ר' יהושע אומר ד' אין חייבין לשלם מן הדין ואין השמים מוחלין להם עד שישלמו. היודע עדות לחבירו ואינו מעיד אינו חייב לשלם מן הדין ואין השמים מוחלין לו עד שישלם. השוכר עדי שקר וגבה אינו חייב לשלם מן הדין ואין השמים מוחלין לו. הכובש קמה לפני האור והפורץ גדר לפני בהמה אין חייבין לו מן הדין ואין השמים מוחלין להן עד שישלם.
Rabbi Joshua says, Four defendants are not legally obligated to pay, yet the Heavens do not forgiven them until they pay:
- one who has testimony that can help a friend, but does not testify
- one who hires false witnesses and collects
- one who bends standing corn before a fire
- and one who breaches the fence before an animal
הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ אֶת הַבְּעֵרָה בְּיַד חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, פָּטוּר בְּדִינֵי אָדָם וְחַיָּב בְּדִינֵי שָׁמָיִם. שָׁלַח בְּיַד פִּקֵּחַ, הַפִּקֵּחַ חַיָּב.
One who sends forth fire in the hands of a heresh, a shoteh or a minor is not liable by the human law, but is liable by the laws of Heaven. If one sent it forth in the hands of a person of sound senses, the one of sound senses is liable.
תניא אמר ר' יהושע ארבעה דברים העושה אותן פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים ואלו הן הפורץ גדר בפני בהמת חבירו והכופף קמתו של חבירו בפני הדליקה והשוכר עדי שקר להעיד והיודע עדות לחבירו ואינו מעיד לו: אמר מר הפורץ גדר בפני בהמת חבירו ה"ד אילימא בכותל בריא בדיני אדם נמי ניחייב אלא בכותל רעוע אמר מר הכופף קמתו של חבירו בפני הדליקה היכי דמי אילימא דמטיא ליה ברוח מצויה בדיני אדם נמי נחייב אלא דמטיא ברוח שאינה מצויה ורב אשי אמר טמון אתמר משום דשויה טמון באש: אמר מר השוכר עדי שקר ה"ד אילימא לנפשיה ממונא בעי שלומי ובדיני אדם נמי ניחייב אלא לחבריה והיודע עדות לחבירו ואינו מעיד לו במאי עסקינן אילימא בבי תרי פשיטא דאורייתא הוא (ויקרא ה, א) אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו אלא בחד...מיהא איכא טובא והני אצטריכא ליה מהו דתימא בדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל הפורץ גדר בפני בהמת חבירו מהו דתימא כיון דלמסתריה קאי מה עביד בדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל הכופף קמתו של חבירו נמי מהו דתימא לימא מי הוה ידענא דאתיא רוח שאינה מצויה ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל ולרב אשי דאמר נמי טמון איתמר מהו דתימא אנא כסויי כסיתיה ניהלך ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל והשוכר עדי שקר נמי מהו דתימא לימא דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל והיודע עדות לחבירו ואינו מעיד לו נמי מהו דתימא מי יימר דכי הוה (אתינא) מסהדינא ליה הוה מודה דלמא הוה משתבע לשקרא ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל:
It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Joshua said: Four defendants are exempt by human law but liable according to the laws of Heaven:
- one who breaches the fence before another’s animal
- one who bends another’s standing grain before a fire
- one who hires false witnesses to testify
- and one who knows testimony of another but does not testify on their behalf.
Master says, One who breaches the fence before another’s animal, what are the circumstances? If we say a stable wall, it should also be liable according to human laws. Rather, an unstable wall. Master says, One who bends another’s standing grain before a fire, what are the circumstances? If we say where the fire would reach the bent grain in a typical wind, let one also be liable for the damage according to human law. Rather, it must be a case where the fire could reach the bent grain only in an atypical wind. And Rav Ashi said: The baraita was stated in the case of a concealed item; because one made it into a concealed item that was subsequently damaged by fire. Master says, One who hires false witnesses, what are the circumstances? If we say that one hired them for one's own benefit, in order to extract payment from another, one is required to reimburse that person with money, and is liable according to human laws. Rather, for the benefit of another.
