אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִיָּמַי לֹא קִבַּלְתִּי מַתָּנוֹת, וְלֹא עָמַדְתִּי עַל מִדּוֹתַי, וּוַתְּרָן בְּמָמוֹנִי הָיִיתִי.
With regard to the original question, Rabbi Neḥunya said to him: In all my days I never accepted gifts. Nor was I ever inflexible by exacting a measure of retribution against those who wronged me. And I was always openhanded with my money.
לֹא קִבַּלְתִּי מַתָּנוֹת, כִּי הָא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר כִּי הֲווֹ מְשַׁדְּרִי לֵיהּ מַתָּנוֹת מִבֵּי נְשִׂיאָה — לָא הֲוָה שָׁקֵיל. כִּי הֲוָה מְזַמְּנִי לֵיהּ — לָא הֲוָה אָזֵיל, אֲמַר לְהוּ: לָא נִיחָא לְכוּ דְּאֶחְיֶה, דִּכְתִיב: ״שׂוֹנֵא מַתָּנוֹת יִחְיֶה״. רַבִּי זֵירָא כִּי הֲווֹ מְשַׁדְּרִי לֵיהּ מִבֵּי נְשִׂיאָה — לָא הֲוָה שָׁקֵיל. כִּי הֲוָה מְזַמְּנִי לֵיהּ — אָזֵיל. אֲמַר: אִתְיַיקּוֹרֵי דְּמִתְיַיקְּרִי בִּי.
The Gemara explains: I never accepted gifts; this is referring to conduct such as that of Rabbi Elazar. When they would send him gifts from the house of the Nasi, he would not take them, and when they would invite him, he would not go there, as he considered hospitality to be a type of gift. He would say to them: Is it not pleasing to you that I should live, as it is written: “He that hates gifts shall live” (Proverbs 15:27)? In contrast, it was reported about Rabbi Zeira that when they would send him gifts from the house of the Nasi, he would not accept them, but when they would invite him, he would go there. He said: They are honored by my presence; therefore my visiting is not considered like I am taking a gift from them.
The first thing that R. Nehuniah did to live a long life was to refuse presents, which here seem to be like bribes. R. Elazar would not accept presents from the Patriarch’s house, for he was afraid they were in essence bribes. He would not even go over there when invited lest by benefiting from them he become indebted to them. These are ethics from which our politicians could certainly learn.
Zera didn’t accept presents either, but he would go to the Exilarch’s (the head of the community in Babylonia) house. He reasoned that they were not honoring him, he was honoring them. Hmm. I’m not sure whether I read this as a justification or not.
The dispute in this section has to do with a dying man who wants to give a gift to someone. Generally, a dying man can gift property without a symbolic act of acquisition—kinyan. He doesn’t even need a deed—words are sufficient. But this person does write out a deed and perform kinyan. The question is—should this be treated like the gift of a dying man, or like the gift of a healthy man, each of which have their own special rules.
According to Rav, the gift is doubly-strong, as if it is riding on two horses. On the one hand, it has the strength of a gift given by a healthy man, such that if he recovers his health, he cannot change his mind. The gift is immediately permanent. On the other hand, it like the gift of a dying man, in that he can transfer debt in this manner—he can say that a loan owed to him should be given to a certain other person. Normally, a healthy person cannot transfer debt in this manner. Here we can see Rav “following the rule of assumption”—he assumes that this person intentionally wished to give his document the strength of a deed bequeathed by a healthy man and the strength of a gift by a dying man.
Shmuel says that the document is entirely invalid because it contradicts itself. A document written by a dying man transfers property only after death, but when he wrote the kinyan in the document, he also gave the impression that the document is what affects the transfer, not his words. Since documents cannot begin their effectiveness after a person’s death, this document contradicts itself and is invalid.
According to Rav, the gift is doubly-strong, as if it is riding on two horses. On the one hand, it has the strength of a gift given by a healthy man, such that if he recovers his health, he cannot change his mind. The gift is immediately permanent. On the other hand, it like the gift of a dying man, in that he can transfer debt in this manner—he can say that a loan owed to him should be given to a certain other person. Normally, a healthy person cannot transfer debt in this manner. Here we can see Rav “following the rule of assumption”—he assumes that this person intentionally wished to give his document the strength of a deed bequeathed by a healthy man and the strength of a gift by a dying man.
