Under what conditions should I report sexual misconduct?
Are there limits to the prohibition on speaking ill of others?
The Jewish ethical tradition establishes a high threshold for speech about others, even when the speech is true. But that does not mean Jewish tradition imposes silence on victims. In the signature book of the rabbinic authority known as the Chofetz Chaim (Rabbi Israel Meir Kagan, 1838-1933), there are seven criteria for determining when it is permissible and even imperative to speak out about the wrong-doing of others. When such criteria are met, the speech is not considered "leshon ha-ra," or evil speech; it is speech that is intended for good.
As we seek to develop new ethical guidelines centered on safety and justice, the criteria of the Chofetz Chaim can offer a foundation.
(א) (א) אִם אֶחָד רָאָה אָדָם, שֶׁעָשָׂה עַוְלָה לַחֲבֵרוֹ, כְּגוֹן שֶׁגְּזָלוֹ אוֹ עֲשָׁקוֹ אוֹ הִזִּיקוֹ, בֵּין אִם הַנִּגְזָל וְהַנִּזָּק (ב) יוֹדְעִים מִזֶּה אוֹ לֹא. אוֹ שֶׁבִּיְּשׁוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁצִּעֲרוֹ וְהוֹנָה אוֹתוֹ בִּדְבָרִים. (ג) וְנוֹדַע לוֹ בְּבֵרוּר, שֶׁלֹּא הֵשִׁיב לוֹ אֶת הַגְּזֵלָה וְלֹא שִׁלֵּם לוֹ אֶת נִזְקוֹ (ד) וְלֹא בִּקֵּשׁ פָּנָיו לְהַעֲבִיר לוֹ עַל עֲוֹנוֹ, אֲפִלּוּ רָאָה דָּבָר זֶה בִּיחִידִי, יָכוֹל לְסַפֵּר הַדְּבָרִים לִבְנֵי אָדָם כְּדֵי לַעֲזֹר לַאֲשֶׁר אָשַׁם לוֹ וּלְגַנּוֹת הַמַּעֲשִׂים הָרָעִים בִּפְנִי הַבְּרִיוֹת, אַךְ יִזָּהֵר, שֶׁלֹּא יַחְסְרוּ אֵלּוּ הַשִּׁבְעָה פְּרָטִים, שֶׁנְּבָאֲרֵם בְּסָמוּךְ.
(א) וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: א (ה) שֶׁיִּרְאֶה זֶה הַדָּבָר בְּעַצְמוֹ, וְלֹא עַל יְדֵי שְׁמִיעָה מֵאֲחֵרִים, אִם לֹא שֶׁנִּתְבָּרֵר לוֹ אַחַר כָּךְ, שֶׁהַדָּבָר אֱמֶת.
(ב) ב שֶׁיִּזָּהֵר מְאֹד, שֶׁלֹּא יַחְלִיט תֵּכֶף אֶת הָעִנְיָן בְּדַעְתּוֹ לְגְזֶל וְעשֶק אוֹ לְהֶזֵּק וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה, (ו) רַק יִתְבּוֹנִן הֵיטֵב אֶת עֶצֶּם הָעִנְיָן, אִם הוּא עַל פִּי דִּין בִּכְלַל גֶּזֶל אוֹ הֶזֵּק.
(ג) ג (ז) שֶׁיּוֹכִיחַ אֶת הַחוֹטֵא מִתְּחִלָּה (ח) וּבְלָשׁוֹן רַכָּה, אוּלַי יוּכַל לְהוֹעִיל לוֹ, וְיֵיטִיב עַל יְדֵי זֶה אֶת דְּרָכָיו, וְאִם לֹא יִשְׁמַע לוֹ, אָז יוֹדִיעַ לָרַבִּים אֶת אַשְׁמַת הָאִישׁ הַזֶּה, מַה שֶּׁהֵזִיד עַל רֵעֵהוּ. (וְאִם יוֹדֵעַ בּוֹ, שֶׁלֹּא יְקַבֵּל תּוֹכַחְתּוֹ, יְבֹאַר לְקַמָּן, אִם יִרְצֶה ה', בְּסָעִיף ז').
(ד) ד (ט) שֶׁלֹּא יַגְדִּיל הָעַוְלָה יוֹתֵר מִמַּה שֶּׁהִיא.
(ה) ה (י) שֶׁיְּכַוֵּן לְתוֹעֶלֶת, וּכְמוֹ שֶׁנְּבָאֵר לְקַמָּן בְּסָעִיף ד', וְלֹא לֵהָנוֹת, חַס וְשָׁלוֹם, מֵהַפְּגָם הַהוּא, שֶׁהוּא נוֹתֵן בַּחֲבֵרוֹ, וְלֹא מִצַּד שִׂנְאָה, שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ עָלָיו מִכְּבָר.
(ו) ו אִם הוּא (יא) יָכוֹל לְסַבֵּב אֶת הַתּוֹעֶלֶת הַזֹּאת גּוּפָא {עצמה} בְּעֵצָּה אַחֶרֶת, שֶׁלֹּא יִצְּטָרֵךְ לְסַפֵּר אֶת עִנְיַן הַלָשׁוֹן הָרָע עָלָיו, אֲזַי בְּכָל גַּוְנִי אָסוּר לְסַפֵּר.
(ז) ז (יב) שֶׁלֹּא יְסוֹבֵב עַל יְדֵי הַסִפּוּר הֶזֵּק לְהַנִּדּוֹן יוֹתֵר מִכְּפִי הַדִּין, שֶׁהָיָה יוֹצֵּא, אִלּוּ הוּעַד עָלָיו בְּאֹפֶן זֶה עַל דָּבָר זֶה בְּבֵית דִּין, וּבֵאוּר דָּבָר זֶה עַיֵּן לְקַמָּן בְּהִלְכוֹת רְכִילוּת בִּכְלָל ט', כִּי שָׁם מְקוֹמוֹ.
