Emunah Peshuta or Chakira

(1) The foundation of foundations and firmest pillar of all wisdom is, To know that there is a First Being, that He caused all beings to be, and that all beings from heaven and earth, and from between them, could not be save for the truth of His Own Being.

(1) TWENTY-FIVE of the propositions which are employed in the proof for the existence of God, or in the arguments demonstrating that God is neither corporeal nor a force connected with a material being, or that He is One, have been fully established, and their correctness is beyond doubt. Aristotle and the Peripatetics who followed him have proved each of these propositions. There is, however, one proposition which we do not accept--namely, the proposition which affirms the Eternity of the Universe, but we will admit it for the present, because by doing so we shall be enabled clearly to demonstrate our own theory.

(1) The existence of God: Every person of Israel must believe and know that there is a preexisting, eternal First Being. And He brought into being, and brings into being, everything that exists. And that is God, may He be blessed.

(1) The existence of God: Every person of Israel must believe and know that there is a preexisting, eternal First Being. And He brought into being, and brings into being, everything that exists. And that is God, may He be blessed.

(2) His perfection: One must also know that the true understanding of this Being, may His name be blessed, is not grasped at all by anyone besides Him. And we only know this about Him: That he is a perfect Being in every type of perfection and there is no deficiency in Him at all. (However we have known these things by tradition from the forefathers and from the prophets. And all of Israel grasped them at the stand at Mount Sinai, clearly understood their truth and taught them to their children - one generation after [another, until] this day. As Moses commanded them from the word of the Almighty [Deuteronomy 4:9], "lest you forget the things that you saw with your own eyes, etc. and you shall make them known to your children and to your children’s children." However all of these matters are even validated by way of the investigation of proofs that can be studied. And it is necessary for them to be so based, on what exists and on that which can be comprehended from them - which we see with our [own] eyes - according to the disciplines of science, geometry, astronomy and other disciplines from which you can take true bases from which the clarity of these true matters is derived. Yet we will not write at length about this now. Rather we will present the bases for their truth and arrange the things clearly according to the tradition that is in our hands and well-known to all of our nation.)

(2) The clear truth in the human species is that which most people in the world have agreed about - and the opinion of all people has already agreed with it - to believe the testimony of people. And with the proliferation of those testifying about a thing about which they are testifying, the thing is more established in the eyes of its hearers. And in those testifying being few, a bit of doubt develops in the thing for those that are sharp. And this matter has become so strong among people to the point that they fixed it in the practices of each and every nation to kill a man according to the testimony of two or three witnesses. And since three is more honored [than two], the perfect Torah also [mentioned it]. And from this reason also did the opinion of all agree to accept from the mouths of the testimony of their fathers, their elders, about that which they tell them that happened in their days or in the days of their fathers or in the days of the fathers of their fathers. And there is no doubt that in the fathers testifying being many - and in the ones that the event happened in their days being many - the thing is strengthened in the hearts of the children that hear [it]. Therefore when God wanted to give the Torah to His people, Israel, He gave it to them in the eyes of six hundred thousand adult men, besides the many infants and women, that they all be believable witnesses about the things. Also in order that the testimony be stronger and more believable, they all merited prophecy [at that time]. As doubt never develops about that which one knows by way of prophecy. And that is [the meaning of] that which God said to Moshe, "in order that the people hear My speaking to you, and they also believe in you forever" (Exodus 19:9) - meaning to say, they and their children will believe in you and your prophecy forever. As they will then know [with] a trustworthy knowledge that God speaks with a man and he can live, and that all of your prophecy is true. And had it not been that they merited prophecy, a claimant could have argued about all of the signs that Moshe did in the eyes of Pharaoh and in their eyes and said, "Who knows if he did it with machinations of the wisdom of demons or with the power of the names of the angels. And even though the wise men of Egypt and all of its magicians, who were more expert in the wisdom of demons and magic than all the rest of the world, conceded to Moshe against their will and said to Pharaoh that it it was through the power of God that he did [it] - as it is written (Exodus 8:15), "it is the finger of God" - nonetheless, one who wants to be stubborn will say it was from his greater wisdom that he did it and they conceded to him. But after the prophecy, no type of hesitation remained about the matter. And [so] they knew clearly that all of the events were done by the command of the Master of the world, and that everything come to them from His hand. And they - who saw with their eyes and knew the thing with a true knowing that people do not have any stronger truth than this - testified to their children that were born afterwards that all the words of the Torah, from the [first letter] bet of the [first word], Bereshit to the lamed [at the end of the final words] le'einei kol Yisrael, that they received from Moshe in the eyes of all of Israel were true and clear without any hesitation in the world. And their children also testified to their children and their children to their children until [it reached] us. It comes out that the Torah that is in our hands is a true Torah according to six hundred thousand believable witnesses - which is the tally that includes all the opinions of the men, besides the infants and the women. And now if a seducer, 'whose heart turns away from the Lord, our God,' would claim to us and say, "What is it with you, Jew-man, and your tradition? And what is with you to 'ask your father and your elder?' Investigate and search well with your intellect and establish your reasoning. 'Open your eyes and see' what is in your world - the movement of the sphere and the four basic elements of the land. From them you will you will see and understand the hidden things of wisdom. And investigate with your reason and you shall learn how the One unified"; we would [then] respond to him: From the angle of our investigation, we could never grasp anything of the word of God. As even in matters of the lowly world, all the wise men of science have not been able to come to fullness [of understanding]. As through the wisdom of investigation, who will reveal the mystery of the grasses and the fruit, the mystery of precious stones and vegetables and the cause of the movement of iron with magnetic rocks? As all of the wise men of science and all the men of understanding have stood wondering [about these things]. Even more [would they not be helpful] if we would say to understand from them the glorious wisdoms and the knowledge of God's existence. God forbid for us, God forbid, to come behind the King in our arrogance and to raise our hand and to think thoughts from that which is above our thoughts and for which we have no need. As behold our ancestors, may their memory be blessed, set up a table in front of us - they probed deeply and they come to the fullness of true knowledge. They grasped knowing that God speaks to a man and he can live. And [hence] what is it to us after this to investigate and to examine if the truth is with them? Rather [it is] for us to drink their words with thirst, according to their words and according to their expressions. And the parable for this is one to whom it has been testified by thousands of thousands of people to not drink from the waters of a river, because they have seen these waters kill its drinkers. And the thing was experienced a thousand times at different time periods and with people [from] different lands. And a sage expert physician said to him, "Do not believe all of them, as I am informing you from the perspective of wisdom that these waters are not fitting to kill, since they are clear and light and the dirt that goes through them is goodly. Drink them until your soul is satiated." Would it be good for this one to leave the famous testimony of all and to do like the words of the sage? Truly the matter is not good and an intelligent person will not listen to him and will not do like his words. This is the matter that we have prefaced - that the truth of matters of the world is known by the multitude of people that testify about it more than by those that prove their words from the angle of their intellect and investigation. Since because man is lacking perfection, his intellect does not grasp the fullness of things. And therefore the chosen path is for a man to fulfill all the words of the Torah, which was received by trustworthy witnesses, which the Master of wisdom gave to people. And in it is included all precious knowledge and all glorious wisdom.

(2) The root of this commandment does not need elucidation. The matter is known and revealed to all that this belief is the foundation of the religion, and that one who does not believe in it denies a fundamental principle and has no share and merit with Israel. And the content of the belief is that he fix in his soul that such is the truth and that a change of (about a change of) this in any way be impossible. And if he be asked about it, he will respond to any enquirer that his heart believes this and he will not assent to a change in it, even if they say they will kill him [as a result]. As all of this - when he takes the thing from the potential to actuality, by which I mean to say when he puts into the words of his mouth what his heart decides - strengthens and fixes the belief of the heart. And if one merits to rise in the levels of wisdom, 'his heart will understand and his eyes will see' with a sealed proof that this belief that he believed is true and clear - it is impossible that there be something besides this - then he will fulfill this positive commandment [in the best way].

(1) Regarding whether or not it is our duty to rationally investigate on the unity of G-d, I will say as follows: For anyone who is capable of investigating on this and other similar matters through rational inquiry - it is his duty to do so according to his intelligence and perception.

(2) I have already written in the introduction to this book sufficient arguments which demonstrate the obligation of this matter. Anyone who neglects to investigate into it is blameworthy and is considered as belonging to the class of men who fall short in wisdom and conduct. He is like a sick man (a doctor) who is an expert on the nature of his disease and the correct healing method, but instead relies on another doctor to heal him who applies various healing methods, while he is lazy to inquire using his own wisdom and reasoning into the methods employed by the doctor, to see whether or not the doctor is dealing with him correctly or not, when he was easily able to do this without anything preventing him. The Torah has already obligated us on this, as written: "know therefore today, and lay it to your heart[, that the L-ord is G-d in heaven above and on the earth beneath; there is no other]" (Deut. 4:39).

(3) The proof that "lay it to your heart" refers to intellectual investigation, is from what the following verse says: "And none lays it to his heart, neither is there knowledge nor understanding" (Isaiah 44:19). So too David urged his son: "And you, Solomon my son, know you the G-d of your father, and serve him with a perfect heart and with a willing soul; for the L-ord searches all hearts" (Chronicles 28:9).

(4) And David said: "Know you that the L-ord He is G-d" (Ps. 100:3).

(5) And "Because he has set his love upon Me, therefore will I deliver him: I will set him on high, because he has known My Name" (Ps. 91:14), and "But let him that glories glory in this, that he understands and knows Me" (Yirmiya 9:23), and our Sages said: "be diligent in the study of Torah and know what to answer a heretic" (Avos 2:14), and the Torah says: "Keep therefore and do them; for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations.." (Deut. 4:6).

(6) And it is impossible for the nations to admit to our claims of superior wisdom and understanding unless there are proofs and evidences which can testify for us along with the testimony of the intellect on the truth of our Torah and our faith. And our Maker has already promised us that He will remove the veil of ignorance from their minds, and show His magnificent glory as a sign to us on the truth of our Torah when He said: "And the nations shall walk by your light" (Isaiah 60:3), and "And many peoples shall go and say, Come you, and let us go up to the mountain of the L-ord, to the house of the G-d of Jacob.." (Isaiah 2:3).

(7) It is now clear from logic, scripture, and tradition that it is our duty to investigate into this of what we are capable of clearly grasping with our minds.

(2) The idolaters compiled many books of worship, defining its principle manner of service, its works and its laws; but the Holy One, blessed be He! charged us not to read those books at all, not to think of idolatry generally nor of aught of its details. Moreover, to look at it is forbidden, as it is said: "Turn ye not unto idols" (Lev. 19.4.); and of thinking on this subject it is said: "And that thou inquire not after their gods, saying, How did these nations serve their god"? (Ibid.), which is a warning that thou shalt not inquire concerning its manner of practice, though thou art not worshiping it, for this very inquiry causes a turning after it and to imitate their practice, as it is further said: "Even so will I do likewise" (Ibid.).

(3) All of these prohibitive commandments are concentrated on one subject, namely: Not to turn after idolatry, and whosoever does turn after it by doing aught resembling its practice is guilty of an offense punishable by lashes. And, yet, not turning after idolatry alone in one's thoughts is forbidden, for even concerning all thought which causes man to delete a principle of the fundamentals of the Torah are we charged not to offer it to our heart, not to concentrate our mind thereon and reason it out and be drawn after the swerving fancies of the heart. Preceding all, behold, the short-coming of man's intelligence, more particularly that not all minds can attain the purity of truth. Now, if every man be drawn away after his heart's fancies, he will be discovered demolishing the world to fit in the shortsightedness of his intelligence. For example: some of the time he will search after idolatry, and some of the time he will meditate about the Unity of the Creator, perhaps He is, and perhaps He is not, what of above and what of below, what of the beginning and what of the end; some of the time he will meditate concerning prophecy, perhaps there is, and perhaps there is not, and some of the time about the Torah, perhaps it is from heaven and perhaps it is not. Whereas, he knows not the standard of thinking wherewith to discover the knowledge of pure truth, as a consequence whereof he goes without to atheism. Even on, this subject there is a warning in the Torah, for it says therein: "And that ye go not about after your own heart and your own eyes, after which ye use to go astray" (Num. 15. 39.), as if saying: "Let not any of you be drawn after his short-sighted intelligence and imagine that his fancy attains the truth". Thus did the wise men say: "After your own heart", is a warning against atheism; and "After your own eyes", is a warning against prostitution (Berakot, 13a). But the violation of this prohibitive commandment, although it causes man's disability to share in the World to Come, is not punishable by lashes.

