Yevamot: Greatest Hits

§ Up until this point, the Gemara has cited the baraita that interprets the biblical basis for the halakha of the mishna. The Gemara further analyzes the foundational principles of this topic. The reason that these women are exempt from levirate marriage is that the Merciful One writes “with her,” from which it may be inferred that if that was not so, I would say that a wife’s sister enters into levirate marriage with her sister’s husband. What is the reason that one would have assumed that this is the case? It is as we say, in accordance with a principle, that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition. In this case, the positive mitzva to enter into levirate marriage overrides the prohibition against marrying one’s wife’s sister. The Gemara asks if that principle is applicable in this case. One can say that we said that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition only when there is a prohibition for which one is punished by lashes alone. However, with regard to a prohibition that includes the punishment of karet, does a positive mitzva override it? This prohibition is more severe than a regular one, and therefore perhaps a positive mitzva does not override it. And furthermore, with regard to a prohibition for which one is punished by lashes alone, from where do we derive that a positive mitzva overrides it? As it is written: “You shall not wear diverse kinds of wool and linen together. You shall make for yourself twisted fringes on the four corners of your covering with which you cover yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:11–12). These verses teach that despite the prohibition against wearing diverse kinds of wool and linen, it is permitted to prepare ritual fringes of diverse kinds, e.g., sky-blue dyed threads of wool on linen garments. This shows that the positive mitzva of ritual fringes overrides the prohibition of diverse kinds. And Rabbi Elazar said: From where in the Torah is it derived that one may draw homiletical interpretations from the juxtaposition of verses? In other words, from where is it derived that the fact that certain verses are adjacent one to the other is a reason to apply the halakhot from one verse to the other? As it is stated: “The works of His hands in truth and justice, all His commandments are sure. Juxtaposed forever and ever, made in truth and uprightness” (Psalms 111:7–8). This verse indicates that it is appropriate to draw inferences from the juxtaposition of God’s commandments. And similarly, Rav Sheshet said that Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya: From where is it derived with regard to a yevama who came before a yavam afflicted with boils that one may not muzzle her, i.e., she cannot be forced to enter into levirate marriage, and he is compelled to release her by ḥalitza? As it is stated: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it treads out the corn” (Deuteronomy 25:4), and, juxtaposed to it, is the verse: “If brothers dwell together” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which begins the passage that deals with the halakhot of levirate marriage. This teaches that just as it is prohibited to muzzle the ox, so too, one may not muzzle and ignore the complaints of a yevama who does not wish to marry a yavam afflicted with boils. And Rav Yosef said: Even according to the one who does not generally derive homiletic interpretations from juxtaposed verses, nevertheless, he does derive them from Deuteronomy, as Rabbi Yehuda does not generally derive homiletic interpretations from juxtaposed verses, and yet he does derive them from Deuteronomy. § The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that Rabbi Yehuda generally does not derive homiletic interpretations from juxtaposed verses? As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the punishment of a sorceress that ben Azzai says that it is stated: “You shall not allow a sorceress to live” (Exodus 22:17), although the manner of her execution is not specified, and it is stated: “Whoever lies with a beast shall surely be put to death” (Exodus 22:18). The Torah juxtaposed this matter to that so as to say: Just as one who lies with a beast is executed by stoning (see Leviticus 20:16), so too, a sorceress is executed by stoning.

§ The Gemara returns to the issue of a mitzva overriding a prohibition: We have found that a positive mitzva overrides a regular prohibition. However, where do we find that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition that includes karet, as the phrase “with her” is necessary to prohibit her? It was mentioned previously that the superfluous phrase “with her” teaches that the mitzva of levirate marriage does not override the prohibition against taking a wife’s sister. However, why is this necessary? Why would it have been assumed that a positive mitzva is so powerful that it overrides even a prohibition that is punishable by karet? And if you suggest an answer and say: Let us derive this claim from the mitzva of circumcision, as there is a positive mitzva to perform circumcision on the eighth day of the boy’s life even on Shabbat, and this mitzva overrides the prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat, which is punishable by karet, one could respond: What about the fact that circumcision is an extremely important and severe positive mitzva, as thirteen covenants were established over it? The term “covenant” is mentioned thirteen times in the chapter of circumcision (Genesis, chapter 17). The Gemara adds: And if you say it is derived from the slaughter of the Paschal lamb, which overrides Shabbat and is therefore a positive mitzva that overrides a prohibition punishable by karet, this too can be rejected: What about the fact that the Paschal lamb is different, as it is a positive mitzva that is so severe that its neglect entails karet for those who do not bring it, unlike all other positive mitzvot? The Gemara offers yet another suggestion: Perhaps it is derived from the daily offering, which was slaughtered every day, even on Shabbat. This is a positive mitzva that overrides the prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat, which is punishable by karet. The Gemara rejects this claim as well: What about the fact that the daily offering is special in that it is frequent? Since the mitzva of the daily offering is performed every day, it is perhaps especially important, whereas a positive mitzva that applies only at certain times might not be powerful enough to override a severe prohibition. The Gemara says: Clearly, the principle cannot be derived from any single one of these cases. However, let it be derived from two of these cases combined together, by analyzing their common features. The Gemara asks: From which two cases can it be derived? If one would say that it can be derived from circumcision and the Paschal lamb, the factor common to both is their particular severity, as their neglect entails karet. If one would seek to derive this from the Paschal lamb and the daily offering, these have a different common factor, as both are a requirement of the altar in the Temple, not for personal benefit. Likewise, if one would suggest deriving the principle from circumcision and the daily offering, this too must be rejected, as both of these mitzvot were known by the Jewish people before the word of God was revealed at Mount Sinai. And this is according to the opinion of the one who said that the burnt-offering brought by the Jewish people in the desert was the daily offering. And moreover, from all of these together, i.e., circumcision, the Paschal lamb, and the daily offering, it is also not possible to derive a conclusion, as all three of these were known before the word of God was revealed. If so, no principle can be derived from these three mitzvot. § Rather, the Gemara suggests an alternative explanation: The inference from “with her” is necessary, as were it not for this inference it might be assumed that the mitzva of levirate marriage overrides the prohibition against marrying one’s wife’s sister despite the fact that this prohibition incurs karet, since it could enter your mind to say that this halakha is derived from the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother. As it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that honoring one’s father and mother overrides Shabbat; therefore, the verse states: “You shall fear every man his mother and his father and you shall keep My Shabbatot, I am the Lord your God” (Leviticus 19:3). The baraita explains the derivation from the verse: All of you, both parent and child, are obligated in My honor, and therefore honoring one’s parents does not override the honor of God, Who commanded the Jewish people to observe Shabbat. The Gemara analyzes this baraita: What, is it not referring to a situation where his father said to him: Slaughter for me, cook for me, or any other labor prohibited on Shabbat on pain of karet? And the reason that the Merciful One specifically writes: “Keep My Shabbatot,” is to warn against violating the prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat, a transgression which incurs karet, for the purpose of honoring one’s parents. It may therefore be inferred that if that was not so, the positive mitzva would override Shabbat. It is therefore possible to deduce from here that in general, positive mitzvot override even prohibitions that entail karet. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, the reference is not to a situation where a father demanded that his child perform prohibited labor on Shabbat that entails karet. Rather, he instructed him to transgress the prohibition against driving a laden animal. Although it is prohibited to cause animals to work on Shabbat, this does not entail the penalty of karet, as it has the status of a regular prohibition. And this shows that if one’s father told him to desecrate Shabbat by driving a donkey, even so, the positive mitzva to honor one’s parents does not override the prohibition against driving a laden animal. § The Gemara asks: If so, rather than that principle in which we maintain that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition, let us derive from here that it does not override even a regular prohibition. Just as it was inferred above from the case of ritual fringes, in which the positive mitzva overrides the prohibition against diverse kinds, that all other positive mitzvot similarly override any prohibition, perhaps one should infer from the case of honoring one’s parents that positive mitzvot do not override prohibitions at all.

§ After discussing different interpretations of the relevant verses, the Gemara addresses the details of the halakhot of the mishna. It first considers the numbers that comprise the structure of the mishna as a whole. The Sage Levi said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Why does the tanna specifically teach the cases of fifteen women? Let him teach the cases of sixteen women, including the case of a rival wife of a forbidden relation. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Judging by his question, it seems to me that this Sage has no brain in his head. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi proceeded to explain the question and the answer himself: What is your thinking? Is it that the tanna should have included the case of his mother who had been raped by his father? In the opinion of the Rabbis, a woman raped by one’s father is permitted in marriage to another of his sons. Consequently, it is possible that she might give birth to a son and later marry one of the other sons of the rapist. If her husband subsequently died childless, this woman would come before the brother of the deceased for levirate marriage, who is in this case her son. If so, there are in fact sixteen women with whom relations are forbidden. However, continued Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, this is incorrect, as the case of his mother raped by his father is a matter of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. According to Rabbi Yehuda, a woman raped by one’s father could never come before him for levirate marriage, as it is prohibited for her to marry his brothers. And the tanna of this mishna does not deal with disputed cases. The mishna enumerates only those cases that are accepted by all opinions, not those that are a matter of dispute.

And the baraita continues: Who is considered a minor? It is a girl from the age of eleven years and one day until the age of twelve years and one day. If she was younger than this or older than this, she may go ahead and engage in relations in her usual manner. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Since it is assumed that a minor who is less than eleven years old cannot become pregnant, she is considered to be in no danger. And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one, i.e., in all these cases, she may go ahead and engage in relations in her usual manner, and Heaven will have mercy upon her and prevent any mishap, since it is stated: “The Lord preserves the simple” (Psalms 116:2).

