Shiur #13: The Commentary of Tosefot Yom Tov, Part 1
- Rav Yosef Marcus
- Introduction
One of the works of the Tosefot Yom Tov is known as the Megillat Eiva, which means “Scroll of Hatred,” in which he describes the story of his arrest, his impending death sentence, and his eventual miraculous rescue. During his term as the rabbi of Prague, the Thirty Years’ War broke out in Europe on the background of the religious struggle between the Protestants and Catholics, as well as a power struggle between various monarchs. In the year 1618, the residents of Prague rebelled against the king of Bohemia, and after the rebellion failed, the king imposed heavy taxes upon the city. This imposition of taxes caused a dispute between various members of the Jewish community, in addition to disputes between many of the members of the community and the Tosefot Yom Tov himself, which reached a crescendo when members of the community slandered the Tosefot Yom Tov to the authorities.
The Tosefot Yom Tov was brought to Vienna and was accused of having written against Christianity both in his work Ma’adanei Melekh, as well as in some of his works on the Gemara. The king ordered these works to be burned. He describes how he sentenced to death based upon these charges, and was saved only with tremendous difficulty. His punishment was lowered to a large fine and the termination of his position as rabbi of community. In the wake of this incident, the Tosefot Yom Tov decreed upon his descendants to fast on the fifth of the month of Tammuz, the day that he was taken from his home.
The Tosefot Yom Tov penned about fifty works on a range of Torah subjects, including Mishna, Gemara, Jewish philosophy, kabbala, and halakha. The most famous of his works include his commentary on the Mishna known as Tosefot Yom Tov, his commentaries on the laws of the Rosh known as Ma’adanei Yom Tov, initially called Ma’adanei Melekh, and the Lechem Chamudot.
2. The Motivation and Goal of the Tosefot Yom Tov in Writing his Commentary
A. Encouraging the Study of Mishna
The Tosefot Yom Tov published his commentary on the Mishna during the period of his first stint in Prague, while serving as a dayyan (religious judge) in the beit din (religious court) of the Maharal. It was first printed between the years 1614-1617, and was then printed a second time in Cracow between the years 1643-1644 after a number of modifications.
The Tosefot Yom Tov explains his motivation for writing the commentary in his introduction to the work:
In the days [of] our holy teacher Rabbi Yehuda Ha-nasi, this Tannaitic teaching[1] was taught: Those who engage in [the study of] scripture, [accomplish] a measure [of Torah study], but [it is] not a [large] measure; [those who engage] in [the study of] Mishna, [accomplish] a [large] measure, and receive reward for it; [those who engage in the study of] Gemara, there is no greater measure than this (Bava Metzia 33a). Following this teaching, everyone abandoned the [study of] Mishna and pursued the [study of] Gemara. Then they interpreted: “And one should always run to [study] Mishna more than the Gemara,” as it is stated in the end of chapter two of Bava Metzia (33b).
So too, [with regard to] our great teacher and rabbi, the ga’on Rabbi Yehuda Loew, son of Betzalel,[2] who was occupied with sitting [studying Torah], [a similar development occurred]: He spread Torah to the public in a large measure, which is the measure of the Gemara, as is well known. Then he preached to run to [study] Mishna, until multiple groups of kings, who are the kings— the Rabbis (Gittin 62a) — were developed. And they engage in [the study of] one chapter of the chapters of the mishnayot every day, and repeat it over again and again. And this was from God [based on Tehillim 118:23], a law not to be violated. Not only in the holy community of Prague [was this practiced], where the edict was given by the aforementioned ga’on, but also in other holy communities, near and far, they upheld and accepted upon themselves [based on Esther 9:27] to teach them in Israel. (Tosefot Yom Tov, introduction to his commentary on the Mishna)
In this passage, the Tosefot Yom Tov refers to the pedagogical approach of the Maharal of encouraging the study of Mishna. With the encouragement of the Maharal, numerous groups of people studying Mishna were indeed formed during his lifetime. The Maharal addressed the importance of Mishna study in many places in his writings, where he called on the public to fulfill the words of Chazal in the Mishna in Pirkei Avot (5:23) where the proper order of study is to begin with Tanakh, then to study Mishna, and finally to study Talmud.[3]
B. The Relationship between the Tosefot Yom Tov and the Commentary of Rav Ovadya of Bartenura
The motivation of the Tosefot Yom Tov in writing his commentary is discussed explicitly in the introduction to his work. After he describes the study groups of Mishna created in Prague, he writes that they first studied the Mishna with the commentary of Rav Ovadya of Bartenura, and this study convinced him that a new, additional commentary was necessary.
And when I traversed the great and wide sea [of Mishna], there were an innumerable number of hints (based on Tehillim 104:25); small issues with big ones. There my humble opinion will go until the place of its hand reaches. And we found a number of gates of the Mishna concealed, not explained. And likewise, a number of mishnayot that contradict each other which were not resolved. And all this is not a deficiency of the commentary. Instead, the deficiency is on our part… as the commentary knew [the meaning] but did not explain it, as he thought that it [was so clear, it] needed no explanation… but also see that in the commentary [of the Bartenura] itself there are clear and revealed contradictions.
In the majority [of cases], [this is] because sometimes he followed the explanation of Rabbi X, and other times [he followed] the explanation of Rabbi Y. And it also happens occasionally that he combines the two explanations [together], but this does not make sense, and sometimes his words themselves require explanation. All of this my eye saw. (Introduction to the Tosefot Yom Tov on the Mishna)
The Tosefot Yom Tov then writes that his commentary should be viewed as complementary to the commentary of the Bartenura, since he comments in places where the Bartenura did not explain sufficiently or his words were not entirely understandable, or where there is a contradiction in his commentary.[4] In fact, the Tosefot Yom Tov explains the name for his work, translated as “the additions of Yom Tov,” as being based upon (in addition to other considerations) the fact that he wrote his commentary to serve as an addendum to the commentary of the Bartenura:
And I rose and contemplated the picture to see and understand its qualities and the qualities of the work, and what [should be] its name, and what is the name of its theme. As every author of a book of the rishonim and the acharonim called their work by names, so that we can relate its name all over the land to say that in this book, he wrote such and such, and in that book [he wrote] such and such. But some call it by the actual name of the author. And some call it by its theme and topic.
And both of them learned from the prophets[5]… therefore, I saw that it was nice to call this work by the name Tosefot Yom Tov, after the one acting [i.e., the Tosefot Yom Tov] and the one being acted upon [the Bartenura], as this is its theme, that it adds [my] explanation to that of the Bartenura, both where he did not explain, as well as where his own words require explanation. Similarly, the nature of the comments are constructed in the image and form of the Tosafot authored on the Gemara… also from this perspective, the name Tosefot Yom Tov is justified. Because this is my portion, my soul said, a portion of heaven above… (Introduction to the Tosefot Yom Tov on the Mishna)
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In the previous shiur, we discussed the methodology of the Tosefot Yom Tov and the novelties inherent to his work beyond the commentaries that preceded him, as well as part of his spiritual and philosophical worldview. In this shiur, we will address a number of important features of his commentary.
- Explanations Not in Accordance with the Interpretation of the Gemara
A group of people was walking on the road, and someone came toward them. One of them said: “I am hereby a nazirite that this is person X,” and another said: “I am hereby a nazirite that this is not person X;” [a third one said:] “I am hereby a nazirite that one of you [the first two] is a nazirite;” [a fourth one said he is a nazirite] “that one of you is not a nazirite;” [a fifth one said he is a nazirite] “that both of you [the first two] are nazirites;” [a sixth one said he is a nazirite] “that all [five] of you are nazirites.” [With regard to these cases] Beit Shammai say: All of them are nazirites, and Beit Hillel say: No one is a nazirite, except the one whose words were not fulfilled. Rabbi Tarfon says: None of them is a nazirite. (Mishna Nazir 5:5)
Based on the comments of the Gemara (Nazir 32b-33a), it appears that the Mishna is referring to a case of six people walking together who then see another person approaching them. The six people argue about this person’s identity. The first two individuals accept upon themselves to become nazirites if they are correct in their identification of the person (though they disagree who it is), and the rest accept upon themselves to become nazirites based upon the declarations of the first two individuals. According to Beit Shammai, all six of them are rendered nazirites, whether they were correct or incorrect in their identification. The reason for this is that according to Beit Shammai, one who accepts upon himself to become a nazirite even in error, nevertheless still becomes a nazirite, just like the consecration of an item to the Temple in error is still valid.
Beit Hillel, in contrast, state that only the individuals who correctly identified the person become nazirites, since in their opinion, a declaration to become a nazirite made in error is invalid.[1]However, it is unclear why Beit Hillel rules that only the ones who guessed incorrectly become nazirites, as their logic should dictate the opposite, that the ones who guessed correctly should become nazirites. Rav Yehuda and Abaye disagree in the Gemara (32b-33a) about the reasoning of Beit Hillel. Rav Yehuda modifies the text of the Mishna by reversing the parts of Beit Hillel’s opinion: Only the ones whose words were actually true become nazirites, while the ones who erred in the identification do not become nazirites.
