Our Gemara on Amud Aleph brings the opinion of Rabbi Yose who holds that in many situations we say, one prohibition does not fall upon another. For example, if one were to engage in sexual relations with a woman who is forbidden on two counts, such as his mother in law, who also happens to be married, he incurs the penalty of the first prohibition that was activated even if the second prohibition has a more severe punishment. The penalty for relations with a mother in law is Sereifah (burning), while the penalty for relations to a married woman is Chenek (choking), which is less painful and less severe. Thus, if at the time he married, his mother in law was already married, the first activated prohibition was that of a married woman, since she was forbidden before he became related to her as his mother in law.
Simply understood, the idea that one prohibition does not fall upon another is a legal mechanism. However, we must understand the Torah value and lesson in this legal technicality. After all, from a point of justice and fairness, he did actually have relations with his mother in law, so why should he not incur the greater punishment? My impression is that there is some overriding idea about compassion that the Torah is trying to teach. Maybe it is to help a person who commits multiple sins bear up better under the guilt. It reminds me about my parenting errors in my youth. If my son and I were having a bad day and getting into power struggles, he might get docked or punished for so many infractions that the entire process was undermined. “You have to go to bed 10 minutes early, no 15! Wait, you are smirking, I’ll add another 10 minutes. Forget it, just go to bed now!” There is something compassionate and merciful about the idea that the person can only be held liable for one prohibition, even when at times, he violates many.
The Arvei Nachal (Noach 3:43) also discusses this and I will offer my interpretation of his cryptic words. Let me first quote him:
ארז"ל (יבמות ל"ב.) מי שנתחייב ב' מיתות נידון בזיקה הראשונה הבאה עליו, וזה כי מעשה האחרון שעשה נמשך מהראשון כי עבירה הראשונה מחייבי מיתות בית דין דנעשה גברא קטילא ולא היה לו שוב שום שמירה לכן אין להענישו כלל על מעשה האחרונה, וכן הוא בתחלואי הגוף כי אם נתחדשו באדם חלאים רבים לא ישתדל הרופא לרפאות רק החולי אשר סיבב כל החלאים האלה כי בהתבטל הסיבה יתבטל המסובב ויתרפאו כל יתר החלאים מעצמם.
Our sages stated that one who incurs two death penalties, is only judged by the first prohibition that was activated. This is because the last sinful act he did was really a result of his first. Once he incurs the death penalty, he is essentially a dead man, and “no longer has protection”, so he is not liable. This is comparable to a man who is severely ill and then contracts an opportunistic infection. The doctor treats the original illness in order that he will cure it by getting to the source.
The difficult to comprehend part of the Arvei Nachal is, what does he exactly mean by “no longer has protection”. It seems as if he is referring to losing some kind of spiritual protection as a result of his sin. This is reminiscent of the Gemara (Kiddushin 30b):
And Rabbi Shimon ben Levi says: A person’s inclination overpowers him every day, and seeks to kill him, as it is stated: “The wicked watches the righteous and seeks to slay him” (Psalms 37:32). And if not for the fact that the Holy One, Blessed be He, assists each person in battling his evil inclination, he could not overcome it, as it is stated: “The Lord will not leave him in his hand” (Psalms 37:33).
Perhaps once he sins, he loses that divine power. Or, as with many mystical ideas, there is a psychological representation of it as well. Once a person “falls off the wagon”, the resulting despair makes it harder to maintain resolve. Most people think they struggle with commitments, but actually they struggle with accepting their lapse and picking themselves up and moving on. The act itself while sinful or problematic is not the major problem. Instead it’s the getting stuck in the bad place and falling further that does the real damage.
Simply understood, the idea that one prohibition does not fall upon another is a legal mechanism. However, we must understand the Torah value and lesson in this legal technicality. After all, from a point of justice and fairness, he did actually have relations with his mother in law, so why should he not incur the greater punishment? My impression is that there is some overriding idea about compassion that the Torah is trying to teach. Maybe it is to help a person who commits multiple sins bear up better under the guilt. It reminds me about my parenting errors in my youth. If my son and I were having a bad day and getting into power struggles, he might get docked or punished for so many infractions that the entire process was undermined. “You have to go to bed 10 minutes early, no 15! Wait, you are smirking, I’ll add another 10 minutes. Forget it, just go to bed now!” There is something compassionate and merciful about the idea that the person can only be held liable for one prohibition, even when at times, he violates many.