MISHNA: Six women with whom relations are forbidden who were not enumerated in the first mishna are forbidden by prohibitions that are more severe than those listed in that mishna because they may be married only to others and may never be married to any of the brothers, due to the closeness of their relationship. However, this stringency entails a corresponding leniency: Since the halakha of levirate marriage is entirely inapplicable in these cases, their rival wives are permitted. The rival wife of a forbidden relative is forbidden herself only if the mitzva of levirate marriage is applicable, but where it is not in effect she is permitted. The six women with whom relations are forbidden are as follows: His mother, and his father’s wife, and his father’s sister, and his paternal half sister, and the wife of his father’s brother, and the wife of his paternal half brother. Each of these women with whom relations are forbidden is forbidden equally to all of the brothers, and the mitzva of levirate marriage is inapplicable. Therefore, her rival wife is permitted. § Up to this point, the discussions were based on the assumption that not only may a forbidden relative not enter into levirate marriage, but her rival wife is also exempt. However, this issue is subject to a long-standing dispute. Beit Shammai permit the rival wives to the brothers, as they did not accept the interpretation of the verses that indicates that rival wives are prohibited. And Beit Hillel forbid them. The previous mishnayot are in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. If any of the rival wives of the brother performed ḥalitza, Beit Shammai disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood, as in their opinion these rival wives were fit for levirate marriage, which means that the ḥalitza was fully valid. Consequently, they are disqualified from marrying a priest, like all other women who perform ḥalitza. And Beit Hillel deem them fit, as they maintain that no legal act of ḥalitza was performed here at all. If they entered into levirate marriage, Beit Shammai deem them fit for the priesthood, as in their opinion, this is a fully legal levirate marriage. And Beit Hillel disqualify them, because they engaged in licentious sexual relations as the rival wives of a forbidden relative. § The mishna comments: Although Beit Hillel prohibit the rival wives to the brothers and Beit Shammai permit them, and although these disqualify these women and those deem them fit, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. Furthermore, with regard to all of the disputes concerning the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity, where these rule that an article is ritually pure and those rule it ritually impure, they did not refrain from handling ritually pure objects each with the other, as Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel frequently used each other’s vessels.

§ Apropos the mishna’s comments concerning the details of the relationship between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, the Gemara discusses the issue of disputes in general. We learned in a mishna there, in tractate Megilla (2a): The Megilla, the Scroll of Esther, is read on the eleventh of Adar, on the twelfth, on the thirteenth, on the fourteenth, or on the fifteenth, in cities surrounded by a wall, no earlier and no later than this. The obligation to read the Megilla on the fourteenth or fifteenth of Adar is stated in the Megilla itself, while the additional days were instituted by the Sages to allow residents of villages, who would come to the cities on Mondays and Thursdays and supply water and rations to the residents of the cities, to hear the reading of the Megilla at that opportunity. Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: I should read here the verse: “You shall not cut yourselves [titgodedu]” (Deuteronomy 14:1), which is interpreted as meaning: Do not become numerous factions [agudot]. In other words, the Jewish people should be united, rather than divided into disparate groups that act in different ways. Before analyzing this issue, the Gemara asks: This verse: “You shall not cut yourselves,” is required for the matter itself, as the Merciful One is saying: Do not cut yourselves over the dead. How is the halakha concerning factions derived from this apparently straightforward verse? The Gemara answers: If so, that the verse comes to teach only about the practices of mourning, let the verse state only: You shall not cut. What is the meaning of: “You shall not cut yourselves”? Learn from this that it comes for this purpose as well, to teach the prohibition against splitting into factions. The Gemara asks: But in that case, one can say that the entire verse comes for this purpose and does not refer to cutting for the dead at all. The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse state: Lo tagodu, rather than lo titgodedu, both of which mean: You shall not cut. What is the meaning of: “Lo titgodedu”? Conclude two conclusions from it: Both the simple prohibition against making cuts for the dead and the matter of dividing into factions. After this incidental discussion, the Gemara returns to the basic question raised by Reish Lakish: Why doesn’t the reading of the Scroll of Esther in different places at different times violate the prohibition against breaking into factions? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Have you not taught until now: In a place where the people were accustomed to perform labor on Passover eve until midday, one may do so on that day; in a place where the people were accustomed not to perform labor, one may not do so? This shows that different places can have different customs without violating the prohibition against dividing into factions. Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: I speak to you of a prohibition, as residents of villages are prohibited from reading the Megilla with a blessing on the fifteenth of Adar, as Rav Shemen bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The verse “to confirm these days of Purim in their appointed times” (Esther 9:31) teaches that the Sages instituted many times for their reading, and it is prohibited to deviate from these dates. And you speak to me about a custom that does not involve a prohibition. How can a prohibition be established in a manner that involves the formation of factions among the people? Rabbi Yoḥanan replied: And in that case there, on Passover eve, is there no prohibition involved? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: On the night before the fourteenth of Nisan, Beit Shammai prohibit the performance of work and Beit Hillel permit it. Evidently, there is indeed a prohibition involved, and yet some perform work while others do not, which splits the people into factions. Reish Lakish said to him: In that case there, the different factions are not noticeable, as one who sees another idle says: It is because he has no labor to perform. Therefore, refraining from work does not have the appearance of breaking off into factions. Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a difficulty: But Beit Shammai permit rival wives to the brothers, and Beit Hillel prohibit this practice. This is an example of a clear prohibition, and yet two different traditions were followed. Reish Lakish said to him: Do you hold that Beit Shammai actually acted in accordance with their own statement? Beit Shammai did not in fact act in accordance with their own statement, as the dispute was merely theoretical. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Beit Shammai certainly did act in accordance with their opinion. The Gemara comments: And this is also reflected in the dispute between Rav and Shmuel, as Rav says: Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own statement, and Shmuel said: They certainly did act in that manner. The Gemara inquires: When does this question apply? If we say that it is referring to the period prior to the Divine Voice that declared that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, then what is the rationale of the one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion? But rather, if one would say it is referring to after the Divine Voice, what is the reason for the one who said that they did act in accordance with their opinion? After all, the Divine Voice established that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. The Gemara answers: Neither of these options poses a difficulty. If you wish, say that it is referring to the period prior to the Divine Voice, and if you wish, say instead that it is after the Divine Voice. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say it is prior to the Divine Voice, and it is referring to the period when Beit Hillel formed the majority of the Sages. Therefore, according to the one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion, the reason is that Beit Hillel was the majority, and the halakha is in accordance with the majority. And the one who said that they did act in accordance with their opinion maintains that when do we follow the majority? It is in a case where the disputing parties are equal in wisdom to one another. Here, however, Beit Shammai are sharper than Beit Hillel, and therefore they acted in accordance with their own opinion despite the fact that they were in the minority. And if you wish, say instead that it was after the Divine Voice. The one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion would say that this was due to the pronouncement of the Divine Voice. And the one who said that they did do so, this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said, with regard to the Divine Voice that emerged and proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the case of the oven of akhnai (Bava Metzia 59b), that one disregards a Heavenly Voice. Just as he disregarded the Divine Voice in his dispute with Rabbi Eliezer, so too, one disregards the Divine Voice that proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. And yet the question remains: According to the one who said that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion, we should read here: “You shall not cut yourselves” (Deuteronomy 14:1), which is interpreted to mean: Do not become numerous factions. Abaye said: When we say that the prohibition: “You shall not cut yourselves” applies, we are referring to a case where two courts are located in one city, and these rule in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and those rule in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel. However, with regard to two courts located in two different cities, we have no problem with it. Rava said to him: But the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is considered like a case of two courts in one city, as these two schools of thought were found everywhere, not in any specific place. Rather, Rava said: When we say that the prohibition: “You shall not cut yourselves” applies, we are referring to a case where there is a court in one city, a section of which rules in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and another section rules in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel. However, with regard to two courts located in one city, we have no problem with it. § The Gemara cites other relevant sources. Come and hear: In the locale of Rabbi Eliezer, where his ruling was followed, they would cut down trees on Shabbat to prepare charcoal from them to fashion iron tools with which to circumcise a child on Shabbat. In Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, not only does the mitzva of circumcision override Shabbat, but also any action required for the preparation of the tools necessary for the circumcision likewise overrides Shabbat. The baraita adds: In the locale of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili they would eat poultry meat in milk, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili held that the prohibition of meat in milk does not include poultry.

