The Halakha of...Gardening?

MISHNA: The Gemara continues to discuss an additional halakha based on a biblical allusion. From where is it derived that in a garden bed that is six by six handbreadths, that one may plant five different types of seeds in it? He may do so without violating the prohibition of sowing a mixture of diverse kinds of seeds in the following manner. One sows four types of plants on each of the four sides of the garden bed and one in the middle. There is an allusion to this in the text, as it is stated: “For as the earth brings forth its growth, and as a garden causes its seeds to grow, so will the Lord God cause justice and praise to spring forth before all the nations” (Isaiah 61:11). Its seed, in the singular, is not stated; rather, its seeds, written in the plural. Apparently, it is possible that several seeds may be planted in a small garden.

With regard to the halakha itself, Rav Asi said: The garden bed in the mishna whose area is six by six handbreadths is one whose internal area is six by six handbreadths excluding the area of its boundaries, which must be added to the total area. That was also taught in a baraita: The internal area of a garden bed is six by six handbreadths. The Gemara asks: How much is the size of its boundaries? The Gemara answers, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: The width of the border is like the width of a foot. And Rabbi Zeira said, and some say it was Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa who said: What is the reason for the statement of Rabbi Yehuda? As it is written: “And you water it with your foot like a garden of herbs” (Deuteronomy 11:10), meaning that just as one’s foot is a handbreadth wide, so too, the boundary between garden beds where one walks to water plants is also a handbreadth wide.

MISHNA: In the case of one who takes manure out to the public domain, in order for it to be transported to fertilize a field, he who takes it out from his property takes it out, and immediately, he who takes it to fertilize the field takes it to fertilize the field. They must relocate the manure immediately without allowing it to sit around in the public domain. Similarly, one may not soak clay in the public domain before it is kneaded, and one may not mold bricks in the public domain since this takes a long time and inhibits use of the public domain by others. But one may knead clay in the public domain, as this process does not take long, but not bricks. With regard to one who builds a structure, keeping the building materials in the public domain, he who brings the stones brings them, and immediately, he who builds the structure builds with them, and may not leave them there. And if the stones cause damage before he had a chance to build them into the structure, he must pay for what he damaged. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may even prepare his work thirty days beforehand; he may keep the building materials in the public domain for that duration.

GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 11:8): Rabbi Yehuda says: When it is the time for the manure to be taken out, a person may take his manure out into the public domain and may pile it up for all thirty days, so that it will be trodden on by the feet of people and by the feet of animals, to prepare it for use as fertilizer, since it was on this condition that Joshua bequeathed Eretz Yisrael to the Jewish people. In other words, it is universally accepted that some will relinquish certain rights for the sake of others, and although it may be a nuisance for certain people, this practice is allowed. The Gemara responds: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, since Rabbi Yehuda concedes that although he acted within his rights, if the manure caused damage, the one who placed it there is liable to pay. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bava Kamma 62b): Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to a Hanukkah lamp placed in the public domain that ignited a fire and caused damage that he is exempt, because he acts with permission? What, is the reason he is exempt not that he acted with the permission of the court to use the public domain in this manner, which indicates that one who acts with court permission is exempt from liability for damage? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it means that he has the permission of a mitzva. Since it is a mitzva to place the Hanukkah lamp outside, he is exempt from paying for the damage it caused. The mere right to place the item in the public domain does not exempt the owner from liability. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to all these cases in which the Sages said that it is permitted for people to place obstacles in the public domain, if they caused damage, these people are liable to pay, and Rabbi Yehuda exempts them? Evidently, according to Rabbi Yehuda, if one has the permission of the court to put an item in the public domain, he is exempt from paying damages. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

Abaye said: Rabbi Yehuda and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Shimon all hold that wherever the Sages gave someone permission to perform an action, and in performing this action he causes damage, he is exempt from payment. The Gemara cites the sources for this assertion: It is clear that Rabbi Yehuda is of that opinion based on that which we just said. It is clear that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is of that opinion, as we learned in the mishna: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may even prepare his work thirty days beforehand. It is clear that Rabbi Shimon is of that opinion, as we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 20b): If one was setting up an oven in the upper story, there must be a plaster floor beneath it, which serves as the ceiling of the lower story, at least three handbreadths thick, so that the ceiling below does not burn. And in the case of a stove the plaster floor must be at least one handbreadth thick. And if he causes damage after having taken the necessary precautions, he pays compensation for that which he damaged. Rabbi Shimon says: The Sages said all of these measurements to teach only that if he causes damage he is exempt from paying, as he took all reasonable precautions. §

The Sages taught: Once the stonecutter has delivered the stones to the chiseler, from that point on, the chiseler is liable for any damage caused by them. Once the chiseler has delivered the stones to the donkey driver to transport them, the donkey driver is liable. Once the donkey driver has delivered the stones to a porter to carry them to the building site, the porter is liable. Once the porter has delivered the stones to the builder, the builder is liable. Once the builder has delivered them to the master builder [adrikhal], who places and straightens the stones on the structure, the master builder is liable. And if he placed a stone upon the row [dimos] of stones and the stone fell off and caused damage, then they are all liable to pay. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita, that only the last one, the master builder, is liable, and all of them are exempt? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as the ruling here, in this baraita, is stated with regard to a case of hiring, and therefore only the last one is liable, whereas the ruling there, in that baraita, is stated with regard to a case of contracting, in which they all agreed to perform the work together, and therefore they are all liable to pay. MISHNA: In the case of two gardens that were located one above the other, i.e., a garden on a plateau that borders another garden below, and vegetables grew in-between, out of the wall of soil resulting from the difference in height between the two gardens, Rabbi Meir says: These vegetables belong to the owner of the upper garden. Rabbi Yehuda says: They belong to the owner of the lower one. Rabbi Meir said in explanation of his ruling: If the owner of the upper garden would want to dig and take his dirt and does so, no vegetables would grow here, as that wall made of soil would not exist. The vegetables therefore belong to him. In response, Rabbi Yehuda said: If the owner of the lower garden would want to fill his garden with dirt and does so, thereby raising its level, no vegetables would grow here, as that wall made of soil would not exist. The vegetables therefore belong to him. Rabbi Meir said: Since the two of them can object to each other, as they each have the ability to prevent the vegetable growth, nothing can be decided based on such considerations. Instead, the court considers from where this vegetable lives and derives nourishment, whether from above or from below. Rabbi Shimon said: Any vegetables that the owner of the upper garden can stretch out his hand and take, those vegetables are his, and the rest belong to the owner of the lower garden.

GEMARA: Rava says: With regard to the root of the vegetable growing out of the wall of soil, everyone agrees that it is the property of the owner of the upper garden, since the ground belongs to him. When they disagree, it is with regard to its leaves, which grow above the airspace of the lower garden. Rabbi Meir holds: Cast its leaves after its root, and consider that they too belong to the owner of the upper garden. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: We do not say: Cast its leaves after its root. The Gemara comments: And they follow their line of reasoning, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to a tree belonging to one individual that grew on land owned by another: That which sprouts from the trunk and from the roots, these belong to the owner of the land. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: That which sprouts from the trunk belongs to the owner of the tree, and anything that grows from the roots belongs to the owner of the land. This statement demonstrates that according to Rabbi Yehuda, ownership of the sprouts is not determined exclusively based on the ownership of the roots.

And we also learned a case like this in a baraita (Tosefta, Orla 1:4), with regard to the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla]: In the case of a tree that sprouts from the trunk and from the roots of an old tree, its owner is obligated in orla, since it is considered like a new tree, and the orla years must be counted anew. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it sprouts from the trunk, the owner is exempt, since it is considered like a branch of the old tree, but if it grows from the roots, the owner is obligated.

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Shimon said: Any vegetables that the owner of the upper garden can stretch out his hand and take, those vegetables are his, and the rest belong to the owner of the lower garden. In the school of Rabbi Yannai they say: And this is only so provided that he does not force himself, but simply stretches out his hand in the usual manner.

Rav Anan, and some say it was Rabbi Yirmeya, raised a dilemma: If the owner of the upper garden can reach its leaves, but he cannot reach its roots, or if he can reach its roots but he cannot reach its leaves, what is the halakha? Is the plant considered to be within his reach or not? No answer was found for this question, and the Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

Rabbah b. Bar Hannah also stated that R. Johanan said in the name of R. Judah b. R. El'ai : Come and see that the later generations are not like the former generations. The former generations used to bring their fruits home by way of the kitchen-garden in order to make them liable to the tithe ; whereas the later generations bring their fruits home by way of the roof, or courts, or enclosures in order to exempt them from the tithe. For R. Jannai has said : Produce is not subject to the tithe until it sees the face of the house ; as it is said, "I have put away the hallowed things out of my house" (Deut. xxvi. 13).

[And you find that with our father] Avraham, that he kept the Torah even it had not yet come to the world, as it is stated: "because that Avraham hearkened to my voice, and kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My laws [Torahs]." It elevated him and blessed him in his youth, and gave him posterity and hope in his old age. Regarding his youth, what does it say (Genesis 13:2): "And Avram was very rich in cattle, in silver, and in gold." Regarding his old age, what does it say (Genesis 24:1): "And Avraham was old , well stricken in age; and the Lord had blessed Avraham in all things." Rabbi Hezkiya, Rabbi Cohen in the name of Rav: It is forbidden to reside in a city that has no doctor, and where there is no bathhouse, and where the courthouse does not flog and imprison [criminals]. Rabbi Yosi ben Rabbi Bon: It is also forbidden to reside in a city where there is no vegetable garden. Rabbi Hezkiya, Rabbi Cohen in the name of Rav: In the future, a person will give a judgement and an accounting over everything that his eye saw and he did not eat. Rabbi Elazar paid attention to this teaching and gathered small coins (that did not require change and could be spent immediately), in order to [purchase and] eat every kind [of produce] with them once a year.

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say: Rabbi Meir ate a half-ripe date and threw the peel away. In other words, he was able to extract the important content from the inedible shell. Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “I went down into the garden of nuts, to look at the green plants of the valley” (Song of Songs 6:11)? Why are Torah scholars compared to nuts? To tell you: Just as this nut, despite being soiled with mud and excrement, its content is not made repulsive, as only its shell is soiled; so too a Torah scholar, although he has sinned, his Torah is not made repulsive.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “Your field,” which indicates that the field belongs to you in your portion of Eretz Yisrael? The Gemara answers: That verse serves to exclude the prohibition of diverse kinds of seeds, which does not apply outside of Eretz Yisrael. Planting different types of seeds together is prohibited only in Eretz Yisrael.

§ The Gemara relates: Rav Ḥanan and Rav Anan were once going together on a road outside of Eretz Yisrael and they saw a certain man planting seeds of diverse kinds together. One of them said to the other: Let the Master come and ostracize him, as he is performing a prohibited act. The other said to him: These halakhot are not understood by you.

And furthermore, they also saw a certain man who was planting wheat and barley between grapevines. One of them said to the other: Let the Master come and ostracize him. He again said to him: These halakhot are not clear to you. He explained: Don’t we hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, who says: One who sows diverse kinds is not liable by Torah law until he sows wheat, and barley, and a grape seed with a single hand motion, i.e., by sowing in the vineyard he violates the prohibition of diverse kinds that applies to seeds and to the vineyard simultaneously. Since this man was not planting in that manner, he should not be ostracized.

The Gemara relates: Rav Yosef was mixing diverse seeds and planting them. Abaye said to him: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that mixing diverse kinds is prohibited outside of Eretz Yisrael by rabbinic law? Rav Yosef said to him: This is not difficult, as here, the mishna is referring to diverse kinds in a vineyard, and there, I am planting legally because I am planting only diverse kinds of seeds. The reason for the difference between these two cases is as follows: With regard to planting diverse kinds in a vineyard, which in Eretz Yisrael is prohibited even with regard to deriving benefit, the Sages issued a decree prohibiting this mixture outside of Eretz Yisrael as well. Conversely, with regard to planting diverse kinds of seeds, which in Eretz Yisrael is not prohibited with regard to deriving benefit, the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting them outside of Eretz Yisrael.

Rav Yosef then said: The matter that I said, i.e., that diverse kinds of seeds are entirely permitted outside of Eretz Yisrael, is not so. The proof is that Rav planted the garden around the study hall in rows [mesharei] of different species. What is the reason that he did that rather than plant different species together? Is it not because he was concerned about mixtures of diverse kinds? Abaye said to him: That is not proof. Granted, if he taught us this halakha through his actions,

and he was careful to plant four different species along the four sides of the garden bed and one in the middle, so that there would be space between them, it works out well. This would show that Rav was cautious not to plant diverse kinds together. But here, where Rav actually planted each species in its own bed, he did so due to beautification, i.e., to improve the appearance of the garden in front of the study hall. Alternatively, the reason Rav planted this way is due to the trouble that would be caused to the attendant. When his attendant would be sent to fetch a certain type of vegetable from the garden he would not need to search for it, but would know where the different vegetables were planted. Therefore, this does not prove that Rav was concerned about diverse kinds outside of Eretz Yisrael.

and he was careful to plant four different species along the four sides of the garden bed and one in the middle, so that there would be space between them, it works out well. This would show that Rav was cautious not to plant diverse kinds together. But here, where Rav actually planted each species in its own bed, he did so due to beautification, i.e., to improve the appearance of the garden in front of the study hall. Alternatively, the reason Rav planted this way is due to the trouble that would be caused to the attendant. When his attendant would be sent to fetch a certain type of vegetable from the garden he would not need to search for it, but would know where the different vegetables were planted. Therefore, this does not prove that Rav was concerned about diverse kinds outside of Eretz Yisrael.

