Talmud Commentary: Bavli 2/3. bSukkah 25a (mSukkah 2:4)

@Manuscript evidence

All the MSS have אמר רב פפא (Rav Papa) instead of אמר רב הונא (Rav Huna).

@General observations

The feminist implications of mSuk 2:4 were discussed in depth with relation to the exemption of women from dwelling in the sukkah.[1] Therefore, at present, I will only briefly compare the mishnah to the parallel Tosefta (tSuk 2:1-2) and associated it to the following talmudic sugya. The Tosefta reveals an ambivalent attitude towards the abovementioned categorical halakhah. It restricts a person from leaving his home during the festival, even for a religious errand, while it broadens the category of invalids and their attendants (who are exempt from the obligation of sukkah) to include those suffering from a temporary pain, such as a headache or a pain in the eye. In order to substantiate this claim, the Tosefta relates how certain important sages also used such illnesses to justify their exemption from the obligation of sukkah.

This exemption is now tied to the sugya, exempting a man occupied with a religious duty from the obligation of reciting the Shema, including a bridegroom. This sugya is also reiterated twice in bBerakhot (11a and 16a). The gemara ascertains that the source for this exemption is a baraita based on Deut 6:7 instructing a person on how to recite the Shema: “Recite them when you sit in your house and when you walk by the way […].”[2] The baraita deduces that “when you sit in your house” refers to everyone, except a man who is occupied with a religious duty, while “when you walk by the way” refers to everyone except a bridegroom. According to Rav Huna, “when you walk by the way” refers to a routine act such as walking to one’s place of work or trade, etc. but not to the atypical act of a bridegroom walking on the way to perform a religious duty. Challenging this line of reasoning, the gemara responds that it is rather the declension “you” (rather than the words “sit” and “walk”) that indicates that when one sits or walks for one’s own needs, one is obligated to recite the Shema, but when it is in order to perform a commandment then one is exempt.[3]

The next issue concerns marriage and exemption from religious obligations. We are informed that a bridegroom of a virgin is exempt from reciting the Shema but not one who marries a widow. Since both are considered a religious duty, why does the the baraita differentiate between the marriage to a virgin and the marriage to a widow? The gemara resolves this apparent internal contradiction by explaining that the bridegroom of a virgin is exceedingly agitated by sexual thoughts while one who marries a widow is not (perhaps because he trusts her previous sexual experience). Consequently, the gemara concludes that only one who marries a virgin is exempt from religious obligations. Such a conclusion contradicts Rabbi Abba bar Zivda’s statement in the name of Rav that a mourner, who is also in a state of extreme agitation, is nevertheless obligated to perform all biblical religious commandments except donning tefillin, which must be observed with splendor. The gemara resolves this contradiction by explaining that a bridegroom and a mourner are in different emotional states. The former is anxious about the upcoming religious obligation of sexual intercourse while the latter is concerned with his bereavement, which is personal, and does not entail the fulfillment of a commandment.

The following difficulties indicate that the stama has fashioned a contrived argument in order to reinforce the distinction between the bridegroom of a virgin and that of a widow:

1. Rav Huna/Papa learns that a man occupied with a religious duty is exempt from reciting the Shema from the word “way” (דרך) while the gemara deduces it from “when you walk” (בלכתך).

2. The phrase “If so, should not even the man who marries a widow be exempt?” refers to the gemara’s line of reasoning concerning “when you sit” and “when you go.” However this question should be asked of Rav Huna/Papa’s statement, exempting anyone who is on the way from reciting the Shema.

3. Yet in light of the distinction the stama makes between an emotionally charged marriaged to a virgin and an unemotionally one to a widow, the contradiction between the emotional state of a bridegroom and mourner, though quite different, is illogical.

@Feminist observations

The questions how and why the words בלכתך בדרך were interpreted so as to free the bridegroom from the religious obligation are important for a feminist understanding of this issue. Rashi states that the exemption of a bridegroom could have been learned from the general exemption of people occupied with religious obligations, based on the words “when you sit in your house” (בשבתך בביתך). Still, in all other cases, people are actually performing religious obligations when at home while a bridegroom, at home before the wedding, is only contemplating such a duty. Therefore the specific case of a bridegroom is cited, since one might mistakenly think that he is not included in the exemption of those performing a religious duty.