Shmuel says that the document is entirely invalid because it contradicts itself. A document written by a dying man transfers property only after death, but when he wrote the kinyan in the document, he also gave the impression that the document is what affects the transfer, not his words. Since documents cannot begin their effectiveness after a person’s death, this document contradicts itself and is invalid.
וְרַב לָא אָזֵיל בָּתַר אוּמְדָּנָא? וְהָא אִיתְּמַר: מַתְּנַת שְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁכָּתוּב בָּהּ קִנְיָן, בְּבֵי רַב מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב אָמְרִי: אַרְכְּבֵיהּ אַתְּרֵי רִכְשֵׁי. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: לָא יָדַעְנָא מַאי אֵידוּן בַּהּ.
Having established that Rabbi Natan follows the principle of assessment, the Gemara asks: And does Rav not follow this principle of assessing intention? But it was stated that Rav and Shmuel disagreed about a specific case with regard to the gift of a person on his deathbed, in which it was also written that the gift was given with an act of acquisition. There is a rabbinic ordinance that one on his deathbed can effect the transfer of property without the ordinarily required act of acquisition, but in this case such an act was performed anyway. In the school of Rav, they say in the name of Rav: He had him ride on two horses, meaning that he gave him a gift with a document strengthened in two different ways. And Shmuel said: I do not know what to decide about it.
בְּבֵי רַב מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב אָמְרִי, אַרְכְּבֵיהּ אַתְּרֵי רִכְשֵׁי: הֲרֵי הִיא כְּמַתְּנַת בָּרִיא, וַהֲרֵי הִיא כְּמַתְּנַת שְׁכִיב מְרַע.
The Gemara explains the two opinions: In the school of Rav, they say in the name of Rav: He had him ride on two horses, meaning that he performed the transfer in a manner that took advantage of two separate halakhot to strengthen its validity. In one aspect, it is similar to the gift of a healthy person, and in a different way it is similar to the gift of a person on his deathbed. Both of these aspects act to strengthen the transfer.
הֲרֵי הִיא כְּמַתְּנַת בָּרִיא, דְּאִם עָמַד — אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ. הֲרֵי הִיא כְּמַתְּנַת שְׁכִיב מְרַע, שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הַלְוָאָתִי לִפְלוֹנִי״ — הַלְוָאָתוֹ לִפְלוֹנִי.
On the one hand, it is similar to the gift of a healthy person in that if he arose from the bed and recovered he cannot retract it, since he performed a proper act of acquisition. On the other hand, it is like the gift of a person on his deathbed in that if he said: My loan, i.e., money owed to me, is transferred to so-and-so as a gift, his loan is in fact transferred to so-and-so. Although ordinarily ownership of a debt cannot be transferred without a formal transference of the promissory note, the verbal statement is sufficient to effect the transfer since this is a gift of a person on his deathbed.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דִּינָא דְּמָר לָא בָּעֵינָא, קַבּוֹלֵי לְקַבֵּיל מָר דְּלָא לִמְנְעַן מָר מֵאַקְרוֹבֵי בִּכּוּרִים. דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְאִישׁ בָּא מִבַּעַל שָׁלִישָׁה וַיָּבֵא לְאִישׁ הָאֱלֹהִים לֶחֶם בִּכּוּרִים עֶשְׂרִים לֶחֶם שְׂעוֹרִים וְכַרְמֶל בְּצִקְלוֹנוֹ״. וְכִי אֱלִישָׁע אוֹכֵל בִּכּוּרִים הֲוָה? אֶלָּא לוֹמַר לָךְ: כׇּל הַמֵּבִיא דּוֹרוֹן לְתַלְמִיד חָכָם — כְּאִילּוּ מַקְרִיב בִּכּוּרִים.
The man said to him: I do not need the Master’s judgment. However, let the Master accept my gift anyway, so that the Master does not prevent me from presenting first fruits. What does the mitzva of first fruits have to with this situation? As it is taught in a baraita: “And there came a man came from Ba’al Shalisha, and he brought the man of God bread of the first fruits, twenty loaves of barley and fresh ears of corn in his sack” (II Kings 4:42). But did Elisha, the recipient of these gifts, eat first fruits? After all, he was not a priest. Rather, this verse comes to tell you: Whoever brings a gift to a Torah scholar, it is as though he has presented first fruits. This visitor to Rav Anan wished to fulfill this mitzva.
