And how would the otheramora, Rabbi Ḥiyya, respond to this assertion? Indeed, he would agree that it is a rabbinic ordinance. However, granted, if you say that by Torah law one who says: Here you are, is obligated to take an oath, that explains why the Sages instituted the oath mentioned in the mishna, as it is similar to an oath administered by Torah law. But if you say that by Torah law one who says: Here you are, is exempt from taking an oath, would the Sages institute an oath that has no corresponding oath in Torah law? Clearly, there is a basis for the oath instituted by the Sages in Torah law, and that basis is the case where the defendant says: Here you are.

The Gemara asks: According to the opinion of Rav Sheshet and Rav Yosef too, certainly everything the Sages instituted through their decrees, they instituted similar to the model established by Torah law. Why, then, did these blind Sages recite the Haggadah themselves?

The Gemara asks: What is different about wine used for a libation, with regard to which the halakha of earthenware vessels is more lenient? As Mareimar taught: A glazed earthenware vessel is permitted whether it is black, white, or green if it was used to store wine belonging to gentiles. Any wine that came in contact with gentiles is suspected of having been poured as a libation offering to idolatry. And if you say that it is possible to distinguish between the prohibition of wine used for a libation, which is a rabbinic prohibition, and that of leavened bread, which is forbidden by Torah law, this is difficult, as all ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted similar to Torah law. Once they have declared that this item is prohibited, the principles applicable to Torah prohibitions apply to it as well. Ameimar said to him: The distinction between the two cases is that with regard to this vessel, which is used for cooking during Passover, its primary use is with hot foods, and therefore the flavor of the leavened bread has become absorbed within its walls. But with regard to this vessel, which is used to store wine, its primary use is with cool liquids, which are not absorbed to the same degree.

And the other Sage, Rav Ḥinnana of Vardonia, why was he silent? He holds that when we say: All ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted parallel to Torah law, it is with regard to a matter that is rooted in the Torah, and upon which the Sages instituted an ordinance. However, with regard to a matter that is not rooted in the Torah, e.g., the halakhot of joining courtyards and merging alleyways, no, they did not institute the ordinances parallel to Torah law.

Abaye says: This is not actual theft; it is an instruction to sit passively and not do anything. The Sages have the authority to instruct one to passively violate a Torah law, so long as no action is taken. Rava says: The Sages are able to institute this ordinance because property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless. As Rabbi Yitzḥak says: From where is it derived that property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless? As it is stated: “And whoever did not come within three days according to the counsel of the princes and the Elders, all of his property shall be forfeited, and he shall be separated from the congregation of the captivity” (Ezra 10:8).

As Rabbi Yitzḥak said: From where is it derived that property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless? As it is stated: “And whoever does not come within three days, according to the council of the princes and the Elders, all his property should be forfeited, and himself separated from the congregation of the captivity” (Ezra 10:8). This verse indicates that the court can confiscate anyone’s possessions.

The Gemara asks: And is there anything that by Torah law renders the bill of divorce void and the wife remains married, and due to the reasoning of: What advantage does the court have, we do not recognize that the bill of divorce is void and permit a married woman to marry anyone? The Gemara answers: Yes, anyone who betroths a woman betroths her contingent upon the will of the Sages, and when one fails to conform to their will in matters of marriage and divorce the Sages expropriated his betrothal from him retroactively.

The Gemara answers: Yes, it is within the authority of the Sages to institute an ordinance freeing the woman from the marriage, as anyone who betroths a woman, betroths her contingent upon the agreement of the Sages, and in certain cases, such as those mentioned above, the Sages invalidated his betrothal retroactively.

The Gemara explains the proof from this source: And here it is a case where by Torah law, the bill of divorce is nullified, and yet due to the reason of: What good is the power of the court, his nullification is ineffective, which means that we permit a married woman to all men. The Gemara answers: The halakhot of marriage afford no proof, as with regard to one who betroths a woman, he betroths on the authorization of the Sages, and in this case the Sages nullified the betrothal, which they can do because their consent was required for the betrothal to be effective in the first place.

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: In the case of a woman who was forced to accept betrothal, the betrothal is certainly not valid. This man acted improperly; consequently, the Sages acted improperly with him, and the Sages expropriated her betrothal from him.

In any case, it is clear that according to this baraita the halakhot of prayer are based on the Temple offerings. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who held that the forefathers instituted the prayers. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, could have said to you: Actually, I will say to you that the Patriarchs instituted the prayers and the Sages based the times and characteristics of prayer on the Temple offerings, even though they do not stem from the same source. As, if you do not say so, that even Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, would agree that the laws of offerings and those of prayers are related, then, according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who instituted the additional prayer? It is not one of the prayers instituted by the forefathers. Rather, even according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, the prayers were instituted by the Patriarchs and the Sages based them on the laws of the offerings.

Rav Kahana replied to them: A great man has spoken, do not laugh at him. The Sages based all rabbinic law on the prohibition of “you shall not deviate”; however, due to concern for human dignity, the Sages permitted suspension of rabbinic law in cases where the two collide. All rabbinic decrees are predicated on the mitzva in the Torah to heed the judges in each generation and to never stray from their words. Therefore, when the Sages suspend a decree in the interest of preserving human dignity, human dignity is overriding a Torah prohibition. In any case, it only overrides rabbinic decrees.

The Gemara asks: Why? Let us also say here: “There is neither wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against the Lord.” Rav bar Shaba interpreted this prohibition, which is overridden by human dignity, before Rav Kahana as referring to the prohibition of: “According to the Torah taught to you and the ruling handed down to you, you shall do, you shall not deviate to the left or the right from that which they tell you” (Deuteronomy 17:11). The Yeshiva students laughed at him, as the prohibition of “you shall not deviate” is by Torah law, like all other Torah prohibitions. Why should human dignity override it any more than any other Torah prohibition?

The Gemara asks: Does this prove by inference that Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov maintains that eating matza nowadays applies by Torah law? But isn’t Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov the one who said that eating matza nowadays applies by rabbinic law? Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov apparently contradicts himself. The Gemara answers: Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov maintains that everything the Sages instituted through their decrees, they instituted similar to the model established by Torah law. In other words, although the obligations to eat matza and recite the Haggadah are rabbinic, the stringencies and restrictions that apply to Torah mitzvot apply here as well. Therefore, a blind person is exempt from reciting the Haggadah.

The Gemara asks: According to the opinion of Rav Sheshet and Rav Yosef too, certainly everything the Sages instituted through their decrees, they instituted similar to the model established by Torah law. Why, then, did these blind Sages recite the Haggadah themselves?

Rava expounded another verse in similar fashion: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And more than these, my son, be careful: of making many books [sefarim] there is no end; and much study is a weariness of the flesh” (Ecclesiastes 12:12)? My son, be careful to fulfill the words of the Sages [soferim] even more than the words of the Torah. For the words of the Torah include positive and negative commandments, and even with regard to the negative commandments, the violation of many of them is punishable only by lashes. Whereas with respect to the words of the Sages, anyone who transgresses the words of the Sages is liable to receive the death penalty, as it is stated: “And whoever breaches through a hedge, a snake shall bite him” (Ecclesiastes 10:8), taking hedges to refer metaphorically to decrees.

To listen to the voice of the court at all times: To listen to the voice of the Great Court and to do all that they command us in the paths of the Torah - regarding the forbidden and the permitted, the impure and the pure, the liable and the exempt and in everything that appears to them to be a reinforcement and enhancement to our religion. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 17:10), "And you shall act according to the word that they tell you." And it is repeated adjacently (Deuteronomy 17:12) to strengthen the thing, "According to the instruction that they instruct you and to the judgement that they say to you shall you act." And there is no difference in this, whether the thing that they see is from their own intellects or is something that they extracted by one of the comparisons through which the Torah is expounded, or something that they agreed is from the secrets of the Torah or they see that the thing is like this in any other way - in everything, we are obligated to listen to them. And the proof that this is from the tally of positive commandments is their, may their memory be blessed, saying in Sifrei Devarim 154, "'And according to the judgement that they say to you shall you act' - this is a positive commandment."

If a case is too baffling for you to decide, be it a controversy over homicide, civil law, or assault—matters of dispute in your courts—you shall promptly repair to the place that the LORD your God will have chosen,

and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case,

If a case is too baffling for you to decide, be it a controversy over homicide, civil law, or assault—matters of dispute in your courts—you shall promptly repair to the place that the LORD your God will have chosen,

you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the LORD chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you.

You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left.

Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the LORD your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die. Thus you will sweep out evil from Israel:

all the people will hear and be afraid and will not act presumptuously again.

If, after you have entered the land that the LORD your God has assigned to you, and taken possession of it and settled in it, you decide, “I will set a king over me, as do all the nations about me,”

you shall be free to set a king over yourself, one chosen by the LORD your God. Be sure to set as king over yourself one of your own people; you must not set a foreigner over you, one who is not your kinsman.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Wherever the Sages prohibited an action due to the appearance of prohibition, even in the innermost chambers, where no one will see it, it is prohibited. When prohibiting an action, the Sages did not distinguish between different circumstances. They prohibited performing the action in all cases.

For the major part of Torah and of reward for its observance is subsumed in the decrees of the sages and their measures relating to things which cannot be derived from the Torah itself, as is concluded from the following (Gittin 60b): R. Elazar said: 'The greater part of Torah is written and the lesser part, oral, as stated (Hosea 8:12): "Though I write for him the multitudes of My Torah, they are reckoned as a strange thing."' R. Yochanan said: 'The greater part is oral and the lesser part is written, as stated (Exodus 34:26): "…for through [lit., "through the mouth of"] these words I have made a covenant with you."' But what does R. Yochanan do with "Though I write for him the multitudes of My Torah"? He sees it as an expression of wonder, viz.: "Shall I write for him the multitudes of My Torah? Are they [even the little that I have written] not reckoned as a strange thing?"