Ritba holds the same opinion as Rashi. He states that a bridegroom who is occupied with his forthcoming marriage belongs to the same class as others who are engaged in performing religious obligations. The words בשבתך בביתך (when you sit in your house) establish that a bridegroom, who is considered as engaged in performing a commandment, is exempt. The addition of the words בלכתך בדרך (when you walk by the way) are required in order to demonstrate that a separate exemption exists for the bridegroom who is preoccupied with thoughts of marriage and is only on his way to or returning from performing this religious obligation. Consequently, both בשבתך בביתך and בלכתך בדרך are included in Deut 6; otherwise one might think that such an exemption only applies to someone who is actually performing a religious duty, such as attending a funeral or going on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Thus, Ritba broadens the significance of a bridegroom’s preoccupation with his religious duty and the consequent exemption. A bridegroom is exempt both from reciting the Shema and from residing in the sukkah, whether he is occupied with the commandment or going to/returning from doing it. This interpretation corresponds with Rabbi Abba bar Zivda’s statement that a bridegroom and his attendants are exempt from the commandment of sukkah for seven days (חתן והשושבינין וכל בני החופה פטורין מן הסוכה כל שבעה ), as discussed in the next tradition (Bavli 2/4. bSuk 25b-26a).

I believe that this explanation is rather forced. A bridegroom usually sits at home and the words בשבתך בביתך are more appropriate for such a situation than the words בלכתך בדרך . Thus, my inclination is toward the explanation of this sugya as suggested by the Tosfot. The Tosfot question Rashi’s interpretation and present another version of the baraita, which they claim is found in bBer 11a:[1]

Based on this reading, they claim that one might interpret בשבתך בביתך (when you sit in your house) as relating to the bridegroom alone, and therefore בלכתך בדרך (when you walk by the way) was added in order to exclude others who are engaged in performing religious obligations, and who we might not have realized that they are also exempt.

From our sugya it is clear that the author views marriage to a virgin very differently from the way he views marriage to a widow.

@Marriage to a Widow or a Virgin

According to mKet 1:1, the marriage of a widow differs from the marriage of a virgin on two points:

1. The wedding of a virgin takes place on Wednesday while a widow’s is on Thursday.
2. The amount designated for a virgin in her ketubbah (marriage contract) is 200 zuz while for a widow it is 100 zuz.

The mishnah explains that a virgin’s marriage takes place on Wednesday so that if her husband wishes to bring a non-virginity charge to the court (bet din) he will be on time, since the bet din convenes on Thursday. The Tosefta (tKet 1:1 and see also yKet 1:1, 25a and bKet 5a) explains that a widow’s marriage takes place on Thursday and the marriage is consummated on Friday night so that her husband can be happy with her for three days – Thursday, Friday evening (erev Shabbat) and Shabbat.

Two reasons may account for these differences:

1. The usual interpretation is that a widow is not a virgin and therefore her husband cannot request to cancel the marriage due to a lack of virginity. Because virginity is an asset, the amount offered for a wife who is not a virgin is less than for a virgin.[1] This is of course a male perspective.
2. However, from a feminist perspective, I note that the marriage of a widow combines sorrow for the death of her first husband with the happiness of her new marriage. Therefore, one could alternatively assume that it is for this reason that it is not celebrated in the same joyous manner as that of a virgin.

The gemara also cites another difference between the marriage of a virgin and that of a widow: אלמנה לית לה כיסני (bKet 17b). In other words, roasted grain[2] is not distributed at a widow’s marriage. The sugya in bKetubbot explains that the purpose of the distribution of these delicacies to the public is to ensure that they remember the wedding as one of a virgin, and can later serve as witnesses to this.

In spite of the above, there are certain similarities between the two marriages. Both women are forbidden to their husbands until a blessing is recited,[3] and the husband is required to gladden his wife (though only for three days for a widow as opposed to a whole week for a virgin).