Drabanans

Should the court be considered to have misused consecrated property, as it is their ordinance that granted the husband ownership? Certainly not, because when the Sages instituted the ordinance, and they said that a husband is considered to be like a buyer of his wife’s property, that was only with regard to non-sacred items, which are permitted for him to use. But with regard to consecrated property, which it is prohibited for him to use, the Sages did not institute the ordinance.

The mishna relates: At the conclusion of all blessings recited in the Temple, those reciting the blessing would say: Blessed are You Lord, God of Israel, until everlasting [haolam], the world. But when the Sadducees strayed and declared that there is but one world and there is no World-to-Come, the Sages instituted that at the conclusion of the blessing one recites: From everlasting [haolam] to everlasting [haolam].

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: Joshua stipulated ten conditions when he apportioned Eretz Yisrael among the tribes:

The conditions are that people shall have the right to graze their animals in forests, even on private property; and that they shall have the right to gather wood from each other’s fields, to be used as animal fodder; and that they shall have the right to gather wild vegetation for animal fodder in any place except for a field of fenugreek; and that they shall have the right to pluck off a shoot anywhere for propagation and planting, except for olive shoots; and that the people of the city shall have the right to take supplies of water from a spring on private property, even from a spring that emerges for the first time; and that they shall have the right to fish in the Sea of Tiberias, i.e., the Sea of Galilee, provided that the fisherman does not build an underwater fence to catch fish, thereby causing an impediment to boats.

The baraita continues the list of Joshua’s ten conditions: And people shall have the right to relieve themselves outdoors behind a fence, even in a field that is full of saffron [karkom]; and they shall have the right to walk in permitted paths, i.e., those paths that cut through a private field, throughout the summer until the second rainfall, when crops begin to sprout; and they shall have the right to veer off to the sides of the roads onto private property because of hard protrusions [yeteidot] of the road; and one who becomes lost among the vineyards shall have the right to cut down branches and enter an area of the vineyard, or cut down branches and exit an area of the vineyard, until he finds his way back to the road; and that a corpse with no one to bury it [met mitzva] acquires its place and is buried where it was found.

§ The Sages taught: Initially, anyone who found a lost item would proclaim his find for three pilgrimage Festivals and for seven days after the last of the three pilgrimage Festivals, so that its owner will go to his home, a trip lasting up to three days, and will return to Jerusalem, a trip lasting up to three days, and proclaim his loss for one day. But from the time that the Temple was destroyed, may it be rebuilt speedily in our days, the Sages instituted that those who find lost items shall proclaim their finds in synagogues and study halls. And from the time that the oppressors proliferated, the Sages instituted an ordinance that one who finds a lost item shall inform his neighbors and acquaintances, and that will suffice for him.

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: From the time that the oppressors proliferated? The Gemara answers: It is from the time that they say: A lost item belongs to the king. The Sages were concerned that any public proclamation would result in confiscation of the lost item. The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ami found a vessel full of dinars. A certain Roman saw that he was wary and hesitant to take it. The Roman said to him: Go, take it for yourself; as we are not Persians, who say that a lost item belongs to the king.

The Sages taught in a baraita on this topic: At first, they would place the phylacteries in the holes adjacent to the bathroom, and mice would come and take them or gnaw upon them. Therefore, they instituted that they should place them in the holes adjacent to the public domain, where there were no mice. However, passersby would come and take the phylacteries. Ultimately, they instituted that one should hold the phylacteries in his hand and enter.

The Gemara cites yet another relevant source. Come and hear, as Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov said: I have heard that the reason why the court may administer lashes and punish not by Torah law, i.e., in response to actions for which one is not liable to receive punishment by Torah law, is not so as to transgress matters of Torah, but to establish a safeguard for the Torah. And an example of this is an incident involving a certain person who rode on a horse on Shabbat in the days of the Greeks, an act that is prohibited by rabbinic law, and they brought him to the court and they stoned him as a desecrator of Shabbat. They did so not because he was deserving of this, as riding a horse is not punishable by stoning by Torah law, but because the hour required it, as at that time Jews were negligent with regard to Shabbat observance.

Now we will explain the levels of the [positive and negative] commandments and the allotment of the punishments: The first level is the severity of the words of the Scribes: We were obligated by the Torah to accept the ordinances of the prophets and the judges, to obey the words of sages and to be careful with their fences, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:11), “you must not deviate from the thing that they tell you either to the right or to the left.” And even though we have also been warned by the Torah to be steadfast to do everything that they instructed us, nevertheless positive commandments [directly] from the Torah are more weighty than their words - since the essence of the thing is mentioned explicitly in the scroll of God’s Torah, and God, may He be blessed, commanded it specifically. But there are ways and angles in which words of the Scribes are more weighty than the words of the Torah - like our Rabbis, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 88b), “(With regards to the rulings of the rebellious elder,) there is greater stringency to the words of the Scribes than to the words of the Torah. For one who states, ‘There is no commandment to don tefillin’ - to transgress the words of the Torah - is exempt. But [one who says,] ‘There are five compartments’ - to add to the words of the Scribes - is liable”; [and] (Berakhot 4b), “Anyone who transgresses the words of the Scribes is liable for the death penalty.”

The Gemara answers: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos: This oath is instituted by rabbinic law in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This oath, administered in the case of two people holding a garment, is an ordinance instituted by the Sages so that everyone will not go and seize the garment of another and say: It is mine.

And this is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: One who says:

I do not want to avail myself of the ordinance of the Sages that was instituted on my behalf, such as in this scenario, we listen to him.

The Gemara asks: What is referred to by the words: Such as in this scenario? What case did Rava refer to that he indicated that in similar situations the halakha is the same? The Gemara explains that Rava was referring to that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: A woman can say to her husband: I do not wish to be sustained by you, and I will not do work for you. Although the Sages instituted on her behalf that she would be sustained in exchange for her work, she has the choice of waiving that right if she prefers to retain her earnings. Rava adds that in any similar case where the Sages instituted an ordinance for one’s benefit, he can say that he does not wish to accept this rabbinic ordinance if it does not assist him.

§ The Gemara discusses the background for the rule that the husband’s property is mortgaged for the marriage contract. Rav Yehuda said: At first they would write for a virgin two hundred dinars and for a widow one hundred dinars. They would then demand that this amount be available in cash, and then the men would grow old and would not marry women, as they did not all possess such large sums of money, until Shimon ben Shataḥ came and instituted an ordinance that a man need not place the money aside in practice. Rather, all of his property is guaranteed for her marriage contract.

MISHNA: Originally, during the Temple era, the lulav was taken in the Temple for seven days, and in the rest of the country outside the Temple it was taken for one day. Once the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted an ordinance that the lulav should be taken even in the rest of the country for seven days, in commemoration of the Temple.

MISHNA: If the members of the Great Sanhedrin in Jerusalem are not familiar with that one who saw the new moon, i.e., that he is a valid witness, the members of his local court of twenty-three send another with him to testify about him. The mishna adds: Initially, the court would accept testimony to determine the start of the month from any person, as all are presumed to be qualified witnesses, absent any disqualifying factors. However, when the Boethusians, a sect whose members had their own opinions with regard to the establishment of the Festivals, corrupted the process by sending false witnesses to testify about the new moon, the Sages instituted that they would accept this testimony only from those men familiar to the Sanhedrin as valid witnesses.

When the Temple was destroyed, the sages instituted (the rule) that the bridegrooms and mourners should go to the synagogues and to the houses of study. The men of the place see the bridegroom and rejoice with him; and they see the mourner and sit with him upon the earth, so that all the Israelites may discharge their duty in the service of loving-kindness. With reference to them he says: Blessed art Thou, who giveth a good reward to those who show loving-kindness.

The Supreme Court in Jerusalem represents the essence of the Oral Torah. Its members are the pillars of direction; law and order emanate from them to all of Israel. Concerning them the Torah assures us, as it is written: "You shall act in accordance with the directions they give you" (Deuteronomy 17:11). This is a positive command. Anyone who believes in Moses, our teacher, and in his Torah, must relate religious practices to them and lean upon them.

— — Whether their direction is based upon what they have learned from tradition, referred to as the Oral Torah, or it is derived from what they have independently discovered by means of any of the rules whereby the Torah is interpreted, and meets with their approval, or it is in the form of temporary regulations designed to preserve the biblical laws, measures consisting of decrees and ordinances and customs, we are biblically commanded to obey our sages with regard to any of these three categories. Whoever disregards one of them breaks a prohibitive command.— —

There has never been dissension [among the sages] with regard to laws handed down by tradition. Anything concerning which there has been dissension is certainly not a tradition dating back to Moses, our teacher. Rules derived by rational inference, if sanctioned by all the members of the Supreme Court, are invested with authority indeed; if there is a divergence of opinion among the sages, we follow the majority and formulate the law according to the greater number. The same applies to the decrees, ordinances and customs : if some sages felt that it was appropriate to issue a decree or to enact an ordinance, or that the people should abandon a certain custom, and others felt that it was improper to issue that decree or to enact that ordinance, or that the people should not discontinue that custom, they would debate the subject and follow the majority opinion, formulating the law according to the greater number.

When the Supreme Court was in existence, there was no religious dissension among the people of Israel. If doubt came to the mind of a Jew concerning any law, he consulted the court of his home town. If they knew, they told him; if not, he was joined by that court or its agents and together they went up to Jerusalem where they submitted the question to the court that was situated at the entrance of the Temple Mount. If they knew, they told him; if not, they all proceeded to the court at the entrance of the Temple Court. If they knew, they told them; if not, they all went to the Supreme Court which occupied the chamber of hewn stone, and put the question to the judges. If the law concerning which they were all in doubt was known to the Supreme Court, either from tradition or from a principle of biblical interpretation, they stated it immediately. If the members of the Supreme Court were uncertain about that specific law, they dealt with it in their own time, and debated it until they eventually reached unanimous agreement or passed the measure by vote, following the majority opinion, and told all the questioners: "This is the law." And they went away. When, however, the Supreme Court ceased to exist, religious dissension increased in Israel: one scholar would declare a thing unclean and give a reason for his statement, while another would declare it clean and give a reason for his statement; one would forbid, while the other would permit.

If two scholars, or two courts of law, whether contemporary or not, are in disagreement at a time when a Sanhedrin is nonexistent, or before a specific law has become clear to the Sanhedrin, follow the stringent view with regard to biblical law and the lenient view with regard to rabbinic law, if you do not know which way the law is prone.

If a Supreme Court issued a decree or enacted an ordinance or introduced a custom, which has become widespread throughout Israel, and a subsequent court desires to abolish the instructions of the predecessors and to eradicate that particular ordinance, decree or custom, it cannot do so, unless it is superior both in wisdom and in number. If it exceeds the other court in wisdom but not in number, or in number but not in wisdom, it cannot annul its instructions. Even if the reason for which the predecessors introduced the decree or ordinance exists no more, the successors cannot revoke anything introduced by the predecessors unless they exceed them. But how can any Supreme Court exceed another in number when each Supreme Court consists of seventy-one members? The reference is to the number of contemporary sages who have agreed to accept the decision of the Supreme Court, or have not opposed it.

The court has the power to suspend even these rules for a term even if it is lesser than the earlier court, for these [rabbinic] decrees must not be more rigorous [in their application] than Torah law. Any court has the authority to suspend the law in an emergency. How so? A court that determines that to strengthen the law/religion and to make a fence so that the masses do not violate Torah law, has the authority to flog [offenders] without warrant authorized by positive law. But they do not establish this [deflection] from positive statute in permanence and do not declare that such and such is the law. And similarly, if they [the members of the court] determine to nullify [le-batel] a positive commandment or to transgress a negative commandment in order to cause the masses to return to law/religion or to prevent the majority of Israel from stumbling [i.e., sinning] in other [similarly serious] matters, [the court] does so [suspend the positive law]. For just as the doctor amputates a limb or foot in order that a patient survives, similarly, the court rules at any time to transgress a few commandments for a term in order that the masses may one day return and fulfil [all] the commandments. Thus, any court may rule, at any time [zeman min ha-zemanim], to violate some commandments temporarily, in order to sustain them all [i.e., all of the commandments], as was commanded40 by the early sages, violate one Sabbath so that one may observe many Sabbaths.

One who does not believe in the Oral Torah is not to be identified with the rebellious elder spoken of in the Torah, but is classed with the epicureans (heretics).— —

The rebellious elder mentioned in the Torah is indeed one of the sages of Israel, who is familiar with the traditional lore, acts as judge, and instructs in subjects of Torah, as do all the wise men of Israel; but he has disagreed with the Supreme Court on a point of law, refusing to yield to their point of view. Instead, he has opposed them and taught others to act contrary to the court's ruling. The Torah has condemned him to death, and if he confesses before being executed he has a share in the world to come. Although he argues just as well as they do, he received the traditional lore just as well as they did, yet the Torah has honored them [favoring their view]. Even if the members of the court are willing to forego their honor and leave him alone, they cannot do so, in order to prevent many dissensions in Israel.

A rebellious elder is not guilty of death unless he is one of the sages of Israel, fit to render decisions, having been ordained by the Sanhedrin, and he is opposed to the court on a matter punishable by kareth for willful action, and by a sin-offering for action in error.— — But if he is a student who has not yet reached the stage of rendering decisions, and he has given a decision concerning what should be done, he is not liable, as it is written: "If a case is too baffling for you to decide" (Deuteronomy 17:8) ; that is, one who is capable of solving any problem except a superior one.

If the elder is the chief scholar of the court, and he differed, imparting his views to others persistently but giving no decision concerning what should be done, he is not liable, as it is written: "The man who acts presumptuously" (12); not that he says something presumptuously, but instructs others to act, or himself, acts presumptuously.

