Zoom Minyan on Shabbat 2 - Technology

Section one addressed the prohibitions associated with the use of electricity to generate heat and light. This section surveys the halachic issues involved in the use of electricity when there is no apparent generation of (and no intent to create) light and heat. The consensus of halachic opinion maintains that it is typically prohibited to turn on electrical appliances on Shabbat. However, a clear understanding has yet to emerge regarding why such a prohibition exists; indeed, one eminent authority maintains that the use of electrical appliances is only prohibited because of tradition. Seven reasons have been advanced to prohibit the use of electrical appliances on Shabbat.¹⁹ The first six reasons are summarized as follows:
1. Turning on an appliance is analogous to creating something new (molid) which is prohibited on Shabbat.
2. Completion of a circuit is prohibited because it is a form of building (boneh).
3. Turning on an appliance violates the prohibition of ma'keh bepatish (completing a product).
4. Completion of a circuit must kindle sparks and therefore is prohibited because it creates a flame.
5. The use of any electrical current leads to an increase in fuel consumption at the power station, which is prohibited.
6. Heating of a metal transistor or wire, even when no visible light is emitted, is prohibited because of cooking or burning.
These first six possible bases for prohibiting the use of electrical appliances on Shabbat divide into two groups. The first four relate to the completion of a circuit which causes current to flow.²⁰ the final two locate the source of the prohibition in running (and not turning on) the appliance. If each of these prohibitions were to be found inapplicable, then only the following reason would remain:
7. The use of electricity without light or heat is actually permitted, but because observant Jews since the invention of electricity have maintained that it is prohibited to use electrical appliances on Shabbat, and rabbinic authorities approved of this stricture, it is prohibited to use such appliances - absent great need - because of tradition.
Each of the six possibilities requires detailed analysis.²¹
While it is beyond the scope of a survey article to convey the full force of the complete halachic dialogue among the various authorities, an effort has been made to present, along with each opinion, some of the Talmudic proofs and some of the questions raised in opposition to each reason.
The possibility that the use of electricity on Shabbat violates the prohibition of molid was first suggested by Rabbi Yitzchak Schmelkes (Beit Yitzchak 2:31). Rabbi Schmelkes states that just as the Sages forbade creating a new fragrant scent in one's clothes on Shabbat, molid reicha (Beitza 23a) - an action which Rashi explains was prohibited because "one who creates something new is almost as one who performs a biblically forbidden act" - so too they forbade creating anything new on Shabbat, including appliances made "new" through the use of electricity or the creation of a current flow. Thus, he states, creating a current flow (molid zerem) is rabbinically forbidden because in doing so one has created something new - a functioning appliance.
Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and many others²² disagree with Rabbi Schmelkes' thesis. Essentially these authorities state that Rabbi Schmelkes' theory must be wrong because any creative act which is routinely done and undone throughout the day cannot be included in the rabbinic prohibition of creating something new. Moreover, there are many examples of "new creations" which were not prohibited by the Sages. Merely because creating a new fragrance is prohibited does not imply that all new "creation" is prohibited on Shabbat. Rabbi Auerbach insists that only a limited number of actions were prohibited in the Talmud because of molid, and one may not extrapolate from these limited examples that creating anything else new (like electrical current) is rabbinically prohibited.
A proof to this can be found in a responsum of the Chacham Zvi (#92), which limits the prohibition of molid to the application of a fragrance to one's clothes. However, he permits one to apply fragrance to many things other than clothes. In addition, Rabbi Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo p. 74) provides numerous examples of new "creative actions" which the rabbis never forbade.
The second possible basis for prohibiting the use of electricity can be found first in the works of Rabbi Abraham Isaiah Karelitz, commonly referred to by the name of his magnum opus, Chazon Ish.²³ He states that it is likely that completion of a live circuit constitutes a forbidden act of building (boneh) on Shabbat. He reasons that completing a circuit renders a previously useless wire into a functional wire, and this is analogous to competing a building or wall. In addition, completing a circuit is analogous to assembling an appliance composed of numerous parts - which halacha defines as building - and is thus prohibited on Shabbat.
