26 (2) Take the sum of all the congregation of the children of Yisra᾽el, from twenty years old and upward, by their fathers’ house, all that are able to go to war in Yisra᾽el.

(3) And Moshe and El῾azar the priest spoke with them in the plains of Mo᾽av by the Yarden near Yereĥo, saying,

(4) Take the sum of the people, from twenty years old and upward; as the Lord commanded Moshe and the children of Yisra᾽el, who went forth out of the land of Miżrayim.

(5) Re᾽uven, the eldest son of Yisra᾽el: the children of Re᾽uven; Ḥanokh, the family of the Ḥanokhi: of Pallu, the family of the Pallu᾽i.

(6) Of Ḥeżron, the family of the Ḥeżroni: of Karmi, the family of the Karmi.

19 (10) And he said, I have been very zealous for the Lord God of hosts: for the children of Yisra᾽el have forsaken Thy covenant, thrown down Thy altars, and slain Thy prophets with the sword; and I only, am left; and they seek my life, to take it away.

(11) And he said, Go out, and stand upon the mountain before the Lord. And, behold, the Lord passed by, and a great and strong wind rent the mountains, and broke the rocks in pieces before the Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind: and after the wind an earthquake; but the Lord was not in the earthquake:

(12) and after the earthquake a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire: and after the fire a still small voice.

(13) And when Eliyyahu heard it, he wrapped his face in his mantle, and went out, and stood in the entrance of the cave. And, behold, there came a voice to him, and said, What art thou doing here, Eliyyahu?

(14) And he said, I have been very zealous for the Lord God of hosts: because the children of Yisra᾽el have forsaken Thy covenant, thrown down Thy altars, and slain Thy prophets with the sword; and I, alone, am left; and they seek my life, to take it away.

73 (26) My flesh and my heart fail: but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever.

(27) For, lo, they that are far from Thee shall perish: Thou hast destroyed all those who go astray from Thee.

(28) But as for me, the nearness of God is my good: I have made the Lord God my refuge, that I may relate all Thy works.

74 (1) A Maskil of Asaf. O God, why hast Thou cast us off for ever? why does Thy anger smoke against the sheep of Thy pasture?

(2) Remember Thy congregation, which Thou hast purchased of old; the tribe of Thy inheritance, which Thou hast redeemed; this mount Żiyyon, wherein Thou hast dwelt.

1. In a case of one who throws a bill of divorce to his wife, and she is in her house or in her courtyard at the time, then she is divorced as though he placed the bill of divorce in her hand. If he threw it to her in his house or in his courtyard, even if the bill of divorce is with her in the bed, she is not divorced. If he threw the bill of divorce into her lap, or into her basket [kaltah], she is divorced, even if she was in her husband’s house at the time.

2. If he said to his wife: Take this promissory note, and it was a bill of divorce, or she found it behind him and he did not tell her what it was but she reads what is written in it and discovers that it is her bill of divorce, it is not a valid bill of divorce until he says to her: This is your bill of divorce. If he gave it to her in her hand and she was sleeping, and he then woke her, and when she reads what is written in it, she finds that it is her bill of divorce, it is not a valid bill of divorce until he says to her: This is your bill of divorce. If the woman was standing in the public domain and her husband took the bill of divorce and threw it to her, if it fell closer to her, she is divorced, and if it fell closer to him, she is not divorced. If it is equally balanced, there is uncertainty as to whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.

3. And the same halakhot apply with regard to betrothal. And the same halakhot apply with regard to a debt. If his creditor said to him: Throw the payment for my debt to me, and he threw it to him and the money fell closer to the creditor, the creditor acquired the payment. The debtor is absolved of his obligation to pay even if the money did not reach the creditor’s hand, e.g., it was stolen or lost after it was thrown and before the creditor was able to take it. If it fell closer to the debtor and the money was lost, the debtor is still obligated to pay. If it was equally balanced and was lost, the two of them divide it, i.e., the debtor owes half of the amount. If a woman was standing on top of the roof and her husband was standing below, and he threw a bill of divorce to her, once the bill of divorce reaches the airspace of the roof, she is divorced. If he was above on the roof and she was below, and he threw it to her, once it leaves the area of the roof, even if the wording was erased or the document was burned before it fell to the ground, she is divorced.