§ The Gemara cites other relevant sources. Come and hear: In the locale of Rabbi Eliezer, where his ruling was followed, they would cut down trees on Shabbat to prepare charcoal from them to fashion iron tools with which to circumcise a child on Shabbat. In Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, not only does the mitzva of circumcision override Shabbat, but also any action required for the preparation of the tools necessary for the circumcision likewise overrides Shabbat. The baraita adds: In the locale of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili they would eat poultry meat in milk, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili held that the prohibition of meat in milk does not include poultry. The Gemara infers: In the locale of Rabbi Eliezer, yes, they would act in this manner, whereas in the locale of Rabbi Akiva, for instance, no, they would not do so, as it is taught in a baraita that a principle was stated by Rabbi Akiva: Any prohibited labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat even if it involves a mitzva. A mitzva whose proper time is on Shabbat overrides Shabbat only if its performance was impossible earlier, e.g., the act of circumcision itself, which cannot be performed earlier. The Gemara asks: And what is this refutation? As stated above, it is different when dealing with numerous places, and the baraita explicitly states that this practice was followed in Rabbi Eliezer’s locale. Consequently, there is no violation of the prohibition against splitting into factions. The Gemara asks: He who asked it, why did he ask it, i.e., what is the basis for the question in the first place? It is obvious that the baraita is referring to a specific place. The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that due to the severity of Shabbat, it, i.e., the world, is considered like a single locale. In other words, one might have thought that the permission to tolerate diverse customs in different places applies only to other prohibitions, whereas the prohibition of Shabbat is so severe that it is unacceptable to allow different customs, as this might lead people to disrespect Shabbat. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that even in the case of Shabbat there can be different customs in various locales.

§ The Gemara cites another relevant case involving Shabbat: Come and hear that Rabbi Abbahu, when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, would move an oil lamp [sheraga] after the flame that had been lit for that Shabbat had burned out, as Rabbi Yehoshua accepted the ruling that it is permitted to carry items of this sort that had been set aside. But when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who prohibited carrying items of this kind that had been set aside on Shabbat, he would not move an oil lamp. This indicates that divergent customs are followed in different places. Again, the Gemara asks: And what is this difficulty? Didn’t we say that it is different when dealing with numerous places? The Gemara explains that this is what we are saying: With regard to Rabbi Abbahu himself, how could he act in this manner here and how could he act in that manner there? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Abbahu holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that it is permitted to carry this item. And when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yoḥanan he would not carry it, in deference to Rabbi Yoḥanan, so as not to act contrary to his ruling in the place where he was the authority. The Gemara asks: But there was a servant accompanying Rabbi Abbahu who would see him carrying these types of articles that had been set aside. Wasn’t Rabbi Abbahu concerned that the servant might carry them in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s locale? The Gemara explains that he would inform the servant and explain to him the reason for his change in behavior.

§ The Gemara continues to discuss the question of whether Beit Shammai followed their own rulings. Come and hear that which is taught in the mishna: Although Beit Hillel prohibit and Beit Shammai permit, and these disqualify the women and those deem them fit, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion, it is due to that reason that they did not have to refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel. However, if you say that they did act in accordance with their opinion, why didn’t they refrain from marrying one another? The Gemara elaborates: Granted, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying into Beit Hillel, as even if Beit Shammai maintain in a certain case that a rival wife required levirate marriage or ḥalitza, if she went ahead and married another man their children are born to a union whose partners are liable by a regular prohibition: “The wife of the dead man shall not be married outside” (Deuteronomy 25:5). Since this transgression does not entail karet, the children of this relationship are not mamzerim. However, why did Beit Hillel not refrain from marrying into Beit Shammai? In the opinion of Beit Hillel the children of these rival wives who entered into levirate marriage are born of a union whose partners are liable to receive karet, as the prohibition of a brother’s wife was never nullified in this case, which means that the children are mamzerim. If so, how could Beit Hillel allow these marriages? And if you would say that Beit Hillel maintain that the child of a union whose partners are liable to receive karet is not a mamzer, as a mamzer is only one whose parents violated a prohibition that entails the death penalty, didn’t Rabbi Elazar say: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to rival wives, they concede that a mamzer is only from a union whose prohibition is a prohibition of forbidden relations punishable by karet? Consequently, the children of rival wives are mamzerim according to Beit Hillel. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from here that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own opinion? The Gemara rejects this conclusion: No; actually, Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinion. As for the problem with these marriages, the answer is that they would inform Beit Hillel and Beit Hillel would withdraw from the match. When those who acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel would come to marry women from those who followed the rulings of Beit Shammai, they would be notified that certain children were born of rival wives and that those people were considered mamzerim in the opinion of Beit Hillel, who therefore declared them forbidden in marriage. The Gemara comments: And so too, it is reasonable that this is the case, as the mishna teaches in the latter clause: With regard to all of the disputes concerning the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity, where those, Beit Hillel, rule an article ritually pure and these, Beit Shammai, rule it ritually impure, they did not refrain from handling ritually pure objects each with the other. Granted, if you say that they notified them, it is due to that reason that they did not need to refrain from using their objects. However, if you say that they did not notify them, granted, it is logical that Beit Shammai did not refrain from handling items belonging to Beit Hillel, as ritually impure objects for Beit Hillel are ritually pure for Beit Shammai, and therefore no special care is necessary. However, why didn’t Beit Hillel refrain from touching articles that belonged to Beit Shammai? After all, ritually pure objects for Beit Shammai are ritually impure for Beit Hillel. Rather, is it not the case that Beit Shammai notified Beit Hillel that these items were ritually pure only in their own opinion, and Beit Hillel separated themselves from them? The Gemara summarizes the discussion: Conclude from here that this is the correct interpretation. The Gemara asks: In what way is this case stronger than that case? In other words, why is the statement with regard to ritual purity and impurity more conclusive than the one that deals with marriage? Since the practice of notification was not explicitly stated in the case of ritual purity but was merely inferred logically, the same reasoning applies equally to the case of marriage. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since it is so unusual, a marriage to a rival wife generates publicity and is so widely known that no special notification is required, therefore, the Gemara teaches us that even in this case notification is required.

§ Since the statement of Rabbi Elazar was mentioned, the Gemara turns to discuss the matter itself. Rabbi Elazar said: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to rival wives, they concede that a mamzer is only from a union whose prohibition is a prohibition of forbidden relations punishable by karet. The Gemara asks: Who concedes to whom? If we say that Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel, this is obvious, since if they acted in accordance with their own opinion that rival wives who married others without ḥalitza are liable only for violating a regular prohibition, their children are therefore fit and are not mamzerim at all. Rather, one could say that Beit Hillel concede to Beit Shammai. But in that case she herself, the rival wife of a forbidden relative who married one of the yevamin, is liable to receive karet in the opinion of Beit Hillel, and the child is a mamzer, whereas Rabbi Elazar’s statement indicates that they concede with regard to a different case. The Gemara explains: Actually, Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel, and this is not a novelty with regard to their basic dispute. Instead, the statement comes to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said: The offspring from forbidden relations for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is a mamzer. Rabbi Elazar teaches us that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that the offspring from forbidden relations for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is not a mamzer; rather, one is a mamzer only if he is born of a union punishable by karet. § The Gemara returns to the initial question of whether or not Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their own opinion. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear: Although Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to several cases, nevertheless, they did not refrain from marrying women from each other’s communities. The cases with regard to which they disagreed include rival wives, and sisters, i.e., if two sisters had been married to two brothers and simultaneously became obligated in levirate marriage, Beit Hillel prohibit both in levirate marriage, and if they violated the prohibition and married regardless, they require a divorce. By contrast, Beit Shammai permit them to remain married. Furthermore, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to an outdated bill of divorce that had been written but not delivered. Beit Shammai maintain that if the husband and wife continued to live together after the writing of the bill of divorce, the same bill of divorce can still be used later, whereas Beit Hillel dispute this. And they likewise disagreed with regard to an uncertain married woman, i.e., whether a minor who was actually married, and not merely betrothed, may perform refusal. And they also disagreed with regard to one who divorces his wife and later she lodged together with him at an inn, as to whether or not this is sufficient grounds for assuming that they remarried. Additionally, they disagreed with regard to the issue of betrothal by money and with the equivalent value of money, and by a peruta or with the equivalent value of a peruta. According to Beit Shammai, the minimal amount of money effective for betrothal is a dinar or the equivalent of a dinar, whereas Beit Hillel maintain that even the less valuable peruta or its equivalent is sufficient. Despite the fact that these halakhot entail important ramifications depending on whether or not these women were married or fit for marriage, or whether their offspring are fit for marriage, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. This serves to teach you that they practiced affection and camaraderie between them, to fulfill that which is stated: “Love truth and peace” (Zechariah 8:19). Rabbi Shimon says: They did refrain in the certain cases, but they did not refrain in the uncertain cases. In other words, Beit Hillel were not worried that any ordinary woman from Beit Shammai might be one of those of uncertain status. The Gemara infers from the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinion, it is due to that reason that they refrained in the certain cases. However, if you say that they did not act in accordance with their opinion, why did they refrain from marriage? The Gemara replies: And how can you understand it that way, that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion? Even if they acted in accordance with their opinion, granted that Beit Hillel refrained from marrying into Beit Shammai, as those rival wives who entered into levirate marriage are liable to receive karet and their children are mamzerim according to the opinion of Beit Hillel. However, why did Beit Shammai refrain from marrying the offspring of rival wives of Beit Hillel? The parents are liable for violating a regular prohibition, and therefore their children are fit. The Gemara answers as Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said with regard to a different matter: This halakha was necessary not for the children of the rival wife, but only for the rival wife herself. Here too, it was necessary only for the rival wife herself. The halakha was not taught with regard to the children of the rival wives; rather, it is referring only to the rival wives. The Gemara asks further: And in what way are uncertain cases different from the certain cases, such as forbidden rival wives? If you say that certain cases are undoubtedly prohibited in the opinion of Beit Hillel, the cases involving uncertain circumstances, e.g., one who divorced his wife and then stayed with her in the same inn, are also prohibited. Even if Beit Hillel render these cases prohibited only due to some uncertainty, the ruling is the same. The Gemara answers: Do not say: In the uncertain cases, i.e., that the halakha involved doubtful circumstances. Rather, say: From the unspecified case. In other words, barring clear knowledge of an uncertain betrothal within a specific family, they would take women from that family in marriage. The reason is that Beit Shammai would notify Beit Hillel of the prohibition according to their opinion, and they would refrain from the marriage. If there was no notification, this was a clear sign that no doubt was involved in this case at all. The Gemara asks: But if so, what does this come to teach us? Is it that they had relations of affection and camaraderie between them, i.e., that each trusted that the other side would never cause them to err with regard to something they held to be prohibited? This is the same as the first clause of the baraita. What is Rabbi Shimon adding by his statement? The Gemara answers: This comes to teach us that the entire baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. This is not a dispute between two Sages. Rather, Rabbi Shimon’s opinion elucidates the earlier statement.

