ובפלוגתא [דרב ושמואל] דרב אומר לא עשו ב"ש כדבריהם ושמואל אמר עשו ועשו אימת אילימא קודם בת קול מ"ט דמ"ד לא עשו ואלא לאחר בת קול מ"ט דמ"ד עשו אי בעית אימא קודם בת קול ואי בעית אימא לאחר בת קול אי בעית אימא קודם בת קול וכגון דב"ה רובא למ"ד לא עשו דהא ב"ה רובא ומ"ד עשו כי אזלינן בתר רובא היכא דכי הדדי נינהו הכא בית שמאי מחדדי טפי ואי בעית אימא לאחר בת קול מ"ד לא עשו דהא נפקא בת קול ומ"ד עשו רבי יהושע היא דאמר אין משגיחין בבת קול ומ"ד עשו קרינן כאן (דברים יד, א) לא תתגודדו לא תעשו אגודות אגודות:

The Gemara comments: And this is also reflected in the dispute between Rav and Shmuel, as Rav says: Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own statement, and Shmuel said: They certainly did act in that manner. The Gemara inquires: When does this question apply? If we say that it is referring to the period prior to the Divine Voice that declared that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, then what is the rationale of the one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion? But rather, if one would say it is referring to after the Divine Voice, what is the reason for the one who said that they did act in accordance with their opinion? After all, the Divine Voice established that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. The Gemara answers: Neither of these options poses a difficulty. If you wish, say that it is referring to the period prior to the Divine Voice, and if you wish, say instead that it is after the Divine Voice. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say it is prior to the Divine Voice, and it is referring to the period when Beit Hillel formed the majority of the Sages. Therefore, according to the one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion, the reason is that Beit Hillel was the majority, and the halakha is in accordance with the majority. And the one who said that they did act in accordance with their opinion maintains that when do we follow the majority? It is in a case where the disputing parties are equal in wisdom to one another. Here, however, Beit Shammai are sharper than Beit Hillel, and therefore they acted in accordance with their own opinion despite the fact that they were in the minority. And if you wish, say instead that it was after the Divine Voice. The one who said that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion would say that this was due to the pronouncement of the Divine Voice. And the one who said that they did do so, this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said, with regard to the Divine Voice that emerged and proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the case of the oven of akhnai (Bava Metzia 59b), that one disregards a Heavenly Voice. Just as he disregarded the Divine Voice in his dispute with Rabbi Eliezer, so too, one disregards the Divine Voice that proclaimed that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. And yet the question remains: According to the one who said that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinion, we should read here: “You shall not cut yourselves” (Deuteronomy 14:1), which is interpreted to mean: Do not become numerous factions.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים נֶחְלְקוּ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּבֵית הִלֵּל, הַלָּלוּ אוֹמְרִים: הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתֵנוּ, וְהַלָּלוּ אוֹמְרִים: הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתֵנוּ. יָצְאָה בַּת קוֹל וְאָמְרָה: אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ דִּבְרֵי אֱלֹקִים חַיִּים הֵן, וַהֲלָכָה כְּבֵית הִלֵּל. וְכִי מֵאַחַר שֶׁאֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ דִּבְרֵי אֱלֹקִים חַיִּים, מִפְּנֵי מָה זָכוּ בֵּית הִלֵּל לִקְבּוֹעַ הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתָן? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנּוֹחִין וַעֲלוּבִין הָיוּ, וְשׁוֹנִין דִּבְרֵיהֶן וְדִבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי, וְלֹא עוֹד אֶלָּא שֶׁמַּקְדִּימִין דִּבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי לְדִבְרֵיהֶן. כְּאוֹתָהּ שֶׁשָּׁנִינוּ: מִי שֶׁהָיָה רֹאשׁוֹ וְרוּבּוֹ בַּסּוּכָּה וְשֻׁלְחָנוֹ בְּתוֹךְ הַבַּיִת, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי פּוֹסְלִין וּבֵית הִלֵּל מַכְשִׁירִין. אָמְרוּ בֵּית הִלֵּל לְבֵית שַׁמַּאי: לֹא כָּךְ הָיָה מַעֲשֶׂה, שֶׁהָלְכוּ זִקְנֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וְזִקְנֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל לְבַקֵּר אֶת רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן הַחוֹרָנִית וּמְצָאוּהוּ יוֹשֵׁב רֹאשׁוֹ וְרוּבּוֹ בַּסּוּכָּה וְשֻׁלְחָנוֹ בְּתוֹךְ הַבַּיִת. אָמְרוּ לָהֶן בֵּית שַׁמַּאי: אִי מִשָּׁם רְאָיָה?! אַף הֵן אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אִם כָּךְ הָיִיתָ נוֹהֵג, לֹא קִיַּימְתָּ מִצְוַת סוּכָּה מִיָּמֶיךָ. לְלַמֶּדְךָ שֶׁכׇּל הַמַּשְׁפִּיל עַצְמוֹ — הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא מַגְבִּיהוֹ, וְכׇל הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ עַצְמוֹ — הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא מַשְׁפִּילוֹ. כׇּל הַמְחַזֵּר עַל הַגְּדוּלָּה — גְּדוּלָּה בּוֹרַחַת מִמֶּנּוּ, וְכׇל הַבּוֹרֵחַ מִן הַגְּדוּלָּה — גְּדוּלָּה מְחַזֶּרֶת אַחֲרָיו, וְכׇל הַדּוֹחֵק אֶת הַשָּׁעָה — שָׁעָה דּוֹחַקְתּוֹ, וְכׇל הַנִּדְחֶה מִפְּנֵי שָׁעָה — שָׁעָה עוֹמֶדֶת לוֹ. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים וּמֶחֱצָה נֶחְלְקוּ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּבֵית הִלֵּל. הַלָּלוּ אוֹמְרִים: נוֹחַ לוֹ לְאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא נִבְרָא יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁנִּבְרָא, וְהַלָּלוּ אוֹמְרִים: נוֹחַ לוֹ לְאָדָם שֶׁנִּבְרָא יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁלֹּא נִבְרָא. נִמְנוּ וְגָמְרוּ: נוֹחַ לוֹ לְאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא נִבְרָא יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁנִּבְרָא, עַכְשָׁיו שֶׁנִּבְרָא — יְפַשְׁפֵּשׁ בְּמַעֲשָׂיו. וְאָמְרִי לַהּ: יְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּמַעֲשָׂיו:

but later reconsidered and did not divorce her, and a resident of his city found him and said: Your name is the same as my name, and your wife’s name is the same as my wife’s name, and we reside in the same town; give me the bill of divorce, and I will use it to divorce my wife, then this document is invalid to divorce with it? Apparently, a man may not divorce his wife with a bill of divorce written for another woman, and the same should apply to the scroll of a sota. The Gemara rejects this argument: How can you compare the two cases? There, with regard to a bill of divorce, it is written: “And he shall write for her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and therefore we require writing it in her name, specifically for her; whereas here, with regard to a sota, it is written: “And he shall perform with her all this ritual” (Numbers 5:30), and therefore we require performance in her name. In her case, the performance is erasure; however, writing of the scroll need not be performed specifically for her. On the topic of Rabbi Meir and his Torah study, the Gemara cites an additional statement. Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina said: It is revealed and known before the One Who spoke and the world came into being that in the generation of Rabbi Meir there was no one of the Sages who is his equal. Why then didn’t the Sages establish the halakha in accordance with his opinion? It is because his colleagues were unable to ascertain the profundity of his opinion. He was so brilliant that he could present a cogent argument for any position, even if it was not consistent with the prevalent halakha. As he would state with regard to a ritually impure item that it is pure, and display justification for that ruling, and likewise he would state with regard to a ritually pure item that it is impure, and display justification for that ruling. The Sages were unable to distinguish between the statements that were halakha and those that were not. It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir was not his name; rather, Rabbi Nehorai was his name. And why was he called by the name Rabbi Meir? It was because he illuminates [meir] the eyes of the Sages in matters of the halakha. And Rabbi Nehorai was not the name of the tanna known by that name; rather, Rabbi Neḥemya was his name, and some say: Rabbi Elazar ben Arakh was his name. And why was he called by the name Rabbi Nehorai? It is because he enlightens [manhir] the eyes of the Sages in matters of the halakha. The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The fact that I am more incisive than my colleagues is due to the fact that I saw Rabbi Meir from behind, i.e., I sat behind him when I was his student. Had I seen him from the front, I would be even more incisive, as it is written: “And your eyes shall see your teacher” (Isaiah 30:20). Seeing the face of one’s teacher increases one’s understanding and sharpens one’s mind. And the Gemara stated that Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Meir had a disciple, and his name was Sumakhus, who would state with regard to each and every matter of ritual impurity forty-eight reasons in support of the ruling of impurity, and with regard to each and every matter of ritual purity forty-eight reasons in support of the ruling of purity. It was taught in a baraita: There was a distinguished disciple at Yavne who could with his incisive intellect purify the creeping animal, explicitly deemed ritually impure by the Torah, adducing one hundred and fifty reasons in support of his argument. Ravina said: I too will deliberate and purify it employing the following reasoning: And just as a snake that