The Sages taught in a Tosefta: One may open a canal that passes adjacent to a garden on Shabbat eve at nightfall, so that water will flow into a garden and the garden continuously fills with water all day long on Shabbat. Similarly, one may place incense, perfumed herbs placed on coals to produce a fragrance, on coals beneath the clothes on Shabbat eve and the clothes may be continuously perfumed all day long. And, similarly, one may place sulfur beneath the silver vessels on Shabbat eve at nightfall for the purpose of coloring the vessels, and they may be continuously exposed to sulfur all day long. And one may place an eye salve [kilor] on the eye and a bandage [ispelanit] smeared with cream on a wound on Shabbat eve at nightfall, and the wound may continuously heal all day long on Shabbat. However, one may not place wheat kernels into the water mill unless he does so in a way so that they will be ground while it is still day on Friday and not on Shabbat.

The Gemara recounts: Rav Naḥman bar Pappa had a certain garden. He planted seeds but they did not sprout. He prayed for mercy, and rain came, and they sprouted. He said: This is what is meant by the statement of Rav Asi, that the Holy One, Blessed be He, desires the prayers of the righteous.

GEMARA: The Gemara identifies the plants mentioned by the mishna by their Aramaic names. Ḥazeret is lettuce. Olashin is called hindevi. With regard to tamkha, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: It is called temakhta in Aramaic. As for ḥarḥavina, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: This is the plant that grows around the palm tree. The mishna taught: And with maror. The Gemara explains: This is a plant called merirata.

Bar Kappara teaches: These are the vegetables with which a person can fulfill his obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover: With endives, chervil, ḥarḥallin, field eryngo, and ḥazeret. Rav Yehuda says: Also wild endives, garden endives, and ḥazeret.

The Gemara asks: Why does Rav Yehuda mention garden endives and ḥazeret? These were already taught in the first clause. The Gemara explains that this is what Rav Yehuda is saying: Even wild endives are equivalent to garden endives and ḥazeret and may be used as bitter herbs on Passover. Rabbi Meir says: The plants asvas, and tura, and sweet myrrh [mar yero’ar] can also be used to fulfill this obligation. Rabbi Yosei said to him: Asvas and tura are two names for one plant, and mar is the same plant as yero’ar.

A Sage of the school of Rabbi Samuel teaches: These are the vegetables with which a person can fulfill his obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover: With ḥazeret, endives, chervil, field eryngo, ḥarginnin, and hardofannin. Rabbi Yehuda says: One can also fulfill his obligation with ḥazeret yolin and ḥazeret gallin, as they are similar to the aforementioned vegetables.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Any plant that has white sap when it is cut may be used as bitter herbs. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Anything whose surface is light green may be used as bitter herbs. Aḥerim say: Any bitter herb that has sap and whose surface is light green is fit for this mitzva. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From the statements of all these Sages, we can learn that a bitter green herb has sap and its surface is light green. Rav Huna said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Aḥerim.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: With regard to the vegetables that the Sages said a person can fulfill with them his obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover, they may all be planted in one garden bed. The Gemara concludes: That is to say that the prohibition against planting diverse kinds of seeds does not apply to them? Rav’s statement indicates that all these species are so similar that they may be planted together without violating the prohibition against planting different species of crops in one area of a field.

Rava raised an objection from a mishna: Ḥazeret and ḥazeret gallin; endive and wild endive; leek and wild leek; coriander and wild coriander; mustard and Egyptian mustard; and Egyptian gourd and harmutza, a type of gourd, are not considered a mixture of diverse kinds when planted together. This indicates that ḥazeret and ḥazeret gallin, yes, they may be planted together; however, ḥazeret and endives, no, they may not be planted together.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: With regard to the vegetables that the Sages said a person can fulfill with them his obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover, they may all be planted in one garden bed. The Gemara concludes: That is to say that the prohibition against planting diverse kinds of seeds does not apply to them? Rav’s statement indicates that all these species are so similar that they may be planted together without violating the prohibition against planting different species of crops in one area of a field. Rava raised an objection from a mishna: Ḥazeret and ḥazeret gallin; endive and wild endive; leek and wild leek; coriander and wild coriander; mustard and Egyptian mustard; and Egyptian gourd and harmutza, a type of gourd, are not considered a mixture of diverse kinds when planted together. This indicates that ḥazeret and ḥazeret gallin, yes, they may be planted together; however, ḥazeret and endives, no, they may not be planted together. And lest you say that all these species are taught together, and the mishna is actually saying that any of these species may be planted together, but didn’t Rav himself say that these plants were taught in pairs, i.e., one may plant each plant only with its pair that is listed in the mishna, due to their similarity; however, one may not, e.g., plant lettuce and endive together. It therefore remains unclear what Rav meant when he said that vegetables fit for use as bitter herbs may be planted in a single garden bed. The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the term planted, which Rav said? It means that these plants may be properly planted. In other words, they may be planted together provided that there is an appropriate amount of space between them, so that there is no violation of

The Gemara responds: In the context of the discussion whether or not human dignity overrides honoring God in the sense of fulfilling his mitzvot, Rav Pappa said to Abaye: What is different about the earlier generations, for whom miracles occurred and what is different about us, for whom miracles do not occur? If it is because of Torah study; in the years of Rav Yehuda all of their learning was confined to the order of Nezikin, while we learn all six orders! Moreover, when Rav Yehuda would reach in tractate Okatzin, which discusses the extent to which the stems of various fruits and vegetables are considered an integral part of the produce in terms of becoming ritually impure, the halakha that a woman who pickles a vegetable in a pot, and some say when he would reach the halakha that olives pickled with their leaves are pure, because after pickling, it is no longer possible to lift the fruit by its leaves, they are no longer considered part of the fruit; he would find it difficult to understand. He would say: Those are the disputes between Rav and Shmuel that we see here. And we, in contrast, learn thirteen versions of Okatzin. While, with regard to miracles, after declaring a fast to pray for a drought to end, when Rav Yehuda would remove one of his shoes the rain would immediately fall, whereas we torment ourselves and cry out and no one notices us.

Rav Mesharshiya said: Over this garden daffodil one recites: Who creates fragrant trees, while over a wild daffodil that grows in the field, one recites: Who creates fragrant plants. Rav Sheshet said: Over fragrant violets one recites: Who creates fragrant plants. Mar Zutra said: One who smells a citron [etrog] or a quince recites: Blessed…who gave pleasant fragrance in fruits.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear that which the mishna teaches: And similarly with regard to a garden, in a place where it is customary to build a partition in the middle of a garden jointly owned by two people, and one of them wishes to build such a partition, the court obligates his neighbor to join in building the partition. This indicates that invading one’s privacy by looking at him while he is in his private domain is called damage.

The Gemara answers: A garden is different with regard to the halakha governing invasion of privacy, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Abba, as Rabbi Abba says that Rav Huna says that Rav says: It is prohibited for a person to stand in another’s field and look at his crop while the grain is standing, because he casts an evil eye upon it and thereby causes him damage, and the same is true for a garden. Since the issue in this case is damage resulting from the evil eye, no proof can be brought with regard to the matter of damage caused by sight.

The Gemara objects: But the mishna teaches: And similarly with regard to a garden, which suggests that a garden and a courtyard are governed by the same rationale. The Gemara answers: The term: And similarly, is stated not with regard to the reason for the obligation to construct a wall, but with regard to the halakha concerning non-chiseled and chiseled stones. A partition in a garden is built with the same materials used for the building of a wall in a courtyard, in accordance with regional custom.

The Gemara answers: A garden is different with regard to the halakha governing invasion of privacy, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Abba, as Rabbi Abba says that Rav Huna says that Rav says: It is prohibited for a person to stand in another’s field and look at his crop while the grain is standing, because he casts an evil eye upon it and thereby causes him damage, and the same is true for a garden. Since the issue in this case is damage resulting from the evil eye, no proof can be brought with regard to the matter of damage caused by sight.

Rafram bar Pappa further relates: And every Shabbat eve, in the afternoon, Rav Huna would send a messenger to the marketplace, and he would purchase all the vegetables that were left with the gardeners who sold their crops, and throw them into the river. The Gemara asks: But why did he throw out the vegetables? Let him give them to the poor. The Gemara answers: If he did this, the poor would sometimes rely on the fact that Rav Huna would hand out vegetables, and they would not come to purchase any. This would ruin the gardeners’ livelihood. The Gemara further asks: And let him throw them to the animals. The Gemara answers: He holds that human food may not be fed to animals, as this is a display of contempt for the food.

The Gemara objects: But if Rav Huna could not use them in any way, he should not purchase the vegetables at all. The Gemara answers: If nothing is done, you would have been found to have caused a stumbling block for them in the future. If the vegetable sellers see that some of their produce is left unsold, the next week they will not bring enough for Shabbat. Therefore, Rav Huna made sure that the vegetables were all bought, so that the sellers would continue to bring them.

And Rav Ḥisda further said: A student of a Torah academy who does not have much bread should not eat a vegetable, because it whets the appetite. And Rav Ḥisda said: I neither ate a vegetable in my state of poverty, nor did I eat a vegetable in my state of wealth. In my poverty, I did not eat a vegetable because it whets the appetite. In my wealth, I did not eat a vegetable because I said: Where a vegetable enters, let meat and fish enter instead.

Similarly, the Sages taught in a baraita dealing with types of sustenance: Meat of the spleen is beneficial for the teeth and harmful for the intestines. Leeks, however, are harmful for the teeth and beneficial for the intestines. They also said that all raw vegetables turn one’s face pale. Generally speaking, anything small that has not yet reached its full size is harmful and impedes growth, and any living creature eaten whole, e.g., a fully grown fish, restores the soul. And anything close to the soul restores the soul. Cabbage is for nourishment and beets for healing. Woe unto the house through which the turnip passes, for it is extremely harmful.

Similarly, the Sages taught in a baraita dealing with types of sustenance: Meat of the spleen is beneficial for the teeth and harmful for the intestines. Leeks, however, are harmful for the teeth and beneficial for the intestines. They also said that all raw vegetables turn one’s face pale. Generally speaking, anything small that has not yet reached its full size is harmful and impedes growth, and any living creature eaten whole, e.g., a fully grown fish, restores the soul. And anything close to the soul restores the soul. Cabbage is for nourishment and beets for healing. Woe unto the house through which the turnip passes, for it is extremely harmful.

All raw vegetables turn one’s face pale. Rabbi Yitzḥak said: It refers here to the first meal after bloodletting, when a person should eat more substantial food.

Leeks are harmful for the teeth and beneficial for the intestines. The Gemara asks: What is its remedy? The Gemara responds: One should boil them and swallow them without chewing.

And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Anyone who eats vegetables before four hours of the day, it is forbidden to speak with him. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? The Gemara explains: This is because the smell of vegetables from his mouth bothers others who have not yet eaten. And in general, Rabbi Yitzḥak said: It is forbidden to eat raw vegetables before four hours of the day.

The Gemara relates that Ameimar, Mar Zutra, and Rav Ashi were sitting. They brought raw vegetables before them before four hours of the day. Ameimar and Rav Ashi ate and Mar Zutra did not eat. They said to him: What is your thinking that led you not to eat? Was it because Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Anyone who eats vegetables before four hours of the day, it is forbidden to speak with him because of the smell? Aren’t we eating and you are nevertheless speaking with us?

He said to them: I hold in accordance with the other halakha of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak said simply: It is forbidden to eat raw vegetables before four hours of the day.

Rav Ḥisda taught in the name of Rabbeinu; and the Gemara remarks incidentally: Who is Rabbeinu? Rav. Over boiled vegetables one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground. And our Rabbis who descended from Eretz Yisrael, and again the Gemara explains: And who is the Sage with this title? Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Over boiled vegetables one recites: By whose word all things came to be, since after they are boiled, they are no longer the same as they were before. Expressing his own opinion, Rav Ḥisda said: And I say that there is an intermediate opinion: Any vegetable that, when eaten in its original uncooked state, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, when he boiled it, he recites: By whose word all things came to be, as boiling damages it qualitatively. And any vegetable that when eaten in its original uncooked state, one recites: By whose word all things came to be, because it is not typically eaten raw, when he boiled it, he recites: Who creates fruit of the ground.

The Gemara asks: Granted, any vegetable that, when eaten in its original uncooked state, one recites: By whose word all things came to be, when he boiled it, he recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, as you can find several vegetables, e.g., cabbage, chard, and pumpkin which are virtually inedible raw, and boiling renders it edible. However, under what circumstances can you find a case where any vegetable that when eaten in its original uncooked state, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, when he boiled it, he recites: By whose word all things came to be, as boiling damages the vegetable qualitatively? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: You can find it in the case of garlic and leeks.

§ It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: The verse states: “After you have gathered in from your threshing floor and from your winepress” (Deuteronomy 16:13). This teaches that just as the grain that is brought to the threshing floor and the wine that is brought to the winepress are special in that they grow on the outgoing year’s water, i.e., the moisture in the ground from the previous winter’s rain, and the halakha is that they are tithed in accordance with the outgoing year, so too, anything that grows on the outgoing year’s water is tithed in accordance with the outgoing year. This comes to exclude vegetables, which grow on the incoming year’s water, as their growth cycle is short and they are nurtured by the rain that falls while they are growing. Consequently, they are tithed in accordance with the incoming year.

Rabbi Akiva says: This is the way the verse should be expounded: “After you have gathered in from your threshing floor and from your winepress”; this teaches us that just as the grain that is brought to the threshing floor and the wine that is brought to the winepress are special in that they grow on most water, i.e., rainfall is sufficient and they do not require irrigation, and the halakha is that they are tithed in accordance with the outgoing year, so too, anything that grows on most water is tithed in accordance with the outgoing year. This comes to exclude vegetables, which grow on all water, i.e., they require irrigation as well. Consequently, they are tithed in accordance with the incoming year.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva? Rabbi Abbahu said: There is a practical difference between them with regard to seedless onions and cowpeas, as we learned in a mishna: Seedless onions, which are cultivated for their greens and not for their bulbs or seeds, and the cowpea plant, which was planted to be eaten as a vegetable, from which one withheld water for thirty days before Rosh HaShana, so that their green portions stopped growing and they began to grow for seed, are tithed in accordance with the outgoing year, and they are permitted if the new year is the Sabbatical Year. And if not, they are prohibited if it is the Sabbatical Year, and in ordinary years they are tithed in accordance with the incoming year. Therefore, the halakha depends not on the species of plant but on whether the crop is in fact nurtured by the previous year’s water or the new year’s water, and this mishna is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

coarse bread, made from coarse flour that has not been thoroughly sifted, new beer, and vegetables. This indicates that vegetables are harmful to one’s well-being. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This statement of Rav Huna is referring to garlic and leeks, which are beneficial; that baraita is referring to other vegetables, which are harmful. As it was taught in a baraita: Garlic is a healthy vegetable; leeks are a half-vegetable, meaning they are half as healthful. If radish has been seen, an elixir of life has been seen, as it is very beneficial to the body.

