The Oral Talmud with Benay Lappe and Dan Libenson Episode 68

MISHNA: One who injures another is obligated in five categories: for damage, for pain, for healing, for rest, and for humiliation. As for damage, how? If one blinded another’s eye, cut off his hand, broke his leg, we view him as if he were a slave being sold in the market, and evaluate how much he was worth and how much he is worth. As for pain, how? If one burned another with a spit or with a nail, and even on his fingernail, a place where it does not cause a bruise, we estimate how much a similar person would want to take to suffer in this way. Healing, how? If one struck another, then he is obligated to heal him. If growths appeared on him--if due to the blow, he is obligated; if not due to the blow, he is exempt. If the wound healed, and then reopened, and again healed, and then reopened, he is obligated to heal him. If healed fully, not obligated to heal him. Rest, how? We view him as if he were a watchman of cucumbers, because he already gave him money for his hand or money for his leg. Humiliation, how? It all depends on the one who humiliates and the one who is humiliated.

GEMARA: Why?! “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), said the Merciful One. You might say an actual eye.

Let your mind not go there. The principle implicit in the mishna is derived from a verbal analogy in the Torah, as it is taught in a baraita: Based on the verse: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot” (Exodus 21:24), one might have thought that if one blinded the eye of another, the court blinds his eye as punishment; or if one severed the hand of another, the court severs his hand; or if one broke the leg of another, the court breaks his leg. Therefore, the verse states: “One who strikes a person,” and the verse also states: “And one who strikes an animal,” (apparently referring to Leviticus 24:21) to teach that just as one who strikes an animal is liable to pay monetary compensation, so too, one who strikes a person is liable to pay monetary compensation.

And if it is your wish to say that there is an objection to this derivation, there is an alternative derivation: The verse states: “And you shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer, who is guilty of death, for he shall die” (Numbers 35:31). This indicates that it is only for the life of a murderer that you shall not take ransom; but you shall take ransom for one who severed another’s extremities, which is analogous to the death of a limb, as severed limbs do not regenerate.

The Gemara asks: To which verse is the baraita referring when it quotes: “One who strikes a person” and: “One who strikes an animal”? If we say that the baraita is referring to the verse: “One who strikes an animal shall pay its compensation, and one who strikes a person shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:21), this cannot be, as that verse is written with regard to killing, not injury, and there is no monetary compensation for killing. Rather, the baraita references the verse from here: “One who strikes an animal mortally shall pay its compensation, a life for a life” (Leviticus 24:18); and juxtaposed to that is the verse: “And if a man maims his neighbor, as he has done, so shall it be done to him” (Leviticus 24:19). The Gemara challenges: But this latter verse does not use the expression: “One who strikes,” which is the basis for the comparison in the baraita. The Gemara responds: We are stating an analogy from striking to striking that is based not upon the exact phrasing of the verse but upon the details of the halakha, as follows: Just as the act of striking that is stated with regard to an animal renders one liable to pay monetary compensation, so too, the act of striking that is stated with regard to a person renders one liable to pay monetary compensation. The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it written in the verses discussing one who injures another: “And a man who strikes any person mortally shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:17), which presumably means that in the case of one who severs another’s extremity the same injury, i.e., death of a limb, is done to the one who caused the injury, and he does not pay monetary compensation? The Gemara answers: The verse does not mean that his limb shall be put to death, i.e., removed, but rather, that he should pay compensation with money. The Gemara asks: From where do you say that the verse is referring to paying compensation with money? Why not say that he is punished with actual death i.e., loss of a limb? The Gemara answers: That interpretation should not enter your mind for two reasons. One reason is that this verse is juxtaposed to the following verse: “One who strikes an animal mortally shall pay its compensation” (Leviticus 24:18). And furthermore, it is written after it: “A fracture for a fracture, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; as he has given a blemish to a person, so shall it be given unto him” (Leviticus 24:20); and learn from the use of the word “given” that the verse is referring to money.

