(א) שלא לדון בדיני עכו"ם ובו ד סעיפים:
אסור לדון בפני דייני עכו"ם ובערכאות שלהם (פי' מושב קבוע לשרים לדון בו) אפי' בדין שדנים בדיני ישראל ואפי' נתרצו ב' בעלי דינים לדון בפניהם אסור וכל הבא לידון בפניהם הרי זה רשע וכאלו חירף וגידף והרים יד בתורת מרע"ה:
(1) It is forbidden to appear for trial before heathen Judges and in their Courts of Law, i.e., [the locality wherein] permanent judicial sessions are held by the [civil] magistrates, even regarding a lawsuit that they [the heathen Judges] adjudicate like the Israelite Law. Even if the two litigants agreed to be tried before them, it is forbidden. And whosoever appears for trial before them is considered a wicked person and is as though he blashphemed, reproached and rebelled against the Law of Moses.
Before proceeding with an analysis of the specifics of the principle "Dina de'malchusa dina," we ought to point out that this is a much more narrow concept than is often imagined.
"Dina de'malchusa dina" cannot be interpreted to mean that the law of the land is the law, period. Were this so, it would mean that wherever the law of the land is different from the law of the Torah, it is the law of the land which we are to follow. This is absurd, for it would reduce Judaism to a practice of rituals alone, and would effectively nullify about half of the Shulchan Aruch. Rather, we take the principle "Dina de'malchusa dina" to indicate that in certain areas and under certain, specific circumstances, the halacha requires that we be governed by the dictates of the sovereign state in which 'we live rather than by the teachings of the Torah alone. We will now consider some of those areas.
Where does ANY government derive their power?
"....What is legal authority, and how is it related to obligations? It is a kind of practical authority, i.e. authority over action. On one influential view, 'To claim authority is to claim the right to be obeyed' (Wolff 1970, 5)..."
- The problem of obligation: What if anything justifies the duty to obey the law, and how far does that obedience properly extend?
- The problem of legitimacy: What if anything justifies the coercive power of law, and how far may that power properly extend?
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Non-voluntarist theories
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Voluntarist Theories - e.g. Consent, Fairness, etc.
a. Fairness
A political community is a cooperative scheme that is geared towards the production of benefits for its members: security, transport, clean water, and so forth. The venture is fruitful in producing these benefits because those participating observe certain restrictions and pay their taxes. To enjoy the benefits of the scheme without submitting to its restrictions is to free-ride on the sacrifices of others, which is unfair. The demands of fairness thus yield political obligation.
b. Gratitude
According to this account, a citizen owes a debt of gratitude to the government for the benefits that it provides. This debt is owed regardless of whether these benefits are accepted or merely received, and the debt is repaid through obedience to law.
c. Consent
On this theory, a citizen that freely consents to his government’s authority binds himself to obedience. Though few deny this, the difficulty with consent theory is identifying an action in the personal history of most individuals that might count as a valid token of consent.
3. Associative Theories
According to associative accounts, a citizen is duty-bound to obey the law simply by virtue of his or her membership in a political community.
5. Sensitivity to Regime Type
Whether liberal democracy is a precondition of political obligation depends on which of the above theories we apply. The gratitude account does not appear to preclude citizens owing obedience to undemocratic and tyrannical regimes. To be sure, the depth of one’s debt of gratitude depends on the extent to which he or she benefits, so it is safe to say that democratic citizens will typically owe more than authoritarian subjects by way of requital.
7. The Weight of Political Obligation
It does not, however, follow from one’s being under a political obligation that he or she ought always to obey the law. Political obligation is prima facie and countervailing moral considerations always need to be taken into account when assessing the right course of action. The weight that should be ascribed to political obligation in any such judgment is, furthermore, an open question.
