תנו רבנן גר שבא להתגייר בזמן הזה אומרים לו מה ראית שבאת להתגייר אי אתה יודע שישראל בזמן הזה דוויים דחופים סחופים ומטורפין ויסורין באין עליהם אם אומר יודע אני ואיני כדאי מקבלין אותו מיד ומודיעין אותו מקצת מצות קלות ומקצת מצות חמורות ומודיעין אותו עון לקט שכחה ופאה ומעשר עני ומודיעין אותו ענשן של מצות אומרים לו הוי יודע שעד שלא באת למדה זו אכלת חלב אי אתה ענוש כרת חללת שבת אי אתה ענוש סקילה ועכשיו אכלת חלב ענוש כרת חללת שבת ענוש סקילה וכשם שמודיעין אותו ענשן של מצות כך מודיעין אותו מתן שכרן אומרים לו הוי יודע שהעולם הבא אינו עשוי אלא לצדיקים וישראל בזמן הזה אינם יכולים לקבל לא רוב טובה ולא רוב פורענות ואין מרבין עליו ואין מדקדקין עליו קיבל מלין אותו מיד נשתיירו בו ציצין המעכבין את המילה חוזרים ומלין אותו שניה נתרפא מטבילין אותו מיד ושני ת"ח עומדים על גביו ומודיעין אותו מקצת מצות קלות ומקצת מצות חמורות טבל ועלה הרי הוא כישראל לכל דבריו אשה נשים מושיבות אותה במים עד צוארה ושני ת"ח עומדים לה מבחוץ ומודיעין אותה מקצת מצות קלות ומקצת מצות חמורות.
The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to a potential convert who comes to a court in order to convert, at the present time, when the Jews are in exile, the judges of the court say to him: What did you see that motivated you to come to convert? Don’t you know that the Jewish people at the present time are anguished, suppressed, despised, and harassed, and hardships are frequently visited upon them? If he says: I know, and although I am unworthy of joining the Jewish people and sharing in their sorrow, I nevertheless desire to do so, then the court accepts him immediately to begin the conversion process. And the judges of the court inform him of some of the lenient mitzvot and some of the stringent mitzvot, and they inform him of the sin of neglecting the mitzva to allow the poor to take gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce in the corner of one’s field, and about the poor man’s tithe. And they inform him of the punishment for transgressing the mitzvot, as follows: They say to him: Be aware that before you came to this status and converted, had you eaten forbidden fat, you would not be punished by karet, and had you profaned Shabbat, you would not be punished by stoning, since these prohibitions do not apply to gentiles. But now, once converted, if you have eaten forbidden fat you are punished by karet, and if you have profaned Shabbat, you are punished by stoning. And just as they inform him about the punishment for transgressing the mitzvot, so too, they inform him about the reward granted for fulfilling them. They say to him: Be aware that the World-to-Come is made only for the righteous, and if you observe the mitzvot you will merit it, and be aware that the Jewish people, at the present time, are unable to receive their full reward in this world; they are not able to receive either an abundance of good nor an abundance of calamities, since the primary place for reward and punishment is in the World-to-Come. And they do not overwhelm him with threats, and they are not exacting with him about the details of the mitzvot. If he accepts upon himself all of these ramifications, then they circumcise him immediately. If there still remain on him shreds of flesh from the foreskin that invalidate the circumcision, they circumcise him again a second time to remove them. When he is healed from the circumcision, they immerse him immediately, and two Torah scholars stand over him at the time of his immersion and inform him of some of the lenient mitzvot and some of the stringent mitzvot. Once he has immersed and emerged, he is like a born Jew in every sense. For the immersion of a woman: Women appointed by the court seat her in the water of the ritual bath up to her neck, and two Torah scholars stand outside the bath house so as not to compromise her modesty, and from there they inform her of some of the lenient mitzvot and some of the stringent mitzvot. .
