Talmud Commentary: Bavli 2/2. bSukkah 23a-24b (mSukkah 2:3)

@General observations

bSuk 23a: The mishnah determines that a sukkah made on the top of a wagon or on the deck of a ship is valid and that one may enter it on the festival. If a person made it on the top of the tree, or on the back of a camel, it is valid at the outset on the intermediate days of Sukkot but a person is prohibited from climbing into it on the festival itself, since one may not use a tree or animal on a festival (mBets 5:2).

In the beginning of the sugya this mishnah is attributed to Rabbi Me’ir, based on a baraita unattested elsewhere: “If he makes his sukkah on the back of an animal, Rabbi Me’ir declares it valid and Rabbi Yehudah invalid.” The continuation of the gemara explains why Rabbi Yehudah invalidates such a sukkah while Rabbi Meir views it as valid. In this context, the gemara cites a baraita from bEruv 44a wherein the two sages dispute whether an animal can be used as a wall of a sukkah. Rabbi Meir invalidates it while Rabbi Yehudah considers it valid. In order to understand Rabbi Me’ir’s reasoning, the gemara links his statement in this baraita with yet another baraita from bEruv 15b: “Whatever contains the breath of life can neither be made a wall for a sukkah nor a sidepost for an alley, not boards around wells, nor a covering stone for a grave.” At the end of the baraita, a statement by Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili is cited: “Nor may a bill of divorcement be written upon it.” At the conclusion of the sugya, Abbayye and Rabbi Zeira offer different interpretations as to why, according to Rabbi Me’ir, an animal cannot serve as a wall of a sukkah. Abbayye states that this is due to the possibility that the animal could die, while Rabbi Zeira states that the reason is that the animal could flee. In both cases, when occuring on a festival day, another wall cannot be erected to replace the animal. Therefore the sukkah will not be serviceable to fulfill the ritual obligation.

bSuk 23b-24a: According to the above explanation, offered by Abbayye, Rabbi Yehudah did not fear the possibility that the animal, which served as a wall of the sukkah, could die. The gemara challenges Abbayye’s interpretation by citing sugyot from bGit 28a and bYev 69b wherein he resolves a contradiction between two tannaitic sources (mGit 3:3 and the baraita in bSuk 23b) with the words: “This [is according to] Rabbi Me’ir, who does not fear death. This [is according to] Rabbi Yehudah, who fears death” (הא רבי מאיר, דלא חייש למיתה, הא רבי יהודה ). The contradiction in both these sources involves the issue of a priest who went overseas and is presumed either alive or dead, his status determining whether his wife may or may not eat from the terumah (namely the priestly gifts of which only priests and their direct family members are allowed to partake). mGit 3:3 states: “If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest, and her husband went to a country beyond the sea, she may eat of the terumah on the presumption that he is still alive.” This text teaches that a person is assumed alive unless definitively proven dead. A baraita,[1] however, states: “[If a priest said to his wife]: Here is your bill of divorce [to take effect] one hour before my death, she is forbidden to eat of the terumah from that moment.” This text suggests, on the contrary, that a person is presumed dead, unless definitively proven alive. Abbayye believes that the mishnaic text here was formulated by Rabbi Me’ir, who did not fear the death, while the text of the baraita was formulated by Rabbi Yehudah, who did.

In addition to Abbayye’s refutation of the contradiction, by assigning one position to Rabbi Me’ir and the other to Rabbi Yehudah, he also uses a baraita from tDem 8:7 to support his position that Rabbi Me’ir did not regard the possibility of death, while Rabbi Yehudah did: “If a man buys wine from among the Samaritans on the eve of of Shabbat and forgot to tithe it,[2] he may say: Two logs which I intend to set aside are terumah and the next ten are the first tithe, and the next nine, the second tithe. And then he redeems them and drinks at once (cf. mDem 7:4). So according to Rabbi Me’ir. Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbi Yosi and Shim‘on forbid it. They said to Rabbi Me’ir: Do you not concede that if his wineskin splits, he drinks untithed [wine]? He said to them: When it splits.” This baraita asks if one who bought wine from Samaritans on the eve of Shabbat and forgot to set aside the tithes may drink the wine immediately, based on the assumption that he will set aside the tithes later. Rabbi Me’ir supports this premise but it is opposed by several scholars, including Rabbi Yehudah, because between drinking and putting aside tithe, the wineskin in which the intended tithe are deposited may split. This baraita supports Abbayye’s rebuttal that Rabbi Me’ir did not regard the possibility of death while Rabbi Yehudah did. If Rabbi Me’ir was not apprehensive that the wineskin could split then he also would not be concerned about the possibility of the death of the animal supporting the sukkah.