The Gemara asks: And why did the baraita offer the second proof that started with the phrase: If it is your wish to say? The Gemara explains: there was a potential challenge that the tanna who authored the baraita recognized, namely: What do you see that lets you learn anything about a case of one who strikes a person from the case of “one who strikes an animal”? We should learn the case of of one who strikes a person from from a case of striking a person. You could say that we should learn damages from damages, and not learn damages from death. The author of the baraita could reply: On the contrary, we do need to analogize the case of a person from a a case of a person, and we really should not analogize a case of a person from a case about animals, and that is why the baraita needed the second proof, which teaches: If it is your wish to say that there is an objection to the first proof, there is an alternative proof, as the verse states: “And you shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer, who is guilty of death, for he shall die” (Numbers 35:31). This indicates that it is only for the life of a murderer that you shall not take ransom; but you shall take ransom even for extremities that do not grow back.

The Gemara challenges the merits of the second proof: But in this verse -- “You shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer” -- which you used for this proof, do you really think that it came to exclude the case of one who severs another’s extremities from the prohibition against taking ransom? Isn’t this verse necessary to teach that which the Merciful One states: You shall not mete out two punishments to him: do not take money from him as ransom and also kill him? The Gemara answers no -- we actually derive that principle from the verse: “Then it shall be, if the guilty deserves to be lashed, that the judge shall lie him down and flog him before him, according to the measure of his evildoing” (Deuteronomy 25:2). From the fact that “evildoing” is singular, the Gemara homiletically infers: For one evildoing, you can render him liable, but you cannot render him liable for two evildoings. The Gemara challenges this explanation: But the verse (“You shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer, for one who is guilty of death”) is still necessary to teach that which the Merciful One states: You shall not take money and thereby exempt the guilty from being put to death, the plain meaning of the verse. The Gemara answers: If so, let the Merciful One have written in the Torah: “You shall not take ransom” and follow it immediately with the phrase “for one who is guilty of death.” Why do I need the Torah to also state “for the life of a murderer”? Learn from the addition of that phrase that it is precisely for the case of a murderer that you shall not take ransom, but you shall take ransom for one who severed another’s extremities, which do not grow back.

The Gemara asks: And once it is written: “You shall not take ransom,” why do I need the baraita's first proof which juxtaposes “One who strikes a person” to “One who strikes an animal”? Say in response: If we derived this principle only from that verse (“You shall not take ransom”), I would say: If the one who caused the damage desires, he may choose to give his eye, and if he desires, he may choose to give the monetary value of his eye. Therefore, the Torah teaches us to derive it from an animal: Just as one who strikes an animal must pay monetary compensation and may not receive corporal punishment, so too, one who strikes a person must pay monetary compensation and may not receive corporal punishment.

(12) He who fatally strikes a man shall be put to death. (13) If he did not do it by design, but it came about by an act of God, I will assign you a place to which he can flee. (14) When a man schemes against another and kills him treacherously, you shall take him from My very altar to be put to death. (15) He who strikes his father or his mother shall be put to death. (16) He who kidnaps a man—whether he has sold him or is still holding him—shall be put to death. (17) He who insults his father or his mother shall be put to death.

(18) When men quarrel and one strikes the other with stone or fist, and he does not die but has to take to his bed— (19) if he then gets up and walks outdoors upon his staff, the assailant shall go unpunished, except that he must pay for his idleness and his cure. (20) When a man strikes his slave, male or female, with a rod, and he dies there and then, he must be avenged. (21) But if he survives a day or two, he is not to be avenged, since he is the other’s property. (22) When men fight, and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, but no other damage ensues, the one responsible shall be fined according as the woman’s husband may exact from him, the payment to be based on reckoning. (23) But if other damage ensues, the penalty shall be life for life, (24) eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, (25) burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise. (26) When a man strikes the eye of his slave, male or female, and destroys it, he shall let him go free on account of his eye. (27) If he knocks out the tooth of his slave, male or female, he shall let him go free on account of his tooth.