כל המתגייר משום אשה משום אהבה משום יראה אין זה גר וכן היו ר׳ יהודה ור׳ נחמיה אומרים כל אותם שנתגיירו בימי מרדכי ואסתר אינם גרים שנא׳ ורבים מעמי הארץ מתיהדים כי נפל פחד היהודים עליהם וכל שאינו מתגייר לשם שמים אינו גר:
Anyone who becomes a proselyte for the sake of [marrying a Jewish] woman, or out of fear, or love is not a proselyte. Similarly R. Judah and R. Nehemiah said: All [the Gentiles] who were converted in the days of Mordecai and Esther were not genuine proselytes, as it is stated, And many from among the peoples of the land became Jews; for the fear of the Jews was fallen upon them. Anyone who is not converted from purely religious motives is not a proselyte.
מתני׳ הנטען על השפחה ונשתחררה או על העובדת כוכבים ונתגיירה הרי זה לא יכנוס ואם כנס אין מוציאין מידו . . .
גמ׳ הא גיורת מיהא הויא ורמינהי אחד איש שנתגייר לשום אשה ואחד אשה שנתגיירה לשום איש וכן מי שנתגייר לשום שולחן מלכים לשום עבדי שלמה אינן גרים דברי ר' נחמיה שהיה רבי נחמיה אומר אחד גירי אריות ואחד גירי חלומות ואחד גירי מרדכי ואסתר אינן גרים עד שיתגיירו בזמן הזה בזמן הזה ס"ד אלא אימא כבזמן הזה הא איתמר עלה א"ר יצחק בר שמואל בר מרתא משמיה דרב הלכה כדברי האומר כולם גרים הם.
MISHNA: One suspected by others of engaging in sexual relations with a Canaanite maidservant and she was later set free, or one suspected of relations with a gentile woman and she subsequently converted, may not marry that woman, since this will strengthen the suspicions against him. But if he did marry her, they, the judges of the court, do not remove her from him, i.e., they do not require him to divorce her. . . .
GEMARA: The mishnah teaches that one who is suspected of relations with a gentile woman who later converted may never marry her. This implies that she is, however, a convert, although it appears that she converted only in order that he might marry her. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: Both a man who converted for the sake of a woman and a woman who converted for the sake of a man, and similarly, one who converted for the sake of the king’s table, so that he could serve in a prestigious capacity, or for the sake of Solomon’s servants, who were also considered prestigious, in all of these cases they are not converts; this is the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya. As Rabbi Neḥemya would say: With regard to converts by lions, i.e., forced converts such as the Samaritans [Kutim] described in II Kings (17:24–25); and converts who convert based on their dreams; and converts of the time of Mordecai and Esther described in the verse, “And many from among the peoples of the land became Jews; for the fear of the Jews was fallen upon them” (Esther 8:17); all of these are not converts until they are converted at this present time. The Gemara clarifies the meaning of the words: Could it enter your mind to say only at this present time? Since he mentioned the converts of Mordecai and Esther, who were deceased before Rabbi Neḥemya made this statement, he therefore cannot possibly mean this phrase literally. Rather, say: Like at this present time, when the Jewish people are in exile and there is no material benefit to conversion. Returning to the question above: How could a woman who converted for the sake of a man be considered a true convert? The Gemara answers: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that baraita that Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the one who says that they are all converts.
הגר שקיבל עליו דברי תורה אפי' נחשד לדבר אחד הוי חשוד לכל התורה כולה והרי הוא כישראל משומד . . . עובד כוכבים שבא לקבל דברי תורה חוץ מדבר אחד אין מקבלין אותו ר' יוסי בר' יהודה אומר אפי' דקדוק אחד מדברי סופרים.
With regard to a convert who accepted upon himself upon his conversion matters of Torah, i.e., all of the mitzvot, even if he is suspect with regard to one matter alone, he is suspect with regard to the entire Torah, and he is considered like a Jewish transgressor [meshummad] . . . In the case of a gentile who comes to convert and takes upon himself to accept the words of Torah except for one matter, he is not accepted as a convert. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Even if he refuses to accept one detail of rabbinic law, he is not accepted.
