Some Key Sources on Abortion - DT 201

BySamantha Frank

Social Topics

שמות כ״א:י״ב

(יב) מַכֵּ֥ה אִ֛ישׁ וָמֵ֖ת מ֥וֹת יוּמָֽת׃

Exodus 21:12

(12) The one who fatally strikes a man shall be put to death.

שמות כ״א:כ״ב-כ״ה

(כב) וְכִֽי־יִנָּצ֣וּ אֲנָשִׁ֗ים וְנָ֨גְפ֜וּ אִשָּׁ֤ה הָרָה֙ וְיָצְא֣וּ יְלָדֶ֔יהָ וְלֹ֥א יִהְיֶ֖ה אָס֑וֹן עָנ֣וֹשׁ יֵעָנֵ֗שׁ כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֨ר יָשִׁ֤ית עָלָיו֙ בַּ֣עַל הָֽאִשָּׁ֔ה וְנָתַ֖ן בִּפְלִלִֽים׃ (כג) וְאִם־אָס֖וֹן יִהְיֶ֑ה וְנָתַתָּ֥ה נֶ֖פֶשׁ תַּ֥חַת נָֽפֶשׁ׃ (כד) עַ֚יִן תַּ֣חַת עַ֔יִן שֵׁ֖ן תַּ֣חַת שֵׁ֑ן יָ֚ד תַּ֣חַת יָ֔ד רֶ֖גֶל תַּ֥חַת רָֽגֶל׃ (כה) כְּוִיָּה֙ תַּ֣חַת כְּוִיָּ֔ה פֶּ֖צַע תַּ֣חַת פָּ֑צַע חַבּוּרָ֕ה תַּ֖חַת חַבּוּרָֽה׃ (ס)

Exodus 21:22-25

(22) When men fight, and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, but there is no other damage (ason), the responsible person shall be fined -according to the woman’s husband, the payment to be based on judgment. (23) But if other damage ensues, the penalty shall be life for life, (24) eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, (25) burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.

סנהדרין פ״ז ב:י׳

דיני נפשות בפלוגתא דרבי ורבנן דתניא רבי אומר (שמות כא, כג) ונתת נפש תחת נפש ממון

Sanhedrin 87b:10

Regarding the verse: “If men struggle and they hurt a pregnant woman…and if there shall be a tragedy (ason) you shall give a life for a life” (Exodus 21:22–23), It is taught by Rabbi that the reference is to a monetary payment for the life. (The tragedy referenced is the unintentional killing of the mother.)

משנה תורה, הלכות חובל ומזיק ד׳:א׳

(א) הַנּוֹגֵף אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם דְּמֵי וְלָדוֹת לַבַּעַל וְנֵזֶק וְצַעַר לָאִשָּׁה:

Mishneh Torah, One Who Injures a Person or Property 4:1

(1) One who strikes a woman and causes her to miscarry, even though this wasn't his intent, he must pay the value of the fetus to the [woman's] husband, and damage and pain to the woman.

משנה אהלות ז׳:ו׳

(ו) הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהִיא מַקְשָׁה לֵילֵד, מְחַתְּכִין אֶת הַוָּלָד בְּמֵעֶיהָ וּמוֹצִיאִין אוֹתוֹ אֵבָרִים אֵבָרִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁחַיֶּיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְחַיָּיו. יָצָא רֻבּוֹ, אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ, שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נָפֶשׁ:

Mishnah Oholot 7:6

(6) If a woman is having trouble giving birth, they cut up the child in her womb and brings it forth limb by limb, because her life comes before the life of [the child]. But if the greater part has come out, one may not touch it, for one may not set aside one person's life for that of another.