(1) From philosophical books etc. he told us many times and absolutely forbade us to even look at them at all. He elaborated on the severity of this prohibition because these books confuse one's religious views with alien views that do not agree at all with the views of our Holy Torah. [The authors of these philosophical books] also do not believe in demons whereas all the words of the Talmudic Sages say the opposite. Specifically, now that we've merited the [revelation of] the Zohar, the books of the Arizal and the Baal Shem Tov of blessed memory and similar works which are all established on Ruach Hakodesh and inspire a person very much in worship of God one who wishes to have pity on himself will distance himself greatly from the philosophy books that some of the authorities of old wrote such as certain commentaries printed in the Mikraot Gedolot which investigate things philosophically and similar things which need not be specified. He said also that one shouldn't study the book Akedat Yitzchak. He said this despite the fact that the book is [philosophically] kosher on the grounds that he brings the words and questions of the philosophers. So too the [first chapter of]Chovot Halevavot [entitled] The Gate of Unity, The Book of Principles [Sefer Haikarim] and Maimonides's Treatise on Logic and Guide for the Perplexed. All other similar works are all absolutely forbidden to learn because they damage and confuse the holy faith. Praiseworthy is he who knows nothing of them and walks in simple uprightness for [philosophical speculation] is not the portion of Jacob etc. and he said that according to their small words the Holy one-blessed be he cannot change the creation even a little even a fly etc. All this is confusion engendered by the views of their wisdom [i.e by the views of the philosophers.] He said furthermore that it is written furthermore in their books, "Can God make a triangle a square?" Our Rebbe of blessed memory said, "I believe that God, blessed be he, can indeed make a triangle a square because the ways of God are hidden." He already explained this many times yet failed it necessary to emphasize and reteach this warning so many times due to the severity of the prohibition of this stumbling block relating to our holy faith. Our Rebbe would repeat this warning endlessly. Everytime he spoke from these books he emphasized repeatedly the absolute prohibition to learn these books of philosophy. He cautioned us to distance ourselves very much from them and not to even look into them at all. It needn't even be said that one must definitely distance oneself from the compositions of our latter-day philosophers if one wishes to save his soul from the well of destruction so his entire world isn't absolutely destroyed, God forbid. Our Rebbe, of blessed memory, was wont to praise God for sending us the faithful one of his house, our master Moses of blessed memory, who took us out of confusion and gave us the Torah and commanded us to believe in God without any philosophical inquiry and to fulfill all the words of the Torah and their commandments in their simple sense. Praiseworthy is he who walks in simplicity etc. (Furthermore, Maimonides in his law code brings some philosophical queries like in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah and Laws of Human Dispositions and in the beginning of Laws of Idolatry one should also flee from them and not look at them at all. One must also flee from any place where he spoke about philosophy.)

(9) It is forbidden to delve into philosophical works. There are certain questions which stem from the chalal hapanui, “the empty void,” to which it is impossible to find any answer. In time to come the answers will be revealed. But in this world it is impossible to put these questions to rest merely with thought and ingenuity. Whole philosophical systems have been built up around them. Anyone who delves into them will be sunk in them and lost eternally, as it is written: “None that go unto her return” (Proverbs 2:19). God is not to be found in these philosophies. Through intelligence alone it will never be possible to solve the intellectual tangles they contain. The Jewish people, with its faith in God, is beyond all these philosophies and their complications. Israel believes in God and His Holy Torah without needing philosophical justifications. They have pure faith. The Hebrew word for “beyond” is עבר, e-ver, and the Jews are called עברים, Ivrim — Hebrews — precisely because they are beyond all this speculation. With a faith which transcends philosophy we do not need to speculate about the truth. We know it. We have received it from our fathers, of blessed memory (64:2).

(6) Too much intellectual sophistication can be harmful, especially when it takes the form of excessive philosophizing and speculation. The basis of true wisdom is a strong heart and a strong character. The only way to attain them is through good deeds. A person whose intelligence outstrips his practical attainments in the form of good deeds will lack the strength of character to contain his intelligence within the necessary bounds. His intelligence will only make him sin. It can be very dangerous when people with lax moral standards dabble in philosophy. Their intelligence drives them on to even greater transgressions and it harms them, and indeed the entire world, more than all the snakes and scorpions, wild animals and other dangerous things in the world. They use their intelligence to hurl insults and abuse at the heavens and to cast aspersions on the Holy Torah and especially the Sages of the Talmud and the Tzaddikim of blessed memory who followed them. All this is well known. May God in His mercy take pity on the remnant of Israel and guard them from this band of people and their babblings (55:6).

(25) 25. Al Khazari: Enough on this subject. Now I should like an explanation of what I read about the sacrifices. Reason cannot accept such expressions as: My offering, My bread for My sacrifices made by fire, 'for a sweet savour unto Me' (Numbers 28:2), employed in connexion with the sacrifices, describing them as being God's offering, bread, and incense.

(26) 26. The Rabbi: The expression: By My fires removes all difficulty. It states that offering, bread and sweet savour, which are ascribed to Me, in reality belong to My fires, i.e. to the fire which was kindled at God's behest, and fed by the offerings. The remaining pieces were food for the priests. The deeper signification of this was to create a well arranged system, upon which the King should rest in an exalted, but not local sense. As a symbol of the Divine Influence, consider the reasoning soul which dwells in the perishable body. If its physical and nobler faculties are properly distributed and arranged, raising it high above the animal world, then it is a worthy dwelling for King Reason, who will guide and direct it, and remain with it as long as the harmony is undisturbed. As soon, however, as this is impaired, he departs from it. A fool may imagine that Reason requires food, drink, and scents, because he sees himself preserved as long as these are forthcoming, but would perish if deprived of them. This is not the case. The Divine Influence is beneficent, and desirous of doing good to all. Wherever something is arranged and prepared to receive His guidance, He does not refuse it, nor withhold it, nor hesitate to shed light, wisdom, and inspiration on it. If, however, the order is disturbed, it cannot receive this light, which is, then, lost. The Divine Influence is above change or damage. All that is contained in the 'order of sacrificial service,' its proceedings, offerings, burning of incense, singing, eating, drinking, is to be done in the utmost purity and holiness. It is called: 'Service of the Lord,' 'the bread of thy God' (Numbers 8:11, Leviticus 21:8), and similar terms which relate to his pleasure in the beautiful harmony prevailing among the people and priesthood. He, so to say, accepts their hospitality and dwells among them in order to show them honour. He, however, is most Holy, and far too exalted to find pleasure in their meat and drink. It is for their own benefit, as is also the proper working order of the digestion in the stomach and liver. The nobler ingredients of the food go to strengthen the heart; the best of all, the spirit. Not only are heart, mind, and brain regenerated by means of this food, but also the digestive organs and all other organs through the strengthening matter which reaches them through the arteries, nerves and sinews. Altogether, this is so arranged and prepared, as to become fit to receive the guidance of the reasoning soul, which is an independent substance, and nearly approaches the angelic, of which it is stated: 'Its dwelling is not with flesh' (Daniel 2:11). It inhabits the body as ruler and guide, not in the sense of space, nor does it partake of this food, because it is exalted above it. The Divine Influence only dwells in a soul which is susceptible to intellect, whilst the soul only associates with the warm vital breath. The latter must needs have a mainspring to which it is attached, as is the flame to the top of the wick. The heart is compared to the wick, and is fed by the flow of blood. Blood is produced by the digestive organs, and therefore requires the stomach, the liver, and lower organs. The heart, in the same way, requires the lungs, throat, nose, the diaphragm, and the muscles which move the muscles of the chest for breathing, as well as to keep in balance the temperature of the heart between the air which enters, and that which is expelled. It further requires for the removal of the food, refuse expelling forces, viz. the excretory and urinary organs. In this way the body is formed from all the component parts mentioned. It also requires organs of motion from place to place, in order to procure its wants, to avoid that which is harmful, and to attract and to repel. It requires hands and feet, advisers who distinguish, warning against what is to be feared, and advising what is to be hoped for; who keep account of what has taken place, and record what has passed, in order to recommend care or hope for future events. It requires the internal and external senses, the seat of which is in the head, and which are assisted by the functions of the heart. The whole body is thus harmoniously arranged, but under the control of the heart, which forms the primary home of the soul. Its localization in the brain is of secondary importance, the heart remaining its regulator. In exactly the same way is the living, godly people arranged, as Joshua said: 'Hereby shall ye know that the living God is among you' (iii. 10). The fire was kindled by the will of God, when the people found favour in His sight, being a sign that He accepted their hospitality and their offerings. For the fire is the finest and noblest element beneath the sphere of the moon. Its seat is the fat and vapour of sacrifices, the smoke of the incense and oil, as it is the nature of fire to cling to fat and oil. So also does natural heat cling to the finest fatty globules of the blood. God commanded the construction of the altar burnt offerings, the Altar of Incense, and the candlestick; their holocausts, incense, and the lamp oil. As regards the altar of burnt offerings, it was destined to bear the visible fire, whilst the Golden Altar was reserved for the invisible and finer fire. The candlestick was to bear the light of wisdom and inspiration; the table that of abundance and material provisions. The sages say: He who wishes to be wise must turn to the south; he who wishes to be rich must turn to the north. All these implements stood in the service of the Holy Ark and the Cherubim which occupied the place of the heart, and the lungs above it. The vessels, such as the laver and its foot, tongs, firepans, dishes, spoons, bowls, pots, and forks, etc., were all required. A place was wanted to house them, viz. the Tabernacle, tent and cover, and the court of the Tabernacle with its appurtenances, as an enclosure for the whole. As bearers of the entire household God appointed the Levites, because they were nearest to Him, especially after the affair of the golden calf, as it is said: 'And all the sons of Levi gathered themselves together unto Him' (Exodus 32:26). From among them He chose Elazar, the finest and noblest of them, as it is said: 'And to the office of Elazar the son of Aaron the priest [pertaineth] the oil for the light, and the sweet incense, and the daily meat offering, and the anointing oil' (Numbers 4:16)--things to which the finer fire clings. The light of wisdom, however, and inspiration was attached to the Urim and Tummim, as well as to the most select section of Levites, viz. the family of Kohāth, who carried the appurtenances of the internal service: the Ark, Table, Candlestick, Altars, and the Holy Vessels 'with which they served.' With regard to them it is said: 'Because the service of the sanctuary belonged unto them, they should bear upon their shoulders' (Numbers 7:9)--just as the internal organs of the body are without bones which help to carry them, but are, themselves, borne by the innate powers in conjunction with all that belongs to them. Another branch of the children of Gershōn bore the more delicate external appurtenances, viz. the carpets of the Tabernacle, the Tent and its cover, and the covering of badgers’ skin that was above it. The lower section of the B’nē Merāri bore the grosser utensils, viz. its hooks, boards, bars, pillars, and sockets. The last two sections were aided in carrying their burden by having chariots, as it is said: 'Two wagons for the Gershoni and four wagons for Merāri according to their service' (Numbers 7:7-8). All this was systematically arranged by God. I do not, by any means, assert that the service was instituted in the order expounded by me, since it entailed something more secret and higher, and was based on a divine law. He who accepts this completely without scrutiny or argument, is better off than he who investigates and analyses. He, however, who steps down from the highest grade to scrutiny, does well to turn his face to the latent wisdom, instead of leading it to evil opinions and doubts which lead to corruption.

(1) Regarding "Greek wisdom" which one is to distance oneself from, and those well-known books like "Physics" and "Metaphysics" [from Aristotle]:

(2) From that which is described in the Talmud there (Sotah 49b, Bava Kamma 82b, Menachot 64b), where they forbade [Greek wisdom] on account of what happened when Jerusalem was besieged. They [in Jerusalem] would lower a basket of golden dinars every day over the wall, and [the Romans] would send back sheep for the Tamid offering. There was an old man there who knew Greek wisdom, and mocked them in Greek wisdom that so long as the Jews practiced Temple worship, they would never be defeated. So they sent [instead of sheep] a pig. At that moment, they declared that cursed is a person who raises pigs [in Israel], and cursed is one who teaches his son Greek wisdom. The Talmud then asks, "Is that so? But isn't there a statement 'Why would one speak the Syriac [Sursi] language? One should speak either the sacred tongue, Hebrew, or the Greek language!'" The Talmud answers that references to Greek language are one thing, and references to Greek wisdom is another. From that we see that books were never included in that decree, for if its that they are written in Greek, that was not the prohibition, and all of them were fluent in it. And to the contrary, it says in the Talmud (Megillah 18a) that the Greek language is kosher for everyone [to read the megillah in]. And if the problem is the wisdom itself, what does that have to do with the elder who mocked them in Greek? Therefore, in my opinion, "Greek wisdom" refers to speaking in Greek riddles and obscurities which the masses cannot understand, and only those knowledgeable and trained in riddles could. This is similar to the Talmud's statement (Eruvin 53b), "The maidservant of Rabbi's house would speak in wise language (i.e., enigmatically), saying, The ladle is knocking against the jug. Let the eagles fly to their nest." And this meant that the cup used to get wine from the barrel was knocking at the bottom of the barrel because the wine was finished. And the other statement is that the students should return and the meal is ended. Similarly, it states there that "when Rabbi Yosei bar Asyan would speak enigmatically, he would say: Prepare for me an ox in judgment on a poor mountain." He was asking for beets in mustard, since ox is tor in Aramaic; judgment is din. Combined they form teradin, beets. Tur Masken translated to chardal, mustard. And there are other examples there, and the Sages referred to it as "wise language", like the verse (Proverbs 1:6) says, "The words of the wise and and their riddle." Similarly in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 12a), "They sent [an encoded message] to Rava, 'A pair came from Rakat, but was apprehended." Such riddles, when said in Greek, are called "Greek wisdom", and that is what they prohibited because of the story, and they allowed Rabban Gamliel's household because they were close to the authorities, and they needed to use it because that was the way they would speak in the king's court, so that people would not know their mysteries and secrets. However, Rashi wrote in Menachot that "Greek wisdom" refers to "hints", and it seems he means to explain that they would not say anything, only using gestures with their hands, fingers, or other limbs. This accords with that which the Sages talk about (Gittin 59a) "A deaf-mute may express his wishes through gestures and respond through gestures." And also (Yevamot 119b) "Just as a deaf-mute marries through gestures, he can divorce through gestures." That is the way they would act before kings, as is mentioned in the Talmud (Chagigah 5b), "Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya was standing in the house of the Caesar. A certain heretic, who was also present, gestured to him, indicating that his was the nation whose Master, God, turned His face away from it. Rabbi Yehoshua gestured to him that His hand is outstretched over us in protection. The Caesar said to Rabbi Yehoshua: What did he gesture to you, and how did you respond? He replied: He indicated that mine is the nation whose Master turned His face from it, and I gestured to him that His hand is outstretched over us. He said to that heretic: What did you gesture to him? He said to them: I gestured that his is the nation whose Master has turned His face from it. They asked: And what did he gesture to you? He said to them: I don’t know; I did not understand. They said: How can a man who does not know what others gesture to him dare to gesture in the presence of the king? They took him out and killed him." And so Rashi explains there that he gestured through hints. So this is "Greek wisdom", which the Greeks were accustomed to, or there was a book they had related to this, and its author was Greek. But my question on this interpretation is that the Talmud did not need to write that the elder mocked them in "Greek wisdom", it could have said he mocked them through gestures, where no speaking at all takes place, and only gestures. Therefore, I believe "Greek wisdom" is as I explained above, and its possible Rashi is saying that any communication that is enigmatic is called "hinting/gesturing". We find this in the Talmud (Kiddushin 80b), "From where is there an allusion to the prohibition against seclusion? As it is stated [concerning one who incites others to idolatrous worship]: 'If your brother, the son of your mother, entices you' (Deuteronomy 13:7)." Similarly in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 10a and Makkot 2b) regarding an allusion to false witnesses. Regardless, whether "Greek wisdom" refers to gestures or enigmatic statements and riddles like I explained, it was only prohibited because of the story.