שֶׁהַמִּצְוָה הַנְּכוֹנָה כְּשֶׁיָּבֹא הַגֵּר אוֹ הַגִּיֹּרֶת לְהִתְגַּיֵּר בּוֹדְקִין אַחֲרָיו שֶׁמָּא בִּגְלַל מָמוֹן שֶׁיִּטּל אוֹ בִּשְׁבִיל שְׂרָרָה שֶׁיִּזְכֶּה לָהּ אוֹ מִפְּנֵי הַפַּחַד בָּא לְהִכָּנֵס לַדָּת. וְאִם אִישׁ הוּא בּוֹדְקִין אַחֲרָיו שֶׁמָּא עֵינָיו נָתַן בְּאִשָּׁה יְהוּדִית. וְאִם אִשָּׁה הִיא בּוֹדְקִין שֶׁמָּא עֵינֶיהָ נָתְנָה בְּבָחוּר מִבַּחוּרֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל. אִם לֹא נִמְצָא לָהֶם עִלָּה מוֹדִיעִין אוֹתָן כֹּבֶד עֹל הַתּוֹרָה וְטֹרַח שֶׁיֵּשׁ בַּעֲשִׂיָּתָהּ עַל עַמֵּי הָאֲרָצוֹת כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּפְרשׁוּ. אִם קִבְּלוּ וְלֹא פֵּרְשׁוּ וְרָאוּ אוֹתָן שֶׁחָזְרוּ מֵאַהֲבָה מְקַבְּלִים אוֹתָן
(יז) גֵּר שֶׁלֹּא בָּדְקוּ אַחֲרָיו אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הוֹדִיעוּהוּ הַמִּצְוֹת וְעָנְשָׁן וּמָל וְטָבַל בִּפְנֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה הֶדְיוֹטוֹת הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּר. אֲפִלּוּ נוֹדַע שֶׁבִּשְׁבִיל דָּבָר הוּא מִתְגַּיֵּר הוֹאִיל וּמָל וְטָבַל יָצָא מִכְּלַל הָעַכּוּ''ם וְחוֹשְׁשִׁין לוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר צִדְקוּתוֹ. וַאֲפִלּוּ חָזַר וְעָבַד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הֲרֵי הוּא כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל מוּמָר שֶׁקִּדּוּשָׁיו קִדּוּשִׁין. וּמִצְוָה לְהַחֲזִיר אֲבֵדָתוֹ מֵאַחַר שֶׁטָּבַל נַעֲשָׂה כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.
14) The appropriate way to perform the commandment [of conversion] is that when the convert comes to convert, we investigate him lest he be motivated for money that he will receive, or for some position of authority that will come his way, or because of fear that he wishes to enter the religion. If he is a man we investigate whether he has cast his eye upon a Jewish woman; and if she is a woman whether she has cast her eye on a Jewish man. If no inappropriate motivation is discovered, we inform him of the magnitude of the weight of the yoke of the Torah and of the tremendous efforts required to perform the commandments. If they accepted and did not change their minds, and we see that they have come out of love, we accept them.
17) A convert whom they did not investigate or to whom they did not make known the commandments and the punishments [for not observing them], but who was circumcised and immersed in front of three judges is a convert. Even if it subsequently becomes known he converted for an ulterior motive, once he has been circumcised and immersed, he is no longer a Gentile, and he remains suspect until his righteousness can be verified. Even if he returns to Gentile worship, he remains in the category of a Jewish apostate whose marriage is a valid marriage.
Rabbi David Zvi Hoffmann (1843-1921), Melammed L’ho’il Yoreh Deah #85
Regarding the question of the accepting a female convert who wishes to marry a Jewish man – I have already ruled previously [on this matter], citing the principle articulated by the Shakh, “Everything depends upon the judgment of the rabbinic court.” See the Beit Yitzhak Y.D. 2:100. And in our day, it is possible for a Jewish man to marry a gentile woman even if she remains in her gentile state since, if we do not accept her [as a convert], the Jew will marry her in a civil ceremony. In addition, if an Orthodox rabbi does not accept her [as a convert], she will go to one of the new rabbis (He-hadashim, i.e., Reform or Liberal) who accept female converts without immersion by a beit din and without kabbalat mitzvoth (acceptance of the yoke of the commandments), and she will then be thought a Jew even though she remains a gentile. Consequently, it is better to keep the evil to a minimum and accept her as a convert if she promises that she is converting for the sake of heaven and that she will fulfill all the commandments, in particular, Shabbat, family purity (niddah), and kashrut (ma’a’chalot asurot – forbidden foods. She should take a pledge of honor on this and the court should warn her husband that he should not marry her unless he knows that she will fulfill all these [commandments] . . . And if the husband testifies after this warning that his wife is converting for the sake of heaven, then it is permissible to accept her as described above. And if it is possible to examine other persons who are not affected by the matter, and [they testify] that she wishes to convert in truth and with a whole heart, how wonderful!
Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch Kalischer (1795-1874) of Thorn, in Responsa of Rabbi Esriel Hildesheimer, Yoreh De’ah #229
In response to a halakhic decision issued by Rabbi Bernard Illowy of New Orleans in 1864. Rabbi Illowy had ruled that sons born to a gentile mother and Jewish father should not be circumcised by a mohel lest they mistakenly be identified as Jews. Seeking support for his stance, Illowy wrote to Der Israelit and asked the European Orthodox rabbinate to express its opinion on this issue. Several rabbis commented upon it and all, including Hildesheimer, supported Illowy’s position. Kalischer, however, dissented from their opinions and stated that it was a “mitzvah to circumcise such children.” Here are selections from his responsum:
And now that we have demonstrated that it is both permissible and a mitzvah to circumcise a gentile [prior to this, Kalischer has argued that it is a mitzvah to circumcise a gentile even if not for the sake of conversion], I will present a logical argument {relevant to this case] which common sense would also dictate. It is as follows. All the inhabitants of the world are the work of the Creator, may He be blessed. One God created us all. Though He favored Israel by the giving of the Torah, He, in His mercy, actually desired to give it to all the world. As the Sages said (Avodah Zarah 2b) about Scripture, "The Lord came forth from Sinai and rose from Seir unto them, He shined forth from Mt. Paran" (Deut. 33:2). It was only when the Blessed One saw that there was a base spirit within the nations that prevented them from receiving the Torah that He gave it to Israel alone. However, it is written, "For all the world is mine and you will be to Me a kingdom of priests" (Exodus 19:5-6). Truly the whole earth is mine, and I want to grant merit to all who dwell therein, even though the light of Torah has not penetrated them. Therefore, you [Jews] will be like priests to all the inhabitants of the world; for, by your coming near to Me, the nations, too, will see the light. In truth, this has already taken place. For the Holy Torah serves as the foundation for the faithful of all nations, and the events that have befallen Israel serve as the foundation for their faith. … Yet, the Blessed One still wished to grant the fullest merit to all His creatures. As they did not accept the Torah, He undoubtedly was expressing an open-ended hope that anyone who wished to convert and take refuge in the inheritance of the Lord would do so and thereby merit the infinite light, like Onkelos, Shemaya, Abtalyon, and others. Therefore, when a non-Jew comes to inclines his heart to enter into the Community of Israel. ... And if we do not circumcise him [in a case where he is a babyj we abrogate his choice because he will not easily subject himself to the pain of circumcision when he is an adult. By circumcising him [as a child] we will be removing an iron barrier from before him ... And if with regard to a child born of two gentile parents the law is such that this action does not constitute a sin, but rather a mitzvah-then it is all the more so in reference to a boy whose father is a Jew. You should not refrain from circumcising him as we are commanded to grant him the opportunity to be circumcised immediately at the directive of his father. Thus, when he grows up, he will quickly be able to perform the will of his father by ritually immersing himself according to the Jewish law of conversion ... However, if we do not circumcise him, we are pushing him away with both hands from the Community of Israel ... Moreover, in regard to this matter, we not only grant merit to the son who now has the free option to make himself holy. But we also grant much merit to the father. For when this sinner inclines his heart to repent, how will his repentance be received if he raises his children as non- Jews? … If, however, we respect his good will in this instance--to circumcise his male childrenthen he, along with his children, will easily repent and we will have extended them a hand in their repentance, And even if, God forbid, he [the father] does not truly repent, he is, in any event, acting properly in this matter, as he wants firmly to establish his children in the Jewish faith by circumcising them, Without a doubt, when they grow up they can receive immersion through the agency of a Beit Din … And with children such as these, there is sometimes the possibility that great leaders of Israel will arise from among them … And as for the fear that he [the child] will not learn the Jewish faith in the house of a gentile woman, ... at a time like this there are many who do not conduct themselves according to Jewish law in their eating of non-kosher meat and pig, Nevertheless [and even though this may be the case here, we should circumcise the son with joy, For we should not make one matter contingent upon the other in areas where we are unable to prevent [transgressions]. But we do relate one matter to another in a case where we are able to grant merit. For, God forbid, we should not push him away. In regard to this, it is fitting to say that even sinners in Israel sometimes perform mitsvot that are as numerous as the seeds in a pomegranate. And thus it is demonstrated from the proofs I have brought above that even if the mother should remain a gentile, the son should be immersed [and thus converted] under the supervision of a Beit Din.