73. The Rabbi: Let us rather assume two other possibilities. Either they employ secret methods of interpretation which we are unable to discern, and which were handed down to them, together with the method of the 'Thirteen Rules of Interpretation,' or they use Biblical verses as a kind of fulcrum of interpretation in a method called Asmakhtā, and make them a sort of hall mark of tradition. An instance is given in the following verse: 'And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat' (Genesis 2:16 sq.). It forms the basis of the 'seven Noahide laws' in the following manner: ['He] commanded' refers to jurisdiction. 'The Lord' refers to prohibition of blasphemy. 'God' refers to prohibition of idolatry. 'The man' refers to prohibition of murder. 'Saying' refers to prohibition of incest. 'Of every tree of the garden,' prohibition of rape. 'Thou mayest surely eat,' a prohibition of flesh from the living animal. There is a wide difference between these injunctions and the verse. The people, however, accepted these seven laws as tradition, connecting them with the verse as aid to memory. It is also possible that they applied both methods of interpreting verses, or others which are now lost to us. Considering the well-known wisdom, piety, zeal, and number of the Sages which excludes a common plan, it is our duty to follow them. If we feel any doubt, it is not due to their words, but to our own intelligence. This also applies to the Tōrāh and its contents. We must ascribe the defective understanding of it to ourselves. As to the Agādās, many serve as basis and introduction for explanations and inunctions. For instance: the saying, 'When the Lord descended to Egypt,' etc. is designed to confirm the belief that the delivery from Egypt was a deliberate act of God, and not an accident, nor achieved with the assistance of human plotting, spirits, stars, and angels, jinn, or any other fanciful creation of the mind. It was done by God's providence alone. Statements of this kind are introduced by the word kibejākhōl, which means: If this could be so and so, it would be so and so. Although this is not to be found in the Talmud, but only in a few other works, it is to be so understood wherever it is found. This is also the meaning of the words of Micaiah, when he said to Ahab: I saw the Lord sitting on his throne . . . host of heaven. And the Lord said, who shall persuade Ahab. . . . And there came forth a spirit,' etc. (I Kings 22:19 sqq.) As a matter of fact all that he intended conveying was: Behold, the Lord has put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these prophets. Verses of this kind serve as a fulcrum and induction, rendering a subject eloquent, apposite, and showing that it is based on truth. To the same category belong tales of visions of spirits, a matter which is not strange in such pious men. Some of the visions they saw were the consequence of their lofty thoughts and pure minds, others were really apparent, as was the case with those seen by the prophets. Such is the nature of the Bāth Qōl, often heard during the time of the second Temple, and regarded as ranking next to prophecy and the Divine voice. Do not consider strange what R. Ishmael said: 'I heard a voice cooing like a dove, etc.' For the histories of Moses and Elijah prove that such a thing is possible, and when a true account is given, it must be accepted as such. In a similar sense we must take the words: 'Woe unto me that I have destroyed my house' (Genesis 6:6), which is of the same character as: 'And it repented the Lord, . . . and it grieved Him at His heart.' Other Rabbinic sayings are parables employed to express mysterious teachings which were not to be made public. For they are of no use to the masses, and were only handed over to a few select persons for research and investigation, if a proper person suitable--one in an age, or in several--could be found. Other sayings appear senseless on the face of them, but that they have their meaning, becomes apparent after but a little reflection. The following is an instance: Seven things were created prior to the world: Paradise, the Tōrāh, the just, Israel, the throne of glory, Jerusalem, and the Messiah, the son of David.' This is similar to the saying of some philosophers: 'The primary thought includes the final deed.' It was the object of divine wisdom in the creation of the world to create the Tōrāh, which was the essence of wisdom, and whose bearers are the just, among whom stands the throne of glory and the truly righteous, who are the most select, viz. Israel, and the proper place for them was Jerusalem, and only the best of men, viz. the Messiah, son of David, could be associated with them, and they all entered Paradise. Figuratively speaking, one must assume that they were created prior to the world. Seemingly against common sense is also the saying: Ten things were created in the twilight, viz. the opening of the earth, the opening of the spring, the mouth of the she ass, etc., as otherwise the Tōrāh were out of harmony with nature. Nature claims to pursue its regular course, whilst the Tōrāh claims to alter this regular course. The solution is that ordinary natural phenomena are altered within natural limits, since they had been primarily fixed by the divine will, and clearly laid down from the six days of creation. I will not deny, O King of the Khazars, that there are matters in the Talmud of which I am unable to give thee a satisfactory explanation, nor even bring them in connexion with the whole. These things stand in the Talmud through the conscientiousness of the disciples, who followed the principle that 'even the commonplace talk of the Sages requires study.' They took care to reproduce only that which they had heard from their teachers, striving at the same time to understand everything they had heard from their masters. In this they went so far as to render it in the same words, although they may not have grasped its meaning. In this case they said: 'Thus have we been taught and have heard.' Occasionally the teacher concealed from his pupils the reasons which prompted him to make certain statements. But the matter came down to us in this form, and we think little of it, because we do not know its purport. For the whole of this relates to topics which do not touch on lawful or unlawful matters. Let us not therefore trouble about it, and the book will lose nothing if we consider the points discussed here.

The Gemara further asks: If so, one can explain as follows: Just as this nail is diminished in size and does not expand, as it wastes away over time, so too matters of Torah are gradually diminished and do not expand. Therefore, the verse states: “Well fastened [netuim].” Just as this plant [neti’a] flourishes and multiplies, so too matters of Torah flourish and multiply. “Those that are composed in collections [ba’alei asufot]”: These are Torah scholars who sit in many groups [asupot] and engage in Torah study. There are often debates among these groups, as some of these Sages render an object or person ritually impure and these render it pure; these prohibit an action and these permit it; these deem an item invalid and these deem it valid.

(Devarim, Ibid.) "Do not lacerate yourselves" (lo tithgodedu): Do not form opposing factions (agudoth, agudoth), but all of you consolidate into one bond, as in (Amos 9:6) "and He founded His bond (agudah) upon the earth."

And Rabbi Elazar says: Even if the rebellious elder says his ruling on the basis of the tradition, and the members of the court say: This is the correct understanding in our eyes, he is executed, so that discord will not proliferate among Israel and to ensure that there will be a standard halakhic ruling. And if you say: For what reason was Akavya ben Mahalalel not executed? It is due to the fact that he did not issue his ruling as practical halakha; he merely claimed that his understanding was correct in theory, which is always permitted.

However, with what are we dealing here, in the case of the wall? We are dealing with domains by rabbinic law, and the Sages reinforced their statements even more than those of the Torah. Due to their severity, Torah laws are generally observed. Therefore, there is no need to impose decrees and enactments in order to preserve them. The same is not true of rabbinic decrees; if people ignore the preventive measures, they might come to violate the entire enactment.

The baraita concludes with a warning: Anyone who transgresses the pronouncements of the Sages is liable to receive the death penalty.

This is a startling conclusion. What is different in all other places that it is not taught that one is liable to receive the death penalty and what is different here that it is taught that he is liable to receive the death penalty? There is no unique stringency apparent in the rabbinic restriction on the recitation of Shema.

The Gemara offers two answers, explaining that the conclusion of the baraita essentially stems not from the magnitude of the transgression, but rather from concern that the “fence” created around this particular mitzva may be neglected. If you wish, say that one returning from work is quite anxious to go to sleep, and due to the risk that he will be overcome by sleep, he must be particularly vigilant in the recitation of Shema. And if you wish, say instead that strong language is employed here in order to exclude the opinion of he who says that although the morning prayer and the afternoon prayer are mandatory, the evening prayer is optional. Therefore, it teaches us that the evening prayer is mandatory, and anyone who transgresses the pronouncement of the Sages in this regard is liable to receive the death penalty.

And how would the otheramora, Rabbi Ḥiyya, respond to this assertion? Indeed, he would agree that it is a rabbinic ordinance. However, granted, if you say that by Torah law one who says: Here you are, is obligated to take an oath, that explains why the Sages instituted the oath mentioned in the mishna, as it is similar to an oath administered by Torah law. But if you say that by Torah law one who says: Here you are, is exempt from taking an oath, would the Sages institute an oath that has no corresponding oath in Torah law? Clearly, there is a basis for the oath instituted by the Sages in Torah law, and that basis is the case where the defendant says: Here you are.

Rava expounded another verse in similar fashion: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And more than these, my son, be careful: of making many books [sefarim] there is no end; and much study is a weariness of the flesh” (Ecclesiastes 12:12)? My son, be careful to fulfill the words of the Sages [soferim] even more than the words of the Torah. For the words of the Torah include positive and negative commandments, and even with regard to the negative commandments, the violation of many of them is punishable only by lashes. Whereas with respect to the words of the Sages, anyone who transgresses the words of the Sages is liable to receive the death penalty, as it is stated: “And whoever breaches through a hedge, a snake shall bite him” (Ecclesiastes 10:8), taking hedges to refer metaphorically to decrees.

“New and old, which I have laid up for you, O my beloved,” the Congregation of Israel said before the Holy One, Blessed be He, and continued: Master of the Universe, I have decreed many decrees upon myself through the enactments and ordinances of the Sages, more than what You decreed upon me in the Torah, and I have fulfilled them. These are the new laws which were added to the old ones stated in the Torah.

“New and old, which I have laid up for you, O my beloved,” the Congregation of Israel said before the Holy One, Blessed be He, and continued: Master of the Universe, I have decreed many decrees upon myself through the enactments and ordinances of the Sages, more than what You decreed upon me in the Torah, and I have fulfilled them. These are the new laws which were added to the old ones stated in the Torah.

It was related that Rav Ḥisda said to one of the Sages who would arrange the traditions of the aggada before him: Did you hear what the meaning of: New and old is? He said to him: These, the new, are the more lenient mitzvot, and these, the old, are the more stringent mitzvot.

Rav Ḥisda said to him: This cannot be so, for was the Torah given on two separate occasions, i.e., were the more lenient and more stringent mitzvot given separately? Rather, these, the old, are mitzvot from the Torah, and these, the new, are from the Sages.

Rava expounded another verse in similar fashion: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And more than these, my son, be careful: of making many books [sefarim] there is no end; and much study is a weariness of the flesh” (Ecclesiastes 12:12)? My son, be careful to fulfill the words of the Sages [soferim] even more than the words of the Torah. For the words of the Torah include positive and negative commandments, and even with regard to the negative commandments, the violation of many of them is punishable only by lashes. Whereas with respect to the words of the Sages, anyone who transgresses the words of the Sages is liable to receive the death penalty, as it is stated: “And whoever breaches through a hedge, a snake shall bite him” (Ecclesiastes 10:8), taking hedges to refer metaphorically to decrees.

Lest you say: If the words of the Sages are of substance and have such great importance, why were they not written in the Torah, therefore, the verse states: “Of making many books there is no end,” meaning that it is impossible to fully commit the Oral Torah to writing, as it is boundless.

What is the meaning of the words: “And much study [lahag] is a weariness of the flesh”? Rav Pappa, son of Rav Aḥa bar Adda, said in the name of Rav Aḥa bar Ulla: This teaches that whoever mocks [malig] the words of the Sages will be sentenced to boiling excrement, which results from the weariness of the flesh of man.