4. Beit Shammai say: A man may send, i.e., divorce, his wife with an outdated bill of divorce, and Beit Hillel prohibit him from doing so. And what is an outdated bill of divorce? Any case where he was secluded with her after he wrote it for her and before he gave it to her.

5. If he wrote the date on the bill of divorce using a calendrical system that counts years in the name of a kingdom that is not legitimate, or he wrote the date in the name of the kingdom of Medea, or in the name of the Greek Empire, after it ceased to exist, or he wrote the date counting to the building of the Temple, or counting to the destruction of the Temple, in all these case, the bill of divorce is not valid. In the time of the mishna, the local government was particular that documents be dated with the official government date. Therefore, the Sages instituted that this must be done in bills of divorce as well. If one deviates from this practice, the rabbinic dictates of bills of divorce have been violated, and the bill of divorce is invalid. If he was in the east and he wrote the location in the bill of divorce as in the west, or if he was in the west and he wrote the location in the bill of divorce as in the east, the bill of divorce is not valid. If he divorced her with this bill of divorce and she remarried, she must leave both this first husband and that second husband, and she needs a bill of divorce from this husband and that husband. And she does not receive payment of her marriage contract, and not the profits from her properties that her husband consumed, and she does not have a claim to receive sustenance, and she does not have a claim to worn clothes that belonged to her, but which her husband used. She cannot demand these items, not of this husband and not of that husband. If she took any of these items from this husband or from that husband, she must return what was taken. And the child that was born from this husband or from that husband that was conceived after she married the second husband is a son born from an adulterous relationship [mamzer]. And neither this husband nor that husband, if they are priests, is permitted to become ritually impure by her when she dies, which a husband may ordinarily do for his wife. And neither this husband nor that husband have the rights to objects she finds, or to her earnings, or to the annulment of her vows. If she was an Israelite woman, then through these two marriages she becomes disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, due to the prohibition against a priest marrying a zona. If she was the daughter of a Levite, through these two marriages she becomes prohibited from partaking of the tithe that is given to Levites. If she was the daughter of a priest, she becomes prohibited from partaking of teruma, even after she returns to the house of her father the priest. And the heirs of this husband and the heirs of that husband do not inherit the rights to collect payment of her marriage contract if she dies. And if the husbands die, the brother of this first husband and the brother of that second husband perform ḥalitza, since she was betrothed to the second one as well, and they do not consummate the levirate marriage. The mishna proceeds to teach an additional halakha concerning a bill of divorce written not in accordance with its halakhot: If he changed his name, i.e., he wrote a different name in the bill of divorce, or he changed her name, or if he changed the name of his city or the name of her city, and she remarried on the basis of this bill of divorce, then she must leave both this first husband and that second husband. And all of those above-mentioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her in this case as well.

6. The mishna teaches another halakha associated with the previous halakhot: With regard to all of those cases in which they said that a man who died without children and left behind a widow who is, to the man’s brother, one of those with whom relations are forbidden, e.g., she is his wife’s sister, not only is there no levirate bond for her, but the rival wives of the brother who died are also permitted to marry without either levirate marriage or ḥalitza. The mishna discusses another case: These rival wives went and married another man without ḥalitza, and these widows with whom relationships were forbidden were found to be sexually underdeveloped women incapable of bearing children [ailonit]. Therefore, it became clear, retroactively, that the marriage to the dead brother was never valid, and accordingly, the rival wives were never exempt from the obligation of levirate marriage due to their being the rival wives of a forbidden relationship. Consequently, the rival wives were forbidden to marry anyone else without ḥalitza, and the rival wives must leave both this man whom they remarried, and that yavam, i.e., they cannot enter into levirate marriage with him. And all of those above-mentioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her in this case as well.

7. Similarly, with regard to one who marries his yevama, and her rival wife went and got married to another man, and it was found that this yevama was a sexually underdeveloped woman, the rival wife must leave this man whom she remarried and that yavam, i.e., she cannot enter into levirate marriage with him. Because the yevama was a sexually underdeveloped woman, the obligation of levirate marriage never applied to her, and her levirate marriage did not exempt her rival wife. And all of those aforementioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her in this case as well.