The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a different baraita: If radish has been seen, a lethal drug has been seen? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, in the baraita that deprecates radish, it is referring to its leaves; there, in the baraita that praises radish, it is referring to the roots. Alternatively, here it is referring to the summer, when radish is beneficial; there, it is referring to the winter, when it is harmful.

as you do not clean yourselves with an earthenware shard, and you do not kill lice on your garments, and you do not pull out a vegetable and eat it before you untie the bundle that was tied by the gardener? This implies that all these actions carry with them the danger of witchcraft.

The Gemara explains: There, the mishna teaches us this, that the way an etrog grows is like a vegetable: Just as it is the way of a vegetable to grow by being watered by all water, i.e., in addition to rainwater it requires irrigation, and its tithing is according to when it is harvested, i.e., its tithing is based on when it is collected from the field, so too, it is the way of an etrog to grow by being watered by all water, as it requires more water than rain provides, and its tithing is according to the time when it is harvested. If, for example, a vegetable is collected during a year when poor man’s tithe is given, that tithe is separated from it, even if it formed a bud during the previous year, when second tithe was separated. The same applies to an etrog. Therefore, the mishna specifically uses the term: Way, to allude to this reason.

Another dispute over the appropriate blessing is with regard to the heart of palm [kura], which is a thin membrane covering young palm branches that was often eaten. Rav Yehuda said that one should recite: Who creates fruit of the ground. And Shmuel, Rav Yehuda’s teacher, said that one should recite: By Whose word all things came to be. Rav Yehuda said: Who creates fruit of the ground; it is a fruit. And Shmuel said: By Whose word all things came to be, since it will ultimately harden and it is considered part of the tree, not a fruit. Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Shinnana. It is reasonable to rule in accordance with your opinion, as a radish ultimately hardens if left in the ground; nevertheless, one who eats it while it is soft recites over it: Who creates fruit of the ground. In any case, despite this praise, the Gemara states: That is not so; people plant a radish with the soft radish in mind. However, people do not plant palm trees with the heart of palm in mind and therefore it cannot be considered a fruit. In response to this, the Gemara asks: And whenever people do not plant with that result in mind, one does not recite a blessing over it? What of the caper-bush that people plant with their fruit in mind, and we learned in a mishna that with regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. This indicates that even over leaves and various other parts of the tree that are secondary to the fruit, the blessing is: Who creates fruit of the ground, and not: By Whose word all things came to be

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is still a difference: Caper-bushes, people plant them with their leaves in mind; palm trees, people do not plant them with the heart of palm in mind. Therefore, no proof may be brought from the halakha in the case of the caper-bush to the halakha in the case of the of the palm. The Gemara concludes: Although Shmuel praised Rav Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Incidental to this discussion, the Gemara cites an additional halakha concerning the caper-bush. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A caper-bush during the first three years of its growth [orla] outside of Eretz Yisrael, when its fruits are prohibited by rabbinic and not Torah law, one throws out the berries, the primary fruit, but eats the buds. The Gemara raises the question: Is that to say that the berries are fruit of the caper, and the bud is not fruit? The Gemara raises a contradiction from what we learned in the mishna cited above: With regard to the parts of the caper-bush [nitzpa], over the leaves and young fronds, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and over the berries, and buds he recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Obviously, the buds are also considered the fruit of the caper-bush. The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A caper-bush is tithed from its component parts, its young fronds, berries and buds, as all these are considered its fruit. And Rabbi Akiva says: Only the berries alone are tithed, because it alone is considered fruit. It was in accordance with this opinion, that Rav prohibited only the eating of the berries during the caper-bush’s years of orla. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, why did Rav issue what seemed to be an independent ruling regarding orla? He should have simply said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from which we could have drawn a practical halakhic conclusion regarding orla as well. The Gemara responds: Had Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us by stating the entire halakha, that there is a principle: Anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, but not in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara questions this: If so, then let Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva outside of Eretz Yisrael as anyone who is lenient in a dispute with regard to the halakhot of orla in Eretz Yisrael, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: Had he said that, I would have said: That only applies with regard to the tithing of trees, which even in Eretz Yisrael itself is an obligation by rabbinic law; but with regard to orla, which is prohibited in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, say that we should issue a decree prohibiting orla even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, he teaches us that even with regard to orla, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. On this topic, the Gemara relates: Ravina found Mar bar Rav Ashi throwing away the berries and eating the buds of an orla caper-bush. Ravina said to Mar bar Rav Ashi: What is your opinion, that you are eating the buds? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is lenient, then you should act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who are even more lenient. As we learned in a mishna with regard to the laws of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in the vineyard, as it is included in the prohibition against planting vegetables in a vineyard. Beit Hillel say: A caper-bush is not considered a diverse kind in a vineyard. Nevertheless, these and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla. Before dealing with the problem posed by Ravina to Mar bar Rav Ashi, the Gemara notes an internal contradiction in this mishna. This mishna itself is problematic: You said that Beit Shammai say: A caper-bush is considered a diverse kind in a vineyard; apparently, they hold that it is a type of vegetable bush, and then you taught: These and those, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree that the caper-bush is obligated in the prohibition of orla; apparently, it is a type of tree. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; Beit Shammai are uncertain whether the caper-bush is a vegetable bush or a tree, and here, regarding diverse kinds, they act stringently and here, regarding orla, they act stringently. In any case, according to Beit Shammai the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and we learned the consensus halakha in a mishna: Uncertain orla in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden to eat, and in Syria it is permitted, and we are not concerned about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, the gentile owner of a field may go down into his field and take from the orla fruit, and as long as the Jew does not see him gather it, he may purchase the fruit from the gentile. If so, then outside of Eretz Yisrael, one may act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai who hold that the caper-bush has the status of uncertain orla, and eat even the berries without apprehension. The Gemara answers: The general rule that outside of Eretz Yisrael one acts in accordance with the lenient opinion in a dispute within Eretz Yisrael applies when Rabbi Akiva expresses a more lenient opinion in place of Rabbi Eliezer, and we act in accordance with his opinion. And however, when Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, and is completely disregarded. The Gemara approaches this matter from a different perspective: Let us derive the halakha that buds are included in the prohibition of orla from the fact that the bud serves as protection for the fruit, and the Torah says: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit [et piryo] as orla” (Leviticus 19:23), and et piryo is interpreted to mean that which is secondary to the fruit. What is that? That section of the plant which is protection for the fruit. The buds should be prohibited as orla, since they protect the fruit. Rava said: Where do we say that a section of the plant becomes protection for the fruit? That is specifically when it exists both when the fruit is detached from the tree and when it is still connected to the tree. However, here, it exists when the fruit is connected to the tree, but when it is detached it does not, and since the protection falls off of the fruit when it is picked, it is no longer considered protection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: In accordance with the baraita mentioned above, one does not normally return for a grafted or layered tree. However, the mishna states that one does return for a grafted or layered tree in a case where one layers a tree and grafts it with a vegetable plant. And that ruling is in accordance with this tanna, Rabbi Yehuda ben Gamda, as cited in a baraita. As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Kilayim 1:12): With regard to one who layers a tree and grafts it with a vegetable plant, the tanna’im engaged in a dispute concerning whether this kind of breeding is permitted. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, speaking in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Gamda of the village of Akko, permits one to do so, and the Rabbis prohibit it. Therefore, one would return from the ranks for a tree grafted to a vegetable plant, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Gamda, although he would not return for the vegetable itself.

The Gemara offers another alternative resolution to the contradiction over whether one returns for a grafted tree. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In accordance with whose opinion is this statement, which says that one does not return for a grafted tree? It is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. He explains: Didn’t Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov say there in the baraita cited earlier: The word vineyard is to be understood as it indicates, i.e., that the exemption is only for a grape vineyard? Here too, the word planted is to be understood as it indicates; with regard to one who plants, yes, he does return, but one who grafts or layers a tree does not return.

The Gemara raises a question about the baraita: But let the tanna of the baraita teach: Tithe, in the singular. Why teach tithes in the plural? The Gemara answers: He uses this formulation to include both the animal tithe and the grain tithe. The Gemara asks further: But let him teach: Vegetable, in the singular. Why teach: Vegetables, in the plural? The Gemara answers: He means to include two categories of vegetables, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to a type of vegetable that is usually made into bundles before being sold, the time of tithing is from when it is bundled; and with regard to a type of vegetable that is not usually made into such bundles, the time of tithing is from when one fills a vessel with it.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: If one picked vegetables on the eve of Rosh HaShana before the sun had set, so that they belong to the previous year, and then he returned and he picked more vegetables

after sunset, so that they belong to the new year, one may not set aside teruma and tithe from the one to the other, as one may not set aside teruma and tithe from the new crop for the old nor from the old crop for the new. If it was the second year of the Sabbatical cycle going into the third year, the halakha is: From what he picked in the second year he must set aside first tithe, which he gives to a Levite, and second tithe, which he eats in Jerusalem; from what he picked in the third year, he must set aside first tithe and poor man’s tithe, which he gives to one who is needy.

The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about it, i.e., whether ashes may be used instead of dust for the water of the sota? Come and hear evidence from that which Rav Huna bar Ashi says that Rav says: If there is no dust available for the sota water, the priest brings decomposed vegetable matter, and he consecrates the water with it. This indicates that it is permitted to substitute other substances for dust. The Gemara responds: But that is not so. Decomposed vegetable matter is permitted because it will become dust, but ashes will not become dust.

Why should the brine not combine with the vegetable, considering that it is itself food? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that brine is a beverage, and food and drinks do not combine, it teaches us that any item that prepares food for eating is considered a food

Rav said: When we learned in the mishna that one may plant five kinds of seeds within a garden bed without violating the prohibition of diverse kinds, we learned this with regard to a garden bed in a desolate area not surrounded by other plants. However, if the garden bed is among other garden beds, it is prohibited to plant that many species there because seeds from the different beds will intermingle. The Gemara asks: If the mishna is dealing with a solitary garden bed, isn’t there space in the corners, where more species of seeds could be planted without encountering the prohibition of diverse seeds? The school of Rav taught in the name of Rav: Rav’s statement is referring to a case where one fills the corners of the flowerbed with the five species of seeds, leaving no room in the corners for other varieties. The Gemara asks: And let him plant on the outside and not fill up the inside, to increase the different seed types instead of filling up the corners. Rather, Rav’s reasoning must be: It is a decree lest one will fill the corners after having first planted the garden bed, and thereby violate the prohibition of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: And why should that matter, the legal status of the garden bed should merely be like a triangular [rosh tor] plot of vegetables. Didn’t we learn in a mishna: If a triangular plot of vegetables was protruding into another field, it is permitted; there, it is not considered a prohibited mixture of diverse kinds, because the end of the field is distinguishable. Based on the shapes of the two fields where they intersect, the demarcation between them is clear. And the Gemara answers: There is no leniency with regard to a triangular plot in a garden bed. This allowance with regard to a triangular section of one field jutting into another field applies only to a large field where the triangular shape can clearly be attributed to a different field, but in a small garden bed where the seeds are adjacent to one another, it is impossible to distinguish between the seeds. And Shmuel said: When we learned in the mishna that one may plant five kinds of seeds within a garden bed without violating the prohibition of diverse kinds, we learned this even with regard to a garden bed among garden beds, not only in a solitary bed. The Gemara asks: Don’t the seeds become intermingled with one another? The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where one inclines one row to here, in one direction, and one row to here, in a different direction (Me’iri). In that way they do not appear intermingled.

Ulla said: They raise a dilemma in the West, Eretz Yisrael: What is the halakha if one opened a single furrow across its entirety? Is it considered demarcation between the garden beds if one dug a furrow between two garden beds (ge’onim, Tosafot)? Rav Sheshet said: The intermingling of these garden beds comes and nullifies the row. The furrow is not considered to be a demarcation between the beds. Rav Asi said: Its intermingling does not disqualify the row. Ravina raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Ashi from a mishna: One who plants two rows of cucumbers and two rows of gourds and two rows of Egyptian beans, it is permitted because each of the species is distinct. However, if he plants one row of cucumbers and one row of gourds and one row of Egyptian beans, it is prohibited because in single rows there is no clear demarcation between the species. This indicates that a furrow between different species of seeds does not prevent intermingling between them. Rav Ashi replied: The case in that mishna is an exception. Here, it is different because there are branches that grow out from these species which become entangled with each other, nullifying the furrow between them. Other vegetables, whose branches do not become entangled, may be planted with a single furrow between them. Rav Kahana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who wishes to fill his entire garden with vegetables and does not want to distance the rows of seeds from one another may make a garden bed that is six by six handbreadths and make five circles inside it (ge’onim, Rambam). He plants different species in the different circles and fills its corners with whatever additional species that he wants. The Gemara asks: Aren’t there seeds between the circles, which intermingle with the species that are in the circles? The school of Rabbi Yannai say in response to this: This is referring to a case where one leaves the space in between them barren and does not plant there. Rav Ashi said: He may fill the entire bed with seeds, and demarcate between the different types of seeds in the following manner. If the circles were planted lengthwise, he plants the seeds in between widthwise; and if the circles were planted widthwise, he plants the seeds in between lengthwise. Ravina raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Ashi: We learned that the work space of a vegetable of one species, when planted with a vegetable of a different species, is six handbreadths. And one views them as a square board. All of the halakhot of planting various species were stated with regard to a square-shaped garden bed. By inference: When it is like a square board, it is permitted; and when that is not the case, it is prohibited. Planting different species in horizontal and vertical rows without a space between the species is ineffective, even with circles. Rav Ashi replied: When the baraita says a square board, it does not mean that the only way to demarcate between different species is when the rows are in that configuration. Rather, it is to introduce a different leniency. The baraita came to permit a triangular plot that protrudes from it into another field. This means that a triangular protrusion into another field is considered a conspicuous demarcation only if the bed was square; in that case, no additional measures are necessary.