Rava strongly objects to this explanation: Is it written: Mock [la’ag]? “Lahag” is the word that is written. Rather, the verse must be understood in the opposite manner: Whoever meditates [hogeh] upon them, the words of the Sages, experiences enjoyment as if it had the taste of meat.

After Rabbi Yehoshua related to him the entire incident, Rabbi Akiva said to him: Give me water so that I may wash my hands. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: The water that I brought will not suffice for drinking; how will it suffice for washing your hands? He said to him: What can I do; for transgressing the words of the Sages and eating without first washing hands one is liable to receive the death penalty. And if so, it is better that I should die my own death by thirst, rather than transgress the opinion of my colleagues who enacted that one must wash hands before eating.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: At the time that King Solomon instituted the ordinances of eiruv of courtyards and of washing hands to purify them from their impurity, which are added safeguards to the words of the Torah, a Divine Voice emerged and said in his praise: “My son, if your heart is wise, My heart will be glad, even Mine” (Proverbs 23:15). And it states with regard to him: “My son, be wise and make My heart glad, that I may respond to he who taunts Me” (Proverbs 27:11).

If a case is too baffling for you to decide, be it a controversy over homicide, civil law, or assault—matters of dispute in your courts—you shall promptly repair to the place that the LORD your God will have chosen,

If a case is too baffling for you to decide, be it a controversy over homicide, civil law, or assault—matters of dispute in your courts—you shall promptly repair to the place that the LORD your God will have chosen,

and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case,

you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the LORD chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you.

You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left.

Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the LORD your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die. Thus you will sweep out evil from Israel:

all the people will hear and be afraid and will not act presumptuously again.

If, after you have entered the land that the LORD your God has assigned to you, and taken possession of it and settled in it, you decide, “I will set a king over me, as do all the nations about me,”

you shall be free to set a king over yourself, one chosen by the LORD your God. Be sure to set as king over yourself one of your own people; you must not set a foreigner over you, one who is not your kinsman.

To listen to the voice of the court at all times: To listen to the voice of the Great Court and to do all that they command us in the paths of the Torah - regarding the forbidden and the permitted, the impure and the pure, the liable and the exempt and in everything that appears to them to be a reinforcement and enhancement to our religion. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 17:10), "And you shall act according to the word that they tell you." And it is repeated adjacently (Deuteronomy 17:12) to strengthen the thing, "According to the instruction that they instruct you and to the judgement that they say to you shall you act." And there is no difference in this, whether the thing that they see is from their own intellects or is something that they extracted by one of the comparisons through which the Torah is expounded, or something that they agreed is from the secrets of the Torah or they see that the thing is like this in any other way - in everything, we are obligated to listen to them. And the proof that this is from the tally of positive commandments is their, may their memory be blessed, saying in Sifrei Devarim 154, "'And according to the judgement that they say to you shall you act' - this is a positive commandment."

To listen to the voice of the court at all times: To listen to the voice of the Great Court and to do all that they command us in the paths of the Torah - regarding the forbidden and the permitted, the impure and the pure, the liable and the exempt and in everything that appears to them to be a reinforcement and enhancement to our religion. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 17:10), "And you shall act according to the word that they tell you." And it is repeated adjacently (Deuteronomy 17:12) to strengthen the thing, "According to the instruction that they instruct you and to the judgement that they say to you shall you act." And there is no difference in this, whether the thing that they see is from their own intellects or is something that they extracted by one of the comparisons through which the Torah is expounded, or something that they agreed is from the secrets of the Torah or they see that the thing is like this in any other way - in everything, we are obligated to listen to them. And the proof that this is from the tally of positive commandments is their, may their memory be blessed, saying in Sifrei Devarim 154, "'And according to the judgement that they say to you shall you act' - this is a positive commandment."

From the roots of the commandments is that which we wrote in the Order of Mishpatim on the commandment to incline according to the many (Sefer HaChinukh 78).

From the laws of the commandment is, for example, that which they, may their memory be blessed, expounded (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 1:2), "'According to the instruction that they instruct you' - these are the decrees and the practices; 'and to the judgement' - these are the things they shall teach from the [Torah] law, through one of the methods that the Torah is expounded; 'from the thing they tell you' - this is the tradition that they received, one man from the mouth of another man." And [also] that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 88b) that at the time that the Great Court is in Jerusalem, any disagreement that existed in any court in its place is asked of the Great Court, and we act according to their word. But now that, on account of our iniquities, there is no court there, any disagreement that there be between the sages in our generations - and the ones that disagree be equal in wisdom - if we are not fit to decide among them and we do not know to where the judgement inclines, we should follow the stringent [opinion] concerning a Torah [law], and follow the lenient [opinion] in scribal (rabbinic) law. And that which they said (Mishnah Eduyot 1:5) that a court is not permitted to revoke that which was forbidden by a court that preceded it, even if it appears to its opinion that the thing is not forbidden according to the letter of the law - so long as it appears that the prohibition has spread in Israel - unless it is greater in wisdom and also in numbers (is composed of more judges) than the court that forbade the thing. And about what are these words speaking, that [the later court] can revoke [it] when [the later court] is greater than [the first court] in wisdom and numbers? When the earlier court did not forbid that thing in order to make a fence for the people for [other] prohibitions. And since this is the law, it is incumbent upon each and every court in its generation to examine the matter and investigate much and to pay attention to each [rabbinic] prohibition that it appears the generation is practicing, not to breach and instruct to be lenient about it (to permit it), lest the [court] that was before it forbade it to make a fence for the people, [and] knew that the thing is permissible by the letter of the law. And 'one who breaches a fence, etc.' And the rest of the details of the commandment are at the end of Sanhedrin (the chapter [entitled] HaNehenakin.)

From the laws of the commandment is, for example, that which they, may their memory be blessed, expounded (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 1:2), "'According to the instruction that they instruct you' - these are the decrees and the practices; 'and to the judgement' - these are the things they shall teach from the [Torah] law, through one of the methods that the Torah is expounded; 'from the thing they tell you' - this is the tradition that they received, one man from the mouth of another man." And [also] that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 88b) that at the time that the Great Court is in Jerusalem, any disagreement that existed in any court in its place is asked of the Great Court, and we act according to their word. But now that, on account of our iniquities, there is no court there, any disagreement that there be between the sages in our generations - and the ones that disagree be equal in wisdom - if we are not fit to decide among them and we do not know to where the judgement inclines, we should follow the stringent [opinion] concerning a Torah [law], and follow the lenient [opinion] in scribal (rabbinic) law. And that which they said (Mishnah Eduyot 1:5) that a court is not permitted to revoke that which was forbidden by a court that preceded it, even if it appears to its opinion that the thing is not forbidden according to the letter of the law - so long as it appears that the prohibition has spread in Israel - unless it is greater in wisdom and also in numbers (is composed of more judges) than the court that forbade the thing. And about what are these words speaking, that [the later court] can revoke [it] when [the later court] is greater than [the first court] in wisdom and numbers? When the earlier court did not forbid that thing in order to make a fence for the people for [other] prohibitions. And since this is the law, it is incumbent upon each and every court in its generation to examine the matter and investigate much and to pay attention to each [rabbinic] prohibition that it appears the generation is practicing, not to breach and instruct to be lenient about it (to permit it), lest the [court] that was before it forbade it to make a fence for the people, [and] knew that the thing is permissible by the letter of the law. And 'one who breaches a fence, etc.' And the rest of the details of the commandment are at the end of Sanhedrin (the chapter [entitled] HaNehenakin.)

And this commandment is practiced by males and females at the time that the Great Court is in Jerusalem, as all are commanded to do that which they instruct. And also included in this commandment is to listen and do like the commandment of the judge in each and every generation - meaning to say, the great sage that is with us in our times. And [it is] like they, may their memory be blessed, expounded (Rosh Hashanah 25b), "'To the judge that will be in those days' - Yiftach in his generation is like Shmuel in his generation"; meaning, that there is a commandment upon us to listen to the voice of Yiftach in his generation, [just] like to Shmuel in his generation. And one who transgresses this and does not listen to the counsel of the great in the wisdom of the Torah in the generation, 'according to everything that they instruct,' has violated a positive commandment; and his punishment is very great, as this is a strong pillar upon which the Torah rests. The matter is well-known to anyone who has intelligence.

And this commandment is practiced by males and females at the time that the Great Court is in Jerusalem, as all are commanded to do that which they instruct. And also included in this commandment is to listen and do like the commandment of the judge in each and every generation - meaning to say, the great sage that is with us in our times. And [it is] like they, may their memory be blessed, expounded (Rosh Hashanah 25b), "'To the judge that will be in those days' - Yiftach in his generation is like Shmuel in his generation"; meaning, that there is a commandment upon us to listen to the voice of Yiftach in his generation, [just] like to Shmuel in his generation. And one who transgresses this and does not listen to the counsel of the great in the wisdom of the Torah in the generation, 'according to everything that they instruct,' has violated a positive commandment; and his punishment is very great, as this is a strong pillar upon which the Torah rests. The matter is well-known to anyone who has intelligence.

To not stray from their words: That we were prevented from disagreeing with the masters of the tradition, peace be upon them, and from changing their words and to not remove ourselves from the commandments in all matters of the Torah. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 17:11), "you shall not stray from the matter that they tell you right or left." And they, may their memory be blessed, said in Sifrei Devarim 154, "'You shall not stray' - this is a negative commandment."

It is from the root of the commandments [that it is] because (see Ramban on Deuteronomy 17:11) the opinions of people are different from one another - never will many intellects agree on things. And the Master of all, blessed be He, knew that if the intention of the verses of the Torah would be given over to the hand of each and every human being - each man, according to his intelligence - every one of them will explain the words of the Torah according to his [own] rationale; and disagreement about the meaning of the commandments would increase in Israel, and the Torah will become like several Torahs - like the matter that I wrote on the commandment of "to incline towards the many" in the Order of Mishpatim (Sefer HaChinukh 78). Hence our God, who is the Master of all the wisdoms, made our Torah - the Torah of truth - perfect with this commandment; that we were commanded to act within [the Torah] according to the true understanding that was received by our early Sages, peace be upon them; and that we should listen to the sages present [now] that received their words, drank the words of their books, and exerted themselves with many exertions - day and night - to understand the depth of their words and the wonders of their opinions. And with this agreement, we will arrive at the true path in the knowledge of the Torah; and without it - if we are seduced after our thoughts and the poverty of our minds - we will not be successful at anything. And by way of the great truth and praise of this commandment, they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sifrei Devarim 154), "'You shall not stray from [it] right or left' - even if they tell say to you about right that it is left, do not stray from their commandments" - meaning to say that even if they err in one of the things, it is not fitting for us to differ with them. Rather, we should do like their mistake. And it is better to suffer one mistake, and everything be given over under their constant good opinion; and not that each and every one go according to his [own] opinion. As with [the latter], there would be destruction of the religion, dissent in the heart of the people and total loss of the nation. And because of these things, the intention of the Torah was given over to the sages of Israel. And from this root, they were also commanded that the small group of the sages is subordinate to the group of the numerous, and as I wrote there about the commandment of "to incline towards the many."

