The Minor Donor-Sibling Dilemma

And it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 1:10) that this distinction is made based on whether the steward intends to feed the produce to the orphans or store it: Stewards can separate teruma and tithes from the produce of the orphans in their charge in order to feed the produce to them, but not with the intention to put it aside. And stewards may sell the orphans’ possessions for them as follows: Cattle, male and female slaves, houses, fields, and vineyards, in order to feed the orphans, so that they will have something to eat immediately, but not with the intention to put aside the proceeds for future use. And they may also sell produce, wine, oil, and flour for them in order to feed them, but not with the intention to put aside the proceeds for a later date. The baraita continues: And stewards make the following items that are required for the fulfillment of a mitzva for the orphans, from their property: A lulav, a willow branch, a sukka, ritual fringes, and any item used for a mitzva that involves a fixed expense. The Gemara notes that the words: Any item used for a mitzva, serve to include a shofar. And they may purchase a Torah scroll, phylacteries, mezuzot, and any other item used for a mitzva that involves a fixed expense. The Gemara comments that these last words serve to include a Megilla. The baraita continues: But stewards may not undertake to give charity on behalf of orphans, and they may not redeem captives on their behalf with their property. Nor may they do anything with the orphans’ property that does not involve a fixed expense. The Gemara explains that this last phrase serves to include that which is brought to comfort mourners.

Rabba imposed a contribution to a certain charity on the orphans of the house of bar Maryon. Abaye said to him: But didn’t Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda teach: One does not impose a charity obligation on orphans even for the sake of redeeming captives, since they are minors and are not obligated in the mitzvot? Rabba said to him: I did this to elevate them in standing, i.e., so that people should honor them as generous benefactors; not in order that the poor should benefit.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to one who says to another: Blind my eye, or: Cut off my hand, or: Break my leg, and he does so, the latter is liable to pay for the damage, even if the injured party explicitly instructed him to do so on the condition that he will be exempt from payment. But if one instructs another to damage his property on the condition that he will be exempt from payment, he is exempt. Rav Asi bar Ḥama said to Rava: What is different in the first clause and what is different in the latter clause? Rava said to him: In the case of the first clause he is liable, despite the fact that he was instructed to carry out the injury on the condition that he would be exempt, because a person does not forgo compensation for damage to his extremities such as his eyes, hands, and feet, mentioned in the mishna (92a). Consequently, when he told the assailant that he would be exempt, the presumption is that he was not sincere. Rav Asi bar Ḥama said to him: But does a person forgo compensation for his pain when he doesn’t lose a limb? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who said to another: Strike me, or wound me, on the condition that you will be exempt from payment, he is exempt. According to Rava’s reasoning, he should be liable in this case as well, as the presumption should be that he was not sincere. Rava was silent, as he did not have a response. Rava said to him: Have you heard anything with regard to this matter? Rav Asi bar Ḥama said to him that this is what Rav Sheshet said: It is because loss of a limb may result in a family flaw, i.e., it may cause harm to the family name. One who loses a limb not only suffers pain; his family suffers as well. He is not in a position to forgive the assailant for the harm caused to his family, but he may forgo compensation for his own pain. Consequently, if he instructed another merely to injure him, without causing loss of limb, on condition that the assailant will be exempt from payment, the assailant will be exempt. It was stated that the amora’im disagreed concerning the explanation for the ruling of the first clause of the mishna. Rabbi Oshaya says: It is because loss of a limb may result in a family flaw. Rava says: It is because a person does not forgo compensation for damage to his extremities.Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is a yes that, based on other factors, is like a no and is not viewed as giving consent. And conversely, there is a no that, based on other factors, is like a yes, and although one said no it is as though he gave consent. In this case as well, where he said: On condition to be exempt, he was not sincere. The Gemara comments that this is also taught in a baraita. With regard to one who said to another: Strike me, or wound me; and the other asks: Is this on the condition that I will be exempt from payment? And the first one said to him, in the tone of a question: Yes, this is an example of the principle: There is a yes that is like a no. It is as if the victim asked: Even if I give you permission to do it, do you think that I would forgo the compensation? By contrast, if one said: Tear my garment, and the other asks: Is this on the condition that I will be exempt from payment? And he said to him, in the tone of a question: No, this is an example of a no that is like a yes, since he meant to say that if he did not want to exempt him from payment he would not ask him to do it.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And now that the opinion of Rava was conclusively refuted, and the halakha is that despair that is not conscious is not considered despair, if those dates are blown off the tree by the wind, how do we eat them? Perhaps their owner did not despair of their recovery. Rav Ashi said to him: Since there are repugnant creatures and creeping animals that eat the dates after they fall, the owner despairs of their recovery from the outset. Therefore, one who finds the dates may keep them. Rav Aḥa asked: Perhaps the tree belonged to minor orphans who, because they are not capable of relinquishing property, cannot despair of recovering the dates from the outset. Accordingly, what is the justification for eating found dates? Rav Ashi said to him: We do not presume a valley to be land belonging to orphans, and therefore that is not a concern. Rav Aḥa asked: If the presumptive status of the trees was previously established as belonging to orphans, what is the halakha? If the trees are surrounded by fences that prevent repugnant creatures and creeping animals from gaining access, what is the halakha? Rav Ashi said to him: The dates are forbidden in those cases.