רש"י על סנהדרין ע״ב ב:י״ד

יצא ראשו - באשה המקשה לילד ומסוכנת וקתני רישא החיה פושטת ידה וחותכתו ומוציאתו לאברים דכל זמן שלא יצא לאויר העולם לאו נפש הוא וניתן להורגו ולהציל את אמו אבל יצא ראשו אין נוגעים בו להורגו דהוה ליה כילוד ואין דוחין נפש מפני נפש ואם תאמר מעשה דשבע בן בכרי (שמואל ב כ׳:כ״א) הנה ראשו מושלך אליך דדחו נפש מפני נפש

Rashi on Sanhedrin 72b:14

its head came out: With a women that is experiencing difficulty giving birth and is in [mortal] danger. And it is taught in the first section [of this teaching], "the midwife extends her hand and cuts it up and extracts [the pieces];" as the entire time that that it has not gone out into the air of the world, it is not [considered] a soul, and [so] it is possible to kill it and to save its mother. But when its head came out, we cannot touch it to kill it, as it is like a born [child]; and we do not push off one soul for the sake of another.

מכילתא דרבי ישמעאל, מַסֶּכְתָּא דִנְזִיקִין ד׳:ב׳-ד׳

(ב) מכה איש .. שומע אני אף בן שמונה במשמע – תלמוד לומר מכה איש מגיד שאינו חייב עד שיהרוג בן קיימא.

Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael, Tractate Nezikin 4:2-4

"And if a person strikes any soul (nefesh) of a person, and he dies, he shall be put to death.” (Leviticus 24:17): I might think that an eight-month birth, (who is destined to die,) is also included. It is, therefore, written "If one strikes a man" — whereby we are apprised that he is not liable unless he kills one who is destined to live.

משנה נדה ג׳:ז׳

(ז) הַמַּפֶּלֶת לְיוֹם אַרְבָּעִים, אֵינָהּ חוֹשֶׁשֶׁת לְוָלָד. לְיוֹם אַרְבָּעִים וְאֶחָד, תֵּשֵׁב לְזָכָר וְלִנְקֵבָה וּלְנִדָּה. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר, יוֹם אַרְבָּעִים וְאֶחָד, תֵּשֵׁב לְזָכָר וּלְנִדָּה. יוֹם שְׁמוֹנִים וְאֶחָד, תֵּשֵׁב לְזָכָר וְלִנְקֵבָה וּלְנִדָּה, שֶׁהַזָּכָר נִגְמָר לְאַרְבָּעִים וְאֶחָד, וְהַנְּקֵבָה לִשְׁמוֹנִים וְאֶחָד. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֶחָד בְּרִיַּת הַזָּכָר וְאֶחָד בְּרִיַּת הַנְּקֵבָה, זֶה וָזֶה לְאַרְבָּעִים וְאֶחָד:

Mishnah Niddah 3:7

(7) If a woman miscarried on the fortieth day, she need not be concerned that it was a valid childbirth...The sages say: the fashioning of the male and the fashioning of the female both take forty-one days.

יבמות ס״ט ב:ט׳-י׳

ובנישואין מי חששו והתניא בת כהן שנישאת לישראל ומת טובלת ואוכלת בתרומה לערב אמר רב חסדא טובלת ואוכלת עד ארבעים דאי לא מיעברא הא לא מיעברא ואי מיעברא עד ארבעים מיא בעלמא היא

Yevamot 69b:9-10

...And if she is pregnant, until forty days from conception the fetus is merely water. It is not yet considered a living being...

גיטין כ״ג ב:ט׳

חד אמר הא מני רבי היא דאמר המשחרר חצי עבדו קנה וחד אמר מאי טעמא דרבי בהא קסבר עובר ירך אמו הוא ונעשה כמי שהקנה לה אחד מאבריה:

Gittin 23b:9

...Rabbi Yehuda haNasi holds: A fetus is considered as its mother’s thigh...