PETAH HA-OHEL: A RABBINIC GUIDE TO CONVERSION:
KABBALAT OL MITZVOT
WITHIN A CONSERVATIVE/MASORTI CONTEXT
The acceptance of the yoke of the commandments is integral to the conversion process. In a real sense such acceptance not only serves as the means by which conversion is accomplished, but should be the ultimate raison d’etre of giyyur, whatever the other ancillary motivations and considerations. Given its centrality to the process, it is not surprising that Jewish Law requires a higher standard of attestation for kabbalat ol mitzvot than for immersion or ritual circumcision for the purpose of conversion. Of the aforementioned only the acceptance of the yoke of the commandments must take place in the form of a declaration made in the presence of a bet din.[1]
The act of kabbalat ol mitzvot includes a formal acceptance of halakhah as an authoritative system of normative religious practice, i.e., an acknowledgment that the laws of the Torah and the rabbinic means by which those are interpreted have a valid claim on the behavior of the individual. Thus, an individual who maintains, for example, that the laws of kashrut have no authority where s/he is concerned most certainly has not accepted the yoke of the commandments, and should be refused conversion.[2]
That an individual has yet to achieve full observance of Jewish law, however, is not tantamount to an a priori rejection of the authoritative character of halakhah. As our colleague, Jeremy Kalmanofsky, observes:
When candidates close themselves to any particular mitzvah – say they are uninterested in its wisdom, unwilling to try its discipline – we should reject them. The commandments have been disclosing their holiness to millions of Jews over hundreds of years. New Jews must open themselves to each practice – even the strange ones. No one fulfills every mitzvah. None of us fulfills even a single mitzvah perfectly. Sometimes we try and fail. Sometimes on ethical, communal or personal grounds, we stop trying. But as long as we live, we stand subject to these sacred obligations. Accepting Jewish religious discipline for Conservative converts means accepting that each mitzvah is a mitzvah. Under this view, selective observance would not vitiate verbal acceptance. Even harboring reservations about observance at the moment of conversion is not necessarily defective. For we demand that converts sincerely declare before the bet din their religious attachment to Judaism – its deeds and teachings – and their aspirations to grow in holiness.[3]
The process of rabbinic sponsorship must incorporate significant discussion about the concept of kabbalat ol mitzvot and its impact on the day-to-day life of the conversion candidate. Should the rabbi encounter a categorical rejection of specific mitzvot (“I will never observe” as opposed “I’m not yet ready to observe”), or a general denial of halakhic authority, it would be wise to defer convening the bet din pending further discussion with the candidate.[4] In the final analysis we must applaud the integrity of those who cannot in good conscience accept the yoke of the commandments. Without such acceptance, however, halakhic conversion remains impossibility.[5]
To be truly meaningful, however, kabbalat ol mitzvot requires more than a declarative statement in the presence of a bet din. The person who acknowledges the authority of Torah in the abstract, while deferring the observance of the most basic mitzvot to some indeterminate future, has said little of significance. The emptiness of such tokenism is self-evident; the real question, then, is what constitutes credible evidence of kabbalat ol mitzvot. Does rabbinic literature offer any guidance regarding the observance of specific mitzvot as pre-requisites to conversion?
