BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
The Torah states that the daughter of a cohen who marries a non-cohen can no longer eat the sacred priestly food that her father receives as mitzvah-gifts from the people. (Cohanim in ancient Israel did not possess their own land to grow crops.) That food is called terumah, a word for "offering." However, if her husband dies, she can return to her parents' house and resume eating terumah--but only if she had no child from the marriage (see Lev 22:12-13). The text below is dealing with the halachic question of whether a fetus also disqualifies a widow from eating her father's terumah, and at what point in the pregnancy this takes effect.
וְהָתַנְיָא:
בַּת כֹּהֵן שֶׁנִּישֵּׂאת לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, וָמֵת — טוֹבֶלֶת, וְאוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה לְעָרֵב!
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: טוֹבֶלֶת וְאוֹכֶלֶת עַד אַרְבָּעִים, דְּאִי לָא מִיעַבְּרָא — הָא לָא מִיעַבְּרָא, וְאִי מִיעַבְּרָא — עַד אַרְבָּעִים מַיָּא בְּעָלְמָא הִיא.
But it is taught in a baraita:
The daughter of a cohen who married a [regular] Jew, and he died [a short time after the marriage was consummated]—she may immerse in a mikveh [to purify herself] and then eat terumah [priestly food] that evening.
Rav Ḥisda said: She may immerse in a mikveh and then eat terumah [but only] up to forty days [from her husband’s death]. For if she did not get pregnant [from the intercourse following marriage], then she is not pregnant [while eating terumah during that whole period]. And if she did get pregnant, up to forty days it is merely water.
Study Questions on Yevamot 69b
1. How do you understand the meaning of the clause, "it is merely water"?
2. Summarize the position of this source in your own words: Why is it permitted for a woman who might have gotten pregnant shortly after her wedding (and was then tragically widowed) to keep eating terumah for another 39 days?
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
The Torah states that if a thief steals an animal and then proceeds to sell or slaughter it, they have to pay a penalty of four or fives times the value of that animal, if they're caught (see Exod 21:37). The Talmud determines that this special penalty only applies if the thief sold the animal 100%, and did not retain ownership of it in any meaningful way. Rabbi Jeremiah here is exploring the boundaries of this law by bringing up possible situations where the thief attempted to hold onto the animal in an unusual way. Try not to be thrown off by the structure of the Talmudic analysis (starting with "Concerning the last case"): Two theories are discussed about the relationship between a fetus-calf and its mother. And for the second theory there are still two different ways to look at the situation.
בעי רבי ירמיה
מכרה חוץ משלשים יום
חוץ ממלאכתה
חוץ מעוברה
מהו
אליבא דמאן דאמר עובר ירך אמו הוא לא תבעי לך דהא שייר בה
כי תבעי לך אליבא דמאן דאמר דעובר לאו ירך אמו
מאי
מימר אמרינן כיון דמחובר בה הוי שיור
או דלמא כיון דלמפרש מינה קאי לא הוי שיור....
תיקו:
Rabbi Jeremiah raised [three] questions [about the laws of penalizing a thief who sold an animal that he had stolen]:
If he sold it, except [he specified that the sale wouldn't take effect] for thirty days;
Or if he sold it, except for its labor [i.e., if the buyer keeps the animal alive, the value of its work would belong to the thief];
Or if he sold it, except for its fetus [over which he retained ownership]—
[In such cases] what is the halakhah?
[Concerning the last case:] According to the Rabbinic opinion that a fetus is [considered] a limb of its mother, you should not have any question, for in fact he has retained part of her [i.e., the mother cow, and so he doesn't have to pay the special, larger penalty].
When you should have a question is according to the Rabbinic opinion that a fetus is not [considered] a limb of its mother.
So what is the halakha in that case [and according to the second theory about a fetus-calf]?
Should we say that since it is [still] attached to her, this is a way of retaining [partial] ownership [over the stolen cow], or perhaps, since it is going to separate from her [when born], this is not a way of retaining [any] ownership?....
The question stands unresolved.
Study Questions on Bava Kamma 78b
1. According to this source, if a fetus-calf is not officially considered part of its mother, what might still make us think that keeping the fetus is a form of keeping the mother?
2. Which of the two theories about the relationship between a fetus-calf and its mother makes more sense to you and why?
3. In your personal opinion, is a text like this--dealing with animals and the laws of theft--something that we could apply and extrapolate from when thinking about Jewish Law as it concerns abortion in human women? Defend your opinion.
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
In a number of settings, Judaism makes use of a ritual bath known as a mikveh. Today, it is primarily used for two purposes: (a) Women who observe the laws of niddah which regulate sexual relations between couples immerse themselves monthly; and (b) Converts to Judaism traditionally immerse in a mikveh as part of their formal acceptance of Torah and mitzvot. Normally, a person immerses in a mikveh naked, with nothing separating their body from the water. (Women in our time who frequent the mikveh don't even wear nail polish.) This text asks about the religious condition of a fetus whose mother has converted using a mikveh.
