The Oral Talmud with Benay Lappe and Dan Libenson Episode 41

MISHNA: The Torah describes the punishment given to a son who steals money from his parents to eat a gluttonous meal of meat and wine in the company of lowly men. If his parents bring him to court for this act, he is exhorted to desist and is punished with lashes. If he repeats the same misdeed and is again brought to court by his parents within the same three-month period, he is considered a stubborn and rebellious son [ben sorer umoreh]. He is liable to receive the death penalty, which in this case is execution by stoning. From when does a stubborn and rebellious son become liable to receive the death penalty imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son? From when he grows two pubic hairs, which are a sign of puberty and from which time he is considered an adult, until he has grown a beard around. The reference here is to the lower beard surrounding his genitals, and not the upper beard, i.e., his facial hair, but the Sages spoke in euphemistic terms. As it is stated: “If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son” (Deuteronomy 21:18), which indicates that the penalty for rebelliousness is imposed upon a son, but not upon a daughter; and upon a son, but not upon a fully grown man. A minor under the age of thirteen is exempt from the penalty imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son, because he has not yet reached the age of inclusion in mitzvot. GEMARA: The Gemara inquires about the source of the halakha taught in the mishna: From where do we derive that a minor is exempt from the punishment imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son? The Gemara comments: This question is puzzling: From where do we derive this halakha? The reason is as is taught in the mishna: Because he has not yet reached the age of inclusion in mitzvot. And furthermore, where do we find that the verse punishes a minor, so that a special verse should be required here in order to exempt him? The Gemara clarifies: This is what we are saying: Is this to say that a stubborn and rebellious son is killed for a sin that he already committed? But, as will be explained (71b), he is killed for what he will become in the end. The Torah understands that since the boy has already embarked on an evil path, he will continue to be drawn after his natural tendencies and commit many offenses that are more severe. It is therefore preferable that he should be killed now so that he may die in relative innocence, rather than be put to death in the future bearing much more guilt. And since he is executed for what he will become in the end, one might have thought that even a minor as well can be sentenced to the death penalty as a stubborn and rebellious son. And furthermore, the exclusion: “A son,” but not a man, indicates that a minor is in fact included in the halakha, as he is not yet a man. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: A minor is exempt from the punishment imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son, as the verse states: “If a man has a son” (Deuteronomy 21:18), which indicates that the halakha applies to a son who is close to the stage of having the strength of a man, i.e., close to full maturity, but not to a younger boy.

MISHNA: From when is a stubborn and rebellious son liable? From when he eats a tarteimar of meat and drinks a half-log of Italian wine. Rabbi Yosei says: From when he eats a maneh of meat and drinks a log of wine. The mishna now lists a series of conditions concerning his eating and drinking. If he ate these items with a group assembled for the performance of a mitzva, or he ate them at a meal celebrating the intercalation of a month, or he ate the items when they had second tithe status, in Jerusalem, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son because each of these circumstances involves some aspect of a mitzva. If he ate the meat of unslaughtered animal carcasses or animals that had wounds that would have caused them to die within twelve months [tereifot] or repugnant creatures or creeping animals, or he ate untithed produce from which tithes and terumot were not separated, or first tithe from which its teruma was not separated, or second tithe outside Jerusalem or consecrated food that was not redeemed, each of which involves a transgression, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. The mishna summarizes: If he ate an item that involves performing a mitzva or an item that involves committing a transgression, or if he ate any food in the world but did not eat meat, or if he drank any beverage but did not drink wine, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless he actually eats meat and actually drinks wine, as it is stated: “This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious; he does not listen to our voice; he…is a glutton [zolel] and a drunkard [vesovei]” (Deuteronomy 21:20). One is not called a glutton and a drunkard unless he eats meat and drinks wine. And although there is no explicit proof to the matter that the reference in the Torah is to meat and wine, there is an allusion to the matter in another verse, as it is stated: “Be not among wine drinkers [besovei], among gluttonous eaters [bezolelei] of meat” (Proverbs 23:20).

