(22) When men fight, and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, and there is no [other] damage, the one responsible shall be fined according as the woman’s husband may exact from him, the payment to be based on reckoning. (23) But if other damage ensues, the penalty shall be life for life, (24) eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, (25) burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.
(ו) הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהִיא מַקְשָׁה לֵילֵד, מְחַתְּכִין אֶת הַוָּלָד בְּמֵעֶיהָ וּמוֹצִיאִין אוֹתוֹ אֵבָרִים אֵבָרִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁחַיֶּיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְחַיָּיו. יָצָא רֻבּוֹ, אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ, שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נָפֶשׁ:
(6) If a woman is having trouble giving birth, they cut up the child in her womb and brings it forth limb by limb, because her life comes before the life of [the child]. But if the majority of [the child] has come out, one may not touch it, for one may not set aside one person's life for that of another.
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Can we draw any conclusions from these sources about the relative value of the life of the fetus and mother?
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What can they tell us about the beginning of personhood?
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Is there a lesson here relative to abortion? In what circumstances would it be permissible?
(ט) אַף זוֹ מִצְוַת לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁלֹּא לָחוּס עַל נֶפֶשׁ הָרוֹדֵף. לְפִיכָךְ הוֹרוּ חֲכָמִים שֶׁהָעֻבָּרָה שֶׁהִיא מַקְשָׁה לֵילֵד מֻתָּר לַחְתֹּךְ הָעֵבָּר בְּמֵעֶיהָ בֵּין בְּסַם בֵּין בְּיָד מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּרוֹדֵף אַחֲרֶיהָ לְהָרְגָהּ. וְאִם מִשֶּׁהוֹצִיא רֹאשׁוֹ אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נֶפֶשׁ וְזֶהוּ טִבְעוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם:
This is a negative commandment: one must not take pity on the life of a rodef/pursuer. Therefore the sages taught: if a pregnant woman’s labor becomes life threatening, it is permitted to dismember the fetus in her womb, either by a medication or by hand, for [the fetus] is like a rodef who is pursuing her to kill her. But from the moment its head emerges, they are is not to be touched, for one life is not to be put aside for another, for this is the natural course of things.
The Mishneh Torah is the code of Jewish Law compiled and written by Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, known as Rambam and also as Maimonides. The Mishneh Torah is one of the most important codes of Jewish Law ever created.
Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to Rav Huna from a baraita: If a woman was giving birth and her life was being endangered by the fetus, the life of the fetus may be sacrificed in order to save the mother. But once its head has emerged during the birthing process, [the fetus] may not be harmed in order to save the mother, because one life may not be pushed aside to save another life. If one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the minor who is pursuing him, why is this so? The fetus is a pursuer who is endangering his mother’s life. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as it is different there, with regard to the woman giving birth, since she is being pursued by Heaven. Since the fetus is not acting of his own volition and endangering his mother of his own will, his life may not be taken in order to save his mother.
יצא ראשו - באשה המקשה לילד ומסוכנת וקתני רישא החיה פושטת ידה וחותכתו ומוציאתו לאברים דכל זמן שלא יצא לאויר העולם לאו נפש הוא וניתן להורגו ולהציל את אמו אבל יצא ראשו אין נוגעים בו להורגו דהוה ליה כילוד ואין דוחין נפש מפני נפש.
its head came out: [This is about] a woman that is experiencing difficulty giving birth and is in [mortal] danger. And it is taught in the first section [of this teaching], "the midwife extends her hand and cuts it up and extracts [the pieces];" as the entire time that that it has not gone out into the air of the world, it is not [considered] a nefesh/living being, and [so] it is possible to kill it and to save its mother. But when its head came out, we cannot touch it to kill it, as it is like a born [baby]; and we do not push off one nefesh/living being for the sake of another.
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What reason does Rambam give for permitting an abortion?
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What is Rashi's reason?
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What kinds of real life cases might be permitted according to Rambam's formulation? According to Rashi's?
שו"ת שאילת יעבץ חלק א סימן מג
אמנם נדון השואל בא"א שזנתה שאלה הגונה היא. וקרוב בעיני להתירה...
וגם בעובר כשר הי' צד להקל לצורך גדול. כל כמה דלא עקר. אפי' אינו משום פקוח נפש אמו. אלא להציל לה מרעתו. שגורם לה כאב גדול וצ"ע.