Interestingly, after all we have said about not taking gifts, we have here a baraita that teaches that bringing a gift to a sage is equivalent to bringing first fruits to the Temple. The man can give the gift to R. Anan as long as R. Anan does not judge his case thereafter. Nevertheless, we shall see below that the sugya is deeply ambivalent about people bringing gifts to rabbis.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְאֵין לוֹ מַה יֹּאכַל — נוֹתְנוֹ לְאַחֵר לְשׁוּם מַתָּנָה, וְהַלָּה מוּתָּר בָּהּ. מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאֶחָד בְּבֵית חוֹרוֹן שֶׁהָיָה אָבִיו נוֹדֵר הֵימֶנּוּ הֲנָאָה, וְהָיָה מַשִּׂיא אֶת בְּנוֹ. וְאָמַר לַחֲבֵרוֹ: חָצֵר וּסְעוּדָה נְתוּנִים הִינָּן לְפָנֶיךָ, אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּבֹא אַבָּא וְיֹאכַל עִמָּנוּ בִּסְעוּדָה.
MISHNA: With regard to one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another and he does not have anything to eat, the other may give the food to someone else as a gift and he is then permitted to eat it. The mishna recounts: An incident occurred involving someone in the city of Beit Ḥoron whose father had vowed not to derive benefit from him, and the son was marrying off his own son and wanted his father to be able to participate in the wedding meal. And he therefore said to another: The courtyard where the wedding will take place and the wedding meal are given before you as a gift, but only so that my father will come and eat with us at the meal.
אָמַר: אִם שֶׁלִּי הֵם — הֲרֵי הֵם מוּקְדָּשִׁין לַשָּׁמַיִם. אָמַר לוֹ: נָתַתִּי לְךָ אֶת שֶׁלִּי שֶׁתַּקְדִּישֵׁם לַשָּׁמַיִם?! אָמַר לוֹ: נָתַתָּ לִי אֶת שֶׁלְּךָ אֶלָּא שֶׁתְּהֵא אַתָּה וְאָבִיךְ אוֹכְלִין וְשׁוֹתִין וּמִתְרַצִּין זֶה לָזֶה, וִיהֵא עָוֹן תָּלוּי בְּרֹאשׁוֹ. אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: כׇּל מַתָּנָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁאִם הִקְדִּישָׁהּ תְּהֵא מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת — אֵינָהּ מַתָּנָה.
The recipient said: If they are mine, they are all hereby consecrated to Heaven, i.e., the Temple, and are forbidden to everyone. The son said to him in anger: And did I give you my property so that you should consecrate it to Heaven? He, the recipient, said to him: You gave me your property only so that you and your father would eat and drink and thereby appease each other, and the sin of transgressing the vow would be hung on his, i.e., my, head, as I enabled the transgression. The Sages therefore said: Any gift that is not so absolute so that if the recipient were to consecrate the gift it would be consecrated, is not a gift. In other words, in order for it to be a gift, the recipient must have the ability to consecrate it.
גְּמָ׳ מַעֲשֶׂה לִסְתּוֹר! חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: וְאִם הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִילָּתוֹ — אָסוּר. וּמַעֲשֶׂה נָמֵי בְּבֵית חוֹרוֹן בְּאֶחָד, דַּהֲוָה סוֹפוֹ מוֹכִיחַ עַל תְּחִילָּתוֹ.
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Was an incident cited to contradict that which was initially stated in the mishna? The mishna explicitly stated that one may give a gift to another in order to bypass the prohibition of a vow. The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and is teaching like this: And if his ultimate actions prove the nature of his initial intent, i.e., if the prior owner protests that he gave the gift only as a technicality in order to bypass the vow, it is forbidden. And to illustrate this point, there was also an incident in Beit Ḥoron concerning someone whose ultimate protest proved that his initial intent was not to give a true gift.
צְרִיכָא: דְּאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַב, דְּלָא עָבְדִי אִינָשֵׁי דְּיָהֲבִי מַתָּנוֹת לְנוּכְרָאָה. אֲבָל גַּבֵּי אֲחוֹתוֹ אֵימָא מוֹדֵה לֵיהּ לִשְׁמוּאֵל.