As it is taught in a mishna (Nedarim 54a): One who takes a vow that vegetables are forbidden to him is permitted to eat gourds, as people do not typically consider gourds a type of vegetable, but Rabbi Akiva deems it prohibited for him to eat gourds. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: But it is a common occurrence that a person says to his agent: Purchase vegetables for us, and the agent, after failing to find vegetables, returns and says: I found only gourds. This indicates that gourds are not considered vegetables. Rabbi Akiva said to them: The matter is so, and that proves that my opinion is correct. Does the agent return and say: I found only legumes? Rather, it is evident that gourds are included in the category of vegetables, although they differ from other vegetables, and therefore, the agent explains that he found only gourds, and asks whether he should purchase them. But legumes are not included in the category of vegetables, and that is why an agent would not even ask about them.

Rav Ḥisda said: Melon juice, which is beneficial for the intestines, may be strained and drunk on Shabbat (ge’onim). The juice of pipuim, which are a type of vegetable (Rashba), may not be drunk on Shabbat. The Gemara relates: Ze’iri’s wife made melon juice for Ḥiyya bar Ashi and he did not consume it. She said to him: I made it for your Rabbi, Ze’iri, and he ate it, and you do not eat it? The Gemara explains: Ze’iri followed his own reasoning in permitting this drink, as Ze’iri said: One may place clear wine and clear water into a strainer used to strain dregs from wine on Shabbat without concern. Apparently, since the wine and water are drunk even with what little dregs may remain, one is doing nothing to improve them. Here, too, since melon juice is consumed this way, without being strained and for non-medical purposes, one is doing nothing and it is permitted.

The Gemara cites a similar dispute. It is taught in a baraita that Naḥum the Mede says: The dill plant is subject to tithes, whether it is used as a seed, or a vegetable, or a pod. The Sages said to him: It would be best if this matter were lost and not stated, as it is not the halakha. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there Rabbi Eliezer, who holds in accordance with his opinion? As we learned in a mishna (Ma’asrot 4:5) that Rabbi Eliezer says: The dill plant is subject to tithes whether it is used as a seed, or a vegetable, or a pod. The Gemara answers: There, Rabbi Eliezer is referring to the garden variety of dill, which is of such a high quality that its seeds, vegetable, and pods are eaten. By contrast, in the case of wild dill, only its seeds and vegetable are eaten, not the pods.

Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, strongly objects to this claim: And is there no example of a halakha in which tithes are treated more stringently than Shabbat? And is there not the halakha of their granary for tithes, as we learned in a mishna (Ma’asrot 1:5): What is the equivalent of their granary, i.e., the point at which the processing of various vegetable is completed so that they become obligated in tithes? With regard to cucumbers and gourds, they become obligated from when one trims the thin hairs that cover them [misheyefaksu], and for those he did not trim, from when he assembles them in a pile. And we also learned in a mishna (Ma’asrot 1:6), with regard to onions, that it is from when one assembles them in a pile. Whereas with regard to Shabbat, one who assembles produce in a pile is exempt, as this is not a prohibited labor on Shabbat.

One who vows that vinegar is forbidden to him is permitted to partake of vinegar of late grapes, as vinegar is typically made from wine. One who vows that leeks are forbidden to him is permitted to eat kaflutot, a type of leek. One who vows that vegetables are forbidden to him is permitted to eat wild field vegetables, as this type of vegetable has a modifier and is not referred to by the unspecified term vegetable.

The baraita continues: With regard to one who vows that vegetables are forbidden to him, if he takes the vow during the first six years of the seven-year Sabbatical cycle, he is prohibited from eating garden vegetables and permitted to eat field vegetables. But if he takes the vow during the Sabbatical Year, he is prohibited from eating field vegetables, which are commonly eaten in the Sabbatical Year, and he is permitted to eat garden vegetables, which are rarely consumed during that period, as it is prohibited to work the land. Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel:

They taught that if he takes the vow in the Sabbatical Year he is permitted to eat garden vegetables only if he is in a place where people do not bring vegetables from outside of Eretz Yisrael to Eretz Yisrael. However, in a place where people bring vegetables from outside of Eretz Yisrael, where the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year do not apply, to Eretz Yisrael, he is prohibited from eating garden vegetables as well, as they are widely available, and therefore included in the unspecified word vegetable.

The Gemara comments that this distinction is like a dispute between tanna’im cited in a baraita: One may not bring vegetables from outside of Eretz Yisrael to Eretz Yisrael. Rabbi Ḥananya ben Gamliel says: One may bring vegetables from outside of Eretz Yisrael to Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of the one who said that one may not bring vegetables from outside of Eretz Yisrael? Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is because a clod of earth might be brought with the vegetables to Eretz Yisrael. Earth from outside of Eretz Yisrael is ritually impure, and bringing it to Eretz Yisrael would spread ritual impurity in the land.

MISHNA: One who vows that cabbage is forbidden to him is prohibited from eating ispargus, as that is a type of cabbage. However, one who vows that ispargus is forbidden to him is permitted to eat cabbage. One who vows that pounded beans are forbidden to him is prohibited from eating pounded bean stew [mikpa]. However, Rabbi Yosei rules that he is permitted to eat it.

One who vows that pounded beans are forbidden to him is prohibited from eating pounded bean stew. However, Rabbi Yosei rules that he is permitted to eat it. One who vows that pounded bean stew is forbidden to him is permitted to eat pounded beans according to all opinions. One who vows that stew is forbidden to him is prohibited from eating the garlic of the stew. However, Rabbi Yosei rules that he is permitted to eat the garlic. One who vows that garlic is forbidden to him is permitted to eat stew.

One who vows that lentils are forbidden to him is prohibited from eating ashishim, a dish made from lentils. However, Rabbi Yosei permits it. It is agreed by all opinions that one who vows that ashishim is forbidden to him is permitted to eat lentils.

If one says: Ḥitta, wheat in singular form, or ḥittim, wheat in plural form, are konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste them, he is prohibited from eating wheat, whether as flour or bread. If one says: Pounded bean or pounded beans are konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste them, he is prohibited from eating them, whether raw or cooked. Rabbi Yehuda says that if one says: Pounded bean or ḥitta is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste them, he is permitted to chew them raw, as that is not the normal way to eat them, and therefore was not included in the intention of the vow.

And we also learned a case like this in a baraita (Tosefta, Orla 1:4), with regard to the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla]: In the case of a tree that sprouts from the trunk and from the roots of an old tree, its owner is obligated in orla, since it is considered like a new tree, and the orla years must be counted anew. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it sprouts from the trunk, the owner is exempt, since it is considered like a branch of the old tree, but if it grows from the roots, the owner is obligated.

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Shimon said: Any vegetables that the owner of the upper garden can stretch out his hand and take, those vegetables are his, and the rest belong to the owner of the lower garden. In the school of Rabbi Yannai they say: And this is only so provided that he does not force himself, but simply stretches out his hand in the usual manner.

Rav Anan, and some say it was Rabbi Yirmeya, raised a dilemma: If the owner of the upper garden can reach its leaves, but he cannot reach its roots, or if he can reach its roots but he cannot reach its leaves, what is the halakha? Is the plant considered to be within his reach or not? No answer was found for this question, and the Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

They may besprinkle his white field but may not sow it; they may sow for him a strip [of field] for a crop of flax when his turn for watering rights comes, according to R. Eliezer; but the Sages said: If he had not already sown it with flax, he should sow it with another kind [of crops], and if he does not sow it that week, he can sow it the following week.

If the animal fell into a garden and derives benefit from produce there, its owner pays for the benefit that it derives and not for other damage caused. If the animal descended into the garden in its usual manner and caused damage there, its owner pays for what it damaged. How does the court appraise the value of the damage when the owner pays for what it damaged? The court appraises a large piece of land with an area required for sowing one se’a of seed [beit se’a] in that field, including the garden bed in which the damage took place. This appraisal includes how much it was worth before the animal damaged it and how much is it worth now, and the owner must pay the difference. The court appraises not only the garden bed that was eaten or trampled, rather the depreciation in value of the bed as part of the surrounding area. This results in a smaller payment, as the damage appears less significant in the context of a larger area.

Rabbi Shimon says: This principle of appraisal applies only in a case where the animal ate unripe produce; but if it ate ripe produce, the owner pays the value of the ripe produce. Therefore, if it ate one se’a of produce, he pays for one se’a, and if it ate two se’a, he pays for two se’a.

One who sees a rooster in a dream should anticipate a male child. One who sees multiple roosters should expect male children. One who sees a hen [tarnegolet] should anticipate a beautiful garden and reason to rejoice [tarbitza na’a vegila], as tarnegolet is interpreted as an acronym for tarbitza na’a vegila. One who sees eggs in a dream, it is a sign that his request is pending, as egg in Aramaic is beya, which is similar to the term for request. If one saw that the eggs broke, it is a sign that his request has already been granted, as that which was hidden inside the shell was revealed. The same is true of nuts, and the same is true of cucumbers, and the same is true of all glass vessels, and the same is true of anything similarly fragile that broke in his dream, it is a sign that his request was granted.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The entire world drinks from the runoff of the Garden of Eden, as it is stated: “And a river went out of Eden to water the garden” (Genesis 2:10). It was taught in a baraita: From the runoff of a beit kor, a field in which a kor of seed can be planted, which is approximately seventy-five thousand square cubits, a field in which a half-se’a [tarkav], of seed can be sown, i.e. one-sixtieth the size of a beit kor, can be watered. If the runoff from a beit kor is sufficient for a field one-sixtieth its size, it can be inferred that the rest of the world is one-sixtieth the size of the Garden of Eden.

Guardians of gardens and orchards are exempt from sukka both during the day and at night. The Gemara asks: And let them establish a sukka there in the garden and reside there. Why are they exempt from the mitzva of sukka? Abaye said: The reason for the exemption is the verse: “In sukkot shall you reside” (Leviticus 23:42), which the Sages interpreted to mean: Reside as you dwell in your permanent home. Since preparing a sukka that is a fully equipped dwelling in the orchard far from his house would involve considerable exertion, the mitzva does not apply to him.

MISHNA: One who carries out a merchant’s basket, even if there are many types of spices and jewelry in it, is obligated to bring only one sin-offering, because he performed only one act of carrying out. The measure that determines liability for carrying out garden seeds on Shabbat is less than a fig-bulk. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: The measure for liability is five seeds.

The measure that determines liability for carrying out cucumber seeds is two seeds because they are large and conspicuous. The measure that determines liability for carrying out squash seeds is two seeds. The measure that determines liability for carrying out seeds of Egyptian beans is two. The measure that determines liability for carrying out a live kosher locust is any amount. For carrying out a dead kosher locust, which is edible, it is the same as any other food, a fig-bulk. The measure that determines liability for carrying out the locust called tzipporet keramim, whether dead or alive, is any amount; this is because one stores them for medicinal purposes or as a talisman, which renders even a small quantity significant. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who carries out a live non-kosher locust is liable for carrying out any amount, because people store locusts for a child who wants to play with it.

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna the measure that determines liability for carrying out garden seeds on Shabbat. And the Gemara raised a contradiction from what we learned: The measure that determines liability for carrying out compost and fine sand on Shabbat is equivalent to that which is used to fertilize a cabbage stalk; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say: Equivalent to that which is used to fertilize a single leek. Even a single plant is a significant amount. Rav Pappa said: This smaller measure applies to a case where the seed was already planted and growing. In that case, one carries out manure to fertilize one plant. That larger measure applies to a case where the seed was not yet planted, because a person does not go to the trouble to carry out a single seed for planting.

With regard to what the mishna said about the measure for carrying out cucumber and squash seeds, the Sages taught: One who carries out date pits on Shabbat, if he did so in order to plant, he is liable for carrying out two pits. If he did so in order for the animals to eat, he is liable for carrying out enough to fill a pig’s mouth. And how much is enough to fill a pig’s mouth? One date pit. If he did so in order to burn the pits, the measure that determines liability is equivalent to that which is used to cook an easily cooked egg. If he carried them out in order to use them to count, the measure for liability is two pits. Aḥerim say the measure for liability is five pits. A person is capable of keeping track of up to five items without help. The Sages taught: One who carries out two hairs from a horse’s tail or from a cow’s tail on Shabbat is liable, since people store them to use in traps. The measure that determines liability for carrying out stiff hair of a pig is one hair. It is significant because it is used to sew shoes. The measure that determines liability for carrying out palm fronds is two fronds, but the measure for palm vines, which are peeled off the frond and are thinner, is one vine.

MISHNA: The court does not divide a courtyard at the request of one of the joint owners unless there will be in it four by four cubits for this one and four by four cubits for that one, i.e., this minimum area for each of the joint owners. And the court does not divide a jointly owned field unless there is space in it to plant nine kav of seed for this one and nine kav of seed for that one. Rabbi Yehuda says: The court does not divide a field unless there is space in it to plant nine half-kav of seed for this one and nine half-kav of seed for that one. And the court does not divide a jointly owned garden unless there is space in it to plant a half-kav of seed for this one and a half-kav of seed for that one. Rabbi Akiva says that half that amount is sufficient, i.e., the area required for sowing a quarter-kav of seed [beit rova].

