א"ר יוחנן משום רבי בנאה מאי דכתיב (ישעיהו לב, כ) אשריכם זורעי על כל מים משלחי רגל השור והחמור אשריהם ישראל בזמן שעוסקין בתורה ובגמילות חסדים יצרם מסור בידם ואין הם מסורים ביד יצרם שנאמר אשריכם זורעי על כל מים ואין זריעה אלא צדקה שנאמר (הושע י, יב) זרעו לכם לצדקה וקצרו לפי חסד ואין מים אלא תורה שנאמר (ישעיהו נה, א) הוי כל צמא לכו למים משלחי רגל השור והחמור תנא דבי אליהו לעולם ישים אדם עצמו על דברי תורה כשור לעול וכחמור למשאוי:
this light bread” (Numbers 21:5), despite the fact it was the highest-quality food. Moses further called them children of ingrates, as it is written that after sinning and eating from the tree of knowledge, Adam said: “The woman whom You gave to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat” (Genesis 3:12). Adam complained that the woman had been given to him in order to cause him to sin, whereas in fact she had been given to him to serve as a helpmate. Yet even Moses our teacher, who said this to the Jewish people, did not allude to the Jewish people until after forty years that they should have stated this request, as it is stated: “And I have led you forty years in the wilderness” (Deuteronomy 29:4), which shows that Moses was speaking forty years after the revelation at Sinai. And at that point it is written: “But the Lord has not given you a heart to know, and eyes to see, and ears to hear, until this day” (Deuteronomy 29:3). Rabba said: Conclude from here that a person does not understand the opinion of his teacher until after forty years, as Moses said this to the Jewish people only after forty years of learning Torah. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Bana’a: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Happy are you that sow beside all waters, that send forth freely the feet of the ox and the donkey” (Isaiah 32:20)? Happy are you Israel; when they, i.e., the Jewish people, engage in Torah study and in acts of kindness, their evil inclination is given over to them, and they are not given over to their evil inclination, as it is stated: “Happy are you that sow beside all waters.” And the term sowing is referring to nothing other than performing charitable deeds, as it is stated: “Sow to yourselves according to charitableness, reap according to mercy” (Hosea 10:12). And the term waters is referring to nothing other than the Torah, as it is stated: “Ho, every one that thirsts, come for water” (Isaiah 55:1). With regard to the continuation of the verse: “That send forth freely the feet of the ox and the donkey,” one of the Sages of the school of Eliyahu taught: A person should always make himself subjugated to matters of Torah like an ox to a yoke and like a donkey to a burden. § After concluding its long introduction, the Gemara analyzes the mishna. The mishna taught that on the three days before the festivals of gentiles it is prohibited to engage with them in business or to lend them items. The Gemara asks: And is it the practice of a gentile to buy an animal so far in advance of his festival that it is required of Jews to refrain from selling an animal to idol worshippers for all of these days before their festivals? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Ḥullin 83a): On four occasions during the year one who sells an animal to another is required to inform him: I sold the mother of this animal today for the buyer to slaughter it, or: I sold the daughter of this animal today for the buyer to slaughter it. This notification is necessary so that this buyer will not slaughter the animal on the same day that its mother or its young is slaughtered, thereby violating the prohibition: “You shall not kill it and its young both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28). The mishna continues: And those four occasions are: The eve of the last day of the festival of Sukkot, the eve of the first day of the festival of Passover, and the eve of Shavuot, and the eve of Rosh HaShana. And according to the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the eve of Yom Kippur in the Galilee is included as well. This mishna indicates that one prepares for a festival for only one day prior to the event. Why does the mishna here prohibit sales three days prior to gentile festivals? The Gemara answers: There, in the mishna in Ḥullin, where the animal is purchased for consumption, it is sufficient to prepare one day before the festival. Here, in the case of this mishna, where the animal is purchased for sacrifice, the gentile requires three days to ensure that the animal has no blemish. The Gemara asks: And for the purpose of sacrifice, is it sufficient to prepare merely three days in advance? But didn’t we learn in a baraita: One begins to ask about the halakhot of Passover thirty days before Passover; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One begins to inquire only two weeks before Passover. According to both opinions, far more than three days are needed in order to begin preparing for the sacrifice of an offering. One can assume that the same applies to gentiles. The Gemara answers: We Jews, for whom blemishes that disqualify the animal are common, as even a small blemish on the cornea of the eye disqualifies it, we require thirty days to prepare for the sacrificial offerings of the festivals. By contrast, with regard to them, gentiles, they hold that the only blemish that disqualifies the animal is if it is lacking an entire limb; therefore, three days are sufficient for them to prepare for the sacrifice. As Rabbi Elazar says: From where is it derived with regard to an animal that is lacking a limb, that it is prohibited for descendants of Noah to sacrifice it as an offering? As it is written: “And of every living thing of all flesh, two of every sort you shall bring into the ark, to keep them alive with you” (Genesis 6:19). In this verse the Torah states: Bring an animal whose extremities are alive, as some of those animals were to be used later as offerings. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that verse required to teach that an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa] is not fit to be sacrificed as an offering? The Gemara answers: The disqualification of a tereifa is derived from the phrase: “To keep seed alive” (Genesis 7:3), as a tereifa cannot propagate. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that a tereifa cannot give birth. According to this opinion, the disqualification of a missing limb is derived from the phrase: “Of every living thing,” while the disqualification of a tereifa is learned from the phrase: “To keep seed alive.”