§ The Gemara offers an alternative resolution: Come and hear, as Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: How should one act with regard to this halakha of rival wives? In what form should it become widespread among the Jewish people? If we act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai and permit a rival wife in levirate marriage, the offspring will be a mamzer according to the statement of Beit Hillel. If we act in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel and grant full exemption to the rival wives, the offspring will be of flawed lineage according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, as he is the child of a woman prohibited in marriage by a regular prohibition. Although he is not a mamzer, his lineage is nevertheless defective. Instead, let us enact a general decree for rival wives that they should perform ḥalitza and not enter into levirate marriage. If they act in this manner, they will be permitted to marry others and the problem will be solved according to all opinions. They were unable to finalize the matter according to the proposition raised by Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri before times of trouble arrived. Due to the outbreak of war they were unable to gather together to vote and establish an accepted halakhic ruling. Sometime later, when they returned to discuss the issue, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said to the other Sages: What shall we do with those earlier rival wives from now onward? Since in the meantime some rival wives had entered into levirate marriage, if we issue a collective ruling that rival wives may not do so, their children will be declared mamzerim. Therefore, it is better not to establish this halakha at all. The Gemara analyzes this episode in relation to the matter at hand. Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their own opinion, this is the meaning of what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What shall we do? Since these rival wives had already entered into levirate marriage, it was impossible to change the status of their children retroactively. However, if you say that they did not act in accordance with their opinion, what is the meaning of: What shall we do? If Beit Shammai did not act upon their ruling, they never actually permitted a yavam to take a rival wife in levirate marriage. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This amendment was necessary, not for the benefit of the children of rival wives, as Beit Shammai never in fact acted on their ruling; rather, it was necessary only for the rival wife herself. If these rival wives married others, in the opinion of Beit Shammai their marriages were flawed, as they did not perform ḥalitza. And as for the question: What shall we do, this is what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is saying: With regard to those rival wives who were entirely exempt according to Beit Hillel, what should we do with them according to Beit Shammai, as these rival wives had already married others without performing ḥalitza? The Gemara elaborates: If you say let them perform ḥalitza, they will be repulsive to their husbands, as it will seem to the husband that the woman he has been living with for some time suddenly requires a permit for marriage. And if you would say, let them be repulsive to their husbands, as that is not our concern, this is not the case, as the Torah says: “Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace” (Proverbs 3:17).

§ The Gemara suggests further: Come and hear another source, as Rabbi Tarfon said: I yearn for the following scenario: When shall my daughter’s rival wife come before me and I will marry her? In other words, in this hypothetical case I would act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai and take her in levirate marriage. This statement indicates that those who held by the traditions of Beit Shammai did indeed act upon their opinion. The Gemara amends this statement. Say: And I will marry her off, i.e., I shall act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel and marry her off to others. The Gemara asks: But he said: I yearn, and if he meant that he would follow the ruling of Beit Hillel, which is the common practice, what is the novelty of Rabbi Tarfon’s statement? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Tarfon comes to exclude the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, who maintains that all rival wives perform ḥalitza. Rabbi Tarfon yearned for an opportunity to demonstrate that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an incident involving Rabban Gamliel’s daughter, who was married to Abba, his brother, and Abba died childless, and Rabban Gamliel entered into levirate marriage with her rival wife. This is apparently conclusive proof that the rival wife of a daughter may enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara asks: And how can you understand it that way? Was Rabban Gamliel among the disciples of Beit Shammai? In fact, Rabban Gamliel, who was a descendant of Hillel himself, certainly followed the opinion of Beit Hillel. Rather, the case of Rabban Gamliel’s daughter is different, as she was a sexually underdeveloped woman [aylonit], and therefore the prohibition against marrying her rival wife does not apply, as explicitly stated in the mishna. The Gemara asks: But from the fact that it is taught in the latter clause of the same baraita: Others say that Rabban Gamliel’s daughter was an aylonit, it can be derived by inference that the first tanna holds that she was not an aylonit. The Gemara answers: The dispute between the tanna’im was not about whether or not she was an aylonit, as she certainly was. Rather, the practical difference between them is whether he knew that she was an aylonit at the time of marriage and decided to marry her regardless. Some maintain in general that if the husband was aware of her condition prior to marriage, her rival wife is forbidden, but if he did not know about her status, the rival wife is permitted. And if you wish, say that the practical difference between them concerns a different case, that of one who married and ultimately divorced. This is referring to an issue discussed above of whether a woman is considered the rival wife of a forbidden relation simply by virtue of her marriage to the specific man or whether she must be married to him at the time when the mitzva of levirate obligation takes effect, i.e., at the time of the brother’s death. And if you wish, say that the practical difference between them concerns a case where there is a condition in sexual relations. In other words, the first tanna holds that Rabban Gamliel’s daughter was married only conditionally, and since the condition was never fulfilled the marriage was nullified. Consequently, Rabban Gamliel could marry the other wife regardless of his daughter’s status as an aylonit, as she was never married to his brother at all. However, according to the other tanna, even if the marriage was dependent upon a condition that was not fulfilled, because the man engaged in sexual relations with her the act of intercourse itself serves to nullify the condition. Accordingly, he maintains that the only reason Rabban Gamliel could enter into levirate marriage with his daughter’s rival wife was not because of the condition, but due to the fact that his daughter was an aylonit. Whichever explanation is accepted, this case provides no proof with regard to the issue of whether or not Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their ruling.

§ Rav Mesharshiyya raised an objection against those who claim that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion. It is taught in a mishna: There was an incident involving Rabbi Akiva, who collected an etrog on the first of the month of Shevat and performed with it two tenths. In other words, he separated two tithes from the fruit, as though it belonged to two different tithing years. He removed both the second tithe and the poor man’s tithe at the same time, two tithes that should not be separated in the same year. The mishna explains: One tithe he removed in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai, who hold that the new year for trees occurs on the first of Shevat, which means that the etrog required tithing according to the regulations of the upcoming year. And one tithe was in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel, who hold the new year for trees is on the fifteenth of Shevat, and therefore the etrog required tithing in accordance with the previous year. The Gemara infers: Conclude from here that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinion, as Rabbi Akiva took care to act in accordance with the ruling of Beit Shammai. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva was uncertain as to his tradition, and he did not know if Beit Hillel said that the New Year for trees occurs on the first of Shevat or if they said it is on the fifteenth of Shevat. He did not act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai at all; rather, he sought to act in accordance with the ruling of Beit Hillel but was uncertain about their opinion on this matter.

§ Mar Zutra raised an objection to this issue from a different source: There was an incident in which the daughter-in-law of Shammai the Elder gave birth to a son. In Shammai’s opinion this newborn baby is immediately obligated in the mitzva to sit in a sukka, and he therefore removed the mortar [ma’aziva] covering the ceiling and he placed sukka covering over the bed for the minor. Conclude from here that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinions. The Gemara answers: There is no proof from there, as anyone watching would say that he did it merely to increase the air. Since people would not necessarily think that he removed the mortar as a ruling of halakha, this behavior is not considered the formation of a faction. Mar Zutra raised a further objection: There was an incident involving the Yehu water trough in Jerusalem, which had a hole that connected it to a ritual bath, and all the ritual purifications in Jerusalem were performed in it, i.e., people immersed their utensils in this trough. And Beit Shammai sent messengers and they widened the opening in the water trough, as in the opinion of Beit Shammai the hole was not large enough for the trough to be considered connected to the adjacent ritual bath as Beit Shammai say: The two areas are not connected unless the majority of it is opened. In other words, they require the major portion of the barrier between the ritual bath and the nearby trough to be open. And we learned in a mishna: Beit Hillel hold that a joining of ritual baths is effective if the hole has the width of the tube used to pour water in and out of a wineskin, and in its open space there is enough room for about two fingers that can return to their place. In other words, if it is possible to insert into the hole two fingers that can move around on all sides, the cavity is sufficiently large to be considered a connection. According to Beit Shammai, however, the hole must open up the majority of the barrier between the two areas. If so, conclude from this that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinions. The Gemara rejects this contention: There, anyone watching would say that he did it to increase the water flow, and he did not intend to change the halakha. Rather, they would think that he widened the water trough only because there was not enough water flow.