The Chazon Ish's position has aroused great debate among halachic scholars. The most vigorous and thorough critique of this position is found in the eleventh chapter of Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach's work, the Minchat Shlomo. While Rabbi Auerbach advances numerous critiques of the Chazon Ish's position, the most crucial aspect of his criticism is that opening a circuit which is designed to be opened and closed routinely cannot be considered an act of building or destroying.²⁴ Closing a circuit is analogous to closing a door - an action which the halacha does not consider to be "building" since the door is intended to be opened and closed constantly.²⁵
The overwhelming majority of halachic decisors appears to side with Rabbi Auerbach. As the Encyclopedia Talmudit (18:166) states:
From the writing of numerous achronim it appears that turning on an electrical circuit does not violate the prohibition of fixing an object [metaken mana and ma'keh bepatish] or building [boneh].²⁶
Nevertheless, at the very least halachic authorities do take into consideration the opinion of the Chazon Ish on this issue when rendering decisions regarding electricity.²⁷
Some authorities believe that causing an electrical appliance to work is a biblical violation of ma'keh bepatish²⁸ (literally "the final blow of the hammer" but generally understood to mean the final act in finishing any product and making it useful²⁹). These authorities cite as precedent those who prohibited winding a watch for this reason.³⁰ Purely by analogy, these authorities argue that since an electrical appliance is useless before electricity is added to it, the introduction of electric current causes it to become a useful piece of equipment, and is therefore prohibited because of ma'keh bepatish.
Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo pp. 69-73) and Rabbi Yaakov Breisch (Chelkat Yaakov 1:53) strongly disagree. They argue that since an appliance is designed to be frequently turned on and off, that action cannot be categorized as ma'keh bepatish. Moreover, they state that it is accepted that an action is considered to be ma'keh bepatish only when that final act is permanent or involves great effort. But, since one does not ordinarily intend to turn on an appliance permanently and since turning on an appliance does not involve great effort, this action cannot be considered as violating ma'keh bepatish. The majority of authorities agree that ma'keh bepatish cannot be the source of the prohibition to turn on electrical appliances.³¹
The fourth reason advanced to prohibit turning on appliances during Shabbat is that the mechanical switching on or off of an electrical circuit generates sparks.³² As a general rule, the creation of sparks is forbidden under the rubric of the rabbinic prohibition against producing sparks from wood or stones. Numerous authorities maintain that an electrical appliance that generates sparks is thus prohibited.³³
A number of factors, however, indicate that this prohibition is inapplicable to the sparks created by turning mechanical switches on or off. First, these sparks are created unintentionally (davar she'eino mitkaven), and no prohibition exists when there is no intent to perform an action on Shabbat and that action might not occur.³⁴ Second, since these sparks are so small that one cannot detect any heat when touching them, and typically they are not visible, it is possible that these sparks should not be considered fire.³³ Additionally, the advent of solid state technology³⁶ and sparkless (arcless) switches frequently makes this issue technologically moot. Thus, Rabbi Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo pp.86-87) states "practically (lehalacha) there isn't even a rabbinic prohibition in the unintentional creation of sparks."
Another possible problem is raised by the author of Chashmal Leor Halacha (2:6). He writes that completing a circuit and causing a current flow sometimes causes additional fuel to be consumed by the power station as a result of the increased need for electricity. Causing additional fuel to be consumed perhaps is to be considered in the category of burning which is forbidden on a biblical level. Thus, it might be prohibited to draw increased current on Shabbat.
Rabbi Auerbach (quoted in Shmirat Shabbat Kehilchata 1:23 n. 137) disagrees.³⁷ First, one is only indirectly causing increased fuel consumption (grama). More significantly, greater fuel consumption is not inevitable or even likely when one turns on one appliance, because statistically it is likely that at that very moment, someone elsewhere has turned off an electrical appliance, thereby elimination the need for increased electric output. Finally, outside Israel the power plants are operated by gentiles (if they are not fully automated), and hence the prohibition would only be in directing a non-Jew to violate the Shabbat, which is only a rabbinic prohibition.