אשריכם ישראל בזמן שעוסקין בתורה ובגמ"ח כו' ואין זריעה אלא צדקה. יש לדקדק אהא דקאמר בגמ"ח במקום צדקה דהא זריעה לא משמע אלא צדקה ונראה לפרש כלפי שאמרו בפרק לולב וערבה גדולה גמ"ח יותר מן הצדקה כו' אדם זורע ספק אוכל קוצר ודאי אוכל ועוד אמרו אין צדקה משתלמת אלא לפי חסד שבה שנאמר זרעו לכם לצדקה וקצרו לפי חסד דהיינו שהנתינה היא צדקה והטורח הוא החסד כגון מוליכה לביתו כו' כפרש"י שם והשתא קאמר הכא אשריכם זורעי על כל מים דודאי יצמח ובא לידי קצירה דהיינו הצדקה הבאה לידי חסד והכי משמע קרא דזורע ונותן צדקה על כל מים דהיינו ע"פ התורה הוא עושה אותה שתבא לידי חסד וקצירה ויהיה משלחי רגל כמשמעו דהיינו שטורח בהולכה דהיינו גמ"ח ולפי שהיצר הרע מרחיק דבר זה ליתן ממונו צדקה לעני ולטרוח עוד עמו להביאו לביתו ובשאר טרחות כפרש"י ע"כ אמר כי העושה הצדקה באופן זה הנה יצרו מסור בידו כו' ועיין קרוב לדרש זה בסוף פ"ק דב"ק ובחידושינו שם:
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר גָּדוֹל הָעוֹשֶׂה צְדָקָה יוֹתֵר מִכׇּל הַקָּרְבָּנוֹת שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר עֲשֹׂה צְדָקָה וּמִשְׁפָּט נִבְחָר לַה׳ מִזָּבַח וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר גְּדוֹלָה גְּמִילוּת חֲסָדִים יוֹתֵר מִן הַצְּדָקָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר זִרְעוּ לָכֶם לִצְדָקָה וְקִצְרוּ לְפִי חֶסֶד אִם אָדָם זוֹרֵעַ סָפֵק אוֹכֵל סָפֵק אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל אָדָם קוֹצֵר וַדַּאי אוֹכֵל וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אֵין צְדָקָה מִשְׁתַּלֶּמֶת אֶלָּא לְפִי חֶסֶד שֶׁבָּהּ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר זִרְעוּ לָכֶם לִצְדָקָה וְקִצְרוּ לְפִי חֶסֶד תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה דְּבָרִים גְּדוֹלָה גְּמִילוּת חֲסָדִים יוֹתֵר מִן הַצְּדָקָה צְדָקָה בְּמָמוֹנוֹ גְּמִילוּת חֲסָדִים בֵּין בְּגוּפוֹ בֵּין בְּמָמוֹנוֹ צְדָקָה לָעֲנִיִּים גְּמִילוּת חֲסָדִים בֵּין לָעֲנִיִּים בֵּין לָעֲשִׁירִים צְדָקָה לַחַיִּים גְּמִילוּת חֲסָדִים בֵּין לַחַיִּים בֵּין לַמֵּתִים:
just as its pouring is in sanctity, so too must its burning be in sanctity. From where may it be inferred that this is referring to burning? Ravina said: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the term sanctity written with regard to libations and sanctity written with regard to leftover offerings. It is written here, with regard to libations: “In sanctity shall you pour a libation” (Numbers 28:7), and it is written there, with regard to leftover offerings: “You shall burn the leftovers in fire; they are not to be eaten, for they are sanctity” (Exodus 29:34). Through the verbal analogy it is derived that leftover libations must also be burned. The Gemara notes: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in this mishna? With regard to libations, initially, prior to being poured, one can misuse consecrated property with them, as is the case with all consecrated items. However, once they descended to the drainpipes, one does not violate the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property with them, because the mitzva was already fulfilled. Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok, who holds that the libations did not descend to the depths but would collect between the ramp and the altar and would be collected once every seventy years. As, if it were in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, how could the libations be misused? Didn’t they already descend to the depths through the drainpipes? The Gemara rejects this: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, it could be referring to a case where some of the wine landed outside the drainpipes and was collected in the space between the ramp and the altar. And some say a different version of this exchange. Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok. As, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, then the wine that collected between the ramp and the altar remains in its sanctity, as it must be burned, and the prohibition against misuse would still apply. The Gemara rejects this: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, there is no item whose mitzva has been performed with which one can violate the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property. Reish Lakish said: When they pour wine onto the altar, they plug the top of the drainpipes so that the wine does not descend to the depths, in order to fulfill that which is stated: “In sanctity shall you pour a libation of strong drink [shekhar] unto the Lord” (Numbers 28:7). The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this is referring to plugging the drainpipes? Rav Pappa said: Shekhar is an expression of drinking, of satiation, of intoxication. In order to underscore all three aspects of the libations, the space between the altar and the ramp would fill with wine. Rav Pappa said: Conclude from this that when a person is satiated from drinking wine, it is from his throat being filled with wine that he is satiated. Unlike food, wine does not satiate a person when it fills his stomach. Rava said: Therefore, let a young Torah scholar, who does not have much wine, swallow his wine in large swigs, filling his throat each time, as he will thereby maximize his enjoyment. And Rava himself, when drinking a cup of blessing, would swallow large swigs so as to drink the wine accompanying the mitzva in an optimal manner. § Apropos the homiletic interpretations of the verses from Song of Songs with regard to the drainpipes, the Gemara cites additional interpretations. Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “How beautiful are your steps in sandals, O prince’s daughter” (Song of Songs 7:2)? How beautiful are the feet of the Jewish people at the time when they ascend to Jerusalem for the Festival. “O prince’s daughter”; this is referring to the daughter of Abraham our Patriarch, who was called prince, as it is stated: “The princes of the peoples are gathered, the people of the God of Abraham” (Psalms 47:10). The verse calls the Jewish people the people of the God of Abraham and not the God of Isaac and Jacob. Why are the Jewish people associated specifically with Abraham? Rather than referring to the three Patriarchs, the verse is referring to the God of Abraham, who was first of the converts, and therefore it is reasonable for the princes of other nations to gather around him. In the school of Rav Anan it was taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The hidden of your thighs” (Song of Songs 7:2)? Why are matters of Torah likened to a thigh? It is to tell you that just as the thigh is always concealed, covered by clothes, so too, matters of Torah are optimal when recited in private and not in public. And this is what Rabbi Elazar said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “It has been told you, O man, what is good, and what the Lord does require of you; only to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with your God” (Micah 6:8)? “To do justly”; this is justice. “To love mercy”; this is acts of kindness. “To walk humbly with your God”; this is referring to taking the indigent dead out for burial and accompanying a poor bride to her wedding canopy, both of which must be performed without fanfare. The Gemara summarizes: And are these matters not inferred a fortiori? If, with regard to matters that tend to be conducted in public, as the multitudes participate in funerals and weddings, the Torah says: Walk humbly, then in matters that tend to be conducted in private, e.g., giving charity and studying Torah, all the more so should they be conducted privately. § Rabbi Elazar said: One who performs acts of charity is greater than one who sacrifices all types of offerings, as it is stated: “To perform charity and justice is more acceptable to the Lord than an offering” (Proverbs 21:3), including all types of offerings. And Rabbi Elazar said: Acts of kindness, assisting someone in need, are greater than charity, as it is stated: “Sow to yourselves according to charity, and reap according to kindness” (Hosea 10:12). This means: If a person sows, it is uncertain whether he will eat or whether he will not eat, since much can go wrong before the seed becomes food. However, if a person reaps, he certainly eats. In this verse, charity is likened to sowing, while acts of kindness are likened to reaping. And Rabbi Elazar said: The reward for charity is paid from Heaven only in accordance with the kindness and generosity included therein and in accordance with the effort and the consideration that went into the giving. It is not merely in accordance with the sum of money, as it is stated: “Sow to yourselves according to charity, and reap according to kindness.” The Sages taught that acts of kindness are superior to charity in three respects: Charity can be performed only with one’s money, while acts of kindness can be performed both with his person and with his money. Charity is given to the poor, while acts of kindness are performed both for the poor and for the rich. Charity is given to the living, while acts of kindness are performed both for the living and for the dead. And Rabbi Elazar said: Anyone who performs charity and justice is considered as though he filled the whole world in its entirety with kindness, as it is stated: “He loves charity and justice; the earth is full of the kindness of the Lord” (Psalms 33:5). Lest you say that anyone who comes to leap and perform an act of kindness may simply leap and do so without scrutiny, the verse states: “How precious is your kindness, O God” (Psalms 36:8). It is a precious and rare occurrence to perform an act of kindness properly. One might have thought that even a God-fearing individual does not always encounter the opportunity to perform acts of kindness. Therefore, the verse states: “But the kindness of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear Him” (Psalms 103:17). Rabbi Ḥama bar Pappa said: With regard to any person who has grace about him, it is certain that he is God-fearing, as it is stated: “But the kindness of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear Him.” When one sees that a certain individual is endowed with grace and kindness, one can be certain that he is a God-fearing person. And Rabbi Elazar said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “She opens her mouth with wisdom, and a Torah of kindness is on her tongue” (Proverbs 31:26)? The Gemara asks: Is there, then, a Torah of kindness and a Torah that is not of kindness? Rather, it is Torah studied for its own sake that is a Torah of kindness, as one studies it wholeheartedly; and it is Torah studied not for its own sake but for some ulterior motive that is a Torah that is not of kindness. Some say that it is Torah studied in order to teach it to others that is a Torah of kindness; it is Torah studied with the intent of not teaching it to others that is a Torah that is not of kindness. § The mishna continues: As its performance during the week, so is its performance on Shabbat, except that on Shabbat one would not draw water. Instead, on Shabbat eve, one would fill a golden barrel that was not consecrated and would place it in the Temple chamber, and water would be drawn from there on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: And why should one do so? Let him bring the water in a consecrated barrel. Ze’iri said: The tanna in the mishna holds that there is no requisite measure for the water to be poured for libation, and therefore more than three log could be consecrated; and that Temple vessels consecrate their content if it is fit to be consecrated, even without intent to consecrate it.