(3) However, the well-known [Greek philosophy] books of "Physics", this is not being referred to, though it is proper to distance oneself from them if they try to uproot the principles of our holy Torah, and especially two foundational pillars, which is creation ex nihilo and God's personal divine providence within the human species. They bring demonstrations and proofs according to their opinion to uphold eternity of the world, that it comes as a necessity from God, such as given that light necessarily comes from the sun, and the shade from the tree, God has no ability to change something as part of his very being, He cannot lengthen the wing of a fly and cannot shorten the leg of an ant, just like the sun cannot change the light which comes from it, nor the tree the shade. And similarly with Divine Providence, there is none beneath the sphere of the moon. They write in their books that one can only know through speculation, not through an accepted tradition. And we, receivers of the truth of our knowledge that our Torah is perfect, that it came to us at Sinai from the mouth of God, through the master of all prophets [Moses], this is higher than everything; all their speculation is nothing in comparison. We learn in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 90a) that "These are the ones without a share in the World to Come: One who says: There is no resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah, and one who says: The Torah did not originate from Heaven, and an epikoros. Rabbi Akiva said: Even those who read external books." The Talmud states that it was taught that this refers to the books of the heretics. Is there any greater "books of heretics" than these that try to disprove the principles of the Torah with proofs and demonstrations?! And Rabbi Akiva didn't say, "Those who *believe* in the external books," but rather even those who read them, lest their hearts are lead astray to believe their words, like what happened with Elisha [ben Avuya], Acher, which we see in the Talmud (Chagigah 15b), "They said about Elisha-Acher that when he would stand up in the study house, many books of heresy would fall from his lap." The Nagid, Rabbi Shmuel Halevi, already asked from Rabbi Hai Gaon whether one can learn these wisdoms, and he responded, "The goodness of the body and the ways of a man should be accomplished through learning Mishna and Talmud, and it is the fortune of Israel, for study of Torah helps him and others like him, and helps the regular masses, for it will draw them after the ways of the Torah and the commandments. And one who turns his heart away to study those things, it will turn one away from Torah and fear of heaven, it will cause him to lose those things, for he will cast off all the words of the Torah completely, and from this removal a person will have mistaken ideas, to the point that even abandoning worship won't be a concern for him. But those who have a solid foundation in Torah and fear of heaven stay away from this, for they lead the masses for the good, without doubts, and don't wish to place and doubts about God, and if you will see some people studying these wisdoms, and they will say to you that it is a paved path, that they can achieve knowledge of the Creator, you should not hate them, and you should know that they are lying to you, and one will not find fear of heaven, fear of sin, zealousness to perform commandments, humility, purity, holiness, except with someone who studies Mishna and Talmud." Thus was his answer. And the Rashba also wrote in a letter to stay away from those among them who are always learning these wisdoms, "And the youth brought up on the wisdom of "Physics" and sees Aristotle's proofs will always believe him, and he will will deny the principles [of faith], and if we try to respond to him, he will blaspheme all the more so." One should not bring proof from Maimonides [who studied Greek philosophy], for he first studied the entire Torah completely, its laws, narratives, the Tosefta, the Sifra, the Sifre, the entire Talmud both Babylonian and Jerusalem, as we can see from his Mishneh Torah that he wrote. Plus, he wrote the Guide for the Perplexed to respond to the heretic to fight the proofs and demonstrations that the Philosopher [Aristotle] offered for the eternality of the world, and also for divine providence, and because in his day, many Jews were perplexed about the principles of the Torah out of what they learned from that wisdom. One can also say like that which is stated in the Talmud (Chagigah 15b) regarding Rabbi Meir, "How could he learn Torah from Acher?" And they answered: Rabbi Meir found a verse and expounded it, (Proverbs 22:17) 'Incline your ear and listen to the words of the sages; Pay attention to my wisdom." It does not say "to their wisdom", but "to my wisdom", meaning to wicked ones who one must nevertheless incline one's ear toward. They explain there that this refers to a great man but not a regular person. Meaning, a student who is great, can separate the kernel from the chafe, as they said there about Rabbi Meir, he would eat the content of the pomegranate and through away the outer shell. Thus, Maimonides brings this verse in the beginning of the Guide. Nevertheless, Maimonides was drawn a bit after some of these proofs, like the [resurrection] of the son of the Zarephath woman [see Guide for the Perplexed 1:42], and regarding the revelation at Sinai. Perhaps he only allowed for these things because he could not give great answers for them from end to end, and so he explained some minor things in the Torah with a view of accordance with philosophy. This, too, he wrote in hints, and hid his opinion of the angels that Abraham saw, which he said happened in a prophetic vision, which Nachmanides responded to in his commentary on the Torah. And the sage Rabbi Levi [ben Gershon] was also a great sage, learned in Talmud, and he produced a beautiful commentary to the Torah and the Prophets, and he followed after Maimonides, but he also really inclined much more to those wisdoms that the way of truth, and he took the opposite approach to that of Maimonides in certain topics, such as whether God has knowledge of the possible future, and also whether the sun actually stood for Joshua, and the promise (Isaiah 38:8) of the sun and shadow - he wrote things that is forbidden to hear. Similarly regarding life of the soul after death, and divine providence regarding the punishment of the wicked in this world, all of which is written in the book he titled "Wars of the Lord." Now every person should make an a fortiori argument for himself using these two kings [Maimonides and Gersonides], that if they could not stay on the straight and narrow regarding some things, and they were among the greatest in the world, how much more so we, who cannot compare to them, we see those who have cast off the yoke of worship, loosening the bind of Torah and the commandments, from learning these wisdoms, like what Rabbi Hai Gaon wrote in that response I cited above.

(1) All of the Jewish people, even sinners and those who are liable to be executed with a court-imposed death penalty, have a share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And your people also shall be all righteous, they shall inherit the land forever; the branch of My planting, the work of My hands, for My name to be glorified” (Isaiah 60:21). And these are the exceptions, the people who have no share in the World-to-Come, even when they fulfilled many mitzvot: One who says: There is no resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah, and one who says: The Torah did not originate from Heaven, and an epikoros, who treats Torah scholars and the Torah that they teach with contempt. Rabbi Akiva says: Also included in the exceptions are one who reads external literature, and one who whispers invocations over a wound and says as an invocation for healing: “Every illness that I placed upon Egypt I will not place upon you, for I am the Lord, your Healer” (Exodus 15:26). By doing so, he shows contempt for the sanctity of the name of God and therefore has no share in the World-to-Come. Abba Shaul says: Also included in the exceptions is one who pronounces the ineffable name of God as it is written, with its letters.

(6) And, the following are they that have no share in the World to Come but suffer excision and loss of identity, and are damned for ever and ever for their exceeding wickedness and sinfulness: atheists, infidels, traducers of the Torah, dissenters of resurrection and the coming of a Redeemer, apostates, enticers of many to sin, seceders from the congregation, a public perpetrator of sins emulating Jehoiakim, informers, leaders who cast fear upon the congregation not for the sake of God, shedders of blood by defaming people in public, evil-tongued people, he who abolishes circumcision.

(1) The hidden good in store for the righteous is, life in the World to Come, which is a life connected with no death and a kind of good connected with no evil; such as is described in the Torah: "That it may be well with thee, and thou mayest prolong thy days" (Deut. 22.7), which was traditionally deducted to mean, "That it may be well with thee" in a world which is entirely good; "and that thou mayest prolong thy days"—in a world existing forever; and this is the World to Come. The reward of the just is, that they will acquire the sweetness thereof, to be in such goodness; and the punishment of the wicked is, that they will not share in such life, but will suffer excision and eternal death. And, whosoever does not earn such life, is to be dead, without coming to life forever; for he is severed from life by his iniquity and goes to oblivion like a cattle. This is the meaning of excision described in the Torah, saying: "That soul shall utterly be cut off" (Num. 15.31), which was traditionally deducted to mean, "utterly cut of," both in this world and in the World to Come. as if saying: "That soul which was separated from the body in this world shares not in the life of the World to Come, for even from the World to Come is it cut off".

(1) Having explained the subject of reward and punishment, some of which is spiritual bestowed in the world to come upon the soul alone or upon body and soul together, we must now investigate whether justice requires that reward and punishment should be temporary or eternal.

(2) Now, according to real justice and equality, reward and punishment should correspond to the act for which the reward or the punishment is received. And since the act is of finite duration, the reward or the punishment should also be of finite duration, corresponding to the finite act, without regard to the quality of the server or of the served. Thus, if one strikes his neighbor and blinds him, or breaks his arm, he should have his eye blinded or his arm broken, and similarly if one causes his neighbor pain lasting an hour, his punishment should be such as to cause him an hour’s pain, no more and no less, according to strict equality and justice. In the same way if one causes his neighbor a little pleasure, his reward should also be little, corresponding to the pleasure or enjoyment which the other person received. How then can an ordinary mortal deserve eternal reward and everlasting enjoyment, whether given to the soul alone or the soul and body together, as the religionists say, and as we explained?

(3) We may, however, say that reward is not measured in this way, but that it is estimated according to the worth of the person for whom the service is performed, as is the case in political justice and the customs of men. In a political society reward and punishment are measured by the worth of the person served and not by the value of the service. One who serves a great prince gets a greater reward than one who serves an ordinary person, and one who serves the king, gets a greater reward than one who serves a prince. The greater the dignity of the person served, the greater the reward. From this it would follow that if the worth of the being served is infinite, the reward should be infinite. This is the point of view adopted by the religionists, who promise eternal reward for the service of God, because God’s worth is infinite. It would follow from this also that the punishment of him who disobeys God should also be infinite, and for the same reason.

(4) If, however, we examine carefully this human custom in the matter of measuring reward by the worth of the person served, we shall find that a different method should be used in relation to the service of God. Service done to a human king does indeed deserve greater reward than service done to any other person according to the measure of the benefit received from the service. Now since the benefit which the king receives has more value than the benefit received by an ordinary person, the reward must be greater. But God does not receive any benefit from man’s service at all, as Elihu said: “If thou be righteous, what givest thou Him, or what receiveth He of thy hand?” We must say, then, that the reward should be commensurate not with the person served, but with the service, i. e. with the trouble endured by the one who does the service; and since the service is done in time, the reward should also be temporary. And similarly punishment should be temporary, as Elihu said: “If thou hast sinned, what doest thou against Him? And if thy transgressions be multiplied, what doest thou unto Him?”

(5) But if we consider this mode of measurement in punishment, we find that it is not proper, for punishment should be determined in accordance with the dignity of the person who is offended. Although God is not affected in any way by a person’s disobedience, nevertheless inasmuch as the intention of the sinner is to do contrary to the command of God, who is infinite in worth, and to rebel against Him, his sin should be regarded as very serious because of his intention. The distinction in the Torah between wilful and unintentional sin shows that sin is to be judged by the intention of the sinner and not by the mere act as such. For example, a person who disobeys the command of a great king, deserves death, even though the king did not suffer any damage on that account. Since his intention was to slight the king’s honor, he should be punished for his intention and not merely for the resulting act. Hence the punishment of the wicked should be eternal, as God is eternal and infinite.

(6) It seems also to be the opinion of the Rabbis that eternal punishment is sometimes inflicted upon the wicked for an act done in time. Thus they say that wicked men of a certain class go down to gehenna and are judged there for ever and ever. From this it appears that there is eternal punishment which is measured in relation to the person to whom the service is due, not in relation to the person who owes the service. It seems, therefore, from our argument that while reward should not be eternal according to strict justice, nor should it be measured in relation to the person served, as we have explained, punishment sholud be eternal and should be measured in relation to the dignity of the person to whom the service is due and the intention of the sinner, as we explained above. We must, therefore, make a distinction between reward and punishment. Reward must be paid simply in accordance with the benefit received. And since the server himself knows that no benefit accrues from his service to the person served, his reward should be of limited duration, corresponding to the act which was of limited duration or the trouble which the act cost him. On the other hand, punishment should be eternal, according to the intention of the sinner to disobey the command of God, who is eternal and infinite.