8. The mishna now discusses another case: A scribe wrote a bill of divorce for a man, so that the man could divorce his wife with it; and he wrote a receipt for the woman, for her to give to her husband upon receiving payment of her marriage contract, verifying that she received the payment. And the scribe erred and gave the bill of divorce to the woman and the receipt to the man, and not knowing what was written in the documents that were in their possession, they gave what they received from the scribe to each other. The woman gave her husband a bill of divorce and the husband gave his wife a receipt, and consequently, there was no divorce at all. And after some time, the bill of divorce is in the possession of the man, and the receipt is in the possession of the woman, and they discover that the divorce never actually transpired. If the woman had remarried another man, she must leave this, the first husband, and that, the second husband. And all of those above-mentioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her in this case as well. Rabbi Elazar says: If the bill of divorce is immediately [le’altar] in the husband’s possession, this is not a valid bill of divorce, since he clearly never gave it to her. But if it is in his possession after some time, then this is a valid bill of divorce, since it is not in the power of the first husband to eliminate the right of the second husband. The assumption is that the husband did in fact give her the bill of divorce in the correct manner, but at some point, he took it back from her. If one wrote a bill of divorce to divorce his wife, and reconsidered and did not give it to her, Beit Shammai say: Although merely writing the bill of divorce does not dissolve the marriage, by doing so he disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. And Beit Hillel say: Even if he gave the bill of divorce to her conditionally and the condition was not fulfilled, and therefore the bill of divorce did not take effect, he did not disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood. A woman is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood only if the divorce takes effect.

9. With regard to one who divorces his wife, and afterward she spent the night with him at an inn [befundaki], Beit Shammai say: She does not require a second bill of divorce from him, and Beit Hillel say: She requires a second bill of divorce from him, since they may have engaged in sexual intercourse at the inn and thereby betrothed her once again. When did they say this halakha? When she was divorced following the state of marriage. Beit Hillel concede that when she was divorced following the state of betrothal, she does not require a second bill of divorce from him, due to the fact that he is not accustomed to her. Therefore, there is no concern that they engaged in sexual intercourse, even though they spent the night together at the inn. If a woman was married by her second husband on the basis of receiving a bare bill of divorce, i.e., a folded and tied bill of divorce that is missing signatures, she must leave both this, the first husband, and that, the second husband. And all of those previously mentioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier mishna (79b) apply to her in this case as well.

10. With regard to a bare bill of divorce; anyone, even those who are disqualified from bearing witness, can complete it, i.e., sign it in addition to the primary witnesses, so that it will not remain bare. This is the statement of ben Nannas. Rabbi Akiva says: Not all who are disqualified from bearing witness can complete it. Rather, only relatives who are fit to testify in another case. Rabbi Akiva permits only the inclusion of witnesses who would ordinarily be valid witnesses, but who are invalid here because they are relatives of either the husband and wife or the other witnesses. And what is a bare bill of divorce? It is any bill of divorce where the number of its folds is more than the number of its witnesses. In a folded and tied bill of divorce, the bill of divorce is folded and the folds are then tied. Instead of having two witnesses sign at the bottom of the document, witnesses would sign on each tied fold. A bare bill of divorce has more folds than signatures, i.e., some folds lack signatures.

This is as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 12:2) that Rabbi Shimon said: For what reason did the Sages say that the court appraises land of superior-quality for payment to injured parties? It is due to the robbers and due to those who take that which is not theirs by force [ḥamsanin]. How so? So that a person will say: Why should I rob and why should I take by force? Tomorrow the court will come down to my property and take my finest field in order to compensate the victim for what I have robbed or taken by force. And the Sages rely on what is written in the Torah: “Of the best of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard, shall he pay” (Exodus 22:4). Consequently, they said that the court appraises land of superior-quality for payment to injured parties.