Abaye, on the other hand, explains that the Mishna refers to a case where the one who declared his nazirite status added a sentence, “instead, if it is not person X, I will be a nazirite,” where he apparently changes his mind. The meaning of the words “whose words were not fulfilled” is that his original statement (the first clause) was not fulfilled, but his later statement (that if it is not person X, he will be a nazirite) was. Rashi and Tosafot disagree as to precisely how to explain Abaye’s opinion, while the Rambam offers a third explanation:
Beit Hillel say that the one obligated in naziriteship is the one with regard to whom none of his words would exempt him. For example, if one says, “I am a nazirite that this is person X,” if his words were true, and it was person X, then he is obligated in naziriteship. And if he said, “I am a nazirite that this is not person X,” and then it was found that it was person X, such [that] his words were not true, he is obligated in naziriteship. We find that the intention of Beit Hillel in referring to “the one whose words were not true” is what we have said. And the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon. (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishna, Nazir 5:5)
In other words, according to the Rambam, the words “his words were not true” mean that no element of his words that would exempt him from becoming a nazirite were true. Evidently, the Rambam flips the explanation of the terms “his words were true” and “his words were not true” from the simple understanding. His explanation consequently also contradicts the understanding of the Gemara, a fact noted by the Tosefot Yom Tov in his comments below:
However, in the Gemara they did not explain [it] this way. Since with regard to the practical halakha, there is no difference, permission is given to explain [however he wants]. I do not see any difference between the explanation of the Mishna and the explanation of scripture, as permission is granted to explain scripture where our eyes have seen the works [of commentary] that are from the times of the Gemara. However, one must not rule [halakha] or explain any halakha in a manner that contradicts the authors of the Gemara. (Tosefot Yom Tov, commentary on Nazir 5:5)
These words of the Tosefot Yom Tov are cited in almost every single discussion about the study of simple understanding of the Torah or Mishna, even when it goes against the interpretations of Chazal. We will address this topic thoroughly in a separate shiur dedicated to the topic of understanding the Mishna in its simple form. However, it should be noted here that despite this fundamental claim of the Tosefot Yom Tov, he rarely explains the Mishna in its simplest form against the interpretation of the Gemara. Only in a few additional instances does he note the fact that the Rambam apparently explains the Mishna not in accordance with the Gemara, and he usually questions the Rambam for doing so.[2]
2. Non-Mystical Explanations Only
Although in practice the Tosefot Yom Tov does not usually interpret the Mishna differently than the Gemara, the tendency of the Tosefot Yom Tov to interpret sources according to their simple meaning is nevertheless found in other contexts. The Mishna (Avot 2:6) states: “He [Hillel] also saw a skull floating in the water. He said to it, because you drowned someone, they drowned you, and ultimately the one who drowned you will drown.” The Tosefot Yom Tov here cites the explanation of the Midrash Shmuel, who explains the Mishna based upon the “principle of gilgul,”[3] an explanation that is rejected by the Tosefot Yom Tov.
And it does not make sense in my eyes at all to say that the intent of Hillel in this statement was only for the secret of “gilgul.” As that is indeed one of the unfathomable matters, and it should be concealed, except for exceptional individuals that God calls.[4] Our Holy teacher [Rabbi Yehuda Ha-nasi] would not have authored this statement or taught it in his Mishna, because just as “scripture does not emerge from its simple sense,” so too the Mishna does not emerge from its meaning that is understood by all. And [if this were the meaning,] he would have left this statement with other statements that they accepted by tradition but chose to leave as oral, and did not write them in the Mishna.[5] (Tosefot Yom Tov on Avot 2:6)
According to the Tosefot Yom Tov, any source in rabbinic literature must first be explained according to its simple understanding.
3. Discussion of Scripture and its Simple Meaning
In a number of places, the Tosefot Yom Tov elaborates on the meaning of words and verses in the Tanakh, a tendency that appears to relate to his pursuit of the simple meaning of sources.
A. The Meaning of the Word Chag
In many places in the Mishna, the word chag refers to Sukkot specifically. The Tosefot Yom Tov addresses this issue in his commentary on tractate Rosh HaShana:
About the matter of the name chag being designated [specifically] for Sukkot, more than [for] Pesach and Shavuot… even though all three are called chag in scripture; nevertheless, the initial implication of the word chag is a circle and dancing. If not for the verbal analogy of the word midbar, midbar… and the Radak does explain it this way in accordance with its simple meaning, which is dancing and clapping with joy. And on Sukkot, there was additional joy based on the drawing of the water. Therefore, it is appropriate for Sukkot specifically to be called chag. And for this reason, we say in the prayer [Shemoneh Esrei], “the time of our rejoicing.” (Tosefot Yom Tov to Rosh Hashana 1:1)
The Tosefot Yom Tov here refers to the fact that Chazal (Chagiga 10b) derived via verbal analogy (known as a gezeira shava) that the word chag refers to an offering, based on two appearances of the words bamidbar.[6] Just as with regard to one, the word chag refers to an offering, so too with regard to the second, the context of the holidays, the word chag refers to an offering. Nevertheless, he explains that according to the simple meaning of the Mishna, it refers to a circle and dancing, a point that specifically characterizes Sukkot due to the ceremony of the water drawing, which was accompanied by much rejoicing and dancing. It is clear to him that despite the verbal analogy, the Rabbis did not alter the original meaning of the word chag as circles and dancing, and therefore referred to Sukkot specifically by the name of chag.
B. Explanation of the Word “Libations” [nesakhim]
The Torah commands that the majority of the offerings sacrificed in the Temple must be brought together with a meal-offering and wine libation. These meal-offerings are thus referred to as the “meal-offerings of libations.” The Mishna in Menachot (9:4) rules: “The lamb brought with the omer offering gets a double meal-offering, but its libation was not doubled.” The Mishna is discussing the halakha of the meal-offering and wine libation for the lamb that accompanies the omer offering, which consisted of barley and was brought annually on the sixteenth of Nissan. The Mishna establishes that although this meal-offering was double – it contained two isaron measures of flour for one lamb, as opposed to the usual one of flour (as specified in Vayikra 23:13) – the quantity of its wine libations was not doubled, a fact that is explicitly stated in that verse.
The Gemara comments that the amount of oil that was mixed in with the flour for the meal-offering was also not doubled, and it derives this from the following exegesis:
Rabbi Elazar said, it says “ve-niska [and its libation, feminine]” and we read it “ve-niskoh [and its libation, masculine].” How so? “Its libation [niska, feminine]” of the meal-offering [mincha, which is feminine][7] is equivalent to “its libation [nisko, masculine]” of the wine [yayin, which is masculine]: Just as [for] wine, [the amount is] a quarter [of a log, a measurement], so too [for] oil, [the amount is] a quarter [of a log]. (Menachot 89b)
The Tosefot Yom Tov discusses this interpretation at length:
And we learn from here that the language of “nesekh” in the Torah is also used for oil. And the reason is that it is also drawn [nitnasekh] and poured into flour. And it makes sense that the Bartenura and the Rambam in the aforementioned Mishna, and also in the last chapter [of this tractate], Mishna 5, refer to the oils of the flour using the formulation of “ve-niskeihem.” Likewise, [it makes sense that] in the text of the [Mussaf] prayer [it says] “and their meal-offerings and their libations [u-minchatam ve-niskeihem],” and then we say “and wine according to its libation [ke-nisko].” Conclude from here [i.e., from the plural form of niskeihem] that ve-niskeihem is referring to the oil [in addition to the wine]. (Tosefot Yom Tov, Menachot 9:4)
The Tosefot Yom Tov explains that this interpretation is based on the fact that practically, oil is drawn and poured, and the Hebrew term nesekh refers to a substance that is poured. He supports this by referencing the Rambam and the Bartenura, who both include oil within the plural term ve-niskeihem. He also references the text of the Mussaf prayer recited on Rosh Chodesh and the holidays, where the word ve-niskeihem, their libations in plural, is distinct from the reference to the wine “yayin ke-niskoh” which proves that the term ve-niskeihem refers to oil.