§ The Gemara cites another relevant source. Come and hear, as Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said: When I studied Torah with Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani, who was a disciple of Beit Shammai, I saw that he would eat dry bread in salt in years of drought. I went and informed my father of his meager meal, and he said to me: Take olives for him, and I took for him some olives. Rabbi Yoḥanan saw that they were moist with the liquid that oozes from olives, which renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. Concerned that they had already become ritually impure, he said to me: I do not eat olives. He spoke politely and stated that he did not eat olives because he did not wish to embarrass his benefactor by disclosing that he feared they had become ritually impure. Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok continued his account. I went and informed my father. He said to me: Go and say to him that the barrel containing the olives was perforated, but it was clogged by sediments in the oil and therefore some moisture remained inside. However, due to the presence of the hole, the olives were not rendered susceptible to ritual impurity. And we learned this in a mishna: With regard to a barrel of preserved olives, Beit Shammai say it does not need to be perforated, as the juice issuing from the olives does not render them susceptible to ritual impurity. And Beit Hillel say that it does need to be perforated, as they maintain that the juice of olives is considered oil and it therefore renders the olives susceptible to ritual impurity. And Beit Hillel concede that if the barrel was perforated and subsequently clogged by sediments it is ritually pure, despite the moisture on the olives. Since liquids render food susceptible to ritual impurity only if they were placed on them intentionally, the hole in the barrel clearly shows that one did not intend for the juice to be there. By boring a hole in the barrel he has rendered it obvious that he did not desire the presence of the olive juices, and therefore it does not matter that the hole became blocked. The baraita adds: And although Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani was a disciple of Shammai, he always acted only in accordance with the statements of Beit Hillel. The Gemara infers: Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinions, this is Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani’s greatness, i.e., he is praised for acting in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. However, if you say that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own rulings, what is the greatness and uniqueness of Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani? From here it can be inferred that Beit Shammai generally did act in accordance with their opinions.

§ The Gemara adds: Come and hear a different proof. They asked Rabbi Yehoshua: What is the halakha with regard to the rival wife of a daughter? He said to them: It is a matter of dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. They continued to ask him: And in accordance with whose statement is the halakha? He said to them: Why are you inserting my head between two great mountains, i.e., between two great disputing opinions, between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel? I fear lest these two mountains break my skull. However, I shall testify to you about two great families that were in Jerusalem, the Beit Tzevo’im family who came from the town of Ben Akhmai, and the Beit Kofai family from the town of Ben Mekoshesh: They were the descendants of rival wives who married others, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, and from them came High Priests who served on the altar. Accordingly, I can testify that this was the accepted halakhic practice throughout the generations. The Gemara infers from this statement: Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinions, this is why Rabbi Yehoshua said: I fear, since a conclusive halakhic ruling would mean that certain children are mamzerim, and the descendants of that family might take vengeance upon him. However, if you say that they did not act in accordance with their opinions, why did he say: I fear? The Gemara retorts: And even if Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their rulings, what is the reason that he said: I fear? Didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua say that in his opinion a mamzer is only someone born from a union of those liable to receive the court-imposed capital punishments, not from those liable to receive karet. If so, in the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, the children of rival wives who entered into levirate marriage would not be mamzerim at all, and therefore he had no reason to fear reprisals. The Gemara answers: Even if this is the case, nevertheless, he had something to fear, as, although the child of a rival wife would not be a mamzer, he would nevertheless be of flawed lineage and disqualified from the priesthood. The Gemara adds that this can be derived by an a fortiori inference from the case of a widow: Just as in the case of a widow, whose prohibition does not apply to all, as she is forbidden in marriage only to a High Priest and not to any other man, and yet the lineage of her son is flawed, as he is disqualified from the priesthood, the son of this rival wife should certainly be disqualified from the priesthood, as her prohibition applies equally to all, even regular Israelites.

§ Incidentally, the Gemara notes a problem with the above discussion: They asked Rabbi Yehoshua about rival wives, and he answered them about the children of rival wives. He did not refer to the rival wives themselves. The Gemara explains: They asked him questions on two matters: First, what is the halakha with regard to rival wives? And if you say that the halakha in the case of rival wives is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel and they are exempt, what is the halakha according to Beit Shammai in the case of the children of rival wives who, following Beit Hillel, married others without ḥalitza? The Gemara asks: What difference does this question make? Since Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that the halakha is in accordance with the ruling of Beit Hillel, why even discuss Beit Shammai’s opinion on this matter? The Gemara explains: His answer enables one to resolve a different issue, the case of a child of one who remarries his divorcée according to the opinion of Beit Hillel. Is the child of a divorcée who remarried her previous husband after she had been married to another man fit or disqualified from the priesthood? The Gemara elaborates: Do we say the following an a fortiori inference: And just as with regard to a widow married to a High Priest, whose prohibition does not apply to all, as she is prohibited in marriage only to a High Priest, and yet the lineage of her son is flawed as he is disqualified from the priesthood, so too, in the case of this rival wife, whose prohibition applies equally to all men, is it not right that her son should be of flawed lineage? Or perhaps this comparison can be refuted: What about the fact that a widow is different, as she herself is disqualified from marrying a priest, i.e., if a High Priest has intercourse with her she is disqualified from marrying any member of the entire priesthood, including common priests, whereas a remarried divorcée herself is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood? And Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: I fear that if I issue a decisive ruling concerning rival wives this might lead to a conflict, whereas with regard to the children of rival wives, I testify to you that they are not disqualified, since, as stated, their descendants served as High Priests.

§ The Gemara states: Come and hear another source that indicates Beit Shammai did act upon their opinions: In the time of Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas, the rival wife of a daughter was permitted to the brothers. Conclude from this that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinions. The Gemara summarizes these proofs: Indeed, conclude from these sources that Beit Shammai did put their rulings into practice. § Since the last source is only part of a larger incident, the Gemara cites the matter itself. In the time of Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas the Sages permitted the rival wife of a daughter to the brothers. In other words, it became known that Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas deemed permitted a daughter’s rival wife. And this matter was difficult in the eyes of the Rabbis because he was a great Sage and his decision in favor of Beit Shammai carried great weight. They could not approach him immediately, as he was very old and his eyes had dimmed so much that he was incapable of coming to the study hall. They said: And who will go and notify him that this matter requires clarification? Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: I will go. They asked: And who shall go after him? They selected Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who was one of the great Sages of the generation, notwithstanding his youth. They further inquired: And who after him? Rabbi Akiva. They went and stood at the entrance of Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas’s house. His maidservant entered and said to him: Rabbi, the Sages of Israel have come to you. He said to her: Let them enter, and they entered. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas grabbed Rabbi Yehoshua, with whom he was already acquainted, and sat him on a bed of gold, as Rabbi Dosa was extremely wealthy. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Rabbi, call your other disciple so that he may sit. He asked him to call the other Sage as well, as it is a mark of respect when speaking to a great scholar to call every other Sage his disciple. He said to him: Who is it? Rabbi Yehoshua replied: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rabbi Dosa said: And does our colleague Azarya have a son? Due to his old age and prolonged absence from the study hall he had not heard of him. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas recited this verse about Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya: “I have been young, and now am old; yet I have not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging bread” (Psalms 37:25). He interpreted this verse to mean that the son of a Torah scholar also becomes a Torah scholar. He grabbed him and sat him on a bed of gold. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Rabbi, call your other disciple so that he may sit. He said to him: Who is that? He said to him: Akiva ben Yosef. Rabbi Dosa said to him: You are Akiva ben Yosef, whose name has spread from one end of the world to the other? Even Rabbi Dosa had heard of Rabbi Akiva’s reputation as a great man. Sit, my son, sit. May the likes of you multiply in Israel. Out of courtesy, they did not wish to broach the subject immediately. Rather, they began to encircle him with deliberations on different halakhot, until they came to the case of the rival wife of a daughter. They said to him: What is the halakha with regard to the rival wife of a daughter? He said that it is a matter of dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. They asked him: According to whose statement is the halakha? He said to them: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. They said to him: But didn’t they say in your name that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai? He said to them: Did you hear that Dosa ben Harkinas issued this ruling, or did you hear that it was stated by ben Harkinas? They said to him: On your life, Rabbi, we heard simply ben Harkinas. He said to them: If so, it is no wonder, as I have a younger brother who is the firstborn of the Satan, i.e., he is extremely sharp and as brazen as a demon. And his name is Yonatan, and he is among the disciples of Shammai. It is he who issued this ruling. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas added: And beware that he not batter you with halakhot in this matter, as he has with him three hundred proofs with regard to the rival wife of a daughter that she is permitted. However, you need not worry about the issue itself, as I call as witnesses before me the heavens and the earth that on this very mortar, which was preserved in my house due to its historical importance, Haggai the prophet sat, and I have a tradition that he said three matters of halakha: First, that the rival wife of a daughter is forbidden. Second, that the halakhic rulings for the territories of Ammon and Moab in Transjordan, although similar to those of Eretz Yisrael, are not exactly the same, as their residents tithe the poor man’s tithe in the Sabbatical Year. The total abandonment of fields in the seventh year does not apply in Ammon and Moab, as they are not part of Eretz Yisrael. Instead, in those areas one must bring the poor man’s tithe to the paupers of Eretz Yisrael, as there are no tithes in Eretz Yisrael in the Sabbatical Year. Lastly, Haggai testified: And one accepts converts from the Karduyin and the Tarmodim, without concern that there might be Jews mingled among them, which could render them mamzerim and prohibited from entering the community. The Sage taught: When they entered, they all entered through one entrance. When they left, they left through three entrances, in an effort to try to find Rabbi Dosa’s brother. Rabbi Akiva encountered him. Yonatan ben Harkinas raised against him all of his objections to the opinion of Beit Hillel, and he withstood him, i.e., Rabbi Akiva was able to respond to all of them. Yonatan ben Harkinas grew angry and said to him: You are Akiva ben Yosef, whose name has spread from one end of the world to the other? Be happy that you have merited a great name, and yet you have not yet reached the level of cattle herders. Cattle herders were generally simple individuals who were not familiar even with ordinary matters, and certainly not with halakha. Rabbi Akiva said to him with characteristic modesty: And I have not even reached the level of shepherds, who are considered even worse than cattle herders, as they are unfit for giving testimony.