וחד אמר שבעה ואמרי לה שלשים ת"ר וכבוד עשו לו במותו זה חזקיה מלך יהודה שיצאו לפניו שלשים וששה אלף חלוצי כתף דברי ר' יהודה א"ל ר' נחמיה והלא לפני אחאב עשו כן אלא שהניחו ס"ת על מטתו ואמרו קיים זה מה שכתוב בזה והאידנא נמי עבדינן הכי אפוקי מפקינן אנוחי לא מנחינן ואיבעית אימא אנוחי נמי מנחינן קיים לא אמרינן אמר רבה בר בר חנה הוה אזילנא בהדיה דר' יוחנן למשאל שמעתא כי הוה עייל לבית הכסא והוה בעינא מיניה מלתא לא פשיט לן עד דמשי ידיה ומנח תפילין ומברך והדר אמר לן אפילו קיים אמרינן לימד לא אמרינן והאמר מר גדול למוד תורה שהלמוד מביא לידי מעשה ל"ק הא למיגמר הא לאגמורי א"ר יוחנן משום ר"ש בן יוחאי מאי דכתיב (ישעיהו לב, כ) אשריכם זורעי על כל מים משלחי רגל השור והחמור כל העוסק בתורה ובגמילות חסדים זוכה לנחלת שני שבטים שנאמר אשריכם זורעי ואין זריעה אלא צדקה שנאמר (הושע י, יב) זרעו לכם לצדקה וקצרו לפי חסד ואין מים אלא תורה שנאמר (ישעיהו נה, א) הוי כל צמא לכו למים וזוכה לנחלת שני שבטים זוכה לכילה כיוסף דכתיב (בראשית מט, כב) בן פורת יוסף בנות צעדה עלי שור וזוכה לנחלת יששכר דכתיב (בראשית מט, יד) יששכר חמור גרם אית דאמרי אויביו נופלין לפניו כיוסף דכתיב (דברים לג, יז) בהם עמים ינגח יחדו אפסי ארץ וזוכה לבינה כיששכר דכתיב (דברי הימים א יב, לג) ומבני יששכר יודעי בינה לעתים לדעת מה יעשה ישראל
הדרן עלך ארבע אבות
מתני׳ כיצד הרגל מועדת לשבר בדרך הלוכה הבהמה מועדת להלך כדרכה ולשבר היתה מבעטת או שהיו צרורות מנתזין מתחת רגליה ושברה את הכלים משלם חצי נזק דרסה על הכלי ושברתו ונפל על כלי ושברו על הראשון משלם נזק שלם ועל האחרון משלם חצי נזק התרנגולין מועדין להלך כדרכן ולשבר היה דליל קשור ברגליו או שהיה מהדס ומשבר את הכלים משלם חצי נזק
הדרן עלך ארבע אבות
מתני׳ כיצד הרגל מועדת לשבר בדרך הלוכה הבהמה מועדת להלך כדרכה ולשבר היתה מבעטת או שהיו צרורות מנתזין מתחת רגליה ושברה את הכלים משלם חצי נזק דרסה על הכלי ושברתו ונפל על כלי ושברו על הראשון משלם נזק שלם ועל האחרון משלם חצי נזק התרנגולין מועדין להלך כדרכן ולשבר היה דליל קשור ברגליו או שהיה מהדס ומשבר את הכלים משלם חצי נזק
And the other one said: They studied there for seven days. And some say they studied there for thirty days. The Sages taught a baraita that offers another interpretation of the verse cited: “And afforded him [lo] honor in his death” (II Chronicles 32:33). This is referring to the honor given to Hezekiah, king of Judea, that at his burial 36,000 men with bared shoulders went out before him. They removed their robes from their shoulders as a sign of mourning. The number 36,000 is alluded to by the numerical value of the word lo, which is thirty-six. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Neḥemya said to him: But didn’t they also do this before Ahab? Apparently, if they did this for the wicked king Ahab, it is an honor shown to all kings, and it is was not a unique show of honor for the righteous Hezekiah. Rather, the honor that was done for Hezekiah was that they laid a Torah scroll upon his bier and they said: This one, i.e., Hezekiah, fulfilled that which is written in this, i.e., the Torah scroll. The Gemara asks: But nowadays as well, we do this for any great Torah scholar that dies, so what is unique about what was done to honor Hezekiah? The Gemara answers: Nowadays, we take a Torah scroll out but we do not lay it on the bier of the deceased. And if you wish, say instead that nowadays we also lay a Torah scroll on the bier of the deceased; but we do not say: This one fulfilled that which is written in this. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: I was once walking together with Rabbi Yoḥanan to ask him about this statement. Whenever he would enter a lavatory, upon his exit I would ask him to explain a matter, and he would not answer us until he had washed his hands and donned his phylacteries and made the blessing, and only then would he answer us. With regard to the honor given to King Hezekiah, he said: Nowadays, we even say: This one fulfilled that which is written in this, but we do not say: He taught that which is written in this, which was a unique honor performed at the burial of the righteous King Hezekiah. The Gemara asks: But didn’t the Master say: Torah study is great because the study of Torah leads to one’s performance of the mitzvot? This indicates that the performance of mitzvot is considered of greater value than Torah study. If so, once Hezekiah had been praised with the fact that he fulfilled the mitzvot of the Torah, why mention that he studied it? The Gemara explains: This is not difficult: This statement of the Master is about studying the Torah for one’s own knowledge, and that unique praise given to King Hezekiah was about teaching the Torah to others. § A verse that was cited at the beginning of the this chapter (2b) as part of a halakhic exposition is now explained homiletically: Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Happy are you that sow beside all waters, that send forth the feet of the ox and the donkey” (Isaiah 32:20)? It teaches that whoever engages in the study of Torah and in the performance of acts of kindness merits reward equal to the portion of two tribes, Joseph and Issachar. The Gemara explains how this is derived from the verse: As it is stated: “Happy are you that sow.” And the reference to sowing refers only to acts of charity, as it is stated: “Sow for yourselves for charity, reap according to kindness” (Hosea 10:12). And the reference to water refers only to the study of Torah, as it is stated with regard to Torah study: “Ho, all who are thirsty, go to water” (Isaiah 55:1). And the fact that he merits reward equal to the portion of two tribes is derived as follows: The reference to the ox in the verse is an allusion to Joseph, who is described as an ox (Deuteronomy 33:17), and one’s reward is that he merits to receive a canopy of honor, as did Joseph, as it is written: “Joseph is a fruitful vine, a fruitful vine by a fountain; its branches run over the wall.” The branches over the wall in this verse allude to the canopy. And the reference to the donkey is an allusion to the fact that he merits to receive the portion of Issachar, who is described as a donkey, as it is stated: “Issachar is a large-boned donkey” (Genesis 49:14). There are some who say that the comparison should be understood in a different manner. His enemies will fall before him just like in the blessing given by Moses to the tribe of Joseph, as it is written in the blessing bestowed by Moses to the tribe of Joseph: “His horns are the horns of the wild-ox; with them he shall gore the nations, even to the ends of the earth” (Deuteronomy 33:17). And he merits the understanding of Issachar, as it is written: “And of the children of Issachar, men that had understanding of the times, to know what Israel ought to do” (I Chronicles 12:33). MISHNA: The mishna in the previous chapter (15b) teaches that the owner of an animal is always forewarned with regard to the category of Trampling. The mishna elaborates: For what damage caused with the hoof is the animal deemed forewarned? It is deemed forewarned with regard to trampling objects and breaking them in the course of its walking. An animal is deemed forewarned with regard to walking in its typical manner and, by doing so, breaking objects as it proceeds. By contrast, if the animal was kicking while it was walking, or it transpired that pebbles were inadvertently propelled from under its feet and those pebbles broke vessels, cases of that kind do not fit precisely into the primary category of Trampling. In both of these cases the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage. If an animal trod upon a vessel and broke it and then a shard of that vessel fell upon a second vessel and broke it, the owner pays the full cost of the damage for the first vessel, as its action is classified under the primary category of Trampling, and he pays half the cost of the damage for the latter vessel, as the damage caused by the shard is tantamount to damage caused by pebbles inadvertently propelled by the foot of an animal. Chickens are deemed forewarned with regard to walking in their typical manner and breaking objects, and therefore, the owner of a chicken pays the full restitution for the damage done to any objects broken by his chicken. If there was a string [delil] tied to a chicken’s leg as an indication of ownership and it wrapped around a vessel and broke it, or if the chicken was hopping in an atypical manner and breaking vessels, its owner pays half the cost of the damage.