מַתְנִי׳ נוֹדְרִין לֶהָרָגִין וְלֶחָרָמִין וְלַמּוֹכְסִין שֶׁהִיא תְּרוּמָה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ תְּרוּמָה שֶׁהֵן שֶׁל בֵּית הַמֶּלֶךְ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָן שֶׁל בֵּית הַמֶּלֶךְ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים בַּכֹּל נוֹדְרִיןחוּץ מִבִּשְׁבוּעָה וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים אַף בִּשְׁבוּעָה בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים לֹא יִפְתַּח לוֹ בְּנֶדֶר וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים אַף יִפְתַּח לוֹ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים בַּמֶּה שֶׁהוּא מַדִּירוֹ וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים אַף בַּמֶּה שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַדִּירוֹ כֵּיצַד אָמַר לוֹ אֱמוֹר קוֹנָם אִשְׁתִּי נֶהֱנֵית לִי וְאָמַר קוֹנָם אִשְׁתִּי וּבָנַי נֶהֱנִין לִי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים אִשְׁתּוֹ מוּתֶּרֶת וּבָנָיו אֲסוּרִין וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ מוּתָּרִין:
גְּמָ׳ וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל דִּינָא דְמַלְכוּתָא דִּינָא אָמַר רַב חִינָּנָא אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל בְּמוֹכֵס שֶׁאֵין לוֹ קִצְבָה דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי אָמַר בְּמוֹכֵס הָעוֹמֵד מֵאֵלָיו:
One may take a vow to murderers, i.e., people suspected of killing others over monetary matters; or to robbers [ḥaramin]; or to tax collectors who wish to collect tax, that the produce in his possession is teruma although it is not teruma. One may also take a vow to them that the produce in his possession belongs to the house of the king, although it does not belong to the house of the king. One may take a false vow to save himself or his possessions, as a statement of this sort does not have the status of a vow. Beit Shammai say: One may vow in such a case, although he has no intention that his words be true, using every means of taking a vow or making a prohibition in order to mislead those people...
From here we see two important features of this Halacha:
1 -It does not apply in all cases
2 - Dina D'Malchusa applies to TAXES
מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַשְּׁטָרוֹת הָעוֹלִים בְּעַרְכָּאוֹת שֶׁל גּוֹיִם אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁחוֹתְמֵיהֶם גּוֹיִם כְּשֵׁירִים חוּץ מִגִּיטֵּי נָשִׁים וְשִׁחְרוּרֵי עֲבָדִים רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר אַף אֵלּוּ כְּשֵׁירִין לֹא הוּזְכְּרוּ אֶלָּא בִּזְמַן שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ בְּהֶדְיוֹט גְּמָ׳ קָא פָּסֵיק וְתָנֵי לָא שְׁנָא מֶכֶר לָא שְׁנָא מַתָּנָה בִּשְׁלָמָא מֶכֶר מִכִּי יָהֵיב זוּזֵי קַמַּיְיהוּ הוּא דִּקְנָה וּשְׁטָרָא רְאָיָה בְּעָלְמָא הוּא דְּאִי לָא יָהֵיב זוּזֵי קַמַּיְיהוּ לָא הֲווֹ מַרְעִי נַפְשַׁיְיהוּ וְכָתְבִין לֵיהּ שְׁטָרָא אֶלָּא מַתָּנָה בְּמַאי קָא קָנֵי לָאו בְּהַאי שְׁטָרָא וְהַאי שְׁטָרָא חַסְפָּא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל דִּינָא דְמַלְכוּתָא דִּינָא וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא תָּנֵי חוּץ מִכְּגִיטֵּי נָשִׁים רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר אַף אֵלּוּ כְּשֵׁירִין וְכוּ׳ וְהָא לָאו בְּנֵי כְרִיתוּת נִינְהוּ אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא יָרַד רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לְשִׁיטָתוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר דְּאָמַר עֵדֵי מְסִירָה כָּרְתִי וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא מוֹדֶה רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בִּמְזוּיָּף מִתּוֹכוֹ שֶׁפָּסוּל הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן
MISHNA: With regard to all documents produced in gentile courts, even though their signatures are those of gentiles they are all valid, except for bills of divorce and bills of manumission. Rabbi Shimon says: Even these are valid, as these two types of documents are mentioned only when they are prepared by a common person, not in court. GEMARA: With regard to the ruling of the mishna that all documents written in gentile courts are valid, the Gemara comments: The tanna categorically teaches a general halakha in the mishna, and it is no different if it is a document concerning a sale and it is no different if it is a document concerning a gift, the document is valid in both cases. The Gemara asks: Granted, in the case of a sale this is reasonable, as from when the buyer gave money to the seller in the presence of the gentile judges he has acquired the property, since he has performed an act of acquisition. And the document is merely a proof for the acquisition. It must be that he already acquired the property in question, as if he had not given money in their presence the court would not act to its own detriment and write a document for him, as the document detailing the sale would not be accurate, and writing such a document would reflect poorly on them. Therefore, the document clearly serves as proof that the acquisition was performed in the correct manner. However, with regard to a gift, by what means does the one who receives the gift acquire it from the giver? Is it not via this document? And yet this document is merely a shard, as a document written by gentiles is not considered a legal document according to halakha. Shmuel said: The law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., Jews must obey the laws of the state in which they live. Consequently, every form of property transfer accepted by local law is valid according to halakha as well. And if you wish, say that one should emend the text of the mishna, and teach: They are all valid except for documents that are like bills of divorce. In other words, the distinction is between different types of documents: Documents that are meant to serve only as proof are valid even if they were produced in gentile courts, whereas documents that effect a legal act, such as bills of divorce, are invalid if they were written in a gentile court.
