פתיחה - סיפור רב חסדא (המורה) ורמי בר חמא (התלמיד)
אמר לו רב חסדא לרמי בר חמא:' לא הוית גבן באורתא בתחומא, דאיבעיא לן מילי מעלייתא' אמר: 'מאי מילי מעלייתא?' א"ל: 'הדר בחצר חבירו שלא מדעתו צריך להעלות לו שכר או אין צריך?'
בירור המקרה המדובר
היכי דמי? אילימא בחצר דלא קיימא לאגרא וגברא דלא עביד למיגר - זה לא נהנה וזה לא חסר!
אלא בחצר דקיימא לאגרא וגברא דעביד למיגר - זה נהנה וזה חסר!
לא צריכא בחצר דלא קיימא לאגרא וגברא דעביד למיגר. מאי מצי אמר ליה מאי חסרתיך? או דלמא מצי אמר הא איתהנית!
המשך הסיפור
א"ל: 'מתניתין היא!'
'הי מתניתין?'
א"ל:' לכי תשמש לי'.
שקל סודריה כרך ליה
א"ל:' אם נהנית משלמת מה שנהנית'
הערה/ביקורת על דברי רמי בר חמא
אמר רבא: כמה לא חלי ולא מרגיש גברא דמריה סייעיה דאע"ג דלא דמי למתניתין קבלה מיניה האי זה נהנה וזה חסר והאי זה נהנה וזה לא חסר הוא!!
דחיית הביקורת - בירור שיטתו של רמי בר חמא
ורמי בר חמא? סתם פירות ברשות הרבים אפקורי מפקר להו.
ניסיונות להוכיח ולברר מה הדין במקרה של זה נהנה וזה לא חסר על פי תקדימים תנאיים
ניסיון 1 מתוך הרישא של משנה, בבא בתרא פרק א' משנה ג':
תנן: "המקיף חבירו משלש רוחותיו וגדר את הראשונה ואת השניה ואת השלישית אין מחייבין אותו"
הא רביעית מחייבין אותו שמא מינה זה נהנה וזה לא חסר חייב.
דחיית הניסיון
שאני התם, דאמר ליה את גרמת לי הקיפא יתירא.
ניסיון 2 מתוך הסיפא של משנה, בבא בתרא פרק א' משנה ג':
תא שמע:" א"ר יוסי אם עמד ניקף וגדר את הרביעית מגלגלין עליו את הכל"
טעמא דגדר ניקף! הא מקיף - פטור. ש"מ - זה נהנה וזה לא חסר פטור!
דחיית הניסיון
שאני התם, דאמר ליה לדידי סגי לי בנטירא בר זוזא.
ניסיון 3 מתוך
ת"ש:" הבית והעלייה של שנים שנפלו אמר בעל העלייה לבעל הבית לבנות והוא אינו רוצה הרי בעל העלייה בונה בית ויושב בה עד שיתן לו יציאותיו"
יציאותיו הוא דמחייב ליה בעל הבית, הא שכרו לא. ש"מ - זה נהנה וזה לא חסר פטור! שאני התם, דביתא לעלייה משתעבד.
ת"ש:" רבי יהודה אומר אף זה הדר בחצר חבירו שלא מדעתו צריך להעלות לו שכר" ש"מ - זה נהנה וזה לא חסר חייב.
שאני התם, משום שחרוריתא דאשייתא.
§ In connection to the principle stated in the mishna, that if the animal derives benefit the owner of the animal pays for the benefit that it derived, the Gemara relates: Rav Ḥisda said to Rami bar Ḥama: You were not with us at night within our boundary when we raised dilemmas concerning exceptional matters. Rami bar Ḥama said to him: What are the exceptional matters you discussed? Rav Ḥisda said to him: With regard to one who resides in another’s courtyard without his knowledge or permission, must he pay him rent for living there or does he not need to pay him rent? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this question? If we say that the case concerns a courtyard that does not stand to be rented out, i.e., if the squatter would not have lived there the owner would have kept it vacant, and the man squatting there is someone who would not have rented other living quarters because he has other lodgings available to him for free, then it is a case where this one, the squatter, does not derive benefit, and that one, the owner, does not suffer a loss; in that case certainly no payment is necessary. Rather, say that the discussion concerns a case of a courtyard that stands to be rented out, and the man squatting there would have rented other living quarters. If so, then this is a case where this one derives benefit and that one suffers a loss, and in that case he certainly must make payment. The dilemma was not with regard to either of these circumstances. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to raise the dilemma in the case of a courtyard that does not stand to be rented out, but the man squatting there would have rented other living quarters had he not squatted in this property. What is the halakha in this case? Is the squatter legally able to say to the owner of the courtyard: What loss have I caused you, as you would not have rented it out anyway? Or perhaps the owner of the courtyard is legally able to say to the squatter:
You have derived benefit from my property, as by living there you saved the money you otherwise would have had to pay in order to rent out a different courtyard, and therefore you must pay me for the benefit you derived. Rami bar Ḥama said to him: This dilemma is not new; rather, it is discussed in the mishna, and the mishna already provided a solution. Rav Ḥisda asked him: To which mishna are you referring? Rami bar Ḥama said to him: After you serve me, I will tell you. Rav Ḥisda took hold of Rami bar Ḥama’s scarf [suderei] and wrapped it around him in the manner it is usually worn. Rami bar Ḥama then said to him: This is the mishna: If the animal derives benefit, the owner of the animal pays for the benefit that the animal derived. This demonstrates that one who derives benefit must pay for the benefit he derives, even if the injured party is not entitled to payment for his loss. Rava said: How little does a man who has the assistance of his Lord have to worry or be concerned about the possibility that his opinion may not be accepted, as even though the dilemma that was raised is in fact not similar to the case in the mishna quoted by Rami bar Ḥama, Rav Ḥisda nevertheless accepted it from him. This case in the mishna, about the animal eating produce in the public domain, is where this one derives benefit and that one suffers a loss, and that case of the squatter living in the courtyard, is where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss. The Gemara asks: And what does Rami bar Ḥama think? Why does he equate the two cases? The Gemara explains: He holds that if produce is left in the public domain without specification with regard to its ownership, it is assumed that the