The Arvei Nachal (Noach 3:43) also discusses this and I will offer my interpretation of his cryptic words. Let me first quote him:
ארז"ל (יבמות ל"ב.) מי שנתחייב ב' מיתות נידון בזיקה הראשונה הבאה עליו, וזה כי מעשה האחרון שעשה נמשך מהראשון כי עבירה הראשונה מחייבי מיתות בית דין דנעשה גברא קטילא ולא היה לו שוב שום שמירה לכן אין להענישו כלל על מעשה האחרונה, וכן הוא בתחלואי הגוף כי אם נתחדשו באדם חלאים רבים לא ישתדל הרופא לרפאות רק החולי אשר סיבב כל החלאים האלה כי בהתבטל הסיבה יתבטל המסובב ויתרפאו כל יתר החלאים מעצמם.
Our sages stated that one who incurs two death penalties, is only judged by the first prohibition that was activated. This is because the last sinful act he did was really a result of his first. Once he incurs the death penalty, he is essentially a dead man, and “no longer has protection”, so he is not liable. This is comparable to a man who is severely ill and then contracts an opportunistic infection. The doctor treats the original illness in order that he will cure it by getting to the source.
The difficult to comprehend part of the Arvei Nachal is, what does he exactly mean by “no longer has protection”. It seems as if he is referring to losing some kind of spiritual protection as a result of his sin. This is reminiscent of the Gemara (Kiddushin 30b):
And Rabbi Shimon ben Levi says: A person’s inclination overpowers him every day, and seeks to kill him, as it is stated: “The wicked watches the righteous and seeks to slay him” (Psalms 37:32). And if not for the fact that the Holy One, Blessed be He, assists each person in battling his evil inclination, he could not overcome it, as it is stated: “The Lord will not leave him in his hand” (Psalms 37:33).
Perhaps once he sins, he loses that divine power. Or, as with many mystical ideas, there is a psychological representation of it as well. Once a person “falls off the wagon”, the resulting despair makes it harder to maintain resolve. Most people think they struggle with commitments, but actually they struggle with accepting their lapse and picking themselves up and moving on. The act itself while sinful or problematic is not the major problem. Instead it’s the getting stuck in the bad place and falling further that does the real damage.
וּמִקְצָתוֹ חָלוּץ. וְיֹאמְרוּ! אִי דִּמְיַיבֵּם וַהֲדַר חָלֵיץ — הָכִי נָמֵי. אֶלָּא גְּזֵירָה דִּילְמָא חָלֵיץ בְּרֵישָׁא וַהֲדַר מְיַיבֵּם, וְקָם לֵיהּ בַּ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִבְנֶה״, וְרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁלֹּא בָּנָה — שׁוּב לֹא יִבְנֶה. אָמַר רָבָא: נָתַן גֵּט לְמַאֲמָרוֹ — הוּתְּרָה צָרָתָהּ. אֲבָל הִיא אֲסוּרָה, דְּמִחַלְּפָה בְּבַעֲלַת גֵּט. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא: נָתַן גֵּט לְמַאֲמָרוֹ — הוּתְּרָה אֲפִילּוּ הִיא. מַאי טַעְמָא? מַאי דַּעֲבַד בַּהּ — שַׁקְלֵיהּ. מַתְנִי׳ שְׁנֵי אַחִין נְשׂוּאִין שְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת, וּמֵת אֶחָד מֵהֶן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵתָה אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁנִי — הֲרֵי זוֹ אֲסוּרָה עָלָיו עוֹלָמִית, הוֹאִיל וְנֶאֶסְרָה עָלָיו שָׁעָה אַחַת. גְּמָ׳ פְּשִׁיטָא! הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה הָתָם דְּלָא מִידַּחְיָא מֵהַאי בֵּיתָא לִגְמָרֵי — אָמְרַתְּ לָא, הָכָא דְּקָא מִידַּחְיָא מֵהַאי בֵּיתָא לִגְמָרֵי — לָא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן! תַּנָּא — הָא תְּנָא בְּרֵישָׁא, וְהָךְ חַזְיַאּ לְהֶיתֵּירָא וְשַׁרְיַאּ, וַהֲדַר חַזְיַאּ לְאִיסּוּרָא. וְאַיְּידֵי דְּחַבִּיבָה לֵיהּ אַקְדְּמַהּ, וּמִשְׁנָה לֹא זָזָה מִמְּקוֹמָהּ. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: בָּא עָלֶיהָ — חַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אָח, וּמִשּׁוּם אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אָח בִּלְבַד. וְהָא תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה בִּלְבָד! לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן שֶׁנָּשָׂא חַי, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָשָׂא מֵת. כָּאן שֶׁנָּשָׂא מֵת, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָשָׂא חַי. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, הֵיכָא דְּנָשָׂא מֵת וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָשָׂא חַי, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיסּוּר אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה לָא חָיֵיל — תִּתְיַיבֵּם יַבּוֹמֵי! אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אִיסּוּר אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה מִיתְלָא תְּלֵי וְקָאֵי, אִי פָּקַע אִיסּוּר אֵשֶׁת אָח — אָתֵי אִיסּוּר אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה וְחָיֵיל, וְהִילְכָּךְ לָא פָּקַע. וְסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר? וְהָא תַּנְיָא: עָבַר עֲבֵירָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ שְׁתֵּי מִיתוֹת — נִידּוֹן בַּחֲמוּרָה. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: נִידּוֹן בַּזִּיקָּה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה הַבָּאָה עָלָיו. וְתַנְיָא: כֵּיצַד אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי נִידּוֹן בַּזִּיקָּה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה הַבָּאָה עָלָיו? חֲמוֹתוֹ וְנַעֲשֵׂית אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ — נִידּוֹן בַּחֲמוֹתוֹ. אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ וְנַעֲשֵׂית חֲמוֹתוֹ — נִידּוֹן בְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ. אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּאִיסּוּר מוֹסִיף. תִּינַח הֵיכָא דְּנָשָׂא חַי וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָשָׂא מֵת — מִגּוֹ דְּאִתּוֹסַף אִיסּוּר לְגַבֵּי אַחִים, אִתּוֹסַף אִיסּוּר לְגַבֵּי דִידֵיהּ. אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּנָשָׂא מֵת וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָשָׂא חַי, מַאי אִיסּוּר מוֹסִיף אִיכָּא? וְכִי תֵּימָא מִגּוֹ דְּאִיתְּסַר בְּכוּלְּהוּ אַחְווֹתָא — הַאי אִיסּוּר כּוֹלֵל הוּא. אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: מַעֲלֶה אֲנִי עָלָיו