From this source we see the power of their courts for titles, contracts, etc.
גופא אמר שמואל דינא דמלכותא דינא אמר רבא תדע דקטלי דיקלי וגשרי גישרי ועברינן עלייהו א"ל אביי ודלמא משום דאייאוש להו מינייהו מרייהו אמר ליה אי לא דינא דמלכותא דינא היכי מייאשי...
The Gemara relates to the matter of civil law itself. Shmuel says: The law of the kingdom is the law, and the halakhic principle is that Jews must obey the laws of the state in which they reside. Rava said: Know that this principle is true from the fact that the municipal authorities cut down palm trees without the consent of their owners and construct bridges from them, and yet we cross over them. Evidently, the wood is not considered stolen property, which one is prohibited from using, because the law of the kingdom is the law. Abaye said to Rava: Perhaps the reason the bridges may be used is because their owners despaired of retrieving them and not because the law of the kingdom is the law. Rava said to Abaye: If not for the fact that the law of the kingdom is the law, how would the despair of the owners of the trees allow us to use the bridges? The fact that the owners have despaired of retrieving their wood does not effect a transfer of property, and it therefore still belongs to them.
From here we see Dina...extends to 'eminent domain', and a quasi-force over all private land.
This, however, should not be abused, as seen from the following famous story:
וְאַמַּאי קָרוּ לֵיהּ ״רֹאשׁ הַמְדַבְּרִים בְּכָל מָקוֹם״? דְּיָתְבִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, וְיָתֵיב יְהוּדָה בֶּן גֵּרִים גַּבַּיְיהוּ. פָּתַח רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְאָמַר: כַּמָּה נָאִים מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן שֶׁל אוּמָּה זוֹ: תִּקְּנוּ שְׁוָוקִים, תִּקְּנוּ גְּשָׁרִים, תִּקְנוּ מֶרְחֲצָאוֹת. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי שָׁתַק. נַעֲנָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַאי וְאָמַר: כׇּל מַה שֶּׁתִּקְּנוּ, לֹא תִּקְּנוּ אֶלָּא לְצוֹרֶךְ עַצְמָן. תִּקְּנוּ שְׁווֹקִין — לְהוֹשִׁיב בָּהֶן זוֹנוֹת, מֶרְחֲצָאוֹת — לְעַדֵּן בָּהֶן עַצְמָן, גְּשָׁרִים — לִיטּוֹל מֵהֶן מֶכֶס. הָלַךְ יְהוּדָה בֶּן גֵּרִים וְסִיפֵּר דִּבְרֵיהֶם, וְנִשְׁמְעוּ לַמַּלְכוּת. אָמְרוּ: יְהוּדָה שֶׁעִילָּה — יִתְעַלֶּה. יוֹסֵי שֶׁשָּׁתַק — יִגְלֶה לְצִיפּוֹרִי. שִׁמְעוֹן שֶׁגִּינָּה — יֵהָרֵג.
Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon were sitting, and Yehuda, sat beside them. Rabbi Yehuda opened and said: How pleasant are the actions of this nation, the Romans, as they established marketplaces, established bridges, and established bathhouses. Rabbi Yosei was silent. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai responded and said: Everything that they established, they established only for their own purposes. They established marketplaces, to place prostitutes in them; bathhouses, to pamper themselves; and bridges, to collect taxes from all who pass over them. Yehuda, went and related their statements to his household, and those statements continued to spread until they were heard by the monarchy. They ruled and said: Yehuda, who elevated the Roman regime, shall be elevated and appointed as head of the Sages. Yosei, who remained silent, shall be exiled from his home in Judea as punishment, and sent to the city of Tzippori in the Galilee. And Shimon, who denounced the government, shall be killed.