On the other hand, Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shim‘on who were apprehensive that the wineskin could split, would also be concerned about the possibility of the animal’s death. This clearly demonstrates that Abbayye believed that Rabbi Me’ir did not regard the possibility of death. Why then did Rabbi Me’ir invalidate the use of an animal as the wall of a sukkah if he did not fear its death?

Now, based on the baraita mentioned above from bEruv 44a, the gemara proposes reversing the statements attributed to Abbayye, so that Rabbi Me’ir regarded the possibility of death while Rabbi Yehudah did not. Still, the gemara has difficulties with this supposition, for if Rabbi Me’ir was concerned about the possibility of death, then he should have also been concerning about the splitting of the wineskin. The gemara resolves this difficulty by rejecting the analogy between the destruction of the wineskin and the death of an animal. The latter is a common occurrence, and cannot be prevented and therefore Rabbi Me’ir was concerned about such a possibility. On the other hand, one can guard against the splitting of a wineskin, which is an infrequent event, and therefore Rabbi Me’ir was not concerned about this possibility.

Having come to this stage in the argument, the gemara is now concerned with the assumption that Abbayye believed that Rabbi Yehudah did not regard the possibility of death. After all, the baraita in tDemai stated that he did fear the possibility of the wineskin splitting. Consequently, Rabbi Yehudah must have been concerned about the possibility of the death of the animal since, according to the stama, this was a frequent occurrence. The gemara responds to this difficulty by the supposition that in mDemai Rabbi Yehudah did not prohibit the drinking of the untithed wine due to the possibility of the wineskin splitting (and therefore the impossibility of implementing the promise to set aside the tithe later) but rather because a man has no choice (לית ליה ברירה). In other words, there is no possibility of discovering whether the wine that remained in the wineskin was that which should be tithed or whether it had already been consumed.

The end of the baraita in tDemai challenges the statement that Rabbi Yehudah did not regard the splitting of the wineskin: “They said to Rabbi Me’ir: Do you not concede that if his wineskin splits, he drinks untithed [wine]?” In other words, those who disagreed with Rabbi Me’ir, including Rabbi Yehudah, expressly stated they were concerned that the wineskin could split. The gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining that Rabbi Yehudah (and the others) said to Rabbi Me’ir: According to our method, it is impossible to know for certain whether there is a danger of drinking untithed wine. Yet also according to your method, where it is possible to know, the danger of drinking untithed wine still exists in the case when the wineskin splits and there is nothing left from which to set aside the tithe.

We have therefore returned to the supposition that Rabbi Yehudah did not regard the possibility of the wineskin splitting or the animal’s death. Yet once again the gemara poses a challenge to this neat assumption, based on another tannaitic source, mYom 1:1 wherein Rabbi Yehudah clearly expresses his fear of death: “Seven days before Yom Kippur a high-priest is taken away from his house to the office of the Palhadrin, and another priest is nominated in his stead, lest he become disqualified. Rabbi Yehudah says: They also find him another wife, lest his wife die.” The difficulty posed by this text, which shows that Rabbi Yehudah fears death (in this case of the wife of the high-priest) is resolved by the statement of the amora Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshu‘a, who explains that מעלה עשו בכפרה (Yom Kippur is treated more respectfully).

Further down, in bSuk 24b, we find a long discussion of a further clause of the baraita mentioned above “Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili they said: Nor may a bill of divorcement be written upon it.” This discussion is found three times in the Bavli. I have presented all three versions synoptically in the text above, and here I will only comment on the differences between them. The comparison highlights two major differences between the sugya in bGittin and those in bEruvin/bSukkah:

1. The tannaitic source: The sugya in bGittin is the only one that responds directly to Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili’s statement in mGit 2:3: “Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili says: One does not write on an animate object nor on food” (רבי יוסי אומר: אין כותבין [גיטין], לא על דבר שיש בו רוח חיים ולא על האכלים). Weiss Halivni notes that in bEruvin, the initial sugya, which was then transferred to bSukkah, the baraita was cited following a mishnah (mEruv 1:7: “Women’s letters of divorce too may be written on [animate objects], but Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili declared it unfit” – וכותבין עליו גיטי נשים ורבי יוסי הגלילי פוסל). He believes that the editor who transferred this text to our sugya eliminated the mishnah. [3]