If the elder is the chief scholar of the court, and he differed, imparting his views to others persistently but giving no decision concerning what should be done, he is not liable, as it is written: "The man who acts presumptuously" (12); not that he says something presumptuously, but instructs others to act, or himself, acts presumptuously.

The Supreme Court in Jerusalem represents the essence of the Oral Torah. Its members are the pillars of direction; law and order emanate from them to all of Israel. Concerning them the Torah assures us, as it is written: "You shall act in accordance with the directions they give you" (Deuteronomy 17:11). This is a positive command. Anyone who believes in Moses, our teacher, and in his Torah, must relate religious practices to them and lean upon them.

— — Whether their direction is based upon what they have learned from tradition, referred to as the Oral Torah, or it is derived from what they have independently discovered by means of any of the rules whereby the Torah is interpreted, and meets with their approval, or it is in the form of temporary regulations designed to preserve the biblical laws, measures consisting of decrees and ordinances and customs, we are biblically commanded to obey our sages with regard to any of these three categories. Whoever disregards one of them breaks a prohibitive command.— —

There has never been dissension [among the sages] with regard to laws handed down by tradition. Anything concerning which there has been dissension is certainly not a tradition dating back to Moses, our teacher. Rules derived by rational inference, if sanctioned by all the members of the Supreme Court, are invested with authority indeed; if there is a divergence of opinion among the sages, we follow the majority and formulate the law according to the greater number. The same applies to the decrees, ordinances and customs : if some sages felt that it was appropriate to issue a decree or to enact an ordinance, or that the people should abandon a certain custom, and others felt that it was improper to issue that decree or to enact that ordinance, or that the people should not discontinue that custom, they would debate the subject and follow the majority opinion, formulating the law according to the greater number.

It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Ezra enacted for the Jewish people that they should read the portion of the curses that are recorded in Leviticus before Shavuot and the portion of the curses that are recorded in Deuteronomy before Rosh HaShana. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Abaye said, and some say that it was Reish Lakish who said: In order that the year may conclude together with its curses, and the new year may begin without the ominous reading of the curses.

§ Rav Yosef says that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi decreed that in the fields, i.e., in those distant places where there were no Torah scholars and whose residents were not well versed in the halakhot of menstruating women and did not know how to distinguish between the days of menstruation and the days of ziva, if she saw blood on one day, she must sit and count six days and that first day. She must observe six clean days without a discharge despite the possibility that she might have experienced bleeding only in her period of ziva, in which case she would be impure for only one day.

MISHNA: Initially, they would accept testimony to determine the start of the month throughout the entire thirtieth day from the beginning of the month of Elul, before Rosh HaShana, and if witnesses arrived from afar and testified that they had sighted the New Moon the previous night, they would declare that day the Festival.

Once, the witnesses tarried coming until the hour was late, and the Levites erred with regard to the song, i.e., the psalm that they were supposed to recite, as they did not know at the time whether it was a Festival or an ordinary weekday. From that point on, the Sages instituted that they would accept testimony to determine the start of the month only until minḥa time. If witnesses had not arrived by that hour, they would declare Elul a thirty-day month and calculate the dates of the Festivals accordingly.

And if witnesses came from minḥa time onward, although the calculations for the dates of the Festivals would begin from the following day, the people would nevertheless observe that day, on which the witnesses arrived, as sacred, so that in future years they would not treat the entire day as a weekday and engage in labor from the morning on the assumption that the witnesses will arrive only after minḥa time. And they would also observe the following day as sacred. On the second day, they observed Rosh HaShana in full, both by sacrificing its offerings as well as by calculating the upcoming Festivals from that date.

After the Temple was destroyed and there was no longer any reason for this ordinance, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that they would once again accept testimony to determine the start of the month the entire day.

Rather, if it was stated, this is how it was stated: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Due to what reason did the Sages in the mishna say that a virgin is married on Wednesday? It is so that if the husband had a claim concerning the bride’s virginity, he would go early the next day to court and make his claim. The Gemara asks: But if that is the reason, let her marry on Sunday, as then too, if the husband had a claim concerning the bride’s virginity, he would go early the next day to court and make his claim. The Gemara answers: The Sages were assiduous in seeing to the well-being of Jewish women and instituted that the wedding take place on Wednesday, so that the groom would exert himself in arranging the wedding feast for three days: Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, and on Wednesday, he marries her.

It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: I heard that the court may administer lashes and capital punishment, even when not required by Torah law. And they may not administer these punishments with the intention of violating the statement of the Torah, i.e., to disregard the punishment stated in the Torah and administer another punishment; rather, they may administer these punishments to erect a fence around the Torah, so that people will fear sinning.

And an incident occurred involving one who rode a horse on Shabbat during the days of the Greeks, and they brought him to court and stoned him, not because he deserved that punishment, as riding a horse on Shabbat is forbidden only by rabbinic decree, but because the hour required it, as people had become lax in their observance of Shabbat and therefore it became necessary to impose the severe punishment for a relatively minor offense. Another incident occurred involving a man who engaged in intercourse with his wife in public under a fig tree, and they brought him to court and flogged him, not because that punishment was fitting for him, as such conduct is not forbidden by the Torah, but because the hour required it. People had become remiss in matters of modesty; therefore, stringent measures had to be taken to rectify the situation.

§ It was stated: Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar: The Sages instituted the marriage contract for Jewish women: For a virgin two hundred dinars and for a widow one hundred dinars. And they deemed the groom credible in that if he says with regard to his virgin bride: I encountered an unobstructed orifice and she is not a virgin, he is deemed credible, causing her to lose her marriage contract. The Gemara asks: If so, and the Sages deemed him credible, what did the Sages accomplish in their ordinance that the marriage contract of a virgin is two hundred dinars, if his claim that she is not a virgin is effective?

Rava said: The ordinance is effective due to the presumption that a person does not exert himself to prepare a wedding feast and then cause it to be lost. Investing in the wedding preparations clearly indicates that the groom’s intention is to marry the bride and rejoice with her. If, nevertheless, he claims that she is not a virgin, apparently he is telling the truth.

§ A Sage taught in a baraita: Since payment of the marriage contract is a penalty instituted by the Sages, she may collect only from the husband’s land of the most inferior quality. The Gemara asks: A penalty? What penalty is there in a marriage contract? Rather, emend the baraita and say: Since it is a rabbinic ordinance and not a Torah obligation, she may collect only from the husband’s land of the most inferior quality. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The marriage contract of a woman is an obligation by Torah law.

Moreover, if the meaning of the text were to forbid adding to or taking away from the number of the commandments, how could the Rabbis say that the court may decide to suspend a biblical commandment, where the suspension involves merely non-feasance? Is the court allowed to violate the command not to diminish from it? Similarly, Solomon, who introduced the ‘erub and the washing of hands, was guilty of violating the commandment not to add thereto. In short, I do not see any evidence in the passages cited by Maimonides that immutability is a dogma of the Mosaic law at all, as Maimonides thinks.

Mar Zutra said that an allusion to this obligation is found in the verse “Thus you shall separate the children of Israel from their impurity” (Leviticus 15:31), which indicates that people must be warned to stay away from that which could cause them to become ritually impure. Rav Ashi said it is derived from the verse: “And you shall keep My charge” (Leviticus 18:30), which means that you must establish a safeguard for My charge, i.e., protective measures must be enacted to prevent people from transgressing halakha, a task that includes distancing people from ritual impurity by marking off graves, so that they not come to convey ritual impurity to teruma or other consecrated items.

And the other Sage, Rav Ḥinnana of Vardonia, why was he silent? He holds that when we say: All ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted parallel to Torah law, it is with regard to a matter that is rooted in the Torah, and upon which the Sages instituted an ordinance. However, with regard to a matter that is not rooted in the Torah, e.g., the halakhot of joining courtyards and merging alleyways, no, they did not institute the ordinances parallel to Torah law.

And the other Sage, Rav Ḥinnana of Vardonia, why was he silent? He holds that when we say: All ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted parallel to Torah law, it is with regard to a matter that is rooted in the Torah, and upon which the Sages instituted an ordinance. However, with regard to a matter that is not rooted in the Torah, e.g., the halakhot of joining courtyards and merging alleyways, no, they did not institute the ordinances parallel to Torah law.

But people would still peek and see it, and once again, if it turned white they would rejoice, and if it did not turn white they would be sad. Therefore, the Sages instituted that they should tie half of the strip to a rock near the place where the one who sent the scapegoat stood and half of it between the horns of the scapegoat, so that the people would not know what happened to the strip until after the conclusion of Yom Kippur. This ordinance was instituted by Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The song in the Torah, i.e., the Song at the Sea (Exodus 15:1–19), Moses and the Jewish people recited it when they ascended from the sea. The Gemara asks: And who said this hallel mentioned in the mishna, Psalms 113–118? The Gemara answers: The Prophets among them established this hallel for the Jewish people, that they should recite it on every appropriate occasion; and for every trouble, may it not come upon them, they recite the supplications included in hallel. When they are redeemed, they recite it over their redemption, as hallel includes expressions of gratitude for the redemption.

MISHNA: And Torah scrolls, phylacteries, or mezuzot are not purchased from the gentiles when they acquire these objects, if they request more than their actual monetary value,

for the betterment of the world, so as not to cause an increase in the theft of sacred Jewish ritual objects in order to sell them for large sums of money.

And if it is so that if one baked without having placed an eiruv for the joining of cooked foods, it is permitted to eat the bread, let the baraita simply teach: With regard to one who transgressed the prohibition and baked, it is permitted to eat the bread. Rav Adda bar Mattana said: There is no proof from here, as the tanna is teaching a remedy involving acting in a permitted manner, and is not teaching a remedy involving a prohibited act. The tanna did not want to teach that it is also possible to solve the problem in this proscribed manner.

With regard to the origins of the four blessings of Grace after Meals, Rav Naḥman said:
Moses instituted for Israel the first blessing of: Who feeds all, when the manna descended for them and they needed to thank God.
Joshua instituted the blessing of the land when they entered Eretz Yisrael.
David and Solomon instituted the third blessing: Who builds Jerusalem, in the following manner:
David instituted “…on Israel Your people and on Jerusalem Your city…” as he conquered the city,
and Solomon instituted “…on the great and Holy Temple…” as he was the one who built the Temple.
They instituted the blessing: Who is good and does good, at Yavne in reference to the slain Jews of the city of Beitar at the culmination of the bar Kokheva rebellion. They were ultimately brought to burial after a period during which Hadrian refused to permit their burial. As Rav Mattana said: On the same day that the slain of Beitar were brought to burial, they instituted the blessing: Who is good and does good, at Yavne. Who is good, thanking God that the corpses did not decompose while awaiting burial, and does good, thanking God that they were ultimately brought to burial.

Moses received the Torah at Sinai and transmitted it to Joshua, Joshua to the elders, and the elders to the prophets, and the prophets to the Men of the Great Assembly. They said three things: Be patient in [the administration of] justice, raise many disciples and make a fence round the Torah.

The Gemara explains: This is what we said, i.e., this is what we meant when we asked the question: Now, all of these days when the Megilla may be read were enacted by the members of the Great Assembly when they established the holiday of Purim itself. As, if it enters your mind to say that the members of the Great Assembly enacted only the fourteenth and fifteenth as days for reading the Megilla, is it possible that the later Sages came and uprooted an ordinance that was enacted by the members of the Great Assembly? Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Eduyyot 1:5) that a rabbinical court cannot rescind the statements of another rabbinical court, unless it is superior to it in wisdom and in number? No subsequent court was ever greater than the members of the Great Assembly, so it would be impossible for another court to rescind the enactments of the members of the Great Assembly.

To listen to the voice of the court at all times: To listen to the voice of the Great Court and to do all that they command us in the paths of the Torah - regarding the forbidden and the permitted, the impure and the pure, the liable and the exempt and in everything that appears to them to be a reinforcement and enhancement to our religion. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 17:10), "And you shall act according to the word that they tell you." And it is repeated adjacently (Deuteronomy 17:12) to strengthen the thing, "According to the instruction that they instruct you and to the judgement that they say to you shall you act." And there is no difference in this, whether the thing that they see is from their own intellects or is something that they extracted by one of the comparisons through which the Torah is expounded, or something that they agreed is from the secrets of the Torah or they see that the thing is like this in any other way - in everything, we are obligated to listen to them. And the proof that this is from the tally of positive commandments is their, may their memory be blessed, saying in Sifrei Devarim 154, "'And according to the judgement that they say to you shall you act' - this is a positive commandment."

From the roots of the commandments is that which we wrote in the Order of Mishpatim on the commandment to incline according to the many (Sefer HaChinukh 78).

From the laws of the commandment is, for example, that which they, may their memory be blessed, expounded (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 1:2), "'According to the instruction that they instruct you' - these are the decrees and the practices; 'and to the judgement' - these are the things they shall teach from the [Torah] law, through one of the methods that the Torah is expounded; 'from the thing they tell you' - this is the tradition that they received, one man from the mouth of another man." And [also] that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 88b) that at the time that the Great Court is in Jerusalem, any disagreement that existed in any court in its place is asked of the Great Court, and we act according to their word. But now that, on account of our iniquities, there is no court there, any disagreement that there be between the sages in our generations - and the ones that disagree be equal in wisdom - if we are not fit to decide among them and we do not know to where the judgement inclines, we should follow the stringent [opinion] concerning a Torah [law], and follow the lenient [opinion] in scribal (rabbinic) law. And that which they said (Mishnah Eduyot 1:5) that a court is not permitted to revoke that which was forbidden by a court that preceded it, even if it appears to its opinion that the thing is not forbidden according to the letter of the law - so long as it appears that the prohibition has spread in Israel - unless it is greater in wisdom and also in numbers (is composed of more judges) than the court that forbade the thing. And about what are these words speaking, that [the later court] can revoke [it] when [the later court] is greater than [the first court] in wisdom and numbers? When the earlier court did not forbid that thing in order to make a fence for the people for [other] prohibitions. And since this is the law, it is incumbent upon each and every court in its generation to examine the matter and investigate much and to pay attention to each [rabbinic] prohibition that it appears the generation is practicing, not to breach and instruct to be lenient about it (to permit it), lest the [court] that was before it forbade it to make a fence for the people, [and] knew that the thing is permissible by the letter of the law. And 'one who breaches a fence, etc.' And the rest of the details of the commandment are at the end of Sanhedrin (the chapter [entitled] HaNehenakin.)