The classic description of conversionary protocol as it applies to the teaching and acceptance of mitzvot is found in the Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 47a-b and echoed in subsequent halakhic literature. Several important points emerge from a consideration of this source. They include:
1) The gemara does not insist on full observance of mitzvot prior to conversion. Indeed the choice of the term kabbalat ol mitzvot instead of shemirat mitzvot supports this contention. The sages understood the growth of religious commitment to be an ongoing endeavor. This awareness finds beautiful expression in the Talmudic story of the dramatically different attitudes taken by Hillel and Shammai to those who came to convert with ulterior motives.[7] Indeed, the very wording of the passage from Yevamot, “some of the major and some of the minor commandments” highlights precisely this point. An important difference exists between Franz Rosenzweig’s sincere “noch nicht” and the individual whose own words and deeds reveal that the conversion process marks the end of Jewish growth.
Consequently, perhaps the single most important criterion for a rabbinic sponsor to employ in evaluating a candidate’s readiness is whether or not the individual is likely to continue to grow in observance and commitment after conversion – a determination that obviously will depend in large measure on the quantitative and qualitative changes in behavior that have already taken place during the pre-conversionary period itself. An honest and open conversation between sponsoring rabbi and candidate about specific plans for continued post-conversionary religious growth should also play an integral role in the evaluation process.
2) A perusal of the halakhic literature yields no “top ten” list of specific mitzvot reflective of genuine kabbalat ol mitzvot. Other than the acceptance of Jewish law as a normative and binding system of authority over the individual, halakhah is silent on the matter of specific observances. That a strong correlation exists between degree of commitment and the declaration of such is self-evident; nevertheless it is impossible to define how much observance constitutes a minimal threshold of kabbalat ol mitzvot.
3) While not determinative from a halakhic standpoint, the specific mention in the gemara of various forms of tzedakah, helev and Shabbat point, at least symbolically, to the integral character of acts of hesed, kashrut and Sabbath observance to any meaningful definition of kabbalat ol mitzvot.[8] The specific relevance of precepts affecting daily life lies in their power to form and shape Jewish identity. In particular, given Conservative/Masorti Judaism’s insistence that kashrut, Shabbat and ethical behavior constitute normative aspects of Jewish practice, a conversion that did not require some substantive (even if less than complete) commitment to these practices would be largely devoid of meaning.
CONCLUSION:
To be considered a valid conversion, kabbalat ol mitzvot requires a formal declarative statement in the presence of a bet din. The statement of kabbalat ol mitzvot published in Moreh Derekh (pp. J14-16) furnishes an appropriate declaration of such, as it stipulates “commitment to the God of Israel, the Torah of Israel, and the people of Israel,” and further requires the individual to pledge “to live the Jewish way of holiness by accepting the mitzvot of Judaism now and always, here and wherever I may be.”
In addition, the Moreh Derekh document calls upon the individual to declare specifically that, “I have determined to the best of my ability, to make the following Jewish observances an integral part of both my life and that of my family.” The ensuing list includes Jewish education for all children, observance of Shabbat and holidays, incorporation of kashrut into one’s life, affiliation with a synagogue and attendance at services, regular prayer, gemilut hasadim, the study of Torah, and identifying with the Jewish community and the State of Israel. As a list of basic practices necessary for meaningful religious expression without being exhaustive, this document clearly reflects both the legal and spiritual intention of kabbalat ol mitzvot. Accordingly, members of the Rabbinical Assembly are encouraged to use the declaration found in Moreh Derekh as a basis for the profession of kabbalat ol mitzvot by gerim at the time of their conversion.
[1] It is always preferable for a bet din to surpervise ritual immersion and hattafat dam brit or brit milah. If these were performed in the presence of two valid witnesses, however, it is acceptable – at least after the fact. In addition the declaration of kabbalat ol mitzvot must take place during the day, i.e., at a time when a rabbinical court would normally convene. Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah, 268:3 also Ta”Z ad loc.