And one who knows testimony in support of another but does not testify on their behalf: with what circumstances are we dealing? If we say two people, it is obvious by Torah law: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1). Rather, the case of the baraita concerns a single witness...Yes, there are other cases, but these [cases that R. Joshua stipulated] were necessary [to stipulate], lest you say that in these cases one should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in these cases one is liable according to the laws of Heaven: one who breaches a fence that stood before another’s animal, you might say: Since the fence is about to collapse even without this person’s intervention, what did he person really do? Based on that logic, one might have thought that one should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven; one who bends another’s standing grain, lest you say: Let the one who bent the grain say to the owner: Did I know that an atypical wind would come and cause the fire to spread? not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. And according to Rav Ashi, who said a concealed item, lest you say that the one who concealed the item could say: I covered it for you in order to protect it from the fire and not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven; and also the one who hires false witnesses, lest you say: Let the one who hired them say: should one heed God (the teacher) or a person (the student), and not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven; one who knows testimony in support of another but does not testify on their behalf is liable according to the laws of Heaven, lest you say that the witness could claim: Who says that had I come forward and testified on behalf of one litigant, the other litigant would admit liability? Perhaps the litigant would have chosen to take a false oath and be absolved. Therefore, you would have thought that this person should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven.
מהרש"ל, ים של שלמה, סימן ו
ומצאתי כתוב בתשובה וזה לשונו 'נראה לי היכא דאיתמר חייב בדיני שמים אף על גב דאין לבית דין לכופו לשלם מכל מקום בדברים בלי כפייה יש לדוחקו'...ולא נהירא לי...גם לישנא דדיני שמים לא משמע להיות חיוב אפילו במקצת בדיני אדם, אלא לעניין יוצא ידי שמים לחוד קאמר. וכן מצאתי בצפנת פענח וזה לשונו 'כל מקום שאמרו חייב בדיני שמים, אם בא צריכין להודיעו אין אנו יכולין לחייב אותך, אבל צריך אתה לצאת ידי שמים כי דינך מסור לו, כדי שיתן אל לבו וירצה את חברו ויצא ידי שמים.'
Maharshal, Yam Shel Shelomo, Siman 6
And I found written in a responsum, quote: It seems to me that where it is said that someone is obligated by the laws of Heaven even though the court cannot force the person to pay, at any rate, they should pressure him with words and without enforcement...
And that does not seem right to me...even the language of "laws of Heaven" does not sound like any degree of obligation by human law, but only to fulfill one's obligations towards Heaven.
And so I found in the writings of the Tzafnat Pane'ach, quote: Everywhere they said 'liable by the laws of Heaven,' if the defendant comes to us were should inform them that while we cannot force you, you must fufill your obligation to the Heavens because your judgement is in God's hands, so that the defendant shall take it to heart and will appease the plaintiff and fulfill the obligations of Heaven.
מאירי, בית הבחירה, בבא קמא דף נו עמוד א
כל שכתבנו עליו כאן שהוא חייב בדיני שמים פירושו שהוא חייב בהשבון הא לענין איסור אף מה שהוא פטור בו מדיני שמים איסור מיהא קא עביד אלא שלענין השבה נאמרה. ומכאן כתבו גדולי הדורות שכל שנאמר עליו חייב בדיני שמים פסול הוא לעדות עד שישיב. והדברים נראין שמאחר שהוא חייב להשיב תורת גזלה חלה עליו עד שישיב.
R. Menachem Meiri, Bet Ha-Behira, Bava Kamma 56a
All that we wrote about here that one is liable by the laws of Heaven means that one is liable to return the money. But when it comes to the question of violation, one has still committed a violation even if one is exempt according to the laws of Heaven. But the obligation according to the laws of Heaven refers to the obligation to return money. And based on this, the greatest of the generations (=Nahmanides) wrote that anyone who is liable by the laws of Heaven is invalid for giving testimony until they return the money. And this makes sense, for given that they are required (by the laws of Heaven) to return the money, the status of theft applies to them until they return the money.