Based on this analysis, the Tosefot Yom Tov questions the opinion of the Maharshal, who writes that he omits the words uminchatam ve-niskeihem from his prayers, as he believes that the plural form of nesakhim is incorrect. The Tosefot Yom Tov rejects this based on the formulation of the Mishna, which demonstrates that the word nesakhim refers to both the wine and oil libations, and adds an additional proof from Scripture that oil is also included in this term, thereby affirming the precision of the text of the Siddur. Within this discussion, he also addresses the question of the simple meaning of the text of the Tanakh in contrast to the more homiletical interpretations:
And I am astonished at the holy mouth of our teacher, Rav Shlomo Luria [the Maharshal], who wrote in his responsa, Siman 64, “I skip [the word] ve-niskeihem, as it appears to me that it is a scribal error. As if one comes to explain [the word] ‘as it is stated [ke-medubar]’ as referring to the libations as well, it should have subsequently said, ‘and wine of one half a hin for the bull,’ etc. Rather, it certainly comes to explain only the meal-offerings, [and the word] ‘as it is stated’ is literal, and the libations [are referred to] in brief when it says, ‘and wine according to its libation.’ And the truth is that in parashat Pinchas it also explains the meal-offerings each time, and [with regard to] the libations, it says only ‘according to their rules,’ or ‘and their libations,’ like the verse does here. And this is the primary [explanation].”[8]
And the explanation of the matter is that since he didn’t consider that “their libations” [niskeihem] refers only to the oil, he was therefore pressed to alter the text. And we have already seen that that the Torah says “and its libation [ve-niskoh]” regarding the oil. And furthermore, in Parashat Pinchas in the sixth [day] of the chag [i.e., Sukkot], it says: “And its libations [nesakheha].”
And Rashi explains there that any [time the words] ve-niska, ve-niskeihem, ve-nisacheha [are mentioned], regarding the offerings of Sukkot, they refer to the daily offering. Now granted, if you say that oil is also referred to as a nesech, that is why is written “and its libations,” [u-nesacheha] in plural, as it refers to oil and wine.
However, if you say that oil is not suitable to be called nesech, what is [the meaning of] u-nesacheha [its libations], as it refers to one burnt-offering. Since, if it refers to the two daily offerings, it should have said, “ve-niskeihem [and their libations],” like it did on the second [day]. And do not answer me that this is why the extra yud is present [in the word ve-niskeihem written on the second day] based on the homiletical interpretation of the drawing of the water, as nevertheless, the verse does not depart from its simple meaning, and [the verse] needs an explanation on the simple level. And even though it is explained according to the simple meaning, even so, the exegetical interpretation can be employed, because one can still derive it because it alters its wording [i.e., it changes the word from ve-niska to ve-niskeihem] from the other verses in the parasha. This is thus a second witness [i.e., proof] to establish the matter that “ve-niskeihem” is appropriate to say [in the Mussaf prayer], and the intention is [to refer to] the oil. And then this version of the text in the prayers is completely supported.
C. “And the Firstborn that is Born”
The Mishna in Yevamot (2:8) rules that ideally, the oldest brother should perform levirate marriage (in a case where the husband dies, and the couple had no children). The Gemara derives this halakha as follows:
The Rabbis taught: “And the firstborn, etc.” (Devarim 25:6); from here [it is derived] that it is a mitzva for the eldest [brother] to perform levirate marriage… now that you said that the verse is written with regard to the eldest [brother], say that [only] a firstborn should perform levirate marriage, and an ordinary [brother] should not [ever] perform levirate marriage… the verse states: “When brothers live together (Devarim 25:5),” the living of the brothers is compared to one another. (Yevamot 24a)
The verse that serves as the source of this halakha is Devarim 25:6: “It shall be that the firstborn that she will bear will be established in the name of his dead brother, and his name will not be expunged from Israel.” The simple meaning of the verse indicates that this commandment refers to the child born as a result of the levirate marriage.[9] However, according to the interpretation of the Gemara, the verse refers to the identity of the one performing the levirate marriage, and commands that the eldest brother do so. The Gemara there cites a number of additional exegetical interpretations of this verse, including one focusing on the words “in the name of his brother,” as follows:
“Will be established in the name of his dead brother,” for an inheritance [i.e., that it goes to the one performing levirate marriage]. You say for an inheritance, or is it only for the name? [For example, if the deceased was named] Yosef, call him [i.e., the newborn child] Yosef, [if the deceased was named] Yochanan, call him Yochanan? It is stated here, “will be established in the name of his dead brother,” and it is stated elsewhere, “they shall be called after the name of their brothers in their inheritance” (Bereishit 48:6). Just as the [word] “name” mentioned there refers to inheritance, so too the [word] “name” mentioned here refers to the inheritance.
“And his name will not be expunged from Israel,” this excludes a saris (sexually underdeveloped male), whose name is erased [since he cannot father a child]. Rava says: Even though in the entire Torah [the rule is that] a verse does not depart from the simple meaning, here the verbal analogy [of the word “name”] comes, and removes it from its simple meaning entirely. (Yevamot 24a)
According to Rava, in this case, the exegetical interpretation removes the verse from its simple meaning entirely, and Rashi explains that accordingly, there is no obligation to call the child by the name of his deceased brother, which is the simple interpretation. The Bartenura cites the various exegetical interpretations of the Gemara in his commentary:
“There is a mitzva for the eldest to perform levirate marriage.” As we interpret: “And take her as a wife, and perform levirate marriage with her, and the firstborn” (Devarim 25:5-6); [this indicates that] the one performing levirate marriage should be a firstborn. “That she will bear,” [this indicates that] that the yevama (the woman whose husband died childless) should be capable of giving birth, which excludes an ailonit (sexually underdeveloped woman who cannot bear children). “The first born,” performing the levirate marriage “will be established in the name of his brother,” to inherit him, and his brothers will not divide it with him. (Commentary of Rav Ovadya of Bartenura, Yevamot 2:8)
Accordingly, the Bartenura does not suffice with citing the scriptural basis for the halakha mentioned in the Mishna explicitly that the elder brother is preferred; rather he brings a number of the Gemara’s exegeses, despite the fact that the halakhot derived there do not appear in the Mishna. The Tosefot Yom Tov comments:
And that which the Bartenura wrote that the firstborn performing the levirate marriage will be established in the name of his dead brother to inherit him is explained in the Gemara [as being derived] from a verbal analogy. As it is stated here, “will be established in the name of his brother,” and it is stated elsewhere, “they shall be called after the name of their brothers in their inheritance” (Bereishit 48:6).
And we say in the Gemara that even though in the entire Torah a verse does not depart from the simple meaning, here the verbal analogy comes, and removes it entirely, resulting in the fact that [the brother of the deceased] need not call his son by the name of his [deceased] brother at all. And now it works well that the Bartenura was compelled to write this exegetical interpretation of the entire verse, [even though] it would seem that he did not need to write the exegetical interpretation about the inheritance at all.
But since this interpretation removes the verse from its simple meaning entirely, this required [the Bartenura to specify] the interpretation of [the phrase] “it shall be the firstborn,” as it is impossible to explain it in its simple sense now, as Tosafot wrote. Rather, it refers to the yavam (the brother performing levirate marriage), as if the verse refers to the firstborn born to the yevama, [and means] that he will be established to [receive] the inheritance, that that firstborn will inherit the deceased, if so, it should have stated: He will be established in the name of the brother of his father. (Tosefot Yom Tov, Yevamot 2:8)
The Tosefot Yom Tov claims that the Bartenura was compelled to cite the Gemara’s interpretation about the inheritance, despite the fact that it doesn’t appear in the Mishna, because the exegetical interpretation deriving that the verse refers not to the child born, but to the yavam, can only be understood in this light. The Tosefot Yom Tov goes on to explain the words of the Rambam (Hilkhot Yibbum 2:6), who cites an alternative source from the one which appears in the Gemara for the Mishna’s ruling that the eldest son should preferably perform the levirate marriage:
And likewise, I believe that since this verbal analogy removes the verse from its simple meaning, this compelled the Rambam, who wrote in his commentary [on the Mishna], as well as in his work [the Mishneh Torah] in chapter 2 of Hilkhot Yibbum: “That she will bear,” means that the mother of the deceased will bear, and [the future form] “she will bear” is [written] in place of “she bore” [past tense], and the future [form] comes in place of the past [form].[10]
But this [interpretation of the Rambam] is difficult, as the Talmud employs [the words “she will bear” for] a different exegetical interpretation, as the Bartenura wrote, “it excludes the ailonit,” and the Rambam also quotes it in chapter 6 of Hilkhot Yibbum. Rather, because the simple meaning of the verse is removed entirely, the Rambam states that it is impossible to say that there should not be an understandable explanation in scripture… that there should nevertheless be a simple explanation [that is] understandable to all for this verse, like [there is] for all verses. Just that the apparent explanation, which is that “the firstborn,” refers to the first child [of the yavam and yevama together], and “shall be established in the name,” refers to the literal name, to this simple meaning, the verbal analogy has removed entirely. Rather, explain “the firstborn” [as referring to] the firstborn of the brothers [of the deceased], and “in the name” is the name of the inheritance. And all this is close to its simple interpretation and meaning of the verse… it emerges from this that the verse has a clear meaning close to its simple meaning, even though the verbal analogy removes it entirely. (Tosefot Yom Tov, Yevamot 2:8)
The Rambam derives the halakha that the eldest brother should perform the levirate marriage from the words “that she will bear,” which he interprets to mean “that the mother of the deceased will bear,” i.e., the eldest child of the mother of the deceased. The Tosefot Yom Tov explains that the Rambam needed to use this derasha (exegetical interpretation) because in his opinion, although the Gemara claimed that in this instance the derasha uprooted the simple meaning, it is necessary to explain the verse in such a manner that it is understandable in some form. In other words, although the derasha does indeed explain the verse differently from its simple sense, the verse must still be easily understandable on a simple level when interpreted in this manner. Again, the sensitivity of the Tosefot Yom Tov to understanding a verse in a simple manner is evident.