By way of this idea that I have raised for you, my son - through it, will I explain to you a certain homelitical teaching, which is in the end of the chapter [entitled] HaZahav in Bava Metzia 59b, regarding the story of Rabbi Eliezer the Great and the "oven of Achnai," which bewilders all who hear it. They said there, "Rabbi Natan met Eliyahu, etc. He said to him, 'What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do in that hour?' He said to him, 'He smiled and said, "My sons have vanquished Me..."'" - meaning that the Holy One, blessed be He, was happy that His sons were walking in the way of the Torah and its commandment, to incline after the many. And that which He said, "My sons have vanquished Me," God forbid that there is any victory before Him, blessed be He. Rather, the explanation about this idea is that in the debate of Rabbi Eliezer with his colleagues, the truth was with Rabbi Eliezer; and like the words of the heavenly voice (bat kol) that decided like him. But even though the truth was with him about this - because of his greater analysis over his colleagues - they could not completely fathom his opinion. And [so] they did not want to concede to him even after the heavenly voice; and they brought a proof from the law set in the Torah that commanded us to always go after the many - whether they say the truth or whether they are mistaken. And about this was the response of the Creator, blessed be He, "My sons have vanquished Me." Meaning, since they turned away from the true path - for Rabbi Eliezer had surmised the truth about this - and they came upon him from the power of the Torah commandment that I commanded them to always listen to the majority; if so, one must nonetheless concede to them this time - like their words - that the truth be absent. And behold, it is as if the Master of truth was defeated.

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 87a), that even though one who transgresses that which the Sages explained about the words of the Torah, transgresses this negative commandment of "you shall not stray"; nonetheless a man does not have the designation of a rebellious judge - known in the Gemara at the end of Sanhedrin 89a, who is liable for the death penalty - until he disagrees with the Great Court (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 3:5, 7), and that he is a sage that has reached [the level] of pronouncing decisions [and] is ordained like the [members of the] Sanhedrin, and that he disagrees with them on a matter the volitional transgression of which [brings] excision and the inadvertent violation of which [brings] a sin-offering, and he instructs to do according to his decision or [himself] does the act according to his decision, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:12), "who wantonly does" - and not that he only instructs. But if he is a student that has not reached [the level] of pronouncing decisions, and makes a decision; he is exempt, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:8), "If a matter is baffling to you" - one who only a baffling thing is beyond him. And so [too,] if he found them outside of the Compartment of Paved Stone (in the Temple) and he rebelled against them, he is exempt, as it is stated, "and you will arise and go up to the place" - teaching that the place causes (is a requirement for) the death penalty.

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 87a), that even though one who transgresses that which the Sages explained about the words of the Torah, transgresses this negative commandment of "you shall not stray"; nonetheless a man does not have the designation of a rebellious judge - known in the Gemara at the end of Sanhedrin 89a, who is liable for the death penalty - until he disagrees with the Great Court (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 3:5, 7), and that he is a sage that has reached [the level] of pronouncing decisions [and] is ordained like the [members of the] Sanhedrin, and that he disagrees with them on a matter the volitional transgression of which [brings] excision and the inadvertent violation of which [brings] a sin-offering, and he instructs to do according to his decision or [himself] does the act according to his decision, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:12), "who wantonly does" - and not that he only instructs. But if he is a student that has not reached [the level] of pronouncing decisions, and makes a decision; he is exempt, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:8), "If a matter is baffling to you" - one who only a baffling thing is beyond him. And so [too,] if he found them outside of the Compartment of Paved Stone (in the Temple) and he rebelled against them, he is exempt, as it is stated, "and you will arise and go up to the place" - teaching that the place causes (is a requirement for) the death penalty.

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 87a), that even though one who transgresses that which the Sages explained about the words of the Torah, transgresses this negative commandment of "you shall not stray"; nonetheless a man does not have the designation of a rebellious judge - known in the Gemara at the end of Sanhedrin 89a, who is liable for the death penalty - until he disagrees with the Great Court (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 3:5, 7), and that he is a sage that has reached [the level] of pronouncing decisions [and] is ordained like the [members of the] Sanhedrin, and that he disagrees with them on a matter the volitional transgression of which [brings] excision and the inadvertent violation of which [brings] a sin-offering, and he instructs to do according to his decision or [himself] does the act according to his decision, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:12), "who wantonly does" - and not that he only instructs. But if he is a student that has not reached [the level] of pronouncing decisions, and makes a decision; he is exempt, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:8), "If a matter is baffling to you" - one who only a baffling thing is beyond him. And so [too,] if he found them outside of the Compartment of Paved Stone (in the Temple) and he rebelled against them, he is exempt, as it is stated, "and you will arise and go up to the place" - teaching that the place causes (is a requirement for) the death penalty.

And the [law is like this], whether he disagrees about something that actually has excision for its volitional transgression (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 4:2) or something that brings to something that has excision for its volitional transgression. How is something that has excision for its volitional transgression? For example, that they disagreed about whether a certain woman is [sexually forbidden to a man] or not; if a certain blood renders impure or does not render impure; if a certain woman is [in the category of impurity called] zavah or is not a zavah; if a certain fat is forbidden or not and all that is similar to this. And how is something that brings to something that has excision for its volitional transgression? For example, that they disagreed about the intercalation of the year which [can] bring to the eating of chamets on Pesach; and so [too,] if they disagreed about a law in the monetary laws, such that according to one, the one took money from his fellow legally, and if he married a woman with it, she is married, and one [besides her husband] who has sexual relations with her volitionally is punished with excision, and when inadvertent, liable for a sin-offering, but according to the words of the other, he is exempt, and so [too,] in every matter in which money is to be extracted, such as those obligated by expropriations or evaluations, [the disagreement being about] whether they are liable to give [money] or not liable - that which they took from them [not according to the correct law] is theft, and if he marries a woman with it, she is not married; and so [too,] anything like this. And even if they disagreed about the laws of lashes, he is liable [to be a rebellious elder] as a result of them - as behold, according to the words of the one that [holds] he is not liable for lashes in court, they are obligated to pay the value of his injury, and he would legally take his payments from them.

And Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote about the matter of this negative commandment of "you shall not stray" (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 1:2) that it is one whether they are things that the Sages learned from the received tradition, or things they learned from their intellects through one of the methods through which the Torah is expounded or things done to make a fence for the Torah - and they are the decrees, the ordinances and the practices (see Rashi on Yoma 74a, s.v. ve'aliba) - in each one of these there things, it is a positive commandment to listen to them; and the one who transgresses any one of them transgresses a positive commandment and a negative commandment. And Ramban, may his memory be blessed, greatly took a hold upon him [about this] and said (in the Sefer HaMitzvot in his gloss on Shoresh 1): Behold, the rabbi holds that included in the negative commandment of "you shall not stray" is everything that is from the words of the Rabbis - whether it is a rabbinic commandment such as the reading of the Scroll [of Esther] or the Channukah light, or whether it is from the ordinances such as poultry meat with milk and the secondary sexual prohibitions; whether they are active positive, such as three prayers every day or a hundred blessings and lulav on [all] seven [days] in the borders (outside of the Temple), or they are negative, such as anything that is because of a rabbinic Shabbat prohibition on Shabbat and holidays, and so [too,] the second day of a holiday in the Diaspora and the [fast of the] Ninth of Av; and more generally, anything that the Talmud forbids or commands about. And behold, the rabbi builds a fortified wall around the words of the Sages, but it is 'like a spreading breach that occurs in a lofty wall, whose breaking comes sudden and swift'; as it is a rationale [that is found] wanting in many places in the Talmud. As behold, according to his opinion, one who uses what is connected to the ground on Shabbat, such as one who leans on a tree, or one who moves something from the sun to the shade or says to a gentile [to do work] and he does it or even if he takes a large step on Shabbat, he transgresses [both] a positive commandment and a negative commandment from the Torah, and he is fit to be lashed forty [lashes]. But the rabbi exempts him in the Book of Judges (Mishneh Torah, Laws of The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 18:2), because it is given to the warning of a death penalty by the court - as the death penalty of anyone who rebels against their words is with strangulation. And behold, according to his words, he should be lashed according to the opinion in the Talmud that says that we administer lashes for a negative commandment, given to the warning of a death penalty by the court - as is mentioned in the chapter [entitled], Mi Shehichshikh (Shabbat 154b). And according to that opinion, it is fitting to be very stringent in rabbinic laws, as they are all [from the] Torah. There is no difference at all between them and between the commandments explicit in the Scripture; and there [would] be nothing in the Torah more weighty than a rabbinic Shabbat prohibition which is of their words, except that which has a liability of excision or the death penalty by the court - but not anything that has the obligation of a positive commandment or a negative commandment. As behold, according to his opinion, there is the obligation of a positive commandment and a negative commandment in all of their words - the positive commandment of "And you shall act according to the thing that they tell you," and the negative commandment of "you shall not stray."

And Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote about the matter of this negative commandment of "you shall not stray" (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 1:2) that it is one whether they are things that the Sages learned from the received tradition, or things they learned from their intellects through one of the methods through which the Torah is expounded or things done to make a fence for the Torah - and they are the decrees, the ordinances and the practices (see Rashi on Yoma 74a, s.v. ve'aliba) - in each one of these there things, it is a positive commandment to listen to them; and the one who transgresses any one of them transgresses a positive commandment and a negative commandment. And Ramban, may his memory be blessed, greatly took a hold upon him [about this] and said (in the Sefer HaMitzvot in his gloss on Shoresh 1): Behold, the rabbi holds that included in the negative commandment of "you shall not stray" is everything that is from the words of the Rabbis - whether it is a rabbinic commandment such as the reading of the Scroll [of Esther] or the Channukah light, or whether it is from the ordinances such as poultry meat with milk and the secondary sexual prohibitions; whether they are active positive, such as three prayers every day or a hundred blessings and lulav on [all] seven [days] in the borders (outside of the Temple), or they are negative, such as anything that is because of a rabbinic Shabbat prohibition on Shabbat and holidays, and so [too,] the second day of a holiday in the Diaspora and the [fast of the] Ninth of Av; and more generally, anything that the Talmud forbids or commands about. And behold, the rabbi builds a fortified wall around the words of the Sages, but it is 'like a spreading breach that occurs in a lofty wall, whose breaking comes sudden and swift'; as it is a rationale [that is found] wanting in many places in the Talmud. As behold, according to his opinion, one who uses what is connected to the ground on Shabbat, such as one who leans on a tree, or one who moves something from the sun to the shade or says to a gentile [to do work] and he does it or even if he takes a large step on Shabbat, he transgresses [both] a positive commandment and a negative commandment from the Torah, and he is fit to be lashed forty [lashes]. But the rabbi exempts him in the Book of Judges (Mishneh Torah, Laws of The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 18:2), because it is given to the warning of a death penalty by the court - as the death penalty of anyone who rebels against their words is with strangulation. And behold, according to his words, he should be lashed according to the opinion in the Talmud that says that we administer lashes for a negative commandment, given to the warning of a death penalty by the court - as is mentioned in the chapter [entitled], Mi Shehichshikh (Shabbat 154b). And according to that opinion, it is fitting to be very stringent in rabbinic laws, as they are all [from the] Torah. There is no difference at all between them and between the commandments explicit in the Scripture; and there [would] be nothing in the Torah more weighty than a rabbinic Shabbat prohibition which is of their words, except that which has a liability of excision or the death penalty by the court - but not anything that has the obligation of a positive commandment or a negative commandment. As behold, according to his opinion, there is the obligation of a positive commandment and a negative commandment in all of their words - the positive commandment of "And you shall act according to the thing that they tell you," and the negative commandment of "you shall not stray."

And behold it is seen that our Rabbis in all of the Gemara say the opposite of this. As behold, they determine all rabbinic cases leniently, as they always say (Beitzah 3b), "A doubt of Torah [law] is to be [ruled] stringent and a doubt of rabbinic [law] is to be [ruled] lenient. And they were lenient regarding a concern of rabbinically forbidden [products being present in a certain food], to say, "As I say" (that we can assume that it is not present). And they said in the first chapter of Pesachim 9b, "I will say that we say, 'As I say,' in a rabbinic [law]; in a Torah [law], can we say, 'As I say?'" And they relied upon minors who are not fit to testify, to testify on that which is rabbinic, as they said (Pesachim 4b), "The checking for chamets is rabbinic, and the Rabbis relied upon them in rabbinic [laws]." And so [too,] regarding perimeters, a minor is believed to say, "The perimeter of Shabbat is to here," [as they] "held that perimeters are rabbinic, and the Rabbis were lenient in the rabbinic," as it is found in Eruvin 58b and in Ketuvot 28b. And they were also likewise lenient in the rabbinic with doubts, as they, may their memory be blessed, said (Berakhot 21a), "[If] there is a doubt if he prayed or if he did not pray, he does not go back and pray; [if] there is a doubt if he said, 'True and solid' or he did not say it, he goes back" - and they said, "What is the reason? Prayer is rabbinic; 'True and solid' is from the Torah." And not only that, but they were even lenient about things that contradict each other in rabbinic [law] - as they said in the chapter [entitled] Bemeh Madlikin (Shabbat 34a), "[If] two [people] said to him, 'Go out and make an eruv for us'; he made an eruv for one while it was still day, etc.," as it appears there. And it is also seen in the Gemara that we constantly uproot their words on account of a Torah prohibition; as they said in Tractate Shabbat 4a, "If he stuck bread onto an oven [wall], they permitted him to scrape it off before he comes to a prohibition [that is punished with] stoning." And there in Shabbat 128b they said, "Negating a vessel from its preparedness is rabbinic, but the pain of animals is [from] the Torah, and a positive commandment [from] the Torah comes and negates a positive commandment [from] the Rabbis," as it appears there. And this is [something seen] very much in the Talmud - a positive commandment [from] the Torah comes and pushes off a positive commandment [from] the Rabbis. And so [too] with a disagreement among the Sages, they said (Avodah Zarah 7a), "If one [group] was greater in wisdom, follow it; and if not, follow the stringent [one] in that of the Torah, and the lenient in that of the [Rabbis]." And even greater than this, they said (Eruvin 67b), "In that of the [Rabbis,] we first do the act, and then we deliberate." And in the chapter [entitled], Mi Shehichshikh (Shabbat 154b), they said, "What is it that you would say? They were also concerned with a small loss. Hence, it makes us hear" - as it is a novelty with them when they do not push off the words of the [Rabbis], even for a small loss. And they said (Berakhot 19b) that priests can render themselves impure with rabbinic impurity to see kings of the nations of the world; so that if they merit [it], they will differentiate that [which separates] the kings of Israel, etc. And also regarding the punishments of the words of the [Rabbis], they only have excommunication, as they said (Pesachim 52), "We excommunicate for the two days of holiday in the Diaspora." And they said about one who does work on Purim, "Let the master excommunicate him." And in [some] places, they have lashes of rebellion, and that is for one that transgress their words that are similar to [commandments] of the Torah - and those are all the decrees that they decreed from their [own] words - that they lash him until he accepts it upon him or until his soul departs, as is explained in the Tosefta of Sanhedrin. The general rule of the matter is that the words of the [Rabbis] are different in all of their laws from the words of the Torah, that [the one tends] towards leniency, and [the other] towards stringency. But the thing that is clear and clean of any confusion is that this negative commandment of "you shall not stray" is only in that which they, may their memory be blessed, said in explanation of the Torah - such as things that are expounded through a gezerah shavah or a binyan av or the rest of the thirteen methods through which the Torah is expounded; or about the meaning of the language of the verse itself - and so [too] regarding that which they received as a law of Moshe from Sinai. And it is about this that they, may their memory be blessed, said that there is a positive commandment and a negative commandment in the thing. And if in this matter, one fitting to pronounce decisions disagrees with the Great Court about that which the volitional transgression [brings] excision and the inadvertent violation [brings] a sin-offering, he becomes a rebellious elder through them - at a time when we judge capital cases. And this is [the meaning of] that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sifrei Devarim 154), "Even if they tell you about the left that it is right"; meaning to say that this is the commandment upon us from the Master of the Torah, may He be blessed - that we believe the greats regarding what they say, and that the one who disagrees not say, "How can I permit it for myself, since I know with certainty that they are mistaken?" As even if it will be such, it is a commandment to listen to them - as I wrote above at the beginning of the commandment - and like the matter that Rabban Gamliel conducted with Rabbi Yehoshua on Yom Kippur that fell out according to [the latter's] calculation, as is mentioned in Rosh Hashanah 25a.

And behold it is seen that our Rabbis in all of the Gemara say the opposite of this. As behold, they determine all rabbinic cases leniently, as they always say (Beitzah 3b), "A doubt of Torah [law] is to be [ruled] stringent and a doubt of rabbinic [law] is to be [ruled] lenient. And they were lenient regarding a concern of rabbinically forbidden [products being present in a certain food], to say, "As I say" (that we can assume that it is not present). And they said in the first chapter of Pesachim 9b, "I will say that we say, 'As I say,' in a rabbinic [law]; in a Torah [law], can we say, 'As I say?'" And they relied upon minors who are not fit to testify, to testify on that which is rabbinic, as they said (Pesachim 4b), "The checking for chamets is rabbinic, and the Rabbis relied upon them in rabbinic [laws]." And so [too,] regarding perimeters, a minor is believed to say, "The perimeter of Shabbat is to here," [as they] "held that perimeters are rabbinic, and the Rabbis were lenient in the rabbinic," as it is found in Eruvin 58b and in Ketuvot 28b. And they were also likewise lenient in the rabbinic with doubts, as they, may their memory be blessed, said (Berakhot 21a), "[If] there is a doubt if he prayed or if he did not pray, he does not go back and pray; [if] there is a doubt if he said, 'True and solid' or he did not say it, he goes back" - and they said, "What is the reason? Prayer is rabbinic; 'True and solid' is from the Torah." And not only that, but they were even lenient about things that contradict each other in rabbinic [law] - as they said in the chapter [entitled] Bemeh Madlikin (Shabbat 34a), "[If] two [people] said to him, 'Go out and make an eruv for us'; he made an eruv for one while it was still day, etc.," as it appears there. And it is also seen in the Gemara that we constantly uproot their words on account of a Torah prohibition; as they said in Tractate Shabbat 4a, "If he stuck bread onto an oven [wall], they permitted him to scrape it off before he comes to a prohibition [that is punished with] stoning." And there in Shabbat 128b they said, "Negating a vessel from its preparedness is rabbinic, but the pain of animals is [from] the Torah, and a positive commandment [from] the Torah comes and negates a positive commandment [from] the Rabbis," as it appears there. And this is [something seen] very much in the Talmud - a positive commandment [from] the Torah comes and pushes off a positive commandment [from] the Rabbis. And so [too] with a disagreement among the Sages, they said (Avodah Zarah 7a), "If one [group] was greater in wisdom, follow it; and if not, follow the stringent [one] in that of the Torah, and the lenient in that of the [Rabbis]." And even greater than this, they said (Eruvin 67b), "In that of the [Rabbis,] we first do the act, and then we deliberate." And in the chapter [entitled], Mi Shehichshikh (Shabbat 154b), they said, "What is it that you would say? They were also concerned with a small loss. Hence, it makes us hear" - as it is a novelty with them when they do not push off the words of the [Rabbis], even for a small loss. And they said (Berakhot 19b) that priests can render themselves impure with rabbinic impurity to see kings of the nations of the world; so that if they merit [it], they will differentiate that [which separates] the kings of Israel, etc. And also regarding the punishments of the words of the [Rabbis], they only have excommunication, as they said (Pesachim 52), "We excommunicate for the two days of holiday in the Diaspora." And they said about one who does work on Purim, "Let the master excommunicate him." And in [some] places, they have lashes of rebellion, and that is for one that transgress their words that are similar to [commandments] of the Torah - and those are all the decrees that they decreed from their [own] words - that they lash him until he accepts it upon him or until his soul departs, as is explained in the Tosefta of Sanhedrin. The general rule of the matter is that the words of the [Rabbis] are different in all of their laws from the words of the Torah, that [the one tends] towards leniency, and [the other] towards stringency. But the thing that is clear and clean of any confusion is that this negative commandment of "you shall not stray" is only in that which they, may their memory be blessed, said in explanation of the Torah - such as things that are expounded through a gezerah shavah or a binyan av or the rest of the thirteen methods through which the Torah is expounded; or about the meaning of the language of the verse itself - and so [too] regarding that which they received as a law of Moshe from Sinai. And it is about this that they, may their memory be blessed, said that there is a positive commandment and a negative commandment in the thing. And if in this matter, one fitting to pronounce decisions disagrees with the Great Court about that which the volitional transgression [brings] excision and the inadvertent violation [brings] a sin-offering, he becomes a rebellious elder through them - at a time when we judge capital cases. And this is [the meaning of] that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sifrei Devarim 154), "Even if they tell you about the left that it is right"; meaning to say that this is the commandment upon us from the Master of the Torah, may He be blessed - that we believe the greats regarding what they say, and that the one who disagrees not say, "How can I permit it for myself, since I know with certainty that they are mistaken?" As even if it will be such, it is a commandment to listen to them - as I wrote above at the beginning of the commandment - and like the matter that Rabban Gamliel conducted with Rabbi Yehoshua on Yom Kippur that fell out according to [the latter's] calculation, as is mentioned in Rosh Hashanah 25a.