וכבר היה רבי טרפון וזקנים מסובין בעלית בית נתזה בלוד נשאלה שאילה זו בפניהם תלמוד גדול או מעשה גדול נענה רבי טרפון ואמר מעשה גדול נענה ר"ע ואמר תלמוד גדול נענו כולם ואמרו תלמוד גדול שהתלמוד מביא לידי מעשה תניא רבי יוסי אומר גדול תלמוד שקדם לחלה ארבעים שנה לתרומות ולמעשרות חמשים וארבע לשמיטים ששים ואחת ליובלות מאה ושלש מאה ושלש מאה וארבע הויין קסבר יובל מתחילתו הוא משמט וכשם שהלימוד קודם למעשה כך דינו קודם למעשה כדרב המנונא דאמר רב המנונא אין תחילת דינו של אדם אלא על דברי תורה שנאמר (משלי יז, יד) פוטר מים ראשית מדון וכשם שדינו קודם למעשה כך שכרו קודם למעשה שנאמר (תהלים קה, מד) ויתן להם ארצות גוים ועמל לאומים יירשו בעבור ישמרו חקיו ותורותיו ינצורו:
a person should view himself as though he were exactly half-liable and half-meritorious. In other words he should act as though the plates of his scale are balanced, so that if he performs one mitzva he is fortunate, as he tilts his balance to the scale of merit. If he transgresses one prohibition, woe to him, as he tilts his balance to the scale of liability, as it is stated: “But one sin destroys much good” (Ecclesiastes 9:18), which means that due to one sin that a person transgresses he squanders much good. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: Since the world is judged by its majority, i.e., depending on whether people have performed a majority of mitzvot or a majority of sins, and an individual is likewise judged by his majority, each person must consider that if he performs one mitzva he is praiseworthy, as he tilts the balance of himself and the entire world to the scale of merit. Conversely, if he transgresses one prohibition, woe to him, as he tilts the balance for himself and the entire world to the scale of liability, as it is stated: “But one sin destroys much good,” i.e., due to one sin that this individual commits, he squanders much goodness from himself and from the entire world. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: Even if one was completely righteous all his life and he rebelled by sinning at the end of his life, he loses his early merit, as it is stated: “The righteousness of the righteous shall not deliver him on the day of his transgression” (Ezekiel 33:12). And similarly, even if one was completely wicked all his life and repented in the end, he is no longer reminded of his wickedness, as it is stated in the continuation of the verse: “And as for the wickedness of the wicked, he shall not stumble over it on the day that he turns from his wickedness.” The Gemara asks: But an individual who performed mitzvot all of his life and then sins should at least be like one whose acts have been half sins and half merits, i.e., each should be of equal weight. Why, then, is he pronounced guilty? Reish Lakish said: This is not referring to an individual who has merely sinned but to one who regrets all the initial mitzvot he performed in the past. In this case the mitzvot he performed are not taken into account. MISHNA: Anyone who is engaged in the study of Bible, and in the study of Mishna, and in the desired mode of behavior, i.e., he performs labor and generally acts in an appropriate manner, will not be quick to sin, as it is stated: “And a threefold cord is not quickly broken” (Ecclesiastes 4:12). One who is involved in all three of these activities will not sin easily. And anyone who does not engage in the study of Bible, nor the study of Mishna, nor the desired mode of behavior, is not part of society, i.e., he is not considered a civilized person at all. GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: To what are the righteous in this world compared? To a tree that is standing entirely in a pure place and its branches hang over an impure place. If its branches are cut, it will stand entirely in a pure place. So too, the Holy One, Blessed be He, brings afflictions upon the righteous in this world to cleanse them of their few sins. He makes them suffer so that they will inherit the World-to-Come entirely, as it is stated: “And your beginning was in pain, your end shall greatly increase” (Job 8:7). And to what are the wicked in this world compared? To a tree that stands entirely in an impure place and whose branches hang over a pure place. If its branches are cut off, it stands entirely in an impure place. So too, the Holy One, Blessed be He, bestows good upon the wicked in this world for the few mitzvot they have performed, in order to expel them and banish them to the lowest level of Gehenna in the future, as it is stated: “There is a way which seems right to a man, but its end are the ways of death” (Proverbs 14:12). In connection to the mishna’s statement about the importance of Torah study, the Gemara relates the following incident: And there already was an incident in which Rabbi Tarfon and the Elders were reclining in the loft of the house of Nit’za in Lod, when this question was asked of them: Is study greater or is action greater? Rabbi Tarfon answered and said: Action is greater. Rabbi Akiva answered and said: Study is greater. Everyone answered and said: Study is greater, but not as an independent value; rather, it is greater as study leads to action. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: Torah study is greater, as it preceded the mitzva of separating ḥalla by forty years. The Torah was given to the Jewish people soon after they left Egypt, whereas the mitzva of separating ḥalla came into effect only after they entered Eretz Yisrael. And it preceded the mitzva of terumot and tithes by fifty-four years, as the Jews become obligated in these mitzvot only fourteen years after they entered Eretz Yisrael, once they had conquered and divided the land. Furthermore, the Torah preceded the observance of Sabbatical Years by sixty-one years, as they began to count the seven-year cycle only once they had divided the land. Finally, it preceded the Jubilee Years by 103 years, as the fifty-year count to the first Jubilee Year began only after they had divided Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asks: Why does the baraita state 103 years? It was actually 104 years. If one adds fifty to the fifty-four years that passed before the Jews began fulfilling the mitzvot dependent on the land, one arrives at a total of 104. The Gemara answers: This tanna maintains that the Jubilee Year releases slaves and returns fields to their original owners from the start of the year. Therefore, 103 years passed before the mitzva of the Jubilee Year took effect. And just as study comes before action, i.e., the mitzva of Torah study takes precedence over other mitzvot, so too, the judgment concerning Torah study precedes the judgment for an action of the performance of a mitzva. This is in accordance with the statement of Rav Hamnuna, as Rav Hamnuna says: The beginning of a person’s judgment is only concerning matters of Torah, as it is stated: “The beginning of judgment is as one lets out water” (Proverbs 17:14). This is understood to refer to the sin of neglecting Torah, as the Torah is compared to water, which brings life to the world. And just as the judgment concerning Torah study precedes the judgment for an action of the performance of a mitzva, so too does the reward for Torah study precede the reward for an action of the performance of a mitzva, as it is stated: “And He gave them the lands of nations, and they took the labor of peoples in possession, that they might observe His statutes and protect His laws” (Psalms 105:44–45). The first reward is for observing the statutes, and as explained on 37a, this is a reference to Torah study. § The mishna teaches that anyone who does not engage in the study of Bible, nor the study of Mishna, nor the desired mode of behavior, is not part of society. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And he is disqualified from bearing witness, as this individual cannot be trusted. The Sages taught: One who eats in the marketplace is comparable to a dog, as he disrespects himself through his lack of embarrassment over eating in public. And some say he is even disqualified from bearing witness. Rabbi Idi bar Avin said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion cited in the name of: Some say. Similarly, bar Kappara taught: An angry person
זוכה לכילה כיוסף דכתיב כו'. יש לדקדק מה ענין כילה לנחלה ולמה קראו אותה נחלת יוסף ונראה לפרש שהבנים חשובים נקראו נחלת שנאמר הנה נחלת יקוק בנים והבנים נקראו ע"ש המטה כמ"ש מטתו של יעקב שלמה ודרש פורת מלשון הושיבה באפריון בפ"ק דסוטה שהוא מטה לכילת חתנים ואפשר שהוא מלשון פוריא כמ"ש שנקראת המטה כך ע"ש פריה ורביה ואמר שזכה לכילה ומצינו בבניו שהיו מרובין באוכלסין בזכות גמ"ח וצדקה שעשה עם אחיו במצרים וזן ופרנס אותן עד שפרו ורבו במאד ובזכות התורה זוכה לנחלת יששכר שהיה עתיר בנכסין שיכול ללמוד תורה כדפרש"י בחומש וירא מנוחה כי טוב גו' ע"ש וא"ד אויביו נופלין לפניו כו' עמים ינגח יחדו אפסי ארץ ר"ל יפילם בנגיחה אחת כנגיחת שור התם כמפורש בספר יהושע ויתקבצו יחדיו להלחם עם יהושע גו' ואת ארצם לכד יהושע פעם אחת כי יקוק וגו' וזה זכה יוסף וגבר באחיו שע"י זרעו יהושע נפלו האויבים בכבוש הארץ בזכות שעשה גמ"ח וצדקה עם אחיו ובזכות התורה זכה לבינה שהיא מעלה עליונה לאגמורי שמביא הרבים לידי מעשה כדאמרינן לעיל וזה שאמר שנא' ומבני יששכר יודעי בינה לעתים לקבוע עתים לתורה ובזה הביאו את הרבים לידי מעשה כדכתיב לדעת מה יעשה בישראל:
תָּא שְׁמַע דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר אֵין מוֹכְרִין סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה אֶלָּא לִלְמוֹד תּוֹרָה וְלִישָּׂא אִשָּׁה שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תּוֹרָה בְּתוֹרָה שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי דִּלְמָא שָׁאנֵי תַּלְמוּד שֶׁהַתַּלְמוּד מֵבִיא לִידֵי מַעֲשֶׂה אִשָּׁה נָמֵי לָא תֹהוּ בְרָאָהּ לָשֶׁבֶת יְצָרָהּ אֲבָל תּוֹרָה בְּתוֹרָה לָא:
It stands to reason to rule in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappi, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: It is permitted for a synagogue to be made into a study hall. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that the opinion of Rav Pappi is correct. § Bar Kappara interpreted a verse homiletically: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And he burnt the house of the Lord, and the king’s house, and all the houses of Jerusalem, and every great house he burnt with fire” (II Kings 25:9)? He explained: “The house of the Lord”; this is the Holy Temple. “The king’s house”; these are the king’s palaces [palterin]. “And all the houses of Jerusalem”; as understood in its literal sense. With regard to the final phrase: “And every great house he burnt with fire,” Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree about the meaning of “great house”: One of them said: It is referring to a place where the Torah is made great, i.e., the study hall; and the other one said: It is referring to a place where prayer is made great, i.e., the synagogue. The Gemara explains their respective opinions: The one who said that the reference is to where the Torah is made great bases his opinion on a verse that describes Torah study as great, as it is written: “The Lord was pleased, for His righteousness’ sake, to make Torah great and glorious” (Isaiah 42:21). And the one who said that the reference is to where prayer is made great bases his opinion on a verse that describes prayer as great, as it is written: “Tell me, I pray you, all the great things that Elisha has done” (II Kings 8:4), and that which Elisha did, i.e., restored a boy to life, he did through prayer. The Gemara comments: Conclude that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is the one who said that “great house” is referring to a place where the Torah is made great, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said elsewhere: It is permitted for a synagogue to be made into a study hall. This ruling indicates that he holds that a study hall has a higher degree of sanctity than a synagogue. It is therefore reasonable that he assumes that “great house” is referring specifically to a study hall. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that he was the one who said the term is referring to a place where the Torah is made great. § The mishna states: However, if they sold a Torah scroll, they may not use the proceeds to purchase scrolls of the Prophets and the Writings. Similarly, the proceeds of the sale of any sacred item may not be used to purchase an item of a lesser degree of sanctity. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha with regard to whether it is permitted to sell an old Torah scroll in order to purchase a new one? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: On the one hand, since the proceeds are not raised to a higher degree of sanctity by doing so, maybe it is prohibited; or, perhaps in this case, since there is no possibility of raising it to another, higher degree of sanctity, it seems well and should be permitted? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the mishna: However, if they sold a Torah scroll, they may not use the proceeds to purchase scrolls of the Prophets and the Writings. One may infer: It is only scrolls of the Prophets and the Writings that may not be purchased with the proceeds, but to purchase a new Torah scroll with the proceeds of an old Torah scroll seems well and is permitted. The Gemara rejects this proof: The mishna discusses the halakha that applies only after the fact that a Torah scroll was sold. Perhaps it is only in that case where the proceeds may be used to purchase another Torah scroll. When the dilemma was raised to us, it was with respect to permitting the sale of one Torah scroll in order to purchase another ab initio. Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a baraita: A Torah scroll may be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah. And scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of the Prophets or Writings, since in each case the wrapping cloths are being used for something with a greater degree of sanctity. However, a scroll of the Prophets or Writings may not be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah, and scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may not be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for a Torah scroll. The Gemara explains the proof: In any event, the baraita is teaching: A Torah scroll may be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah. One may infer: A Torah scroll may be rolled up only in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah; but to roll it up in wrapping cloths of another Torah scroll, no, it is not permitted. By extension, one Torah scroll may certainly not be sold in order to purchase another. The Gemara rejects the proof: If this inference is valid, one should be able to say the latter clause and make a similar inference from it. The latter clause teaches: And scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may not be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for a Torah scroll. It may be inferred from this that it is prohibited only to roll up scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah in wrapping cloths that are used for a Torah scroll, but to roll up one Torah scroll in the wrapping cloths of another Torah scroll seems well. By extension, one should be permitted to sell a Torah scroll to purchase another. Rather, perforce one must conclude that no inference beyond its basic meaning can be deduced from the baraita, as the inferences are contradictory. Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the Tosefta (Megilla 3:12): A Torah scroll may be placed upon another Torah scroll, and a Torah scroll may be placed upon scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah, and scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may be placed upon scrolls of the Prophets or Writings. However, scrolls of the Prophets or Writings may not be placed upon scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah, and scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may not be placed upon a Torah scroll. From the first clause, it is apparent that one Torah scroll may be used for the sake of another. By extension, it should be permitted to sell one Torah scroll to purchase another. The Gemara rejects this proof: Can you say a proof from the halakha of placing one Torah scroll upon another? The halakha of placing scrolls upon one another is different, because it is impossible to place them in any other way, as they must be laid one atop the other when placed in the ark. As, if you do not say so, that it is indeed permitted when in an unavoidable situation, how could we furl a Torah scroll at all? Does one sheet of parchment not rest upon another? Rather, since it is impossible to furl the scroll in any other way, it is permitted. Here too, since it is impossible to place the scrolls in the ark in any other way, it is permitted. Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a baraita: As Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: A person may not sell an old Torah scroll in order to purchase a new one. The Gemara rejects this proof. There, in the case of the baraita, it is prohibited because of a concern for negligence. The old one might be sold and a new one never bought. However, when we speak, it is of a case where the new scroll is already written and waiting to be redeemed immediately with the proceeds of the sale. Therefore, the question remains: What is the halakha in this case? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a baraita: As Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Meir: A Torah scroll may be sold only if the seller needs the money in order to study Torah or to marry a woman. Learn from this baraita that exchanging one entity of Torah, i.e., a Torah scroll, for another entity of Torah, i.e., Torah study, seems well, and by extension, it should be permitted to sell one Torah scroll to purchase another. The Gemara rejects the proof: Perhaps Torah study is different, as the study of Torah leads to action, i.e., the fulfillment of the mitzvot, and perhaps it is only due to its great importance of Torah study that it is permitted to sell a Torah scroll for it. Similarly, marrying a woman is also of utmost importance, as it is stated with regard to Creation: “He created it not a waste; He formed it to be inhabited” (Isaiah 45:18). This indicates that marrying and having children fulfills a primary goal of Creation. But selling an old Torah in order to buy a new Torah might not be permitted. On the same topic, the Sages taught in a baraita: A person may not sell a Torah scroll, even if he does not need it. Furthermore, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: Even if a person has nothing to eat, and out of his need he sold a Torah scroll or he sold his daughter to be a maidservant, he never sees a sign of blessing from the proceeds of either sale. Clearly, it is never appropriate to sell a Torah scroll for any purpose. The mishna states: And similarly, the same limitation applies to any surplus funds from the sale of sacred items. Rava said: They taught that the surplus funds have sanctity only in a case where the community sold a sacred object and then used the proceeds to purchase something with a greater degree of sanctity, and there was money left over. However, if the community collected money from its members in order to purchase a sacred object, and there was extra money left over beyond the price of the object, that extra money is permitted to be used for any purpose, as the money was never sanctified. Abaye raised an objection to Rava from a baraita: In what case is this statement of the mishna said? When they did not explicitly stipulate that they would do with the surplus funds as they see fit. However, if they made such a stipulation, then even to use the money for a dukhsusya is permitted. The Gemara will explain the meaning of the term dukhsusya. Abaye explains the challenge: What are the circumstances of this stipulation? If we say that they sold a sacred object and after using the proceeds to purchase another sacred object there was money left over, then even when they made a stipulation, of what avail is it? How can a stipulation desanctify the money? Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case where they collected money to purchase a sacred object and there was money left over after they made the purchase. In such a case, the reason that it is permitted to use the extra money for any purpose is that they made an explicit stipulation. However, if they did not make a stipulation, no, it would not be permitted. Rava rejects this argument: Actually, you can explain that the mishna is referring to a case where they sold a sacred object and there was money left over after purchasing a new one, and this is what the baraita is saying: In what case is this statement of the mishna said? In a case where the seven representatives of the town did not explicitly stipulate that they could use the money as they see fit, in an assembly of the residents of the town. However, if the seven representatives of the town made such a stipulation in an assembly of the residents of the town, then even to use the money for a dukhsusya would also be permitted. Abaye said to one of the Sages who would arrange the Mishna before Rav Sheshet: Did you hear anything from Rav Sheshet with regard to what the meaning of the term dukhsusya is? He said to him: This is what Rav Sheshet said: It is the town horseman who would serve the townspeople as a sentry and for public dispatches. The Gemara introduces a parenthetical comment: Abaye said: Accordingly, one can learn from this incident that with regard to this young Torah scholar who has heard something and does not know the meaning of it, he should inquire of its meaning before somebody who is frequently before the Sages, as it is impossible that such a person did not hear something about it from some great man. § Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Meir: In the