דְּאָמַר רָבָא: גּוֹיָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת שֶׁנִּתְגַּיְּירָה — בְּנָהּ אֵין צָרִיךְ טְבִילָה, אַמַּאי אֵין צָרִיךְ טְבִילָה?
וְכִי תֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה, רוּבּוֹ וּמַקְפִּיד עָלָיו — חוֹצֵץ, רוּבּוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַקְפִּיד עָלָיו — אֵינוֹ חוֹצֵץ.
וְהָא אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא רוּבּוֹ, אֲבָל כּוּלּוֹ — חוֹצֵץ!
שָׁאנֵי עוּבָּר, דְּהַיְינוּ רְבִיתֵיהּ.
Rava said: A pregnant gentile who converted [to become Jewish], her child [when born later] does not require immersion in a mikveh [to also be Jewish]. But why doesn't the child require [a separate] immersion?
You might argue it's because of a teaching by Rabbi Yitzḥak, for Rabbi Yitzḥak said: According to Torah law, if the majority [of one's body is covered during immersion], and it is something he would want removed, the covering is considered to interfere [with the immersion]. But if the majority [of the person is covered], and it is something he does not care whether it is removed, it is not considered to interfere.
However, Rav Kahana said: They [those Tanna'im, led by Rabbi Yitzḥak] only taught this concerning the majority [of the person's body], but if it is their whole body, it is considered to interfere [regardless of one's attitude toward the covering].
A fetus is different, since this is its natural position.
Study Questions on Yevamot 78a
1. Why might one assume (before studying this text) that a fetus would need to immerse after birth in order to become Jewish?
2. How does Rabbi Yitzḥak's teaching seem to help explain why the born child does not need another immersion? Be as precise as you can.
3. Explain how Rav Kahana presents a problem for making use of Rabbi Yitzḥak's teaching in our fetus case.
4. What do you think the last line of this text saying? Why isn't Rav Kahana's comment actually a problem for Rava's original halakhah?
5. In your opinion and interpretation, does this source suggest more that a fetus is an intrinsic part of its mother, or that a fetus is a separate entity of its own? State the reasons and logic behind your opinion. You may also give arguments for both interpretations, if you want.
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Chapter 5 of the Mishnah tractate called "Niddah" explains a number of laws which take effect immediately after a child is born, or at another very young age. It is one Jewish text, among others, that draws a legal line between pre-birth and post-birth. Ikar Tosafot Yom Tov (based on the Talmud) makes that line explicit in terms of the punishment for murder. Rambam (Maimonides) summarizes the Rabbinic concept that even after birth there can be a sense in which a born child is not a full-fledged human being--at least for certain ritual purposes.
תִּינוֹק בֶּן יוֹם אֶחָד...הַהוֹרְגוֹ, חַיָּב. וַהֲרֵי הוּא לְאָבִיו וּלְאִמּוֹ וּלְכָל קְרוֹבָיו כְּחָתָן שָׁלֵם:
A child who is one day old...a person who kills them is guilty [of murder] and, in fact, to his father and mother and all his [close] relatives, he is like a groom just married [when it comes to the laws of mourning].
חייב.
אבל עובר לא:
"Guilty [of murder]":
But not for a fetus.
ואמרו כחתן שלם ר"ל שיחוייב להתאבל עליו ובתנאי שיהיה אצלם התאמתות שנולד לתשעה חדשים שלמים אמנם אם לא יתאמת לאביו ולאמו זה הנה לא יחוייבו להתאבל עליו עד שישלמו לו שלשים יום לפי שהעיקר אצלינו כל שלא שהה שלשים יום באדם הרי זה נפל [אלא] אם כלו חדשיו כמו שבארנו אפילו מת ביום שלשים עצמו אינו מחוייב להתאבל עליו:
And they said [in the Mishnah], "like a groom just married," i.e., in the sense that they [the close relatives] are obligated to mourn for him [using the rituals of Jewish law]. But this is on the condition that it is clear to them that the child was born after nine full months. However, if this is not clear to the father and mother, then they are not obligated to mourn for the child [unless the child lived] until 30 days had passed, since we hold by the principle that any human child who does not survive 30 days is [legally] considered a [type of] miscarriage, unless he has completed his [full number of gestational] months, as we explained.
Study Questions on Mishnah Niddah 5:3, Ikar Tosafot Yom Tov, and Rambam
1. Overall, what is the Mishnah (and Ikar Tosafot Yom Tov) saying about the legal significance of birth in Jewish Law?
2. Why do you think this Mishnah compares a new infant who has died to a newly married man who has died? (Keep in mind that the Mishnah could have just said, "like an adult.")
3. If you were a lawyer who was defending someone accused of killing a one-week old baby (in a court run according to Jewish Law), do you believe it could be a good strategy to question whether the baby had been born prematurely? Explain your thoughts.