And this commandment is practiced by males and females at the time that the Great Court is in Jerusalem, as all are commanded to do that which they instruct. And also included in this commandment is to listen and do like the commandment of the judge in each and every generation - meaning to say, the great sage that is with us in our times. And [it is] like they, may their memory be blessed, expounded (Rosh Hashanah 25b), "'To the judge that will be in those days' - Yiftach in his generation is like Shmuel in his generation"; meaning, that there is a commandment upon us to listen to the voice of Yiftach in his generation, [just] like to Shmuel in his generation. And one who transgresses this and does not listen to the counsel of the great in the wisdom of the Torah in the generation, 'according to everything that they instruct,' has violated a positive commandment; and his punishment is very great, as this is a strong pillar upon which the Torah rests. The matter is well-known to anyone who has intelligence.

To not stray from their words: That we were prevented from disagreeing with the masters of the tradition, peace be upon them, and from changing their words and to not remove ourselves from the commandments in all matters of the Torah. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 17:11), "you shall not stray from the matter that they tell you right or left." And they, may their memory be blessed, said in Sifrei Devarim 154, "'You shall not stray' - this is a negative commandment."

It is from the root of the commandments [that it is] because (see Ramban on Deuteronomy 17:11) the opinions of people are different from one another - never will many intellects agree on things. And the Master of all, blessed be He, knew that if the intention of the verses of the Torah would be given over to the hand of each and every human being - each man, according to his intelligence - every one of them will explain the words of the Torah according to his [own] rationale; and disagreement about the meaning of the commandments would increase in Israel, and the Torah will become like several Torahs - like the matter that I wrote on the commandment of "to incline towards the many" in the Order of Mishpatim (Sefer HaChinukh 78). Hence our God, who is the Master of all the wisdoms, made our Torah - the Torah of truth - perfect with this commandment; that we were commanded to act within [the Torah] according to the true understanding that was received by our early Sages, peace be upon them; and that we should listen to the sages present [now] that received their words, drank the words of their books, and exerted themselves with many exertions - day and night - to understand the depth of their words and the wonders of their opinions. And with this agreement, we will arrive at the true path in the knowledge of the Torah; and without it - if we are seduced after our thoughts and the poverty of our minds - we will not be successful at anything. And by way of the great truth and praise of this commandment, they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sifrei Devarim 154), "'You shall not stray from [it] right or left' - even if they tell say to you about right that it is left, do not stray from their commandments" - meaning to say that even if they err in one of the things, it is not fitting for us to differ with them. Rather, we should do like their mistake. And it is better to suffer one mistake, and everything be given over under their constant good opinion; and not that each and every one go according to his [own] opinion. As with [the latter], there would be destruction of the religion, dissent in the heart of the people and total loss of the nation. And because of these things, the intention of the Torah was given over to the sages of Israel. And from this root, they were also commanded that the small group of the sages is subordinate to the group of the numerous, and as I wrote there about the commandment of "to incline towards the many."

By way of this idea that I have raised for you, my son - through it, will I explain to you a certain homelitical teaching, which is in the end of the chapter [entitled] HaZahav in Bava Metzia 59b, regarding the story of Rabbi Eliezer the Great and the "oven of Achnai," which bewilders all who hear it. They said there, "Rabbi Natan met Eliyahu, etc. He said to him, 'What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do in that hour?' He said to him, 'He smiled and said, "My sons have vanquished Me..."'" - meaning that the Holy One, blessed be He, was happy that His sons were walking in the way of the Torah and its commandment, to incline after the many. And that which He said, "My sons have vanquished Me," God forbid that there is any victory before Him, blessed be He. Rather, the explanation about this idea is that in the debate of Rabbi Eliezer with his colleagues, the truth was with Rabbi Eliezer; and like the words of the heavenly voice (bat kol) that decided like him. But even though the truth was with him about this - because of his greater analysis over his colleagues - they could not completely fathom his opinion. And [so] they did not want to concede to him even after the heavenly voice; and they brought a proof from the law set in the Torah that commanded us to always go after the many - whether they say the truth or whether they are mistaken. And about this was the response of the Creator, blessed be He, "My sons have vanquished Me." Meaning, since they turned away from the true path - for Rabbi Eliezer had surmised the truth about this - and they came upon him from the power of the Torah commandment that I commanded them to always listen to the majority; if so, one must nonetheless concede to them this time - like their words - that the truth be absent. And behold, it is as if the Master of truth was defeated.

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 87a), that even though one who transgresses that which the Sages explained about the words of the Torah, transgresses this negative commandment of "you shall not stray"; nonetheless a man does not have the designation of a rebellious judge - known in the Gemara at the end of Sanhedrin 89a, who is liable for the death penalty - until he disagrees with the Great Court (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 3:5, 7), and that he is a sage that has reached [the level] of pronouncing decisions [and] is ordained like the [members of the] Sanhedrin, and that he disagrees with them on a matter the volitional transgression of which [brings] excision and the inadvertent violation of which [brings] a sin-offering, and he instructs to do according to his decision or [himself] does the act according to his decision, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:12), "who wantonly does" - and not that he only instructs. But if he is a student that has not reached [the level] of pronouncing decisions, and makes a decision; he is exempt, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:8), "If a matter is baffling to you" - one who only a baffling thing is beyond him. And so [too,] if he found them outside of the Compartment of Paved Stone (in the Temple) and he rebelled against them, he is exempt, as it is stated, "and you will arise and go up to the place" - teaching that the place causes (is a requirement for) the death penalty.

And the [law is like this], whether he disagrees about something that actually has excision for its volitional transgression (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 4:2) or something that brings to something that has excision for its volitional transgression. How is something that has excision for its volitional transgression? For example, that they disagreed about whether a certain woman is [sexually forbidden to a man] or not; if a certain blood renders impure or does not render impure; if a certain woman is [in the category of impurity called] zavah or is not a zavah; if a certain fat is forbidden or not and all that is similar to this. And how is something that brings to something that has excision for its volitional transgression? For example, that they disagreed about the intercalation of the year which [can] bring to the eating of chamets on Pesach; and so [too,] if they disagreed about a law in the monetary laws, such that according to one, the one took money from his fellow legally, and if he married a woman with it, she is married, and one [besides her husband] who has sexual relations with her volitionally is punished with excision, and when inadvertent, liable for a sin-offering, but according to the words of the other, he is exempt, and so [too,] in every matter in which money is to be extracted, such as those obligated by expropriations or evaluations, [the disagreement being about] whether they are liable to give [money] or not liable - that which they took from them [not according to the correct law] is theft, and if he marries a woman with it, she is not married; and so [too,] anything like this. And even if they disagreed about the laws of lashes, he is liable [to be a rebellious elder] as a result of them - as behold, according to the words of the one that [holds] he is not liable for lashes in court, they are obligated to pay the value of his injury, and he would legally take his payments from them.

And Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote about the matter of this negative commandment of "you shall not stray" (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 1:2) that it is one whether they are things that the Sages learned from the received tradition, or things they learned from their intellects through one of the methods through which the Torah is expounded or things done to make a fence for the Torah - and they are the decrees, the ordinances and the practices (see Rashi on Yoma 74a, s.v. ve'aliba) - in each one of these there things, it is a positive commandment to listen to them; and the one who transgresses any one of them transgresses a positive commandment and a negative commandment. And Ramban, may his memory be blessed, greatly took a hold upon him [about this] and said (in the Sefer HaMitzvot in his gloss on Shoresh 1): Behold, the rabbi holds that included in the negative commandment of "you shall not stray" is everything that is from the words of the Rabbis - whether it is a rabbinic commandment such as the reading of the Scroll [of Esther] or the Channukah light, or whether it is from the ordinances such as poultry meat with milk and the secondary sexual prohibitions; whether they are active positive, such as three prayers every day or a hundred blessings and lulav on [all] seven [days] in the borders (outside of the Temple), or they are negative, such as anything that is because of a rabbinic Shabbat prohibition on Shabbat and holidays, and so [too,] the second day of a holiday in the Diaspora and the [fast of the] Ninth of Av; and more generally, anything that the Talmud forbids or commands about. And behold, the rabbi builds a fortified wall around the words of the Sages, but it is 'like a spreading breach that occurs in a lofty wall, whose breaking comes sudden and swift'; as it is a rationale [that is found] wanting in many places in the Talmud. As behold, according to his opinion, one who uses what is connected to the ground on Shabbat, such as one who leans on a tree, or one who moves something from the sun to the shade or says to a gentile [to do work] and he does it or even if he takes a large step on Shabbat, he transgresses [both] a positive commandment and a negative commandment from the Torah, and he is fit to be lashed forty [lashes]. But the rabbi exempts him in the Book of Judges (Mishneh Torah, Laws of The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 18:2), because it is given to the warning of a death penalty by the court - as the death penalty of anyone who rebels against their words is with strangulation. And behold, according to his words, he should be lashed according to the opinion in the Talmud that says that we administer lashes for a negative commandment, given to the warning of a death penalty by the court - as is mentioned in the chapter [entitled], Mi Shehichshikh (Shabbat 154b). And according to that opinion, it is fitting to be very stringent in rabbinic laws, as they are all [from the] Torah. There is no difference at all between them and between the commandments explicit in the Scripture; and there [would] be nothing in the Torah more weighty than a rabbinic Shabbat prohibition which is of their words, except that which has a liability of excision or the death penalty by the court - but not anything that has the obligation of a positive commandment or a negative commandment. As behold, according to his opinion, there is the obligation of a positive commandment and a negative commandment in all of their words - the positive commandment of "And you shall act according to the thing that they tell you," and the negative commandment of "you shall not stray."

And behold it is seen that our Rabbis in all of the Gemara say the opposite of this. As behold, they determine all rabbinic cases leniently, as they always say (Beitzah 3b), "A doubt of Torah [law] is to be [ruled] stringent and a doubt of rabbinic [law] is to be [ruled] lenient. And they were lenient regarding a concern of rabbinically forbidden [products being present in a certain food], to say, "As I say" (that we can assume that it is not present). And they said in the first chapter of Pesachim 9b, "I will say that we say, 'As I say,' in a rabbinic [law]; in a Torah [law], can we say, 'As I say?'" And they relied upon minors who are not fit to testify, to testify on that which is rabbinic, as they said (Pesachim 4b), "The checking for chamets is rabbinic, and the Rabbis relied upon them in rabbinic [laws]." And so [too,] regarding perimeters, a minor is believed to say, "The perimeter of Shabbat is to here," [as they] "held that perimeters are rabbinic, and the Rabbis were lenient in the rabbinic," as it is found in Eruvin 58b and in Ketuvot 28b. And they were also likewise lenient in the rabbinic with doubts, as they, may their memory be blessed, said (Berakhot 21a), "[If] there is a doubt if he prayed or if he did not pray, he does not go back and pray; [if] there is a doubt if he said, 'True and solid' or he did not say it, he goes back" - and they said, "What is the reason? Prayer is rabbinic; 'True and solid' is from the Torah." And not only that, but they were even lenient about things that contradict each other in rabbinic [law] - as they said in the chapter [entitled] Bemeh Madlikin (Shabbat 34a), "[If] two [people] said to him, 'Go out and make an eruv for us'; he made an eruv for one while it was still day, etc.," as it appears there. And it is also seen in the Gemara that we constantly uproot their words on account of a Torah prohibition; as they said in Tractate Shabbat 4a, "If he stuck bread onto an oven [wall], they permitted him to scrape it off before he comes to a prohibition [that is punished with] stoning." And there in Shabbat 128b they said, "Negating a vessel from its preparedness is rabbinic, but the pain of animals is [from] the Torah, and a positive commandment [from] the Torah comes and negates a positive commandment [from] the Rabbis," as it appears there. And this is [something seen] very much in the Talmud - a positive commandment [from] the Torah comes and pushes off a positive commandment [from] the Rabbis. And so [too] with a disagreement among the Sages, they said (Avodah Zarah 7a), "If one [group] was greater in wisdom, follow it; and if not, follow the stringent [one] in that of the Torah, and the lenient in that of the [Rabbis]." And even greater than this, they said (Eruvin 67b), "In that of the [Rabbis,] we first do the act, and then we deliberate." And in the chapter [entitled], Mi Shehichshikh (Shabbat 154b), they said, "What is it that you would say? They were also concerned with a small loss. Hence, it makes us hear" - as it is a novelty with them when they do not push off the words of the [Rabbis], even for a small loss. And they said (Berakhot 19b) that priests can render themselves impure with rabbinic impurity to see kings of the nations of the world; so that if they merit [it], they will differentiate that [which separates] the kings of Israel, etc. And also regarding the punishments of the words of the [Rabbis], they only have excommunication, as they said (Pesachim 52), "We excommunicate for the two days of holiday in the Diaspora." And they said about one who does work on Purim, "Let the master excommunicate him." And in [some] places, they have lashes of rebellion, and that is for one that transgress their words that are similar to [commandments] of the Torah - and those are all the decrees that they decreed from their [own] words - that they lash him until he accepts it upon him or until his soul departs, as is explained in the Tosefta of Sanhedrin. The general rule of the matter is that the words of the [Rabbis] are different in all of their laws from the words of the Torah, that [the one tends] towards leniency, and [the other] towards stringency. But the thing that is clear and clean of any confusion is that this negative commandment of "you shall not stray" is only in that which they, may their memory be blessed, said in explanation of the Torah - such as things that are expounded through a gezerah shavah or a binyan av or the rest of the thirteen methods through which the Torah is expounded; or about the meaning of the language of the verse itself - and so [too] regarding that which they received as a law of Moshe from Sinai. And it is about this that they, may their memory be blessed, said that there is a positive commandment and a negative commandment in the thing. And if in this matter, one fitting to pronounce decisions disagrees with the Great Court about that which the volitional transgression [brings] excision and the inadvertent violation [brings] a sin-offering, he becomes a rebellious elder through them - at a time when we judge capital cases. And this is [the meaning of] that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sifrei Devarim 154), "Even if they tell you about the left that it is right"; meaning to say that this is the commandment upon us from the Master of the Torah, may He be blessed - that we believe the greats regarding what they say, and that the one who disagrees not say, "How can I permit it for myself, since I know with certainty that they are mistaken?" As even if it will be such, it is a commandment to listen to them - as I wrote above at the beginning of the commandment - and like the matter that Rabban Gamliel conducted with Rabbi Yehoshua on Yom Kippur that fell out according to [the latter's] calculation, as is mentioned in Rosh Hashanah 25a.