(7) That this is the correct conception of the matter appears also from Onkelos’ interpretation of the verse: “And repayeth them that hate Him to their face,” which he translates: “He repays the wicked for the good deeds which they have done before Him during their lifetime, in order to destroy them.” His meaning is that God repays those that hate Him in their lifetime, giving them a temporary reward for their good deeds, so that they may be punished with eternal destruction for their transgressions. Now if justice required that reward should be eternal and bear a relation to the person receiving the service, how is it conceivable that God would deprive any creature of its reward and give it a small temporary reward instead of the eternal reward which is its due? In the same way if strict justice required that punishment should be temporary and finite, how can we suppose that God would pervert judgment and punish the wicked eternally, as the Rabbis say that the unbelievers (minin) and informers go down to gehenna and are judged there for ever and ever, instead of giving them temporary punishment, as they deserve?

(8) It seems therefore that the truth is as we have explained, namely that in accordance with justice reward should be temporary and punishment eternal. The original question therefore comes back—How does a mortal deserve to attain eternal reward and everlasting happiness, as we said before? The religionists also promise eternal reward as well as eternal punishment, and the tradition of the Rabbis is in agreement with the same idea. For, referring to the verse: “They shall inherit the land forever,” they say it alludes to spiritual reward, which is eternal, as they say: “All Israel have a share in the world to come, as is said: ‘Thy people … shall be all righteous, they shall inherit the land forever.’ ”

(9) My opinion is that strict justice requires that reward should be temporary, nevertheless God in His abundant kindness gives to those who do His will eternal and infinite reward, as He is eternal and infinite in worth. This is the hint that was given to Abraham in the vision, when God said to him: “Fear not, Abram, I am thy shield, thy reward shall be exceeding great.” Abraham thought that reward is temporary, as justice requires, and hence he was afraid that his merits were diminished or suffered deduction by reason of his victory over the five kings. Therefore God said to him: Fear not, Abram, I am thy shield, i. e. fear not that thy merits shall be deducted from, for I am the one who pay thy reward, and My power is unlimited. Therefore thy reward will be very great, i. e. infinite, for the reward will be given in relation to Me and not in relation to thee and thy act, which are finite. The conversation concludes with the words: “And he believed in the Lord; and he counted it to Him for righteousness.” The meaning is, Abraham believed God’s promise of great reward and thought that it signified God’s charity and kindness, for strict justice required that reward should be temporary and finite, but by reason of God’s charity and kindness it is infinite. This is also stated in the Torah: “Who keepeth covenant and mercy with them that love Him and keep His commandments to a thousand generations.” The last expression denotes infinite time, like the verse: “The word which He commanded to a thousand generations.” For we find in another place: “And showing mercy unto the thousandth generation of them that love Me …,” and there is no doubt that the words, “unto the thousandth generation,” refer to an infinite time. The word “mercy” is used to indicate that the eternal reward is due to mercy. But punishment is eternal by strict justice, as we have explained.

(1) The idea that punishment bears relation to the being to whom service is due and not to the person who owes the service, and hence is eternal, seems to be indicated in the words which God said to Moses: “And I will send an angel before thee … for I will not go up in the midst of thee; for thou art a stiff-necked people; lest I consume thee in the way.” Here we see that He feared they would be destroyed if God Himself with His great name should go up among them, but if an angel would go up with them, they would be saved from destruction, though some other punishment would come upon them, as we read: “Behold, I send an angel before thee … Take heed of him, and hearken unto his voice; be not rebellious against him; for he will not pardon your transgression; for My name is in him.” The words: “For he will not pardon your transgression,” do not indicate that they will get greater punishment by rebelling against the command of the angel than by rebelling against God, for the text says: “For I will not go up in the midst of thee … lest I consume thee in the way.” The meaning is this: If they disobey God, there is, indeed, the fear that they may be punished very severely—with destruction. But there is an advantage on the other hand, for God has the power to pardon them, but the angel has not this power. Despite this, however, God said that it would be better for them to be guided by an angel, for though he will not forgive their transgression, their punishment, if they disobey the angel, will not be as great as it would be if God went with them and guided them without an intermediary and they disobeyed Him, for then they would be in danger of destruction.

(2) It is clear, therefore, that the punishment of the one who disobeys God is greater than the punishment of him who disobeys an angel. This shows that in justice punishment bears relation to the master or commander or the one to whom service is due, and not to the person owing the service. We find also Moses complaining of this characteristic in the “Prayer of Moses.” Moses was praying to God concerning the people in captivity and was deploring the length of the exile. Wishing to complain of the characteristic above mentioned, he begins by way of apology: “Lord, Thou hast been our dwelling-place in all generations.” The meaning is: Although I complain of Thy principle of measuring punishment in relation to Thee and not in relation to us, nevertheless I acknowledge that all Thy ways are just and I can not quarrel with Thee, either so far as we are concerned, or so far as Thou art concerned, or so far as the punishment itself is concerned.

(3) So far as we are concerned, I recognize and acknowledge that we are the recipients of Thy benefits, that Thou hast shown us very great kindness and we should not have sinned against Thee. And since we should not have sinned before Thee, we have no reason to complain of Thy justice so far as we are concerned, having been benefited by Thee, for Thou hast been our dwelling place and refuge and hiding-place in all generations. Nor can we complain of Thee in relation to Thyself, for Thou art eternal and infinite: “Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever Thou hadst formed the earth and the world, Even from everlasting to everlasting, Thou art God,” eternal and infinite in worth. Hence he who disobeys Thee should be punished severely and we can not complain of Thy judgment so far as Thou art concerned. But neither can we complain of Thee so far as the punishment itself is concerned, for I know that all which Thou doest, the sufferings which Thou bringest upon man, when “Thou turnest man to contrition,” are for a good purpose, viz. that man may turn to Thee in repentance: “And sayest: ‘Return, ye children of men.’ ”

(4) Nevertheless I complain of, and am grieved by the evil which accrues to us on account of this method, in that Thou measurest the punishment in relation to Thee, who art infinite, instead of measuring it in relation to the sinner, who is finite. For if Thou measure it in relation to Thy worth, man will be destroyed in a moment, “For a thousand years in Thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night. Thou carriest them away as with a flood; they are as sleep.” The meaning is: If Thou shouldst sweep away the whole world with a flood of water, as Thou didst to the generation of the deluge, they would all be like a sleep before Thee, and in the morning they would pass away like grass before Thee—like grass which springs up in the morning, and the time of its growth passes quickly away, “For in the evening it is cut down, and withereth.” From this we get much evil, “For we are consumed in Thine anger, and by Thy wrath are we hurried away,” because, “Thou hast set our iniquities before Thee,” i. e. because Thou measurest our iniquities in relation to Thee—this is the complaint—and also because Thou hast set “our secret sins” (‘alumenu), i. e. the sins that are hidden (‘alam) from us, or it may mean the sins which we committed in our youth (biyeme ‘alumenu), “in the light of Thy countenance,” i. e. before Thee, so that Thou dost not forget them. It follows from this that “all our days are passed away in Thy wrath,” because Thou measurest punishment in relation to Thee, and “we bring our years to an end as a tale that is told.” That is, our years, which are time and belong to the category of continuous quantity, pass away like speech (hegeh), which belongs to the category of discrete quantity, whose parts are not continuous with one another. This is due to the many changes and vicissitudes that come upon us from day to day, so that our time does not flow continuously like a continuous quantity, but changes from day to day and from moment to moment like discrete quantity. Thou oughtest to measure our punishment in relation to the days of our life, which are short, for, “The days of our years are,” on the average, “Three-score years and ten; or even by reason of strength four-score years,” and not more, for if they extend beyond that limit, they are, “travail and vanity,” and not worth counting as life. I see that the time of our life is very short, “For it is speedily gone, and we fly away,” i. e. it is quickly cut off and we fly, as it were, because the years of our life pass away so quickly, for our days are like a shadow of a flying bird, which does not stand still for a moment, or like a lengthening shadow in the evening, when the sun sets quickly, and therefore I wither like grass.

(5) All this is because Thou measurest punishment in relation to Thee, whereas Thou shouldst measure it in relation to us, who are finite beings. If Thou art going to measure it in relation to Thee, who can calculate the proper punishment, since Thou art infinite? Hence he says: “Who knoweth the power of Thine anger?” since it is infinite, “And thy wrath according to the fear that is due unto Thee,” i. e.: According to the fear which is due to Thee, who art infinite, so is Thy wrath against us infinite. But it ought not to be so, but “according to the number of our days, so should the punishment be,” i. e. the punishment should be measured in accordance with the number of our days. The word limnot is an infinitive used for a noun, and the word hoda‘ means punishment or suffering, like, “And with them he taught (punished) (vayyoda‘) the men of Succoth,” as David Kimhi wrote in The Book of Roots, s. v. yada‘, in the name of Ibn Janah.

(6) The meaning of the text is, therefore, as follows: As the number of our days is small, so Thy punishment for our sins should also be small; and similarly, according to the number of our days, which is small, “we may get us a heart of wisdom.” But since the exile is extended for a long time, and we are laden with contempt, “Return, O Lord; how long? And let it repent Thee concerning Thy servants. O satisfy us in the morning with Thy mercy,” i. e. in the time of our youth, so “that we may rejoice and be glad all our days.” And if not in the time of our youth, then, “Make us glad according to the days wherein Thou hast afflicted us, according to the years wherein we have seen evil.” And if Thou say that those who come after us will inherit the land, it is more proper that we should see our share in that good: “Let Thy work appear unto Thy servants,” and the result will be, “Thy glory upon their children.” “And let the graciousness of the Lord our God be upon us and the work of our hands,” that we may prosper in all our doings, so that we may attain the delight which is found in divine works, as we explained in the introduction to this book.

(7) Then he adds to this: “O thou that dwellest in the covert of the Most High …,” as though by way of reply to the difficulty. The answer is that though the exile is long for the nation as a whole, because they are not as a whole perfect enough to deserve redemption, yet every righteous man is provided for by special Providence and delivered from trouble.

(8) He divides the righteous into three or four classes. 1. “He who dwells in the covert of the Most High, and abides in the shadow of the Almighty.” This embraces all those Israelites who believe in the Torah and fulfil the commandments. 2. The righteous man who trusts in God: “For thou hast made the Lord who is my refuge, even the Most High, thy habitation.” 3. He who loves God and longs for Him: “Because he hath set his love upon Me, therefore will I deliver him; I will set him on high, because he hath known My name, He shall call upon Me, and I will answer him …” 4. “Because he hath known My name,” probably represents the fourth class, who is referred to in the words: “He shall call upon Me, and I will answer him.”

(9) The Psalmist begins: “I will say of the Lord, who is my refuge and my fortress, my God in whom I trust, that He will deliver thee from the snare of the fowler, etc.” That is, Thou who dwellest in the covert of the Most High, and abidest in the shadow of the Almighty, fear not trouble, for I say to thee in the name of God, who is my refuge and my fortress, my God, in whom I trust, that He will deliver thee from the snare of the fowler … and from all the troubles that come upon the world. He concludes his remarks to the men of this class in the words: “And see the recompense of the wicked.” Then he begins with the men of the second class, who say: “For Thou, O Lord art my refuge, etc.” Concerning them he says: “There shall no evil befall thee … The young lion and the serpent shalt thou trample under feet.” The words: “I will say of the Lord, who is my refuge and my fortress, My God in whom I trust …,” which Moses uses in the beginning, refer to this class also and to the other classes. But in place of the words: “That He will deliver thee from the snare of the fowler …,” which he said before, he says in relation to the second class: “There shall no evil befall thee …,” i. e. thou who sayest that the Lord is thy refuge, I say to thee, in the name of God, who is my refuge and fortress, and in whom I trust, that there shall no evil befall thee, that He will deliver thee from natural and unnatural accidents, so that “Thou shalt tread upon the lion and asp; the young lion and the serpent shalt thou trample under feet.” Similarly I say to you in the name of God that he who desires Him will be delivered from all evil in the world. He represents God as saying: “Because he hath set his love upon Me, therefore will I deliver him; I will set him on high …” And if he reaches a still higher degree, namely: “That he hath known My name,” then: “He shall call upon Me, and I will answer him; I will be with him in trouble; I will rescue him and bring him to honour.” The meaning is that he who knows My name stands higher than all other righteous men.

(10) The gist of Moses’ words in this Psalm is that the righteous men are taken care of and delivered from trouble in different ways, depending on the degree which they attain. We see from this that Moses is complaining of God’s method of punishing in accordance with God’s being, to whom service is offered, whereas he thinks the punishment should be accommodated to the number of years of human life, which are few. This shows that the punishment which comes from God in accordance with strict justice is not computed in relation to the disobedient and the sinner, but in relation to the Being sinned against, whose spirit is defied.

(1) We have now explained that according to justice the punishments inflicted by God should be eternal, and that reward is either eternal, through divine grace, or not eternal, as strict justice demands. But there is a very important difficulty in the matter of punishment, as follows:

(2) Since “there is not a righteous man upon earth, that doeth good and sinneth not,” it follows that all men should be punished eternally for any sin they have committed or for disobedience of God’s command of which they are guilty, though the nature of the punishment be different. How then can any one escape eternal punishment according to this mode of determination, and how can a mortal merit spiritual reward, whether temporary or eternal? A still greater difficulty arises from the statement of the Rabbis that the punishment of the wicked in gehenna lasts twelve months, indicating that punishment is not eternal. And, on the other hand, they say that reward is eternal, inferring it from the words: “They shall inherit the land forever.”