MISHNA: With regard to one who sells produce to another that is sometimes purchased for consumption and sometimes for planting, and the buyer planted it and it did not sprout, and even if he had sold flaxseeds, which are only occasionally eaten, the seller does not bear financial responsibility for them, i.e., he is not required to compensate the buyer. Since the buyer did not specify that he purchased the produce in order to plant it, the seller can claim that he assumed the buyer intended to eat it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If he had sold seeds for garden plants, which are not eaten at all, then the seller bears financial responsibility for them, as they were certainly purchased for planting.

This is like the practice of Rav Daniel bar Ketina, who had a certain garden. Every day he would go and inspect it, to see what it needed. He would say: This bed requires water and this bed does not require water, and rain would come and water everywhere that required water, but nowhere else.

Antoninus also said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Important Romans are upsetting me; what can I do about them? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi brought him to his garden, and every day he uprooted a radish from the garden bed before him. Antoninus said to himself: Learn from it that this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying to me: You should kill them one by one, and do not incite all of them at once.

The Gemara cites an episode from the Tosefta. The Sages taught: The son of a man named Bohayan designated for the poor the produce in the corner in a garden of vegetables, and his father Bohayan found the poor laden with vegetables and standing at the opening of the garden on their way out. He said to them: My sons, cast the vegetables that you have gathered from upon yourselves and I will give you twice the amount in tithed produce, and you will be no worse off. Not because I begrudge you what you have taken. Rather, it is because the Sages say: One does not designate for the poor the produce in the corner in a garden of vegetables. Therefore, the vegetables that you took require tithing.

The Gemara cites a baraita which discusses purchasing items from watchmen: The Sages taught (Tosefta 11:8): With regard to produce watchmen, one may purchase produce from them when they are sitting and selling the produce, and the baskets are before them and the scales [veturtanei] are before them, as in these circumstances it is reasonable to assume that they are not selling stolen merchandise. But in all cases where they said to the buyer: Conceal your purchase, it is prohibited to purchase from them, as there is good reason to suspect that the merchandise is stolen. The baraita adds: One may purchase from a watchman from the entrance of the garden, but not from the back of the garden, because if the produce is being sold inconspicuously, there is a concern that it might have been stolen.

he Gemara further relates: There were two brothers who divided their father’s estate between them. One received a hall [aspelida] in his share and one received a garden. The one who received the garden went and built a wall in front of the opening of the hall. His brother said to him: You are blocking the light with your wall and darkening my house. The one who received the garden said to him: I am building on my property. Rav Ḥama said: By right he said that to him, as it is permitted for him to build there. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In what way is this different from that which is taught in a baraita: If two brothers divided their father’s estate between them, one of them taking a vineyard and the other one taking a grain field, the owner of the vineyard has the right to an area four cubits wide in the grain field for the purpose of working the vineyard, since it was on that condition that they divided the estate. Why in this case does the owner of the hall not have the right to make use of the light coming in from the garden? Rav Ashi said to him: There, the reason is that they made an assessment with each other with regard to the value of the fields, arranging for compensation if one received more than the other, and they took the work area into account. Ravina asked: But what did they do here? Did they not make an assessment with each other? Are we dealing with fools, that this one took the valuable hall and the other one took the much less valuable garden without making an assessment with each other? Rav Ashi said to him: Although they assessed with each other the value of the bricks, the beams, and the boards, they did not assess with each other the value of the airspace. With regard to that, each one retained full rights to his respective airspace. The Gemara says: And let the one who received the hall say to the other: Initially, you gave me a well-lit hall; now you are making it into a small dark room [idrona]. Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: He gave him only a place that is called a hall by name, that is, a place that is called a hall even though it is no longer used that way. Rav Ashi continues: Isn’t it taught in a baraita: In the case of one who says to another: I am selling you a beit kor of dirt, it becomes his even if it is only a letekh, i.e., a half-kor, and the sale is not void, because he sold him only a place that is called a beit kor by name. The Gemara comments: And this ruling applies only as long as the land he is selling him is actually called a beit kor. Similarly, if he says to him: I am selling you an orchard, it becomes his even if it lacks pomegranates, because he sold him only a place that is called an orchard by name. The Gemara comments: And this applies only as long as the land he is selling is actually called an orchard. And similarly, if he says to him: I am selling you a vineyard, it becomes his even if it lacks grapevines, because he sold him only a place that is called a vineyard by name. The Gemara comments: And this applies only as long as the land he is selling is actually called a vineyard. The Gemara rejects this argument: Are these cases comparable? There, the seller can say to the buyer: I sold you only a place that is called that by name; here, the one who received the hall can say to his brother: I took this portion as my share on condition that I would live there the way our fathers lived there, and that you would not change that by blocking the light entering through the windows. With regard to Rav Ḥama’s ruling that it is permitted for the brother who received the garden to build a wall in front of the hall, they said to him, i.e., Mar Yenuka and Mar Kashisha, sons of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: The Sages of Neharde’a follow their usual line of reasoning, as Rav Ḥama, who was from Neharde’a, issued his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who was also from that city. As Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: In the case of brothers who divided their father’s estate, they do not have a right-of-way against each other. Although the father would traverse the outer field from the inner field to access the public domain, the brother who received the inner field as an inheritance does not have the right to traverse his brother’s outer field. Shmuel continues: Nor do they have the right of windows against each other, i.e., the right to prevent the other from building a wall facing his windows; nor do they have the right of ladders against each other, i.e., the right to set up a ladder in the other’s property in order to get to his own; nor do they have the right of a water channel against each other, i.e., the right to pass a water channel through the other’s property. And be careful with these, since they are established halakhot. Rava says: The brothers do have all of the aforementioned rights. Rav Ḥama agrees with Shmuel’s opinion, that each brother can do as he pleases on his own property without the other one preventing him from doing so.

in a large building with many residences, the renter may make use of the building’s projections and of the cavities in its external walls up to a distance of four cubits from his room, and he may make use of the thickness of the wall in a place where it is customary to do so. But as for making use of the building’s front garden [betarbatz], he may not do so. And Rav Naḥman himself said: He may make use of even the building’s front garden. But he may not use the yard that is at the back of the house. And Rava said: He may use even the yard that is at the back of the house.

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: One may not separate teruma from the detached for the attached, and if he separated teruma, his teruma is not teruma. How so? If he said: The detached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the attached produce of this garden bed, or: The attached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the detached produce of this garden bed, he has not said anything of consequence, as the obligation to separate teruma applies only to detached produce. But if he said that the attached produce will be teruma when they will be detached, and they become detached, his statement is valid, as he has the power to detach them.

Moreover, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov said that even if one said: The detached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the attached produce of this garden bed, or: The attached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the detached produce of this garden bed when they, i.e., the attached produce, will reach one-third of their growth and are detached, although at the time they had yet to ripen which means that the obligations of terumot and tithes do not apply to them, when they will reach one-third of their growth and are detached, his statement is upheld.

Rabba says: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says this ruling only with regard to fodder, produce that has grown stalks even if it is not yet ripe. But he did not refer to produce that is still completely soft [agam]. Rav Yosef says: He even referred to soft produce. In relation to this dispute, the Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this word agam is a term of growth [butzlana]? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Elazar said that this is as the verse states: “Is it to bow down his head as a bulrush [ke’agmon]” (Isaiah 58:5), i.e., like a soft, drooping plant.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain garden from which Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, a priest, would take the first tithe, in accordance with his opinion that priests are also entitled to this tithe. Rabbi Akiva went, closed up the garden, and changed its entrance so that it would be facing toward the cemetery, to prevent Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya from entering the garden. Rabbi Elazar said in the form of a lighthearted exaggeration: Akiva, a former shepherd, comes with his satchel, but I have to live; from where will I receive my livelihood if I cannot claim the first tithe? Rabbi Elazar was actually a very wealthy man and did not need the produce from this garden. However, his point was that Rabbi Akiva acted in order to stop him from receiving something that he felt was rightfully his.

Rav and Shmuel continue: When they disagree it is with regard to the entrance through which one enters from the house to the garden, i.e., the entrance of the gatehouse to the garden. One Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that the small room into which the gatehouse opens is the main area, and therefore the gatehouse, which is used for entering the small room, is considered like a regular gatehouse to a house, and all its entrances require a mezuza. And one Sage, the Rabbis, hold that the garden is the main area, and therefore this entrance does not require a mezuza.

Conversely, Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: With regard to the entrance through which one enters from the house to the garden, i.e., the entrance between the gatehouse and the garden, everyone agrees that one is exempt from placing a mezuza. What is the reason? It is the entrance to the garden, and the garden does not require a mezuza. When they disagree it is with regard to the entrance from the garden to the house, i.e., the entrance between the gatehouse and the small room. One Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that it is the way of entering the house, and the house requires a mezuza, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that the entire

area is made for the purpose of reaching the garden, not for entering the house, and therefore even with regard to the entrance between the gatehouse and small room, one is exempt from placing a mezuza at the entrance of the small room.

The Gemara relates that Abaye and Rava would act in accordance with the explanation of Rabba and Rav Yosef, i.e., they would not place a mezuza on the two entrances of a gatehouse, neither to the garden nor to the small room, in accordance with the ruling of the Rabbis. And Rav Ashi would act in accordance with the explanation of Rav and Shmuel, stringently, i.e., following the ruling of Rabbi Yosei that both entrances require a mezuza. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the explanation of Rav and Shmuel, stringently.

MISHNA: And likewise, in the case of an olive press that is built inside a cave in a rock, and one garden, belonging to another person, was planted on top of it, and the roof of the olive press broke, which caused the garden to collapse inward, in such a case, the owner of the garden may descend and sow below until the other one constructs for his olive press sturdy arches to support the roof, so that the owner of the garden can once again sow above him.

In the case of one whose wall was adjacent to another’s garden, and the wall fell, and the owner of the garden said to him: Clear away your stones, and the owner of the stones said to him:

They are yours, as I hereby declare them ownerless, and you can take them for yourself; the court does not listen to him, since he cannot force the other to acquire the stones. If after the owner of the garden voluntarily accepted ownership of the stones upon himself, the owner of the wall said to him: Here you are, take your expenditures for the removal of the stones, and I will take the stones that are mine; the court does not listen to him, as they had already been acquired by the owner of the garden.

Rav says: They taught that one must leave a space of four cubits between his wall and that of his neighbor only if he builds it alongside the wall of his neighbor’s garden, where people do not usually walk due to the seeds. But with regard to the wall of a courtyard, where people walk, if he comes to place his wall close by, he may place it close by. By contrast, Rabbi Oshaya says: With regard to both the wall of a garden and the wall of a courtyard, if one comes to place his wall close by, he may not place his wall close by.

Rav Sheisha said to Rav Pappa: But here too, the owner of the field can say: What loss have I caused you? I have caused you to lose a handful of hay. Take a handful of hay and go. Rav Pappa said to him: I claim that I grew garden saffron there. He claimed that he lost land that he could have used for the cultivation of expensive produce, not only hay. Rav Sheisha said to him: Even so, you admit that you wanted the land for other plantings, not to plant palm trees, and you have thereby revealed your intention that you acted so as to take the produce and leave. Take your garden saffron and leave, as you have rights only to the value of wood alone. Since you did not mean to grow these trees, you are entitled only to the price you could have received for the palm trees had you had uprooted them and sold them as wood during the time you cultivated the field.

The Gemara relates another incident: Rav Beivai bar Abaye received land to cultivate and he surrounded it with a fence made of earth. In the meantime, trees sprouted in it. When he left the field he said to the owners: Give me my value of the enhancement of the trees that sprouted. Rav Pappi said: Is it because you come from unfortunate people that you say unfortunate and unsound words? Abaye’s family came from the family of Eli, whose descendants were sentenced to die at a young age. Rav Pappi explains: Even Rav Pappa said only that he is entitled to the value of the enhancement of the palm trees when he has suffered a loss, as they take up part of the field. Here, by contrast, what loss do you have? As the trees sprouted in a place that would have been left unplanted, you have not lost anything and you are not entitled to compensation.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection: And is it permitted to purchase produce from an ownerless field worth only the value of three meals and no more? He raised a contradiction from a mishna (Shevi’it 9:1): Rue and sorrel, two types of herbs, and vegetables such as asparagus, purslane, coriander that is found in the mountains, water parsley of the rivers, and garden-eruca are all exempt from the requirement of tithes in all years, and they may be purchased from any person during the Sabbatical Year because there is no plant of their species that is safeguarded. These plants are not cultivated but grow wild, rendering them ownerless. Apparently, these plants that grow wild may be purchased in any quantity, even from an am ha’aretz, with no three-meal limit.

The Gemara continues. Rav Sheshet raised the objection, and he also resolved it: The Sages taught this halakha in the mishna with regard to food in the amount sufficient for his sustenance [man]. These plants that the mishna excludes from the prohibition against purchase from an am ha’aretz are still subject to the three-meal limit. And likewise, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Sages taught this halakha in the amount sufficient for his sustenance [man]. From where may it be inferred that man is a term meaning sustenance? It is as it is written: “And the king appointed [vayman] for them a daily portion of the king’s food” (Daniel 1:5).

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, if one’s animal ate from a rich garden bed, it is understandable that he must pay the injured party the value of a rich garden bed. But if it ate from a poor garden bed, is it reasonable that he pays the value of a rich garden bed? While this is the straightforward meaning of his statement, it is untenable, as he would be paying more than the value of the damage he caused.

Rav Idi bar Avin said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the animal that caused the damage ate from one garden bed among other garden beds, and we do not know whether it ate from a poor one or it ate from a rich one. In such a case, the halakha is that the animal’s owner pays the injured party the value of a rich one.

Rava raised a question and said: And if we would know that the animal ate from a poor garden bed, its owner would have to pay only the value of a poor garden bed. Now that we do not know whether it ate from a poor garden bed or if it ate from a rich garden bed, is it reasonable that he should have to pay the value of a rich garden bed? There is a general principle governing monetary disputes that the burden of proof falls on the claimant. Therefore, so long as the injured party cannot prove that the animal ate from the rich garden bed, he should not be entitled to collect the value of such a garden bed.