§ Haggai also declared: And one accepts converts from the Karduyim and the Tarmodim. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rami bar Yeḥezkel teach in a baraita: One does not accept converts from the Karduyim? Rav Ashi said: Kartuyim, not Karduyim, was stated by Rami bar Yeḥezkel. As people say in common discourse: The Kartuyim are unfit. And there are those who say a slightly different version of this discussion. Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: One does not accept converts from the Kartuyim. What, is it not the case that Kartuyim is the same as Karduyim? If so there is a contradiction between the baraita of Rami bar Yeḥezkel and the statement of Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas. Rav Ashi said: No; the Kartuyim are one discrete category and the Karduyim are another discrete category, as people say: Kartuyim are unfit. Rabbi Yoḥanan and the Elders both say: One does not accept converts from the Tarmodim. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this, that one does not accept converts from the Tarmodim due to a concern that Jews may have intermingled with them? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: All clothing with stains of blood that might be from a menstruating woman and that come from the city on the border of Eretz Yisrael called Rekem are ritually pure, as it can be assumed that they belong to gentiles, and the blood of a menstruating gentile woman is not ritually impure. And Rabbi Yehuda deems it ritually impure because those residents of that place are converts and are in error. In other words, some of the inhabitants of Rekem assimilated and no longer observe the halakhot of the Torah, and therefore one must be wary lest the stains are in fact from a Jewish menstruating woman. Stains that came from among the gentiles, however, are ritually pure. And we discussed the following problem: The tanna concluded and taught: All stains from among the gentiles are pure, from which it may be inferred: And even from Tarmod. This indicates that in all places inhabited by gentiles there is no need to be concerned about stains. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That is to say, one accepts converts from Tarmod without concern that they might be Jewish, albeit mamzerim. This contradicts the previous opinion attributed to Rabbi Yoḥanan that converts from the Tarmodim are not accepted. And if you would say that Rabbi Yoḥanan specifically emphasized: That is to say, i.e., he meant that this conclusion may be logically inferred from the mishna, and yet he himself does not hold by this opinion, but didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan state a principle that the halakha is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna, as is the case here? The Gemara answers: They are amora’im, and they disagree in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Some Sages said in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name that the Tarmodim are unfit, while others maintain that they are fit.

§ Rav Yehuda said that Rav Asi said: With regard to a gentile who betrothed a Jewish woman nowadays, we are concerned that the betrothal might be valid, despite the fact that a betrothal of a gentile is meaningless, lest he be from the ten tribes of Israel who intermingled with the gentiles. The Gemara raises an objection: But there is an important principle in halakha that any item separated, i.e., not fixed in its place, is presumed to have been separated from the majority. In this case, it can be assumed that any individual singled out from the gentiles belongs to the majority of gentiles and has no Jewish roots at all. The Gemara responds: Rav Yehuda means that there is a concern only with regard to those who came from the permanent dwelling places of the ten tribes. As Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said that the verse states about those exiled from Samaria: “And he put them in Halah, and in Habor, on the river of Gozan, and in the cities of the Medes” (I Kings 18:11). Rabbi Abba bar Kahana proceeded to identify these places. Halah; this is the place called Ḥalzon. And Habor; this is Ḥadyab. The river of Gozan; this is Ginzak. And the cities of the Medes; this is Ḥamadan and its surroundings. And some say: This is Nihar and its surroundings. The Gemara asks: Which are its surroundings? Shmuel said: Kerakh, Mushkhei, Ḥidkei, and Domakya are the surroundings of Ḥamadan. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And all of them are for disqualification. In other words, if someone from one of these places wishes to convert, there is concern that he might be a descendant of a Jew and therefore a mamzer. Consequently, they all are disqualified. Rav Yehuda continued his recounting: When I said this halakha, that there is a concern about the betrothal of gentiles nowadays, before Shmuel, he said to me: One need not worry about this, as your son from a Jewish woman is called your son, i.e., he inherits his lineage from you, and your son from a gentile woman is not called your son, but rather her son. Consequently, all children born to Jews from gentile women are not considered Jews, as their lineage is determined by their gentile mothers. The Gemara asks: Aren’t there Jewish girls who were captured by gentiles, whose children are considered to be Jews? And Ravina said: Learn from this that the son of your daughter from a gentile is called your son. If so, the descendants of Jewish women captured by gentiles would indeed be Jews. The Gemara answers: This is no concern, as it is learned as a tradition that the girls from the ten tribes of that generation became barren and did not give birth to any offspring, whereas some of the exiled men of the ten tribes married gentile women. Consequently, all of the children born there were gentiles. There are those who say that Rav Yehuda actually related the following: When I said this halakha before Shmuel, he said to me: They did not move from there, the place where they deliberated on this matter, until they rendered all of them, including those who intermingled with the ten tribes in different locations, full-fledged gentiles. Consequently, there is no concern that their betrothals might be of any effect, as it is stated: “They have dealt treacherously against the Lord, for they have begotten strange children” (Hosea 5:7).

The Gemara relates: Rav Hamnuna sat before Ulla and was engaged in the study of halakha. Ulla said about him: What a man; what a man. In other words: What a great man this Rav Hamnuna is. If only Harpanya were not his city, as the inhabitants of that place are all of flawed lineage, which indicates that the lineage of Rav Hamnuna is likewise impaired. Rav Hamnuna was ashamed. Ulla said to him: Where do you give the money for payment of the poll tax? He said to him: I pay it to the city of Pum Nahara, as my city is subject to taxation by that city. He said to him: If so, you are from Pum Nahara, not Harpanya, and your lineage is evidently not flawed.

§ The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the name Harpanya? Rabbi Zeira said: It means the mountain to which all turn [har shehakol ponin bo]. In other words, it is the destination for all those who could not find wives anywhere else, as most of its population is of flawed lineage. It is taught in a baraita: All those who do not know their family or tribe turn there. Rava said: This type of flaw is appalling and is deeper than the netherworld, as is stated: “Shall I ransom them from the power of the netherworld? Shall I redeem them from death?” (Hosea 13:14). This verse indicates that it is possible to be ransomed and released from the netherworld, whereas their disqualification cannot be rectified. The Gemara comments: Those who are disqualified from Harpanya are unfit due to the disqualification of the inhabitants of nearby Meishon, who were unfit and intermarried with the residents of Harpanya. Those disqualified from Meishon are unfit due to those disqualified from Tarmod, and those disqualified from Tarmod are disqualified due to the servants of Solomon. The Gemara comments: And this explains the folk saying that people say in this regard: A large ephah and a small ephah, which are both inaccurate utensils that may not be used for measuring, roll onward to the netherworld, and from the netherworld to Tarmod, and from Tarmod to Meishon, and from Meishon to Harpanya. The same idea expressed by the Sages with regard to the disqualification of lineage was also incorporated into a well-known adage among commoners.