(3) It seems to me that the difficulty may be solved by saying that just as reward is made eternal by divine grace, though according to strict justice it should be temporary, so punishment is made temporary by divine grace, though according to strict justice it should be eternal. The Bible indicates this very thing: “God hath spoken once, twice have I heard this: that strength belongeth unto God; also unto Thee, O Lord, belongeth mercy; for Thou renderest to every man according to his work.” The meaning is that the statement in the Torah that God does not hold the wicked guiltless but punishes them for their iniquities, contains two statements in it. One is that strength belongeth unto God to do justice to the wicked and to pay to every man according to his ways, as the Bible says: “The strength also of the king who loveth justice.” But in this very justice which He does to the wicked we also find that God has mercy, “Also unto Thee, O Lord, belongeth mercy, for Thou renderest to every man according to his work,” i. e. in the fact that Thou punishest the wicked in a temporary way, in accordance with the sin he committed, which is temporary, we can see that Thou conductest Thyself mercifully toward man in this regard, for according to strict justice, a person should receive eternal punishment for his sins in accordance with the infinity of God against whom he rebelled, as we explained above. The Psalmist says, therefore, that in the punishment which comes upon the wicked man in this world for the transgressions of which he is guilty, we see two things, viz. that God has power to do justice to those who transgress His will, and that He conducts Himself mercifully in this very justice, in that He inflicts temporary punishment, in accordance with the act of transgression, which is temporary. God does this in order that the person in question should be saved from eternal punishment in the world to come.

(4) Some say that the words: “Also unto Thee, O Lord, belongeth mercy,” refer to the spiritual reward which God bestows by grace. For man does not deserve any reward, as the Bible says: “If thou be righteous, what givest thou Him?” and granting that he does deserve reward, it should be temporary, as his good deeds are temporary, but not eternal, except by divine grace, as we said before. This statement, taken by itself, is true and in agreement with what we said, that temporary reward is made eternal by God’s mercy. But it bears no relation to the contents of the passage and has no connection with the words: “God hath spoken once, twice have I heard this.” Moreover, the words: “For Thou renderest (teshallem) to every man according to his work,” show that he is speaking of punishment, like the words: “And recompensest (meshallem) the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them,” and: “Yea, I will requite (veshillamti) into their bosom.”

(5) It should be noted that this mercy of which we are speaking, by virtue of which the punishment which should be eternal, in accordance with the eternity of the Being to whom service is due, is made temporary by way of accommodation to the person owing the service, is shown only to those who love God and keep His commandments, as the Torah says: “For I, the Lord thy God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate Me; and showing mercy unto the thousandth generation of them that love Me and keep My commandments.” The meaning of this passage is that in the case of those that hate Him, He visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation, so that they may be destroyed thoroughly and forever, as justice demands, but to those that love Him and keep His commandments He shows mercy, not visiting their iniquity upon them all at once, but distributing it over a thousand generations, so that they should not be completely destroyed, but that they may get a little punishment during a long time, in order that they may exist forever.

(6) The Rabbis say in this connection: If a man has a thousand zuz owing to him and the debtor is his enemy, he collects the whole debt at once. But if he is his friend, he collects it little by little. Since, however, not every one can attain to the degree of perfect love, of which we spoke before, the Bible says that Israelites generally, who keep God’s commandments, receive this mercy. Hence the Bible adds: “And keep My commandments.” From this we infer that those who hate the Lord and do not keep His commandments will receive eternal punishment. Hence the Rabbis say that the Minim, the unbelievers (Apikorosim), those who deny the Torah and the resurrection, and the others that the Rabbis enumerate in the Mishnah and the Baraita, persons who deny the fundamental principles or some of them or the secondary principles derived from the former, being excluded from the community of Israel and the seed of those who love God and keep His commandments, are treated in accord with strict justice and suffer eternal punishment. These are the men of whom the Rabbis say that they go down to gehenna and are judged there for ever and ever. Those, however, who believe in the principles of the Torah but are guilty of some transgressions, deserve to enjoy the mercy which is shown to those who keep the divine covenant, and to the seed of those who love Him. For just as reward is made eternal through the divine mercy that was shown to Abraham, as we explained before, so punishment is made temporary through divine mercy, as we said before.

(7) Micah explains this when he says: “Who is a God like unto Thee, that pardoneth the iniquity, and passeth by the transgression of the remnant of His heritage? He retaineth not His anger forever, because He delighteth in mercy.” The meaning is that God does not punish man according to his sins, but He pardoneth the iniquity and passeth by the transgression by way of mercy, but not for every man, only for the remnant of His heritage. The words: “He retaineth not His anger forever,” indicate that according to strict justice, He ought to retain His anger forever. For it is clear that we do not say to a person: “The judge showed you mercy in not sentencing you to death,” unless he deserved death. Hence if the prophet says: “He retaineth not His anger forever,” it follows that strict justice demands that He should retain His anger forever, if not for His mercy. Hence he concludes: “Because He delighteth in mercy,” and adds: “He will again have compassion upon us; He will subdue our iniquities, … Thou wilt show faithfulness to Jacob, mercy to Abraham …” The meaning is: Even if He should subdue our iniquities and hide them, or if eternal punishment should be made temporary, we would still be in need of mercy, in order that temporary reward should be made eternal. This is the mercy shown to Abraham when he was told: “Thy reward shall be exceeding great,” as we explained above. Hence the prophet says: “Thou wilt show faithfulness to Jacob, mercy to Abraham,” i. e. wilt show and make permanent; and the mercy which Thou didst show to Abraham in making his reward eternal will become true for Jacob, just as eternal punishment is made temporary by God’s mercy, as we explained before.

(8) The Psalmist also explains this, namely that eternal punishment is made temporary and temporary reward is made eternal through grace. In reference to punishment he says: “He will not always contend; neither will He keep His anger forever,” as should be the case, but, “He hath not dealt with us after our sins, nor requited us according to our iniquities.” He explains then that this is due to God’s mercy: “For as the heaven is high above the earth, so great is His mercy toward them that fear Him.” For to give eternal reward for a temporary act shows great mercy, as great as the heavens are high above the earth. The word height signifies worth, as in the verse, “But the Lord of hosts is exalted (made high) through justice,” because the heavens are eternal, as David said: “He hath also established them for ever and ever,” while the earth is temporary and destined to destruction. God’s mercy in giving eternal reward for a temporary act is similar. But in order that a person may deserve this reward, it is necessary to remove our transgressions from us far away, as far as the east is from the west, and to inflict temporary punishment upon the righteous in this world in order that they may merit eternal reward in the world to come. For if He should inflict eternal punishment, as justice demands, no person would merit eternal reward. Hence he says: “Like as a father hath compassion upon His children, so hath the Lord compassion upon them that fear Him,” to show that it is an act of compassion on the part of God to inflict temporary punishment upon the righteous in this world for the few transgressions of which they are guilty, in order that they may merit eternal reward in the world to come, as a father chastises and punishes his son by way of compassion so as to lead him to a good end and enable him to attain a high degree for his own ultimate good.

(9) Then he explains the reason of this mercy: “For He knoweth our inclination; He remembereth that we are dust.” That is, since He knows that by reason of our inclination we are destined to sin, “For the imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth,” if He should not show us this mercy in punishing a man temporarily instead of eternally, no man would escape the judgment of gehenna, and what would the righteous then do, who can not but commit some sin in this world? In the same way if God did not convert temporary reward into eternal through mercy, no man would attain eternal happiness, for man is a temporary being: “As for man, his days are as grass; as a flower of the field, so he flourisheth, for the wind passeth over it, and it is gone …” What, then, would Moses and Abraham and the other righteous men do in order to merit eternal reward, since they are temporary beings, and can only do temporary acts, unless they merit this reward through God’s mercy? Hence he concludes: “But the mercy of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear Him …,” i. e. even though man’s days are like grass and his acts are temporary, for he can only do a temporary act, his reward is eternal through God’s mercy, which is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear Him.

(10) In the beginning of the Psalm he also refers to these two kinds of mercy. “Who forgiveth all thine iniquity,” refers to the mercy which converts eternal punishment into temporary. “Who healeth all thy diseases,” refers to the mercy which converts temporary reward into eternal. Then he explains the matter further and says: “Who redeemeth thy life from the pit,” which surely refers to redemption from the eternal punishment of gehenna, for no one is redeemed from the natural death of the body. Then he says: “Who encompasseth thee with loving-kindness and tender mercies,” to indicate that by making eternal punishment temporary, it becomes possible to attain eternal spiritual reward, which is a crown of beauty to the soul and a diadem of glory on the head of every righteous man. The attainment of this reward is designated as mercy and compassion.

(11) At the end of the Psalm he explains that these two kinds of mercy extend only to those who love God and observe His commandments: “But the mercy of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear Him … To such as keep His covenant, and to those that remember His precepts to do them.” All this is due to the fact that the divine providence extends over all existing things above and below: “The Lord hath established His throne in the heavens; and His kingdom ruleth over all.” This much we have desired to explain concerning reward and punishment.

(1) TWENTY-FIVE of the propositions which are employed in the proof for the existence of God, or in the arguments demonstrating that God is neither corporeal nor a force connected with a material being, or that He is One, have been fully established, and their correctness is beyond doubt. Aristotle and the Peripatetics who followed him have proved each of these propositions. There is, however, one proposition which we do not accept--namely, the proposition which affirms the Eternity of the Universe, but we will admit it for the present, because by doing so we shall be enabled clearly to demonstrate our own theory.

(2) PROPOSITION I.

(3) The existence of an infinite magnitude is impossible.

(4) PROPOSITION II.

(5) The co-existence of an infinite number of finite magnitudes is impossible.

(6) PROPOSITION III.

(7) The existence of an infinite number of causes and effects is impossible, even if these were not magnitudes: if, e.g., one Intelligence were the cause of a second, the second the cause of a third, the third the cause of a fourth, and so on, the series could not be continued ad infinitum.

(8) PROPOSITION IV.

(9) Four categories are subject to change:

(10) (a.) Substance.--Changes which affect the substance of a thing are called genesis and destruction.

(11) (b.) Quantity.--Changes in reference to quantity are increase and decrease.

(12) (c.) Quality.--Changes in the qualities of things are transformations.

(13) (d.) Place.--Change of place is called motion. The term "motion" is properly applied to change of place, but is also used in a general sense of all kinds of changes.

(14) PROPOSITION V.

(15) Motion implies change and transition from potentiality to actuality.

(16) PROPOSITION VI.

(17) The motion of a thing is either essential or accidental; or it is due to an external force, or to the participation of the thing in the motion of another thing. This latter kind of motion is similar to the accidental one. An instance of essential motion may be found in the translation of a thing from one place to another. The accident of a thing, as, e.g., its black colour, is said to move when the thing itself changes its place. The upward motion of a stone, owing to a force applied to it in that direction, is an instance of a motion due to an external force. The motion of a nail in a boat may serve to illustrate motion due to the participation of a thing in the motion of another thing; for when the boat moves, the nail is said to move likewise. The same is the case with everything composed of several parts: when the thing itself moves, every part of it is likewise said to move.

(18) PROPOSITION VII.

(19) Things which are changeable are, at the same time, divisible. Hence everything that moves is divisible, and consequently corporeal; but that which is indivisible cannot move, and cannot therefore be corporeal.

(20) PROPOSITION VIII.

(21) A thing that moves accidentally must come to rest, because it does not move of its own accord: hence accidental motion cannot continue for ever.

(22) PROPOSITION IX.

(23) A corporeal thing that sets another corporeal thing in motion can only effect this by setting itself in motion at the time it causes the other thing to move.

(24) PROPOSITION X.

(25) A thing which is said to be contained in a corporeal object must satisfy either of the two following conditions: it either exists through that object, as is the case with accidents, or it is the cause of the existence of that object; such is, e.g., its essential property. In both cases it is a force existing in a corporeal object.

(26) PROPOSITION XI.

(27) Among the things which exist through a material object, there are some which participate in the division of that object, and are therefore accidentally divisible, as, e.g., its colour, and all other qualities that spread throughout its parts. On the other hand, among the things which form the essential elements of an object, there are some which cannot be divided in any way, as, e.g., the soul and the intellect.

(28) PROPOSITION XII.

(29) A force which occupies all parts of a corporeal object is finite, that object itself being finite.

(30) PROPOSITION XIII.

(31) None of the several kinds of change can be continuous, except motion from place to place, provided it be circular.

(32) PROPOSITION XIV.

(33) Locomotion is in the natural order of the several kinds of motion the first and foremost. For genesis and corruption are preceded by transformation, which, in its turn, is preceded by the approach of the transforming agent to the object which is to be transformed. Also, increase and decrease are impossible without previous genesis and corruption.

(34) PROPOSITION XV.

(35) Time is an accident that is related and joined to motion in such a manner that the one is never found without the other. Motion is only possible in time, and the idea of time cannot be conceived otherwise than in connexion with motion; things which do not move have no relation to time.

(36) PROPOSITION XVI.

(37) Incorporeal bodies can only be numbered when they are forces situated in a body; the several forces must then be counted together with substances or objects in which they exist. Hence purely spiritual beings, which are neither corporeal nor forces situated in corporeal objects, cannot be counted, except when considered as causes and effects.

(38) PROPOSITION XVII.