איתמר המראה דינר לשולחני ונמצא רע תני חדא אומן פטור הדיוט חייב ותניא אידך בין אומן בין הדיוט חייב אמר רב פפא כי תניא אומן פטור כגון דנכו ואיסור דלא צריכי למיגמר כלל אלא במאי טעו טעו בסיכתא חדתא דההיא שעתא דנפק מתותי סיכתא ההיא איתתא דאחזיא דינרא לרבי חייא אמר לה מעליא הוא למחר אתאי לקמיה ואמרה ליה אחזיתיה ואמרו לי בישא הוא ולא קא נפיק לי אמר ליה לרב זיל חלפיה ניהלה וכתוב אפנקסי דין עסק ביש ומאי שנא דנכו ואיסור דפטירי משום דלא צריכי למיגמר רבי חייא נמי לאו למיגמר קא בעי רבי חייא לפנים משורת הדין הוא דעבד כדתני רב יוסף (שמות יח, כ) והודעת להם זה בית חייהם את הדרך זו גמילות חסדים ילכו זו ביקור חולים בה זו קבורה את המעשה זה הדין אשר יעשון זו לפנים משורת הדין
It was stated: With regard to one who presents a dinar to a money changer to assess its value or authenticity and the money changer declares it valid, and it is found to be invalid, causing its owner a monetary loss, it is taught in one baraita that an expert money changer is exempt, while if he an ordinary person is liable. And it is taught in another baraita that irrespective of whether the moneychanger is an expert or an ordinary person: regardless, they are liable to pay for the owner’s loss. To reconcile the baraitot, Rav Pappa said: When the baraita teaches that an expert is exempt from liability, it is referring to renowned experts such as the money changers Dankhu and Issur, whose expertise is so great that they do not need to learn about assessing currency at all. But if they are so proficient, in what did they err? They erred with regard to a coin from a new press, which at that time was leaving the press, and they did not know its value. There was a certain woman who presented a dinar to Rabbi Ḥiyya to assess its authenticity. He said to her: It is a proper coin. The next day she came before him and said to him: I presented it to others, and they told me that it is a bad dinar, and I am not able to spend it. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rav: Go exchange it for her, and write on my tablet: This was a bad transaction, as I should not have assessed the coin. But what is different about Dankhu and Issur, who are exempt due to the fact that they do not need to learn about assessing currency? Rabbi Ḥiyya too did not need to learn, as he was also an expert. Rabbi Ḥiyya was not actually required to return a dinar to this woman, but when he did so he acted beyond the letter of the law. This is as that which Rav Yosef taught concerning the verse: “And you shall show them the way wherein they must walk, and the work that they must do” (Exodus 18:20): “And you shall show them”; this is referring to the core of their existence, i.e., Torah study, which is the source of life. “The way”; this is referring to acts of kindness. “They must walk”; this is referring to visiting the sick. “Wherein”; this is referring to the burial of the dead. “The work”; this is referring to conducting oneself in accordance with the law. “That they must do”; this is referring to conducting oneself beyond the letter of the law. This indicates that the Torah mandates that people conduct themselves beyond the letter of the law.
דתני רב יוסף (שמות יח, כ) והודעת להם זה בית חייהם את הדרך זו גמילות חסדים [(אשר) ילכו זה ביקור חולים בה זו קבורה ואת המעשה זה הדין אשר יעשון זו לפנים משורת הדין: אמר מר (אשר) ילכו זה ביקור חולים היינו גמילות חסדים לא נצרכה אלא לבן גילו דאמר מר בן גילו נוטל אחד מששים בחליו ואפי' הכי מבעי ליה למיזל לגביה בה זו קבורה היינו גמילות חסדים לא נצרכה אלא לזקן ואינו לפי כבודו אשר יעשון זו לפנים משורת הדין דאמר ר' יוחנן לא חרבה ירושלים אלא על שדנו בה דין תורה אלא דיני דמגיזתא לדיינו אלא אימא שהעמידו דיניהם על דין תורה ולא עבדו לפנים משורת הדין:
The Gemara cites a source for going beyond the letter of the law. As Rav Yosef taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And you shall teach them the statutes and the laws, and shall show them the path wherein they shall walk and the action that they must perform” (Exodus 18:20). The baraita parses the various directives in the verse. “And you shall teach them,” that is referring to the structure of their livelihood, i.e., teach the Jewish people trades so that they may earn a living; “the path,” that is referring to acts of kindness; “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill; “wherein,” that is referring to burial; “and the action,” that is referring to acting in accordance with the letter of the law; “that they must perform,” that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law. Master said: With regard to the phrase “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill. That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The reference to visiting the ill is necessary only for the contemporary of the ill person, as the Master said: When one who is a contemporary of an ill person visits him, he takes one-sixtieth of his illness. Since visiting an ill contemporary involves contracting a bit of his illness, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to go and visit him. It was taught in the baraita: With regard to the phrase “wherein,” that is referring to burial. That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The reference to burial is necessary only to teach the halakha of an elderly person, and it is in a circumstance where it is not in keeping with his dignity to bury the dead. Therefore, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to participate in the burial. It was taught in the baraita: “That they must perform”; that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Jerusalem was destroyed only for the fact that they adjudicated cases on the basis of Torah law in the city. Rather, what else should they have done? Should they rather have adjudicated cases on the basis of arbitrary decisions? Rather, say: That they established their rulings on the basis of Torah law and did not go beyond the letter of the law.
(ו) רופא אומן שריפא ברשות ב"ד והזיק פטור מדיני אדם ודינו מסור לשמים המחתך את העובר במעי אמו ברשות ב"ד והזיק פטור מדיני אדם ודינו מסור לשמים.