owner has rendered it ownerless. The owner does not expect to derive benefit from the produce, and therefore when the animal ate it he suffered no loss. Consequently, it is a case where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, and it is comparable to the case of the squatter in the courtyard. The Gemara attempts to cite conclusive evidence from another case: We learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 4b): If one’s fields surround the fields of another on three sides, and he fenced in the first, the second, and the third field, thereby providing protection also to the other man’s field, the court does not obligate the owner of the inner field to share in the costs of the fence, as he can claim that he does not derive benefit from it, since his field remains exposed on the fourth side. The Gemara infers: But this indicates that if his fields surrounded the inner field on all four sides, and the owner of the outer fields fenced the field on the fourth side as well, the court does obligate the owner of the inner field to share in the expenses. The Gemara suggests: Conclude from the mishna that where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, the one who derives benefit is obligated to pay for that benefit. In this case, the owner of the inner field benefits from the fence while the owner of the outer field does not suffer a loss, because in any event he would have needed to build those fences, and the owner of the inner field is obligated to share in the expense. The Gemara rejects this: It is different there because the owner of the outer field can say to the owner of the inner field: Your field caused me to have to build the fence with a larger circumference than I would have otherwise needed to had your field not been there, and therefore your field caused me an additional expense. This case is therefore similar to those where this one derives benefit and that one suffers a loss. The Gemara attempts another resolution: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of that mishna. Rabbi Yosei said: If the owner of the surrounded, i.e., inner, field arose and enclosed the fourth side on his own, the court imposes upon him the obligation to pay his share of all of it, as through his actions he demonstrated that he was interested in having the fence installed. The Gemara infers from this: The reason the court imposes upon him the obligation to pay his share of all of it is because the owner of the surrounded field arose and enclosed the fourth side himself. By inference, had the owner of the surrounding field built the fourth fence, the owner of the inner field would be exempt. The Gemara suggests: Conclude from the mishna that where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, the one who derives benefit is exempt. The Gemara rejects this: It is different there because the owner of the inner field can say to the owner of the surrounding fields: For me, the protection of a fence worth a dinar would have been sufficient; I did not wish to pay for such an expensive fence. The Gemara attempts another resolution: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Bava Metzia 117a): If a house and its upper story, which belonged to two separate people, collapsed, necessitating that the entire structure be rebuilt, and the owner of the upper story told the owner of the lower story of the house to build the lower story again so that he could rebuild the upper story, but the owner of the lower story does not want to do so, the owner of the upper story may build the lower story of the house and live in it until the owner of the lower story will pay him for his expenses, and only then will he be required to vacate the lower story of the house and build the upper story. The Gemara infers: It is all of his expenses that the owner of the lower story of the house is obligated to pay him, and he does not subtract from the amount compensation for rent for the time that the owner of the upper story lived in the lower story of the house. Conclude from the mishna that where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, the one who derives benefit is exempt, as the owner of the upper story derived benefit from living in the lower story, while the owner of the lower story did not suffer a loss, since he said he did not need it. The Gemara rejects this proof: It is different there because the lower story of the house is subjugated to the upper story, because it also serves as the foundation of the upper story, and therefore the owner of the lower story of the house is obligated to provide lodging to the owner of the upper story in the interim. The Gemara attempts another resolution. Come and hear a proof from the continuation of the mishna, in which Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the first tanna and holds that the owner of the upper story may not reside in the lower story of the house without payment. Rabbi Yehuda says: A proof that the owner of the upper story must pay rent is from the halakha that even this one who resides in another’s courtyard without his knowledge must pay him rent. Conclude from the mishna that when this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, the one who derives benefit is obligated to pay. The Gemara rejects this: It is different there, as there it is possible to claim that the owner of the lower story suffers a loss due to the blackening of the walls, as when a person lives in a home, the value of the house depreciates due to the use.