And there is one condition about this law according to that which they, may their memory be blessed, said in Tractate Horayot 2b, that if at the time of the Sanhedrin, there was a wise man who was fitting to pronounce decisions or was part of the Sanhedrin, and the Great Court decided not like his opinion, he is not allowed to permit himself the matter that is forbidden according to his opinion, until he gives and takes (discusses) with them about the thing, and after they all - or their majority - agree to the negation of that opinion, confound his rationale against him and come to the conclusion that he is mistaken; [only] then is he allowed to act for himself according to the permissibility about that which it was his opinion to forbid - and it is also a commandment upon this one to accept their opinion regardless. But with the ordinances and the decrees that the Sages made as a protection of the Torah and as its fence, this negative commandment is only a [recommendation], and there is no law of rebellion about them at all. And the rest of the details of the commandment are elucidated at the end of Sanhedrin ([in the] chapter [entitled] HaNehenakin).

And this commandment is practiced concerning the matter of the rebellious elder at the time of the [Temple]. And concerning the matter to listen to the words of our ancient Sages and to our greats in the wisdom of the Torah and to our judges in our generation, it is practiced in all places and at all times by males and females. And one who transgress this and 'breaches a fence' in one of all of that which our Rabbis taught us in explanation of the Torah - such as through one of the thirteen methods or something forbidden from a law of Moshe from Sinai, and like the matter that we wrote adjacently - has violated this negative commandment, besides violating the positive commandment in it. But we do not administer lashes for it, since it is given to the warning of a death penalty by the court with the law of the rebellious elder, and as we wrote.

(2)You shall not add anything to what I command you or take anything away from it, but keep the commandments of the LORD your God that I enjoin upon you.

(1) Be careful to observe only that which I enjoin upon you: neither add to it nor take away from it.

Be careful to observe only that which I enjoin upon you: neither add to it nor take away from it.

in any case of an uncertainty with regard to the legal status of an item prohibited by Torah law, the ruling is stringent.... and in any case of an uncertainty with regard to the legal status of an item prohibited by rabbinic law, the ruling is lenient.

... That which the Sages established as a safeguard such as the secondary forbidden relationships, this is a Mitzva from the Torah as long as they know they are as a safeguard and they are not from the almighty.

§ The mishna taught: Rabbi Yehoshua took his staff and his money in his hand, and appeared before Rabban Gamliel on the day on which Yom Kippur occurred according to his calculation, as Rabban Gamliel had ordered him to do. The Sages taught in a baraita: When Rabban Gamliel saw Rabbi Yehoshua, he rose from his chair and kissed him on his head and said to him: Peace be on you, my teacher and my student. My teacher, as you have taught me Torah in public, and my student, as I issue a decree against you and you fulfill it like a student of mine. Fortunate is the generation in which the greater heed the lesser, and it is an a fortiori inference that the generation in which the lesser heed the greater is certainly fortunate as well.

BY OUR MASTER MOSES BEN MAIMON OF BLESSED MEMORY
"Then should I not be ashamed, when I have regard unto all Thy Commandments". (Ps. 119.6.)
All of the commandments which were given to Moses on Sinai were given together with their oral explanation for, it is said: "And I will give thee the tables of stone, and the Torah and the commandment" (Ex. 24.12.); the Torah, is Holy Writ; and the commandment, its oral explanation. Moreover, He commanded us to observe the Torah by the word of the commandment; thus it is this commandment which is called Oral Torah.

And it says in another verse: “Moses and Aaron among His priests, and Samuel among those who call His name; they called upon the Lord, and He answered them” (Psalms 99:6). This verse equates Samuel to Moses and Aaron. In this manner, the verse weighed three light ones of the world, i.e., it considered the three less distinguished figures of Gideon, Samson, and Jephthah as equal to three significant ones of the world, Moses, Aaron, and Samuel, three of the greatest leaders of the Jewish people.

This comes to tell you that Jerubaal in his generation is worthy of being treated like Moses in his generation; Bedan in his generation is like Aaron in his generation; and Jephthah in his generation is like Samuel in his generation. This serves to teach you that even the lightest of the light, i.e., the least distinguished individual, once he has been appointed as a leader over the community, he must be treated like the greatest of the great, and all are required to heed him and obey his rulings.

And it further says: “And you shall come to the priests, the Levites, and to the judge who shall be in those days” (Deuteronomy 17:9). But can it enter your mind that a person can go to a judge that is not alive in his days? What, then, is the meaning of the phrase “in those days”? It teaches that you need to go only to the judge in one’s days, i.e., he is authorized to judge and decide matters. And it also says: “Do not say: How was it that the former days were better than these? For it is not out of wisdom that you inquire concerning this” (Ecclesiastes 7:10). Instead, one must accept the rulings of the leaders of his generation.

§ The mishna taught: Rabbi Yehoshua took his staff and his money in his hand, and appeared before Rabban Gamliel on the day on which Yom Kippur occurred according to his calculation, as Rabban Gamliel had ordered him to do. The Sages taught in a baraita: When Rabban Gamliel saw Rabbi Yehoshua, he rose from his chair and kissed him on his head and said to him: Peace be on you, my teacher and my student. My teacher, as you have taught me Torah in public, and my student, as I issue a decree against you and you fulfill it like a student of mine. Fortunate is the generation in which the greater heed the lesser, and it is an a fortiori inference that the generation in which the lesser heed the greater is certainly fortunate as well.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that to fulfill a mitzva one does not need intent, and here they disagree with regard to the condition needed to violate the prohibition: Do not add to mitzvot of the Torah. As the first tanna holds that one does not need intent to violate the prohibition: Do not add to mitzvot. One who dons another pair of phylacteries transgresses the prohibition against adding to mitzvot even if he does not don them with the intention of fulfilling the mitzva. And Rabban Gamliel holds that in order to violate the prohibition: Do not add to mitzvot, one needs intent to perform a mitzva. Since in this case one’s intention is merely to move the phylacteries to a safer place, he may don a second pair.

40. Al Khazari: How could this be made to agree with the verse: 'Thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from it?' (Deuteronomy 13:1).

41. The Rabbi: This was only said to the masses, that they should not conjecture and theorise, and contrive laws according to their own conception, as the Karaites do. They were recommended to listen to the post-Mosaic prophets, the priests and judges, as it is written: 'I will raise them up a prophet . . . and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him' (Deuteronomy 18:18). With regard to the priests and judges it is said that their decisions are binding. The words: 'You shall not add,' etc., refer to 'that which I commanded you through Moses' and any 'prophet from among thy brethren' who fulfils the conditions of a prophet. They further refer to regulations laid down in common by priests and judges 'from the place which thy Lord shall choose.' For they have divine assistance, and would never, on account of their large number, concur in anything which contradicts the Law. Much less likelihood was there of erroneous views, because they had inherited vast learning, for the reception of which they were naturally endowed. The members of the Synhedrion, as is known by tradition, had to possess a thorough acquaintance with all branches of science Prophecy had scarcely ceased, or rather the Bath Qōl, which took its place. Now, suppose we allow the Karaite interpretation of the sentence 'From the morrow of the Sabbath till the morrow of the Sabbath' (Leviticus 23:11, Leviticus 23:15, Leviticus 23:16) to refer to the Sunday. But we reply that one of the judges, priests, or pious kings, in agreement with the Synhedrion and all Sages, found that this period was fixed with the intention of creating an interval of fifty days between 'the first fruits of the harvest of barley and the harvest of wheat,' and to observe 'seven weeks,' which are 'seven complete Sabbaths.' The first day of the week is only mentioned for argument's sake in the following manner: should the day of 'putting the sickle to the corn' be a Sunday, you count till Sunday. From this we conclude that should the beginning be on a Monday, we count till Monday. The date of putting the sickle, from which we count, is left for us to fix. This was fixed for the second day of Passover, which does not contradict the Tōrāh, since it originated with 'the place which the Lord shall choose' on the conditions discussed before. Perhaps this was done under the influence of divine inspiration. It was quite possible, and it saves us from the confusion of those who endeavour to cause confusion.

and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case,

you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the LORD chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you.

You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left.

Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the LORD your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die. Thus you will sweep out evil from Israel:

The Gemara asks: Why? Let us also say here: “There is neither wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against the Lord.” Rav bar Shaba interpreted this prohibition, which is overridden by human dignity, before Rav Kahana as referring to the prohibition of: “According to the Torah taught to you and the ruling handed down to you, you shall do, you shall not deviate to the left or the right from that which they tell you” (Deuteronomy 17:11). The Yeshiva students laughed at him, as the prohibition of “you shall not deviate” is by Torah law, like all other Torah prohibitions. Why should human dignity override it any more than any other Torah prohibition?

you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the LORD chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you.

You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Wherever the Sages prohibited an action due to the appearance of prohibition, even in the innermost chambers, where no one will see it, it is prohibited. When prohibiting an action, the Sages did not distinguish between different circumstances. They prohibited performing the action in all cases.

§ The Sages taught: Even after Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that a husband cannot render void a bill of divorce when not in the presence of the wife or the agent, if he nevertheless rendered it void, the bill of divorce is rendered void; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He is unable to render it void, and he also cannot add on to his condition if the bill of divorce contained some condition, as if so, i.e., if he can render it void, what advantage does the court have, if an ordinance of the court of Rabban Gamliel can be ignored?

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Ulla say that wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, this is a full testimony equal to that of two witnesses, and the statement of one witness has no bearing in a place where it is contradicted by two witnesses? If so, there is no difference between one witness and two witnesses in this case. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the pair who said he was dead were disqualified from giving testimony, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya.