Rav Huna said: With regard to a convert who is a minor, one immerses him in a ritual bath with the consent of the court. As a minor lacks the capacity to make halakhic decisions, the court is authorized to make those decisions in his stead. What is Rav Huna coming to teach us? Is he teaching that it is a privilege for the minor to convert, and one may act in a person’s interests even in his absence? We already learned that explicitly in a mishna (Eiruvin 81b): One may act in a person’s interests in his absence, but one may not act against a person’s interests in his absence. Rav Huna’s statement was necessary lest you say: With regard to a gentile, licentiousness is preferable for him, so conversion is contrary to his interests, just as we maintain that with regard to a slave, licentiousness is certainly preferable. Just as a slave has no interest in assuming the restrictions that come with freedom, in that a freed Canaanite slave is a convert to Judaism, a gentile would have the same attitude toward conversion. Therefore, Rav Huna teaches us: That applies only with regard to an adult, who has experienced a taste of prohibition. Therefore, presumably he prefers to remain a slave and indulge in licentiousness. However, with regard to a minor, who did not yet engage in those activities, it is a privilege for him to convert. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna supports Rav Huna’s statement: With regard to a female convert, or a captive woman, or a maidservant, who were ransomed with regard to the captive, or who converted with regard to the convert, or who were freed with regard to the maidservant, when they were less than three years and one day old; what, is it not referring to a case where they immersed the minor converts and the maidservants with the consent of the court? Apparently, a conversion of that sort is valid. The Gemara rejects that proof: No, with what are we dealing here? It is with a convert whose minor sons and daughters converted with him, as they are content with whatever their father does in their regard. However, that does not apply to a child who is converting on his own.

MISHNA:And Rabbi Meir further said: The halakhic authorities may broach dissolution with him from that which is written in the Torah, and they may say to him: Had you known that through your vow you are transgressing the prohibition....... “and your brother should live with you” (Leviticus 25:36), as he, the one prohibited by the vow, is poor and now you are not able to provide him with a livelihood due to your vow, would you have vowed in that case? If he said in reply: Had I known that it is so, that my vow involved all these prohibitions, I would not have vowed; it is dissolved.

GEMARA:Rav Huna bar Rav Ketina said to the Sages: But let the one who stated the vow say with regard to the last claim: All who become poor do not fall upon me; it is not my responsibility to provide for this specific poor person. What is placed upon me to provide for him together with everyone else, I will provide to him when I give money to those collecting for the communal charity fund. They said to him: I say that anyone who falls into poverty and requires assistance does not fall into the hands of the charity collector first.

R' Eliezer from Metz of Righteous memory explains, “they should appoint a charity collector I will give him my portion”. This is permitted like we learnt (the end of the chapter 4) “If the one who vowed to render benefit from him forbidden, and the one for whom benefit is forbidden were traveling together along the road and the one for whom benefit is forbidden does not have anything to eat, the one who from whom benefit is forbidden gives food to one other person as a gift, and it is permitted for that person for whom benefit is forbidden, to eat the food because it no longer belongs to the one from whom benefit is forbidden. Therefore he will not regret it since he's not violating the commandment.

The Talmud answers that he's violating (the mitzvah) because “I say that anyone who falls into poverty does not fall into the hands of the charity collector first” and it is not the responsibility of the charity collector to feed him, rather his relatives are obligated to feed him. First they have the obligation of “and your brother should live with you”, Until the court will analyze that the relatives cannot completely support him, however after they analyze that it's not enough the charity collector is responsible, and this Mishna is referring to someone who vows benefits from a relative therefore he will regret.

We learn from here that the charity collector is not obligated to support a poor man that has rich relatives that are able to support him, even though they give to the Fund.

A poor man who has wealthy relatives does not have to be supported by the Gabbaïm, even though the relatives are contributors to the fund.