And there is one condition about this law according to that which they, may their memory be blessed, said in Tractate Horayot 2b, that if at the time of the Sanhedrin, there was a wise man who was fitting to pronounce decisions or was part of the Sanhedrin, and the Great Court decided not like his opinion, he is not allowed to permit himself the matter that is forbidden according to his opinion, until he gives and takes (discusses) with them about the thing, and after they all - or their majority - agree to the negation of that opinion, confound his rationale against him and come to the conclusion that he is mistaken; [only] then is he allowed to act for himself according to the permissibility about that which it was his opinion to forbid - and it is also a commandment upon this one to accept their opinion regardless. But with the ordinances and the decrees that the Sages made as a protection of the Torah and as its fence, this negative commandment is only a [recommendation], and there is no law of rebellion about them at all. And the rest of the details of the commandment are elucidated at the end of Sanhedrin ([in the] chapter [entitled] HaNehenakin).

And this commandment is practiced concerning the matter of the rebellious elder at the time of the [Temple]. And concerning the matter to listen to the words of our ancient Sages and to our greats in the wisdom of the Torah and to our judges in our generation, it is practiced in all places and at all times by males and females. And one who transgress this and 'breaches a fence' in one of all of that which our Rabbis taught us in explanation of the Torah - such as through one of the thirteen methods or something forbidden from a law of Moshe from Sinai, and like the matter that we wrote adjacently - has violated this negative commandment, besides violating the positive commandment in it. But we do not administer lashes for it, since it is given to the warning of a death penalty by the court with the law of the rebellious elder, and as we wrote.

To appoint a king from Israel: That we were commanded to appoint upon ourselves a king from Israel, so that he can gather us all together and administer us according to his desire. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 17:15), "Surely place upon yourself a king, etc." And in Sifrei Devarim 157, "'Surely place upon yourself a king' is a positive commandment."

I have written from the roots of the commandment in the Order of Mishpatim on the negative commandment of the chieftain (Sefer HaChinukh 71). And there I wrote at length about the benefit that is found for a people in there being one person upon them as the head and as the officer; as the order of the people will not be preserved without this. And behold, you see in the books of the Prophets that it comes as a curse when many people are the head in one place - and as it is written (see the book of Judges 9).

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings and Wars 1:3) that we do not a priori set up a king in Israel except by the word of a court of seventy elders and by the word of a prophet - like Yehoshua, as Moshe, our teacher, and his court appointed him; and like Shaul and David, as Shmuel HaRamati and his court appointed them. And [also] that which they said (in Sifrei Devarim 157), that we do not set up a woman to the monarchy, as it is stated, "a king" - and not a queen. And when they would set up a king, they would anoint him with anointing oil (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings and Wars 1:7). And once he has been appointed, he acquires the monarchy for himself and for his sons, as it is written (Deuteronomy 17:20), "in order that he will have length of days upon his monarchy; he and his sons, among Israel." If he [only] left over a minor son, we preserve the monarchy for him until he grows up, as Yehoyada did for Yoash. And anyone who is precedent for the inheritance is precedent for the inheritance of the monarchy. And the big son precedes the small son. And it is not just the monarchy, but all positions of authority - in actuality or as an honorary title from the honorary titles - and all appointments in Israel are an inheritance for a man, such that his son acquires it after him, and his son's son, and his son's son's son forever. And this is when he fills the place of his fathers with the fear of Heaven. But if there is no fear of Heaven in him - even though he has great wisdom - there is no need to say that we do not appoint him to an appointment of the appointments in Israel, but it is [even] fitting to hate him and distance him. And about them, David stated (Psalms 5:6), "[You] have hated all doers of iniquity."

I have written from the roots of the commandment in the Order of Mishpatim on the negative commandment of the chieftain (Sefer HaChinukh 71). And there I wrote at length about the benefit that is found for a people in there being one person upon them as the head and as the officer; as the order of the people will not be preserved without this. And behold, you see in the books of the Prophets that it comes as a curse when many people are the head in one place - and as it is written (see the book of Judges 9).

And this commandment is practiced when Israel is on their land - and like they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 20b), "Israel was commanded three commandments in their entering into the land: to appoint a king over themselves, to build the Choice House and to cut off the seed of Amalek." And do not ruminate about my words, my son, to say, "And how can my father count this as one of the commandments practiced by [all] the generations? And is it not that since King David was anointed, that this commandment was withdrawn from Israel; since it is not upon them to appoint another king, as David and his seed are the elevated ones over them 'until Shilo comes,' that the king be from his seed forever - may it be speedily and in our days?" As the content of this commandment is not only to appoint a new king; but rather from its content is all that we have have mentioned - to anoint a new king if there is a cause that necessitates it - but also to set up the monarchy in the hand of the inheritor, to put his fear upon us, to behave [towards] him in everything according to the Torah and according to the well-known commandment. And this is truthfully practiced forever.

I have written from the roots of the commandment in the Order of Mishpatim on the negative commandment of the chieftain (Sefer HaChinukh 71). And there I wrote at length about the benefit that is found for a people in there being one person upon them as the head and as the officer; as the order of the people will not be preserved without this. And behold, you see in the books of the Prophets that it comes as a curse when many people are the head in one place - and as it is written (see the book of Judges 9).

§ The Sages taught that Ezra the Scribe instituted ten ordinances: He instituted that communities read the Torah on Shabbat in the afternoon; and they also read the Torah on every Monday and Thursday; and the courts convene and judge every Monday and Thursday; and one does laundry on Thursday; and one eats garlic on Shabbat eve. And Ezra further instituted that a woman should rise early and bake bread on those days when she wants to bake; and that a woman should don a breechcloth; and that a woman should first comb her hair and only then immerse in a ritual bath after being ritually impure; and that peddlers of cosmetics and perfumes should travel around through all the towns. And Ezra further instituted the requirement of immersion for those who experienced a seminal emission.

And [also] that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 19b), "'Surely place upon yourself a king' - that his fear should be upon you"; meaning to say that we fear him, trust his words in every matter that he does not command against the commandments of the Torah and that we honor him with the full honor that can be fitting for flesh and blood. And in the hand of the king is the right to kill anyone who transgresses the commandment of the king who is established according to the Torah, or rebels against any matter [pertaining to him]. And there is no angle of iniquity in this, to the point where they, may their memory be blessed, said (Shabbat 56a) that Uriah became liable for his soul (life), when he said in front of David, "my master, Yoav" (II Samuel 11:11) - as he should not have mentioned mastery about any other man in front of the king. And [also] that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 20b) that in the hand of the king is the power to make a road in the middle of fields and vineyards, and that he may judge people according to what appears to him to be the truth - and even without clear witnesses. And [also] that which they said (Sanhedrin 22a) that we do not ride on his horse; we do not sit on his throne; we do not marry his widow; we do not use his scepter, his crown nor any vessels he uses. And all of this is for his stature and his honor. And when he dies, his vessels are burned in front of his bier. And [also] that which they said (Sanhedrin 19b) that [if] a king forgoes his honor, his honor is not foregone. And all of these things, they are all for the good of the people and for their benefit. And the laws of the king are all like they are explained in the book of I Samuel 8:11-17. [These] and the rest of the details of the commandment are elucidated in the second chapter of Sanhedrin, in the first chapter of Keritot and in the seventh chapter of Sotah. And this is from the commandments that are incumbent upon all of the community; [that is] upon the males, as it is proper for them to do these matters.

But the fruit of the tree in the middle of the garden, God has said, "You shall neither eat of it nor touch it, or you will die!" (Genesis 3:3). Thus it is written, "Do not add onto God's words, or God will punish you, as you will be a liar" (Proverbs 30:6). Rabbi Chiyya taught: That means that you must not make the fence more than the principal thing, lest it fall and destroy the plants. Thus, the Holy One, blessed be, has said, "But of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, you must not eat, for on the day you partake of it, you will surely die" (Genesis 2:17). Eve did not say this, but rather, "You shall neither eat of it nor touch it" (Genesis 3:3). When the serpent saw her exaggerating in this manner, he grabbed her and pushed her against the tree. "So, have you died?" he asked her. "Just as you were not stricken when you touched it, so will you not die when you eat from it."

Ḥizkiyya says: From where is it derived that anyone who adds, subtracts? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated that Eve said: “God has said: You shall not eat of it, neither shall you touch it” (Genesis 3:3), whereas God had actually rendered prohibited only eating from the tree but not touching it, as it is stated: “But of the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil, you shall not eat of it” (Genesis 2:17). Because Eve added that there was a prohibition against touching the tree, the snake showed her that touching it does not cause her to die, and she consequently sinned by eating from it as well.

"On the eighth day, the chieftain of the Children of Menashe" (Numbers 7:54). Teach us, our rabbi, what is [the status of] a light of Chanukah from the first day that has oil remain in it. Can [it] be lit on the second [day]? So did our rabbis teach: [Regarding] a light of Chanukah from the first day that has oil remain in it, one should add [at least] a tiny amount to it and light it on the second day. And if there was [oil] left over on the second day, he adds upon it on the third day and lights. And so on with all of the days. But if there was [oil] left over on the eighth day, he makes it into a bonfire by itself. Why? Since it was put aside for the commandment, it is forbidden to use it [for another purpose]. A person should not say, "I will not fulfill the commandments of the elders (rabbis), since they are not from the Torah." The Holy One, blessed be He, said to them, "My children, you are not allowed to say this. Rather, observe anything that they decree upon you, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:10-11), 'And you shall do according to [...] the law that they shall instruct you.'" Why? Because I also agree with their words, as it is stated (Job 22:28), "You will decree and it will be fulfilled for you." You should know, as behold what is written [about] Yaakov at the time that he blessed Menashe and Ephraim? "And he placed Ephraim before Menashe" (Genesis 48:20). He made the younger [go] before the older; and the Holy One, blessed be He, fulfilled his decree. When? During the sacrifices of the chieftains, such that the tribe of Ephraim sacrificed first, as it is stated (Numbers 7:48), "On the seventh day, the chieftain of the Children of Ephraim," and [only] afterwards [was the sacrifice of] Menashe. From where [do we know this]? From that what they read about the matter, "On the eighth day, the chieftain of the Children of Menashe" (Numbers 7:54).

The Gemara answers: You can even say that all agree with Rabbi Yannai’s ruling, as there is a difference between the general use of property and the double payment. This is because the Sages instituted for the husband to consume the produce, but the Sages did not institute for him to consume the produce of the produce. The double payment does not have the status of the offspring itself but of produce resulting from its theft, which is considered the produce of the produce and therefore is given to the woman.

The Sages, therefore, ordained that the agents of the court should uproot the diverse kinds and cast them on the roads. Yet the property holders would still greatly rejoice that the agents of the court weeded their fields free of charge. Finally, the Sages ordained that they should pronounce the crop of the entire field in which diverse kinds was found ownerless.

The mishna lists additional ordinances that were instituted for the betterment of the world: The witnesses sign their names on the bill of divorce, even though the bill of divorce is valid without their signatures, for the betterment of the world, as the Gemara will explain. And Hillel instituted a document that prevents the Sabbatical Year from abrogating an outstanding debt [prosbol] for the betterment of the world, as the Gemara will explain.

The mishna relates that initially, a husband who wished to render the bill of divorce void would convene a court elsewhere and render the bill of divorce void in the presence of the court before it reached his wife. Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted an ordinance that one should not do this, for the betterment of the world. The Gemara will explain what this means.

The mishna relates that initially, a husband who wished to render the bill of divorce void would convene a court elsewhere and render the bill of divorce void in the presence of the court before it reached his wife. Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted an ordinance that one should not do this, for the betterment of the world. The Gemara will explain what this means.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Wherever the Sages prohibited an action due to the appearance of prohibition, even in the innermost chambers, where no one will see it, it is prohibited. When prohibiting an action, the Sages did not distinguish between different circumstances. They prohibited performing the action in all cases.

The Gemara responds: This halakha of Rav Naḥman is a rabbinic ordinance and not an oath required by Torah law,

Likewise, the halakha that if the defendant is suspect with regard to taking a false oath the plaintiff takes the oath and collects the money is also a rabbinic ordinance, and we do not institute one rabbinic ordinance upon another rabbinic ordinance. Therefore no oath is administered.

Likewise, the halakha that if the defendant is suspect with regard to taking a false oath the plaintiff takes the oath and collects the money is also a rabbinic ordinance, and we do not institute one rabbinic ordinance upon another rabbinic ordinance. Therefore no oath is administered.