§ Rava said: Where is the prohibition against secondary forbidden relationships hinted at in the Torah? As it is stated at the end of the portion discussing forbidden incestuous relations: “For all these abominations have the men of the land done” (Leviticus 18:27). “These” must be understood to mean the harsh ones, i.e., the severe transgressions. This proves by inference that there are also lesser transgressions that are, as it were, soft ones. And what are those soft ones? They are secondary forbidden relationships. The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that the word “these” [ha’el] is an expression meaning harsh? As it is written: “And the mighty [eilei] of the land he took away” (Ezekiel 17:13). The similarity of these words implies that “these” also has connotations of mighty or harsh. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this statement contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Levi? As Rabbi Levi said: The harshness of the punishment for using dishonest measures is more than the punishment for transgressing the prohibition of forbidden relationships, as with regard to this, forbidden relations, it is stated only: “These [el],” whereas with regard to that, dishonest measures, it is stated: “These [eleh]” with an additional letter heh as a suffix: “For all that do these [eleh] things, even all that do unrighteously, are an abomination unto the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 25:16). This implies that the word eleh indicates harshness and not the word el. The Gemara answers: This does not contradict his opinion. The word el has the connotation of harsh, but eleh has the connotation of even harsher than el. The Gemara asks: With regard to forbidden relationships the word eleh is also written: “For whosoever shall do any of these [eleh] abominations, even the souls that do them shall be cut off from among their people” (Leviticus 18:29). If so, why is the punishment for using dishonest measures considered harsher? The Gemara answers: That expression meaning these [eleh] in the context of forbidden relations does not emphasize their severity; rather, it comes to exclude one who uses deception in measures from the penalty of karet. The Gemara asks: Rather, in what way is deception in measurements more severe than forbidden relations? The Gemara answers: Those who engage in forbidden relations have the possibility of repentance. If one engaged in relations with a forbidden relative he can rectify the sin through repentance. In the case of those who deceive the public with dishonest measures, it is not possible to repent fully because, having deceived the general public, they have no way of returning the money. Whereas generally a thief can return stolen property to its rightful owner, one who used dishonest measures with multiple customers has no way to track them all down in order to return the money. Rav Yehuda said that the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships is learned from here: As it says with regard to King Solomon: “He weighed [izzen] and sought out, and set in order many proverbs” (Ecclesiastes 12:9), and Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: Before Solomon came, the Torah was like a basket [kefifa] without handles [oznayim], until Solomon came and made handles for it. By means of his explanation and proverbs he enabled each person to understand and take hold of the Torah, fulfill its mitzvot, and distance himself from transgressions. Rabbi Oshaya said that the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships is learned from here: “Avoid it, pass not by it; turn from it, and pass on” (Proverbs 4:15). One must distance oneself from any prohibited act and not pass near a place of forbidden objects or situations. Rav Ashi said a parable: To what is this matter, the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya, comparable? It is comparable to a man guarding an orchard; if he guards it from the outside, all of it is guarded. But if he guards it from the inside, only that which is in front of him that he can see is guarded, while that which is behind him is unguarded. The Gemara comments: And this parable of Rav Ashi is a mistake [beduta] and is not accurate. There, in his metaphor, that which is in front of him at least is guarded; here, in the case of forbidden relationships, were it not for the rabbinic decree against secondary forbidden relationships one would eventually encounter and transgress the biblically forbidden relationship itself. Guarding from the outside is not only preferable, it is essential. Rav Kahana said that the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships is alluded to from here, in the verse stated at the conclusion of the verses discussing the halakhot of forbidden relationships: “Therefore shall you protect [ushmartem] My prized possession [mishmarti], that you do not any of these abominable customs” (Leviticus 18:30). This means: Establish a safeguard [mishmeret] for My prized possession. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: If the prohibition against secondary forbidden relationships is learned from here then it would be by Torah law, yet the prohibition against secondary forbidden relationships is by rabbinic law. He answered him: The requirement to add an additional safeguard itself is in fact by Torah law, and the Sages interpreted and defined where and when to apply this law. Abaye objected: But isn’t all of the Torah also interpreted by the Sages and yet has the force of Torah law? In that case, why are these laws considered to be rabbinic? Rather, the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships was decreed by rabbinic law, and the verse is a mere support but does not indicate a Torah law. § The Sages taught in a baraita: What are the secondary forbidden relationships that were prohibited? His mother’s mother, and his father’s mother, and his father’s father’s wife, and his mother’s father’s wife, and the wife of his father’s maternal half brother, and the wife of his mother’s paternal half brother, and his son’s daughter-in-law, and his daughter’s daughter-in-law. A man is permitted to take his father-in-law’s former wife, provided she is not the mother of his wife, and his stepson’s wife, if the stepson died or divorced her. And he is prohibited from marrying the daughter of his stepson. And it is permitted for one’s stepson to marry the stepfather’s wife or daughter.

§ Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Did the Master see this one of the Sages who came from the West, Eretz Yisrael, who said: In the West they asked whether the Sages issued a decree prohibiting secondary forbidden relationships for converts, or whether they did not issue a decree prohibiting secondary forbidden relationships for converts? Rav Naḥman did not answer whether he had seen this Sage, but said to him: Now, with regard to all the forbidden relationships themselves, were it not for the fact that if converts would find that as Jews they were permitted to enter into relationships that were forbidden to them as gentiles and would say that they went from a state of more stringent sanctity as gentiles to a state of lesser sanctity as Jews, then the Sages would not have decreed to prohibit these relationships. Without the rabbinic decree it would have been permitted for a convert to marry even a close female relative, even his twin sister, who also converted. This is because a convert has the legal status of a newborn, with no family ties. Is it necessary to state that the Sages did not extend that decree to include secondary forbidden relationships? The purpose of the rabbinic prohibitions is to protect the Torah prohibitions, but in the case of converts this particular Torah prohibition does not apply. Rav Naḥman said: Since the issue of converts and their relatives has come to hand and is the topic of discussion, let us say a matter of halakha: Maternal half brothers who both convert may not testify together as a pair of witnesses before the court, but if they did testify, their testimony is valid. Although blood relatives are invalid as witnesses, converts are considered as though they have no relations. Paternal half brothers who both convert may testify together ab initio, since the halakha does not consider paternal half brothers of gentiles to be true relatives. Ameimar said: Even maternal half brothers may also testify together ab initio. In what way is this case different from forbidden relations, where a convert may not marry his maternal sister due to rabbinic decree? The halakhot of forbidden relations are handed over to all, and every individual chooses his own wife. Therefore, the Sages issued a decree to prevent confusion between the status of a convert and that of a born Jew. However, testimony is handed over to the court, and the court knows to distinguish between the status of a born Jew and that of a convert. And the legal status of a convert who just converted is like that of a child just born, and all previous family ties become irrelevant.

§ Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Did the Master see this one of the Sages who came from the West, Eretz Yisrael, who said: In the West they asked whether the Sages issued a decree prohibiting secondary forbidden relationships for converts, or whether they did not issue a decree prohibiting secondary forbidden relationships for converts? Rav Naḥman did not answer whether he had seen this Sage, but said to him: Now, with regard to all the forbidden relationships themselves, were it not for the fact that if converts would find that as Jews they were permitted to enter into relationships that were forbidden to them as gentiles and would say that they went from a state of more stringent sanctity as gentiles to a state of lesser sanctity as Jews, then the Sages would not have decreed to prohibit these relationships. Without the rabbinic decree it would have been permitted for a convert to marry even a close female relative, even his twin sister, who also converted. This is because a convert has the legal status of a newborn, with no family ties. Is it necessary to state that the Sages did not extend that decree to include secondary forbidden relationships? The purpose of the rabbinic prohibitions is to protect the Torah prohibitions, but in the case of converts this particular Torah prohibition does not apply. Rav Naḥman said: Since the issue of converts and their relatives has come to hand and is the topic of discussion, let us say a matter of halakha: Maternal half brothers who both convert may not testify together as a pair of witnesses before the court, but if they did testify, their testimony is valid. Although blood relatives are invalid as witnesses, converts are considered as though they have no relations. Paternal half brothers who both convert may testify together ab initio, since the halakha does not consider paternal half brothers of gentiles to be true relatives. Ameimar said: Even maternal half brothers may also testify together ab initio. In what way is this case different from forbidden relations, where a convert may not marry his maternal sister due to rabbinic decree? The halakhot of forbidden relations are handed over to all, and every individual chooses his own wife. Therefore, the Sages issued a decree to prevent confusion between the status of a convert and that of a born Jew. However, testimony is handed over to the court, and the court knows to distinguish between the status of a born Jew and that of a convert. And the legal status of a convert who just converted is like that of a child just born, and all previous family ties become irrelevant.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one who is suspected of relations with a gentile woman who later converted may never marry her. This implies that she is, however, a convert, although it appears that she converted only in order that he might marry her. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: Both a man who converted for the sake of a woman and a woman who converted for the sake of a man, and similarly, one who converted for the sake of the king’s table, so that he could serve in a prestigious capacity, or for the sake of Solomon’s servants, who were also considered prestigious, in all of these cases they are not converts; this is the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya. As Rabbi Neḥemya would say: With regard to converts by lions, i.e., forced converts such as the Samaritans [Kutim] described in II Kings (17:24–25); and converts who convert based on their dreams; and converts of the time of Mordecai and Esther described in the verse, “And many from among the peoples of the land became Jews; for the fear of the Jews was fallen upon them” (Esther 8:17); all of these are not converts until they are converted at this present time. The Gemara clarifies the meaning of the words: Could it enter your mind to say only at this present time? Since he mentioned the converts of Mordecai and Esther, who were deceased before Rabbi Neḥemya made this statement, he therefore cannot possibly mean this phrase literally. Rather, say: Like at this present time, when the Jewish people are in exile and there is no material benefit to conversion. Returning to the question above: How could a woman who converted for the sake of a man be considered a true convert? The Gemara answers: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that baraita that Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the one who says that they are all converts. The Gemara asks: If so, why is one suspected of relations with such a woman not permitted to enter into marriage with her ab initio as well? The Gemara answers: The reason for the prohibition is due to the following statement of Rav Asi. As Rav Asi said with regard to such cases: “Put away from yourself a twisted mouth, and perverse lips put far from you” (Proverbs 4:24). If they were to marry, they would give substance to the prior suspicions. The Sages taught: Converts are not accepted in the days of the Messiah. Similarly, they did not accept converts in the days of King David or in the days of King Solomon. Rabbi Eliezer said: What is the verse that hints at this halakha? “Behold, they may gather together [gor yagur], but without Me; whosoever shall gather together [gar] with you shall fall on yours” (Isaiah 54:15). The word gor implies that only a convert [ger] who becomes part of the Jewish people when the Jews are living in exile, at a time when God is not clearly revealed, i.e., “without Me,” are considered part of the Jewish people. But another who wishes to convert in a time when God is clearly revealed shall not be accepted. § The mishna states that one who was suspected of relations with a married woman may not marry her even after she divorces her husband. Even if they marry without permission, they must divorce. Rav said: This is only in a case when there were witnesses to her infidelity, and because of their testimony the court required her first husband divorce her. However, if her first husband divorced her due to suspicion and rumors but without witnesses, her second husband would not be obligated to divorce her. Rav Sheshet said: I say that when Rav was dozing or sleeping he said that halakha, and it is mistaken. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who was suspected of adultery with a married woman and as a result the court requires her husband to divorce her, and later she married someone else and was then divorced by this other, if the one who had been suspected of illicit relations with her then married her, he need not divorce her. The Gemara clarifies this: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is referring to a case where there are witnesses to their adultery, when another came and put an end to the rumor of her misconduct by marrying her, what of it? If there were witnesses, the adulterers may never marry each other. Rather, is it not referring to a case where there were no witnesses to the adultery, and the reason she does not have to be divorced from her third husband, with whom she committed adultery while married to her first husband, is specifically because another came and, by marrying her, put an end to the rumor? This implies that were it not so, i.e., had she not married someone else before marrying the man suspected of committing adultery with her, the court would have removed her from him and required them to divorce, even without witnesses to their adultery. This contradicts Rav’s statement above that they must divorce only if there were witnesses to the infidelity. The Gemara responds: Rav could have said to you that the same is true even if another did not come and put an end to the rumor by marrying her. The same principle applies: If there were witnesses to the adultery the court removes her and requires them to divorce, but if there were no witnesses, the court does not remove her. And this is what the baraita is saying: The novelty in this baraita is that even though another came and put an end to the rumor by marrying her, nevertheless, the suspected adulterer may not marry her ab initio due to the original suspicions. The Gemara raises an objection from a different baraita that qualifies the previous one: In what case is this statement, that the court removes her from the suspected adulterer, said? It is when she has no children from her first husband. But if she has children from him, she is not required to be divorced from the suspected adulterer. On the contrary, if they were required to divorce, it could strengthen the original rumor and others might suspect that her children are mamzerim. However, if witnesses to her impurity, i.e., her adultery, came and testified that she had relations with this man while she was married, then even if she has several children from the first husband, she is required to be divorced. This implies that a woman without children from her first husband must separate from a man suspected of illicit relations with her on strength of suspicion alone. The Gemara answers and explains that Rav establishes the mishna as referring only to a case where she has children by her first husband and there are witnesses to her adultery. In such a situation, she and the adulterer must divorce, but without witnesses they are not required to divorce. The Gemara asks: What forced Rav to establish the mishna as referring to a case where she has children and there are witnesses and explain that the reason that the court removes her from the suspected adulterer is because there were witnesses, but that if there were no witnesses they do not remove her? Why does he not establish the mishna as referring to a case where there were no children and that they must divorce even if there were no witnesses? Rava said: The language of the mishna was difficult for him; due to that he deemed it necessary to interpret it as he did. Why does the tanna specifically teach: They remove her from him [hotziuha]? Let it teach: He divorces her [hotziah] in the singular. Rather, every time the plural form: They remove her, is used, it is referring to the judges of the court. And a court removes a woman from her suspected adulterer only if there were witnesses, and not due to suspicion alone. If you wish, say a different answer for Rav’s explanation: Those baraitot that require the wife and the suspected adulterer to divorce even without witnesses to the adultery are taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a case where a husband saw a peddler leaving the house, and when he entered he found his wife retying her smock [sinar], i.e., putting her clothes back on, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Since this is a distasteful matter because it looks as though she committed adultery with the peddler, she must be divorced by her husband. Alternatively, if the husband entered after the peddler had left and found saliva above the netting of the bed, implying that someone had lain on the bed and spit upward, although no actual act was witnessed, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Since this is a distasteful matter, she must be divorced. The same applies if the husband found the shoes reversed under the bed, so that the toe of the shoe faced the bed; this is a sign that a stranger came in and placed them like that. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Since this is a distasteful matter, she must be divorced. The Gemara questions this: Shoes turned around? Let him see whose they are and clarify who the stranger was and then find out what he was doing there. Rather, the case was that he found the place of the shoes, i.e., shoe prints, reversed under the bed and cannot recognize whose shoe prints they are. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Since this is a distasteful matter, she must be divorced. The Gemara concludes: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, that they must divorce only if there were witnesses, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that they must divorce if there is a matter that is distasteful. The Gemara challenges this: One halakha is difficult, as it contradicts the other halakha. The Gemara answers: This contradiction is not difficult. This one relates to a case where the rumor ceases and the woman is sent away only if there are witnesses, but that one relates to a case where the rumor does not cease, in which case he divorces her even if there are no witnesses. The Gemara elucidates the cases: In cases of a rumor that does not cease, even if there are no witnesses the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and he divorces her. If the rumor ceases and there are witnesses, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and he divorces her because there are witnesses. The Gemara clarifies this: At what point is it considered to be a persistent rumor? Abaye said: My mother told me: A rumor in the city lasts a day and a half. The Gemara comments: We said that this is the length of time only if the rumor did not cease in the meantime. But if the rumor did cease in the meantime, even it was later renewed, this is considered a rumor that has ceased and is disregarded. And we said that a rumor that ceased is not considered persistent only if the reason it ceased was not due to fear of the individual about whom it is said. But if it ceased due to fear, it is only due to fear and is still considered a persistent rumor. And we said that a persistent rumor has validity only if the subject of the rumor does not have any known enemies, but if he has enemies it may be assumed that it is the enemies who put out the rumor about him. § We learned in a mishna there (Gittin 45b): A man who divorces his wife due to her bad reputation may not take her back again, even if it turns out that the rumor was untrue. Likewise, if he divorced his wife due to a vow of hers that is unbearable to him he may not take her back even if she is released from that vow. Rabba bar Rav Huna sent a question to Rabba bar Rav Naḥman: Our teacher, instruct us. If one of those men listed in that mishna divorced his wife due to her bad reputation or vow and it was therefore prohibited for him to take her back, yet he nevertheless remarried her, what is the halakha? Must he divorce her? Rabba bar Rav Naḥman said to him: We already learned in the mishna (24b): With regard to one who is suspected of committing adultery with a married woman, and he, her husband, divorced her, even if he subsequently remarried her he must divorce her. Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: Is this comparable to the case I asked about? There, in the mishna, it says: They, the court, remove her from him, whereas here (Gittin 45b), the mishna states: He divorced her of his own accord. Perhaps if the court requires them to divorce, the halakha is different. The Gemara explains: And Rabba bar Rav Naḥman, who held that the two mishnayot were comparable, had a text of the mishna that also read: He divorced her, instead of: They remove her. Rabba bar Rav Huna asks: Still, is this comparable? Here, the question was raised in a case where the first husband remarried her, which will not strengthen the rumors of her bad reputation, but there, the mishna refers to the man with whom she committed adultery remarrying her, which strengthens those rumors. He said to him: They are certainly comparable to each other: Here, in the mishna discussing one who is suspected of committing adultery, the Sages said that he may not marry her and if he did marry her he must divorce her. So too, the Sages said in the case of one who divorced his wife due to her reputation or vow that he may not take her back, and if he does remarry her he must divorce her. The Gemara rejects this: That is not so, as there, when the man suspected of committing adultery marries the woman, he thereby strengthens the rumor of adultery. For this reason he must divorce her. Here, we say that he, the husband, established the facts of the rumor and found that it was not so and the rumor was baseless. Therefore, there is no need for him to divorce her if he remarries her. Rabba bar Rav Huna’s question remains unresolved.

MISHNA: An agent who brought a bill of divorce from a country overseas and said: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, as required in order to establish the bill of divorce as valid, may not marry the wife, i.e., the divorcée. Since the validity of the bill of divorce is based upon his testimony, marrying the divorcée creates the impression that he had an ulterior motive for his testimony. Similarly, a witness who testified that a certain man died, or testified: I killed him, or: We killed him, may not marry that man’s wife. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he testified: I killed him, his wife may not be married at all based on that evidence, as his testimony is unreliable, but if he said: We killed him, his wife may be married to anyone other than those witnesses.

MISHNA: In the case of three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters and one who was married to an unrelated woman, the following occurred: He who was married to the unrelated woman died, and one of the husbands of the sisters married his wife, and then died childless as well. The first woman, i.e., the sister who was originally married to the brother who performed levirate marriage, is dismissed and is exempt from levirate marriage due to her status as the sister of his wife. And the second woman, i.e., the unrelated woman who had entered into levirate marriage, is dismissed as her rival wife. If, however, he performed levirate betrothal with the unrelated woman, and then died, then this unrelated woman must perform ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage, as levirate betrothal rendered her status with regard to yibbum as similar to the rival wife of his wife’s sister. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why do I need this mishna as well? This principle is identical to the principle behind the ruling in the previous mishna, and therefore this ruling can easily be deduced from the previous ruling. Now, just as there, when his wife’s sister became rival wife of the unrelated woman who was already the brother’s wife, you say that the unrelated woman is forbidden despite the fact that the forbidden relative joined later, here, where the unrelated woman became the rival wife of his wife’s sister afterward, is it not all the more so clear that she is exempt as a rival wife? The Gemara answers: This mishna was unnecessary, and this is how the duplication occurred: The tanna taught this mishna at first, and with regard to that previous case saw it fitting to render her permitted, and he permitted her to the brother, for he held that if the forbidden relative joined the man’s household later, then she would not render the first wife prohibited as the rival wife of a forbidden relative. And then the tanna subsequently retracted and saw it fitting to render the woman forbidden. He decided that this woman should be considered the rival wife of a forbidden relative as well, and therefore rendered her forbidden to the brother. And since that case was novel, it was beloved to him and he taught it earlier. In truth, it would have now been possible to eliminate the present mishna, for there was no longer any novelty in it; its ruling could be derived by an a fortiori argument from the previous ruling. However, a mishna does not move from its place. Since this version of the mishna had already been fixed, it was deemed inappropriate to remove it completely, and it remained in place despite the fact that it was no longer necessary.