(28) When an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall be stoned and its flesh shall not be eaten, but the owner of the ox is not to be punished. (29) If, however, that ox has been in the habit of goring, and its owner, though warned, has failed to guard it, and it kills a man or a woman—the ox shall be stoned and its owner, too, shall be put to death. (30) If ransom is laid upon him, he must pay whatever is laid upon him to redeem his life. (31) So, too, if it gores a minor, male or female, [the owner] shall be dealt with according to the same rule. (32) But if the ox gores a slave, male or female, he shall pay thirty shekels of silver to the master, and the ox shall be stoned. (33) When a man opens a pit, or digs a pit and does not cover it, and an ox or an ass falls into it, (34) the one responsible for the pit must make restitution; he shall pay the price to the owner, but shall keep the dead animal. (35) When a man’s ox injures his neighbor’s ox and it dies, they shall sell the live ox and divide its price; they shall also divide the dead animal. (36) If, however, it is known that the ox was in the habit of goring, and its owner has failed to guard it, he must restore ox for ox, but shall keep the dead animal.

(17) If anyone kills any human being, he shall be put to death. (18) One who strikes an animal mortally shall pay its compensation, a life for a life. (19) And if a man maims his neighbor, as he has done, so shall it be done to him. (20) fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. The injury he inflicted on another shall be inflicted on him. (21) One who kills a beast shall make restitution for it; but one who kills a human being shall be put to death.

(9) The LORD spoke further to Moses: (10) Speak to the Israelite people and say to them: When you cross the Jordan into the land of Canaan, (11) you shall provide yourselves with places to serve you as cities of refuge to which a manslayer who has killed a person unintentionally may flee. (12) The cities shall serve you as a refuge from the avenger, so that the manslayer may not die unless he has stood trial before the assembly. (13) The towns that you thus assign shall be six cities of refuge in all. (14) Three cities shall be designated beyond the Jordan, and the other three shall be designated in the land of Canaan: they shall serve as cities of refuge. (15) These six cities shall serve the Israelites and the resident aliens among them for refuge, so that anyone who kills a person unintentionally may flee there. (16) Anyone, however, who strikes another with an iron object so that death results is a murderer; the murderer must be put to death. (17) If he struck him with a stone tool that could cause death, and death resulted, he is a murderer; the murderer must be put to death. (18) Similarly, if the object with which he struck him was a wooden tool that could cause death, and death resulted, he is a murderer; the murderer must be put to death. (19) The blood-avenger himself shall put the murderer to death; it is he who shall put him to death upon encounter. (20) So, too, if he pushed him in hate or hurled something at him on purpose and death resulted, (21) or if he struck him with his hand in enmity and death resulted, the assailant shall be put to death; he is a murderer. The blood-avenger shall put the murderer to death upon encounter. (22) But if he pushed him without malice aforethought or hurled any object at him unintentionally, (23) or inadvertently dropped upon him any deadly object of stone, and death resulted—though he was not an enemy of his and did not seek his harm— (24) in such cases the assembly shall decide between the slayer and the blood-avenger. (25) The assembly shall protect the manslayer from the blood-avenger, and the assembly shall restore him to the city of refuge to which he fled, and there he shall remain until the death of the high priest who was anointed with the sacred oil. (26) But if the manslayer ever goes outside the limits of the city of refuge to which he has fled, (27) and the blood-avenger comes upon him outside the limits of his city of refuge, and the blood-avenger kills the manslayer, there is no bloodguilt on his account. (28) For he must remain inside his city of refuge until the death of the high priest; after the death of the high priest, the manslayer may return to his land holding. (29) Such shall be your law of procedure throughout the ages in all your settlements. (30) If anyone kills a person, the manslayer may be executed only on the evidence of witnesses; the testimony of a single witness against a person shall not suffice for a sentence of death. (31) You may not accept a ransom for the life of a murderer who is guilty of a capital crime; he must be put to death. (32) Nor may you accept ransom in lieu of flight to a city of refuge, enabling one to return to live on his land before the death of the priest. (33) You shall not pollute the land in which you live; for blood pollutes the land, and the land can have no expiation for blood that is shed on it, except by the blood of him who shed it. (34) You shall not defile the land in which you live, in which I Myself abide, for I the LORD abide among the Israelite people.