The baraita continues: For what reason did the Sages say that a creditor collects his debt from intermediate-quality land? It is so that a person should not see another’s fine field or fine house and say: I will jump in and lend him money so that later I will collect the field or house for my debt, if the borrower does not have enough money to repay the loan. Therefore, the Sages said that a creditor collects his debt only from intermediate-quality land, and he would not receive that fine field that would have prompted him to extend the loan in the first place.

The Gemara asks: If it is so that the objective is that people not be tempted to lend money for the purpose of acquiring the borrower’s property should he default on the loan, then the halakha governing a creditor should be to collect his debt from inferior-quality land. The Gemara answers: If so, then you would be locking the door before potential borrowers, as no one would be willing to lend them money.

The baraita continues: Payment of a woman’s marriage contract is collected from inferior-quality land; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: It can be collected from intermediate-quality land. Rabbi Shimon said: For what reason did the Sages say that a woman’s marriage contract is collected from inferior-quality land? It is because more than a man wants to marry a woman, a woman wants to become married to a man. Consequently, she will agree to marry even if she knows that she will not be able to collect payment of the marriage contract from superior-quality land.

Alternatively, it is because a woman is sent out from her husband with her consent or without her consent, but a man sends his wife out from his house only with his consent.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason that he mentions an alternative explanation? What problem is there with the first explanation? The Gemara answers: The alternative explanation does not explain why she collects from inferior-quality land, but serves to explain a different matter. Since the Sages instituted a marriage contract in order to strengthen the institution of marriage, it is possible to ask: And if you would say that just as when a man divorces his wife the Sages instituted a marriage contract for her from him, so too, when she leaves him they should similarly institute a marriage contract for him from her; then come and hear: A woman is sent out from her husband with her consent or without her consent, but a man sends his wife out from his house only with his consent. Even if she instigates a quarrel with him to bait him into divorcing her, it is nevertheless possible for the husband to keep her waiting for a bill of divorce. A man gives his wife a bill of divorce only when he wishes to do so, and so in essence the divorce depends solely on him.

§ The mishna teaches that payment of a woman’s marriage contract is collected from inferior-quality land. Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, said: We said that a woman collects her marriage contract from inferior-quality land only when her husband died and she collects payment from the orphans who inherit his estate. But if she was divorced and she collects payment from the husband himself, then she collects it from intermediate-quality land.

The Gemara asks: If the mishna is referring to collecting from orphans, then why discuss specifically a woman’s marriage contract? Even all matters, such as payment for damage, should also be collected from inferior-quality land when it is collected from orphans, as didn’t we learn in the mishna: If one who owed money died and his children inherited his property, the father’s debt can be collected from the property of the orphans only from inferior-quality land. Rather, is it not that the mishna is referring to a case where the woman collects her marriage contract from the husband himself?

The Gemara rejects this argument: Actually, the mishna is referring to a case where the woman collects her marriage contract from the orphans who inherit their father’s estate. And it was necessary for the mishna to teach the halakha specifically with regard to a woman’s marriage contract. As it could enter your mind to say that the Sages were more lenient with her for the sake of desirability, so that she would be a more desirable partner should she want to remarry, and consequently they allowed her to collect payment of her marriage contract from intermediate-quality land even from orphans, the mishna teaches us that even payment for a woman’s marriage contract is not collected from the intermediate-quality land of orphans, but only from their inferior-quality land.

Where a synagogue or house of study has two doors, one may not use it as a passage, entering at one door and leaving by the other to shorten a journey, since it is forbidden to enter these buildings except to fulfill a religious duty.

If one has occasion to go into a synagogue to call a child or other person, he may go in, but should read some portion of Scripture or recite a traditional dictum, so that his entry shall not be for the sake of his private affairs only. If he has no knowledge he should say to one of the children, "Recite to me the verse which you are now reading" or he should stay a while in the synagogue and then leave, for staying there is also a religious act, as it is said, "Happy are they that dwell in Thy house" (Psalms 84:5).

One who entered a synagogue to pray or read Scripture may leave at the opposite door to that by which he entered, in order to take a short cut. A person may go into a synagogue with his staff, shoes, moneybelt and with dust on his feet. If he has need to do so, he may expectorate in the synagogue.