kills people and animals and thereby increases ritual impurity in the world, as a corpse imparts impurity through contact, through being carried, and by means of a tent, is ritually pure and transmits no impurity, a creeping animal that does not kill and does not increase impurity in the world, all the more so should it be pure. The Gemara rejects this: And it is not so; that is not a valid a fortiori argument, as it can be refuted. A snake is performing a mere act of a thorn. A thorn causes injury and even death; nevertheless, it is not ritually impure. The same applies to a snake, and therefore this a fortiori argument is rejected. Rabbi Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion. Ultimately, a Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and those are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. The Gemara asks: Since both these and those are the words of the living God, why were Beit Hillel privileged to have the halakha established in accordance with their opinion? The reason is that they were agreeable and forbearing, showing restraint when affronted, and when they taught the halakha they would teach both their own statements and the statements of Beit Shammai. Moreover, when they formulated their teachings and cited a dispute, they prioritized the statements of Beit Shammai to their own statements, in deference to Beit Shammai. As in the mishna that we learned: In the case of one whose head and most of his body were in the sukka, but his table was in the house, Beit Shammai deem this sukka invalid; and Beit Hillel deem it valid. Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: Wasn’t there an incident in which the Elders of Beit Shammai and the Elders of Beit Hillel went to visit Rabbi Yoḥanan ben HaḤoranit, and they found him sitting with his head and most of his body in the sukka, but his table was in the house? Beit Shammai said to them: From there do you seek to adduce a proof? Those visitors, too, said to him: If that was the manner in which you were accustomed to perform the mitzva, you have never fulfilled the mitzva of sukka in all your days. It is apparent from the phrasing of the mishna that when the Sages of Beit Hillel related that the Elders of Beit Shammai and the Elders of Beit Hillel visited Rabbi Yoḥanan ben HaḤoranit, they mentioned the Elders of Beit Shammai before their own Elders. This is to teach you that anyone who humbles himself, the Holy One, Blessed be He, exalts him, and anyone who exalts himself, the Holy One, Blessed be He, humbles him. Anyone who seeks greatness, greatness flees from him, and, conversely, anyone who flees from greatness, greatness seeks him. And anyone who attempts to force the moment and expends great effort to achieve an objective precisely when he desires to do so, the moment forces him too, and he is unsuccessful. And conversely, anyone who is patient and yields to the moment, the moment stands by his side, and he will ultimately be successful. The Sages taught the following baraita: For two and a half years, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These say: It would have been preferable had man not been created than to have been created. And those said: It is preferable for man to have been created than had he not been created. Ultimately, they were counted and concluded: It would have been preferable had man not been created than to have been created. However, now that he has been created, he should examine his actions that he has performed and seek to correct them. And some say: He should scrutinize his planned actions and evaluate whether or not and in what manner those actions should be performed, so that he will not sin. MISHNA: The cross beam, which the Sages stated may be used to render an alleyway fit for one to carry within it, must be wide enough to receive and hold a small brick. And this small brick is half a large brick, which measures three handbreadths, i.e., a handbreadth and a half. It is sufficient that the cross beam will be a handbreadth in width, not a handbreadth and a half, enough to hold a small brick across its width. And the cross beam must be wide enough to hold a small brick and also sturdy enough to hold a small brick and not collapse. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it is wide enough to hold the brick, even though it is not sturdy enough to actually support it, it is sufficient. Therefore, even if the cross beam is made of straw or reeds, one considers it as though it were made of metal. If the cross beam is curved, so that a small brick cannot rest on it, one considers it as though it were straight; if it is round, one considers it as though it were square. The following principle was stated with regard to a round cross beam: Any beam with a circumference of three handbreadths is a handbreadth in width, i.e., in diameter.

אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָשֵׂא גּוֹי אֶחָד שָׁאַל אֶת רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קָרְחָה, כְּתִיב בְּתוֹרַתְכֶם (שמות כג, ב): אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים לְהַטֹּת, אָנוּ מְרֻבִּים מִכֶּם מִפְּנֵי מָה אֵין אַתֶּם מַשְׁוִין עִמָּנוּ בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. אָמַר לוֹ, יֵשׁ לְךָ בָּנִים, אָמַר לוֹ הִזְכַּרְתַּנִּי צָרָתִי, אָמַר לוֹ לָמָּה, אָמַר לוֹ הַרְבֵּה בָּנִים יֵשׁ לִי, בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁהֵן יוֹשְׁבִין עַל שֻׁלְחָנִי זֶה מְבָרֵךְ לֵאלוֹקֵי פְּלוֹנִי וְזֶה מְבָרֵךְ לֵאלוֹקֵי פְּלוֹנִי, וְאֵינָם עוֹמְדִים מִשָּׁם עַד שֶׁמְפַצְּעִין אֶת מֹחָן אֵלּוּ אֶת אֵלּוּ. אָמַר לוֹ וּמַשְׁוֶה אַתָּה עִמָּהֶן, אָמַר לוֹ, לֹא. אָמַר לוֹ, עַד שֶׁאַתָּה מַשְׁוֶה אוֹתָנוּ, לֵךְ הַשְׁוֵה אֶת בָּנֶיךָ, נִדְחַף וְהָלַךְ לוֹ. כֵּיוָן שֶׁיָּצָא אָמְרוּ לוֹ תַּלְמִידָיו, רַבִּי, לָזֶה דָּחִיתָ בְּקָנֶה רָצוּץ, לָנוּ מָה אַתָּה מֵשִׁיב, אָמַר לָהֶם בְּעֵשָׂו כְּתִיב בֵּיה שֵׁשׁ נְפָשׁוֹת וּכְתִיב בּוֹ נְפָשׁוֹת הַרְבֵּה, דִּכְתִיב (בראשית לו, ו): וַיִּקַח עֵשָׂו אֶת נָשָׁיו וְאֶת בָּנָיו וְאֶת בְּנֹתָיו וְאֶת כָּל נַפְשׁוֹת בֵּיתוֹ, וּבְיַעֲקֹב שִׁבְעִים נָפֶשׁ וּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ נֶפֶשׁ אֶחָת, דִּכְתִיב (שמות א, ה): וַיְהִי כָּל נֶפֶשׁ יֹצְאֵי יֶרֶךְ יַעֲקֹב שִׁבְעִים נָפֶשׁ, אֶלָּא עֵשָׂו שֶׁהוּא עוֹבֵד לֶאֱלֹהוֹת הַרְבֵּה כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ נְפָשׁוֹת הַרְבֵּה, אֲבָל יַעֲקֹב שֶׁהוּא עוֹבֵד לֶאֱלוֹקַּ אֶחָד כְּתִיב בּוֹ נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת, וַיְהִי כָּל נֶפֶשׁ וגו':

(6) Hezkiya taught (Jeremiah 50:17): "Israel are scattered sheep" - why are Israel likened to a sheep? Just as a sheep, when hurt on its head or some other body part, all of its body parts feel it. So it is with Israel when one of them sins and everyone feels it. (Numbers 16:22): "When one man sins [will You be wrathful with the whole community]." Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai taught a parable: Men were on a ship. One of them took a drill and started drilling underneath him. The others said to him: What are sitting and doing?! He replied: What do you care. Is this not underneath my area that I am drilling?! They said to him: But the water will rise and flood us all on this ship. This is as Iyob said (Job 19:4): "If indeed I have erred, my error remains with me." But his friends said to him (Job 34:37): "He adds transgression to his sin; he extends it among us." [The men on the ship said]: You extend your sins among us. Rabbi Elasa said: a gentile asked Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karha: In your Torah, it is written (Exodus 23:2): "After the multitude will you side." We are more numerous than you, so why don't you become like us in practicing idolatry? He [Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karha] said to him: Do you have children? He replied: You reminded me of my troubles. He asked: Why? [The gentile] said: I have many children. When they sit at my table, this one blesses to this god and that one blesses to that god, and they don't get up from the table until they wrack each other's brains. He [Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karha] said: Do you settle [the arguments] with them? He said: No. He [Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karha] said: Before you make us agree with you, find agreement with your own children! [The gentile] was spurned and went away. After he left [Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karha's] students said to him: Rabbi! You pushed him away like a broken reed, but what would you answer for us? He said to them: Six souls are about written [in the Torah] about Esau, and "souls" [nefashot] is written in the plural, as stated (Genesis 36:6): "Esau took his wives, his sons and daughters, and all the souls of his household." For Yaakov, however, there were seventy souls, and soul [nefesh] is written [in the Torah] in the singular. As it is stated (Exodus 1:5): "And all of the people [nefesh] that were of Jacob's issue, etc." Because Esau worshipped many gods, it is written many "souls," but for Yaakov--who worshipped one God--it is written one soul, "And all of the people [nefesh], etc."