(1) When there is a dispute between men and they go to law, and a decision is rendered declaring the one in the right and the other in the wrong— (2) if the guilty one is to be flogged, the magistrate shall have him lie down and be given lashes in his presence, by count, according the the measure of his evildoing. (3) He may be given up to forty lashes, but not more, lest being flogged further, to excess, your brother be degraded before your eyes.

The Gemara presents a series of derivations for the principle that one who injures another is liable to pay monetary compensation.

It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Dostai ben Yehuda says: The phrase: “An eye for an eye” (Leviticus 24:20), means monetary restitution. Do you say that he must pay the victim monetary restitution, or is it only teaching that the one who caused the injury must lose an actual eye? You say: There may be a case where the eye of the one who caused the injury is large and the eye of the injured party is small. How can I read and literally apply the phrase “an eye for an eye” in this case? The Gemara continues the derivation: And if you would say that in all cases like this, where their eyes are different sizes, the injured party takes monetary restitution from the one who caused him injury, but in a case where their eyes are the same size, the one who caused injury is punished by actually having his eye removed, this cannot be, as the Torah said: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), teaching that the law shall be equal for all of you. The Sages object to this derivation and say: What is the difficulty in saying that his eye should be blinded? Perhaps, as the one who caused the injury took the sight from the injured party’s eye, the Merciful One states that the court should take the sight from his eye as well, no matter the size of the eye. Since, if you do not say so, then by the same logic,

(17) If anyone kills any human being, he shall be put to death. (18) One who kills a beast shall make restitution for it: life for life. (19) If anyone maims his fellow, as he has done so shall it be done to him: (20) fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. The injury he inflicted on another shall be inflicted on him. (21) One who kills a beast shall make restitution for it; but one who kills a human being shall be put to death. (22) You shall have one manner of law for stranger and citizen alike: for I the LORD am your God.

in the case of a small person who killed a large person, or a large person who killed a small person, how do we kill the murderer? If one suggests that in such a case a monetary penalty will be imposed, the Torah stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), teaching that the law shall be equal for all of you, so the punishment must be the same for all murderers. Rather, explain that since the murderer took the life of the victim, the Merciful One states that the court should likewise take the life from him. So too, since the one who caused the injury took the sight from the eye of the injured party, the Merciful One states that the court should likewise take the sight from his eye. Therefore, the Gemara does not accept the derivation of Rabbi Dostai ben Yehuda, in accordance with the objection of the Sages. The Gemara presents another derivation:

It is taught in another baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: “An eye for an eye” (Leviticus 24:20), is referring to monetary restitution. Do you say that this is referring to monetary restitution, or is it only teaching that the one who caused the injury must lose an actual eye? There may be a case where there was a blind person and he blinded another, or there was one with a severed limb and he severed the limb of another, or there was a lame person and he caused another to be lame. In this case, how can I fulfill “an eye for an eye” literally, when he is already lacking the limb that must be injured? If one will suggest that in that case, a monetary penalty will be imposed, that can be refuted: But the Torah stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), which teaches that the law shall be equal for all of you. The Sages object to this derivation and say: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps in a case where it is possible to render the guilty party liable according to the punishment listed in the Torah, it is possible and the court does so; but in a case where it is not possible to enact such a punishment, it is not possible, and we exempt him. As if you do not say so, that punishing one and exempting another is not counter to the principle of: “One manner of law,” then by the same logic, in the case of one who has a wound that will cause him to die within twelve months [tereifa] and who killed a healthy person, what do we do to him? Rather, one must say that in a case where it is possible to render the guilty party liable according to the punishment listed in the Torah, it is possible and the court does so; but in a case where it is not possible to do so, it is not possible, and we exempt him. Therefore, the Gemara does not accept the derivation of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, in accordance with the objection of the Sages. The Gemara presents another derivation:

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the verse states: “A fracture for a fracture, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; as he has given a blemish to a person, so shall it be given unto him” (Leviticus 24:20), and giving can refer only to a payment of money. The Gemara challenges: But if that is so, then when the same verse states: “As he has given [yitten] a blemish to a person,” does this word, “yitten,” also refer to money? The word “yitten” means that he caused an actual injury, even though it employs a term whose literal meaning is give. The Sages say in response: The rabbis of the school of Rabbi Yishmael are interpreting a superfluous verse. Now, it is written: “And if a man gives a blemish to his neighbor; as he has done, so shall it be done to him” (Leviticus 24:19), so why do I need the verse: “So shall it be given unto him” (Leviticus 24:20)? Learn from the repetition that the verse is referring to monetary restitution. The Gemara asks: But if this is so, why do I need the verse: “As he has given [yitten] a blemish to a person” (Leviticus 24:20)? What does the usage of the term “yitten” teach? The Gemara answers: In fact, it does not teach anything, but rather, since the Merciful One needs to write at the end of that verse: “So shall it be given unto him,” where the employment of a term of giving is accurate, the Merciful One also wrote earlier in the verse: “As he has given [yitten] a blemish to a person.” The Gemara presents another derivation:

The school of Rabbi Ḥiyya taught that the verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: “And your eye shall not pity; a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot” (Deuteronomy 19:21). This teaches that the witnesses pay compensation with that which is given from hand to hand. And what type of compensation is that? Monetary restitution. The Gemara challenges: But if that is so, is the phrase: “A foot for a foot” (Deuteronomy 19:21), also like that, i.e., is it teaching that the witnesses pay compensation with an item passed from foot to foot? The Sages say: The rabbis of the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya are interpreting a superfluous phrase in the verse. Now, it is written: “And you shall do to him as he purposed to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19). If it enters your mind to say that the verse means this literally, why do I need the Torah to specify: “A hand for a hand” (Deuteronomy 19:21)? The punishment will be whatever he purported to do to his brother. Learn from the extra phrase that the punishment is monetary restitution. If so, why do I need the phrase: “A foot for a foot” (Deuteronomy 19:21)? Since it is written: “A hand for a hand,” the Merciful One also wrote in the Torah: “A foot for a foot.”

The Gemara presents another derivation: Abaye says that this principle is derived from that which was taught by the school of Ḥizkiyya, as the school of Ḥizkiyya taught that the Torah states: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), and: “A life for a life” (Exodus 21:23), but not an eye and a life for an eye. And if it enters your mind to say that the verse means this literally, there could be times when you find a case where both an eye and a life are taken for an eye, i.e., when the one who caused the damage is so weak that as the court blinds his eye, his soul departs from his body. The Gemara objects: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps we evaluate the physical condition of the guilty party; if he can withstand this punishment, then we do blind his eye; if he cannot withstand this punishment, then we do not do so and he goes unpunished. And if we evaluate him and determine that he can withstand this punishment, and we do so to him and blind his eye, and yet his soul departs his body as a result, if he dies, he will die. Didn’t we learn in a mishna with regard to lashes (Makkot 22b): If one was sentenced to be flogged, and the court evaluated him and determined that he could withstand a certain number of lashes, and he dies at the hand of the officer tasked with administering the lashes, then the officer is exempt, even though the one who was flogged was not sentenced to the death penalty? Therefore, the Gemara does not accept the derivation of Abaye.

The Gemara presents another derivation: Rav Zevid said in the name of Rabba that the verse states: “A wound for a wound” (Exodus 21:25), to teach that one who injures another must pay compensation for pain, even in a case where he pays compensation for damage. And if it enters your mind that the phrase: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), refers to the removal of an actual eye from the one who injured the other, then just as it is so that the injured party has pain from the loss of his eye, the one who caused him injury also has pain when the court removes his eye; why then does the Torah require that he pay compensation for pain as well? The Gemara objects: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps there is a person who is delicate, so he has more pain, and there is a person who is not delicate, so he does not have the same amount of pain. Therefore, even if the court actually removes an eye for an eye, the one who caused the injury might still need to compensate the injured party for pain. What is the practical difference when the Torah states: “A wound for a wound” (Exodus 21:25)? It renders the one who caused the injury liable to give the injured party compensation for the difference between them in pain tolerance. Therefore, the Gemara does not accept the derivation of Rav Zevid.