The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita: If there were five gardens that draw their water requirements from one spring and the spring became damaged, all must help fix it with the owner of the upper garden, near whose garden the damage occurred. As a result of this ruling, the owner of the lower garden fixes it with all of them in the above case, and fixes it for himself if the damage occurred in the lower area. And similarly, if there were five courtyards that would run off water into a single sewer and the sewer became damaged, all must help fix it with the owner of the lower courtyard, near whose courtyard the damage occurred. The result is that the owner of the upper courtyard fixes the sewer with all of them and fixes it for himself if the damage affected his courtyard alone. This is in accordance with Rav Yehuda’s ruling.

The prohibition of robbery is stated, according to the school of Menashe, as it is written: “Every moving thing that is alive shall be for food for you; like the green herbs I have given you all” (Genesis 9:3). And Rabbi Levi says: Like the green herbs that sprout all over by themselves and are ownerless, and not like the vegetation of a garden, which belongs to the garden’s owner alone. This indicates that robbery is prohibited. The Gemara asks: And how do the other tanna’im interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, that verse comes to permit the consumption of meat.

The Gemara asks: What is that statement of Rabbi Shimon? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: All after-growths that grow on their own during the Sabbatical Year are prohibited and may not be eaten, except for the after-growths of cabbage, as there is nothing similar to them among the vegetables in the field. The Sages did not extend the decree prohibiting after-growths to cabbage, because it is unlike other vegetables. Rather, it is like fruit of a tree, which may be eaten if it grows wild during the Sabbatical Year. And the Rabbis say: All after-growths are prohibited, including the after-growths of cabbage.

The Gemara comments: And both Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, who disagree in this case, hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. As it was taught in a baraita: The verse states, “And if you shall say: What shall we eat in the seventh year? Behold, we may not sow, nor gather our crops” (Leviticus 25:20). Rabbi Akiva said: And since they cannot sow, from where would they gather? Why does the verse mention gathering? It is derived from here that gathering after-growths that were not planted but grew on their own is prohibited.

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle then, do they disagree? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis, who prohibit all after-growths, hold: We issue a decree prohibiting cabbage after-growths due to other after-growths in general. And Rabbi Shimon holds: We do not issue a decree prohibiting cabbage after-growths due to other after-growths in general.

It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: With regard to two garden beds located one above the other, one may not draw water from the channel supplying the lower garden bed in order to irrigate the upper garden bed, due to the excessive exertion involved. Furthermore, Rabbi Elazar bar Shimon said: Even in the case of a single garden bed, half of which is lower and half of which is higher, one may not draw water from the channel supplying the lower area to irrigate the upper area, even though they are two parts of the same garden bed.

The Sages taught in a baraita: One may draw water and irrigate vegetables in order to eat them on the intermediate days of a Festival. But if he does this in order to improve their growth and to enhance their appearance it is prohibited, as he is considered to be unnecessarily exerting himself on the Festival.

The Gemara relates that Ravina and Rabba Tosefa’a were once walking along the road when they saw a certain man that was drawing water with a bucket on the intermediate days of a Festival. Rabba Tosefa’a said to Ravina: Let the Master come and excommunicate him for transgressing the words of the Sages. Ravina said to him: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One may draw for vegetables in order to eat them, and so he has not committed a transgression. Rabba Tosefa’a said to him: Do you maintain that what is meant by one may draw [madlin] is that one may draw water in order to irrigate the vegetables? This is not so. Rather, what is meant by

one may draw is that one may pull out some of the vegetables that are growing densely together. The baraita comes to teach that one is permitted to thin out a garden bed on the intermediate days of a Festival in order to eat on the Festival those that he removes, but he is prohibited to do so in order to enhance the appearance of those that remain. As we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 7:5): One who thins out [meidel] the vines in his vineyard, just as he may thin out his own vines, so too, he may thin out the vines set aside for the poor. Since he is doing it for the sake of the vines, he may also thin out what he leaves for the poor; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir disagrees and says: His own vines he is permitted to thin out, but he is not permitted to thin out the vines set aside for the poor. This mishna indicates that the term meidel can be used to mean thinning out and does not refer only to drawing water.

Ravina said to Rabba Tosefa’a: But wasn’t it explicitly taught in a baraita: One may draw water to irrigate vegetables in order to eat them? Rabba Tosefa’a said to him: If it is taught explicitly in a baraita, the halakha is as it is taught, and I retract my statement.

Rav says: One who draws an image, e.g., he paints an image on the wall, on the property of a convert who died without heirs has acquired it, as Rav himself acquired the garden of the house of Rav, which had been ownerless property, only by drawing an image.

§ It was stated: With regard to a field that is defined by its boundaries, i.e., it has clearly demarcated boundaries on all sides, Rav Huna says that Rav says: Once he struck the land with a hoe one time, he acquired the entire property. And Shmuel says that he has acquired only the place that he struck with the hoe.

The Sages taught: Within a karpef that is greater than two beit se’a, but which was enclosed from the outset for the purpose of residence, carrying is permitted regardless of its size; however, if subsequently the greater part of it was sown with seed crops, it is considered like a garden, which is not a place of dwelling, and it is prohibited to carry anything within it.

However, if the greater part of it was planted with trees, it is considered like a courtyard, which is a place of dwelling, and one is permitted to carry. The reason for this distinction is that the presence of trees does not nullify the status of the karpef as a place of residence, because people normally plant trees even in their courtyards. However, people ordinarily plant seed crops only in gardens at some distance from their houses, in places they do not use for dwelling; therefore, the presence of seed crops does nullify the residential status of the karpef.

It was stated above that if the greater part of the karpef was sown with seed crops, it is prohibited to carry in it. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: We only said this in a case where the sown section is greater than two beit se’a, but if it is no more than two beit se’a, it is permitted.

The Gemara comments: In accordance with whose opinion was this stated? It was stated in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Shimon says: Roofs, courtyards, and karpeifot are all one domain with regard to utensils that began Shabbat in them, even if the utensils belong to different people. Since these are not proper dwelling places, setting an eiruv is unnecessary, and objects may be carried from place to place within them. But they are not one domain with regard to utensils that began Shabbat in the house and that were later taken outside. This shows that the unsown part of a karpef and the sown part, which has the status of a garden, are considered a single domain, in which one is permitted to carry, as the garden section does not prohibit the karpef section.

The Gemara rejects this argument: Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, since the greater part of the karpef is sown, the minor part

is nullified relative to the greater part, and it is as though the karpef were entirely sown. And therefore, it is regarded as a karpef greater than two beit se’a, in which it is prohibited to carry.

Rather, if this was stated, this is what was stated by Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: If the greater part of the karpef was sown, it is prohibited to carry within it. It follows that if only a minor part of the karpef was sown, it is permitted to carry within it. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: We said that it is permitted to carry only if the sown section is not as large as two beit se’a, however, if it is at least two beit se’a, it is prohibited to carry anywhere in the karpef, even though most of it is not sown.

It was stated earlier that if the greater part of the karpef was planted with trees, it is considered like a courtyard, and it is permitted to carry. Rav Yehuda said that Avimi said: This is only if the trees were planted in rows [itztablaot], the customary manner of planting ornamental trees in a courtyard. But if they were arranged differently it is considered an orchard, which is not made for dwelling, and where it is prohibited to carry. But Rav Naḥman said: This applies even if they were not planted in rows, as people commonly plant trees in any arrangement in the courtyards of their houses.

MISHNA: And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava said: With regard to a garden or a karpef, an enclosed courtyard used for storage, that is not more than seventy cubits and a remainder, a little more, as will be explained below, by seventy cubits and a remainder, and is surrounded by a wall ten handbreadths high, one may carry inside it, as it constitutes a proper private domain. This is provided that it contains a watchman’s booth or a dwelling place, or it is near the town in which its owner lives, so that he uses it and it is treated like a dwelling.

But according to your opinion, as you say that when both this and that cause a result it is prohibited, as seen from your ruling that it is prohibited to plant under an ashera during the summer because of the positive effect of the ashera tree’s shade, you should concede to me, in any event, that planting the vegetables even during the rainy season, when there is no shade, is prohibited, because they are fertilized by the fallen foliage.

And as for the mishna, which seems to indicate that Rabbi Yosei holds that when a result is caused by both permitted and forbidden items it is forbidden, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yosei was not expressing his own opinion. Rather, when he said that one may not plant vegetables under an ashera even during the rainy season, he said so in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis that a result caused by both permitted and forbidden items is forbidden. Rabbi Yosei said to them: According to my own opinion, when both this and that cause it, i.e., when both permitted and forbidden items contribute to a result, the result is permitted. It is therefore permitted to plant vegetables under an ashera during all seasons.

But according to your opinion, as you say that when both this and that cause a result it is prohibited, as seen from your ruling that it is prohibited to plant under an ashera during the summer because of the positive effect of the ashera tree’s shade, you should concede to me, in any event, that planting the vegetables even during the rainy season, when there is no shade, is prohibited, because they are fertilized by the fallen foliage.

The Gemara concludes: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The hala-kha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara recounts an incident supporting this ruling: There was a certain garden that was fertilized with dung that came from an animal used in idol worship. Rav Amram sent a query to Rav Yosef, asking what the halakha is in such a case. Rav Yosef said to him that this is what Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei; the produce of the garden is therefore permitted.

Rava said to him: There, during the rainy season, there is no reason to prohibit the practice, for with regard to what need we be concerned? If you say he wants the water to flow out into the public domain because he is concerned about spoiling and sullying his courtyard, it is already spoiled by the rainwater. And if you say it should be prohibited due to a decree lest people say that so-and-so’s gutter is flowing with water on Shabbat, which might lead them to think he is watering his garden or violating some other prohibition, and they might act likewise even in the summer, this is not a relevant concern. As gutters ordinarily flow with water in the rainy season, people do not entertain this suspicion.

MISHNA: One who has ownership of a garden located beyond the garden of another, and also has access rights to it, may enter his garden only at a time when it is usual for people to enter, and may leave only at a time when it is usual for people to leave. Furthermore, he may not bring merchants into his garden, and he may not enter the garden solely in order to use it as a passageway, to enter from it into another field. And the owner of the outer garden may sow the path leading to the inner garden.

If the court gave him an access path from the side of the outer garden, with the agreement of both of them, he may enter at any time he wants, and leave at any time he wants, and may bring merchants into the inner garden. But he may still not enter the garden solely in order to enter from it into another field. In such a case, neither this one, the owner of the inner garden, nor that one, the owner of the outer garden, is permitted to plant that side path.

§ The mishna teaches: As, if the surplus in the field was an area required for the sowing of nine kav of seed, and in a garden an area required for the sowing of a half-kav of seed, or, according to the Rabbi Akiva, an area required for the sowing of a quarter-kav of seed, the buyer can return the surplus land to the seller, and the seller cannot demand payment in money. Rav Huna says: The halakha that was stated in the mishna, that a surplus in the size of an area required for the sowing of nine kav of seed can be returned to the seller, applies even in a large valley which measures several kor. If the surplus is a significant plot of land equal in size to an area required for the sowing of nine kav of seed, the buyer can return it to the seller, even if it is less than one-quarter of a kav per se’a, i.e., less than one twenty-fourth the size of the field that was sold.

And Rav Naḥman says: He calculates seven and a half kav for each and every kor, which is equivalent to one-quarter of a kav per se’a. As long as the surplus does not exceed that ratio, he is not required to return it, even if the surplus is greater than the area required for the sowing of nine kav.

Rava raised a further objection to Rav Naḥman: We learned in the continuation of the mishna that if the surplus in a garden was an area required for the sowing of a half-kav of seed, the buyer returns the land to the seller. Isn’t this the halakha even in a case where he sold him a garden measuring two se’a? Once again, this would seem to indicate that the surplus is returned to the seller, provided that it is equal in size to the minimum measure of a garden, even if the surplus does not exceed one-half of a kav per two se’a, which is equivalent to one-quarter of a kav per se’a. Rav Naḥman rejects this argument as well: No, the case in the mishna is where he sold him a garden measuring a se’a, so that the surplus is proportionately twice as large.

Rava raised yet another objection to Rav Naḥman from the next clause in the mishna, which states: Or, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, if the surplus in the garden was an area required for sowing a quarter-kav of seed, the buyer returns the land to the seller. What, isn’t this the halakha even in a case where he sold him a garden measuring a se’a? In that case, the surplus does not exceed one-quarter of a kav per se’a, and nevertheless the surplus is returned to the seller, provided that it is equal in size to the minimum measure of a garden. Rav Naḥman also rejects this argument: No, the case in the mishna is where he sold him a garden measuring a half-se’a, so that the surplus is proportionately twice as large.

The mishna teaches that in the case of a field, the buyer can return the land itself if the surplus was an area required for the sowing of nine kav of seed, and in the case of a garden, if the surplus was an area required for the sowing of a half-kav of seed. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: If one sold a field and it turned out that the plot was larger than had been stipulated, but before the buyer returned the surplus, the plot was turned into a garden, or if it was initially a garden and it was turned into a field (see 11a), what is the halakha? Is the surplus governed by the halakhot applying to a field or by those applying to a garden? The Gemara answers: The dilemma shall stand unresolved, as no answer has been found.

11a

This case is similar only to the last clause of that mishna, which states: If the owner of the inner garden is given a side path, so that he suffers a loss of some kind because he cannot take the shortest path to reach his garden, both this owner of the inner garden and that owner of the outer garden are not permitted to sow the path. Similarly, here too, neither the owner of the trees nor the owner of the field are permitted to sow the place designated for the gatherer of figs and his basket.

Abaye said to him: Are the cases comparable? There, in the case of the outer and inner gardens, there is no loss suffered by the buyer when the owner of the outer garden sows the path, as he can still pass through it. But here, there is a loss for the buyer, as the one who bought the trees says to the owner of the field: The fruits that fall from the trees will become soiled by the plants.