MISHNA: With regard to the Festival day of Rosh HaShana that occurs on Shabbat, in the Temple they would sound the shofar as usual. However, they would not sound it in the rest of the country outside the Temple. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the people should sound the shofar on Shabbat in every place where there is a court of twenty-three judges. Rabbi Elazar said: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted this practice only in Yavne, where the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges resided in his time, but nowhere else. They said to him: He instituted the practice both in Yavne and in any place where there is a court.

How is the mitzva of lulav fulfilled in the Temple when the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat? If the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, all the people bring their lulavim to the Temple Mount on Friday. The attendants receive the lulavim from them and arrange them on a bench [itztaba], while the Elders place their lulavim in the chamber. They were given permission to do so due to the concern that they would be injured the following morning in the rush of people in search of their lulavim. And the court teaches the people to say: With regard to anyone whom my lulav reaches his possession, it is his as a gift. They did so to avoid the likely situation where people would inadvertently take lulavim that did not belong to them, as on the first day of the Festival one does not fulfill his obligation with a lulav that does not belong to him.

Rav Mesharshiyya says that the idea that one who adds, subtracts can also be proven from here: “Two cubits [amatayim] and a half shall be its length” (Exodus 25:10). Without the letter alef at the beginning of the word amatayim, it would be read matayim, which would mean two hundred cubits. The addition of the alef therefore reduces this term to only two cubits.

Rav Ashi says another example: In the verse: “Eleven [ashtei esrei] curtains” (Exodus 26:7), without the letter ayin at the beginning of the phrase it would read shtei esrei, twelve. Therefore, the additional letter ayin reduces the amount from twelve to eleven.

(Exodus 15:22) "And they went out to the desert of Shur": This is the desert of Kazav. They said about the desert of Kazav that it was nine hundred parasangs by nine hundred parasangs — all full of serpents and scorpions, viz. (Devarim 8:15) "… who led you in the great, awesome desert of snake, fiery serpent, and scorpion, etc." And it is written (Isaiah 21:1) "A prophecy of the desert of the sea, etc.", and (Ibid. 30:6) "A prophecy of the beasts of the south in a land of affliction and oppression, lavi and layish (types of lions) among them, efeh and flying serpent, etc." "efeh" is a viper. It was said about this viper, that when it sees the shadow of a bird flying in the air and "links up" with its shadow, its limbs descend, in spite of which (Jeremiah 2:6) "they did not say 'Where is the L rd who brought us up from the land of Egypt, who led us through the wilderness, a land of deserts and pits, a land of drought and tzalmaveth?'" What is "tzalmaveth"? "tzel" (a shadow) and (i.e., accompanied by) "maveth" (death). R. Akiva said: This was told to me by Rabbeinu Hakadosh (Rebbi): There was a man in Eretz Yisrael called "Merutah" ("torn"). Once he climbed a hill to collect wood, and he saw the snake, but the snake did not see him, when at once the hair of his head fell out and he had no hair until the day of his death — wherefore he was called Merutah." (Exodus 15:22) "and they went in the desert for three days without finding any water": R. Yehoshua says: This is to be taken literally. R. Elazar says: Wasn't there water under the feet of the Israelites, the earth floating on water, viz. (Psalms 136:6) "He spread the earth over the water"? (i.e., they could dig for it). What, then, is the intent of "without finding any water"? __ (He made them dig) in order to weary them (to test their faith). Others say: The water that Israel had taken in their vessels between the clefts (in the Red Sea) gave out at that time. What is the intent, then, of "without finding water"? Even in their vessels, as in (Jeremiah 14:3) "Their nobles sent their youths for water. They came to the cisterns, but found no water. They returned, their vessels empty." The expounders of metaphors said: They did not "find" words of Torah, which are compared to water. Where is this seen? (Isaiah 55:1) "Ho! all who thirst, go to the waters!" Because they separated from words of Torah for three days, they rebelled — wherefore the prophets and the elders instituted that they read in the Torah on Sabbath, Monday, and Thursday. How so? They read on Sabbath and pause on Sunday; they read on Monday and pause on Tuesday and Wednesday; they read on Thursday and pause on Friday (so that they do not go three consecutive days without reading Torah.)

(Exodus 15:22) "And they went out to the desert of Shur": This is the desert of Kazav. They said about the desert of Kazav that it was nine hundred parasangs by nine hundred parasangs — all full of serpents and scorpions, viz. (Devarim 8:15) "… who led you in the great, awesome desert of snake, fiery serpent, and scorpion, etc." And it is written (Isaiah 21:1) "A prophecy of the desert of the sea, etc.", and (Ibid. 30:6) "A prophecy of the beasts of the south in a land of affliction and oppression, lavi and layish (types of lions) among them, efeh and flying serpent, etc." "efeh" is a viper. It was said about this viper, that when it sees the shadow of a bird flying in the air and "links up" with its shadow, its limbs descend, in spite of which (Jeremiah 2:6) "they did not say 'Where is the L rd who brought us up from the land of Egypt, who led us through the wilderness, a land of deserts and pits, a land of drought and tzalmaveth?'" What is "tzalmaveth"? "tzel" (a shadow) and (i.e., accompanied by) "maveth" (death). R. Akiva said: This was told to me by Rabbeinu Hakadosh (Rebbi): There was a man in Eretz Yisrael called "Merutah" ("torn"). Once he climbed a hill to collect wood, and he saw the snake, but the snake did not see him, when at once the hair of his head fell out and he had no hair until the day of his death — wherefore he was called Merutah." (Exodus 15:22) "and they went in the desert for three days without finding any water": R. Yehoshua says: This is to be taken literally. R. Elazar says: Wasn't there water under the feet of the Israelites, the earth floating on water, viz. (Psalms 136:6) "He spread the earth over the water"? (i.e., they could dig for it). What, then, is the intent of "without finding any water"? __ (He made them dig) in order to weary them (to test their faith). Others say: The water that Israel had taken in their vessels between the clefts (in the Red Sea) gave out at that time. What is the intent, then, of "without finding water"? Even in their vessels, as in (Jeremiah 14:3) "Their nobles sent their youths for water. They came to the cisterns, but found no water. They returned, their vessels empty." The expounders of metaphors said: They did not "find" words of Torah, which are compared to water. Where is this seen? (Isaiah 55:1) "Ho! all who thirst, go to the waters!" Because they separated from words of Torah for three days, they rebelled — wherefore the prophets and the elders instituted that they read in the Torah on Sabbath, Monday, and Thursday. How so? They read on Sabbath and pause on Sunday; they read on Monday and pause on Tuesday and Wednesday; they read on Thursday and pause on Friday (so that they do not go three consecutive days without reading Torah.)

And that which Solomon said: “And I praised the dead that are already dead”; he was not speaking of all dead people, but rather in praise of certain dead people. As when Israel sinned in the desert, Moses stood before the Holy One, Blessed be He, and he said several prayers and supplications before Him, and his prayers were not answered. And when he said: “Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, Your servants” (Exodus 32:13), his prayers were answered immediately. Consequently, did Solomon not speak appropriately when he said: “Wherefore I praised the dead that are already dead”? Certainly the merit of the deceased forefathers is greater than that of the righteous people who are alive. Alternatively, the way of the world is such that when a flesh-and-blood prince issues a decree on the public it is uncertain whether they fulfill it and uncertain whether they do not fulfill it. And even if you want to say that they fulfill it, it is only during his lifetime that they fulfill it; after he dies they do not fulfill it. But Moses our teacher issued several decrees and instituted several ordinances, and they are in effect forever and ever. And, if so, is it not appropriate that which Solomon said: “Wherefore I praised the dead that are already dead”?

“New and old, which I have laid up for you, O my beloved,” the Congregation of Israel said before the Holy One, Blessed be He, and continued: Master of the Universe, I have decreed many decrees upon myself through the enactments and ordinances of the Sages, more than what You decreed upon me in the Torah, and I have fulfilled them. These are the new laws which were added to the old ones stated in the Torah.

It was related that Rav Ḥisda said to one of the Sages who would arrange the traditions of the aggada before him: Did you hear what the meaning of: New and old is? He said to him: These, the new, are the more lenient mitzvot, and these, the old, are the more stringent mitzvot.

“New and old, which I have laid up for you, O my beloved,” the Congregation of Israel said before the Holy One, Blessed be He, and continued: Master of the Universe, I have decreed many decrees upon myself through the enactments and ordinances of the Sages, more than what You decreed upon me in the Torah, and I have fulfilled them. These are the new laws which were added to the old ones stated in the Torah.

Rav Ḥisda said to him: This cannot be so, for was the Torah given on two separate occasions, i.e., were the more lenient and more stringent mitzvot given separately? Rather, these, the old, are mitzvot from the Torah, and these, the new, are from the Sages.

Rava expounded another verse in similar fashion: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And more than these, my son, be careful: of making many books [sefarim] there is no end; and much study is a weariness of the flesh” (Ecclesiastes 12:12)? My son, be careful to fulfill the words of the Sages [soferim] even more than the words of the Torah. For the words of the Torah include positive and negative commandments, and even with regard to the negative commandments, the violation of many of them is punishable only by lashes. Whereas with respect to the words of the Sages, anyone who transgresses the words of the Sages is liable to receive the death penalty, as it is stated: “And whoever breaches through a hedge, a snake shall bite him” (Ecclesiastes 10:8), taking hedges to refer metaphorically to decrees.

Lest you say: If the words of the Sages are of substance and have such great importance, why were they not written in the Torah, therefore, the verse states: “Of making many books there is no end,” meaning that it is impossible to fully commit the Oral Torah to writing, as it is boundless.

What is the meaning of the words: “And much study [lahag] is a weariness of the flesh”? Rav Pappa, son of Rav Aḥa bar Adda, said in the name of Rav Aḥa bar Ulla: This teaches that whoever mocks [malig] the words of the Sages will be sentenced to boiling excrement, which results from the weariness of the flesh of man.

If a case is too baffling for you to decide, be it a controversy over homicide, civil law, or assault—matters of dispute in your courts—you shall promptly repair to the place that the LORD your God will have chosen,

and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case,

you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the LORD chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you.

You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left.

Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the LORD your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die. Thus you will sweep out evil from Israel:

Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the LORD your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die. Thus you will sweep out evil from Israel:

all the people will hear and be afraid and will not act presumptuously again.

If, after you have entered the land that the LORD your God has assigned to you, and taken possession of it and settled in it, you decide, “I will set a king over me, as do all the nations about me,”

you shall be free to set a king over yourself, one chosen by the LORD your God. Be sure to set as king over yourself one of your own people; you must not set a foreigner over you, one who is not your kinsman.

When he is seated on his royal throne, he shall have a copy of this Teaching written for him on a scroll by the levitical priests.

Let it remain with him and let him read in it all his life, so that he may learn to revere the LORD his God, to observe faithfully every word of this Teaching as well as these laws.

The LORD your God will raise up for you a prophet from among your own people, like myself; him you shall heed.

This is just what you asked of the LORD your God at Horeb, on the day of the Assembly, saying, “Let me not hear the voice of the LORD my God any longer or see this wondrous fire any more, lest I die.”

Whereupon the LORD said to me, “They have done well in speaking thus.

I will raise up a prophet for them from among their own people, like yourself: I will put My words in his mouth and he will speak to them all that I command him;

and if anybody fails to heed the words he speaks in My name, I Myself will call him to account.

But any prophet who presumes to speak in My name an oracle that I did not command him to utter, or who speaks in the name of other gods—that prophet shall die.”

And should you ask yourselves, “How can we know that the oracle was not spoken by the LORD?”—

if the prophet speaks in the name of the LORD and the oracle does not come true, that oracle was not spoken by the LORD; the prophet has uttered it presumptuously: do not stand in dread of him.

The honor of God is to conceal a matter For instance, the account of the Merkavah and the account of the Creation.

whereas the honor of kings is to search out a matter When you expound on the honor of the Sages and on the safeguards that they enacted to the Torah, and on the decrees that they decreed upon them, you should search, seek, and ask the reason for the matter. When you expound on the account of the Merkavah or on the account of the Creation, or on the statutes written in the Torah—like the statutes and things that Satan denounces and refutes, such as eating pork, mingled species in a vineyard, and shaatnes—you should not search, but only conceal [the reason] and say, “It is the King’s decree.”

GEMARA: The Sages taught the following baraita: At first, the meal after the burial would be brought to the house of the mourner in various ways. The wealthy would bring the meal in baskets of silver and gold, and the poor would bring it in baskets of peeled willow branches. And the poor were embarrassed, as everyone would see that they were poor.The Sages instituted that everyone should bring the meal in baskets of peeled willow branches, due to the honor of the poor.

The Sages taught a similar baraita: At first, they would serve wine in the house of the mourner during the first meal after the burial; the wealthy would do so in cups made from white glass, and the poor would serve this wine in cups of colored glass. And the poor were embarrassed, as everyone would see that they were poor. The Sages instituted that all should serve drinks in the house of the mourner in colored glass cups, due to the honor of the poor.

Furthermore, at first they would uncover the faces of the wealthy who passed away and cover the faces of the poor,because their faces were blackened by famine. And the poor were embarrassed because they were buried in a different manner. The Sages instituted that everyone’s face should be covered, due to the honor of the poor.

§ The mishna taught that Hillel the Elder instituted a document that prevents the Sabbatical Year from abrogating an outstanding debt [prosbol]. We learned in a mishna there (Shevi’it 10:3): If one writes a prosbol, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate debt. This is one of the matters that Hillel the Elder instituted because he saw that the people of the nation were refraining from lending to one another around the time of the Sabbatical Year, as they were concerned that the debtor would not repay the loan, and they violated that which is written in the Torah: “Beware that there be not a base thought in your heart, saying: The seventh year, the year of release, is at hand; and your eye be evil against your needy brother, and you give him nothing” (Deuteronomy 15:9). He arose and instituted the prosbol so that it would also be possible to collect those debts in order to ensure that people would continue to give loans.