4. Alternate Versions of the Text and Realia
A striking feature of the commentary of the Tosefot Yom Tov is his many glosses and clarifications to the text of the Mishna. Rabbi Shlomo Ha-Adeni, the author of the commentary Melekhet Shlomo on the Mishna, who also dealt extensively with alterations of the text, addresses this issue in his introduction to the Mishna where he relates that he discovered the commentary of the Tosefot Yom Tov just as he had almost completed writing his own commentary on the Mishna:
“And together is his heart to say it.” There is no coincidence that in one generation, one sits alone in a corner in the city of Chevron,[11] may it be rebuilt speedily in our days, and one of his colleagues sits in the distant land of the cities of Ashkenaz.[12] They agreed together to delve and toil within the labor of Torah, and to edit the Mishna and to explain it in nearly the same style. (Melekhet Shlomo, Introduction to the Mishna)
The Melekhet Shlomo labels the commentary of the Tosefot Yom Tov as one designed “to edit the Mishna and to explain it.” However, on this point we find a dispute among scholars about how to understand the glosses of the Tosefot Yom Tov. Many scholars believe that one of the goals of the Tosefot Yom Tov, in addition to serving as a commentary, was indeed to clarify the correct text of the Mishna based upon the various versions of the Mishna available to him.[13] However, Yair Horowitz[14] recently claimed that the Tosefot Yom Tov did not engage in a systematic clarification of the correct text, and in fact never intended to prepare a critical edition of the Mishna. Rather, his goal was to explain the Mishna, and he engaged in critical analysis of the text as a means to this end. Horowitz marshals many proofs to his position, including the fact that in his introduction, the Tosefot Yom Tov does not mention this at all among his various stated goals. In any event, the Tosefot Yom Tov does indeed frequently engage in a critical analysis of the text of the Mishna, and he can be considered a trailblazer to some degree in this regard.
Tosefot Yom Tov may have developed his interest in analyzing the various versions and manuscripts of the Mishna through study with his teacher, the Maharal, who also engages in such analysis occasionally.[15] The following is one example of the Maharal’s style in Pirkei Avot, where the Mishna states:
Ten objects were created on the eve of Shabbat during twilight, and they are: The opening of the ground, the opening of the well, the mouth of the donkey [of Bila’am], the rainbow, the manna, the staff [of Moshe], the shamir worm [used to cut the stones for constructing the Temple], the letters, the writing, and the Tablets. And some say even the demons, and the burial-place of Moshe, and the ram for Avraham our father. And some say even tongs are made from other tongs [but the first was created by God at this time as well]. (Pirkei Avot 5:6)
In his commentary to Pirkei Avot, the Maharal comments that multiple versions of the text exist for this Mishna:
And in our Mishna, not all the versions of the text are identical, as in some versions, it is written: And some say, even the demons and the burial-place of Moshe and the ram of Avraham, and some say even tongs are made with other tongs. And in other versions, it is written, and some say the ram of Yitzchak and the burial-place of Moshe, and some say even the demons and the tongs. (Maharal, Derech Chaim on Pirkei Avot, 5:6)
The Maharal later in this passage is troubled by these two different versions of the text, as he assumes that every list of “some say” must include somewhat similar items in them, which is not the case regarding demons and tongs, or demons and the burial-place of Moshe and the ram of Avraham. For this reason, he concludes:
And therefore I say that the correct version of the text is “The ram of Yitzchak and the burial-place of Avraham,” since the ram and the burial plot are both used for great righteous individuals, as will be explained, “and some say even the demons, and some say even tongs are made with other tongs. (Maharal, Derech Chaim on Pirkei Avot, 5:6)
It is evident from here that the Maharal understood the clarification of the correct text to be an integral part of explaining the Mishna, and the Tosefot Yom Tov mentions the opinion of his teacher in his commentary on that Mishna.
Another example of the Maharal engaging in clarifying the correct text can be found elsewhere in Pirkei Avot (3:4): Rabbi Chanina ben Chakhinai says: “One who is awake at night, and one who travels on the road alone, and one who turns his heart to idle thoughts jeopardizes his life.” According to this version of the text, the Mishna lists three distinct examples of a person who jeopardizes his life: One who is awake at night, one who travels alone, and one who turns his heart to idleness. The Maharal discusses the uniqueness of each case individually, and then writes:
And some have the version of the text that reads “one who is awake at night and turns his heart to idleness,” and it is one case, as since he is awake during the night, his mind turns to idleness,[16] and the nighttime is subject to the influence of the destroyers [i.e., demons and other similar creatures], therefore he jeopardizes his life. But the formulation of the language [used] is not this way, as [if this were correct] it should only have said “and one who turns his heart to idleness at night.” (Maharal, Derech Chaim on Pirkei Avot, 3:4)
According to the second version of the text cited here, the Mishna only presents two cases: Being awake at night and traveling alone. The Maharal rejects this version based on textual considerations as well as syntax. The Tosefot Yom Tov cites the comments of the Maharal in this instance as well.
We will conclude our discussion regarding the approach of the Tosefot Yom Tov to manuscripts and alternate versions of the text with a comment he made about a Mishna in Bava Metzia:
One who receives a field from another to sow barley in it, he may not sow it with wheat; [if he is given the field to plant] wheat, he may sow barley. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel forbids this. [If he receives the field to sow] grain, he may not sow it with legumes; legumes, he may sow it with grain. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel forbids. (Mishna, Bava Metzia 9:8)
The Mishna here refers to a person who is hired as a sharecropper to work the field of another, from which he receives a portion of the profit. If the sharecropper wishes to sow a different type of crop, then the Mishna, according to the printed version, says that the first tanna forbids sowing legumes if the field was received for the purpose of sowing grain, but the reverse case is permitted. Rashi there (Bava Metzia 106b) explains that the legumes weaken the ground more than grain does. The Tosefot Yom Tov cites the explanation of Rashi and then notes that others had a different version of the text:
Grain, he may not sow it with legumes: Rashi explains that legumes weaken the ground more than grain. And other versions of the text have the reverse reading, and this is the version [that appears] in the Rif and [the Jerusalem Talmud]. And the Rambam in his work [the Commentary on the Mishna] writes similarly. And our teacher, Rav Wolk Cohen, was astonished at the Shulchan Arukh (Siman 324), as do they argue about the logic of those that work the ground which one weakens the ground more?...
However, it seems that perhaps one can say that this tanna was referring to the land of Israel, as appears in the Gemara about this Mishna. And the Rif and Rambam did not live in the land of Israel, and therefore the nature of the land was not widely known in their [locale]; and they copied the Mishna according to the version of the text that was known to them. And certainly [the same is true regarding] Rashi and his group [of commentaries], who were very distant from the land of Israel. (Tosefot Yom Tov, Commentary on the Mishna, Bava Metzia 9:8)
The Tosefot Yom Tov here concludes that the version of the text of the Rambam and Rif stems from a lack of awareness of the natural topography of the land of Israel. This led them to maintain the version of the text forbidding the sowing of grain if the field was received in order to sow legumes.
[2] See, e.g., his commentary to Shevi’it 4:10: “… this is the explanation of the Rambam in his commentary. And I am astonished, why did he choose to insert another explanation from that which they said in the Gemara, in the chapter of “Makom She-nahagu” (Pesachim 52b), ’For eating and not for a loss?’ And even though the Torah was given to interpret in many different ways, this is true regarding mere homiletical interpretation, but regarding the rulings of halakha, we have only what the Sages of the Gemara said...”
A similar style comment appears in the commentary of the Tosefot Yom Tov to Nedarim 1:1, in reference to the commentary of the Rambam and the Bartenura there: “And a strong question may be raised against the Rambam and the Bartenura, who explain our Mishna in a different manner than the explanation of the Gemara.”
[3] Gilgul is a Kabbalistic notion whereby a soul exists in the body of one individual, and after that person dies, it can later live again in the body of another individual.
[4] This expression is based upon a verse in the book of Yoel (3:5).
[5] A similar comment appears in the Ma’adanei Yom Tov on the Rosh, which was written by the Tosefot Yom Tov, as mentioned in the last shiur, in Berakhot (on Rosh 5:16, #6 at the end): “And we have no dealings with concealed matters in this work, as the Mishna and Gemara were constructed in a manner to understand the simple sense of matters.”