The Gemara explains: It is necessary to present the disagreement in both instances because if it were stated only with regard to that case, of buying property from a robber, one might have reasoned that it is specifically in that case that Rav says that the money returns to the purchaser, as people do not tend to give gifts to non-relatives, and therefore it is clear that the purchaser intended for the money to be a deposit. But with regard to the case of one who betroths his sister, one might say that Rav concedes to Shmuel that the money was given as a gift. It is therefore necessary to present Rav’s opinion in both cases.
דִּתְנַן: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּבֵית חוֹרוֹן, בְּאֶחָד שֶׁהָיָה אָבִיו מוּדָּר הֵימֶנּוּ הֲנָאָה, וְהָיָה מַשִּׂיא בְּנוֹ; וְאָמַר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: הֲרֵי חָצֵר וּסְעוּדָה נְתוּנִין לְךָ בְּמַתָּנָה, וְאֵינָן לְפָנֶיךָ אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּבֹא אַבָּא וְיֹאכַל עִמָּנוּ בַּסְּעוּדָה.
As we learned in a mishna (Nedarim 48a): An incident occurred involving someone in the city of Beit Ḥoron whose father had vowed not to derive benefit from him, and the son was marrying off his own son and wanted his father to be able to participate in the wedding meal. And he therefore said to another: The courtyard where the wedding will take place and the wedding meal are hereby given to you as a gift, but they are given to you only so that my father will come and eat with us at the meal. The son wanted to circumvent the prohibition imposed by the vow and enable his father to participate in the meal, so he transferred ownership to someone else for that purpose.
אָמַר לוֹ: אִם שֶׁלִּי הֵן – הֲרֵי הֵן מוּקְדָּשִׁין לַשָּׁמַיִם! אָמַר לוֹ: לֹא נָתַתִּי לְךָ אֶת שֶׁלִּי שֶׁתַּקְדִּישֵׁם לַשָּׁמַיִם! אָמַר לוֹ: לֹא נָתַתָּ לִי אֶת שֶׁלְּךָ אֶלָּא שֶׁתְּהֵא אַתָּה וְאָבִיךְ אוֹכְלִין וְשׁוֹתִין וּמְרַצִּין זֶה לָזֶה, וִיהֵא עָוֹן תָּלוּי בְּרֹאשׁוֹ!
The recipient said to him: If they are mine, they are all hereby consecrated to Heaven, i.e., the Temple, and are forbidden to everyone. The son said to him in anger: I did not give you my property so that you should consecrate them to Heaven. The recipient said to him: You gave me your property only so that you and your father would eat and drink and thereby appease each other, and the sin of transgressing the vow would be hung on his, i.e., my, head, as I enabled the transgression.
אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: כׇּל מַתָּנָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁאִם הִקְדִּישָׁהּ מוּקְדֶּשֶׁת – אֵינָהּ מַתָּנָה.
The mishna continues: In reference to this incident, the Sages said: Any gift that is not so absolute that if the recipient were to consecrate it, the gift would be consecrated, is not a gift. In other words, in order for it to be a gift the recipient must have the ability to consecrate it. Similarly, Shammai had initially reasoned that the gift to Yonatan ben Uzziel was not a valid gift, as its sole purpose was so that the property should not fall into the possession of the man’s children. Once he discovered that Yonatan ben Uzziel consecrated part of the gift, he realized that it was, in fact, a valid gift, with which the recipient could do whatever he pleased.
אָמַר רָבָא: ״אֶתְרוֹג זֶה נָתוּן לְךָ בְּמַתָּנָה, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּחְזִירֵהוּ לִי״, נְטָלוֹ וְיָצָא בּוֹ; הֶחְזִירוֹ – יָצָא, לֹא הֶחְזִירוֹ – לֹא יָצָא. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּמַתָּנָה עַל מְנָת לְהַחֲזִיר – שְׁמָהּ מַתָּנָה.
Rava says: If one person said to another: This etrog is given to you as a gift on the condition that you return it to me, and the recipient took it on Sukkot and attempted to fulfill his obligation with it, if he ultimately returned it, he has fulfilled his obligation; if he did not return it, he has not fulfilled his obligation, as he did not fulfill the condition, thereby retroactively invalidating the gift. The Gemara explains that Rava teaches us that a gift given on the condition that it be returned is considered a valid gift.