GEMARA: The Sages taught a baraita with regard to the basic halakha governing the eve of Passover that occurs on Shabbat: This law was forgotten by the sons of Beteira, who were the leaders of their generation. The fourteenth of Nisan once occurred on Shabbat, and they forgot and did not know whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not. They said: Is there any person who knows whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not? They said to them: There is a certain man in Jerusalem who came up from Babylonia, and Hillel the Babylonian is his name. At one point, he served the two most eminent scholars of the generation, Shemaya and Avtalyon, and he certainly knows whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not. The sons of Beteira sent messengers and called for him. They said to him: Do you know whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not? He said to them: Have we but one Paschal lamb during the year that overrides Shabbat? Do we not have many more than two hundred Paschal lambs, i.e., sacrifices, during the year that override Shabbat?

They said to him: From where do you know this? He said to them: “Its appointed time” is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb and “its appointed time” is also stated with regard to the daily offering, for the verse says: “Command the children of Israel and say to them, My offering, the provision of My sacrifice made with fire, for a sweet savor to Me, shall you observe to offer Me at its appointed time” (Numbers 28:2). From here we learn that the daily offering is brought even on Shabbat. Thus, the daily morning and afternoon offerings are brought on more than fifty Shabbatot over the course of the year, and two sheep are offered every Shabbat as additional offerings, for a total of more than two hundred sacrifices a year that override Shabbat. Just as the expression “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the daily offering, indicates that it overrides Shabbat, so too “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb, indicates that it overrides Shabbat.

And furthermore, it is an a fortiori inference: If the daily offering, the neglect of which is not punishable by karet, overrides Shabbat, is it not right that the Paschal lamb, the neglect of which is punishable by karet, should override Shabbat?

After Hillel brought these proofs, they immediately seated him at the head and appointed him Nasi over them, and he expounded the laws of Passover that entire day. In the course of his teaching, he began rebuking them [mekanteran] them with words. He said to them: What caused this to happen to you, that I should come up from Babylonia and become Nasi over you? It was the laziness in you that you did not serve the two most eminent scholars of the generation living in Eretz Yisrael, Shemaya and Avtalyon.

They said to Hillel: Our teacher, if one forgot and did not bring a knife on the eve of Shabbat and cannot slaughter his Paschal lamb, what is the law? Since he could have brought the knife before Shabbat, he cannot bring it on Shabbat; but what should he do in this situation? He said to them: I once heard this halakha from my teachers but I have forgotten it. But leave it to the Jewish people; if they are not prophets to whom God has revealed His secrets, they are the sons of prophets, and will certainly do the right thing on their own.

The next day, on Shabbat that was the eve of Passover, one whose Paschal offering was a lamb took the knife and stuck it in its wool; and one whose Paschal offering was a goat, which does not have wool, stuck it between its horns. Hillel saw the incident and remembered the halakha that he had once learned and said: This is the tradition I received from the mouths of Shemaya and Avtalyon, meaning that this is in fact the proper course of action. This concludes the text of the baraita and the Gemara will begin to elucidate it.

The Sages taught in a baraita: Initially the mourners would stand, and all the people would pass by one after another and console them. And there were two families in Jerusalem who would fight with each other, as this one would say: We pass by first because we are more distinguished and important, and that one would say: We pass by first. Consequently, they decreed that the people should stand and the mourners pass by, and disputes would be avoided.

Rami bar Abba says: Rabbi Yosei returned the matter to its former custom in Tzippori his city, that the mourners would stand and all the people would pass. And Rami bar Abba says: Rabbi Yosei instituted an ordinance in Tzippori that a woman should not walk in the market and have her son following behind her; rather, he should walk in front of her, because of an incident that happened in which bandits abducted a child and assaulted the mother when she came searching for him in his place of captivity. And Rami bar Abba says: Rabbi Yosei instituted an ordinance in Tzippori that women should converse in the bathroom, because of the restrictions on women being secluded with men. Since the public bathrooms there were outside the city a man might enter to take advantage of a woman, but he would be warded off by the women’s conversation.

Rav Menashya bar Ute says: I asked a question of Rabbi Yoshiya the Great in the cemetery of Huzal, and he said this halakha to me: There is no line for consoling mourners with fewer than ten people, and the mourners are not included in the count. This minimum number of consolers applies whether the mourners stand and all the people pass by, or the mourners pass by and all the people stand.

The Gemara comments: This was also taught in a baraita: Measures of punishments are halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. Others say: These measures were instituted by the court of Jabez. The Gemara questions this: How can this be? Isn’t it written: “These are the mitzvot which the Lord commanded Moses for the children of Israel at Mount Sinai” (Leviticus 27:34). The word “these” underscores that a prophet is not permitted to introduce any new element related to the Torah and its mitzvot from here on. Rather, over the course of time, the people forgot the measures; subsequently the prophets reestablished the measures and taught them to the masses.

With regard to this topic, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Measures and punishments are halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. The Gemara expresses surprise at this: The punishments for all transgressions are written explicitly in the Torah, and therefore are not part of an oral transmission from Moses. Rather, this is what was said: Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Measures that determine liability for punishments are halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai.

The Gemara asks: Even if we claim that the measure for impure foods is an egg-bulk, one could say it is referring to the giant egg-bulk of the bird called bar yokhani. The Gemara answers: If you grasped many, you did not grasp anything; if you grasped few, you grasped something. This means that in a case of doubt, take the smaller number, as it is included in the larger number. Therefore, the correct measure is the volume of a chicken egg. The Gemara questions this: If so, say it is referring to a very small bird’s egg. Consequently, no proof can be brought from the verse that the volume of a chicken egg is the measure for ritual impurity.

Rabbi Abbahu himself said: The verse states: “Of all food which may be eaten.” This is referring to food that you can eat at one time. The Sages estimated: The esophagus cannot hold more than the volume of a chicken’s egg, and therefore this is the measure used for the ritual impurity of foods.

Incidental to the discussion on Torah measures, Rabbi Elazar said: One who unwittingly eats forbidden fat even today must write down the exact measure that he ate, lest another court come in the future and increase the measure.

The Gemara asks: What does it mean to increase the measure? If we say that a future court will obligate him to bring an offering even for the bulk of a small olive, which is less than what is considered an olive-bulk today, he would not be liable to bring a guilt-offering. Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: It was said with regard to guilt-offerings: “And if any one of the common people sin through error, in doing any of the things which the Lord has commanded not to be done, and be guilty” (Leviticus 4:27)? This teaches that one who repents due to his awareness, i.e., one who repents following becoming aware that he performed a transgression, brings an offering for his unwitting transgression.

However, one who does not repent due to his awareness that he sinned does not bring an offering for his unwitting action. Similarly, if one eats less than an olive-bulk, based on the current measures, he will not be obligated to bring a guilt-offering in the future if the measures change, even if the amount that he ate equals the volume of a revised olive-bulk. This is because the individual would not be bringing his offering because he became aware he had sinned, but because the Torah measures had been changed.

Rather, it should be explained as follows: It is possible that in the future a court will not obligate one to bring an offering until he has eaten the bulk of a large olive, which is more than today’s amount. One should write down how much he ate, since in the future a court might rule that the amount he ate is less than the size of an olive, and therefore he will not be obligated to bring an offering.

The Gemara returns to its first suggestion: According to what entered his mind initially, that in the future a court might obligate him to bring an offering for the bulk of a small olive, what is the meaning of increase the measure? Rabbi Elazar should have said decrease the measure. The Gemara answers: The statement may have meant that perhaps there will be an increase in offerings that are brought due to the smaller measure for liability.

With regard to this topic, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Measures and punishments are halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. The Gemara expresses surprise at this: The punishments for all transgressions are written explicitly in the Torah, and therefore are not part of an oral transmission from Moses. Rather, this is what was said: Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Measures that determine liability for punishments are halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai.

The Gemara comments: This was also taught in a baraita: Measures of punishments are halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. Others say: These measures were instituted by the court of Jabez. The Gemara questions this: How can this be? Isn’t it written: “These are the mitzvot which the Lord commanded Moses for the children of Israel at Mount Sinai” (Leviticus 27:34). The word “these” underscores that a prophet is not permitted to introduce any new element related to the Torah and its mitzvot from here on. Rather, over the course of time, the people forgot the measures; subsequently the prophets reestablished the measures and taught them to the masses.

He must not look out for good as against bad, or make substitution for it. If he does make substitution for it, then it and its substitute shall both be holy: it cannot be redeemed.

These are the commandments that the LORD gave Moses for the Israelite people on Mount Sinai.

Rava said: Even though they prohibited reading by candlelight due to a decree lest they adjust the wick, if he is an important person, it is permitted, as even on weekdays he is not accustomed to adjust a lamp that is dirty with oil. The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a Tosefta: One may not read a book on Shabbat by the light of the lamp, lest he adjust it. The Tosefta relates that Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha said: I will read and will not adjust, as I will certainly not forget that it is Shabbat. However, once he read a book by candlelight and he sought to adjust the wick. He said: How great are the words of the Sages, who would say that one may not read by candlelight, as even a person like me sought to adjust the wick. Rabbi Natan says: That was not the way it happened. Rather, he read and actually adjusted the wick, and he wrote afterward in his notebook [pinkas]: I, Yishmael ben Elisha, read and adjusted a lamp on Shabbat. When the Temple will be rebuilt I will bring a fat sin-offering as atonement for this sin. This proves that even an important person like Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha is liable to adjust the wick. Rabbi Abba said: Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha is different, since with regard to the study of Torah, he comports himself like a simple man with no air of importance, but generally, an important person would not dirty his hands and adjust the wick.

Rav Ashi said: There were two ordinances instituted: Initially, the court of priests instituted for a virgin daughter of a priest a marriage contract of four hundred dinars, and for a widow, a marriage contract of one hundred dinars.

Once the members of the court saw that the priests were demeaning the widows, they instituted for them a marriage contract of two hundred dinars, so that they would treat them with greater esteem. Once they saw that the grooms were distancing themselves from them, as they said: Instead of marrying a widow who is the daughter of priests and paying a marriage contract of two hundred, let us go marry a virgin Israelite woman for the same price. Since men would no longer marry widows from priestly families, they restored matters to their original status. This indicates that the mishna and the baraita are addressing different time periods and different ordinances.

As Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said that it is written: “And Jacob called his sons and said, Gather around and I will tell you what will occur to you in the end of days” (Genesis 49:1). Jacob wanted to reveal to his sons when the complete redemption would arrive at the end of days (see Daniel 12:13), but the Divine Presence abandoned him, rendering him unable to prophesy. He said: Perhaps the Divine Presence has abandoned me because, Heaven forfend, one of my descendants is unfit, as was the case with my grandfather Abraham, from whom Ishmael emerged, and like my father Isaac, from whom Esau emerged. His sons said to him: Hear Israel, our father, the Lord is our God, the Lord is One. They said: Just as there is only one God in your heart, so too, there is only one in our hearts. At that moment Jacob our father said in praise: Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom for ever and ever, as all his children were righteous.

The Rabbis said: What should we do? Shall we recite this verse? But Moses our teacher did not say it in the Torah as part of Shema. Shall we not recite it? But Jacob said it. In order to resolve this dilemma they established that this passage should be recited surreptitiously. Rabbi Yitzḥak said that the school of Rabbi Ami said: This is analogous to the daughter of a king who smelled the fragrance of the dried spices stuck to the bottom of the pot and craved to eat them. What can she do? If she tells her servants to give it to her, she will be disgraced, as the dried spices are a contemptible food. However, if she does not say she wants to eat them, she will endure suffering. Her servants began to bring them to her surreptitiously. One should conduct himself in that manner in similar cases of uncertainty.

The Rabbis said: What should we do? Shall we recite this verse? But Moses our teacher did not say it in the Torah as part of Shema. Shall we not recite it? But Jacob said it. In order to resolve this dilemma they established that this passage should be recited surreptitiously. Rabbi Yitzḥak said that the school of Rabbi Ami said: This is analogous to the daughter of a king who smelled the fragrance of the dried spices stuck to the bottom of the pot and craved to eat them. What can she do? If she tells her servants to give it to her, she will be disgraced, as the dried spices are a contemptible food. However, if she does not say she wants to eat them, she will endure suffering. Her servants began to bring them to her surreptitiously. One should conduct himself in that manner in similar cases of uncertainty.

Among the list of items in the mishna with regard to which the disciples of Shammai and Hillel instituted decrees, were the hands of any person who did not purify himself for the sake of purity of teruma. If he came into contact with teruma, the Sages decreed it impure. The Gemara asks: And with regard to hands, was it the disciples of Shammai and Hillel who issued the decree of impurity? Shammai and Hillel themselves issued the decree. As it was taught in a baraita: Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida and Yosei ben Yoḥanan of Jerusalem decreed impurity on the land of the nations, that the land outside Eretz Yisrael transmits impurity; and they decreed impurity on glass vessels, even though glass is not listed in the Torah among the vessels that can become impure. Shimon ben Shataḥ instituted the formula of a woman’s marriage contract and also decreed special impurity on metal vessels. Shammai and Hillel decreed impurity on the hands.

And if you say that the baraita is referring to Shammai and his faction and Hillel and his faction, didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel said: With regard to eighteen matters they issued decrees that day, and with regard to those eighteen matters they disagreed prior to that? The eighteen disputes were only between the disciples of Shammai and Hillel, whereas Hillel and Shammai themselves argued only in three places. Clearly, they were neither party to the disputes nor the decrees. As Rav Huna said: Shammai and Hillel disagreed in only three places and no more. And if you say that Hillel and Shammai came and decreed that teruma that came into contact with hands would be in abeyance, and their students came and decreed to burn teruma that came into contact with hands, then the following difficulty arises. Didn’t Ilfa, one of the Sages, say: With regard to hands, from the beginning their decree was that teruma that comes into contact with them is to be burned? According to Ilfa, there is no uncertainty. Teruma that came into contact with definite impurity is burned. Teruma that is in abeyance may not be destroyed. One must wait until it becomes definitely impure or decomposes on its own. Rather, the explanation is that they came and issued a decree and the people did not accept the decree from them, and their disciples came and issued a decree and they accepted it from them.