According to his approach presented here, any statement that appears in rabbinic literature must be understood according to its simple meaning. However, he does stray from this principle in a number of cases. See, e.g., his commentary to Sukka 4:5 and 5:9.
[6] “And they should rejoice for Me in the wilderness” (Shemot 5:1); “the offerings and meal-offering you presented me in the wilderness” (Amos 5:25).
[7] This refers to the oil used for the meal-offering.
[8] The Maharshal refers here to the text of the Mussaf prayer that details the offerings brought. For example, on Rosh Chodesh, the text of the prayer first lists the various animal offerings brought on that day, and then continues: “And their meal-offerings and their libations [minchatam ve-niskeihem] are as is stated [ke-medubar], three isaron for the bull, and two isaron for the ram, and one isaron for the lamb, and wine according to its libation [ke-nisko], etc.” The Maharshal argues here that the term ve-niskeihem refers only to the ingredients used within the meal-offerings, and this is what is stated explicitly in the Torah [ke-medubar]. He thus argues that the only reference to the libations in the prayer is “wine according to its libation,” and therefore the reference to libations in plural, ve-niskeihem, is incorrect, as only the wine libation is referenced here.
[9] See Rashbam, Ibn Ezra, and Ramban ad loc.; Bereishit 38:9.
[10] He means that since the giving birth here is not being interpreted as referring to the mother of the brother who died, this happened many years before, and the future tense “she will bear” is inappropriate. Therefore, the Rambam says that in this case, the future tense actually refers to a past action, as if it stated “she bore.”
[11] This is where the Melekhet Shlomo lived.
[12] This refers to the Tosafot Yom Tov.
[13] See R. Yaakov Nachum Epstein, Mavo Le-nusach Ha-Mishna, p.1282; Ezra Zion Melamed, Pirkei Mavo La-sifrut Ha-talmudit, p.146; R. Hanoch Albeck, Mavo La-Mishna, p.124.
[14] Yair Horowitz, Master’s Thesis, “Kavim Le-haghotav shel Ha-Tosefot Yom Tov,” Bar Ilan University, 5764.
[15] The following examples are taken from Horowitz, p.18.
[16] The reason for this may be that in those days, there was no electricity at night, and without enough light to engage in other activities, one’s mind could easily turn to idle matters.
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(א) עֲקַבְיָא בֶן מַהֲלַלְאֵל אוֹמֵר, הִסְתַּכֵּל בִּשְׁלשָׁה דְבָרִים וְאִי אַתָּה בָא לִידֵי עֲבֵרָה. דַּע מֵאַיִן בָּאתָ, וּלְאָן אַתָּה הוֹלֵךְ, וְלִפְנֵי מִי אַתָּה עָתִיד לִתֵּן דִּין וְחֶשְׁבּוֹן. מֵאַיִן בָּאתָ, מִטִּפָּה סְרוּחָה, וּלְאָן אַתָּה הוֹלֵךְ, לִמְקוֹם עָפָר רִמָּה וְתוֹלֵעָה. וְלִפְנֵי מִי אַתָּה עָתִיד לִתֵּן דִּין וְחֶשְׁבּוֹן, לִפְנֵי מֶלֶךְ מַלְכֵי הַמְּלָכִים הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא:
(ב) רַבִּי חֲנִינָא סְגַן הַכֹּהֲנִים אוֹמֵר, הֱוֵי מִתְפַּלֵּל בִּשְׁלוֹמָהּ שֶׁל מַלְכוּת, שֶׁאִלְמָלֵא מוֹרָאָהּ, אִישׁ אֶת רֵעֵהוּ חַיִּים בְּלָעוֹ. רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶן תְּרַדְיוֹן אוֹמֵר, שְׁנַיִם שֶׁיּוֹשְׁבִין וְאֵין בֵּינֵיהֶן דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, הֲרֵי זֶה מוֹשַׁב לֵצִים, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (תהלים א) וּבְמוֹשַׁב לֵצִים לֹא יָשָׁב. אֲבָל שְׁנַיִם שֶׁיּוֹשְׁבִין וְיֵשׁ בֵּינֵיהֶם דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, שְׁכִינָה שְׁרוּיָה בֵינֵיהֶם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (מלאכי ג) אָז נִדְבְּרוּ יִרְאֵי יְיָ אִישׁ אֶל רֵעֵהוּ וַיַּקְשֵׁב יְיָ וַיִּשְׁמָע וַיִּכָּתֵב סֵפֶר זִכָּרוֹן לְפָנָיו לְיִרְאֵי יְיָ וּלְחֹשְׁבֵי שְׁמוֹ. אֵין לִי אֶלָּא שְׁנַיִם, מִנַּיִן שֶׁאֲפִלּוּ אֶחָד שֶׁיּוֹשֵׁב וְעוֹסֵק בַּתּוֹרָה, שֶׁהַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא קוֹבֵעַ לוֹ שָׂכָר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (איכה ג) יֵשֵׁב בָּדָד וְיִדֹּם כִּי נָטַל עָלָיו:
(ג) רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, שְׁלשָׁה שֶׁאָכְלוּ עַל שֻׁלְחָן אֶחָד וְלֹא אָמְרוּ עָלָיו דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, כְּאִלּוּ אָכְלוּ מִזִּבְחֵי מֵתִים, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה כח) כִּי כָּל שֻׁלְחָנוֹת מָלְאוּ קִיא צֹאָה בְּלִי מָקוֹם. אֲבָל שְׁלשָׁה שֶׁאָכְלוּ עַל שֻׁלְחָן אֶחָד וְאָמְרוּ עָלָיו דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, כְּאִלּוּ אָכְלוּ מִשֻּׁלְחָנוֹ שֶׁל מָקוֹם בָּרוּךְ הוּא, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (יחזקאל מא) וַיְדַבֵּר אֵלַי זֶה הַשֻּׁלְחָן אֲשֶׁר לִפְנֵי ה':
שלשה שאכלו וכו'. פירש במדרש שמואל בשם לב אבות. דנקיט שלשה. דבפסוק שהביא לראיה. שם מדבר ג"כ משלשה. והם החכם. והכהן. והנביא. והחסיד ז"ל נתן טעם למה שלשה כי שנים יתעסקו בדברים ויהיו נדונים כשוגגים. אבל כשהם שלשה היה להם לשלישי להזכירם. והרשב"ם כתב כי נקט שלשה לפי שסתם שלחן איכא שלשה לזימון. ע"כ:
(ד) רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶן חֲכִינַאי אוֹמֵר, הַנֵּעוֹר בַּלַּיְלָה וְהַמְהַלֵּךְ בַּדֶּרֶךְ יְחִידִי וְהַמְפַנֶּה לִבּוֹ לְבַטָּלָה, הֲרֵי זֶה מִתְחַיֵּב בְּנַפְשׁוֹ:
(ה) רַבִּי נְחוּנְיָא בֶּן הַקָּנָה אוֹמֵר, כָּל הַמְקַבֵּל עָלָיו עֹל תּוֹרָה, מַעֲבִירִין מִמֶּנּוּ עֹל מַלְכוּת וְעֹל דֶּרֶךְ אֶרֶץ. וְכָל הַפּוֹרֵק מִמֶּנּוּ עֹל תּוֹרָה, נוֹתְנִין עָלָיו עֹל מַלְכוּת וְעֹל דֶּרֶךְ אֶרֶץ:
(ו) רַבִּי חֲלַפְתָּא בֶן דּוֹסָא אִישׁ כְּפַר חֲנַנְיָה אוֹמֵר, עֲשָׂרָה שֶׁיּוֹשְׁבִין וְעוֹסְקִין בַּתּוֹרָה, שְׁכִינָה שְׁרוּיָה בֵינֵיהֶם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (תהלים פב) אֱלֹהִים נִצָּב בַּעֲדַת אֵל. וּמִנַּיִן אֲפִלּוּ חֲמִשָּׁה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (עמוס ט) וַאֲגֻדָּתוֹ עַל אֶרֶץ יְסָדָהּ. וּמִנַּיִן אֲפִלּוּ שְׁלשָׁה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (תהלים פב) בְּקֶרֶב אֱלֹהִים יִשְׁפֹּט. וּמִנַּיִן אֲפִלּוּ שְׁנַיִם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (מלאכי ג) אָז נִדְבְּרוּ יִרְאֵי ה' אִישׁ אֶל רֵעֵהוּ וַיַּקְשֵׁב ה' וַיִּשְׁמָע וְגוֹ'. וּמִנַּיִן אֲפִלּוּ אֶחָד, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כ) בְּכָל הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר אַזְכִּיר אֶת שְׁמִי אָבֹא אֵלֶיךָ וּבֵרַכְתִּיךָ:
(ז) רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אִישׁ בַּרְתּוֹתָא אוֹמֵר, תֶּן לוֹ מִשֶּׁלּוֹ, שֶׁאַתָּה וְשֶׁלְּךָ שֶׁלּוֹ. וְכֵן בְּדָוִד הוּא אוֹמֵר (דברי הימים א כט) כִּי מִמְּךָ הַכֹּל וּמִיָּדְךָ נָתַנּוּ לָךְ. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, הַמְהַלֵּךְ בַּדֶּרֶךְ וְשׁוֹנֶה, וּמַפְסִיק מִמִּשְׁנָתוֹ וְאוֹמֵר, מַה נָּאֶה אִילָן זֶה וּמַה נָּאֶה נִיר זֶה, מַעֲלֶה עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב כְּאִלּוּ מִתְחַיֵּב בְּנַפְשׁוֹ:
(ח) רַבִּי דּוֹסְתַּאי בְּרַבִּי יַנַּאי מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, כָּל הַשּׁוֹכֵחַ דָּבָר אֶחָד מִמִּשְׁנָתוֹ, מַעֲלֶה עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב כְּאִלּוּ מִתְחַיֵּב בְּנַפְשׁוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים ד) רַק הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ וּשְׁמֹר נַפְשְׁךָ מְאֹד פֶּן תִּשְׁכַּח אֶת הַדְּבָרִים אֲשֶׁר רָאוּ עֵינֶיךָ. יָכוֹל אֲפִלּוּ תָקְפָה עָלָיו מִשְׁנָתוֹ, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר (שם) וּפֶן יָסוּרוּ מִלְּבָבְךָ כֹּל יְמֵי חַיֶּיךָ, הָא אֵינוֹ מִתְחַיֵּב בְּנַפְשׁוֹ עַד שֶׁיֵּשֵׁב וִיסִירֵם מִלִּבּוֹ:
(ט) רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶן דּוֹסָא אוֹמֵר, כָּל שֶׁיִּרְאַת חֶטְאוֹ קוֹדֶמֶת לְחָכְמָתוֹ, חָכְמָתוֹ מִתְקַיֶּמֶת. וְכָל שֶׁחָכְמָתוֹ קוֹדֶמֶת לְיִרְאַת חֶטְאוֹ, אֵין חָכְמָתוֹ מִתְקַיֶּמֶת. הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר, כָּל שֶׁמַּעֲשָׂיו מְרֻבִּין מֵחָכְמָתוֹ, חָכְמָתוֹ מִתְקַיֶּמֶת. וְכָל שֶׁחָכְמָתוֹ מְרֻבָּה מִמַּעֲשָׂיו, אֵין חָכְמָתוֹ מִתְקַיֶּמֶת:
כל שיראת חטאו קודמת לחכמתו וכו'. כתב הר"ב שמקדים במחשבתו יראת חטאו לחכמתו וכו'. ובהכי מיתרץ דלא פליג אדהלל שאמר בפ' דלעיל משנה ה' אין בור ירא חטא. דהכא במחשבה קאמר ולא בפועל. שאין בור יודע איזהו חטא שיירא ממנו אבל במחשבה יכול לחשוב ולירא מכל דבר שיהיה חטא. ועיין לקמן משנה י"ז [ד"ה אם אין חכמה]. ובמד"ש מדייק רישא לסיפא דמדיוקא דרישא משמע שאם באו כאחת אין חכמתו מתקיימת. ומדיוקא דסיפא משמע דאם באו כאחת מתקיימת. ותירץ דהא אמרינן [נדה ע"ז:] שגוזרין עליו אם יהיה חכם או טפש. והשתא לא אמר כל שיראת חטאו וכו' אלא לבטל הגזירה ההיא. ואם יראת חטאו קודמת אפי' הגזירה שיהיה טפש מקיימין בידו חכמתו. כדאמרי' [במס' מגילה] [דף ו' ע"ב] לאוקמי גרסא סיעתא דשמיא ואם חכמתו קודם וכו' הואיל ולא למד ע"מ לעשות. הנה אע"פ שהגזירה שיהיה חכם מטפשין אותו ואין חכמת מתקיימת על העון אשר חטא שלא למד תורה לשמה דהיינו לשמור ולעשות [ותוכל להתקיים הגזירה בשאר עניניו שיהא חכם ולא בלמוד התורה כ"כ בבבא השניה] ואם באו שניהם כאחד מניחים אותו כפי טבעו כפי הגזירה שאם היא שיהיה חכם מתקיימת. ואם שיהיה טפש אינה מתקיימת. ע"כ. וכתב עוד דאית דגרסי כל שיראת חטאו קודמת לחכמתו חכמתו מתקיימת. וכל שאין יראת חטאו קודמת לחכמתו אין חכמתו מתקיימת ובדבור כל שחכמתו וכו' דוחה גרסא זו:
(י) הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר, כָּל שֶׁרוּחַ הַבְּרִיּוֹת נוֹחָה הֵימֶנּוּ, רוּחַ הַמָּקוֹם נוֹחָה הֵימֶנּוּ. וְכָל שֶׁאֵין רוּחַ הַבְּרִיּוֹת נוֹחָה הֵימֶנּוּ, אֵין רוּחַ הַמָּקוֹם נוֹחָה הֵימֶנּוּ. רַבִּי דוֹסָא בֶן הַרְכִּינַס אוֹמֵר, שֵׁנָה שֶׁל שַׁחֲרִית, וְיַיִן שֶׁל צָהֳרַיִם, וְשִׂיחַת הַיְלָדִים, וִישִׁיבַת בָּתֵּי כְנֵסִיּוֹת שֶׁל עַמֵּי הָאָרֶץ, מוֹצִיאִין אֶת הָאָדָם מִן הָעוֹלָם:
ויין של צהרים. פי' הר"ב מושך לבו של אדם וכו' כי בשחרית האדם הוא עצל מחמת השינה. ובערב כבר הוא יגע מבקש לנוח. ובצהרים האדם בכחו ביותר עד שהוא שמח לגמרי. דרך חיים:
(יא) רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הַמּוֹדָעִי אוֹמֵר, הַמְחַלֵּל אֶת הַקָּדָשִׁים, וְהַמְבַזֶּה אֶת הַמּוֹעֲדוֹת, וְהַמַּלְבִּין פְּנֵי חֲבֵרוֹ בָרַבִּים, וְהַמֵּפֵר בְּרִיתוֹ שֶׁל אַבְרָהָם אָבִינוּ עָלָיו הַשָּׁלוֹם, וְהַמְגַלֶּה פָנִים בַּתּוֹרָה שֶׁלֹּא כַהֲלָכָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּיָדוֹ תוֹרָה וּמַעֲשִׂים טוֹבִים, אֵין לוֹ חֵלֶק לָעוֹלָם הַבָּא:
והמלבין וכו'. כתב הר"ב המתבייש פניו מאדימות תחלה. וי"מ דגרסינן והמאדים במשנה. וכן נמצא במקצת פירוש רש"י:
(יב) רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר, הֱוֵי קַל לְרֹאשׁ, וְנוֹחַ לְתִשְׁחֹרֶת, וֶהֱוֵי מְקַבֵּל אֶת כָּל הָאָדָם בְּשִׂמְחָה:
(יג) רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר, שְׂחוֹק וְקַלּוּת רֹאשׁ, מַרְגִּילִין לְעֶרְוָה. מָסֹרֶת, סְיָג לַתּוֹרָה. מַעַשְׂרוֹת, סְיָג לָעשֶׁר. נְדָרִים, סְיָג לַפְּרִישׁוּת. סְיָג לַחָכְמָה, שְׁתִיקָה:
סייג לחכמה שתיקה. ולא אמר שתיקה סייג לחכמה כמו באינך. שכן דרך לשנות כך באחרון להודיע שהוא אחרון. כ"כ בדרך חיים. ובמד"ש כתב דשאני הא לפי שאין שום סייג לחכמה כי אם השתיקה בלבד. ולהכי תני סייג קודם. כלומר סייג החכמה אינה אלא שתיקה. משא"כ אינך דאע"ג שכל אחד סייג לאותו דבר. מ"מ יש לאותו דבר ג"כ סייג אחר מלבד זה:
(יד) הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר, חָבִיב אָדָם שֶׁנִּבְרָא בְצֶלֶם. חִבָּה יְתֵרָה נוֹדַעַת לוֹ שֶׁנִּבְרָא בְצֶלֶם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (בראשית ט) כִּי בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים עָשָׂה אֶת הָאָדָם. חֲבִיבִין יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנִּקְרְאוּ בָנִים לַמָּקוֹם. חִבָּה יְתֵרָה נוֹדַעַת לָהֶם שֶׁנִּקְרְאוּ בָנִים לַמָּקוֹם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים יד) בָּנִים אַתֶּם לַה' אֱלֹהֵיכֶם. חֲבִיבִין יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנִּתַּן לָהֶם כְּלִי חֶמְדָּה. חִבָּה יְתֵרָה נוֹדַעַת לָהֶם שֶׁנִּתַּן לָהֶם כְּלִי חֶמְדָּה שֶׁבּוֹ נִבְרָא הָעוֹלָם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (משלי ד) כִּי לֶקַח טוֹב נָתַתִּי לָכֶם, תּוֹרָתִי אַל תַּעֲזֹבוּ:
(טו) הַכֹּל צָפוּי, וְהָרְשׁוּת נְתוּנָה, וּבְטוֹב הָעוֹלָם נִדּוֹן. וְהַכֹּל לְפִי רֹב הַמַּעֲשֶׂה:
(טז) הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר, הַכֹּל נָתוּן בְּעֵרָבוֹן, וּמְצוּדָה פְרוּסָה עַל כָּל הַחַיִּים. הַחֲנוּת פְּתוּחָה, וְהַחֶנְוָנִי מֵקִיף, וְהַפִּנְקָס פָּתוּחַ, וְהַיָּד כּוֹתֶבֶת, וְכָל הָרוֹצֶה לִלְווֹת יָבֹא וְיִלְוֶה, וְהַגַּבָּאִים מַחֲזִירִים תָּדִיר בְּכָל יוֹם, וְנִפְרָעִין מִן הָאָדָם מִדַּעְתּוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתּוֹ, וְיֵשׁ לָהֶם עַל מַה שֶּׁיִּסְמֹכוּ, וְהַדִּין דִּין אֱמֶת, וְהַכֹּל מְתֻקָּן לַסְּעוּדָה:
(יז) רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה אוֹמֵר, אִם אֵין תּוֹרָה, אֵין דֶּרֶךְ אֶרֶץ. אִם אֵין דֶּרֶךְ אֶרֶץ, אֵין תּוֹרָה. אִם אֵין חָכְמָה, אֵין יִרְאָה. אִם אֵין יִרְאָה, אֵין חָכְמָה. אִם אֵין בִּינָה, אֵין דַּעַת. אִם אֵין דַּעַת, אֵין בִּינָה. אִם אֵין קֶמַח, אֵין תּוֹרָה. אִם אֵין תּוֹרָה, אֵין קֶמַח. הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר, כָּל שֶׁחָכְמָתוֹ מְרֻבָּה מִמַּעֲשָׂיו, לְמַה הוּא דוֹמֶה, לְאִילָן שֶׁעֲנָפָיו מְרֻבִּין וְשָׁרָשָׁיו מֻעָטִין, וְהָרוּחַ בָּאָה וְעוֹקַרְתּוֹ וְהוֹפַכְתּוֹ עַל פָּנָיו, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ירמיה יז) וְהָיָה כְּעַרְעָר בָּעֲרָבָה וְלֹא יִרְאֶה כִּי יָבוֹא טוֹב וְשָׁכַן חֲרֵרִים בַּמִּדְבָּר אֶרֶץ מְלֵחָה וְלֹא תֵשֵׁב. אֲבָל כָּל שֶׁמַּעֲשָׂיו מְרֻבִּין מֵחָכְמָתוֹ, לְמַה הוּא דוֹמֶה, לְאִילָן שֶׁעֲנָפָיו מֻעָטִין וְשָׁרָשָׁיו מְרֻבִּין, שֶׁאֲפִלּוּ כָל הָרוּחוֹת שֶׁבָּעוֹלָם בָּאוֹת וְנוֹשְׁבוֹת בּוֹ אֵין מְזִיזִין אוֹתוֹ מִמְּקוֹמוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שם) וְהָיָה כְּעֵץ שָׁתוּל עַל מַיִם וְעַל יוּבַל יְשַׁלַּח שָׁרָשָׁיו וְלֹא יִרְאֶה כִּי יָבֹא חֹם, וְהָיָה עָלֵהוּ רַעֲנָן, וּבִשְׁנַת בַּצֹּרֶת לֹא יִדְאָג, וְלֹא יָמִישׁ מֵעֲשׂוֹת פֶּרִי:
אם אין תורה אין דרך ארץ וכו'. פי' הר"ב דרך ארץ משאו ומתנו יפה וכו' ואם אין דרך ארץ סוף שתורתו משתכחת ממנו. ולא בא התנא לומר על קדימה ואיחור שצריך שיקדם האחד לחברו שאם אתה אומר כן אין גם אחד מהם (לא) יהיה במציאות. שאם אין האחד אלא א"כ שיקדם לו האחר. וכל אחד יש לו דין קדימה על חבירו נמצא שאי אפשר שימצא המאוחר בלא הקודם ושניהם מאוחרים נמצא ששניהם אינם נמצאים. ועוד שודאי שיש לדרך ארץ קדימה זמנית על התורה. וכמ"ש במ"ב פ"ב. אלא שכוונת התנא שאם אינו לומד אע"פ שנושא ונותן לא יהיה יפה עם הבריות. כי לא ידע כדת מה לעשות כענין חז"ל בפרק המניח (בבא קמא דף ל') האי מאן דבעי למיהוי חסידא לעיין במילי דנזקין וכן אם אין דרך ארץ כלומר שאינו נושא ונותן יפה וכו' סוף שתורתו משתכחת ממנו על העון אשר חטא שהוא מחלל שם שמים שאומרים אדם זה שלמד תורה כמה מקולקלין מעשיו [יומא דף פ"ו] וכו':
(יח) רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן חִסְמָא אוֹמֵר, קִנִּין וּפִתְחֵי נִדָּה, הֵן הֵן גּוּפֵי הֲלָכוֹת. תְּקוּפוֹת וְגִימַטְרִיאוֹת, פַּרְפְּרָאוֹת לַחָכְמָה:
(1) Akabyah ben Mahalalel said: mark well three things and you will not come into the power of sin: Know from where you come, and where you are going, and before whom you are destined to give an account and reckoning. From where do you come? From a putrid drop. Where are you going? To a place of dust, of worm and of maggot. Before whom you are destined to give an account and reckoning? Before the King of the kings of kings, the Holy One, blessed be he.
(2) Rabbi Hanina, the vice-high priest said: pray for the welfare of the government, for were it not for the fear it inspires, every man would swallow his neighbor alive. R. Hananiah ben Teradion said: if two sit together and there are no words of Torah [spoken] between them, then this is a session of scorners, as it is said: “nor sat he in the seat of the scornful…[rather, the teaching of the Lord is his delight]” (Psalms 1:1); but if two sit together and there are words of Torah [spoken] between them, then the Shekhinah abides among them, as it is said: “then they that feared the Lord spoke one with another; and the Lord hearkened and heard, and a book of remembrance was written before Him, for them that feared the Lord and that thought upon His name” (Malachi 3:16). Now I have no [scriptural proof for the presence of the Shekhinah] except [among] two, how [do we know] that even one who sits and studies Torah the Holy One, blessed be He, fixes his reward? As it is said: “though he sit alone and [meditate] in stillness, yet he takes [a reward] unto himself” (Lamentations 3:28).
(3) Rabbi Shimon said: if three have eaten at one table and have not spoken there words of Torah, [it is] as if they had eaten sacrifices [offered] to the dead, as it is said, “for all tables are full of filthy vomit, when the All-Present is absent” (Isaiah 28:8). But, if three have eaten at one table, and have spoken there words of Torah, [it is] as if they had eaten at the table of the All-Present, blessed be He, as it is said, “And He said unto me, ‘this is the table before the Lord’” (Ezekiel 41:22).
THREE THAT ATE, etc. Midrash Shmuel writes in the name of Lev Avot that the mishna chooses three because the verse quoted as proof is speaking of three people: the sage, the priest, and the prophet. Chasid Ya’avetz says that two might slip into idle discussions and will be seen as unintentional sinners, but when there are three of them, the third one should have said something. Rashbam says that the mishna chooses three because a normal table has the three people necessary for a zimun.
(4) Rabbi Hananiah ben Hakinai said: one who wakes up at night, or walks on the way alone and turns his heart to idle matters, behold, this man is mortally guilty.
(5) Rabbi Nehunia ben Hakkanah said: whoever takes upon himself the yoke of the Torah, they remove from him the yoke of government and the yoke of worldly concerns, and whoever breaks off from himself the yoke of the Torah, they place upon him the yoke of government and the yoke of worldly concerns.
(6) Rabbi Halafta of Kefar Hanania said: when ten sit together and occupy themselves with Torah, the Shechinah abides among them, as it is said: “God stands in the congregation of God” (Psalm 82:1). How do we know that the same is true even of five? As it is said: “This band of His He has established on earth” (Amos 9:6). How do we know that the same is true even of three? As it is said: “In the midst of the judges He judges” (Psalm 82:1) How do we know that the same is true even of two? As it is said: “Then they that fear the Lord spoke one with another, and the Lord hearkened, and heard” (Malachi 3:16). How do we know that the same is true even of one? As it is said: “In every place where I cause my name to be mentioned I will come unto you and bless you” (Exodus 20:21).