כְּאִילּוּ עָשָׂה שְׁתַּיִם, וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. וְכֵן כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַעֲלֶה אֲנִי עָלָיו כְּאִילּוּ עָשָׂה שְׁתַּיִם, וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. מַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְקׇבְרוֹ בֵּין רְשָׁעִים גְּמוּרִים. וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא. דְּאִיתְּמַר: זָר שֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ בְּשַׁבָּת, רַבִּי חִיָּיא אוֹמֵר: חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם. בַּר קַפָּרָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. קָפַץ רַבִּי חִיָּיא וְנִשְׁבַּע: הָעֲבוֹדָה! כָּךְ שָׁמַעְתִּי מֵרַבִּי: שְׁתַּיִם. קָפַץ בַּר קַפָּרָא וְנִשְׁבַּע: הָעֲבוֹדָה! כָּךְ שָׁמַעְתִּי מֵרַבִּי: אַחַת. הִתְחִיל רַבִּי חִיָּיא לָדוּן: שַׁבָּת לַכֹּל נֶאֶסְרָה, כְּשֶׁהוּתְּרָה בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ — אֵצֶל כֹּהֲנִים הוּתְּרָה. לְכֹהֲנִים הוּתְּרָה, וְלֹא לְזָרִים. יֵשׁ כָּאן מִשּׁוּם זָרוּת, וְיֵשׁ כָּאן מִשּׁוּם שַׁבָּת. הִתְחִיל בַּר קַפָּרָא לָדוּן: שַׁבָּת לַכֹּל נֶאֶסְרָה, כְּשֶׁהוּתְּרָה בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ — הוּתְּרָה. אֵין כָּאן אֶלָּא זָרוּת. בַּעַל מוּם שֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ בְּטוּמְאָה. רַבִּי חִיָּיא אוֹמֵר: חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם. בַּר קַפָּרָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. קָפַץ רַבִּי חִיָּיא וְנִשְׁבַּע: הָעֲבוֹדָה! כָּךְ שָׁמַעְתִּי מֵרַבִּי: שְׁתַּיִם. קָפַץ בַּר קַפָּרָא וְנִשְׁבַּע: הָעֲבוֹדָה! כָּךְ שָׁמַעְתִּי מֵרַבִּי: אַחַת. הִתְחִיל רַבִּי חִיָּיא לָדוּן: טוּמְאָה לַכֹּל נֶאֶסְרָה, כְּשֶׁהוּתְּרָה בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ — אֵצֶל כֹּהֲנִים תְּמִימִים הוּתְּרָה. לְכֹהֲנִים תְּמִימִים הוּתְּרָה, וְלֹא לְבַעֲלֵי מוּמִין. יֵשׁ כָּאן מִשּׁוּם בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין, וְיֵשׁ כָּאן מִשּׁוּם טוּמְאָה. הִתְחִיל בַּר קַפָּרָא לָדוּן: טוּמְאָה לַכֹּל נֶאֶסְרָה, כְּשֶׁהוּתְּרָה בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ — הוּתְּרָה, אֵין כָּאן אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם בַּעַל מוּם. זָר שֶׁאָכַל מְלִיקָה, רַבִּי חִיָּיא אוֹמֵר: חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם. בַּר קַפָּרָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. קָפַץ רַבִּי חִיָּיא וְנִשְׁבַּע: הָעֲבוֹדָה! כָּךְ שָׁמַעְתִּי מֵרַבִּי: שְׁתַּיִם. קָפַץ בַּר קַפָּרָא וְנִשְׁבַּע: הָעֲבוֹדָה! כָּךְ שָׁמַעְתִּי מֵרַבִּי: אַחַת. הִתְחִיל רַבִּי חִיָּיא לָדוּן: נְבֵלָה לַכֹּל נֶאֶסְרָה. כְּשֶׁהוּתְּרָה בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ — אֵצֶל כֹּהֲנִים הוּתְּרָה. לְכֹהֲנִים הוּתְּרָה, וְלֹא לְזָרִים. יֵשׁ כָּאן מִשּׁוּם זָרוּת, וְיֵשׁ כָּאן מִשּׁוּם מְלִיקָה. הִתְחִיל בַּר קַפָּרָא לָדוּן: נְבֵלָה לַכֹּל נֶאֶסְרָה, כְּשֶׁהוּתְּרָה בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ — הוּתְּרָה, אֵין כָּאן אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם זָרוּת.