A trained physician who healed someone with the permission of the court and did damage is exempt based on human laws but their judgement is executed by Heaven. One who cut out a fetus from its mother's womb with permission of the court and did damage is exempt based on human laws but their judgement is executed by Heaven.
Like the pious individual, the pious judge must apply the laws of the Torah with consideration for a range of values – not only truth (the precise line of the law, which is certainly a value), but also such values as compassion, modesty, peace, humility, or charity; these values will sometimes override a strict adherence to judicial “truth"...
The failure to deviate from the strict line of the law in deference to some larger good can be devastating, because the right ruling is not always the (morally) best ruling.
When and how, precisely, is truth dangerous? After all, truthfulness is essential to the smooth conduct of human affairs, and the rabbis no less than the biblical prophets denounced lying, deceitful persons. But the rabbis understood that a commitment to “Truth” is dangerous first, if it is misapplied, and second, if it is absolutized.
There are some domains to which the categories “true” and “false” do not apply. As Aristotle already noted, universal, exception-less, “truth” may be attainable in arithmetic and logic but it is unattainable in the realm of practical and moral affairs. When deliberating over the morality of an action, we appeal not to concepts of truth and falsehood, but to concepts of good and bad which are not easily absolutized. However good a general rule or law might be in theory, and however well a previous moral decision may have served us in the past, it is entirely possible that it is not the best course of action in a similar new case. We must ask: do the demands of the hour indicate that a modification of the earlier rule or decision would be a better course of action? We do not have the luxury of simply whipping out an immutable rule on the assumption that it will secure the best moral outcome in every situation. Not only is it lazy, it can cause great damage. To determine what it is best to do in any given situation requires a particularized judgment. Thus, moral reasoning does not prove that something is immutably true; it argues that something is situationally good – today, and maybe often, and maybe for a very long time, but not absolutely and immutably because the circumstances of life are ever shifting. Wouldn’t a truly divine law -- one that can be relied upon now and in the future -- have to be dynamic and responsive rather than absolute and immutable (pace the Stoics)? Wouldn’t it have to be open to critique and revision as new situations, new challenges, new information, and new moral insights arise?
The rabbis understood the danger that lies in the misapplication of immutable truth language to the dynamic realm of morality, especially, given the human tendency to absolutize “Truth,” to assume that nothing – not even God -- has the power to displace “Truth.” To the rabbis’ way of thinking, declaring truth an absolute value -- especially in the dynamic realm of moral inquiry -- makes truth more sacred than God. And that is the cardinal sin of idolatry.
The refusal to absolutize any one value such as truth should not be confused with the refusal of all values or with relativism. The rabbis’ position is not a value-less position but a value rich position. Rabbinic sources eulogize many virtues and values (especially truthfulness) and even hierarchize them on occasion, but they refuse to install any one value as permanently and absolutely supreme. They recognize that each moment of moral judgment requires the dynamic activation, weighing and balancing, of those strongly held values to determine the morally best course of action. In the rabbinic moral calculus, formal, empirical, and judicial truth (i.e., strict justice) will occasionally give way to the consideration of other values, as we have seen.
...it is a Jewish tradition and a fundamental principle in Jewish law that, along with strict legal liability, there is an additional obligation to act lifnim mi-shurat ha-din. It is of particular significance here that this obligation found one of its chief expressions in Jewish lawin the field of torts, in a case precisely in point with the instant case.
...Under our current legal system, we cannot force a person to act beyond the letter of the law; it is up to the initiative and goodwill of the litigant. But it appears to me that, under certain circumstances, it is appropriate for the sitting judge to make such a suggestion . . . I myself would exhort the vindicated party to behave in a manner beyond the letter of the law and compensate the claimants as she originally intended, so that she can fulfill the instructions of our Sages, so that you should walk on the path of goodness, and preserve the ways of the wise (Mishlei 2:20), the source of the principle of going beyond the letter of the law.”
I strongly dissent from the objective revealed between the lines of the opinion of my distinguished colleague that seeks to elevate payment of compensation lifnim mi-shurat ha-din to the status of a settled general principle of the law of torts...such an approach will necessarily bring about the filing of frivolous appeals...My concern here is not for the time of the court, but for the resulting consequence, namely, the adverse effect on those appellants whose appeals have merit and who will have to wait even longer for a decision in their cases.
Moreover, a legal system that deliberately chooses to abandon the boundary lines marked out in the substantive law and to add, as an additional and alternative stratum and as an established part of the system, a recommendation for the payment of compensation beyond what the law requires, necessarily acts according to impossibly vague standards, which ultimately depend on the fortuity of which particular judge sits when the case is reached. Such a system will, over the course of time, bring about confusion in the law and adversely affect the rights of the parties. The absence of clear standards may also often actually produce inconsistent results.