The Gemara asks further: Still, the matter is not clear, as the decree of hands was issued by King Solomon. As Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: At the time that Solomon instituted the ordinances of eiruv and of washing hands to purify them from their impurity, a Divine Voice emerged and said in his praise: “My son, if your heart is wise my heart will be glad, even mine” (Proverbs 23:15), and so too: “My son, be wise and make my heart glad, that I may respond to those who taunt me” (Proverbs 27: 11). The Gemara responds: Came

Solomon and decreed impurity on hands to prohibit contact with consecrated items, and Shammai, Hillel, and their disciples came and decreed impurity on hands even to prohibit contact with teruma.

"IF THERE BE CONCEALED FROM YOU A MATTER OF JUDGMENT — BETWEEN BLOOD AND BLOOD, BETWEEN LAW AND LAW, OR BETWEEN PLAGUE SPOT AND PLAGUE SPOT, MATTERS OF CONTENTION WITHIN YOUR GATES, THEN YOU SHALL ARISE AND GO UP TO THE PLACE THAT THE L-RD YOUR G-D WILL CHOOSE" (DEUTERONOMY 17:8)

This parshah is the root of the Torah and its foundation, for it is impossible that all of the sages be in accord in respect to all of the specific cases arising every day. Therefore, to eliminate doubt from Israel, the Torah commanded that the deciding body be the Sanhedrin, thus precluding the possibility of any unresolved issue in their time. And thus is it stated by our sages (Sanhedrin 88b): "It was taught: R. Yossi said: In the beginning there was no dispute in Israel, but the beth-din of seventy-one would sit in the chamber of hewn stone, and two courts of twenty-three each would sit, one at the entrance to the Temple mount and the other at the entrance to the Temple court, and the other courts of twenty-three would sit in all the cities of Israel. If a question of judgment arose, the city court was consulted. If they had heard the ruling, they stated it… they would then go to the chamber of hewn stone, where the Sanhedrin sat from the daily morning offering until the daily afternoon offering (on Sabbaths and festivals they sat in the Temple fort). The question was presented to them. If they had heard the ruling, they stated it, and if not, they took a count. If the majority ruled unclean, the verdict was unclean; if clean, then it was clean. When there was an increase in the number of disciples of Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel who were not completely versed in the law, controversy grew in Israel, and the Torah became as two Torahs." And because this strikes at the very foundations of the religion, the sages were extremely severe in the punishment of a "rebellious elder" — to the point that even if beth-din would wish to pardon him they are not permitted to do so, so that controversy not spread in Israel.

But this raises a question. According to this parshah the power of ultimate decision was given only to the Great Sanhedrin, and only in their designated place, for our sages of blessed memory have said (Ibid 14b): "If he [the rebellious elder] found them [the Sanhedrin] in Beth Pagi and rebelled against them, I might think that this constitutes rebellion. The Torah, however, tells us (Deuteronomy 17:8): 'Then you shall arise and go up to the place.' This teaches us that the place is the critical factor." Whence, then, do we know that we must abide by the decisions of the sages in all of the generations?

This parshah is the root of the Torah and its foundation, for it is impossible that all of the sages be in accord in respect to all of the specific cases arising every day. Therefore, to eliminate doubt from Israel, the Torah commanded that the deciding body be the Sanhedrin, thus precluding the possibility of any unresolved issue in their time. And thus is it stated by our sages (Sanhedrin 88b): "It was taught: R. Yossi said: In the beginning there was no dispute in Israel, but the beth-din of seventy-one would sit in the chamber of hewn stone, and two courts of twenty-three each would sit, one at the entrance to the Temple mount and the other at the entrance to the Temple court, and the other courts of twenty-three would sit in all the cities of Israel. If a question of judgment arose, the city court was consulted. If they had heard the ruling, they stated it… they would then go to the chamber of hewn stone, where the Sanhedrin sat from the daily morning offering until the daily afternoon offering (on Sabbaths and festivals they sat in the Temple fort). The question was presented to them. If they had heard the ruling, they stated it, and if not, they took a count. If the majority ruled unclean, the verdict was unclean; if clean, then it was clean. When there was an increase in the number of disciples of Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel who were not completely versed in the law, controversy grew in Israel, and the Torah became as two Torahs." And because this strikes at the very foundations of the religion, the sages were extremely severe in the punishment of a "rebellious elder" — to the point that even if beth-din would wish to pardon him they are not permitted to do so, so that controversy not spread in Israel.

But this raises a question. According to this parshah the power of ultimate decision was given only to the Great Sanhedrin, and only in their designated place, for our sages of blessed memory have said (Ibid 14b): "If he [the rebellious elder] found them [the Sanhedrin] in Beth Pagi and rebelled against them, I might think that this constitutes rebellion. The Torah, however, tells us (Deuteronomy 17:8): 'Then you shall arise and go up to the place.' This teaches us that the place is the critical factor." Whence, then, do we know that we must abide by the decisions of the sages in all of the generations?

And if you would ask: "If our obligation to heed the words of the sages stems from 'After the multitude,' then how are we to understand (Berachoth 19b): 'Great is human dignity, which overrides a negative commandment in the Torah'? Rav bar Sheva stated in the presence of R. Cahana that the negative commandment referred to is (Deuteronomy 17:11): "Do not deviate [from the words of the judges]." In the West [Eretz Yisrael], they ridiculed this, saying: "'Do not deviate' is a Torah prohibition!" [Why, then, should it be overridden by a rabbinical concern for human dignity?] At this, R. Cahanah said to them: "A great man has said something; do not ridicule it." [His meaning was that] all rabbinical enactments are empowered by 'Do not deviate,' and the rabbis waived this power when human dignity would be compromised thereby."' It would seem from here that our obligation to heed the words of the sages stems from 'Do not deviate,' but according to what was stated before, 'After the multitude' should have been given as the basis!"

The answer: Our obligation to obey Sanhedrin embraces two areas: the first, what they explain in respect to the laws of the Torah; the second, all of the fences and ordinances which they institute. The sages of the generations following them we are obligated to obey in what they explain in respect to the laws of the Torah, this being subsumed in "After the multitude." But we are not enjoined to heed their fences and ordinances by "After the multitude," this only stating that the rule of the majority is to be applied in the clarification of the judgments of the Torah, into which category fences and ordinances do not enter at all. The injunction to abide by the latter is a kind of extension of "Do not deviate." That is, just as the power was given to Sanhedrin to be the teachers of Torah and its dignitaries, in the same way it is fitting that this power be accorded the great Torah sages of Israel in all generations. It is for this reason that fences and ordinances are linked to "Do not deviate." But in the explanation of the laws of the Torah the obligation to obey the sages derives directly from "After the multitude."

As to the statement that "the place is the critical factor," this applies only to capital cases, as explained in the first chapter of Avodah Zarah (8b) and not to the interpretation of Torah, which it is the province of the sages of all generations to explain according to their understanding, whether their explanation constitute the absolute truth or not. It is their judgment which is the critical factor here, as is illustrated in the episode of R. Yehoshua and R. Gamliel, the latter [the Nassi at the time] commanding the former to appear before him with his walking stick and his money on the day that was Yom Kippur according to R. Yehoshua's estimate. (See Rosh Hashanah 25a) And this is the intent of the statement in the first chapter of Bava Bathra (12a): "Amemar said: 'A sage is greater than a prophet, as it is written (Psalms 90:12): "…and a prophet has a heart of wisdom." Which is made secondary to which? The lesser is made secondary to the grater.'" This all stems from the fact that the prophet's power is limited to saying what he has heard; he may not add anything from his own understanding. And if he speaks the truth, we must heed him; if not, we must not heed him. As regards the sage, however, whether he does or does not speak the truth, we must heed him. What follows, however, requires explanation, viz.: Know this to be true, for a great man said something which had been stated in the same manner by a great man before him." According to our interpretation there seems to be no relationship between the subject and the proof. The same applies to what follows: "Perhaps both of them were born under the same constellation." The entire discussion requires extensive interpretation and explanation:

It is axiomatic that a relationship can be posited only between things of the same kind. If they are not of the same kind, then even if they are of the same class, no descriptive comparison can be made. So that it cannot be said, for example, that one red is brighter or more beautiful than another green. For though they both fall within the class of color, since they do not correspond in kind, they are not susceptible of comparison in terms of more or less. Therefore, since Amemar has said that "a sage is greater than a prophet," we must say that there resides in a sage prophetic power. For if this were not the case, no comparison could be made in terms of relative greatness though one did possess great qualities that the other did not. This is the intent of Abbaye's statement: "Know this to be true, for a great man said something which had been stated in the same manner by a great man before him." That is, know it to be true that a sage possesses prophetic power, for a great man said something, which no one else, no other sages as great as he, could originate or deduce; and yet another sage who came before him originated exactly the same idea, likewise being the only sage in his time to do so. If the power of intellect alone had been operative here, how can it be that thousands of sages of comparable intellect could not have conceived the same idea — while these two conceived it in exactly the same manner down to the last detail! Intellect alone could not have achieved it; something higher than intellect must have been superadded here, namely, prophecy. This is countered by Rava: "Why so, perhaps both of them were born under the same constellation!" That is, it is well known (as held by our sages of blessed memory) that the intellect, being a "separate intelligence" is identical in the bodies of all men. Why, then, do its powers differ for different men, some men being oriented to wisdom and others not? This is perforce attributable to one of two factors: the matter, or the giver of the form and initiator of existence. In point of the matter; even if the giver of the form be the same for two men, if one operate within superior matter and the other within inferior matter, it is impossible that the powers of the two men acted upon will correspond in all respects. This is the intent of (Shabbath 156a): "He who is born under the star chammah will be enlightened and wise because it is the scribe of the sun." The statement is in respect of the acting agency. It is not to be understood that two men born under the star chammah — one, of the choicest of humors and of the finest brain composition, and the other, of the most turgid and clouded humors — it is not to be understood that they will, notwithstanding, be equal in their receptiveness to wisdom. Though they were born in the same instant this would not be so, for though the acting agency is the same, a) the resultant act varies according to the variance of the subjects within which that agency operates. This is obvious with a minimum of reflection. And this is the manner in which the powers of intellect vary in relation to the nature of the body.

b) But they vary, too, in relation to the giver of the form, the time here being the moments of conception and birth. This is the basis of Rava's counter-question: "Why so?" That is, how does the fact that two men conceive something which no others can conceive indicate that sages possess the power of prophecy? Perhaps their unity of conception is traceable to their being born under the same constellation, for which reason the powers of their psyches and intellects are in accord. And though they are not of the same bodily natures, since the acting agency is the same, their ideas and views will concur although they may be at variance with many others. The basis of Rava's question here is the giver of the form and not bodily nature, identity of which is extremely rare or non-existent. It is for this reason that Rava adduces a new proof: "Know this to be true, for a great man said something which had been stated in the same manner by R. Akiva ben Yosef." His meaning here is that it is impossible that any sage in our time be identical with R. Akiva ben Yosef with respect to the giver of the form. Their levels and intellects would perforce be far apart. How, then, could their complete unanimity on this matter be explained?

But, still, R. Ashi persists: "Perhaps in relation to this particular matter they are of one constellation." That is, the distant heavenly causes are concealed from us, and perhaps there is such a cause engendering unity in this matter but not in all. It is for this reason that R. Ashi adduces a new proof: "Know this to be true, for a great man said something which had been stated in the same manner as 'a law to Moses upon Sinai.'" This proves indisputably that prophetic power is operative here, for "a law to Moses upon Sinai" cannot be generated by intellect but is above it. For if the law could be derived through intellect its derivation would be relegated to the sages, just as the other judgments of the Torah, and there would be no need for "a law to Moses upon Sinai." Since we see, then, that this sage conceived something which is above the powers of intellect, we must conclude that he conceived it through a prophetic power residing within him.

And since sage and prophet have the attribute of prophecy in common, and the sage has an added superiority in that his judgments proceed from his intellect and must be heeded whether true or false, it can, indeed, be said that "a sage is greater than a prophet."

And there is yet another respect in which a sage is greater than a prophet. A prophet's credibility is dependent upon a sage, but a sage's credibility is not dependent upon a prophet. For if a prophet would command us not to heed a sage, he himself would not be heeded. The discrimination of a prophet, however, is left to the sages, the Torah having written (Deuteronomy 18:15): "A prophet from your midst, from your brothers, such as I, will the L-rd your G-d raise up for you; him shall you heed." No criteria are given for the discrimination of a true from a false prophet. And though it is written (Ibid 21-22): "And if you ask: 'How shall I know the thing that the L-rd has not spoken? Whatever thing the prophet say in the name of the L-rd and that thing not come to pass, then that thing was not spoken by the L-rd…" — this does not necessarily imply the converse, that whatever does come to pass has been spoken by the L-rd. For the verse just negates inclusion [into the ranks of prophecy of one whose words do not come to pass]; it does not imply a converse but is only partially prescriptive. Therefore, when the Torah writes "Him shall you heed," why does it not include the criteria for heeding him? It must be, then, that these criteria were left to the sages; and it is on this basis that the sages established prerequisites for acceptance as a prophet, such as wisdom, strength, wealth, and the like. If one meets these conditions and he commands us to observe the Torah or to abide by certain temporary injunctions, then, if he produces a sign or wonder, he is to be heeded. This is the view of the former sages of blessed memory.

