השואל כלי מחבירו מערב יום טוב. פשיטא – לא. צריכא, שלא מסרו לו אלא ביום טוב. מהו דתימא: לאו ברשותיה אוקמיה, קא משמע לן. מסייע ליה לרבי יוחנן, דאמר רבי יוחנן: השואל כלי מחבירו מערב יום טוב, אף על פי שלא נתנו לו אלא ביום טוב, הרי הוא כרגלי השואל. ביום טוב כרגלי המשאיל. פשיטא – לא. צריכא דרגיל ושאיל מיניה. מהו דתימא: ברשותיה קא מוקים ליה, קא משמע לן. מימר אמר: דלמא משכח איניש אחרינא, ואזיל ושאיל מיניה. וכן האשה ששאלה מחברתה. כי סליק רבי אבא אמר: יהא רעוא דאימא מלתא דתתקבל. כי סליק אשכחיה לרבי יוחנן ורבי חנינא בר פפי ורבי זירא, ואמרי לה רבי אבהו ורבי שמעון בן פזי ורבי יצחק נפחא, ויתבי וקאמרי: אמאי? ולבטיל מים ומלח לגבי עיסה [...]
וטעמא מאי? אביי אמר: גזרה, שמא תעשה עיסה בשותפות, רבא אמר: תבלין לטעמא עבידי, וטעמא לא בטיל. ורב אשי אמר: משום דהוי ליה דבר שיש לו מתירין, וכל דבר שיש לו מתירין, אפילו באלף לא בטיל. רבי יהודה פוטר במים. מים, אין. מלח, לא. והא תניא: רבי יהודה אומר: מים ומלח בטלין בין בעיסה בין בקדרה. לא קשיא, הא. במלח סדומית, הא, במלח אסתרוקנית. והתניא: רבי יהודה אומר: מים ומלח בטלין בעיסה ואין בטלין בקדרה, מפני רוטבה. לא קשיא. הא, בעבה, הא, ברכה.
[1][If] one borrows a utensil from his friend on the eve of a festival day, [it is accorded a tehum like that of the feet of the borrower]. This is obvious. No. This [ruling] is necessary [in a case] where [the lender] did not hand it over to [the borrower] until the festival day [began]. You might have said that [the lender therefore] did not assign it to [the borrower’s] possession. [The Mishnah therefore] informs us [that since s/he agreed before the festival to lend him/her the utensil, s/he also designates it to his/her possession and his/her tehum]. This supports [a ruling of] Rabbi Yohanan. For Rabbi Yohanan said: [If] one borrows a utensil from his/her friend on the eve of a festival day, even though s/he did not [actually] give it to him/her until the festival day [began], it is [accorded a tehum] like [that of] the feet of the borrower. [If s/he borrowed the utensil] on a festival day, it is [accorded a tehum] like [that of] the feet of the lender. This is obvious. No. This [ruling] is necessary [in a case] where s/he is in the habit of borrowing from him/her. You might have said that [the lender therefore] assigned it to the possession [and tehum] of [the borrower before a festival, since s/he anticipated it being borrowed during a festival]. [The Mishnah therefore] informs us [that this is not so, because the lender] says [to him/herself that since his/her friend did not yet ask to borrow it], perhaps [the borrower] will find someone else and will go and borrow from him. And so, too, a woman who borrowed from her female friend [condiments for her cooking, or water and salt for her dough on a festival day, these are restricted to the tehum common to both women]. [The gemara relates a discussion which took place regarding this ruling:] When Rabbi Abba went up [from Babylonia to the Land of Israel] he said: May it be the will [of God] that I say something that will be accepted. When he came up [to the Land of Israel] he found Rabbi Yohanan, Rabbi Hanina bar Pappi and Rabbi Zeira, and others say Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Shime‘on ben Pazi and Rabbi Yitshaq Nafha and they were sitting and saying: Why [should the dough be restricted to the tehum common to both of them?] Let the water and salt become nullified in the dough [...]
So what is the reason [that the lesser ingredients are not nullified in the mixture]? Abbayye said: As a decree against the possibility that she will make the dough in partnership [with another woman]. Rava says: Condiments are added for taste, and [anything added for] taste does not become nullified [in a mixture],[2] and Rav Ashi says: [The other ingredients are not nullified], because they are items that become permitted and any item that becomes permitted does not become nullified even [in a mixture of one part] in a thousand. Rabbi Yehudah exempts water. [Is it only with regard to] water [that Rabbi Yehudah] indeed [disagrees, but] not [with regard to] salt? But it was taught: Rabbi Yehudah says: Water and salt become nullified both in dough and in a pot [of food]. [This is] not a difficulty. This [baraita] refers to Sodomite salt [which is fine], whereas this [the mishnah] refers to istroqian salt [which can be noticed because it is coarser]. But it was taught: Rabbi Yehudah says: Water and salt become nullified in dough, but do not become nullified in a pot [of food]. [This is] not a difficulty. [The Mishnah] refers to thick food [in which water has been absorbed], [whereas] this [baraita] refers to soft food [in which water has not been absorbed and therefore did not lose its status].