2. The style of the sugya in bGittin: Although the sugya in bGittin is shorter than the other two versions in bSukkah and bEruvin, most of it is identical to the sugya in bSukkah. Weiss Halivni[4] believes that the bSukkah sugya originated in either bEruvin or bGittin. Yet I do not understand why he considers bEruvin as its possible source. bGittin’s short style and direct response to a mishnah confirms that it represents the original version. Moreover, in contrast to the similarities between bGittin and bSukkah, there are no stylistic overlaps between bGittin and bEruvin.[5] Weiss Halivni’s other claim, however, that the sugya developed in Rava’s bet midrash appears to be more accurate since a sugya in bQid 5a relates how Rava deduced that a woman is not divorced through money from the words "וכתב לה" of Deut 24:1, while Abbayye learned this same principle through logical deduction.

In any case, according to all of the versions, the sages and Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili differed regarding the proper material upon which a bill of divorce should be written. While the former maintained that a bill of divorce could be written upon any material, Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili believed that it could only be written upon an inanimate object (one that has no breath of life and does not eat). His view is based, as will be shown in feminist observations, below, upon a tradition preserved in a halakhic midrash (SifDeut 269).

@Feminist observations

There are three issues in this sugya that merit a feminist commentary:

First, in bSuk 23a the following baraita is cited during the discussion: “Rabbi Me’ir used to say: Whatever contains the breath of life can neither be made a wall for a sukkah […] In the name of Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili they said: Nor may a bill of divorcement be written upon it.” bSuk 24b discusses the rationale for the statement uttered by Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili beginning with the words: “The Master said: In the name of Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili they said: Nor may a bill (sefer) of divorcement be written upon it.”[1] The sugya discusses this assertion. However, it soon becomes an exposition of the phrase “a bill of divorcement” (ספר כריתות) which is derived from the following verse:

Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili posits that the words וכתב לה (he writes her) means that the bill of divorcement can be written on any entity. However, the word ספר (bill) limits this to an inanimate object.

This entire talmudic discussion is intimately tied up with a tannaitic midrash found in Sifre Deuteronomy. SifDeut 269 is the first relevant parallel. While taking Deut 24:1 to basically mean the same thing as Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili maintains, it interprets the word ונתן (hands it) as meaning that the bill of divorcement can be written on any object and the word ספר (bill) as limiting this to an inanimate object that is timeless, and to something that is not fixed to the ground:

The word קיימא, which is mentioned both in the midrash and in our sugya, is interpreted as meaning something that does not wear away, that is, it is not an animal or a plant that could die or wither.

Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili’s opinion that a bill of divorce may be written on any inanimate object presents a challenge for the stama of the sugya. He could not ignore the word ספר (bill) and its interpretation yet in order to strengthen the view of the sages, that a sukkah’s wall may be built of something animate, he had to find a way to interpret this word so as to include other animate objects.

The sages, who are presented as arguing with Rabbi Yosi, first maintain that ספר refers to the words written in the get (ספר דרשו החכמים) and not to the object on which the get is written. They interpret the word וכתב , to signify that a woman is divorced through the use of a written object and not through money. Otherwise, one might think that, just as she is given in marriage through money (cf. mQid 1:1), she would also leave a marriage through payment of money.

Although I have not found an interpretation of the word וכתב in tannaitic sources similar to that offered by the sages in our sugya, nonetheless Sifre Deuteronomy contains an indirect reference to the fact that a woman is not divorced through money but only through a get. Moreover, based on the fact that a woman is divorced through a document, the midrash deduces that she is also married by means of a document:

This midrash assumes that it is a known fact that a woman is not divorced via money but only through a document. Based on the way she is divorced, it deduces that the same conditions apply to a marriage. The author of the sugya was apparently acquainted with this halakhic tradition (and perhaps also the logical reasoning from divorce to marriage), which form the basis for his commentary to the sages explanation of וכתב (and he writes). In conclusion, the sages’ interpretation of Deut 24:1 is as follows: “he writes” means that it has to be a document, “bill” refers to the words written in the get. The sages do not address the question whether or not the document is on an animate or inanimate entity.