משנה תורה, הלכות רוצח ושמירת נפש א׳:ט׳

(ט) אַף זוֹ מִצְוַת לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁלֹּא לָחוּס עַל נֶפֶשׁ הָרוֹדֵף. לְפִיכָךְ הוֹרוּ חֲכָמִים שֶׁהָעֻבָּרָה שֶׁהִיא מַקְשָׁה לֵילֵד מֻתָּר לַחְתֹּךְ הָעֵבָּר בְּמֵעֶיהָ בֵּין בְּסַם בֵּין בְּיָד מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּרוֹדֵף אַחֲרֶיהָ לְהָרְגָהּ. וְאִם מִשֶּׁהוֹצִיא רֹאשׁוֹ אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נֶפֶשׁ וְזֶהוּ טִבְעוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם:

Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 1:9

(9) This, indeed, is one of the negative mitzvot - not to take pity on the life of a rodef (pursuer). On this basis, our Sages ruled that when complications arise and a pregnant woman cannot give birth, it is permitted to abort the fetus in her womb, whether with a knife or with drugs. For the fetus is considered a rodef (pursuer) of its mother. If the head of the fetus emerges, it should not be touched, because one life should not be sacrificed for another. Although the mother may die, this is the nature of the world.

בעיות הלכתיות עכשוויות, כרך א, חלק שני, פרק טו: הפלה בספרות ההלכה ט׳

...

Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol I, Part II, CHAPTER XV Abortion in Halakhic Literature 9

It may readily be inferred from this statement that destruction of the fetus is prohibited in situations not involving a threat to the life of the pregnant mother. Incorporation of the justificatory statement "for her life takes precedence over its life" within the text of the Mishnah indicates that in the absence of this consideration abortion is not sanctioned. Tosafot (Sanhedrin 59a; Hullin 33a) states explicitly that feticide, although entailing no statutory punishment, is nevertheless forbidden. Elsewhere we find that according to rabbinic exegesis (Mekhilta, Exod. 21:12; Sanhedrin 84a) the killing of an unborn child is not considered to be a capital crime—an implication derived from the verse "He that smiteth a man so that he dieth, shall surely be put to death" (Exod. 21:12). Tosafot, on the basis of the Mishnah, apparently reasons that although feticide does not occasion capital punishment, the fetus is nevertheless sufficiently human to render its destruction a moral offense.

בעיות הלכתיות עכשוויות, כרך א, חלק שני, פרק טו: הפלה בספרות ההלכה י״ג

...

Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol I, Part II, CHAPTER XV Abortion in Halakhic Literature 13

Differing from these various views are the opinions of the many scholars who have espoused the diametrically opposite position that the prohibition against feticide is rabbinic in origin. There is evidence that as early an authority as Rabbenu Nissim is to be numbered among the latter group. R. Chaim Ozer cites Rabbenu Nissim's explanation of the reason for the ruling of the Mishnah (Erukhin 7a) that the execution of an expectant mother must not be delayed in order to allow the delivery of her child. Rabbenu Nissim (commentary on Hullin 58a) fails to offer the explanation adopted by other commentators; namely, that the fetus is regarded as but an organic limb of the mother having no inherent claim of its own to inviolability and hence considerations of its welfare cannot interfere with the statutory provision for immediate execution of the condemned in order to avoid subjecting the convicted criminal to agonizing suspense between announcement of the verdict and execution of the sentence. Rabbenu Nissim offers a simple explanation to the effect that the fetus has not yet emerged into the world and therefore we need not reckon with its well-being. Since Rabbenu Nissim's remarks certainly cannot be construed as sanctioning wanton destruction of a fetus, R. Chaim Ozer infers that it is Rabbenu Nissim's opinion that the prohibition against taking fetal life is of rabbinic origin. If considered as a rabbinic edict, it is understandable that the Sages suspended their ban in order to mitigate the agony of the condemned woman, giving considerations of her welfare priority over the well-being of the unborn child.

בעיות הלכתיות עכשוויות, כרך א, חלק שני, פרק טו: הפלה בספרות ההלכה ל״ג

...

Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol I, Part II, CHAPTER XV Abortion in Halakhic Literature 33

Authority for performance of an embryotomy in order to preserve the life of the mother is derived from the previously cited Mishnah, Oholot 7:6. Virtually all authorities agree that the Mishnah does not merely sanction but deems mandatory that the life of the fetus be made subordinate to that of the mother. At the same time the Mishnah expressly forbids interference with natural processes after the moment of birth, which is defined as the emergence from the womb of the forehead or the greater part thereof. In the ensuing talmudic discussion (Sanhedrin 72b), the child is described as being in effect an aggressor "pursuing" the life of its mother. As such, its life is forfeit if necessary to save the innocent victim so pursued. At this point the question is raised, why should an embryotomy not be performed in such circumstances even in the final stages of parturition? It is answered by pointing out that the law of pursuit does not apply when the mother is "pursued by Heaven," i.e., her danger is the result of natural occurrences rather than malevolent human activity. The apparent inference to be drawn from this discussion is that there is no need for resort to the law of pursuit in order to justify destruction of the fetus prior to birth. On the contrary, were there need for such justification, the law of pursuit would be of no avail since it cannot be validly applied in cases where such "pursuit" arises as a result of the processes of nature. Rashi (ad loc.) explains that the fetus is sacrificed in order to spare the life of the mother because even though the fetus has a claim to life and is sufficiently human to render its destruction a moral offense, neither this claim nor its status as a human life is equal to that of the mother: "As long as it [the fetus] has not emerged into the light of the world, it is not a human life."

בעיות הלכתיות עכשוויות, כרך א, חלק שני, פרק טו: הפלה בספרות ההלכה ל״ז

...

Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol I, Part II, CHAPTER XV Abortion in Halakhic Literature 37

The aforementioned discussions concern themselves only with cases in which failure to terminate pregnancy will indubitably result in the loss of life to the mother. The question of termination of a pregnancy which, while jeopardizing the life of the pregnant mother, will not necessarily result in imminent loss of life again centers around Maimonides' invocation of the law of pursuit. Citing Rashi, Sanhedrin 72b and Pesaḥim 2b, Rabbi Schorr demonstrates that the law of pursuit cannot be invoked in cases of doubt. Hence abortion may be permitted only when there exists incontravertible medical evidence that the pregnancy per se will result in the loss of the life of the pregnant mother. R. Shlomoh Drimer (Bet Shlomoh, Hoshen Mishpat, no. 120), however, reaches the opposite conclusion, at least in theory. Following the authorities who maintain that a fetus is "not a life" and hence its destruction does not constitute an "appurtenance" of homicide, Rabbi Drimer concludes that feticide is no different from other transgressions which may be violated even in cases of possible or suspected danger. Nevertheless, in practice, Rabbi Drimer, on the basis of other considerations, withholds permission in cases of merely possible danger to the life of the mother. The Gemara (Yoma 82a) specifies that a pregnant woman who becomes agitated at the smell of food on the Day of Atonement may, if necessary, partake of the food which causes this excitement lest she suffer a miscarriage and her fetus be spontaneously aborted. Maimonides, Rabbenu Asher and Rabbenu Nissim interpret this provision as being based, not on a concern for the preservation of the unborn child, but on a concern for the life of the mother. According to their view, expulsion of the fetus ipso facto constitutes a threat to the life of the mother. Accordingly, reasons Rabbi Drimer, even if continuation of pregnancy jeopardizes the life of the mother, this consideration is counterbalanced by the fact that termination of pregnancy in itself constitutes a parallel jeopardy. Therefore, a course of "sit and do not act" is preferable. Even if physicians advise that there is no danger involved in the performance of the abortion, their advice is to be disregarded, just as medical opinion is ignored when it fails to recognize cases of "danger" which are delineated by Halakhah as constituting a threat to human life. Halakhah specifies that a woman's life is in jeopardy for a minimum period of three days following childbirth and hence during this time she is permitted to partake of food on the Day of Atonement, the Sabbath is violated on her behalf, etc. Since Halakhah defines childbirth as a "danger," medical opinions to the contrary or protestations of well-being on the part of the patient are disregarded. Rabbi Drimer reasons that the same considerations should apply to the conditions surrounding abortion.