וא"כ לדברינו ודאי בעלמא (ר"ל בעובר כשר) איסורא איכא להשחית עובר. חוץ מנדון השאלה בא"א שקלקלה הגדתי היום דעתי הקלה שמותר, ואולי קרוב לשכר מצוה
Responsa She’elat Ya”vetz 1:43
The questioner asks about an adulterous married woman (who is pregnant) is a good question. It appears to me to permit her (to abort)...
And even in the case of a legitimate fetus, there is reason to be lenient if there is a great need, as long as the fetus has not begun to emerge; even if the mother’s life is not in jeopardy, but only so as to save her from an evil associated with it that would cause her great pain...
Therefore our ruling is: in general it is certainly forbidden to destroy a legitimate fetus, but in the case before us of a married woman who has gone astray, I hereby state my humble opinion that it is permitted; perhaps it is even worthy of being regarded as a mitzvah.
שו"ת ציץ אליעזר חלק ט סימן נא - קונ' רפואה במשפחה פרק ג
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(ח) ברם מתקבל על הדעת לומר דעיקר נימוק ההיתרמה שיש להתיר בא"א שזינתה הוא מפני דנקרא זה לצורך אמו בכדי להצילה עי"כ מבושת ובזיון שתנחל ויהא מנת חלקה בהולדו לכל ימי חייה, והוי זה בדומה למה שלאחר מיכן כותב היעב"ץ לצדד אפילו הפלת ולד כשר לצורך גדול אפילו אינו משום פקו"נ אמו אלא להציל לה מרעתה שגורם לה כאב גדול, דאין לך צורך גדול וכאב גופני ורוחני גדול לאם השבה בתשובה יותר מזה שחטאת ולדה הממזר יעמוד חי נגדה תמיד, ופשוט ומובן דאם נתיר מטעם זה אזי יש להתיר גם כשהא"א נאנסה דהולד הרי הוא ממזר גם כשנוצר ע"י שנאנסה. על כן נראה דאם יש חשש מבוסס שהילד שיולד יצא בעל מום ובעל יסורים יש לצדד להתיר לבצע הפלה קודם מלאת ארבעים יום מהריונה, וגם לרבות כשלא נמלאו עכ"פ שלשה חדשים והעובר עדנה לא בתנועה. |
Responsa Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3
(Referring to She’elat Ya”avetz 1:43)
However, it makes sense to say that the main reason to permit (abortion for an adulterous married woman) is because this is “because of the mother’s need,” to save her in this way from embarrassment and disgrace...when her child is born, for all her days. This is similar to what Ya”avetz writes afterwards to permit even abortion of a legitimate fetus “out of great need,” even if not pikuah nefesh/saving the life of the mother, but rather to save her from evil which great pain would cause her. For there is no greater need, nor physical and spiritual pain greater for a mother who has done teshuvah than that the sin of her illegitimate child will be living (reproof) constantly. It is simple and clear that if we permit (abortion) for this reason, then we should permit it in the case of a married woman who is raped, for the child would be illegitimate when conceived by rape.
Therefore it seems that if there is a valid concern that the child will be born deformed or in constant pain we should permit an abortion within 40 days of conception, and at the most up to 3 months, and providing that the fetus is not moving.
“One should permit…abortion as soon as it becomes evident without doubt from the test that, indeed, such a baby (diagnosed with Tay-Sachs) shall be born, even until the seventh month of her pregnancy… If, indeed, we may permit an abortion according to the Halakhah because of ‘great need’ and because of pain and suffering, it seems that this is the classic case for such permission. And it is irrelevant in what way the pain and suffering is expressed, whether it is physical or psychological. Indeed, psychological suffering is in many ways much greater than the suffering of the flesh.”
שו"ת אגרות משה חושן משפט חלק ב סימן סט
וגם כתב שהשאילת יעב"ץ מתיר אף שאסר בפירוש, בשביל לשון וגם בעובר כשר יש צד להקל לצורך גדול, אף שברור ופשוט דלשון יש צד להקל הוא כאמר שיותר צדדים איכא לאסור וכדמסיק היעב"ץ ע"ז וצ"ע,
ועל שו"ת רב פעלים שג"כ היה ירא לפסוק בזה שלכן מסיק להתיר בתיי - סקס להפיל עד שבעה חדשים, ולא מובן זמן זה שלא מצינו כלל. וברור ופשוט כדכתבתי הלכה הברורה ע"פ רבותינו הראשונים המפרשים והפוסקים ממש שאסור בדין רציחה ממש כל עובר בין כשר בין ממזר בין סתם עוברים ובין הידועים לחולי תיי - סקס שכולן אסורין מדינא ממש.