and part of it must be released by ḥalitza. That is, if two women were married to a single man, one of these women must enter into levirate marriage and the other must perform ḥalitza. The Gemara wonders: So let them say it. Why would it be problematic if people thought that? Even were they to act upon this mistaken assumption it would cause no harm, as there is no transgression involved in performing ḥalitza. The Gemara answers: If he were to consummate the levirate marriage with one and then later proceed to perform ḥalitza with the other, then indeed there would be no reason for concern. Rather, the requirement to perform ḥalitza with both women is a rabbinic decree that was instituted lest he first perform ḥalitza with one of his brother’s wives and subsequently consummate the levirate marriage with the other. Under such circumstances, he would in fact be violating a prohibition. Once he performs ḥalitza with the first woman he is subject to the prohibition indicated by the verse “So shall it be done to the man who does not build his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9). In this verse the Merciful One states that once he did not build his brother’s house but rather opted to perform ḥalitza with one of his brother’s wives, he may not proceed to build it by consummating the levirate marriage with a different wife. Rava said: If the brother who performed levirate betrothal in the case described in the mishna subsequently gave a bill of divorce to that wife in order to nullify his levirate betrothal before he died, her rival wife is rendered permitted to the third brother. The third brother is allowed to consummate the levirate marriage with the wife of the second brother because this wife is no longer considered to be the rival wife of a woman with a double levirate relationship. The bill of divorce serves to nullify the act of levirate betrothal completely. However, the woman with whom the brother performed levirate betrothal and then received the bill of divorce is forbidden to the third brother. Why is this? She might be confused with a woman who receives a bill of divorce. In general cases where levirate betrothal was not performed, if a man gives a yevama a bill of divorce, he is no longer allowed to consummate the levirate marriage with her. If it were permitted to consummate the levirate marriage in this case, people might mistakenly do so in other cases of divorce as well. There are those who say an alternative formulation of Rava’s statement. Rava said: If the second brother gave a bill of divorce to the wife of the first deceased brother in order to nullify his levirate betrothal to her, then even she herself is permitted to enter into levirate marriage with the third brother. What is the reason for this? That which he performed with her, he removed. The levirate betrothal was completely nullified by the bill of divorce, and it is as though he had done nothing at all. Therefore, as far as the third brother is concerned, she remains with her original, single levirate bond, as though her status had never been changed by the second brother. MISHNA: In the case where two brothers were married to two sisters, and one of the brothers died, the widow at this point would be exempt from levirate marriage as the sister of his wife. And afterward the wife of the second brother died. Although the yevama is no longer the sister of his wife, this woman is nevertheless forbidden to him forever, since she had already been forbidden to him at one time. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? Now, just as there, in the earlier mishnayot, where there was a third brother and so the woman was not disassociated from this household completely, as the levirate obligation existed between her and the third brother to whom she was permitted, you said that she may not enter into levirate marriage because she was forbidden at one time, here, in the case of only two brothers, where she is disassociated from this household completely, is it not all the more so clear that it should be prohibited for her to enter into levirate marriage? The Gemara answers: The tanna taught this mishna at first, at which time he saw it fitting to rule that those other cases are permitted, and therefore he permitted them. And then he subsequently saw it fitting to rule that they are forbidden. And since that case was novel, it was beloved to him, he taught it earlier. But despite the fact that this mishna was no longer necessary, the mishna does not move from its place. § The Sages taught: If he engaged in sexual intercourse with this woman who was forbidden to him, he is liable to receive punishment for violating the prohibition against marrying a brother’s wife, because she was never rendered permitted by the levirate mitzva, and he is liable to receive punishment for violating the prohibition against marrying a wife’s sister; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Shimon says: He is liable to receive punishment only for violating the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife. Rabbi Shimon holds that one prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition is already in place, and since she was already forbidden as his brother’s wife, the additional prohibition cannot take effect. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita, Rabbi Shimon says: He is liable only due to the prohibition against marrying a wife’s sister? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, in the second baraita, it is referring to a case where the living brother married his wife first and afterward the brother who is now deceased married her sister. In that case, the first prohibition to take effect on the yevama was that of a wife’s sister, and only later, when she was married to his now-deceased brother, did the additional prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife take effect. There, in the first baraita, it is referring to a case where the brother who is now deceased married his wife first, whereby she became forbidden to the brother as a brother’s wife, and afterward the living brother married her sister, rendering her forbidden as his wife’s sister as well. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, in a case where the deceased brother married one of the sisters first, in which case she was forbidden to his brother as a brother’s wife, and afterward the living brother married her sister, the only prohibition in place is that of a brother’s wife. Therefore, since the prohibition with regard to a wife’s sister never took effect, then after her husband died she should now enter into levirate marriage. As the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife is canceled in the face of the levirate mitzva, she should indeed enter into levirate marriage. Rav Ashi said: The prohibition with regard to a wife’s sister remains suspended. If the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife is terminated, the prohibition proscribing a wife’s sister comes and takes effect. Therefore, it is clear that the prohibition proscribing a wife’s sister is not completely terminated. Accordingly, when a man dies and the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife is overridden by the levirate mitzva, the prohibition proscribing a wife’s sister takes effect and she is forbidden to him due to that. The moment the first prohibition ceases to exist, the second immediately takes effect. The baraita indicates that Rabbi Yosei holds that if the brother consummated the levirate marriage with this woman he violated two prohibitions. The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei hold that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One who committed a transgression deserving of two death penalties is sentenced to the harsher of the two deaths? One would be guilty of such a transgression if he engaged in intercourse with a forbidden relative who was also a married woman, as he would incur one death penalty due to her being a forbidden relative and one death penalty due to her being a married woman. Rabbi Yosei says: He is sentenced according to the first relationship that applied to him with regard to this woman. And it is taught in a baraita: In what case did Rabbi Yosei say that he is sentenced according to the first relationship that applied to him? If this woman was his mother-in-law who was widowed or divorced, and therefore forbidden to him only due to her status as his mother-in-law, and later she married and became forbidden as a married woman and he engaged in sexual relations with her, then he is sentenced for violating the prohibition proscribing his mother-in-law, since this was the first prohibition to apply. Alternatively, if she was a married woman and then he married her daughter so that she then became his mother-in-law, and then had sexual relations with her, he is sentenced for violating the prohibition proscribing a married woman. Rabbi Abbahu said: Rabbi Yosei concedes that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists when it is an expanded prohibition. An expanded prohibition is a prohibition that has a greater scope than the original prohibition, either because it applies with greater severity or because it applies to additional individuals. Rabbi Yosei holds that if the second prohibition incorporates additional individuals into the list of those for whom the original item is prohibited, then it takes effect in addition to the previous prohibition that had a more limited range. The Gemara asks: This works out well in cases where the living brother married his wife first, and her sister became forbidden to him as a wife’s sister, and then afterward the brother who was subsequently deceased married his wife’s sister. In that case it is possible to say: Since a prohibition was added for all the brothers, a prohibition was added for the living brother as well, and he is liable due to both prohibitions, as this prohibition is more wide-ranging than the previous one. In other words, at first this sister was permitted to the other brothers, and when the second brother married her she was rendered a brother’s wife and so she was additionally forbidden to the other brothers. However, where the deceased brother married first and afterward the living brother married her sister, in what way is there a prohibition that adds? No additional individuals were incorporated into the prohibition as a result of the marriage of the living brother with the sister, since the prohibition here proscribing a wife’s sister applies to him alone. And if you would say: Since he himself now married a sister he became prohibited to all of the other sisters, as opposed to the prior state of affairs where only his brother was married to one of the sisters and all of the other sisters were permitted to him, and therefore an additional prohibition now applies to him, this is difficult. In this case the new prohibition is not considered an expanded prohibition, but rather it is considered a more inclusive prohibition. It is more inclusive and more comprehensive in that it adds additional aspects to the prohibition for the same individual. This is not called an expanded prohibition, as it does not add prohibitions to additional individuals. Rather, Rava said that when Rabbi Yosei stated in the baraita that the man is liable due to both prohibitions, for a brother’s wife and for a wife’s sister, he meant to say: I ascribe to him liability as though he transgressed twice, since indeed he violated two prohibitions, yet he is liable to