Following this discussion, which explains how the rabbis interpreted “and he writes” and “bill,” the sugya now asks how Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili learnt the halakhah that divorce is implemented only through a document and not through money and that the words in the get have to emphasize severance. The answer to the first question is given through the juxtaposition of the two words ספר and כריתות – only a document can sever a wife from her husband. The word כריתות then leads the sages to conclude that what is written in the get must demonstrate a complete separation between wife and husband. In order to demonstrate the difference between objects that achieve a total separation and those that do not, the gemara cites a baraita also found in tGittin:

[If a man says:] Herewith is your divorce bill [to take effect] on condition that you never again go to your father’s house, on condition that you never again drink wine, it is no divorce, for she might go [to her father’s house] and drink [wine]. [If he says:] On condition that you not go to your father’s house for thirty days, on condi tion that you not drink wine for thirty days, it is a divorce, and one does not worry that she might go [to her fathers house] or that she drink [wine] (tGit 5:11).

According to this baraita, the distinction between לעולם (for ever) and שלושים יום (thirty days) is that in the first case it is impossible to fulfill the condition while in the second case it is possible. With this baraita the gemara demonstrates that divore is not effected by the bill itself as an object, but by the words within. Apparently, this gemara too is based upon a tannaitic halakhic tradition from the Sifre:

The answer to the second question concerning Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili – on what basis does he learn that the language must emphasize the severance? – is learnt from the phrase ספר כריתות (bill of divorcement) in the Torah. Had the Torah used the phrase ספר כרת (bill of divorce), it would have signified that the document itself severs the relationship between wife and husband. However, the Torah employed the phrase ספר כריתות , and this indicates that the language of the document will bring about the severance. This logical principle, according to the stama, was not used by the other sages.

The continuation of this passage in Sifre proves the antiquity of this tradition. It cites various other charcteristics of a bill of divorce[1] and is attributed to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, a tanna who lived during the Second Temple period: “Since a bill is characterized as something which endures, this excludes anything that does not endure” (SifDeut 269). Thus, according to Sifre Deuteronomy, the halakhah stipulating that a bill of divorce must be written on an inanimate object dates back as early as the Second Temple period. The objective of this ancient ruling was apparently to provide a divorced woman with a permanent document, verifying that it is permissible for her to remarry.

Moreover, there is no opposing opinion to those of Rabbi Yosi ha-Galili and the ancient tradition in the Sifre, stating that a divorce bill must be written on any permanent object, in any tannaitic source. We only learn of the sages’ opposition to this from the gemara. This is the most imprtant point of the entire discussion. It shows that historically the sages did not oppose Rabbi Yose at all. Only by associating the discussion of the get with the sukkah’s wall is their opposition generated by the stama. Whether the object the get was written on was animate or not was simply not relevant for the early sages’ reasoning. It is of course of vital importance for the woman that her get is produced on material that is durable, so that she can always prove that she is divorced. Therefore, the stama’s assumption that the sages may have allowed the get to be written on an animate object is based on pure legal fiction.

The second issue relevant to a feminist commentary is based on the following periscope:

But did Abbayye not say that Rabbi Me’ir takes the possibility of death into consideration when Rabbi Yehudah disregards it? Have we not in fact learnt: If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest, and her husband went to a country beyond the sea, she may eat of the terumah on the presumption that he is still alive. And we pointed to the following contradiction: [If a priest said to his wife]: Here is your bill of divorce [to take effect] one hour before my death, she is forbidden to eat terumah at once.Abbayye answered that there is no difficulty since the former [statement] is according to Rabbi Me’ir who disregards the possibility of death, while the latter is according to Rabbi Yehudah who regards the possibility of death (bSuk 23b).

The first tradition cited here, about a priest’s wife, is taken from mGit 3:3 and it states that a wife whose priest husband is away from home may eat terumah (food bestowed on the priests by the Israelites) on the assumption that he is still alive. The right of a priest’s wife to eat terumah is based upon Lev 22:11: “But a person who is a priest’s property by purchase may eat of them; and those that are born into his household may eat of his food” (וְכֹהֵן כִּי יִקְנֶה נֶפֶשׁ קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ הוּא יֹאכַל בּוֹ וִילִיד בֵּיתוֹ הֵם יֹאכְלוּ בְלַחְמוֹ). However, the Mishnah makes clear that this right is revoked immediately on the priest’s death and for any priestly foodstuffs consumed subsequently the woman must be penalized. Thus, we read in the Mishnah:

From this text it is perfectly clear that a woman should be aware of the exact moment of her husband’s death. Therefore, the ensuing discussion is devoted to this issue.