And Scripture tells us that this prophet has been accorded us in place of the soothsayers and diviners employed by the other, idolatrous nations, in order to outdo their performances. For, indeed, the soothsayers and diviners are knowledgeable of certain things through which benefit may be derived, and the L-rd accorded us greater perfection in this area by means of the prophet. This is the intent of (Ibid 9-18): "When you come to the land which the L-rd your G-d has given you, do not learn to do according to the abominations of those nations. Let there not be found among you one who passes his son or daughter through fire, a diviner… For these nations which you shall inherit heed the soothsayers and diviners, but the L-rd your G-d has not rendered you thus… I shall raise up a prophet…" It is seen, then, that the idea of the prophet is to suppress those arts and to outdo them.

And this was, indeed, effected in the beginning of the prophesying of the faithful prophet [Moses]. At that time, the magicians and soothsayers were humbled and suppressed. And it was a Divine stratagem to have all of this transpire in the very hotbed of necromancy [Egypt], where the grandeur of his signs would be more clearly discriminated than in a land devoid of such arts. This is the intent of (Menachoth 85a): "Yochni and Mamre said to him [Moses]: 'Are you bringing straw to Ofraim, the city of straw!' He answered: 'People say: "Take greens to the place of greens."' The meaning is as follows: Yochni and Mamre assumed that these signs displayed by the faithful prophet were produced through the agency of those stratagems common to necromancy. They, therefore, took him to task for deceiving the people according to their wretched minds) in the midst of a land full of such trickery. And Moses countered: "People say: 'Take greens to the place of greens.'" That is, the excellence of one who is perfect in something cannot be recognized except in a place where that thing is present to a certain extent. By way of analogy, if one possesses the most excellent of greens, he will be more apt to sell them in a city where there is an abundance of greens and where their relative superiority would, in consequence, be more easily recognized. This was precisely Moses' situation. We find, then, that the prophet outdoes all that the diviners do, and with a greater degree of perfection. For just as the diviner foretells matters affecting the individual, so does the prophet (as evidenced in the episode of the lost asses, in which Saul consulted the prophet Samuel). Therefore, when the Torah interdicted these occult arts, prophecy was provided as a replacement.

The verse relates that after Amnon raped her: “And Tamar put ashes on her head and rent her garment of many colors that was on her” (II Samuel 13:19). The Sages taught in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa: Tamar established a great fence at that time by way of her public outcry, as people said: If such an occurrence could happen to the daughters of kings, all the more so could it happen to the daughters of ordinary people. If such an occurrence could happen to modest women like Tamar, who resisted, all the more so could it happen to licentious women. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: At that time they decreed

about seclusion, that a man should not be secluded with women who are forbidden to him, and about a single woman.

The Gemara objects: Seclusion with a woman forbidden by familial ties is prohibited by Torah law, and was not a rabbinic decree issued in the time of David. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: From where is there an allusion to the halakha that seclusion is forbidden by Torah law? As it is stated: “If your brother, the son of your mother, entices you” (Deuteronomy 13:7). One can ask: But does the son of a mother entice, and does the son of a father not entice? Why mention only the son of a mother? Rather, this verse serves to tell you that only a son may be secluded with his mother. Sons are frequently with their mother, and two half-brothers of one mother consequently have the opportunity to grow close to one another. But another individual may not be secluded with those with whom relations are forbidden by the Torah, including a stepmother. Therefore, half-brothers of one father spend less time together.

Since seclusion, then, is prohibited by Torah law, how did Rav say that it was prohibited by a decree issued in King David’s time? Rather, say that they decreed against seclusion of a man with a single woman, to prevent occurrences like that of Amnon and Tamar.

We learned in our mishna: And furthermore, Rabbi Eliezer said: One may even cut down trees to prepare charcoal for the purpose of circumcision on Shabbat. With regard to this issue, the Sages taught in a baraita: In the locale of Rabbi Eliezer, where they would follow his ruling, they would even cut down trees on Shabbat to prepare charcoal from it in order to fashion iron tools with which to circumcise a child on Shabbat. On a related note, the baraita relates: In the locale of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili they would eat poultry meat in milk, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili held that the prohibition of meat in milk does not include poultry.

The Gemara relates: Levi happened to come to the house of Yosef the hunter. They served him the head of a peacock [tavsa] in milk and he did not eat. When Levi came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the latter said to him: Why did you not excommunicate these people who eat poultry in milk, contrary to the decree of the Sages? Levi said to him: It was in the locale of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, and I said: Perhaps he taught them that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who permits the eating of poultry meat in milk. Given the possibility that their rabbi rules that it is permitted, I cannot come and prohibit it, and I certainly cannot excommunicate them for it.

Rabbi Yitzḥak said: There was one city in Eretz Yisrael where they would act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to circumcision, and they would die at their appointed time and not earlier, as a reward for their affection for this mitzva. And not only that, but on one occasion the wicked empire, Rome, issued a decree against the Jewish people prohibiting circumcision; but against that city it did not issue the decree.

Rav Mesharshiyya raises an objection to the statement of Rabbi Yonatan from a baraita: Our Sages relied on the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and on the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, who would say: One does not issue a decree upon the congregation unless the majority of the congregation is able to withstand it.

And Rav Adda bar Abba said: What is the verse from which this principle is derived? It is derived from the verse: “With the curse you are cursed, yet you rob Me, the entire nation” (Malachi 3:9). The verse is referring to the oath taken by the entire people to observe the halakhot of tithes, and they violated those halakhot. But here it is written: “The entire nation,” and yet, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, relied on this verse to derive that the legal status of the majority of an entity is like that of the entire entity, and therefore if a majority of the congregation can withstand the decree the court may issue it. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan is indeed a conclusive refutation.

The Gemara asks: Rather, now that Rabbi Yonatan’s opinion has been refuted, what is derived from the phrase “the entire assembly” that the Merciful One states? This is what it is saying: If there are all the judges present and they issue that ruling based on the majority, it is a ruling, and if not, it is not a ruling.

Abaye said to Rav Dimi: Why does Rav Giddel interpret it this way? Perhaps the meaning of “great” is that he ascribed greatness to Him by enunciating God’s explicit name? Rav Dimi said to him: The explicit name may not be enunciated in the provinces, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard.

The Gemara asks: And is this really not permitted? Isn’t it written: “And Ezra the Scribe stood upon a pulpit of wood, which they had made for the purpose... and Ezra blessed the Lord, the great God” (Nehemiah 8:4-6); and Rav Giddel said: “Great” in this verse means that he ascribed greatness to Him by enunciating God’s explicit name. Since this event took place outside the Temple (see Nehemiah 8:3), it suggests that God’s explicit name may indeed be enunciated outside the Temple. The Gemara answers: That cannot be proven from here because the permission to use God’s explicit name in that context was a provisional edict issued in exigent circumstances, since the people had uniquely come together in a prayerful commitment to God.

The Gemara comments: This interpretation that Rav Mattana said leans to, i.e., is consonant with, the exposition of RabbiYehoshua ben Levi. As Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Why are the Sages of those generations called the members of the Great Assembly? It is because they returned the crown of the Holy One, Blessed be He, to its former glory. How so? Moses came and said in his prayer: “The great, the mighty, and the awesomeGod” (Deuteronomy 10:17). Jeremiah the prophet came and said: Gentiles, i.e., the minions of Nebuchadnezzar, are carousing in His sanctuary; where is His awesomeness? Therefore, he did not say awesome in his prayer: “The great God, the mighty Lord of Hosts, is His name” (Jeremiah 32:18). Daniel came and said: Gentiles are enslaving His children; where is His might? Therefore he did not say mighty in his prayer: “The great and awesome God” (Daniel 9:4).

The members of the Great Assembly came and said: On the contrary, this is the might of His might, i.e., this is the fullest expression of it, that He conquers His inclination in that He exercises patience toward the wicked. God’s anger is flared by the gentile nations’ enslavement of His people, yet He expresses tremendous might by suppressing His anger and holding back from punishing them immediately. Therefore, it is still appropriate to refer to God as mighty. And these acts also express His awesomeness: Were it not for the awesomeness of the Holy One, Blessed be He, how could one people, i.e., the Jewish people, who are alone and hated by the gentile nations, survive among the nations?

The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, i.e., Jeremiah and Daniel, how could they do this and uproot an ordinance instituted by Moses, the greatest teacher, who instituted the mention of these attributes in prayer? Rabbi Elazar said: They did so because they knew of the Holy One Blessed be He, that He is truthful and hates a lie. Consequently, they did not speak falsely about Him. Since they did not perceive His attributes of might and awesomeness, they did not refer to them; therefore, they cannot be criticized for doing so.

The mishna teaches: If a hired laborer requests payment at the proper time and the employer claims he already paid him, the laborer takes an oath that he did not receive his wages and then receives the wages from the employer. The Gemara asks: Why did the Sages institute for a hired laborer, who is the plaintiff, to take an oath and receive his wages, in opposition to the principle that in the case of a monetary dispute between two parties, the defendant takes an oath that he is not liable and thereby exempts himself from payment?

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: They taught great halakhot here. The Gemara is puzzled by this choice of words: Are these halakhot? They are ordinances designed for the proper running of business transactions, not halakhot that apply to everyone at all times. The Gemara emends the above statement: Rather, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: They taught great ordinances here. The Gemara is still unsatisfied with the terminology: Does the word great indicate by inference that there are minor ordinances? Which ordinances are considered of minor importance?

Rather, Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: They taught fixed ordinances here that are necessary for practical life. The reason is that taking the oath is actually the duty of the employer, but the Sages transferred the oath of the employer and imposed it upon the hired laborer due to the livelihood of the hired laborer. The laborer requires his wages to survive, and therefore if the employer is allowed to exempt himself by taking an oath, the laborer will be left with nothing. The Gemara asks: And simply due to the livelihood of the hired laborer should we cause the employer to lose out? If the employer is entitled to take an oath to exempt himself, why should he suffer due to the laborer’s needs?

I believe that Moses gives two separate instructions here. 1) To observe and to listen to the Torah and the various commandments, i.e. the ones with which the Israelites were already familiar; 2) the various decrees our rabbis have formulated throughout our history known as "fences." Concerning the Torah and the commandments written therein Moses said שמר, "observe," seeing these were already known; concerning the rabbinic decrees which were not yet known he said ושמעת, "be sure to hearken." Moses said את כל to warn the people to be sure that they include all the various decrees and ordinances that would be enacted by the Rabbis in the future. He said the words כל הדברים, "the whole words," to remind us that unless one fulfils both the biblical and the rabbinic part of the commandments one has not truly fulfilled them. Moses concludes this thought with the words למען ייטב לך ולבניך to remind us that it is the performance of all these rabbinic decrees which will enable the Jewish people to raise Torah-true generations of children and grandchildren. This is what would separate us from the people who indulge in a way of life that is abhorrent to G'd.

כי תעשה הטוב, "so that you will do what is good, etc." Moses explains that the purpose of rabbinic decrees and ordinances is designed only to enable you to do what is good and correct in the eyes of the Lord. Accordingly, this part of the verse is also part of the reason why Moses commands us to "observe and hearken." The good which G'd has in mind for us will be the result of our relating with equal seriousness to rabbinic decrees as we relate to biblical injunctions. All of this is additional to the good that will devolve on future generations as a result of the interpretations of Torah left to us by the scholars. The words כי תעשה are an addition to the words שמר ושמעת.

The Gemara explains: Rather, the entire institution of the tied document is rabbinic in origin, and all these verses that were cited above by various amora’im were intended as mere support for the concept of a tied document, as opposed to actual sources.

The Gemara explains: This question is not necessary except where it was the case that a Jew robbed another of the item and sold it to a gentile, and the gentile enhanced it, and then the gentile went back and sold it to another Jew. What is the halakha in this case? Do we say: Since it was initially stolen by a Jew and was then acquired by a Jew, the Sages did institute an ordinance? Or, perhaps since there is the ownership of a gentile intervening, the Sages did not institute an ordinance. The Gemara comments: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ The mishna taught that these are the non-priestly watches: Since it is stated: “Command the children of Israel.” The Gemara asks: What is the mishna saying about the non-priestly watches? How does the verse relate to the watches? The Gemara explains that the mishna is saying as follows: These are the non-priestly watches, which will be explained later. And what is the reason that they instituted non-priestly watches? Since it is stated: “Command the children of Israel and say to them: My offering of food, which is presented to Me made by a fire, of a sweet savor to Me, you shall observe to sacrifice to Me in their due season” (Numbers 28:2).

GEMARA: Rami bar Ḥama said: What is the difference between the case of a deaf-mute man and a deaf-mute woman, that the Sages enacted rabbinic marriage for them despite their condition, and the case of an imbecilic man and an imbecilic woman, that the Sages did not enact marriage for them? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to an imbecilic man and a minor who married women and died, their wives are exempt from ḥalitza and from levirate marriage. This indicates that the marriages of an imbecile and a minor are of no significance.

In light of the previous mention of the blessing of the heretics, the Gemara explains how this blessing was instituted: The Sages taught: Shimon HaPakuli arranged the eighteen blessings, already extant during the period of the Great Assembly, before Rabban Gamliel, the Nasi of the Sanhedrin, in order in Yavne. Due to prevailing circumstances, there was a need to institute a new blessing directed against the heretics. Rabban Gamliel said to the Sages: Is there any person who knows to institute the blessing of the heretics, a blessing directed against the Sadducees? Shmuel HaKatan, who was one of the most pious men of that generation, stood and instituted it.

The Gemara relates: Rav Ya’akov from Nehar Pekod prepared a glass vessel that could contain a quarter-log of water for washing his hands. Rav Ashi in Huzal likewise prepared an earthenware vessel that could contain a quarter-log.

The Gemara relates: Rav Ya’akov from Nehar Pekod prepared a glass vessel that could contain a quarter-log of water for washing his hands. Rav Ashi in Huzal likewise prepared an earthenware vessel that could contain a quarter-log.