The Gemara inquires: And how much space must there be between the three trees for them to be considered one unit, which means that the land is acquired by the owner of the trees? Rav Yosef says that Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The distance between the trees must be from four cubits to eight cubits. Rava says that Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: It must be from eight cubits to sixteen cubits. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Do not disagree with Rav Naḥman, as we learned in a mishna in accordance with his opinion.

As we learned in a mishna (Kilayim 4:9): One who plants his vineyard sixteen cubits by sixteen cubits, i.e., he leaves sixteen cubits between each row of vines, is permitted to bring other species of seeds to the empty spaces between the rows and sow them there. This is not considered a violation of the biblical prohibition with regard to sowing diverse crops in a vineyard, which is one of the prohibitions of diverse kinds.

Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident in the city of Tzalmon, where one individual planted his vineyard sixteen by sixteen cubits. And he would turn the branches of two rows that were facing each other to one side, so that there was a space of sixteen cubits between the two rows, and sow the clearing. The following year he would turn the branches to the place that was sown the year before, and would sow the land that had been left uncultivated the previous year, as it had been filled with the branches from the vines. And the incident came before the Sages and they permitted it. This demonstrates that sixteen cubits between plants is required for them to be considered separate units.

§ It is taught in the mishna: And one may seal a breach in the wall of his garden on the intermediate days of a Festival. The Gemara asks: How does one seal such a breach? Rav Yosef said: With palm branches [hutza] and the branches of a bay tree [dafna], which do not create a significant partition, but simply a temporary barrier.

It was taught in a baraita: One fills in the breach with stone, but he does not plasterthe stones with clay. Rav Ḥisda said: They taught that he may seal a breach but not build a wall in his usual manner only with regard to the wall of a garden, as no significant loss will be suffered if he delays building until after the Festival. However, with regard to the wall of a courtyard, which prevents the entry of strangers who are likely to steal from him, he may build a wall in his usual manner even on the intermediate days of a Festival.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Actually, the sale is valid. It is not considered an invalid sale until there is an error so extreme that had there been no mistake, there would have remained in the field an area required for sowing nine kav of seed, the smallest area of land worth working. In that case, the orphans can reasonably claim that they are unwilling to give up on the land that belongs to them. However, if the error is less than this, it is enough if she returns the remainder to the orphans. And in the case of a garden, the sale is void if, had there been no error, there would have remained an area required for sowing a half-kav of seed, as this is the smallest size of garden worth working. Or, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, an area required for sowing a quarter-kav of seed.

The Gemara notes that if these vegetables that are exempt from pe’a contained garlic and onions, which are stored for an extended period of time, then they are obligated in pe’a as well. As we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 3:4): If one has garden beds of onions that are between the vegetables, Rabbi Yosei says that one leaves a separate pe’a from each and every one of the beds. And the Rabbis say one leaves pe’a from one garden bed for all of them.

And yet in the case of tithe, we learned in a mishna (Ma’asrot 1:1) with regard to the halakhot of tithes: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the earth is obligated in tithes. And whereas some of the conditions overlap, the following criteria are not taught with regard to tithes: Gathered as one, and that one brings in to storage for preservation. Evidently, the obligation of tithes applies to fig trees and vegetables, despite the fact that the obligation of pe’a does not apply.

§ Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of endives that were initially planted to be fed to animals, and later the owner reconsidered their designation and decided to use them for human consumption

The Gemara analyzes each criterion of the mishna. The clause: Anything that is food, serves to exclude the sefiḥin, produce that grew without being intentionally planted, of woad [setim] and safflower [vekotza]. These plants are used as dyes rather than for food. The clause: And is protected, serves to exclude ownerless crops, which no one protects. The clause: And grows from the earth, serves to exclude truffles and mushrooms, which do not draw sustenance from the ground. The clause: And is gathered as one, serves to exclude the fig tree, whose fruit is gathered over an extended period, as the figs do not all ripen at the same time. Finally, the clause: And that one brings in to storage for preservation, serves to exclude vegetables, which cannot be stored for lengthy periods.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is added by the last clause of the mishna? The Gemara answers: It serves to add figs and vegetables, for which one is not obligated to designate pe’a, although the obligation of tithes does apply to them. As we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 1:4): The Sages stated a principle with regard to the halakhot of pe’a: With regard to anything that is food, and is protected, and that grows from the earth, and is gathered as one, i.e., there is one fixed time for gathering it, and that one brings in to store for preservation, its owner is obligated to designate pe’a.

The Gemara asks: But the view of Rabbi Akiva is the same as that of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who maintains that in the case of a garden that was not enclosed for the purpose of residence, one is only permitted to carry if the area of the enclosed area is no more than two beit se’a. Rabbi Akiva disagrees only about whether we require a watchman’s booth or a dwelling place as well, but the two agree with regard to the size of the garden. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva’s stipulation: Provided that it measures not more than seventy cubits and a remainder by seventy cubits and a remainder, is superfluous. The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to a tiny amount. And what is this tiny amount? It is as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: It is by a tiny amount that one of the sides of a square measuring two beit se’a exceeds seventy cubits and a remainder, but the Sages did not give its exact measurement, owing to its small size and because it is impossible to be absolutely precise about the matter. And what is the measure of the area of two beit se’a? It is as large as the courtyard of the Tabernacle, which was fifty cubits by one hundred cubits. The first tanna and Rabbi Akiva dispute this issue: The first tanna maintains that the garden may have an area as large as two beit se’a, whereas Rabbi Akiva says that it must not exceed seventy and two-thirds cubits squared. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The matters referred to are that we must square the courtyard of the Tabernacle in order to reach the size of garden or similar enclosure in which one is permitted to carry on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda said: This is learned from the verse that stated: “The length of the courtyard shall be a hundred cubits, and the breadth fifty by fifty, and the height, five cubits of fine twined linen, and their sockets of brass” (Exodus 27:18).

The Gemara asks: But the view of Rabbi Akiva is the same as that of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who maintains that in the case of a garden that was not enclosed for the purpose of residence, one is only permitted to carry if the area of the enclosed area is no more than two beit se’a. Rabbi Akiva disagrees only about whether we require a watchman’s booth or a dwelling place as well, but the two agree with regard to the size of the garden. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva’s stipulation: Provided that it measures not more than seventy cubits and a remainder by seventy cubits and a remainder, is superfluous. The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to a tiny amount. And what is this tiny amount? It is as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: It is by a tiny amount that one of the sides of a square measuring two beit se’a exceeds seventy cubits and a remainder, but the Sages did not give its exact measurement, owing to its small size and because it is impossible to be absolutely precise about the matter. And what is the measure of the area of two beit se’a? It is as large as the courtyard of the Tabernacle, which was fifty cubits by one hundred cubits. The first tanna and Rabbi Akiva dispute this issue: The first tanna maintains that the garden may have an area as large as two beit se’a, whereas Rabbi Akiva says that it must not exceed seventy and two-thirds cubits squared. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The matters referred to are that we must square the courtyard of the Tabernacle in order to reach the size of garden or similar enclosure in which one is permitted to carry on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda said: This is learned from the verse that stated: “The length of the courtyard shall be a hundred cubits, and the breadth fifty by fifty, and the height, five cubits of fine twined linen, and their sockets of brass” (Exodus 27:18).

The Gemara asks: But the view of Rabbi Akiva is the same as that of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who maintains that in the case of a garden that was not enclosed for the purpose of residence, one is only permitted to carry if the area of the enclosed area is no more than two beit se’a. Rabbi Akiva disagrees only about whether we require a watchman’s booth or a dwelling place as well, but the two agree with regard to the size of the garden. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva’s stipulation: Provided that it measures not more than seventy cubits and a remainder by seventy cubits and a remainder, is superfluous. The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to a tiny amount. And what is this tiny amount? It is as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: It is by a tiny amount that one of the sides of a square measuring two beit se’a exceeds seventy cubits and a remainder, but the Sages did not give its exact measurement, owing to its small size and because it is impossible to be absolutely precise about the matter. And what is the measure of the area of two beit se’a? It is as large as the courtyard of the Tabernacle, which was fifty cubits by one hundred cubits. The first tanna and Rabbi Akiva dispute this issue: The first tanna maintains that the garden may have an area as large as two beit se’a, whereas Rabbi Akiva says that it must not exceed seventy and two-thirds cubits squared. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The matters referred to are that we must square the courtyard of the Tabernacle in order to reach the size of garden or similar enclosure in which one is permitted to carry on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda said: This is learned from the verse that stated: “The length of the courtyard shall be a hundred cubits, and the breadth fifty by fifty, and the height, five cubits of fine twined linen, and their sockets of brass” (Exodus 27:18).

The Gemara asks: But the view of Rabbi Akiva is the same as that of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who maintains that in the case of a garden that was not enclosed for the purpose of residence, one is only permitted to carry if the area of the enclosed area is no more than two beit se’a. Rabbi Akiva disagrees only about whether we require a watchman’s booth or a dwelling place as well, but the two agree with regard to the size of the garden. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva’s stipulation: Provided that it measures not more than seventy cubits and a remainder by seventy cubits and a remainder, is superfluous. The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to a tiny amount. And what is this tiny amount? It is as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: It is by a tiny amount that one of the sides of a square measuring two beit se’a exceeds seventy cubits and a remainder, but the Sages did not give its exact measurement, owing to its small size and because it is impossible to be absolutely precise about the matter. And what is the measure of the area of two beit se’a? It is as large as the courtyard of the Tabernacle, which was fifty cubits by one hundred cubits. The first tanna and Rabbi Akiva dispute this issue: The first tanna maintains that the garden may have an area as large as two beit se’a, whereas Rabbi Akiva says that it must not exceed seventy and two-thirds cubits squared. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The matters referred to are that we must square the courtyard of the Tabernacle in order to reach the size of garden or similar enclosure in which one is permitted to carry on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda said: This is learned from the verse that stated: “The length of the courtyard shall be a hundred cubits, and the breadth fifty by fifty, and the height, five cubits of fine twined linen, and their sockets of brass” (Exodus 27:18).

The Gemara asks: But the view of Rabbi Akiva is the same as that of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who maintains that in the case of a garden that was not enclosed for the purpose of residence, one is only permitted to carry if the area of the enclosed area is no more than two beit se’a. Rabbi Akiva disagrees only about whether we require a watchman’s booth or a dwelling place as well, but the two agree with regard to the size of the garden. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva’s stipulation: Provided that it measures not more than seventy cubits and a remainder by seventy cubits and a remainder, is superfluous. The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to a tiny amount. And what is this tiny amount? It is as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: It is by a tiny amount that one of the sides of a square measuring two beit se’a exceeds seventy cubits and a remainder, but the Sages did not give its exact measurement, owing to its small size and because it is impossible to be absolutely precise about the matter. And what is the measure of the area of two beit se’a? It is as large as the courtyard of the Tabernacle, which was fifty cubits by one hundred cubits. The first tanna and Rabbi Akiva dispute this issue: The first tanna maintains that the garden may have an area as large as two beit se’a, whereas Rabbi Akiva says that it must not exceed seventy and two-thirds cubits squared. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The matters referred to are that we must square the courtyard of the Tabernacle in order to reach the size of garden or similar enclosure in which one is permitted to carry on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda said: This is learned from the verse that stated: “The length of the courtyard shall be a hundred cubits, and the breadth fifty by fifty, and the height, five cubits of fine twined linen, and their sockets of brass” (Exodus 27:18).

The Gemara asks: But the view of Rabbi Akiva is the same as that of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who maintains that in the case of a garden that was not enclosed for the purpose of residence, one is only permitted to carry if the area of the enclosed area is no more than two beit se’a. Rabbi Akiva disagrees only about whether we require a watchman’s booth or a dwelling place as well, but the two agree with regard to the size of the garden. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva’s stipulation: Provided that it measures not more than seventy cubits and a remainder by seventy cubits and a remainder, is superfluous. The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to a tiny amount. And what is this tiny amount? It is as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: It is by a tiny amount that one of the sides of a square measuring two beit se’a exceeds seventy cubits and a remainder, but the Sages did not give its exact measurement, owing to its small size and because it is impossible to be absolutely precise about the matter. And what is the measure of the area of two beit se’a? It is as large as the courtyard of the Tabernacle, which was fifty cubits by one hundred cubits. The first tanna and Rabbi Akiva dispute this issue: The first tanna maintains that the garden may have an area as large as two beit se’a, whereas Rabbi Akiva says that it must not exceed seventy and two-thirds cubits squared. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The matters referred to are that we must square the courtyard of the Tabernacle in order to reach the size of garden or similar enclosure in which one is permitted to carry on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda said: This is learned from the verse that stated: “The length of the courtyard shall be a hundred cubits, and the breadth fifty by fifty, and the height, five cubits of fine twined linen, and their sockets of brass” (Exodus 27:18).

The Gemara asks: But the view of Rabbi Akiva is the same as that of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who maintains that in the case of a garden that was not enclosed for the purpose of residence, one is only permitted to carry if the area of the enclosed area is no more than two beit se’a. Rabbi Akiva disagrees only about whether we require a watchman’s booth or a dwelling place as well, but the two agree with regard to the size of the garden. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva’s stipulation: Provided that it measures not more than seventy cubits and a remainder by seventy cubits and a remainder, is superfluous. The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to a tiny amount. And what is this tiny amount? It is as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: It is by a tiny amount that one of the sides of a square measuring two beit se’a exceeds seventy cubits and a remainder, but the Sages did not give its exact measurement, owing to its small size and because it is impossible to be absolutely precise about the matter. And what is the measure of the area of two beit se’a? It is as large as the courtyard of the Tabernacle, which was fifty cubits by one hundred cubits. The first tanna and Rabbi Akiva dispute this issue: The first tanna maintains that the garden may have an area as large as two beit se’a, whereas Rabbi Akiva says that it must not exceed seventy and two-thirds cubits squared. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The matters referred to are that we must square the courtyard of the Tabernacle in order to reach the size of garden or similar enclosure in which one is permitted to carry on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda said: This is learned from the verse that stated: “The length of the courtyard shall be a hundred cubits, and the breadth fifty by fifty, and the height, five cubits of fine twined linen, and their sockets of brass” (Exodus 27:18).