MISHNA: If he stole that which belonged to his father and ate on his father’s property, or he stole that which belonged to others and ate on the property of others, or he stole that which belonged to others and ate on his father’s property, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless he steals that which belonged to his father and eats on the property of others. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He does not become a stubborn and rebellious son unless he steals that which belonged to his father and that which belonged to his mother. GEMARA: The Gemara explains the reasons for the various halakhot taught in the mishna: If he stole that which belonged to his father and ate on his father’s property, even though this is accessible to him and it is easy for him to steal, he is afraid that his father will see him eating what he had stolen, and therefore he will not be drawn after his action to further evil. If he stole that which belonged to others and ate on the property of others, even though he is not afraid of them, as they neither know him nor watch over him, this theft is not easily accessible to him, as it is performed on someone else’s property, and therefore he will not be drawn to additional sin. And all the more so if he stole that which belonged to others and ate on his father’s property, in which case it is not accessible to him, and he is also afraid of his father. Therefore, he is not liable unless he steals that which belonged to his father and eats on the property of others, in which case it is easily accessible to him, and he is not afraid, and there is concern that he will be drawn after his action to additional sin. The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says that he is not liable as a stubborn and rebellious son unless he steals that which belonged to his father and that which belonged to his mother. The Gemara asks: With regard to his mother, from where does she have independently owned property that her son can steal? The basis for this question is the halakha that anything that a woman acquires is acquired by her husband. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says in answer to this question: The mishna is referring to a case where the boy stole food from a meal that had been prepared for his father and for his mother. In such a case the husband grants his wife ownership of the food that she will eat over the course of her meal. The Gemara raises a difficulty. But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥanan bar Molada say that Rav Huna says: A stubborn and rebellious son is not liable unless he purchases inexpensive meat and eats it, and he purchases inexpensive wine and drinks it, which indicates that he becomes liable only if he steals money, not if he steals the actual meat and wine? Rather, say that the boy stole from money set aside for a meal that was to be prepared for his father and for his mother. The Gemara presents another answer to the question posed concerning the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: If you wish, say instead that another person gave property to the mother and said to her: This shall be yours on the condition that your husband shall have no right to it. In such a case, the woman acquires the property for herself and her husband does not acquire it. Therefore, it is possible for the son to steal from his mother’s property. MISHNA: If his father wishes to have him punished but his mother does not wish that, or if his father does not wish to have him punished but his mother wishes that, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless they both wish that he be punished. Rabbi Yehuda says: If his mother was not suited for his father, the two being an inappropriate match, as the Gemara will explain, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What does Rabbi Yehuda mean when he speaks of the mother as being not suited for the father? If we say that due to their union they are among those who are liable to receive karet, in which case the marriage does not take effect, and certainly if the union puts them in the category of those who are liable to receive one of the types of court-imposed death penalty, in which case the marriage also does not take effect, there is a difficulty: Why should it matter if they are not married? Ultimately, his father is still his father and his mother is still his mother, and the verses concerning the stubborn and rebellious son can be fulfilled. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda is saying that the boy’s mother must be identical to his father in several aspects. The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: If his mother was not identical to his father in voice, appearance, and height, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? As the verse states: “He will not obey our voices [kolenu]” (Deuteronomy 21:20), which indicates that they both have the same voice. And since we require that they be identical in voice, we also require that they be identical in appearance and height. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita: There has never been a stubborn and rebellious son and there will never be one in the future, as it is impossible to fulfill all the requirements that must be met in order to apply this halakha. And why, then, was the passage relating to a stubborn and rebellious son written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning, this being an aspect of the Torah that has only theoretical value. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who requires that the parents have certain identical characteristics, making it virtually impossible to apply the halakha. If you wish, say instead that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: And is it simply due to the fact that the boy ate a tarteimar of meat and drank a half-log of Italian wine that his father and his mother shall take him out to stone him? Rather, there has never been a stubborn and rebellious son and there will never be one in the future. And why, then, was the passage relating to a stubborn and rebellious son written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning. Rabbi Yonatan says: This is not so, as I saw one. I was once in a place where a stubborn and rebellious son was condemned to death, and I even sat on his grave after he was executed.

MISHNA: If one of the parents was without hands, or lame, or mute, or blind, or deaf, their son does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, as it is stated: “Then shall his father and his mother lay hold of him, and bring him out to the elders of his city and to the gate of his place. And they shall say to the elders of his city: This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious; he will not obey our voices; he is a glutton and a drunkard” (Deuteronomy 21:19–20). The Sages derive: “Then shall his father and his mother lay hold of him,” but not people without hands, who cannot do this. “And bring him out,” but not lame people, who cannot walk. “And they shall say,” but not mutes. “This son of ours,” but not blind people, who cannot point to their son and say “this.” “He will not obey our voices,” but not deaf people, who cannot hear whether or not he declined to obey them. After he is brought before the elders of the city, he is admonished before three people and then they flog him for having stolen. If he sins again, he is judged by a court of twenty-three judges, but he is not stoned unless the first three judges before whom he had been flogged are present there, as it is stated: “This son of ours,” this is the son who was already flogged before you.