שטרות של המלוכה כיון שהולכין כמטבע גמורה הרי הם ככל המטבעות ונוטל הבכור בהם פי שנים
It is clear from the above -and many other sources -of Dina's power to effect currency, etc. Would this then cause an issue with using Crypto, etc.?
תניא ר"א בן יעקב אומר שמעתי שבית דין מכין ועונשין שלא מן התורה ולא לעבור על דברי תורה אלא כדי לעשות סייג לתורה ומעשה באחד שרכב על סוס בשבת בימי יונים והביאוהו לבית דין וסקלוהו לא מפני שראוי לכך אלא שהשעה צריכה לכך
Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: I heard that the court may administer lashes and capital punishment, even when not required by Torah law. And they may not administer these punishments with the intention of violating the statement of the Torah, i.e., to disregard the punishment stated in the Torah and administer another punishment; rather, they may administer these punishments to erect a fence around the Torah, so that people will fear sinning. And an incident occurred involving one who rode a horse on Shabbat during the days of the Greeks, and they brought him to court and stoned him, not because he deserved that punishment, as riding a horse on Shabbat is forbidden only by rabbinic decree, but because the hour required it,
To this, Rishonim (i.e. Ran, inter alia) point out that this rule extents to proper civil courts (i.e Dina) as well.
We then learn that Dina extends to judicial and extra-Judicial crime and punishment (although Dina is in and of itself, halachikly, extra-judicial; in other words, based on this the Gemara may simply be explaining why Halacha would ever allow us to surrender to the 'rule of law', in that this is a Beis Din choice as a need in Galus, like the stories in this Gemara-of which we only shared one).
הנהו בני גלילא דנפק עלייהו קלא דקטול נפשא אתו לקמיה דרבי טרפון אמרו ליה לטמרינן מר אמר להו היכי נעביד...
There were these people of the Galilee about whom a rumor emerged that they had killed someone. They came before Rabbi Tarfon and said to him: Will the Master hide us? Rabbi Tarfon said to them: What should we do? ...If I hide you...
We see from Rashi that should they be guilty it would be forbidden to hide them; however, one can infer that if not guilty...one can hide them? (See Rav Shlomo Luria, et al.)
(11) When is the previous case applicable? When the tax collector is like a robber, like when an idolater or the tax collector that is standing above him or the one sent by the king, and there is no limit, rather, he takes as much as he wants and gives [to the king] as much as he wants. But the tax established by the king, and is he said he should take a third or a fourth, or any amount with a limit. And [if] he appoints a Jew to collect this part for the king and it is known that this person is trustworthy, and he does not add anything over what the king has decreed, he is not under the assumption that he is a robber, since the law of the king is law. Not only that, but one who transgresses and smuggles from this tax is stealing from the king, whether the king is an idolater or a Jewish king.
(12) And so too a king who put a tax over the inhabitants of a city, or over each and every person, a predictable thing of every year; or over a field, something predictable...
(14) The general principle is: Any law that a king decrees to be universally applicable, and not merely applying to one person, is not considered robbery. But whenever he takes from one person alone in a manner that does not conform to a known law, but rather seizes the property from the person arbitrarily, it is considered to be robbery. ...
(17) [In the case of] a king who cut down trees belonging to individual property owners and made a bridge out of them, it is permissible to cross the bridge. So too if he destroyed homes to make a path or a wall, one is allowed to benefit from it. And so it is for all similar circumstances, for the king's law is the law.
(18) In what instances does this principle [the king's law is the law] apply? When the king's coins are accepted throughout those lands [under his control], for the residents of that country have agreed to him and have accepted that he is their master and they are to him as slaves. But if his coins do not circulate, he is like a robber by force and like a band of armed thieves whose laws are not enforced, and such a king and all his servants are considered thieves in all matters.
WHAT IS THE 'SEVARAH' OF DINA D'MALCHUSA?