After clarifying the opinions themselves, the Gemara analyzes the case in greater detail. Rabba said to Rav Ḥisda: According to your opinion, that you said he has done nothing at all, meaning that even that se’a he set aside returns to its former untithed state, what is the reason for this? It is a rabbinic decree, as perhaps he will be negligent and will not separateteruma a second time. However, is there anything that by Torah law is teruma, as stated by Rabbi Elai, and yet due to the concern: Perhaps he will be negligent, the Sages removed its status as sacred and gave to it the status of non-sacred food? And can the court stipulate and enact a decree to uproot something that applies by Torah law?

Rav Ḥisda sent a proof to Rabba, in the hand of Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna: And can the court not stipulate to uproot something prohibited by Torah law? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: From when does a man inherit from his minor wife, who was married off by her mother or brother, as enacted by the Sages, a marriage that is not valid by Torah law? Beit Shammai say: From when she stands at her fully developed height, i.e., when she grows up and reaches the age of maturity. And Beit Hillel say: From when she enters the wedding canopy. Rabbi Eliezer says: From when she has sexual relations. As soon as she is considered his wife, all the halakhot of a wife apply to her. And he inherits from her and becomes impure for her if she dies, even if he is a priest, and she eats teruma on his account if he is a priest.

The Gemara returns to the issue at hand, whether the court can stipulate to uproot something prohibited by Torah law. In any event the baraitais teaching that he inherits from her. But here is a case where by Torah law her father, i.e., his relatives, as he is dead, inherits from her, as a minor orphan cannot marry by Torah law, and yet by rabbinic law the husband inherits from her. This shows that the Sages can uproot a Torah mitzva. The Gemara answers: This is no proof, as in monetary matters property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless, and therefore the court can allocate her inheritance as they see fit.

As Rabbi Yitzḥak said: From where is it derived that property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless? As it is stated: “And whoever does not come within three days, according to the council of the princes and the Elders, all his property should be forfeited, and himself separated from the congregation of the captivity” (Ezra 10:8). This verse indicates that the court can confiscate anyone’s possessions.

Rabbi Elazar says that the proof that the court can declare property ownerless is from here: “These are the inheritances that Elazar the priest, and Joshua, son of Nun, and the heads of the fathers’ houses of the tribes of the children of Israel distributed for inheritance” (Joshua 19:51). What do heads have to do with fathers? The expression “the heads of the fathers’ houses of the tribes” is unusual and vague. Rather, this comes to tell you: Just as fathers bequeath to their sons anything they want to, so too, the heads, i.e., the leaders and judges of the people, bequeath to the people anything they want to. This shows that the leaders can take property from one individual and give it to another.

It was stated that the husband of a minor becomes impure for her, even if he is a priest. The Gemara asks: But here is a case where by Torah law her father, not the man she married, is obligated to become impure for her, as the latter is not his wife by Torah law, and yet by rabbinic law her husband defiles himself for her. The Gemara answers: This is because she is considered like a corpse with no one to bury it [met mitzva], for which even a priest must become impure. Once she is married, her relatives from her father’s family no longer care for her welfare, which means her husband is the only one who is entrusted with her burial.

The Gemara returns to the issue at hand, whether the court can stipulate to uproot something prohibited by Torah law. And here it is a case where by Torah law the produce he gave him is proper payment, and is fully owned by the priest, to the extent that if a priest betroths a woman with them, the betrothal with her is valid. And yet the Sages said, i.e., it is a rabbinic law, according to Sumakhos in the name of Rabbi Meir, that his payment is not payment. And this means that we permit a married woman to all men, as she is betrothed by Torah law but in practice she is treated as an unmarried woman. Evidently, a rabbinical prohibition overrides a betrothal that is effective by Torah law.

And here it is a case where by Torah law the blood effects acceptance, as it is taught in a baraita: For what does the High Priest’s frontplate effect acceptance? For blood, for meat, and for fat that became impure, whether unwittingly or intentionally, whether by unavoidable accident or willingly, whether in the case of an individual offering or an offering of the community. And the Sages said that if a priest sprinkled impure blood intentionally the frontplate does not effect acceptance, and its owner must bring another offering. The Gemara infers: Since he is not obligated to bring this extra offering by Torah law, in essence he subsequently brings in a non-sacred animal to the Temple courtyard.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Ultimately, the Torah mitzva of eating the meat of this offering is uprooted, and it is written: “And they shall eat those things with which atonement was made” (Exodus 29:33). This verse teaches that the priests eat the offering and the owner thereby gains atonement. He said to him: The case of sit and refrain from action [shev ve’al ta’aseh] is different. In other words, the Sages can uproot a Torah mitzva by instructing one to sit and refrain from action, i.e., to remain passive and do nothing. They cannot, however, uproot a mitzva by telling him to perform an action.

And finally I wished to raise a difficulty from the case of a lulav, which may not be carried on the first day of Sukkot that occurred on Shabbat, for the same reason the Sages rendered it prohibited to sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana that occurs on Shabbat. However, now that you have resolved for us that an action defined as a case of: Sit and refrain from action, is not considered uprooting, all these are also cases of sit and refrain from action.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof. The verse states with regard to a true prophet: “To him you shall listen” (Deuteronomy 18:15). From here it is derived that even if the prophet says to you: Transgress one of the mitzvot of the Torah, for example, as in the case of Elijah at Mount Carmel, who brought an offering to God on that mountain during a period when it was forbidden on pain of karet to sacrifice offerings outside the Temple, with regard to everything that he permits for the requirement of the hour, you must listen to him. This indicates that a Torah mitzva can indeed be uprooted in an active manner.

The Gemara answers: There it is different, as it is written: “To him you shall listen,” which means that it is a positive mitzva to obey a prophet, and a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition. The Gemara asks: And let him derive from this case a principle that the Sages have the same power as a prophet. The Gemara answers: Safeguarding a matter is different. Since Elijah acted with the aim of preventing the Jewish people from worshipping idols, it was temporarily permitted for him to override a mitzva, in order to strengthen Torah observance with regard to a particular matter in which the people are lax.

The Gemara suggests another proof. Come and hear: The Sages rendered it prohibited for a man who has sent a bill of divorce to his wife to cancel it in the presence of a court without her knowledge after he has given the bill of divorce to his messenger but before she gets the document. The prohibition was instituted to prevent a situation where the messenger, who is unaware of the cancellation, gives her the bill of divorce and she marries another man under the mistaken impression that she is divorced. If he proceeded to nullify it regardless, it is nullified; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He cannot nullify or add to its condition in a case where the bill of divorce included a stipulation. For if so, i.e., if he has the ability to cancel the bill of divorce, what good is the power of the court in their decree that one may not do so?

The Gemara cites yet another relevant source. Come and hear, as Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov said: I have heard that the reason why the court may administer lashes and punish not by Torah law, i.e., in response to actions for which one is not liable to receive punishment by Torah law, is not so as to transgress matters of Torah, but to establish a safeguard for the Torah. And an example of this is an incident involving a certain person who rode on a horse on Shabbat in the days of the Greeks, an act that is prohibited by rabbinic law, and they brought him to the court and they stoned him as a desecrator of Shabbat. They did so not because he was deserving of this, as riding a horse is not punishable by stoning by Torah law, but because the hour required it, as at that time Jews were negligent with regard to Shabbat observance.

And again, an incident occurred involving a certain person who cohabited with his own wife under a fig tree in plain view, and they brought him to the court and flogged him, not because this punishment was fitting for him, as it is not prohibited by the Torah for one to engage in relations with his wife wherever he chooses, but because the hour required it, to discourage others from engaging in licentious behavior. This shows that the court can uproot a Torah mitzva even by means of a positive action such as stoning. The Gemara answers: Safeguarding a matter is different. As stated above, the court may uproot a Torah mitzva so as to strengthen Torah observance in general, as was the case with the prophet Elijah.

Rava said: These are halakhot transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and the Sages merely supported them with verses. Therefore, there is no contradiction. The Gemara asks: Which is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and whichhalakhais derived from a verse? If we say that the halakha that a one-day-old boy is included in the halakhot of a zav is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and the halakha that the seminal emission of a boy aged nine years and one day renders him impure is derived from a verse, then one may object: But the verse is written in an unspecified manner; consequently, even a one-day-old boy should be included in the verse.

The Sages forbade moving some things on Shabbat in the way that he does on [weekdays]. And for what reason did they [promulgate] this prohibition? They said, "And just like the prophets prohibited and commanded that your going on Shabbat not be like your going on [weekdays] and that the speech of Shabbat not be like the speech of [weekdays]—as it is stated (Isaiah 58:13), 'and speak a word'—all the more so should the carrying of Shabbat not be like the carrying of [weekdays. This would be] so that it not be like a [week]day in his eyes, and he come to pick up and fix vessels from one corner to another or from one house to another, or store rocks, and that which is similar to it. As he is surely idle and sits in his house and will seek something with which to occupy himself. And it will come out that he would not have rested, and would nullify the reason [for Shabbat]; as it is stated (Exodus 22:12 and Deuteronomy 5:13), 'in order that he will rest.'"

They said to Hillel: Our teacher, if one forgot and did not bring a knife on the eve of Shabbat and cannot slaughter his Paschal lamb, what is the law? Since he could have brought the knife before Shabbat, he cannot bring it on Shabbat; but what should he do in this situation? He said to them: I once heard this halakha from my teachers but I have forgotten it. But leave it to the Jewish people; if they are not prophets to whom God has revealed His secrets, they are the sons of prophets, and will certainly do the right thing on their own.

The next day, on Shabbat that was the eve of Passover, one whose Paschal offering was a lamb took the knife and stuck it in its wool; and one whose Paschal offering was a goat, which does not have wool, stuck it between its horns. Hillel saw the incident and remembered the halakha that he had once learned and said: This is the tradition I received from the mouths of Shemaya and Avtalyon, meaning that this is in fact the proper course of action. This concludes the text of the baraita and the Gemara will begin to elucidate it.

The Gemara asks: But how could they sacrifice sin offerings for the sin of idolatry? After all, they were intentional idol worshippers, and a sin offering is brought only by one who sins unwittingly. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in response: It was a provisional edict issued in exigent circumstances, according to which they were permitted to bring sin offerings even for intentional sins.

The Gemara adds that this also stands to reason, as, if you do not say so, one can object as follows: Granted, they sacrificed twelve bulls and goats, since each tribe must bring a communal sin offering, as stated in the Torah (Numbers, chapter 15), and these offerings correspond to the twelve tribes. But to what do the ninety-six sheep correspond? Rather, it must be that it was a provisional edict.