בעיות הלכתיות עכשוויות, כרך א, חלק שני, פרק טו: הפלה בספרות ההלכה ל״ח

...

Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol I, Part II, CHAPTER XV Abortion in Halakhic Literature 38

A very different conclusion is reached by R. Mordecai Leib Winkler (Levushei Mordekhai), who finds reason to distinguish between miscarriages and abortions performed by medical practitioners. Since there is no explicit reference to the latter, those authorities who state that abortion per se constitutes a threat to the life of the mother may not have intended their remarks to encompass therapeutic abortion surrounded by medical safeguards. Levushei Mordekhai also introduces the notion of comparative danger and seems to indicate that, while abortion may itself constitute a danger in the opinion of these authorities, this danger may not be acute since dispensation for violation of Shabbat and Yom Kippur is granted for even the slightest threat to life. Abortion should therefore be sanctioned in order to obviate a more acute danger. Furthermore, the remarks of these authorities fail to demonstrate that miscarriage per se jeopardizes the life of the mother. Their pronouncements are consistent with the conclusion that danger will result only if the woman fails to receive proper care pursuant to the expulsion of the fetus. Since such care would involve desecration of Yom Kippur in any event, the woman may break her fast in order to prevent the necessity for such later violations. Levushei Mordekhai concludes that there is, then, no evidence that a therapeutic abortion performed under proper medical conditions and with provision for proper convalescence constitutes a jeopardy to the life of the mother.

בעיות הלכתיות עכשוויות, כרך א, חלק שני, פרק טו: הפלה בספרות ההלכה ל״ט

...

Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol I, Part II, CHAPTER XV Abortion in Halakhic Literature 39

Relevant to this issue is the tragic case of a pregnant woman suffering from a terminal case of cancer which is pondered by R. Waldenberg (Ẓiz Eli'ezer, IX, 239). Medical authorities predict that continuation of pregnancy to term will foreshorten her life, but the expectant mother is steadfast in her desire to be survived by a child. Normally her desire would be irrelevant to a halakhic determination that preservation of maternal life is sufficient reason to abort the fetus. With regard to this specific question, Rabbi Waldenberg concludes that since Bet Shlomoh and other authorities withhold permission to abort the fetus on grounds that the abortion itself also constitutes a danger to the life of the mother, in this case one is justified in acceding to the wishes of the mother and adopting a stance of passive noninterference.

סנהדרין מ״ב א:ה׳

אלא כדרב יהודה דאמר רב יהודה ברוך [וכו'] אשר במאמרו ברא שחקים וברוח פיו כל צבאם חוק וזמן נתן להם שלא ישנו את תפקידם ששים ושמחים לעשות רצון קונם פועלי אמת שפעולתן אמת וללבנה אמר שתתחדש עטרת תפארת לעמוסי בטן שהן עתידין להתחדש כמותה ולפאר ליוצרם על שם כבוד מלכותו ברוך אתה ה' מחדש חדשים

Sanhedrin 42a:5

Rather, the full version of the blessing is the version of Rav Yehuda. As Rav Yehuda says: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who by His word created the heavens, and by the breath of his mouth all their hosts. He set for them a law and a time, that they should not deviate from their task. And they are joyous and glad to perform the will of their Owner; they are workers of truth whose work is truth. And to the moon He said that it should renew itself as a crown of beauty for those He carried from the womb, as they are destined to be renewed like it, and to praise their Creator for the name of His glorious kingdom. Blessed are You the Lord, Who renews the months.