(39) When an object moves, there must be some agent that moves it, from without, as, e.g., in the case of a stone set in motion by the hand: or from within, e.g., when the body of a living being moves. Living beings include in themselves, at the same time, the moving agent and the thing moved: when, therefore, a living being dies, and the moving agent, the soul, has left the body, i.e., the thing moved, the body remains for some time in the same condition as before, and yet cannot move in the manner it has moved previously. The moving agent, when included in the thing moved, is hidden from, and imperceptible to, the senses. This circumstance gave rise to the belief that the body of an animal moves without the aid of a moving agent. When we therefore affirm, concerning a thing in motion, that it is its own moving agent, or, as is generally said, that it moves of its own accord, we mean to say that the force which really sets the body in motion exists in that body itself.

(40) PROPOSITION XVIII.

(41) Everything that passes over from a state of potentiality to that of actuality, is caused to do so by some external agent: because if that agent existed in the thing itself, and no obstacle prevented the transition, the thing would never be in a state of potentiality, but always in that of actuality. If, on the other hand, while the thing itself contained that agent, some obstacle existed, and at a certain time that obstacle was removed, the same cause which removed the obstacle would undoubtedly be described as the cause of the transition from potentiality to actuality, [and not the force situated within the body]. Note this.

(42) PROPOSITION XIX.

(43) A thing which owes its existence to certain causes has in itself merely the possibility of existence: for only if these causes exist, the thing likewise exists. It does not exist if the causes do not exist at all, or if they have ceased to exist, or if there has been a change in the relation which implies the existence of that thing as a necessary consequence of those causes.

(44) PROPOSITION XX.

(45) A thing which has in itself the necessity of existence cannot have for its existence any cause whatever.

(46) PROPOSITION XXI.

(47) A thing composed of two elements has necessarily their composition as the cause of its present existence. Its existence is therefore not necessitated by its own essence; it depends on the existence of its two component parts and their combination.

(48) PROPOSITION XXII.

(49) Material objects are always composed of two elements [at least], and are without exception subject to accidents. The two component elements of all bodies are substance and form. The accidents attributed to material objects are quantity, geometrical form, and position.

(50) PROPOSITION XXIII.

(51) Everything that exists potentially and whose essence includes a certain state of possibility, may at some time be without actual existence.

(52) PROPOSITION XXIV.

(53) That which is potentially a certain thing is necessarily material, for the state of possibility is always connected with matter.

(54) PROPOSITION XXV.

(55) Each compound substance consists of matter and form, and requires an agent for its existence, viz., a force which sets the substance in motion, and thereby enables it to receive a certain form. The force which thus prepares the substance of a certain individual being, is called the immediate motor.

(56) Here the necessity arises of investigating into the properties of motion, the moving agent and the thing moved. But this has already been explained sufficiently; and the opinion of Aristotle may be expressed in the following proposition: Matter does not move of its own accord--an important proposition that led to the investigation of the Prime Motor (the first moving agent).

(57) Of these foregoing twenty-five propositions some may be verified by means of a little reflection and the application of a few propositions capable of proof, or of axioms or theorems of almost the same force, such as have been explained by me. Others require many arguments and propositions, all of which, however, have been established by conclusive proofs partly in the Physics and its commentaries, and partly in the Metaphysics and its commentary. I have already stated that in this work it is not my intention to copy the books of the philosophers or to explain difficult problems, but simply to mention those propositions which are closely connected with our subject, and which we want for our purpose.

(58) To the above propositions one must be added which enunciates that the universe is eternal, and which is held by Aristotle to be true, and even more acceptable than any other theory. For the present we admit it, as a hypothesis, only for the purpose of demonstrating our theory. It is the following proposition:

(59) PROPOSITION XXVI

(60) Time and motion are eternal, constant, and in actual existence.

(61) In accordance with this proposition, Aristotle is compelled to assume that there exists actually a body with constant motion, viz., the fifth element. He therefore says that the heavens are not subject to genesis or destruction, because motion cannot be generated nor destroyed. He also holds that every motion must necessarily be preceded by another motion, either of the same or of a different kind. The belief that the locomotion of an animal is not preceded by another motion, is not true: for the animal is caused to move, after it had been in rest, by the intention to obtain those very things which bring about that locomotion. A change in its state of health, or some image, or some new idea can produce a desire to seek that which is conducive to its welfare and to avoid that which is contrary. Each of these three causes sets the living being in motion, and each of them is produced by various kinds of motion. Aristotle likewise asserts that everything which is created must, before its actual creation, have existed in potentiâ. By inferences drawn from this assertion he seeks to establish his proposition, viz., The thing that moves is finite, and its path finite; but it repeats the motion in its path an infinite number of times. This can only take place when the motion is circular, as has been stated in Proposition XIII. Hence follows also the existence of an infinite number of things which do not co-exist but follow one after the other.

(62) Aristotle frequently attempts to establish this proposition; but I believe that he did not consider his proofs to be conclusive. It appeared to him to be the most probable and acceptable proposition. His followers, however, and the commentators of his books, contend that it contains not only a probable but a demonstrative proof, and that it has, in fact, been fully established. On the other hand, the Mutakallemim try to prove that the proposition cannot be true, as, according to their opinion, it is impossible to conceive how an infinite number of things could even come into existence successively. They assume this impossibility as an axiom. I, however, think that this proposition is admissible, but neither demonstrative, as the commentators of Aristotle assert, nor, on the other hand, impossible, as the Mutakallemim say. We have no intention to explain here the proofs given by Aristotle, or to show our doubts concerning them, or to set forth our opinions on the creation of the universe. I here simply desire to mention those propositions which we shall require for the proof of the three principles stated above. Having thus quoted and admitted these propositions, I will now proceed to explain what may be inferred from them.

(1) ACCORDING to Proposition XXV., a moving agent must exist which has moved the substance of all existing transient things and enabled it to receive Form. The cause of the motion of that agent is found in the existence of another motor of the same or of a different class, the term "motion," in a general sense, being common to four categories (Prop. IV.). This series of motions is not infinite (Prop. III.); we find that it can only be continued till the motion of the fifth element is arrived at, and then it ends. The motion of the fifth element is the source of every force that moves and prepares any substance on earth for its combination with a certain form, and is connected with that force by a chain of intermediate motions. The celestial sphere [or the fifth element) performs the act of locomotion which is the first of the several kinds of motion (Prop. XIV.), and all locomotion is found to be the indirect effect of the motion of this sphere; e.g., a stone is set in motion by a stick, the stick by a man's hand, the hand by the sinews, the sinews by the muscles, the muscles by the nerves, the nerves by the natural heat of the body, and the heat of the body by its form. This is undoubtedly the immediate motive cause, but the action of this immediate cause is due to a certain design, e.g., to bring a stone into a hole by striking against it with a stick in order to prevent the draught from coming through the crevice. The motion of the air that causes the draught is the effect of the motion of the celestial sphere. Similarly it may be shown that the ultimate cause of all genesis and destruction can be traced to the motion of the sphere. But the motion of the sphere must likewise have been effected by an agent (Prop. XVII.) residing either without the sphere or within it; a third case being impossible. In the first case, if the motor is without the sphere, it must either be corporeal or incorporeal: if incorporeal, it cannot be said that the agent is without the sphere; it can only be described as separate from it; because an incorporeal object can only be said metaphorically to reside without a certain corporeal object. In the second case, if the agent resides within the sphere, it must be either a force distributed throughout the whole sphere so that each part of the sphere includes a part of the force, as is the case with the heat of fire; or it is an indivisible force, e.g., the soul and the intellect (Props. X. and XI.). The agent which sets the sphere in motion must consequently be one of the following four things: a corporeal object without the sphere; an incorporeal object separate from it; a force spread throughout the whole of the sphere; or an indivisible force [within the sphere].

(2) The first case, viz., that the moving agent of the sphere is a corporeal object without the sphere, is impossible, as will be explained. Since the moving agent is corporeal, it must itself move while setting another object in motion (Prop. IX.), and as the sixth element would likewise move when imparting motion to another body, it would be set in motion by a seventh element, which must also move. An infinite number of bodies would thus be required before the sphere could be set in motion. This is contrary to Proposition II.

(3) The third case, viz., that the moving object be a force distributed throughout the whole body, is likewise impossible. For the sphere is corporeal, and must therefore be finite (Prop. I.); also the force it contains must be finite (Prop. XII.), since each part of the sphere contains part of the force (Prop. XI.): the latter can consequently not produce an infinite motion, such as we assumed according to Proposition XXVI., which we admitted for the present.

(4) The fourth case is likewise impossible, viz., that the sphere is set in motion by an indivisible force residing in the sphere in the same manner as the soul resides in the body of man. For this force, though indivisible, could not be the cause of infinite motion by itself alone: because if that were the case the prime motor would have an accidental motion (Prop. VI.). But things that move accidentally must come to rest (Prop. VIII.), and then the thing comes also to rest which is set in motion. (The following may serve as a further illustration of the nature of accidental motion. When man is moved by the soul, i.e., by his form, to go from the basement of the house to the upper storey, his body moves directly, while the soul, the really efficient cause of that motion, participates in it accidentally. For through the translation of the body from the basement to the upper storey, the soul has likewise changed its place, and when no fresh impulse for the motion of the body is given by the soul, the body which has been set in motion by such impulse comes to rest, and the accidental motion of the soul is discontinued). Consequently the motion of that supposed first motor must be due to some cause which does not form part of things composed of two elements, viz., a moving agent and an object moved: if such a cause is present the motor in that compound sets the other element in motion; in the absence of such a cause no motion takes place. Living beings do therefore not move continually, although each of them possesses an indivisible motive element; because this element is not constantly in motion, as it would be if it produced motion of its own accord. On the contrary, the things to which the action is due are separate from the motor. The action is caused either by desire for that which is agreeable, or by aversion from that which is disagreeable, or by some image, or by some ideal when the moving being has the capacity of conceiving it. When any of these causes are present then the motor acts; its motion is accidental, and must therefore come to an end (Prop. VIII.). If the motor of the sphere were of this kind the sphere could not move ad infinitum. Our opponent, however, holds that the spheres move continually ad infinitum: if this were the case, and it is in fact possible (Prop. XIII.), the efficient cause of the motion of the sphere must, according to the above division, be of the second kind, viz., something incorporeal and separate from the sphere.

(5) It may thus be considered as proved that the efficient cause of the motion of the sphere, if that motion be eternal, is neither itself corporeal nor does it reside in a corporeal object; it must move neither of its own accord nor accidentally; it must be indivisible and unchangeable (Prop. VII. and Prop. V.). This Prime Motor of the sphere is God, praised be His name!

(6) The hypothesis that there exist two Gods is inadmissible, because absolutely incorporeal beings cannot be counted (Prop. XVI.), except as cause and effect; the relation of time is not applicable to God (Prop. XV.), because motion cannot be predicated of Him.

(7) The result of the above argument is consequently this: the sphere cannot move ad infinitum of its own accord; the Prime Motor is not corporeal, nor a force residing within a body; it is One, unchangeable, and in its existence independent of time. Three of our postulates are thus proved by the principal philosophers.

(8) The philosophers employ besides another argument, based on the following proposition of Aristotle. If there be a thing composed of two elements, and the one of them is known to exist also by itself, apart from that thing, then the other element is likewise found in existence by itself separate from that compound. For if the nature of the two elements were such that they could only exist together--as, e.g., matter and form--then neither of them could in any way exist separate from the other. The fact that the one component is found also in a separate existence proves that the two elements are not indissolubly connected, and that the same must therefore be the case with the other component. Thus we infer from the existence of honey-vinegar and of honey by itself, that there exists also vinegar by itself. After having explained this proposition Aristotle continues thus: We notice many objects consisting of a motor and a motum, i.e., objects which set other things in motion, and whilst doing so are themselves set in motion by other things; such is clearly the case as regards all the middle members of a series of things in motion. We also see a thing that is moved, but does not itself move anything, viz., the last member of the series: consequently a motor must exist without being at the same time a motum, and that is the Prime Motor, which, not being subject to motion, is indivisible, incorporeal, and independent of time, as has been shown in the preceding argument.

(9) Third Philosophical Argument.--This is taken from the words of Aristotle, though he gives it in a different form. It runs as follows: There is no doubt that many things actually exist, as, e.g., things perceived with the senses. Now there are only three cases conceivable, viz., either all these things are without beginning and without end, or all of them have beginning and end, or some are with and some without beginning and end. The first of these three cases is altogether inadmissible, since we clearly perceive objects which come into existence and are subsequently destroyed. The second case is likewise inadmissible, for if everything had but a temporary existence all things might be destroyed, and that which is enunciated of a whole class of things as possible is necessarily actual. All things must therefore come to an end, and then nothing would ever be in existence, for there would not exist any being to produce anything. Consequently nothing whatever would exist [if all things were transient]; but as we see things existing, and find ourselves in existence we conclude as follows:--Since there are undoubtedly beings of a temporary existence, there must also be an eternal being that is not subject to destruction, and whose existence is real, not merely possible.

(10) It has been further argued that the existence of this being is necessary, either on account of itself alone or on account of some external force. In the latter case its existence and non-existence would be equally possible, because of its own properties, but its existence would be necessary on account of the external force. That force would then be the being that possesses absolute existence (Prop. XIX). It is therefore certain that there must be a being which has absolutely independent existence, and is the source of the existence of all things, whether transient or permanent, if, as Aristotle assumes. there is in existence such a thing, which is the effect of an eternal cause, and must therefore itself be eternal. This is a proof the correctness of which is not doubted, disputed, or rejected, except by those who have no knowledge of the method of proof. We further say that the existence of anything that has independent existence is not due to any cause (Prop. X.), and that such a being does not include any plurality whatever (Prop. XXI.); consequently it cannot be a body, nor a force residing in a body (Prop. XXII.). It is now clear that there must be a being with absolutely independent existence, a being whose existence cannot be attributed to any external cause, and which does not include different elements; it cannot therefore be corporeal, or a force residing in a corporeal object; this being is God.

