Ze Kollel Yevamot 121b Grave of the Fireflies and the grasshopper

MISHNA: Even if one heard from the women, who were saying: So-and-so died, this is sufficient in order to testify to his death. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if one heard from the children, who were saying: We are going to eulogize and bury so-and-so, that is also sufficient. Furthermore, one may rely upon someone mentioning that a man died, regardless of whether the speaker intends to testify and thereby allow the man’s wife to remarry or whether he does not intend to offer formal testimony.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava says: With regard to a Jew who offers this information, it may be relied upon even if he intends for his statement to be considered formal testimony. However, with regard to a gentile, if he intended to testify, his testimony is not considered valid testimony. His statement is relied upon only when he does not intend to state it as formal testimony.

GEMARA: With regard to relying on what children said, that they are going to eulogize and bury so-and-so, the Gemara asks: Perhaps they will not go; perhaps they only assumed that the individual would die, but in the end he didn’t. The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is referring to a situation where the children say: We are coming from eulogizing and burying so-and-so. The Gemara asks: Since they are children, perhaps it was merely a grasshopper with which they played that died, and they brought it out as if to its funeral, calling it by the name of the individual suspected to be dead, and their statement should not be considered valid proof of his death. The Gemara answers: It is referring to a situation where the children say: Such and such rabbis were there; such and such eulogizers were there, so that it is clear that they were referring to an event that truly occurred.

It was taught in the mishna: With regard to a gentile, if he intended to testify, his testimony is not considered valid testimony. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They taught this only in a case where he intended to permit the woman to remarry through his testimony, but if he merely intended to testify about the man’s death, his testimony is considered testimony. The Gemara asks: How do we know the intention of the gentile? Rav Yosef said: If he came to the court and said: So-and-so died, allow his wife to marry, this is an instance of intending to permit her to remarry. If he said simply: He died, this is an instance of merely intending to testify. This was also stated by other amora’im. Reish Lakish said: They taught this only when one intended to permit the woman to remarry, but if he merely intended to testify about the man’s death, his testimony is considered valid testimony. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Didn’t such an incident occur involving Rabbi Oshaya the Distinguished, who permitted women to marry based upon the testimony of gentiles while he was with eighty-five Elders? He said to the Elders: They taught that one may not rely upon a gentile’s testimony only when he intended to permit the woman to remarry, but if he merely intended to testify about the man’s death, his testimony is considered valid testimony. But the Rabbis did not concur with him on this, and they maintained that one may not rely upon the testimony of a gentile at all.

The Gemara asks: But, if that is so, what about that which is taught in the mishna: With regard to a gentile, if he intended to testify, his testimony is not considered valid testimony, which implies that if the gentile does not intend to testify, his statement may be relied upon? How can you find a case where one would rely on his statement? The Gemara answers: One may rely on a gentile’s statement when he speaks offhandedly, without any intention to testify. Like that gentile who was going around saying: Who is from the house of Ḥivvai; who is from the house of Ḥivvai? Ḥivvai has died. And based upon this report, Rav Yosef allowed Ḥivvai’s wife to marry. There was also a certain gentile who was going around saying: Alas for the brave horseman who was in Pumbedita, for he is dead. And Rav Yosef, and some say Rava, allowed his wife to marry. § There was also a certain gentile who was going around saying: Who is from the house of Ḥasa? Ḥasa has drowned. Rav Naḥman said: By God! The fish have eaten Ḥasa. The Gemara relates: Due to Rav Naḥman’s statement, although he did not issue a court ruling permitting it, Ḥasa’s wife went and married, and no one said anything to her to protest this action. ab initio.

The Gemara relates that a certain gentile said to a Jew: Harvest the fodder and give it to my animals on Shabbat, and if not, I will kill you like I killed so-and-so the Jew, for I said to him: Cook me a pot of food on Shabbat, and he didn’t cook it for me, so I killed him. The wife of the missing Jew heard the gentile say that he killed her husband, and she came before Abaye to ask if she was permitted to remarry.

Rav Ashi said: Learn the following from this incident: That which the Sages said, that if a man fell into an endless body of water, his wife is prohibited from remarrying, this applies only ab initio, but if someone married her, we do not take her away from him. There are those who say that Rav Naḥman actually issued a ruling and allowed his wife to marry. He said: Ḥasa is a great man; if it was so that he emerged from the water the incident would have generated publicity. Since nothing was heard from Ḥasa in a long while, it can be assumed that he died. The Gemara comments: That is not so. It is not different if he is a great man and it is not different if he is not a great man. If a woman remarried based on testimony that her husband drowned in an endless body of water, after the fact, yes, she may remain married, but she may not remarry ab initio.

he deferred to the time of the three pilgrim Festivals, on which the Sages gather together to study, but he could not resolve this uncertainty on any of those occasions. Rav Adda bar Ahava said to her: Go before Rav Yosef, whose knife is sharp, i.e., he has keen insight into halakhic matters, and ask him to decide your case. She went before him and he resolved the case based on this baraita: With regard to a gentile who was selling fruit at the market and said: These fruits are from the first three years of the tree’s growth [orla]; or they are from Azeka, i.e., land tilled on the Sabbatical Year, the produce of which it is prohibited to eat; or they are fourth-year produce, which it is prohibited to eat outside of Jerusalem, he has said nothing of consequence. His statement is not deemed credible, since it is possible that he intended only to enhance the reputation of his goods, as he thought that his produce would fetch a higher price if he described it in that fashion. Rav Yosef derived from this baraita that in the case of the missing Jew, the gentile’s statement could not be relied upon, as he may have stated it only to promote his own agenda.

Ageism of the trees: Fruits of young trees are better than that of old trees.

Abba Yudan of Sidon said: An incident occurred involving a Jew and a gentile who traveled on the road, and later the gentile came and said: Alas for the Jew who was with me on the road, for he died, and I buried him. And the Sages relied upon this statement and allowed his wife to marry. And there was another incident involving a group of people who had been taken prisoner, each of whom was shackled with a collar [kolar] around his neck, and they were walking to Antioch. And some time later a certain gentile came and said: Alas for the group of collared people, for they died, and I buried them. And the Sages allowed their wives to marry. And there was yet another incident involving sixty people who were walking to the siege [karkom] of Beitar, and later a gentile came and said: Alas for those sixty people who were walking on the road to Beitar, for they died, and I buried them. And the Sages allowed their wives to marry.

With regard to the origins of the four blessings of Grace after Meals, Rav Naḥman said:
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They instituted the blessing: Who is good and does good, at Yavne in reference to the slain Jews of the city of Beitar at the culmination of the bar Kokheva rebellion. They were ultimately brought to burial after a period during which Hadrian refused to permit their burial.