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(א) הַפְּרָט הַחֲמִישִׁי, שֶׁכָּתַבְנוּ לְעֵיל, שֶׁיְּכַוֵּן לְתוֹעֶלֶת, הוּא כְּמוֹ שֶׁנְּבָאֵר, דְּהַיְנוּ לָא מִבָּעֵי {לא זו בלבד} אִם הָאֲנָשִׁים, שֶׁהוּא מְסַפֵּר לִפְנֵיהֶם יְכוֹלִים הֵם (יד) לַעֲזֹר לַנִּגְזָל וְהַנֶּעֱשָׁק וְהַנִּזָּק וְהַמִּתְבַּיֵּשׁ בְּעִנְיָנָם, בְּודַּאי נָכוֹן לַעֲשׂוֹת הדָּבָר כֵּן. וַאֲפִלּוּ אִם הַתּוֹעֶלֶת הַזֹּאת לֹא תּוּכַל לְהַגִּיעַ עַל יְדֵי סִפּוּרוֹ, (טו) רַק שֶׁהוּא מִתְכַּוֵּן שֶׁיִּתְרַחֲקוּ בְּנֵי אָדָם מִדֶּרֶךְ רֶשַׁע כְּשֶׁיִּשְׁמְעוּ, שֶׁהַבְּרִיּוֹת מְגַנּוֹת פּוֹעֲלֵי אָוֶן, וְאוּלַי הוּא בְּעַצְמוֹ יָשׁוּב עַל יְדֵי זֶה מִדְּרָכָיו הָרָעִים וִיתַקֵּן מַעֲשָׂיו, כְּשֶׁיִּשְׁמַע, שֶׁהַבְּרִיּוֹת מְגַנּוֹת אוֹתוֹ עֲבוּר זֶה, גַּם זֶה אֵינֶנּוּ בִּכְלַל לָשׁוֹן הָרָע, וּלְתוֹעֶלֶת יֵחָשֵׁב, (טז) כֵּיוָן שֶׁעַל כָּל פָּנִים אֵין מְכַוֵּן לֵהָנוֹת מֵהַפְּגָם הַהוּא שֶׁהוּא נוֹתֵן בַּחֲבֵרוֹ, רַק לְקַנִּא לָאֱמֶת, וְאוּלַי תָּבוֹא עַל יְדֵי זֶה תּוֹעֶלֶת עַל לְהַבָּא.
If one saw a person harming a friend, whether robbing them, oppressing them, or causing them damage— whether the one robbed or caused damage knew of it or not — or shaming them or aggrieving them, or wronging them with words, and it became known to one clearly that the theft was not returned and the damage was not redressed and they were not sought out for forgiveness for the transgression, then even if one saw this thing alone, one can relate it to others in order to help them who were wronged and to condemn these evil deeds before people; but take care not to fall short with regard to seven criteria which we shall now explain:
(1) One should see the thing oneself and not hear of it from others, unless it becomes clear to one afterwards that the thing is true.
(2) One should take great care not to immediately determine that the matter is theft, or oppression, or damage, and the like, but rather examine the essence of the matter well, determining whether it is theft or damage according to the law.
(3) One should first gently reprove the sinner— perhaps it will help them and they will rectify their ways. And if they do not listen, then one should apprise the public of this person's guilt — how they deliberately harmed their friend.
(And if one knows that the reproof will not be accepted — this will be explained below, God willing, in section 7.)
(4) One should not exaggerate the wrong beyond what it is.
(5) One's intention should be for good, and not (as is explained below), God forbid, to benefit oneself from this fault ascribed to a friend, and not out of personal hatred.
(6) If one can bring about the desired good in another way, without needing to tell of the matter that is evil speech about a person, then, in all instances, it is forbidden to tell.
(7) One should not cause through the telling more damage to the one spoken about than is appropriate—than that would come out if this matter was adjudicated in court.
[...]
The fifth criterion that we wrote of above, namely, that one's intention be for good, is as we shall explain: It is not necessary that the people to whom one tells [the story] can help the one who was robbed, or oppressed, or damaged, or shamed—[If this condition is met,] then certainly it is correct to do this [i.e., to expose the perpetrator]. But even if this benefit cannot result through one's telling, and one only intends to distance people from the way of wickedness when they hear—since people condemn those who do wrong—and perhaps even the one [who is spoken of] will repent of evil ways and correct his actions once he hears people condemning him, this is still not considered "lashon ha-ra" and can be considered a good intention, since in any case, one is not intending to benefit from the fault ascribed to a friend but only to be zealous for the truth, so perhaps some future benefit will result.
1. The Chofetz Chaim distinguishes between good and evil intentions for speaking about wrongdoing. What are some of the good intentions for speaking out about sexual misconduct and abuse? Do you find any of them reflected in the passage above?
2. At the beginning of the passage, there is a long list of harms that one person causes another: "Robbing them, oppressing them, or causing them damage (whether the one robbed or caused damage knew of it or not), shaming them, aggrieving them, wronging them with words." Sexual misconduct and abuse are not listed specifically. To what degree do you think the Chofetz Chaim's guidance applies to this kind of harm? Are there other considerations that are specific to the trauma of gender-based misconduct and sexual abuse?
3. According to #7 above, speaking out about the wrongdoing should not cause more harm to the perpetrator than the appropriate penalty that would be meted out by the court. But "the court of public opinion" is often much harsher than an actual court, especially on social media. What are measures one can take to try to meet this requirement?