THERE ARE SEVERAL OPINIONS:
(א) וַיְהִ֕י כַּאֲשֶׁ֥ר זָקֵ֖ן שְׁמוּאֵ֑ל וַיָּ֧שֶׂם אֶת־בָּנָ֛יו שֹׁפְטִ֖ים לְיִשְׂרָאֵֽל׃ (ב) וַיְהִ֞י שֶׁם־בְּנ֤וֹ הַבְּכוֹר֙ יוֹאֵ֔ל וְשֵׁ֥ם מִשְׁנֵ֖הוּ אֲבִיָּ֑ה שֹׁפְטִ֖ים בִּבְאֵ֥ר שָֽׁבַע׃ (ג) וְלֹֽא־הָלְכ֤וּ בָנָיו֙ בִּדְרָכָ֔ו וַיִּטּ֖וּ אַחֲרֵ֣י הַבָּ֑צַע וַיִּ֨קְחוּ־שֹׁ֔חַד וַיַּטּ֖וּ מִשְׁפָּֽט׃ {פ}
(ד) וַיִּֽתְקַבְּצ֔וּ כֹּ֖ל זִקְנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֑ל וַיָּבֹ֥אוּ אֶל־שְׁמוּאֵ֖ל הָרָמָֽתָה׃ (ה) וַיֹּאמְר֣וּ אֵלָ֗יו הִנֵּה֙ אַתָּ֣ה זָקַ֔נְתָּ וּבָנֶ֕יךָ לֹ֥א הָלְכ֖וּ בִּדְרָכֶ֑יךָ עַתָּ֗ה שִֽׂימָה־לָּ֥נוּ מֶ֛לֶךְ לְשׇׁפְטֵ֖נוּ כְּכׇל־הַגּוֹיִֽם׃ (ו) וַיֵּ֤רַע הַדָּבָר֙ בְּעֵינֵ֣י שְׁמוּאֵ֔ל כַּאֲשֶׁ֣ר אָֽמְר֔וּ תְּנָה־לָּ֥נוּ מֶ֖לֶךְ לְשׇׁפְטֵ֑נוּ וַיִּתְפַּלֵּ֥ל שְׁמוּאֵ֖ל אֶל־יְהֹוָֽה׃ {פ}
(ז) וַיֹּ֤אמֶר יְהֹוָה֙ אֶל־שְׁמוּאֵ֔ל שְׁמַע֙ בְּק֣וֹל הָעָ֔ם לְכֹ֥ל אֲשֶׁר־יֹאמְר֖וּ אֵלֶ֑יךָ כִּ֣י לֹ֤א אֹֽתְךָ֙ מָאָ֔סוּ כִּי־אֹתִ֥י מָאֲס֖וּ מִמְּלֹ֥ךְ עֲלֵיהֶֽם׃ (ח) כְּכׇֽל־הַמַּעֲשִׂ֣ים אֲשֶׁר־עָשׂ֗וּ מִיּוֹם֩ הַעֲלֹתִ֨י אוֹתָ֤ם מִמִּצְרַ֙יִם֙ וְעַד־הַיּ֣וֹם הַזֶּ֔ה וַיַּ֣עַזְבֻ֔נִי וַיַּעַבְד֖וּ אֱלֹהִ֣ים אֲחֵרִ֑ים כֵּ֛ן הֵ֥מָּה עֹשִׂ֖ים גַּם־לָֽךְ׃ (ט) וְעַתָּ֖ה שְׁמַ֣ע בְּקוֹלָ֑ם אַ֗ךְ כִּֽי־הָעֵ֤ד תָּעִיד֙ בָּהֶ֔ם וְהִגַּדְתָּ֣ לָהֶ֔ם מִשְׁפַּ֣ט הַמֶּ֔לֶךְ אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִמְלֹ֖ךְ עֲלֵיהֶֽם׃ {ס} (י) וַיֹּ֣אמֶר שְׁמוּאֵ֔ל אֵ֖ת כׇּל־דִּבְרֵ֣י יְהֹוָ֑ה אֶל־הָעָ֕ם הַשֹּׁאֲלִ֥ים מֵאִתּ֖וֹ מֶֽלֶךְ׃ {ס} (יא) וַיֹּ֕אמֶר זֶ֗ה יִֽהְיֶה֙ מִשְׁפַּ֣ט הַמֶּ֔לֶךְ אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִמְלֹ֖ךְ עֲלֵיכֶ֑ם אֶת־בְּנֵיכֶ֣ם יִקָּ֗ח וְשָׂ֥ם לוֹ֙ בְּמֶרְכַּבְתּ֣וֹ וּבְפָרָשָׁ֔יו וְרָצ֖וּ לִפְנֵ֥י מֶרְכַּבְתּֽוֹ׃ (יב) וְלָשׂ֣וּם ל֔וֹ שָׂרֵ֥י אֲלָפִ֖ים וְשָׂרֵ֣י חֲמִשִּׁ֑ים וְלַחֲרֹ֤שׁ חֲרִישׁוֹ֙ וְלִקְצֹ֣ר קְצִיר֔וֹ וְלַעֲשׂ֥וֹת כְּלֵֽי־מִלְחַמְתּ֖וֹ וּכְלֵ֥י רִכְבּֽוֹ׃ (יג) וְאֶת־בְּנוֹתֵיכֶ֖ם יִקָּ֑ח לְרַקָּח֥וֹת וּלְטַבָּח֖וֹת וּלְאֹפֽוֹת׃ (יד) וְאֶת־שְׂ֠דֽוֹתֵיכֶ֠ם וְאֶת־כַּרְמֵיכֶ֧ם וְזֵיתֵיכֶ֛ם הַטּוֹבִ֖ים יִקָּ֑ח וְנָתַ֖ן לַעֲבָדָֽיו׃ (טו) וְזַרְעֵיכֶ֥ם וְכַרְמֵיכֶ֖ם יַעְשֹׂ֑ר וְנָתַ֥ן לְסָרִיסָ֖יו וְלַעֲבָדָֽיו׃ (טז) וְאֶת־עַבְדֵיכֶם֩ וְֽאֶת־שִׁפְח֨וֹתֵיכֶ֜ם וְאֶת־בַּחוּרֵיכֶ֧ם הַטּוֹבִ֛ים וְאֶת־חֲמוֹרֵיכֶ֖ם יִקָּ֑ח וְעָשָׂ֖ה לִמְלַאכְתּֽוֹ׃ (יז) צֹאנְכֶ֖ם יַעְשֹׂ֑ר וְאַתֶּ֖ם תִּֽהְיוּ־ל֥וֹ לַעֲבָדִֽים׃ (