(11) It can easily be proved that absolutely independent existence cannot be attributed to two beings. For, if that were the case, absolutely independent existence would be a property added to the substance of both; neither of them would be absolutely independent on account of their essence, but only through a certain property, viz., that of this independent existence, which is common to both. It can besides be shown in many ways that independent existence cannot be reconciled with the principle of dualism by any means. It would make no difference, whether we imagine two beings of similar or of different properties. The reason for all this is to be sought in the absolute simplicity and in the utmost perfection of the essence of this being, which is the only member of its species, and does not depend on any cause whatever this being has therefore nothing in common with other beings.

(12) Fourth Argument.--This is likewise a well-known philosophical argument. We constantly see things passing from a state of potentiality to that of actuality, but in every such case there is for that transition of a thing an agent separate from it (Prop. XVIII). It is likewise clear that the agent has also passed from potentiality to actuality. It has at first been potential, because it could not be actual, owing to some obstacle contained in itself, or on account of the absence of a certain relation between itself and the object of its action: it became an actual agent as soon as that relation was present. Whichever cause be assumed, an agent is again necessary to remove the obstacle or to create the relation. The same can be argued respecting this last-mentioned agent that creates the relation or removes the obstacle. This series of causes cannot go on ad infinitum; we must at last arrive at a cause of the transition of an object from the state of potentiality to that of actuality, which is constant, and admits of no potentiality whatever. In the essence of this cause nothing exists potentially, for if its essence included any possibility of existence it would not exist at all (Prop. XXIII.); it cannot be corporeal, but it must be spiritual (Prop. XXIV.); and the immaterial being that includes no possibility whatever, but exists actually by its own essence, is God. Since He is incorporeal, as has been demonstrated, it follows that He is One (Prop. XVI).

(13) Even if we were to admit the Eternity of the Universe, we could by any of these methods prove the existence of God; that He is One and incorporeal, and that He does not reside as a force in a corporeal object.

(14) The following is likewise a correct method to prove the Incorporeality and the Unity of God: If there were two Gods, they would necessarily have one element in common by virtue of which they were Gods, and another element by which they were distinguished from each other and existed as two Gods; the distinguishing element would either be in both different from the property common to both-in that case both of them would consist of different elements, and neither of them would be the First Cause, or have absolutely independent existence; but their existence would depend on certain causes (Prop. XIX.)--or the distinguishing element would only in one of them be different from the element common to both: then that being could not have absolute independence.

(15) Another proof of the Unity of God.--It has been demonstrated by proof that the whole existing world is one organic body, all parts of which are connected together; also, that the influences of the spheres above pervade the earthly substance and prepare it for its forms. Hence it is impossible to assume that one deity be engaged in forming one part, and another deity in forming another part of that organic body of which all parts are closely connected together. A duality could only be imagined in this way, either that at one time the one deity is active, the other at another time, or that both act simultaneously, nothing being done except by both together. The first alternative is certainly absurd for many reasons: if at the time the one deity be active the other could also be active, there is no reason why the one deity should then act and the other not; if, on the other hand, it be impossible for the one deity to act when the other is at work, there must be some other cause [besides these deities] which [at a certain time] enables the one to act and disables the other. [Such difference would not be caused by time], since time is without change, and the object of the action likewise remains one and the same organic whole. Besides, if two deities existed in this way, both would be subject to the relations of time, since their actions would depend on time; they would also in the moment of acting pass from potentiality to actuality, and require an agent for such transition: their essence would besides include possibility [of existence]. It is equally absurd to assume that both together produce everything in existence, and that neither of them does anything alone; for when a number of forces must be united for a certain result, none of these forces acts of its own accord, and none is by itself the immediate cause of that result, but their union is the immediate cause. It has, furthermore, been proved that the action of the absolute cannot be due to an [external] cause. The union is also an act which presupposes a cause effecting that union, and if that cause be one, it is undoubtedly God: but if it also consists of a number of separate forces, a cause is required for the combination of these forces, as in the first case. Finally, one simple being must be arrived at, that is the cause of the existence of the Universe, which is one whole; it would make no difference whether we assumed that the First Cause had produced the Universe by creatio ex nihilo, or whether the Universe co-existed with the First Cause. It is thus clear how we can prove the Unity of God from the fact that this Universe is one whole.

(16) Another argument concerning the Incorporeality of God.--Every corporeal object is composed of matter and form (Prop. XXII.); every compound of these two elements requires an agent for effecting their combination. Besides, it is evident that a body is divisible and has dimensions: a body is thus undoubtedly subject to accidents. Consequently nothing corporeal can be a unity, either because everything corporeal is divisible or because it is a compound; that is to say, it can logically be analysed into two elements; because a body can only be said to be a certain body when the distinguishing element is added to the corporeal substratum, and must therefore include two elements: but it has been proved that the Absolute admits of no dualism whatever.

(17) Now that we have discussed these proofs, we will expound our own method in accordance with our promise.

(2) nearest way...the clearest path -- nearest in that it does not require many logical constructs and preliminary introductions like the other ways [such as philosophical inquiry]. Clearest in that it is a well-trodden path by many people, and a well-trodden path is free from stumbling blocks, mishaps, and errors. In other ways of inquiry, a man is not assured against mishaps and mistakes in treading them, as in truth, there are many, many casualties strewn along the path of philosophical inquiry unlike the path of examination [of G-d's wisdom], which none grow weary or stumble in it.

(1) You must consider, when reading this treatise, that mental perception, because connected with matter, is subject to conditions similar to those to which physical perception is subject. That is to say, if your eye looks around, you can perceive all that is within the range of your vision: if, however, you overstrain your eye, exerting it too much by attempting to see an object which is too distant for your eye, or to examine writings or engravings too small for your sight, and forcing it to obtain a correct perception of them, you will not only weaken your sight with regard to that special object, but also for those things which you otherwise are able to perceive: your eye will have become too weak to perceive what you were able to see before you exerted yourself and exceeded the limits of your vision.

(2) The same is the case with the speculative faculties of one who devotes himself to the study of any science. If a person studies too much and exhausts his reflective powers, he will be confused, and will not be able to apprehend even that which had been within the power of his apprehension. For the powers of the body are all alike in this respect.

(3) The mental perceptions are not exempt from a similar condition. If you admit the doubt, and do not persuade yourself to believe that there is a proof for things which cannot be demonstrated, or to try at once to reject and positively to deny an assertion the opposite of which has never been proved, or attempt to perceive things which are beyond your perception, then you have attained the highest degree of human perfection, then you are like R. Akibha, who "in peace entered [the study of these theological problems], and came out in peace." If, on the other hand, you attempt to exceed the limit of your intellectual power, or at once to reject things as impossible which have never been proved to be impossible, or which are in fact possible, though their possibility be very remote, then you will be like Elisha Aḥer; you will not only fail to become perfect, but you will become exceedingly imperfect. Ideas founded on mere imagination will prevail over you, you will incline toward defects, and toward base and degraded habits, on account of the confusion which troubles the mind, and of the dimness of its light, just as weakness of sight causes invalids to see many kinds of unreal images, especially when they have looked for a long time at dazzling or at very minute objects.

(4) Respecting this it has been said, "Hast thou found honey? eat so much as is sufficient for thee, lest thou be filled therewith, and vomit it" (Prov. 25:16). Our Sages also applied this verse to Elisha Aḥer. How excellent is this simile! In comparing knowledge to food (as we observed in chap. xxx.), the author of Proverbs mentions the sweetest food, namely, honey, which has the further property of irritating the stomach, and of causing sickness. He thus fully describes the nature of knowledge. Though great, excellent, noble and perfect, it is injurious if not kept within bounds or not guarded properly; it is like honey which gives nourishment and is pleasant, when eaten in moderation, but is totally thrown away when eaten immoderately. Therefore, it is not said "lest thou be filled and loathe it," but "lest thou vomit it." The same idea is expressed in the words, "It is not good to eat much honey" (Prov. 25:27); and in the words, "Neither make thyself over-wise: why shouldst thou destroy thyself?" (Eccles. 7:16); comp. "Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of God" (Eccles. 4:17). The same subject is alluded to in the words of David, "Neither do I exercise myself in great matters, or in things too high for me" (Ps. 131:2), and in the sayings of our Sages: "Do not inquire into things which are too difficult for thee, do not search what is hidden from thee: study what you are allowed to study, and do not occupy thyself with mysteries." They meant to say, Let thy mind only attempt things which are within human perception; for the study of things which lie beyond man's comprehension is extremely injurious, as has been already stated. This lesson is also contained in the Talmudical passage, which begins, "He who considers four things," etc., and concludes, "He who does not regard the honour of his Creator"; here also is given the advice which we have already mentioned, viz., that man should not rashly engage in speculation with false conceptions, and when he is in doubt about anything, or unable to find a proof for the object of his inquiry, he must not at once abandon, reject and deny it; he must modestly keep back, and from regard to the honour of his Creator, hesitate [from uttering an opinion) and pause. This has already been explained.

(5) It was not the object of the Prophets and our Sages in these utterances to close the gate of investigation entirely, and to prevent the mind from comprehending what is within its reach, as is imagined by simple and idle people, whom it suits better to put forth their ignorance and incapacity as wisdom and perfection, and to regard the distinction and wisdom of others as irreligion and imperfection, thus taking darkness for light and light for darkness. The whole object of the Prophets and the Sages was to declare that a limit is set to human reason where it must halt. Do not criticise the words used in this chapter and in others in reference to the mind, for we only intended to give some idea of the subject in view, not to describe the essence of the intellect: for other chapters have been dedicated to this subject.

(1) 1. AL KHAZARI: I must trouble thee to give me a clear and concise discourse on religious principles and axioms according to the method of the Mutakallims. Let me hear them exactly as thou didst study them, that I may accept or refute them. Since I have not been granted a perfect faith free from doubts, and I was formerly sceptical, had my own opinions, and exchanged ideas with philosophers and followers of other religions, I consider it most advantageous to learn and to instruct myself how to refute dangerous and foolish views. Tradition in itself is a good thing if it satisfies the soul, but a perturbed soul prefers research, especially if examination leads to the verification of tradition. Then knowledge and tradition become united.

(2) 2. The Rabbi: Where is the soul which is strong enough not to be deceived by the views of philosophers, scientists, astrologers, adepts, magicians, materialists, and others, and can adopt a belief without having first passed through many stages of heresy? Life is short, but labour long. Only few there are to whom belief comes naturally, who avoid all these views, and whose soul always detects the points of error in them. I hope that thou art one of those few. Since I cannot resist, I will not lead thee the way of the Karaites, who ascended the heights of metaphysics without intermediate steps. I will give thee a clear standpoint, which will assist thee to acquire clear notions of matter and form, elements, nature, soul, intellect, and metaphysics in general. After this I will prove to thee, as briefly as possible, that the rational soul can exist without a body; further, the existence of reward hereafter, providence and omnipotence. As regards tangible objects, we can perceive their quantity and quality by means of our senses, whilst reason maintains that they are borne by a fulcrum which is difficult to imagine. How can we imagine a thing that has neither quantity nor quality? [Imagination denies its existence, but reason answers that quantity and quality] are accidents which have no independent existence, but must necessarily have an object to support them. Philosophers call this object matter, adding that our intelligence grasps its meaning only imperfectly, since imperfection is its nature; that it does not really exist, and therefore cannot claim any predicate, and although it only exists virtually, its predicate is corporeal. Aristotle says that it is, so to speak, ashamed to appear naked, and therefore only shows itself clothed in a form. Some people believe that the 'water' spoken of in the biblical account of the creation is an appellation for this matter, and that 'the spirit of the Lord hovering over the surface of the water' only expresses the divine will which penetrates all atoms of matter, with which He does what, how, and when He desires, as the potter with the shapeless clay. The absence of form and order is called darkness and tōhū wabōhū. After this the wise, divine will ordained the revolution of the uppermost sphere, which completes one revolution in four and twenty hours, carrying all other spheres with it. Through this the matter which fills the sphere of the moon underwent a change, which was in accordance with the movements of the spheres. The first process was that the air near the moon sphere became hot, because it was nearest to the periphery. It thus became an aetherial fire, called elementary fire by natural philosophers, having neither colour nor combustion, and being a fine, delicate, and light substance. It is called the fire sphere. Then comes the water sphere, and then the terrestrial globe, which forms a heavy and compact centre, being removed farthest from the periphery. These are the four elements, from the intermixture of which all things arise.

(1) The investigation of fundamental principles is extremely dangerous. For though laws agree in general matters, like the existence of God, reward and punishment, and so on, they are divided in particular matters. It follows therefore necessarily that laws have particular principles by which one divine law differs from another. And there is grave danger in investigating particular matters. For any one who denies one of the particular principles of a law is excluded from the group identified with that law. For example, one who denies the prophecy and mission of Moses is a denier of the law of Moses without any doubt, though it is not a general principle of divine law. Similarly one who does not believe in the coming of the Messiah, which Maimonides counts among the principles of the Mosaic law, is, according to him, put into a class with those who deny one of the principles of the Mosaic law, who are excluded from the community under that law and have no share in the world to come. Maimonides, in the book Madda‘, in the third chapter of the Laws Concerning Penitence, classes such a person among unbelievers. This is very strange, for in the talmudic treatise Sanhedrin, chapter Helek, we find a statement of Rabbi Hillel, one of the Jewish sages of the Gemara, that the Jews need expect no Messiah, seeing that they had enjoyed his benefits in the time of Hezekiah, king of Judah. According to Maimonides this sage would have to be classed as an infidel and excluded from a share in the world to come. But if this were the case, why is he mentioned in the Gemara if he was excluded from the community of Israel and did not believe in the principles of their law? We can not say that his words are cited only for the purpose of being refuted, for in that case he would not be referred to as Rabbi, nor would authoritative rules be quoted in his name anywhere.