The premise of the first tannaitic text (mGit 3:3) is that as long as a husband’s death is not abolsutely secure, he is presumed to be alive and his wife may eat terumah. Following the first tannaitic text, our sugya quotes another contradicting one, prefaced by the expression ורמינן עלה (=we pointed to the following contradiction). This source is only cited in the Bavli twice (once in bYev 69a and once in bGit 28a, where the word ורמינהו is used to introduce it) but by using the expression “we pointed to the following contradiction,” the author of the sugya clarifies that this (second) source is assumed to be tannaitic and is as valid as the first one. And indeed, in bYev 69b the same source appears prefaced by the word והתניא , indicating that the authors of this text considered it a valid baraita. According to this second text, upon receiving her divorce bill, the woman is immediately prohibited from eating terumah since the husband stipulated in the divorce bill that the divorce takes effect one hour before his death – and such an event could occur at any time. The gemara therefore deduces that this tannitic source is based upon the supposition that death is a common occurrence and one should be apprehensive about such a possibility all the time. One does not need to be assured of the husband’s death but rather of his being alive. This premise contradicts the mishnah’s perception that a husband who went overseas is considered alive and one is not apprehensive about his death.

A statement by Abbayye resolves the aforesaid contradiction. He attributes the mishnah to Rabbi Me’ir, who was not apprehensive about death, while the contradictory baraita he attributes to Rabbi Yehudah who was apprehensive about such an event.

Yet as we saw above, a subsequent section of a baraita previously mentioned in the sugya is cited, contradicting Abbayye’s solution: “If he used an animal as a wall of the sukkah, Rabbi Me’ir declares it invalid and Rabbi Yehudah valid.” This forces the gemara to reverse Abbayye’s statement and claim that Rabbi Me’ir was apprehensive about death, while Rabbi Yehudah was not apprehensive. Obviously both cannot be true.

I believe that because the stama of the sugya created an artificial contradiction between Rabbi Yosi and the sages (see above), this then prompted a further artificial contradiction between two tannaitic sources. Gittin’s prohibition against a priest’s wife eating terumah is imposed because one can never know when the husband may potentially die and therefore anytime may be one hour before his death. Consequently, the tannaitic source provides us with the true reason for the prohibition against eating the terumah in such circumstances, as opposed to the gemara’s premise that death is a common event.[1] In my opinion, the fact that the author of the sugya reversed Abbayye’s statement demonstrates that he was uncertain as to its exact content. In order to clarify Abbayye’s statement, the stamaitic author of the sugya created an academic debate based on a contradiction between two tannaitic sources that discuss women, or more precisely, priests’ wives.

Thirdly, in bSuk 24a another source relevant to women’s issues is of interest here, it too refering to the special situation of a priest’s wife.

But does not Rabbi Yehudah regard the possibility of death? Have we not in fact learnt: Rabbi Yehudah says: They also find him another wife, lest his wife die? On this surely it was stated: Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshu‘a said: They adopted a higher standard with regard to Atonement.

This text is a citation of mYom 1:1, which states that “Seven days before Yom Kippur a high-priest is taken away from his house […]. Rabbi Yehudah says: They also find him another wife, lest his wife die, as it is written: “And Aaron […] shall make atonement for himself and for his house” (Lev 16:6). “His house” means his wife.” This mishnah relates that prior to Yom Kippur the highpriest is removed from his house, probably in order to separate him from his wife, for if she is in a state of niddah (menstruation) she could make him impure. He is transferred to the Chamber of the Parhedrin[2] located in the Temple precint and another high-priest who can replace him in the Yom Kippur service is prepared in the event that some circumstance, such as contracting impurity, would disqualify him. This requirement is supplemented by the comment of Rabbi Yehudah that they should also prepare for him a supplementary wife, in case his dies. He explains this necessity by expounding a verse from Leviticus. Lev 16:6 states that the high-priest must make atonement for both himself and his house, which Rabbi Yehudah here interprets to mean his wife.[3] This interpretation indicates that without a wife a high-priest cannot serve in the Yom Kippur service and make atonement. The sages disagree since they reason that she too could die and thus it would engender an endless cycle.[4]

As in the previous issue discussed, here too the gemara links the discussion in mYoma to our sugya in order to conclude that Rabbi Yehudah was apprehensive about death but the sages were not. Such a conclusion distorts the sages’ statement in mYoma in response to the words of Rabbi Yehudah. In fact, the sages did not claim that they were not apprehensive about the wife’s death. On the contrary, they present an extremist view fearing death to such an extent that they did not believe it could be overcome by preparing another wife, since she could also die, and so forth. Yet the gemara only cites Rabbi Yehudah’s statement from the mishnah. It does not give the sages’ reply since this would contradict the assumption that the sages did not fear death and differed with Rabbi Yehudah who did.