[2] A deliberate and explicit rejection of a particular commandment in the presence of a bet din is sufficient grounds for the invalidation of conversion: “ iht 'sjt rcsn .uj 'vru, hrcs kcek tca ohcfuf scug
"/u,ut ihkcen BT, Bekhorot 30b. The plain meaning of the text indicates that a categorical refusal to observe any commandment is sufficient to terminate the conversion process. Nevertheless, this source does not prove that a potential ger must explicitly pledge to accept and demonstrate observance of all precepts prior to conversion. Not only does the foundational text on conversion in Bavli Yevamot 47a-b (see below) demonstrate the unlikelihood of this premise, but all the major codes of Jewish law require no more than a general acceptance of the yoke of the commandments as a prerequisite to conversion.
In the last 150 years, however, a number of prominent ultra-Orthodox authorities have made the novel claim that kabbalat ol mitzvot is synonymous with complete observance – indeed, some have gone so far as to opine that the failure to maintain such observance is sufficient to render an individual’s conversion null and void, even after the fact. See Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah, vol. I, responsum 124. For a fuller treatment of the ultra-Orthodox view, its origins, and the ramifications for conversion in the modern State of Israel, see Rabbi David Golinkin, “A Responsum Regarding the Annulment of Conversions,” Schechter Institute of Jewish Studies, vol. 2, no. 9 (June 2008).
[3] Jeremy Kalmanofsky, “Spiritual Citizenship: Reflections on Hilkhot Giyyur,” Conservative Judaism Vol. LX, nos. 1-2 (Fall/Winter 2007-08), p. 36. One finds a similar approach among Sephardic poskim and moderate Orthodox rabbis as well. Writing a half century ago, Rabbi Moshe Ha-Kohen of Djerba opined: “Kabbalat ol ha-mitzvot does not mean that he is required to accept all the mitzvot to observe them [italics added], but to accept all the mitzvot of the Torah and, if he transgresses, to accept upon himself the punishments he deserves. Therefore, we do not care if at the hour that he accepts the mitzvot he has decided to transgress a specific commandment and [as a consequence] receive the punishment.” V’heshiv Moshe on Yoreh Deah 268, no. 50. Rabbi Ben Zion Meir Ouziel, the first Sephardic Chief Rabbi of the State of Israel, reached the same conclusion in his Piskei Uziel: “It is clear [from Bavli, Yevamot 47a – see below] that we do not demand of him to observe [all of] the mitzvot, and it is also unnecessary that the Bet Din know that he will observe them, for if not, no converts will be accepted in Israel, for who will guarantee that this gentile will be loyal to all the mitzvot in the Torah.” Piskei Ouziel, no. 65, p. 385.
Speaking from a centrist Orthodox perspective in North America, Rabbi Maurice Lamm further notes, “One may choose to observe or not to observe, but one may not decide what Jewish law demands to be observed. Therefore, if a convert candidate – before becoming a Jew – rejects the practice of a specific mitzvah as fundamentally not valid and therefore not to be observed, rather than because he simply does not have the capacity to keep it now, he disqualifies himself as a credible candidate for conversion.” See Lamm, Becoming a Jew (New York: Jonathan David Publishers, 1991), p. 211.
[4] An individual ambivalent about kabbalat ol mitzvot can and should delay the conversion . . . even with one foot poised to enter the mikveh. See Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah, 268:1.
[5] The Committee on Jewish Law and Standards has examined the issue whether or not a conversion obtained through deception may be annulled. Rabbi Steven Saltzman’s teshuva concludes, “Where it can be clearly demonstrated that the proselyte acted dishonestly, withholding information vital to our ability to make a coherent decision, then the conversion may be considered null and void.” The responsum was adopted by a vote of 11-8 with no abstentions. See also the concurring opinion of Rabbi Avram Reisner and the dissenting addenda of Rabbi Morris Shapiro. Proceedings of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, 1986-1990, pp. 185-200, 547-554.
[6] BT, Yevamot 47a.
[7] BT, Shabbat 31a.
[8] Helev, of course, is a precept related to sacrifice, rather than kashrut. On the other hand, the prohibition of its consumption is a dietary observance. There are, moreover, myriad associations between altar and dining table in both halakhah and aggadah.