(2) Others explain the difficulty by saying that Rabbi Hillel did not deny the doctrine of the Messiah, far from it; but that he meant to say that this dogma does not rest on any biblical text; that all the chapters in the book of Isaiah which speak of the Messiah, like chapter eleven, beginning, And there shall come forth a shoot out of the stock of Jesse, and the like, refer to Hezekiah, king of Judah, in whose days those prophecies were fulfilled. The tenth verse of the same chapter, The root of Jesse, that standeth for an ensign of the peoples, unto him shall the nations seek, refers to Merodach-baladan the son of Baladan, king of Babylon, who sent a letter and a present to Hezekiah. The expression at the end of the same verse, And his resting-place shall be glorious, also refers to Hezekiah. It is the wont of a hero or a king to go out to meet the enemy, to risk his life for his people and gain the victory for them. To remain quietly at home would be a great disgrace, and death would be better than such shame. Thus Saul, though he knew that he would die in the war, having been told by Samuel, And to-morrow shalt thou and thy sons be with me, nevertheless went to war to avoid disgrace.

(3) Now Hezekiah was reproached by everybody because he had shut himself up in Jerusalem and did not go out to fight. But when they saw the great miracle of the death of Sennacherib and the destruction of his army, it became clear to them that the reason Hezekiah had not gone out to fight was because he trusted in God to fight his battles. His resting, therefore, redounded to his glory, for the whole world knew that he was a completely righteous man, beloved by God, who gave him the desires of his heart and fought for him. Not so other kings, for whom resting is not glorious. When this miracle spread abroad, all the Jews who had been taken captive to Assyria and those who fled to Cush and Egypt and Pathros and other lands returned to Palestine. This is the meaning of the verse in Isaiah, And there shall be a highway for the remnant of His people, etc. This is the way in which the whole chapter is interpreted by Rabbi Moses ha-Kohen, Ibn Bal‘am and other literalists. Accordingly it might be said that Rabbi Hillel’s opinion was that the texts of Isaiah and the other prophets can not be cited to prove the coming of the Messiah, but that he believed in the coming of the redeemer on the basis of tradition and hence was not excluded from the community of Israel and not classed as a sinner.

(4) This explanation, however, does not seem plausible. For the Gemara goes on to say that his disputants replied, May the Lord forgive Rabbi Hillel, a remark which indicates that they did regard him as guilty of sin for holding such an opinion. But this could not be if he merely denied the scriptural evidence and believed in the doctrine itself on the strength of tradition, as we shall make clear in Book Four. We must therefore conclude that Rabbi Hillel did not believe in the coming of the Messiah at all, and if despite this he was not classed as an unbeliever, it is because the dogma of the Messiah is not a fundamental principle of the Law of Moses, as Maimonides thinks, for we can conceive of the existence of the Mosaic law without it. It is a special principle of the religion of the Christians, for their religion can not exist without it. However, it is a dogma which it behooves every one professing Judaism to believe, as creation of the world out of nothing is a dogma which it behooves every one professing a divine law to believe, though it is not a fundamental principle of divine law. One who believes that there is a prime and eternal matter out of which all existing things came to be through the will of God is not an infidel according to the opinion of Maimonides, who does not count creation ex nihilo among the fundamental dogmas. But he is nevertheless guilty of a sin. Similarly Rabbi Hillel was guilty of a sin for not believing in the coming of the redeemer, but he was not an infidel. This is the opinion of the modern authorities, for they do not place the dogma of the Messiah and of the creation of the world in time among the fundamental principles.

(5) The above remarks show how dangerous it is to investigate fundamental principles. For one runs the risk of denying something that is a fundamental principle of the Torah. Thus, according to the opinion of the one who regards creation in time as a fundamental principle of the Torah, Rabbi Moses ben Maimon would be an unbeliever, God forbid! On the other hand, the one who does not regard the dogma of the Messiah as a fundamental principle, would be an unbeliever in the opinion of Maimonides, who classes it among the fundamental dogmas. The same thing applies to the other matters which Maimonides classes among fundamental principles, though they are not such, as we shall see. For this reason we said that there is grave danger in the investigation of principles. For how can one tell what those things are, the denial of which, and of their fundamental character, constitutes one an unbeliever?

(4) 4. Al Khazari: If there be conviction in the mind that God's is the kingdom, the unity, omnipotence, and omniscience, and that everything is dependent upon Him, He being dependent upon no one, then is not reverence and love for Him a necessary consequence, without such anthropomorphisms?

(5) 5. The Rabbi: This is a doctrine of philosophers. We see that the human soul shows fear whenever it meets with anything terrible, but not at the mere report of such a thing. It is likewise attracted by a beautiful form which strikes the eye, but not so much by one that is only spoken of. Do not believe him who considers himself wise in thinking that he is so far advanced that he is able to grasp all metaphysical problems with the abstract intellect alone, without the support of anything that can be conceived or seen, such as words, writing, or any visible or imaginary forms. Seest thou not that thou art not able even to collect the burden of thy prayer in thought alone, without reciting it? Neither canst thou reckon up to a hundred without speaking, still less if this hundred be composed of different numbers. Were it not for the sensible perception which encompasses the organization of the intellect by means of similar sayings, that organization could not be maintained. In this way, prophets’ images picture God's greatness, power, loving kindness, omniscience, life, eternity, government, and independence, the dependence of everything on Him, His unity, and holiness, and in one sudden flash stands revealed this grand and majestic figure with its splendour, its characteristics, the instruments which typify power, etc., the up-lifted hand, the unsheathed sword, fire, wind, thunder and lightning which obey his behest, the word which goes forth to warn, to announce what has happened, and to predict. Many angels stand humbly before Him, and He gives them according to their requirements without stint. He raises the lowly, humbles the mighty, and holds out His hand to the repentant, saying to them: 'Who is conscious [of a sin] shall repent' (Jonah 3:9). He is wroth with the wicked, deposes and appoints, whilst before Him 'thousand thousands minister unto Him' (Daniel 7:10). Such are the visions which the prophet sees in one second. Thus fear and love come to him naturally, and remain in his heart for the whole of his life. He even yearns and longs to behold the vision again and again. Such a repetition was considered a great event for Solomon, in the words: 'The Lord who has appeared to him twice' (I Kings 11:9). Will a philosopher ever achieve the same result?

(14) 14. The Rabbi: I feared that thou wouldst be deceived, and acquiesce in their views. Because they furnish mathematical and logical proofs, people accept everything they say concerning physics and metaphysics, taking every word as evidence. Didst thou not, from the very beginning, doubt their theories of the four elements, their search of the fire world, in which they place the aetherial fire, which is colourless, and therefore prevent the colour of the sky and stars from being seen. When did we ever accept an elementary fire? The highest degree of heat, if found in the earth, appears as coal; in the air as flame; in the water at boiling point. When did we ever witness an igneous or atmospheric substance entering into the substance of the plant or animal, and asserted that it was composed of all four elements, viz. fire, air, water, and earth? Supposing we did perceive water and earth enter the substance of a plant in altered form; but air and heat only assisted the process through their quality, but not as igneous and atmospheric bodies. Or when did we ever see them dissolved into the four real elements? If a part is reduced to a kind of dust, it is not real dust, but ashes, which can be used for healing purposes. Another part which is reduced to a kind of water is not real water, but an expressed liquid, a juice either poisonous or nourishing, but not drinkable water. The portion which is dissolved into a kind of air is vapour or fume, but no air fit to be breathed. Sometimes they alter their condition when absorbed by an animal or a plant, or enter a combination with earthly particles, move from alteration to alteration, but only in rare cases are they reduced to the pure element. Science, it is true, forces us to accept the theory that heat, cold, moisture, and dryness are primary qualities, the influences of which nobody can escape; that reason reduces compound things to them, or declares them to be composed of them; and places substances at their disposal which bear them, calling them fire, air, water, and earth. This is, however, but a conception and nomenclature, but it does not mean that they can emerge from mere theory into reality, and produce, by combination, all existing things. How can philosophers make such an assertion, whilst teaching the eternity of matter, and that man never arose otherwise than from issue and blood, blood from food, food from vegetables, and vegetables, as we have said, from seeds and water transformed with the assistance of sunlight, air, and earth. All stars and spherical constellations also exercise their influence. This is the objection to the view of philosophers concerning the elements. According to the Tōrāh, it was God who created the world, together with animals and plants. There is no need to presuppose intermediaries or combinations [of elements]. If we make creation a postulate, all that is difficult becomes easy, and all that is crooked straight, as soon as one assumes that this world once did not exist, but came into existence by the will of God at the time He desired. Why dost thou trouble to examine the way in which bodies arose and were equipped with souls? Why art thou reluctant to accept the 'firmament' and 'the water above the heavens,' and the evil spirits mentioned by the Sages, the description of the events to be expected during the days of the Messiah, the resurrection of the dead and the world to come? Why should we need such artificial theories in order to prove the life of the soul after the dissolution of the body, considering that we have reliable information with regard to the return of the soul, be it spiritual or corporeal. If thou wouldst endeavour to confirm or refute these views logically, life would be spent in vain. Who vouchsafes the truth of the theory quoted above, that the soul is a spiritual substance which cannot be encompassed by space, and which is not subject to growth and decay? In what way differs my soul from thine, or from the Active Intellect, from other causes and the Prime Cause? Why, also, did not Aristotle's soul become united to that of Plato, either of them knowing the other's belief and innermost thought? Why do not all philosophers conceive their notions simultaneously, as is the case with God and the Active Intellect? How can they be subject to forgetfulness, and require reflection for every single one of their notions? Why is not a philosopher conscious of himself when he is asleep or intoxicated, or is prostrate with pleurisy, or has brain fever, or is old and decrepit? How should we judge a person who, having arrived at the extreme limit of philosophic speculation, is stricken by melancholy or depression, which makes him forget all his knowledge? Is he not himself in his eyes, or shall we say that he is some one else? Suppose he recovers gradually from his complaint, and begins to learn over again, but becomes old without having reached the former extent of his knowledge, has he two souls, the one different from the other? Suppose, further, that his temperament undergoes a change in the direction of love, ambition, or desire, shall I say that he has one soul in paradise and another in hell? Which are the limits of metaphysical knowledge by means of which the human soul is separated from the body without perishing? If this is the complete knowledge of existing things, much remains of which philosophers are ignorant concerning heaven, earth, and ocean. If one, however, must be satisfied with partial knowledge, then every rational soul exists separate, because primary notions are implanted in it. But if the isolated existence of the soul is based on the conception of the Ten Categories, or higher still, on the principles of intuition, in which all existing things are included ready to be grasped logically without following up all details, so is this a knowledge easily acquirable in one day. It would be strange if man could become an angel in one day. If it is incumbent to go the whole length and comprehend all these things in logical and scientific study, then the matter is unattainable and ends, in their opinion, infallibly in the death of the one who pursues it. Now thou didst allow thyself to be deceived by injurious fancies, didst seek that which thy Creator did not grant thee, and to obtain which no facilities have been granted to human nature. Only a few privileged individuals are allowed to grasp such things on the conditions mentioned before. These are the souls which comprehend the whole universe, know their Lord and His angels; who see one another, and know each other's secrets, as the prophet says: 'I, too, know it; be ye silent' (II Kings 2:3). We others, however, would not know how and by what means this came to pass, unless by way of prophecy. If what philosophers know of the matter were true, they would surely acquire it, since they discourse on the souls and prophecy. They are, however, like ordinary mortals. As regards human wisdom, they indeed occupy a high rank, as Socrates said: 'O my people, I do not deny your knowledge of the gods, but I confess that I do not understand it. As for me, I am only wise in human matters.' Philosophers justify their recourse to speculation by the absence of prophecy and divine light. They established the demonstrative sciences on a broad and unlimited basis, and on that account separated without either agreeing or disagreeing with each other concerning that on which they held such widely diverging views later on in metaphysics, and occasionally in physics. If there exists a class representing one and the same view, this is not the result of research and investigation, but because they belong to the same philosophic school in which this was taught, as the schools of Pythagoras, Empedocles, Aristotle, Plato, or others, as the Academy and Peripatetics, who belong to the school of Aristotle. They start with views which deprecate reason, but are deprecated by the latter. An example of this is their explanation of the cause of the revolution of the sphere, and the endeavour of the latter to remedy its imperfection, so as to be absolutely exact on all sides. As, however, this is not always possible and in all points, it tries to revolve the opposite way. They contrived similar theories with regard to the emanations from the Prime Cause, viz., that from the intuition of the first cause an angel arose; and from its knowledge of itself a sphere arose, and thence downward in eleven degrees, until the emanation arrived at the Active Intellect, from which neither an angel nor a sphere developed. All these things are still less satisfactory than the "Book of Creation." They are full of doubts, and there is no consensus of opinion between one philosopher and another. Yet they cannot be blamed, nay, deserve thanks for all they have produced in abstract speculations. For their intentions were good; they observed the laws of reason, and led virtuous lives. At all events, they have earned this praise, because the same duties were not imposed on them as they were on us when we were given revelation, and a tradition which is tantamount to revelation.