisrael al-pi ha-Torah, vol.1, Jerusalem 1989, ibid. p.111), stating that the women of our generation, especially those who have been put foreward as candidates for parliament, have a very broad education, and are successful in business, run charitable institutions etc. Accordingly, are surely fit to serve in leadership positions in the community, even as members of parliament. And, he argues, the Rambam would agree with this, and his remarks were made given the cultural state of women in his time. (Cf. above note 29) And as to the acceptance of women on the part of a congregation, as judges as opposed to their nomination-- see his, albeit reserved, view ibid. pp.43-46, where he finally agrees that it is permitted (p.45).

And this indeed is what the Sefer ha-Hinuch says (Mitzvah 77) says. For after bringing the Rambam's position, and raising the question of Devorah the. prophetess, he first gives the answer offered by earlier authorities, namely that she did not give the final ruling, but:

they would discuss with her matters of issur ve-heter and dinim, and therefore it was said that "she judged Israel".

He then continues to offer a second alternative solution namely that:

since the leaders of Israel accepted her authority, for with acceptance (kabbalah) everyone is certainly fit to give rulings, since on conditions regarding monetary issues (tenai she-be-mammon) everyone's ruling has validity. However, all that I have stated that they do not judge, is only according to some of the Aharonim and the Yerushalmi (Sanhedrin 3:9), where this is explicitly stated. However, according to some of the commentators they may judge.

R. Hayyim David ha-Levi, in his Asei le-cha Rav, vol.8, Tel-Aviv 1988, cites the Hinuch and adds that there may be an indication in Ecclesiates Rabba (to Eccles 2:8) a text we have already referred to above, that there were women judges. For this Midrash (also found in Yalkut Shimoni Ecclesiastes 968), explains the verse "..I made men singers and women singers , shiddah ve-shiddot" which latter words the homilist explains as "dayyanim zecharim ve-dayyanot nekeivot", male and female judges.

And should one suggest that a woman's serving in a central position of authority in a community, and especially in the synagogue constitutes a breach of modesty, (as indeed does R. Yaakov Ariel, in his Halachah be-Yameinu: Morashtah, Limmudah, Horaatah ve-Yissumah, Ashkelon- Jerusalem 2010, p.190, although he agrees that in principle women may serve in leadership positions), and perhaps even involves the prohibition against "the voice of a woman being unchaste", Rav Uziel already determined (Piskei Uziel 44):

It is common sense that in any serious meeting and meaningful conversation there is no question of lack of modesty.... And sitting in the proximity [of women] when involved in communal affairs, which is work of holiness, does not lead to lightheartedness, (i.e. immodesty). For all Israel are holy people, and her women are holy, and are not to be suspect of breach of modesty and morality.

Moreover, latter day authorities stated that wherever the awe of the Shechinah is present, we need not concern oneself with this rule, (R. Zvi Elimelech of Dinov, Bnei Yisaschar, [Zolkiev-Lvov 1846] Kislev-Tevet 4, 123, in the name of the Hida [Rosh David , Mantua 1776], 56d. Be-Shalah.

See further Sefer Yad Sofer, by R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer, (in his Kenesset Hayyim Jerusalem 1993), p.54, who quotes the Hida in his Rosh David (Parshat Be-Shalah 54:4), who wrote:

When we pay attention to the song the the prophetess Miriam sang with all the women following her, and surely we hold that a woman's voice is ervah – unchaste, and how could this have taken place in such a holy situation! And early authorities answered in accordance with that which is found in B. Nidah 14 [read 13a] that where there is fear of the Shehinah (beiatuta de-Shehinta) there is no suspicion of sexual distraction, and here at the Red Sea surely the fear of the Divine Presence hovered over them, and hence there was no chance that this would lead to suspicion of inchastity. Hence, it was completely acceptable for the women to sing. This is what he stated. Such are the words of the Hida.

Furthermore, in Hemed le-Mareh (by R. Nissim Avraham Raphael Ashkenazi, Zeraim, Saloniki 1732) to Y. Halah 180a, we read that concerning a woman's carrying out a verbal mitzvah for an individual, there is an issue of kol be-ishah; but when she does so for a congregation (rabim), one does not raise this issue, because of the "fear of the Shehinah".

Further proof for this position may surely be inferred from the passage in Torat Kohanim to Leviticus 7:2 (Tzav 5:3), where it is stated that the sacrifice of the asham (sin) offering may be carried out by women. (So too, ibid. Nedavah 4:2; and cf. M. Zerahim 3:1, B. Zerahim 31b-32a.) And we learn = from that passage in Torat Kohanim that the sacrifice of the asham, as well as that of the hatat, was offered at the north of the altar, i.e. in the innermost sanctum of the temple itself. And women were also allowed semichah, that is to say the placing of the hands upon their sacrifice. So their presence in the inner sanctum of the Temple was completely permissible, and apparently, there was no fear of a breach of modesty.

To the above we may add the ruling of the Rema in Even ha-Ezer 21:5, that:

There are those who say that any such actions that are not carried out as form of affection (derech hibah) but for the sake of heaven, are permitted, and therefore they ruled leniently in such matters (referring to Tosafot Kiddushin 82a.)

And furthermore, the Sdei Hemed (Maarechet kof, klal mem-beit) cites the view that wherever the singing is not songs of lust (shirei agavim, i.e. sexually provocative ones), and the listeners do not intend to enjoy [the femininity of her voice, when she intones songs of praise to God, the issue of kol ishah is not relevant.