Iggrot Moshe Hoshen Mishpat 2:69
And he further wrote that She’elat Ya”vetz permitted, even though he explicitly forbade, because he used the language “and also regarding a legitimate fetus there is a side to permit for great need” which is like saying there are more sides to forbid, and as
Ya”vetz himself concludes “needs further study.”
Regarding the Responsa from Rav P’alim, who also was hesitant to decide on this issue, who therefore decides to permit abortion through the 7th month for a Tay-Sachs fetus...And it is clear and straightforward as I wrote the clear halakhah...that it is forbidden as actual murder (to abort) any fetus, whether legitimate or mamzer, whether any fetus or one with Tay-Sachs - all are forbidden by Torah.
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What is the justification for his ruling that Rabbi Yaakov Emden gives in She’elat Ya''avetz?
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What case does he start with? And how far does he extend his ruling?
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How does Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg understand Ya''avetz’s ruling? Does he agree? What
case does he add?
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How does Rabbi Moshe Feinstein read the Ya''avetz responsa? What is his final stance on
the various scenarios that might lead to abortion?
(ד) בֶּן נֹחַ שֶׁהָרַג נֶפֶשׁ אֲפִלּוּ עֵבָּר בִּמְעֵי אִמּוֹ נֶהֱרָג עָלָיו. וְכֵן אִם הָרַג טְרֵפָה אוֹ שֶׁכְּפָתוֹ וּנְתָנוֹ לִפְנֵי אֲרִי אוֹ שֶׁהִנִּיחוֹ בָּרָעָב עַד שֶׁמֵּת. הוֹאִיל וְהֵמִית מִכָּל מָקוֹם נֶהֱרָג. וְכֵן אִם הָרַג רוֹדֵף שֶׁיָּכוֹל לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵאֵיבָרָיו נֶהֱרָג עָלָיו. מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל:
(4) A non-Jew who kills someone, even a fetus in its mother’s womb, is executed. Even if they kill someone who has an incurable, terminal illness, or tied someone up and placed them in front of a lion or they let them starve until they died is liable since they caused someone to die. Similarly, if they killed a Rodef/Pursuer when they could have saved their friend by merely injuring one of the Pursuer’s limbs, is also executed. This is not the case with a Jew.
כח שור סימן כ'
דזה רחוק מן השכל דלגבי דידן לא חשבה התורה עובר לנפש ולגבי דידהו חשבה התורה עובר לנפש. וזה דבר לא יכילהו הרעיון. רק צ"ל דבאמת גם לגבי דידהו לא מקרי העובר נפש כמו לגבי דידן רק התורה החמירה על הנכרים שיתחייבו אף על רציחת עובר אף שאינן מקרי נפש...לכך רשאין לדחותו מפני נפש האם כמו לדידן.
Koah Shor Siman 20
(Commentary on the Mishneh Torah)
This is hard to accept that the Torah would consider the embryo as a person (nefesh) for them (children of Noah) but not a person for us. Logic would not accept this. The fetus is not a person for them either; the Torah merely was more severe in its practical ruling in their regard. Hence, therapeutic abortion would be permissible to them, too.
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If we would look to halakhah for guidance on contemporary social policy for non-Jews as well as Jews, what would we do based on Rambam's ruling?
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What is the ruling of Rabbi Yitzhak Schorr? What is the basis for his decision? How might this impact contemporary social policy?
By Rabbi Kass Abelson.
There is clear precedent in the tradition...to permit abortion of a fetus to save a mother’s life, to safeguard her health, or even for “a very thin reason,” such as to spare her physical pain or mental anguish. Some...also consider the well-being of other children, and the future of the fetus itself as reasons to permit abortion. All agree that there must be a reason to justify the destruction of the potential person the fetus will become after birth.
Where there is reason to believe that the fetus may be defective...If the tests indicate that the child will be born with major defects..it is permitted to abort the fetus.
Proceedings, ibid., p. 26 Rabbi Robert Gordis
..Abortion should be legally available but ethically restricted, to be practiced only for very good reasons.
Proceedings, ibid. P. 37 Rabbis Ben Zion Bokser and Kassel Abelson
Jewish tradition..does not permit abortion on demand. However, it sanctions abortion under some circumstances...The Rabbinical Assembly Committee on Jewish Law and Standards takes the view that an abortion is justifiable if a continuation of pregnancy might cause the mother severe physical or psychological harm, or when the fetus is judged by competent medical opinion as severely defective.
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According to these teshuvot of the Law Committee, what are the parameters of permissible abortion?
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What would their view be of abortion on demand?