case of residents of a town who collectively went to another town and, while there, the charity collectors in that town made them pledge a certain sum for charity, they must give the promised sum to the town’s charity collector, so as not to be suspected of reneging. But when they go home, their money is returned to them, and they bring it back with them, and with it they finance the poor of their own town. The Gemara comments: That is also taught in a baraita: In the case of residents of a town who collectively went to another town and, while there, the local charity collectors made them pledge a certain sum for charity, they must give the promised sum to the town’s charity collector. But when they go home, their money is returned to them, and they bring it back with them. But in the case of an individual who went from his hometown to another town and, while there, the local charity collectors made him pledge a certain sum for charity, he should give it to the poor of that town. The Gemara relates: Rav Huna once decreed a fast day. On the day of the fast, Rav Ḥana bar Ḥanilai and all the people of his town came to Rav Huna. A certain sum of charity was imposed upon them and they gave it. When they wanted to go home, they said to Rav Huna: May our Master give to us the charity that we gave, and we will go back, and with it we will finance the poor of our own town. He said to them: It was taught in a baraita: In what case is this statement, that the money is returned when the people leave, said? When there is no
תלמוד גדול שהתלמוד מביא לידי מעשה. תימה דאמר בספ"ק דב"ק (דף יז.) ר' יוחנן משי ידיה ומנח תפילין והדר אמר לן קיים אמרינן לימד לא אמרי' ופריך והא אמר מר גדול תלמוד תורה שהתלמוד מביא לידי מעשה פירש בקונטרס מי נתלה במי קטן נתלה בגדול וא"כ כיון דאמר קיים כל שכן לימד שאינו חשוב כל כך אלמא מוכח התם מהכא דמעשה גדול וי"ל דהתם הכי פי' והדר אמר לן קיים אמרינן לימד לא אמרינן ופריך התם והאמר מר גדול תלמוד שמביא לידי מעשה א"כ היאך קיים אם לא לימד וכיון שאנו אומרים לו קיים הרי אומרים לו לימד ואת אמרת קיים אמרינן לימד לא אמרי' ומשני הא למיגמר הא לאגמורי כלומר למגמר לדידיה ודאי מעשה עדיף אבל לאגמורי אחרינא ודאי עדיף טפי ממעשה והלכך לימד לאחריני לא אמרי' וי"מ דאדם שלא למד עדיין ובא לימלך אם ילמוד תחילה או יעסוק במעשה אומרים לו למוד תחלה לפי שאין עם הארץ חסיד אבל אדם שלמד כבר המעשה טוב יותר מלימוד:
והאמר מר גדול למוד תורה שמביא לידי מעשה - פי' בקונטרס אלמא מעשה עדיף וקשה לר"ת דאדרבה מהכא דייק ספ"ק דקדושין (דף מ: ושם) למוד גדול ממעשה גבי זקנים שהיו מסובין בעליית בית נתזה בלוד ונשאלה שאילה זו בפניהם למוד גדול או מעשה גדול ונמנו כולם ואמרו למוד גדול שמביא לידי מעשה ואומר ר"ת דה"פ והאמר מר שלמוד מביא לידי מעשה וכיון שאנו אומרים קיים הרי אנו אומרים שלמד דאי לא שלמד היאך קיים שהלמוד מביא לידי מעשה ולא מסיק אדעתיה השתא לחלק בין למד ללימד ומשני הא לאגמורי [דלימוד] ודאי לא אמרינן דהא ודאי עדיף שמביא את הרבים לידי מעשה כשמלמדם ובשאלתות דרב אחאי גאון ל"ג קיים אמרינן לימד לא אמרינן אלא גרס ומנח תפילין והדר אמר לן ותו לא ופריך גמרא והיאך הוה מנח תפילין תחלה קודם שהיה אומר להם השמעתתא והלא למוד גדול ממעשה ומשני הא למגמר הא לאגמורי דליגמר נפשיה למוד גדול שמביא לידי מעשה אבל לאגמורי לאחרים לא עדיף ולפיכך היה מניח תפילין תחלה:
But didn't the Master say: Torah study is great because [it] leads to performance [of the mitzvoth]? R’ Yochanan ruled that we may place a Torah scroll on the bier of a righteous person and announce that he fulfilled all that is written in the Torah, but we may not say that he taught all that is written in the Torah. It seems that fulfilling all that is written in the Torah is less of an accomplishment than teaching all that is written in the Torah. We may accord a righteous person the lesser honor of saying that he fulfilled, but not the greater honor that he taught all of the Torah. That honor is reserved for the righteous of Hizkiyah’s caliber.
The Gemara challenges this by asking: But the master taught that learning Torah is great because it leads one to performing the mitzvos of the Torah? What exact point is the Gemara trying to make by citing the teaching that Torah study is great because it leads to performance of the mitzvos?
Tosafot cites Rashi’s explanation, argues with it and eventually introduces his own explanation.
Rashi explains: We see that performance of the mitzvos is greater, because we are saying that the greatness of studying the Torah is that it leads one to fulfilling the Torah, obviously fulfilling must be the greater of the two. This is a contradiction to R’ Yochanan who said that we may say about a righteous person that he fulfilled the Torah but not that he taught the Torah. R’ Yochanan is saying that announcing that one taught is the greater honor, while we have learned that fulfilling the Torah is the greater of the two.
Rabbeinu Tam finds this difficult: to the contrary, from this statement, the Gemara deduces in the end of the first Perek of Kidushin (40b) that learning Torah is greater than the performance of Mitzvos.
In regard to the elders who were reclined in the attic of the house of Nitzoh in Lod, and the this question was raised before them: Is studying Torah greater or performance of Mitzvos greater?
They were all counted and said: studying is greater because it leads one to performance. It seems that the Gemara there is clearly saying that studying Torah is greater. If so, what is the Gemara’s question here to R’ Yochanan who is also saying that announcing that one studied the entire Torah is the greater honor.
Rabbeinu Tam adopts a new approach to our Gemara. The Gemara at this point is not addressing the issue of whether studying is greater than performance, it is addressing the essence of R’ Yochanan’s statement that we may say that a righteous person fulfilled all of the Torah, but not that he studied all of the Torah.
And Rabbeinu Tam says: that this is the explanation of our Gemara: but the Master said that it is studying that leads one to fulfilling, and when we say that he fulfilled the Torah, we are in effect saying that he learned all of the Torah, for if he did not learn, how could he fulfill the Torah, for it is the learning of Torah that leads one to fulfilling the Torah? Without learning how to perform the Mitzvos one cannot fulfill them.
It did not enter upon the mind of the Gemara at this time to differentiate between studying Torah and teaching Torah.
And the Gemara answers: that this statement of R’ Yochanan is speaking about teaching others, this we can certainly not say about any deceased righteous person, because that is certainly the strongest praise that one can possibly say about a person because he leads the multitudes to fulfilling the Torah when he teaches them. This level of praise is reserved for Hizkiyah and may not be said about other righteous people. The Gemara was correct in its understanding that saying that one fulfilled all of the Torah is equivalent to saying that he learned all of the Torah, for if he did not learn how could he fulfill? R’ Yochanan did not say that we cannot announce that a person learned all of the Torah. What he said is that we may not announce that he taught others all of the Torah. This praise is reserved only for those of Hizkiyah’s caliber.
According to Rabbeinu Tam and Rashi the greatest praise that could possibly be said about a person is that he taught others all of the Torah. This is reserved for Hizkiyah and others of his caliber. We may say that a person studied and fulfilled all of the Torah. Tosafot will now present the opinion of Sh’iltos of Rav Achai who has a radically different approach to our Gemara. His approach is based on a variant text.
