ההוא גברא דאמר להו: הבו ליה ארבע מאה זוזי לפלוני, ולנסיב ברתי. אמר רב פפא: ארבע מאה שקיל, וברתיה, אי בעי, נסיב, אי בעי, לא נסיב. טעמא דאמר: הבו ליה ולנסיב, אבל אי אמר: לנסיב והבו ליה, אי נסיב, שקיל, ואי לא נסיב, לא שקיל. יתיב מרימר וקאמר: להא שמעתא משמיה דנפשיה. אמר ליה רבינא למרימר: אתון הכי מתניתו לה, אנן כדבעא מיניה ריש לקיש מרבי יוחנן מתנינן לה.
If a certain man said to them: Give four hundred zuz to so-and-so and let him marry my daughter. Rav Papa said: [The] four hundred he takes, and as for his daughter, if he wishes he may marry [her], [and] if he wishes he may not marry [her]. The reason is that [the man] said: Give him and he shall marry; but if he had said: Let him marry and give him, [then] if he marries [her], he receives [the money]; but if he does not marry [her], he does not receive [it]. Meremar was sitting and stated this ruling in his own name. Said Ravina to Marimar: You are teaching this thus, [but] we teach it as a question directed by Resh Laqish to Rabbi Yohanan.
@General observations
Usually, any transfer of ownership requires a formal act of acquisition. Yet, oral instructions are, under certain circumstances, deemed to be valid as formal acts of acquisition. bBM 147b, for instance, says that someone who is ill, and may soon die, is permitted to issue oral instructions which are considered binding. In the above-cited passage the acquisition of a woman through marriage is based upon a verbal declaration and a monetary transaction. No reason is given why, in this particular case, a verbal declaration suffices. Instead, the text emphasizes that, if the father wishes someone to marry his daughter, he has to make it verbally clear that the monetary provision depends upon the recipient’s agreement to marry her. The recipient, therefore, will only be paid the promised sum once he marries the daughter. If this paternal condition is not made clear to the recipient by the time the money is handed over to him, he has the option to marry the daughter or not, as he wishes. This ruling was explained by the Babylonian Marimar as his own teaching but others rebuked him as not having transmitted it in the name of its rightful authors, the amoraim of the Land of Israel, Resh Laqish and Rabbi Yohanan.
@Feminist observations
אמר רבא:
תן מנה לפלוני ואקדש לך, מקודשת [...]
מנה והתקדשי לפלוני, מקודשת [...]
תן מנה לפלוני ואקדש אני לו, מקודשת [...]
מנה ואקדש אני לך, [...] מקודשת [...]
Rava said:
[If a woman says to a man] give a portion [100 zuz] to so-and-so, and I will become betrothed to you, she is betrothed [if he does so] [...]
[If a man says to a woman] here is a portion [100 zuz] and be betrothed to so-and-so, she is betrothed [if she accepts it] [...]
[If a woman says to a man] give a portion [100 zuz] to so-and-so and I will become betrothed to as him, she is betrothed [if he does so and the designated husband accepts it] [...]
[If a woman says]: Here is a portion [100 zuz] and I will be betrothed to you, she is betrothed [...]
These are four different cases reported about valid betrothals. Three of them involve three parties: A woman, a man and a third party; the last case refers to a valid betrothal between a woman and a man, without a third party. In all cases, women are part of the negotiations.
To these Tractate Betsah adds a fifth case: Two men negotiate a betrothal, but the woman is completely absent. The woman’s absence in this story fits into another one, recorded in the Bavli, about the possible teacher of the ruling in bBets 20a: Rabbi Yohanan, who offered his sister to Resh Laqish in return for Resh Laqish’s promise to learn Torah (bBM 84a). The approving consent of his sister was not necessary for this negotiation. Likewise, many stories in the Bavli emphasize the father’s right to arrange his daughter’s marriage. He may betroth his minor daughter and collect her betrothal benefits.[1]
Indeed, Massekhet Betsah here underlines the fact that can be observed throughout rabbinic literature, namely that betrothal and marriage were a commercial transaction between the bride’s father and her future husband.[2] In general, the rabbis thought of marriage as a religious duty, desired by God himself. The example here demonstrates that whereas the rabbis elevated themselves to be the legal heirs and representatives of God’s will on earth, equipped with the ultimate authority over marriage and betrothal, women were demeaned by being defined as the property of men and by being denied participation in their own marriage negotiations.