receive punishment in human courts on only one count. And likewise, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: I ascribe to him liability as though he transgressed twice, yet he is liable to receive punishment on only one count. The Gemara asks: What difference does it make if we consider it as though he transgressed twice? The Gemara answers: It affects the decision whether or not to bury him among the completely wicked. Just as a righteous individual is not buried among the wicked, so too, a wicked individual is not buried among those more wicked than himself. He who violated this prohibition is considered as though he committed two transgressions and not one, and so he would be buried accordingly. § The Gemara comments that the issue of a prohibition taking effect where another prohibition already exists is taught in the dispute found in a baraita, where it was stated: With regard to a non-priest who served in some capacity in one of the Temple services, such as the burning of a burnt-offering on the altar on Shabbat, Rabbi Ḥiyya says: He is liable to receive punishment on two counts, both because he was a non-priest serving in the Temple and because he desecrated Shabbat. Bar Kappara says: He is liable on only one count. Rabbi Ḥiyya jumped up and swore: I swear by the Temple service that this I heard from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: He is liable on two counts. Bar Kappara jumped up and swore: I swear by the Temple service that this I heard from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: He is liable on one count. Since the matter could not be decided by tradition, Rabbi Ḥiyya began to deliberate and analyze the question logically. Prohibited labor on Shabbat was prohibited to all. When prohibited labor was permitted in the Temple for the purposes of the Temple service, it was permitted only for priests. This indicates that it was permitted for priests and not for non-priests. Therefore, when a non-priest serves in the Temple on Shabbat, there is a transgression here due to his serving as a non-priest and there is a transgression here due to his desecrating Shabbat. Bar Kappara began to deliberate in a different manner: Shabbat was prohibited to all. When it was permitted it was permitted in the Temple, so that if it was permitted for one to serve in the Temple, it was permitted for him to serve on Shabbat. Therefore, there is a transgression here only for his serving as a non-priest, since if this man were a priest his service would have been permitted. Therefore, he is not liable to receive punishment for desecrating Shabbat. They disagreed over a similar issue as well, the case of a priest with a blemish who served in the Temple by sacrificing a public offering, which overrides ritual impurity, while he was ritually impure. Rabbi Ḥiyya says: He is liable on two counts, both for serving with a blemish and for being ritually impure. Bar Kappara says: He is liable on only one count, for serving with a blemish. Rabbi Ḥiyya jumped up and swore: I swear by the Temple service that this I heard from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: He is liable on two counts. Bar Kappara jumped up and swore: I swear by the Temple service that this I heard from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: He is liable on one count. Rabbi Ḥiyya began to deliberate. Ritual impurity was prohibited to all, as it was prohibited for all individuals who are ritually impure to enter into the Temple. When it was permitted in the Temple in circumstances where the entire public was impure, it was permitted for unblemished priests. Therefore, it was permitted only for unblemished priests and not for priests with blemishes. Consequently, if that priest with a blemish served while impure, there is a transgression here due to his status as a blemished priest and there is a transgression here due to ritual impurity. Bar Kappara began to deliberate in a different manner: Ritual impurity was prohibited to all. When it was permitted in the Temple, it was permitted for all. Therefore, the only problem was that this priest was blemished, and so there is a transgression here only due to his status as a blemished priest. They disagreed over a similar issue as well. This dispute is with regard to a non-priest who ate a bird sin-offering that was killed by pinching the back of its neck. It is permitted for priests to consume such an offering, but it is prohibited to consume any other bird killed in such a manner, since it was not ritually slaughtered. Rabbi Ḥiyya says: He is liable to receive punishment on two counts, both for being a non-priest who ate a priestly offering and for eating something that was not properly slaughtered. Bar Kappara says: He is liable on only one count. Rabbi Ḥiyya jumped up and swore: I swear by the Temple service that this I heard from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: He is liable on two counts. Bar Kappara jumped up and swore: I swear by the Temple service that this I heard from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: He is liable on one count. Rabbi Ḥiyya began to deliberate. An unslaughtered animal carcass was prohibited to all. When it was permitted in the Temple, it was permitted to priests alone. Since it was permitted to priests and not to non-priests, there is a transgression here due to his status as a non-priest who ate of the sin-offering and there is a transgression here due to eating an animal killed by pinching. Bar Kappara began to deliberate: An unslaughtered animal carcass was prohibited to all. When it was permitted in the Temple, it was permitted to all. Therefore there is a transgression here only for being a non-priest, since if he were a priest there would be no prohibition at all.