According to the text of our Gemara, Rabbah bar Bar Chonoh asked R’ Yochanan about the issue that was discussed in our Gemara; is it so that we may not say that a righteous person fulfilled all of the Torah? R’ Yochanan’s response was directly about this issue and he answered that we may announce that a person fulfilled all of the Torah, but we may not announce that he taught all of the Torah.
According to the text of Shiltos Rabbah bar Bar Chonoh asked nothing about this issue, nor did R’ Yochanan say anything about it. The Gemara is analyzing R’ Yochanan’s behavior when faced with this dilemma. He was asked about a passage of Gemara while he needed to put on his t’filin. How did R’ Yochanan act?
In the Sh’iltos of Rav Achai Gaon, we do not have the text that R’ Yochanan responded we may say that he performed the Mitzvos but not that he taught. This issue was not raised at all. When Rabbah bar Bar Chonoh says that he was asking R’ Yochanan about a teaching, he was not referring to this issue at all. He was speaking about learning in general. He is saying that when I asked R’ Yochanan a question about what I was studying, this is how he behaved.
Rather, the text is: and he, R’ Yochanan, put on his T’filin and then told us the answer to our question and nothing more is in the text of the Gemara. There is no reference to the issue of what may be announced at a righteous person’s funeral.
And the Gemara asks: How did he put on t’filin first before he told them the teaching that they had asked him about? But study is greater than fulfilling and he should have taught them the Gemara that they needed to know, which is Torah study, before he put on his t’filin, which is performance of mitzvos, because studying takes precedence?
And the Gemara answers: This is speaking about learning and that is speaking about teaching. For learning oneself, study is greater because it leads one to fulfilling, but teaching others is not as vital and it is for this reason that he put on t’filin first before teaching Rabbah bar Bar Chonoh what he needed to know.
There is a radical difference between Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam who both hold that the greatest honor that can be accorded to a person is to announce that he taught Torah to others and Sh’iltos who holds that teaching others is not as important as learning oneself.
We will return to you Arbo’oh Ovos!
The Gemara challenges this by asking: But the master taught that learning Torah is great because it leads one to performing the mitzvos of the Torah? What exact point is the Gemara trying to make by citing the teaching that Torah study is great because it leads to performance of the mitzvos?
Tosafot cites Rashi’s explanation, argues with it and eventually introduces his own explanation.
Rashi explains: We see that performance of the mitzvos is greater, because we are saying that the greatness of studying the Torah is that it leads one to fulfilling the Torah, obviously fulfilling must be the greater of the two. This is a contradiction to R’ Yochanan who said that we may say about a righteous person that he fulfilled the Torah but not that he taught the Torah. R’ Yochanan is saying that announcing that one taught is the greater honor, while we have learned that fulfilling the Torah is the greater of the two.
Rabbeinu Tam finds this difficult: to the contrary, from this statement, the Gemara deduces in the end of the first Perek of Kidushin (40b) that learning Torah is greater than the performance of Mitzvos.
In regard to the elders who were reclined in the attic of the house of Nitzoh in Lod, and the this question was raised before them: Is studying Torah greater or performance of Mitzvos greater?
They were all counted and said: studying is greater because it leads one to performance. It seems that the Gemara there is clearly saying that studying Torah is greater. If so, what is the Gemara’s question here to R’ Yochanan who is also saying that announcing that one studied the entire Torah is the greater honor.
Rabbeinu Tam adopts a new approach to our Gemara. The Gemara at this point is not addressing the issue of whether studying is greater than performance, it is addressing the essence of R’ Yochanan’s statement that we may say that a righteous person fulfilled all of the Torah, but not that he studied all of the Torah.
And Rabbeinu Tam says: that this is the explanation of our Gemara: but the Master said that it is studying that leads one to fulfilling, and when we say that he fulfilled the Torah, we are in effect saying that he learned all of the Torah, for if he did not learn, how could he fulfill the Torah, for it is the learning of Torah that leads one to fulfilling the Torah? Without learning how to perform the Mitzvos one cannot fulfill them.
It did not enter upon the mind of the Gemara at this time to differentiate between studying Torah and teaching Torah.
And the Gemara answers: that this statement of R’ Yochanan is speaking about teaching others, this we can certainly not say about any deceased righteous person, because that is certainly the strongest praise that one can possibly say about a person because he leads the multitudes to fulfilling the Torah when he teaches them. This level of praise is reserved for Hizkiyah and may not be said about other righteous people. The Gemara was correct in its understanding that saying that one fulfilled all of the Torah is equivalent to saying that he learned all of the Torah, for if he did not learn how could he fulfill? R’ Yochanan did not say that we cannot announce that a person learned all of the Torah. What he said is that we may not announce that he taught others all of the Torah. This praise is reserved only for those of Hizkiyah’s caliber.
According to Rabbeinu Tam and Rashi the greatest praise that could possibly be said about a person is that he taught others all of the Torah. This is reserved for Hizkiyah and others of his caliber. We may say that a person studied and fulfilled all of the Torah. Tosafot will now present the opinion of Sh’iltos of Rav Achai who has a radically different approach to our Gemara. His approach is based on a variant text.
According to the text of our Gemara, Rabbah bar Bar Chonoh asked R’ Yochanan about the issue that was discussed in our Gemara; is it so that we may not say that a righteous person fulfilled all of the Torah? R’ Yochanan’s response was directly about this issue and he answered that we may announce that a person fulfilled all of the Torah, but we may not announce that he taught all of the Torah.
According to the text of Shiltos Rabbah bar Bar Chonoh asked nothing about this issue, nor did R’ Yochanan say anything about it. The Gemara is analyzing R’ Yochanan’s behavior when faced with this dilemma. He was asked about a passage of Gemara while he needed to put on his t’filin. How did R’ Yochanan act?
In the Sh’iltos of Rav Achai Gaon, we do not have the text that R’ Yochanan responded we may say that he performed the Mitzvos but not that he taught. This issue was not raised at all. When Rabbah bar Bar Chonoh says that he was asking R’ Yochanan about a teaching, he was not referring to this issue at all. He was speaking about learning in general. He is saying that when I asked R’ Yochanan a question about what I was studying, this is how he behaved.
Rather, the text is: and he, R’ Yochanan, put on his T’filin and then told us the answer to our question and nothing more is in the text of the Gemara. There is no reference to the issue of what may be announced at a righteous person’s funeral.
And the Gemara asks: How did he put on t’filin first before he told them the teaching that they had asked him about? But study is greater than fulfilling and he should have taught them the Gemara that they needed to know, which is Torah study, before he put on his t’filin, which is performance of mitzvos, because studying takes precedence?
And the Gemara answers: This is speaking about learning and that is speaking about teaching. For learning oneself, study is greater because it leads one to fulfilling, but teaching others is not as vital and it is for this reason that he put on t’filin first before teaching Rabbah bar Bar Chonoh what he needed to know.
There is a radical difference between Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam who both hold that the greatest honor that can be accorded to a person is to announce that he taught Torah to others and Sh’iltos who holds that teaching others is not as important as learning oneself.
We will return to you Arbo’oh Ovos!