The Gemara presents another derivation: Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava that concerning one who was injured by another, who must pay for damage, the verse states: “If he rises again, and walks outside upon his staff, then he that struck him shall be absolved; only he shall pay for his loss of livelihood, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed” (Exodus 21:19), which teaches that one who injures another must pay compensation for medical costs even in a case where he pays compensation for damage. And if it enters your mind that the phrase: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), is referring to an actual eye, then just as it is so that the injured party needs healing, the one who caused him the injury also needs healing after the court removes his eye; why, then, does the Torah require that he pay compensation for medical costs as well? The Gemara objects: What is the difficulty? Perhaps there is one whose flesh heals quickly, and there is another whose flesh does not heal quickly. Therefore, even if the court actually removes an eye for an eye, the one who caused the injury might still need to compensate the injured party for medical costs. What is the practical difference when the Torah states: “And shall cause him to be thoroughly healed” (Exodus 21:19)? It renders the one who caused the injury liable to give the injured party compensation for the difference between their respective medical costs.

The Gemara presents another derivation: Rav Ashi said that the fact that one who injures another pays monetary restitution is derived from a verbal analogy of the word “for,” as written with regard to injuries caused to people from the word “for,” as written with regard to an ox that gored another ox. It is written here: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), and it is written there, with regard to a forewarned ox that gored the ox of another: “He shall pay an ox for an ox” (Exodus 21:36). Just as there, the verse does not mean that the owner pays compensation with an actual ox, but rather pays monetary restitution, so too here, one who injures another pays monetary restitution. The Gemara asks: What did you see that led you to derive the halakha from a verbal analogy of the word “for” as stated in the verse with regard to injuries to a person from the word “for” as stated with regard to an ox? Let us learn a verbal analogy of the word “for” as stated in the verse with regard to injuries to a person from the word “for” as stated with regard to a person, as it is written about one who kills another: “You shall give a life for a life” (Exodus 21:23). Just as there, the court punishes the guilty party by taking his actual life, so too here, why not say that the court should take his actual eye? The Sages say in response: The halakha concerning damages is derived from a verse concerning damages, and the halakha concerning damages is not derived from a verse concerning death. The Gemara objects: On the contrary, say that the halakha concerning a person is derived from a verse concerning a person, and the halakha concerning a person is not derived from a verse concerning animals. Rather, Rav Ashi retracted his original statement and said a different derivation: The halakha is derived from a verbal analogy of the word “for” as written with regard to injuries from the word “for” as written with regard to a man who rapes a woman, who must pay monetary compensation. The verse states: “Then the man that lay with her shall give to the girl’s father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall be his wife, for he has afflicted her; he may not send her away all his days” (Deuteronomy 22:29). Based on this verbal analogy, the halakha concerning a person is derived from a verse concerning a person, and the halakha concerning damages is derived from a verse concerning damages.

§ It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: The verse that states: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), is referring to an actual eye. The Gemara asks: Can it enter your mind that the verse is referring to an actual eye? Doesn’t Rabbi Eliezer understand the verse like all these tanna’im, who explained that this verse is referring to monetary payment? Rabba said in response: Rabbi Eliezer means to say that the court does not appraise the injured party as a slave to assess the compensation for the injury. Abaye said to Rabba: Rather, like whom does the court appraise the injured party? If you say that the court appraises him like a freeman, does a freeman have monetary value? Rather, Rav Ashi said: Rabbi Eliezer means to say that the court does not appraise the injured party as if he were going to be sold as a slave, but rather, they appraise the one who caused him damage. The court appraises how much the latter’s value would be reduced were he to sustain the same injury he caused to the injured party, and he pays this amount as indemnity.