Ravina said to Ravi Ashi: We learn as well in a mishna (Pe’a 3:4) that discusses the mitzva to leave produce in the corner of the field for the poor [pe’a]: If one has garden beds of onions that are among the vegetables, Rabbi Yosei says that one leaves separate pe’a from each and every one of the beds. And the Rabbis say that one leaves pe’a from one garden bed for all of them. This indicates that Rabbi Yosei concedes that one is obligated to leave pe’a and gleanings from onions, despite the fact that they are picked by hand rather than harvested with tools. The reason is that this is the usual manner of gathering onions.

Rabbi Elai said: I heard from Rabbi Eliezer that one is permitted to carry in a garden or karpef, even if the garden is an area of a beit kor, i.e., thirty times larger than the area of a beit se’a.

The Gemara makes a distinction between the two cases: There, in the case cited in the mishna in Bava Metzia, the reason for that halakha is as is taught in the mishna, that Rabbi Meir said: What if the owner of the upper garden would wish to take his earth? This would result in a situation where there are no more vegetables, as the vegetables would not have earth from which to draw nutrients. The fact that the owner of the upper garden has the ability to destroy the vegetables is an indication that he is the owner.

Rava said: In the latter clause of the mishna we came to a different issue, i.e., the final section of the mishna is not designed to counter Rabbi Meir’s statement with regard to the public domain. Rather, it refers to the gates of a garden with an area greater than two beit se’a in size, whose legal status is that of a karmelit. Consequently, the mishna is saying as follows: And likewise, one may not stand in the private domain and open a door in a karmelit; neither may one stand in a karmelit and open a door in the private domain,

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: If an animal ate one kav or two kav, the court does not say that the owner pays compensation according to their value, i.e., the value of the actual damage; rather, they view it as if it were a small garden bed and evaluate it accordingly. What, is it not that this means that the court evaluates that garden bed according to what it would cost if sold by itself, which contradicts all the previous explanations?

§ The Gemara asks: How do we, the court, appraise the value of the damage? Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: The court appraises the value of an area required for sowing one se’a of seed [beit se’a] relative to an area required for sowing sixty se’a of seed, and according to this calculation determines the value of the damage. Rabbi Yannai says: The court appraises each tarkav, equivalent to half a beit se’a, relative to an area of sixty tarkav. Ḥizkiyya says: The court appraises the value of each stalk eaten relative to sixty stalks.

The Sages taught: When appraising the damage, the court does not appraise it based on an area of a beit kav, because doing so enhances his position, and they also do not appraise it relative to an area of a beit kor, equivalent to the area in which one can plant thirty se’a of seed, because this weakens his position.

The Gemara asks: What is this baraita saying? Rav Pappa said: This is what the baraita is saying: The court does not appraise the value of one kav relative to an area of sixty kav, which, being too large for an individual but too small for a trader, is always sold in the market at a lower price, because that would enhance the position of the one liable for damage. Conversely, the court does not appraise the value of a kor relative to an area of sixty kor, an area so large that it is purchased only by a person with a specific need and therefore for a high price, because that would weaken the position of the one liable for damage.

The mishna teaches, and it was similarly taught in the baraita, that Rabbi Eliezer says: One who sells a courtyard has sold only the airspace of the courtyard, and he has sold nothing found in the courtyard, not even the houses. To clarify the disagreement between the unattributed opinion in the mishna and Rabbi Eliezer, Rabba said: If the seller said to the buyer that he is selling him dirata, i.e., the place of residence, everyone agrees that he means to sell the houses and that they are also included in the sale. When they disagree, it is where he said to him that he is selling him darta, i.e., the courtyard. One Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that he means to sell only the garden, i.e., the space between the houses, and one Sage, the unattributed first opinion in the mishna, holds that he means to sell also the houses.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even bringing produce into the courtyard determines that the production process of the produce has been completed and that the produce is therefore subject to tithes, as it is stated in the confession of the tithes: “And I have given to the Levite, the stranger, the orphan, and the widow, and they shall eat in your gates and be satisfied” (Deuteronomy 26:12).

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan also, isn’t it written: “From the house”? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that the term “house” is not to be taken literally. Rather, it indicates that bringing untithed produce into a courtyard is similar to bringing it into a house, in the following way: Just as a house is a secured area, so too, the courtyard must be secured. An area that is accessible to the public is not considered a courtyard for the purposes of this halakha.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yannai also, isn’t it written: “In your gates”? The Gemara answers: That term is necessary to teach that this halakha, that the production process is considered complete, applies only when one brings the produce into his house through the gate, i.e., the entranceway, to the exclusion of produce that was brought in through rooftops and enclosures, in which case the produce is not subject to tithes.

Rabba raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Yosef: The verse states in the context of returning lost items: “Return them” (Deuteronomy 22:1), repeating the verb “hashev teshivem.” The Sages expounded as follows: From the word “hashev” I have derived only that one may return the item to the house of the owner of the lost article. From where do I derive that even if one returns it to his garden or to his ruin, i.e., an unused structure on his property, he has discharged his obligation and is no longer responsible for the item that he found? For this, the verse states: “Teshivem,” repeating the verb for emphasis, to teach that he fulfills the mitzva by returning the item to any place belonging to the owner.

The mishna teaches that one who sells a field has not sold the cluster of reeds that occupy a beit rova. The Gemara comments: And this is so even though they are thin, as since they occupy the area of a beit rova they are considered a separate entity and are not part of the field. Concerning this ruling, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is not only a cluster of reeds that is considered a separate entity, and therefore not included in the sale; rather, even a small garden bed of spices that does not occupy the area of a beit rova but has a distinct name is not sold along with the field. Rav Pappa said: What this means is that people call it the roses [vardda] of so-and-so, thereby establishing for it a name of its own.

The mishna teaches: One who sells a field has not sold the carob tree that has been grafted, and he has not sold the sycamore trunk.

Likewise, is the animal fed it in the city or in the field? When it is in the field, the fodder is certainly effective for this animal, as it is calm. When it is in the city, what is the halakha? Rav Ashi raises a further dilemma: If you say that this treatment is effective only when it is in the field, not when it is the city, what is the halakha with regard to a garden adjacent to the city? No resolution is found for any of these inquiries, and with regard to each of them the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

5. It is permitted to open water to the garden and the water will continue and flow all of Shabbat. It is permitted to put קילור, thick collyrium (salve) on the eye even though it is forbidden to put it on on Shabbat. It is permitted to perfume one’s clothes when the process of perfuming is continued all of Shabbat, even if the perfume is placed in a vessel, since one is not commanded to rest his vessels. It is permitted to put barley in a tub to soak, and to load the beams of the olive press or wine press while it is still day upon the olives or the grapes, and the oil or wine that comes from them is permitted [And see Siman 320 Seif 2]. Similarly, if unripe grapes or ears are mashed while it is still day, it is permitted to drink that which comes forth from it. It is permitted to put wheat in a water mill near dark. RAMA: And we do not worry to the sound of the voices of those who say 'the mill of this person is grinding on Shabbat'. There are those who forbid regarding mills and in any place that there is a worry about listening to the sound (Tur; Tosefos; Rosh; Sma"g; Hagahos Maimoni; Teshuvos Mahari"v; Agur) and this is our custom initially. However in a place of loss there are those who are lenient as as explained above at the end of Siman 244. One may place a keli of a weight called זייגר from Erev Shabbat even though he hears a voice announcing the hours of Shabbat, because everyone knows that it is their way to place it there from yesterday (Tur Agur) and see below Seif 338...

Rema: If one cuts [a radish] very finely [i.e., dicing], one needs 60 times against the entire radish.And some say the same is true if it is cut with a meat knife the entire radish is prohibited with dairy. And this is our practice ab initio, however after the fact only an "amount to be taken" is rendered forbidden. And this is only true if the radish itself was cut, but if the radish greens were cut there is no cause for concern. And if there is doubt if the radish was cut with a non-kosher knife, we are lenient. And so too we purchase radishes that were cut on their tops for we can assume they were cut with garden tools.And in a place where only knife-cut radishes can be found, the practice is to permit them through removing an "amount to be taken."

Rema: If one cuts [a radish] very finely [i.e., dicing], one needs 60 times against the entire radish.And some say the same is true if it is cut with a meat knife the entire radish is prohibited with dairy. And this is our practice ab initio, however after the fact only an "amount to be taken" is rendered forbidden. And this is only true if the radish itself was cut, but if the radish greens were cut there is no cause for concern. And if there is doubt if the radish was cut with a non-kosher knife, we are lenient. And so too we purchase radishes that were cut on their tops for we can assume they were cut with garden tools.And in a place where only knife-cut radishes can be found, the practice is to permit them through removing an "amount to be taken."

Rema: If one cuts [a radish] very finely [i.e., dicing], one needs 60 times against the entire radish.And some say the same is true if it is cut with a meat knife the entire radish is prohibited with dairy. And this is our practice ab initio, however after the fact only an "amount to be taken" is rendered forbidden. And this is only true if the radish itself was cut, but if the radish greens were cut there is no cause for concern. And if there is doubt if the radish was cut with a non-kosher knife, we are lenient. And so too we purchase radishes that were cut on their tops for we can assume they were cut with garden tools.And in a place where only knife-cut radishes can be found, the practice is to permit them through removing an "amount to be taken."

3. One is permitted to walk on grass, whether it is dry or wet, because he does not intend to uproot it. However, those who eat in the garden are forbidden to wash their hands over the garden, because they water the plants. Even though this is not their intention, it is an unavoidable consequence ("psik reisha") of their action. However, it is permitted to urinate on them or to dispense other liquids that do not make the plants grow. Rem"a: Therefore, it is a good idea to be stringent and to not eat in a garden if one is using water, because it is difficult to be careful not to spill some water there (Beit Yosef in the name of Sefer HaTrumah).

4. One should be careful to not throw seeds in a place where it rains, as they will eventually grow. If one throws seeds to chickens, he should only through the amount that they will eat in one or two days. If he is in a place where people walk a lot, it is permitted, because the seeds will not grow.

5. Vegetation that grows on the spout of the pitcher from the moistness of the pitcher is considered as if it were attached to the ground, and he who picks it off is liable.

6. If vegetation is inserted into dirt while it is still day on Friday so that it will be wet, it is permitted to grab the leaves and pull it out, as long as it has not taken root. It also must be the case that he didn't want it to take root. However, if he intended to plant it, this is forbidden.

7. It's forbidden to uproot plants even from a flowerpot that is not perforated.

8. With a flowerpot (meaning a half jar in which vegetation is planted (The Arukh)), even one that is not perforated, one must be careful to not carry it from the ground to pegs or the opposite, whether it is wooden or clay. Rem"a: If a tree branch fell from a tree on Friday and it has fruit, it is permitted to pick the fruit from it on Shabbat (Rabbeinu Yerucham Path 12 Part 2).

If, however, you have a desire to rise to a higher state, viz., that of reflection, and truly to hold the conviction that God is One and possesses true unity, without admitting plurality or divisibility in any sense whatever, you must understand that God has no essential attribute in any form or in any sense whatever, and that the rejection of corporeality implies the rejection of essential attributes. Those who believe that God is One, and that He has many attributes, declare the unity with their lips, and assume plurality in their thoughts. This is like the doctrine of the Christians, who say that He is one and He is three, and that the three are one. Of the same character is the doctrine of those who say that God is One, but that He has many attributes; and that He with His attributes is One, although they deny corporeality and affirm His most absolute freedom from matter; as if our object were to seek forms of expression, not subjects of belief. For belief is only possible after the apprehension of a thing; it consists in the conviction that the thing apprehended has its existence beyond the mind [in reality] exactly as it is conceived in the mind. If in addition to this we are convinced that the thing cannot be different in any way from what we believe it to be, and that no reasonable argument can be found for the rejection of the belief or for the admission of any deviation from it, then the belief is true. Renounce desires and habits, follow your reason, and study what I am going to say in the chapters which follow on the rejection of the attributes; you will then be fully convinced of what we have said: you will be of those who truly conceive the Unity of God, not of those who utter it with their lips without thought, like men of whom it has been said, "Thou art near in their mouth, and far from their reins" (Jer. 12:2). It is right that a man should belong to that class of men who have a conception of truth and understand it, though they do not speak of it. Thus the pious are advised and addressed, "Commune with your own heart upon your bed and be still. Selah." (Ps. 4:5.)

The Gemara offers support for this contention: Didn’t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, say: With regard to a stalk of cabbage that has hardened, one must allow a beit rova of space for it, in which no other seeds may be planted. Apparently, since it will ultimately harden, one must give it more space. Here too, in the case of the ḥazeret, it might have been thought that one is required to give it more space. Therefore, Rava teaches us that all types of bitter herbs, even lettuce, may be planted together in one bed without leaving additional space between each species.

With regard to a garden bed that is six by six handbreadths in area, one may plant in it five different types of seeds, four types on the four sides of the bed and one type in the middle. This mishna teaches that it is permitted to plant different types of seeds in one garden bed, provided that one maintains the appropriate distance between them. The Gemara explains: Rav’s statement is nevertheless necessary. Lest you say that that applies only to seeds, but with regard to vegetables, no, it is prohibited to plant them in a single garden bed even if this separation is maintained, Rava teaches us that it is permitted to plant in this manner with vegetables as well.

The Gemara asks: Could it even enter your mind that bitter herbs are types of seeds? But didn’t we learn the word vegetables in a mishna? And bar Kappara likewise taught: Vegetables. And furthermore, the Sage of the school of Shmuel taught: Vegetables. The Gemara explains: It was necessary for Rav to mention the status of ḥazeret. It could enter your mind to say that since ḥazeret ultimately hardens into a type of seed, one must therefore give it more space in a garden bed than other vegetables. Rav’s statement indicates that this is not the case.