§ Earlier the Gemara mentioned the halakha of a sin offering whose owner died, which was one of the halakhot forgotten during the mourning period for Moses (see 16a). On this topic the Gemara says that we learned in a mishna there (Sota 47a): From the time when Yosef ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida and Yosef ben Yoḥanan of Jerusalem died, the clusters [eshkolot] ceased, i.e., they were the last of the clusters. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of eshkolot? It means a man who contains all [ish shehakol bo], i.e., both Torah and mitzvot.

And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: All the clusters who stood at the head of the Jewish people, from the days of Moses until Yosef ben Yo’ezer died, would study Torah in the manner of Moses, our teacher. From that point forward they would not study Torah in the manner of Moses, our teacher.

The Gemara objects: But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel said: Three thousand halakhot were forgotten during the days of mourning for Moses. This suggests that the Sages who came immediately after Moses did not study Torah in the same manner as Moses. The Gemara answers: Those halakhotthat they forgot, were forgotten, but with regard to those halakhotthat they studied, they would continue to study in the manner of Moses, our teacher.

The Gemara objects: But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to the resolution of questions of halakha: From the time when Moses died, if the majority deem an item impure, they have established it as impure, and if the majority deem an item pure, they have established it as pure. If this is the case, then the manner of studying Torah after the death of Moses is based on a majority, whereas when Moses was alive there was no dispute in matters of halakha.

The Gemara explains that this baraita is referring specifically to those halakhot that were forgotten during the mourning period after the death of Moses. Since the understanding of the heart was limited [libba de’ime’it], the Sages were unable to reach a clear ruling on these matters. Consequently, they had to follow the majority. But with regard to all other halakhotthey studied, they would study them in the manner of Moses, our teacher.

It was taught in a baraita: All the clusters who stood at the head of the Jewish people from the days of Moses until Yosef ben Yo’ezer died had no flaw in them. From this point forward the clusters, i.e., the leadership of the Jewish people, had flaws in them.

And we maintain that anywhere that it says: There was an incident involving a certain pious man, the man in question is either Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava or Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai. And these Sages lived many generations after Yosef ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida. If this is the case, then even in later generations there were Sages without a flaw.

The Gemara returns to the matter itself. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Three thousand halakhot were forgotten during the days of mourning for Moses. The Jewish people said to Joshua: Ask for guidance from Heaven so that you can reacquire the forgotten halakhot. Joshua said to them: “It is not in heaven” (Deuteronomy 30:12). Once the Torah was given on Sinai, the Sages of each generation must determine the halakha. No new halakhot may be added or subtracted by heavenly instruction or through prophecy.

Many years later the Jewish people again said to Samuel: Ask for halakhic guidance from Heaven. He said to them: This is not possible, as the Torah states: “These are the commandments that the Lord commanded Moses to tell the children of Israel at Mount Sinai” (Leviticus 27:34). The word “these” indicates that from now on a prophet is not permitted to introduce any new element related to the Torah and its mitzvot through prophecy. With regard to the topic of the chapter, Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa says: Also, the halakha of a sin offering whose owner has died was one of those forgotten during the days of mourning for Moses.

At the time of Moses’ death, the people said to Pinehas: Ask for halakhic guidance from Heaven so that you can relearn the forgotten halakhot. Pinehas said to them: “It is not in heaven” (Deuteronomy 30:12). The people said to Elazar: Ask for halakhic guidance from God. He said to them that the verse states: “These are the commandments,” to teach that a prophet is not permitted to introduce any new element from now on.

§ Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Just before the time when Moses, our teacher, left this world and went to the Garden of Eden, he said to Joshua: Ask from me all the cases of uncertainty in matters of halakhathat you have, so that I can clarify them for you. Joshua said to him: My teacher, did I ever leave you for even one moment and go to another place? Didn’t you write this about me in the Torah: “But his minister, Joshua, son of Nun, a young man, did not depart out of the tent” (Exodus 33:11)? If I would have had any case of uncertainty I would have asked you earlier. Immediately after he said this, Joshua’s strength weakened, and three hundred halakhot were forgotten by him, and seven hundred cases of uncertainty emerged before him, and the entire Jewish people arose to kill him, as he was unable to teach them the forgotten halakhot.

The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Joshua: It is impossible to tell you these halakhot, as the Torah is not in Heaven. But to save yourself from the Jewish people who want to kill you, go and exhaust them in war, so that they will leave you alone. As it is stated: “Now it came to pass after the death of Moses, the servant of the Lord, that the Lord spoke to Joshua, son of Nun, Moses’ minister, saying: Moses My servant is dead, now therefore arise, go over this Jordan” (Joshua 1:1–2). This shows that immediately after the death of Moses, God commanded Joshua to lead the nation into battle.

§ It is taught in a baraita: One thousand and seven hundred a fortiori inferences, and verbal analogies, and minutiae of the scribes were forgotten during the days of mourning for Moses.

Rabbi Abbahu says: Even so, Othniel, son of Kenaz, restored them through his sharp mind [pilpulo], as it is stated: “And Caleb said: To he who smites Kiriath Sefer, and takes it, to him will I give Achsah my daughter as a wife. And Othniel, son of Kenaz, the brother of Caleb, took it; and he gave him Achsah his daughter as a wife” (Joshua 15:16–17).The name “Kiriath Sefer,” which literally means the village of the book, is homiletically interpreted as a reference to those parts of the Torah that were forgotten, while the phrase “took it” is referring to Othniel’s acumen and learning. The baraita adds: And why is she called Achsah? The reason is that anyone who sees her became angry [ko’es] about his own wife, who was not as beautiful as Achsah.

The Gemara relates another incident involving Achsah. The verse states: “And it came to pass, when she came to him, that she persuaded him to ask of her father a field; and she alighted from off her donkey; and Caleb said to her: What do you want?” (Joshua 15:18). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: “And she alighted [vatitznaḥ],” which can also be understood as crying out? Rava says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Achsah said to Caleb: Just as in the case of this donkey, when it has no food in its trough it immediately cries out, so too in the case of a woman, when she has no produce in her house she immediately cries out.

The Gemara cites yet another verse involving Achsah: “And she said: Give me a blessing; for that you have set me in the land of the South [negev], and you have given me springs of water. And he gave her the upper springs and the lower springs” (Joshua 15:19). She said to her father: You have given me a home dried [menugav] of all goodness. “And you have given me springs of water”; this is referring to a man who has nothing other than Torah, which is metaphorically called water. But as he is unable to provide me with food, how can I live? “And gave her the upper springs and the lower springs.” Caleb said to her: Does someone learned in Torah, who dwells in the upper worlds and the lower worlds, require that sustenance be requested for him? He certainly does not need it, as God will provide for him in merit of his Torah studies.

The Gemara asks: And Caleb, was he the son of Kenaz? Wasn’t he Caleb, son of Jephunneh (Joshua 15:13)? The Gemara explains that Jephunneh was not the name of his father, but a description of Caleb. What does the word Jephunneh mean? It means that he turned [sheppana] from the advice of the spies and did not join with them in their negative report about Eretz Yisrael.

The Gemara further asks: But still, was he the son of Kenaz? He was the son of Hezron, as it is written: “And Caleb, son of Hezron, begot children of Azubah his wife, and of Jerioth, and these were her sons: Jesher, and Shobab, and Ardon” (I Chronicles 2:18). Rava said: Caleb was actually the son of Hezron, but after his father passed away his mother remarried Kenaz, and consequently he was the stepson of Kenaz. Othniel, son of Kenaz, was therefore his maternal half brother.

A tanna taught in a baraita: The same person is known as Othniel and he is also known as Jabez. And what is his actual name? Judah, brother of Simeon, is his name. He was known as Othniel, as God answered [ana’o El] his prayer. He was also known as Jabez [yabetz] because he advised and spread [ya’atz veribetz] Torah among the Jewish people.

The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that God answered him? As it is written: “And Jabez called on the God of Israel, saying: If You will bless me indeed, and enlarge my border, and that Your hand may be with me, and that You will work deliverance from evil, that it may not pain me! And God granted him that which he requested” (I Chronicles 4:10).

The Gemara interprets this verse. The phrase: “If You will bless me indeed,” means that he prayed for a blessing with regard to Torah. “And enlarge my border,” means that he prayed for a blessing with regard to students. “And that Your hand be with me,” that my studies not be forgotten from my heart. “And that You will work deliverance from evil [mera’ati],” that I will find friends [re’im] like me. “That it may not pain me,” that the evil inclination should not grow stronger and prevent me from studying Torah. Othniel further prayed: If You do so, good; and if not, I will go depressed [linsisi] to my grave and the netherworld. Immediately, God answered him, as the verse states: “And God granted him that which he requested.”

On a similar note, you say likewise with regard to the following verse: “The poor man and the oppressor [tekhakhim] meet together; the Lord gives light to the eyes of both of them” (Proverbs 29:13). When the student, who is poor in his knowledge, goes to his teacher, i.e., one who knows enough to teach but requires further enlightenment himself, as he is a man between [tokh] the levels of a Sage and a commoner, and says to him: Teach me Torah, if the teacher agrees to teach him, then the Lord gives light to the eyes of both of them, as they both become greater as a result. But if the teacher will not teach the student, then “the rich and the poor meet together; the Lord is the maker of them all” (Proverbs 22:2). This verse teaches that He Who made this one wise now makes him foolish, and He Who made that one foolish now makes him wise. This is the exposition of Rabbi Natan.

And if you would say that indeed this method is not effective in a case of this kind, if so you have rendered your statement subject to circumstances. In other words, the application of the acquisition in the presence of all three parties is not absolute, and instead depends on whether in this particular case the borrower agrees to transfer his debt from one person to another.

And if you would say that indeed this method is not effective in a case of this kind, if so you have rendered your statement subject to circumstances. In other words, the application of the acquisition in the presence of all three parties is not absolute, and instead depends on whether in this particular case the borrower agrees to transfer his debt from one person to another.

Rav Kahana replied to them: A great man has spoken, do not laugh at him. The Sages based all rabbinic law on the prohibition of “you shall not deviate”; however, due to concern for human dignity, the Sages permitted suspension of rabbinic law in cases where the two collide. All rabbinic decrees are predicated on the mitzva in the Torah to heed the judges in each generation and to never stray from their words. Therefore, when the Sages suspend a decree in the interest of preserving human dignity, human dignity is overriding a Torah prohibition. In any case, it only overrides rabbinic decrees.

Rav Mesharshiyya raises an objection to the statement of Rabbi Yonatan from a baraita: Our Sages relied on the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and on the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, who would say: One does not issue a decree upon the congregation unless the majority of the congregation is able to withstand it.