(1) When Samuel grew old, he appointed his sons judges over Israel. (2) The name of his first-born son was Joel, and his second son’s name was Abijah; they sat as judges in Beer-sheba. (3) But his sons did not follow in his ways; they were bent on gain, they accepted bribes, and they subverted justice. (4) All the elders of Israel assembled and came to Samuel at Ramah, (5) and they said to him, “You have grown old, and your sons have not followed your ways. Therefore appoint a king for us, to govern us like all other nations.” (6) Samuel was displeased that they said “Give us a king to govern us.” Samuel prayed to the LORD, (7) and the LORD replied to Samuel, “Heed the demand of the people in everything they say to you. For it is not you that they have rejected; it is Me they have rejected as their king. (8) Like everything else they have done ever since I brought them out of Egypt to this day—forsaking Me and worshiping other gods—so they are doing to you. (9) Heed their demand; but warn them solemnly, and tell them about the practices of any king who will rule over them.” (10) Samuel reported all the words of the LORD to the people, who were asking him for a king. (11) He said, “This will be the practice of the king who will rule over you: He will take your sons and appoint them as his charioteers and horsemen, and they will serve as outrunners for his chariots. (12) He will appoint them as his chiefs of thousands and of fifties; or they will have to plow his fields, reap his harvest, and make his weapons and the equipment for his chariots. (13) He will take your daughters as perfumers, cooks, and bakers. (14) He will seize your choice fields, vineyards, and olive groves, and give them to his courtiers. (15) He will take a tenth part of your grain and vintage and give it to his eunuchs and courtiers. (16) He will take your male and female slaves, your choice young men,-a and your asses, and put them to work for him. (17) He will take a tenth part of your flocks, and you shall become his slaves. (18) The day will come when you cry out because of the king whom you yourselves have chosen; and the LORD will not answer you on that day.” (19) But the people would not listen to Samuel’s warning. “No,” they said. “We must have a king over us, (20) that we may be like all the other nations: Let our king rule over us and go out at our head and fight our battles.”
(לז) וּתְבוּאָתָ֣הּ מַרְבָּ֗ה לַמְּלָכִ֛ים אֲשֶׁר־נָתַ֥תָּה עָלֵ֖ינוּ בְּחַטֹּאותֵ֑ינוּ וְעַ֣ל גְּ֠וִיֹּתֵינוּ מֹשְׁלִ֤ים וּבִבְהֶמְתֵּ֙נוּ֙ כִּרְצוֹנָ֔ם וּבְצָרָ֥ה גְדֹלָ֖ה אֲנָֽחְנוּ׃ {פ}