(7) Rabbi Elazar of Bartotha said: give to Him of that which is His, for you and that which is yours is His; and thus it says with regards to David: “for everything comes from You, and from Your own hand have we given you” (I Chronicles 29:14). Rabbi Jacob said: if one is studying while walking on the road and interrupts his study and says, “how fine is this tree!” [or] “how fine is this newly ploughed field!” scripture accounts it to him as if he was mortally guilty.
(8) Rabbi Dostai ben Rabbi Yannai said in the name of Rabbi Meir: whoever forgets one word of his study, scripture accounts it to him as if he were mortally guilty, as it is said, “But take utmost care and watch yourselves scrupulously, so that you do not forget the things that you saw with your own eyes” (Deuteronomy 4:9). One could [have inferred that this is the case] even when his study proved [too] hard for him, therefore scripture says, “that they do not fade from your mind as long as you live” (ibid.). Thus, he is not mortally guilty unless he deliberately removes them from his heart.
(9) Rabbi Hanina ben Dosa said: anyone whose fear of sin precedes his wisdom, his wisdom is enduring, but anyone whose wisdom precedes his fear of sin, his wisdom is not enduring. He [also] used to say: anyone whose deeds exceed his wisdom, his wisdom is enduring, but anyone whose wisdom exceeds his deeds, his wisdom is not enduring.
ANYONE WHOSE FEAR OF HEAVEN PRECEDES HIS LEARNING, ETC. Rav: I heard this explained as follows: one who thinks primarily of fear of Heaven over learning, in that he wants to study so that he come to fear of Heaven. If so, we can avoid a potential contradiction between this mishna and the mishna of Hillel who said in 2:5 that an unlearned person cannot be fearful of sin. For our mishna is discussing his intent, not his actual deeds, and while an unlearned person cannot know what is and isn’t a sin that he should fear it, he can determine his intent and generally fear whatever it is that might be a sin. Cf. mishna 17 [s.v. im ein chochma].
Midrash Shmuel points out the difficulty stemming from the two halves of this statement. For the first half implies that if they are at the same level his learning will not endure, whereas the second half implies that if they are at the same level his learning will endure. He answers by quoting the Talmud in Niddah 16b, that Heaven decrees whether a person will be a chacham104The word can mean either a generally intelligent and clever person or a person who is learned in addition. The latter meaning will be discussed first, but the former will come into play in Tosafot Yom Tov’s bracketed comment. or a tipesh.105A stupid or silly person. When our mishna says of one whose fear of heaven precedes his learning that his learning will endure it means that even if it was decreed that he be a fool, if his fear of heaven precedes his learning he can overcome that decree and G-d will cause his learning to endure, as per the Talmud in Megillah 6b: “to retain one’s learning requires the aid of heaven.” And if his learning precedes his fear of heaven, since he did not learn in order to do, even if it was decreed that he be a learned person G-d will make him into a fool and his learning will not endure on account of his sin, as he did not study the Torah with the proper intent of observing its laws. [He writes in his commentary to the second half of the mishna that the decree can be fulfilled in other areas in which he can be a chacham outside of Torah study.] If both are at the same level then whatever was decreed will come to pass, whether he was decreed to be a chacham or tipesh.
He also writes that there are versions that read: anyone whose fear of heaven precedes his learning, his learning will endure; anyone whose fear of heaven does not precede his learning, his learning will not endure. In his commentary to the next section of the mishna he rejects this version.
(10) He used to say: one with whom men are pleased, God is pleased. But anyone from whom men are displeased, God is displeased. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas said: morning sleep, midday wine, children’s talk and sitting in the assemblies of the ignorant put a man out of the world.
AND NOONTIME WINE. Rav: a person is drawn to it. This is because in the morning a person is still drowsy from his sleep and by evening he is exhausted and wishes to rest. But noontime a person is at the peak of his strength and achieves total happiness110Making it possible that this was the text Rashi had in Bava Kamma as well.—Maharal in Derech Chaim.
(11) Rabbi Elazar of Modiin said: one who profanes sacred things, and one who despises the festivals, and one who causes his fellow’s face to blush in public, and one who annuls the covenant of our father Abraham, may he rest in peace, and he who is contemptuous towards the Torah, even though he has to his credit [knowledge of the] Torah and good deeds, he has not a share in the world to come.
ONE WHO EMBARASSES [Heb. malbin—lit. “cause to turn white”]. Rav: the face of one who gets embarassed first turns red and then turns white. Some commentaries read ma’adim, “cause to turn red” in the mishna, a version which is found in some editions of Rashi’s commentary.
(12) Rabbi Ishmael said: be suppliant to a superior, submissive under compulsory service, and receive every man happily.
(13) Rabbi Akiva said:Merriment and frivolity accustom one to sexual licentiousness; Tradition is a fence to the Torah; Tithes a fence to wealth, Vows a fence to abstinence; A fence to wisdom is silence.
A FENCE FOR WISDOM IS SILENCE. The mishna does not say “silence is a fence for wisdom,” following the order of the other sections, because it often changes the language of the last item in a list to make clear that it is the last—Maharal in Derech Chaim. Midrash Shmuel writes that this case differs from the others in that there is no fence for wisdom other than silence, for which reason the mishna says “a fence for wisdom is silence,” i.e. the only fence for wisdom is silence. Whereas in the other cases, though the mishna gives a fence for each one, other fences might exist.
(14) He used to say: Beloved is man for he was created in the image [of God]. Especially beloved is he for it was made known to him that he had been created in the image [of God], as it is said: “for in the image of God He made man” (Genesis 9:6). Beloved are Israel in that they were called children to the All-Present. Especially beloved are they for it was made known to them that they are called children of the All-Present, as it is said: “your are children to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:1). Beloved are Israel in that a precious vessel was given to them. Especially beloved are they for it was made known to them that the desirable instrument, with which the world had been created, was given to them, as it is said: “for I give you good instruction; forsake not my teaching” (Proverbs 4:2).
(15) Everything is foreseen yet freedom of choice is granted, And the world is judged with goodness; And everything is in accordance with the preponderance of works.
(16) He used to say: everything is given against a pledge, and a net is spread out over all the living; the store is open and the storekeeper allows credit, but the ledger is open and the hand writes, and whoever wishes to borrow may come and borrow; but the collectors go round regularly every day and exact dues from man, either with his consent or without his consent, and they have that on which they [can] rely [in their claims], seeing that the judgment is a righteous judgment, and everything is prepared for the banquet.
(17) Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said: Where there is no Torah, there is no right conduct; where there is no right conduct, there is no Torah. Where there is no wisdom there is no fear of God; where there is no fear of God, there is no wisdom. Where there is no understanding, there is no knowledge; where there is no knowledge, there is no understanding. Where there is no bread, there is no Torah; where there is no, Torah there is no bread. He used to say: one whose wisdom exceeds his deeds, to what may he be compared? To a tree whose branches are numerous but whose roots are few, so that when the wind comes, it uproots it and overturns it, as it is said, “He shall be like a bush in the desert, which does not sense the coming of good. It is set in the scorched places of the wilderness, in a barren land without inhabitant” (Jeremiah 17:6). But one whose deeds exceed his wisdom, to what may he be compared? To a tree whose branches are few but roots are many, so that even if all the winds in the world come and blow upon it, they cannot move it out of its place, as it is said, “He shall be like a tree planted by waters, sending forth its roots by a stream. It does not sense the coming of heat, its leaves are ever fresh. It has no care in a year of drought; it does not cease to yield fruit” (ibid, 17:8).
IF THERE IS NO TORAH, THERE IS NO DERECH ERETZ, ETC. Rav explains derech eretz as proper business dealings with others. He writes: one who has no derech eretz eventually forgets his Torah. The tanna does not mean to say that one is a prerequisite for the other and must precede it in time, for if so neither would exist. For if each requires the other to exist first for its own existence, since they cannot both be first neither would come into being. And besides, derech eretz certainly must precede Torah chronologically, as I wrote on 2:2. The tanna simply means that if one does not study Torah, when he does business he won’t deal properly with others because he will not know what to do, along the lines of what the Sages said in the Talmud, Bava Kamma 30a: “one who wishes to be pious should study the laws of torts and commerce.” Similarly, one who does not do business properly with others will eventually forget his Torah for the sin of profaning G-d’s name, as people will say “Look at this Torah scholar and how disgusting his behavior is!” [Yoma 86a.]
(18) Rabbi Eliezer Hisma said: the laws of mixed bird offerings and the key to the calculations of menstruation days these, these are the body of the halakhah. The calculation of the equinoxes and gematria are the desserts of wisdom.