All the above surely applies to women leading (parts of) the service in the synagogue.

This may also be deduced from the straightforward reading of the beraita in Megillah 23a; and R. Ovadia Yosef. (Yehaveh Daat vol.4 Jerusalem 1981. sect.15 ad fin, and his note on p.78), as well as Rav Herzog, (ibid. p.98), write that they see no problem concerning matters of immodesty, for "surely women appear in our law courts.... and we have never heard that anyone has cast doubt on such behaviour. And if we were to take such a stringent position, life would no longer be liveable".

In actual fact, the issue of modesty is largely irrelevant. For R. Yehuda Henkin, in his Understanding Tzniut: Modern Controversies in the Jewish Community, Jerusalem New York 2008, pp.72-84, has convincingly demonstrated that because we are so used to seeing women in a broad variety of roles and situations, this no longer causes sexual distraction – hirhur. Thus, for example, among the several sources he cites, we read that the Levush, at the end of his Minhagim stated that:

We do not take care about [avoiding] mixed seating, because nowadays women are very common among men, and there are relatively few sinful thoughts about them... (ibid. 81-82).

Indeed, this was the basis of R. Yosef Messas' remarkable ruling permitting married women to appear in public without hair covering. At the end of his responsum he writes:

It is certainly understood... that since nowadays all women uncover all their hair... this being so usual it is not considered immodesty (peritzut)...., and any man is personally aware that in seeing thousands of women day by day passing before him with an uncovered head, he does not even notice them, and certainly has not hirhur, for uncovered hair [no longer] excites sexual distraction. (Otzar ha-Michtavim no.1484, vol.3, Jerusalem 1975, p.211).

More recently, R. Mosheh Lichtenstein, in his article entitled Shirat Nashim le-Lo Kiruv ha-Daat, Tehumin 32, 2002, pp.291-299, reached much the same conclusion with regard to listening to a woman's singing, that where there is no likelihood of sexual distraction (hashash hirhur) there is no reason to forbid it, and in the reality of our social situation, this indeed is the case.

To summarise: from the time of our ancestral mothers, - such as Sarah, Yael, Deborah the Prophetess, Beruriah the wife of R. Meir, Yalta the wife or Rav Nahman - there were learned women who dealt in halachah, and gave halachic rulings. See, for example, Teshuvot Maimoniyot to Maachalot Asurot 5; Tosafot Shabbat 111 b; Raviah, Evel sect. 841; Or Zarua vol.2, 256; Responsa R. Hayyim Or Zarua 101, 146, etc. Madame Bailah the wife of the Sma, was famous and was described by his son, R. Yosef Jospe ha-Cohen (in his introduction to the Derasha on Tur Yoreh Deah part 2) as being learned. R. Avraham Gombiner, (the Magen Avraham) disagreed with two of her hiddushim, but R. Yehezkel Landau wrote of her "that in my humble opinion the law is according to his mother.... And so would I rule like the wife of the Gaon the Derishah, who is a lady whose heart rises up in wisdom."

There is even a tradition brought by R. David Conforte, in his Koreh ha-Dorot, (Venice 1746, 25b, Jerusalem 2008, p.93) that "a wise woman wrote " the anonymous Kol Bo, a famous mediaeval book of halachah, (though he himself, probably quite rightly, rejects this attribution).

Here it is interesting to take note of a most unusual comment of R. Efraim Shlomoh Luntshitz (Lenczyca, Poland 1550-1619), in his Klei Yakar to Numbers 13:2, "Send thou men, [that they may search the Land of Canaan which I give unto the children of Israel, of every tribe of their fathers shall ye send a man, every one a ruler among them].."

For the Sages said that they hated the Land of Israel, and said, "Let us make a captain, and let us return to Egypt" (Numbers 14:4), while the women loved the Land, and said [i.e. the daughters of Tzelofhad]" Give unto us therefore a possession among the brethren of our father" (ibid. 27:4). Therefore, the Holy One blessed be He said, "In my opinion, seeing the future, it would have been better to send women who love the Land [to spy it out], for they would not speak badly of it. But you [Moses] think these people are suitable, so send them". And from these words one could conclude that women could serve in public positions of authority.

It is true that this interpretation of the Klei Yakar was rejected by R. Eliyah Katz, in his Beer Yaakov (vol.3, Jerusalem 2003, no.15, p.32); however, whether his refutation be correct or not, clearly R. Efraim Luntshits saw a place for women in public leadership positions, and sought to find some source in the canonic texts.

In conclusion: From the above sources, the Tosafot in Nidah, the Ran in Shevuot, the Rashba and the Ritba to Bava Kama, the Sefer ha-Hinuch, the Hida in Birkei Yosef, and a number of latter-day authorities, it emerges that "a wise woman", a God-fearing one, who studied Torah intensively and halachah systematically in depth and in breadth from truly learned scholars, and who was examined by them and/or by an experienced rabbi, and who gained practical experience in the areas of halachah by being in constant contact with true authorities – shimush -,she is certainly worthy to be crowned with the crown of Torah, and rightly to be considered eligible to give halachic responses and practical ruling, in those areas in which she was examined and found competent. And may the Lord guard over her that she make no error, and lead no one astray, but guide her congregation along the pathway of Torah and the fear of God.