[1] A parallel version can be found in bShab 124a.
[2] Rava does not dispute Abbayye’s answer, but adds another reason why nullification does not apply in the case of condiments. Abbayye explains why water does not become nullified in dough. Rava explains why condiments do not become nullified in dough.
אמר רבי בא: תחומין, עשו אותן כמידת הדין. תדע לך שכן, תמן אמרין בשם רב חסדא, ולא ידעין אין מן שמועה ואין מן מתנית': ואפילו עצים. וסברנן מימר עצים אין בהן ממש. רבי יודה פוטר במים, מפני שאין בהן ממש. מה נפק מביניהון?
המים. מאן דאמר: מפני שאין בהן ממש, הרי יש בהן ממש. מאן דאמר: מפני שהן נבלעין בעיסה, הרי אינן נבלעין בתבשיל.
A woman who borrowed from her female friend spice, water, or salt for her dough, these [objects] follow the status of both women].
Said Rabbi Ba [in matters affecting] tehumim, [the sages] acted in accordance with the law [so that each woman owns a share in the spice, water, or salt, with the result that the dough or bread is subject to tehum Shabbat governing each of the owners]. You may know that this is the case, for they have said there in the name of Rav Hisda, and one does not know whether [it derives from] an oral tradition, or [from a reasoning on] the Mishnah itself: And even the wood [if it is borrowed for kindling fire, imposes the status of the owner of the wood upon the bread that is baked with that wood]. And we considered that [on the contrary], wood has no substance [Yet, it clearly does]. Rabbi Yudah declares water exempt, for it is of no substance. What is the [practical] difference between these two positions? [It is the matter of] the water. He who said: It is because it is of no substance, in the case [of water] there is a matter of substance. He who said it is because [the water] is absorbed into the dough, it is not absorbed into a cooked dish [and hence would not be taken into account].
האשה ששאלה מחברתה
A woman who borrowed from her female friend. MS Göttingen reads only: האשה ששאלה (a woman who borrowed). Vatican 134 and HARL. 5508 (400) read: 'האשה כו. (the woman etc.) Vatican 109 reads:
האשה ששאלה תבלין ומים
< >
מלח לעיסתה הרי אילו כרגלי שתיהן
(a woman who borrowed condiments and water
< >
salt for her dough [on a festival day] these are like both their feet.)
The Bavli transmits the story of Rav Abba who went to the Land of Israel to ask why a different rule applies to dough than to other items. The rabbis in the Land of Israel replied that there is no difference, since the water and the salt both become “nullified” in the dough.[1] The dough could, therefore, be handled like every other item. Yet, although the Bavli states that the rabbis in the Land of Israel thought that carrying dough was similar to carrying any other item, the Bavli provides three further arguments as to why, nevertheless, the case of dough is different and, therefore, restricted to the tehum of both women together, the lender and the borrower:
1. According to Abbayye, the dough has to be treated differently in order to prevent women from working together.
2. The second reason, provided by Rava, is that because the ingredients that one woman borrows are added for taste, the nullification rule does not apply.
3. The third reason is adduced by Rav Ashi, who states that the dough can be eaten without resorting to the nullification of its prohibition. The concept of nullification, therefore, does not apply to dough.
Similarly, the Bavli transmits a statement by Abbayye that demonstrates a certain mistrust of women’s halakhic adherence or reliability. He states that the collective activities of women should be banned. That is because one may confuse the case of a woman lending water and salt with the case of two women who share things equally and make dough together. In the latter case, the dough is certainly restricted to the tehum common to both of them, since they are partners. However, a woman who had once borrowed water and salt for her dough, and who had been permitted to carry it throughout her tehum, might not realize the distinction. She might assume that she could carry the dough to her own separate tehum even if her partner owned half of it. The rabbis, therefore, decreed that the dough be restricted in all cases to the common tehum of all the owners of its ingredients.
Why did the same mistrust not also apply to men? Surely one reason is because the trustworthiness of women was, in general, questioned and had to be repeatedly denied or confirmed by the rabbis (for a discussion of the trustworthiness of women see Bavli 2/3. bBetsah 18a). But there seems to be another reason: Abbayye opposed expressis verbis the practice of women working together. The fact that women worked, baked and cooked together can be observed throughout the tractate. Therefore, one has to assume that they exchanged not just ingredients, but also knowledge and information. A women’s network was naturally much more powerful than isolated women who worked on their own. The power women gained, even against the will of the rabbis, is consistently described throughout the tractate with reference to a group of women (see, for instance, Bavli 4/1. bBetsah 30a). It is this power that, in the opinion of the rabbis, needed to be contained. Thus, the rabbis here do not only decide about the ingredients of dough. They also limit exchanges among women, as well as restricting their mobility and independence.