One other possible prohibition is raised by the Chazon Ish.³⁸ He states that when the current passing through a wire raises the wire's temperature above the temperature at which a human hand pulls away because of the heat (yad soledet bo),³⁹ it is considered to be an act of "cooking" (bishul) and thus prohibited. The Chazon Ish states that this "cooking" is prohibited even though the person who turns on the appliance is unaware that it is occurring and does not intend that there be any "cooking."
Rabbi Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo, p. 107) disagrees and states that a metal wire can only be "cooked" when one intends to soften (or temper) the metal and it glows. Although the wire is lightly softened, once the electricity is extinguished the wire immediately returns to its original state. In addition, one who turns on an appliance has no intention to soften the wires; hence this action can not be defines as "cooking" from the perspective of halacha.⁴⁰
Additionally, in the last twenty years, solid state technology has become dominant, and fewer and fewer appliances have wires that are heated (vacuum tubes), thus making this argument factually obsolete.
Rabbi Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo 74, 84), after rejecting all the potential sources discussed above for prohibiting the use of electricity when no light or heat is generated, concludes that, at least in theory, electrical appliances that use no heat or light (e.g., a fan) are permitted on Shabbat and Yom Tov. However, he declines actually to permit their use absent urgent need. He states:
In my opinion there is no prohibition [to use electricity] on Shabbat or Yom Tov... There is no prohibition of ma'keh bepatish or molid... (However, I [Rabbi Auerbach] am afraid that the masses will err and turn on incandescent lights on Shabbat, and thus I do not permit electricity absent great need...) ... This matter requires further analysis.
* * * *
However, the key point in my opinion is that there is no prohibition to use electricity on Shabbat unless the electricity causes a prohibited act like cooking or starting a flame.
Rabbi Auerbach additionally states that since the tradition forbids the use of electricity, and this tradition received near unanimous approval from rabbinic authorities in the normal course of events observant Jews should accept this tradition (even though he feels it is based on incorrect premises) and operate under the presumption that the use of electricity without light or heat is a violation, of rabbinic origin, based on molid.⁴¹ Only in the case of urgent need does he allow one to rely on his opinion that electricity is permitted where no heat or light is generated.
In cases of urgent need it is possible to accept Rabbi Shmelkes' ruling that electricity is prohibited as a form of creating something new (molid) as correct, and perhaps still use electrical appliances. For example, in a recent work, Shealot Uteshuvot Merosh Tzurim pp. 501-509, Rabbi Shmuel David was asked by kibbutz members if it was permitted to use a telephone on Shabbat to call a veterinarian for advice on a mysterious plague that had struck the chicken coop. This plague was so devastating that it would destroy nearly all of the animals if professional help were not received. Furthermore, these chickens were a significant source of financial support to the kibbutz. Rabbi David ruled that it was permitted to use the telephone if it was used in an unusual manner. He reasoned that in all likelihood, Rabbi Auerbach is correct and no prohibition is violated, and even if the Beit Yitzchak is correct, in cases of great need (perhaps even great financial need, and certainly physical need), since this case involved suffering to living creatures (tza'ar ba'alei chaim), rabbinic prohibitions when done in an unusual manner may be violated.⁴²
So, too, when one is forced to choose between prohibited actions, it is appropriate to realize that the consensus is that electricity without light and heat is a rabbinic and not a biblical violation. For example, if one has to bring a person to the hospital on Shabbat, it is unquestionably preferable to call a taxi (for a gentile driver) by telephone, which most consider only a rabbinic violation (see section IV:b), than to drive there oneself (which is unquestionably a biblical violation), if the few minutes differential in time are irrelevant.

THE USE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC DEVICES ON SHABBAT
Rabbi Daniel S. Nevins - Committee on Jewish Law and Standards Approved by the CJLS on May 31, 2012
By a vote of 17 in favor, 2 opposed and two abstaining. In favor: Rabbis David Hoffman, Amy Levin, Aaron Alexander, David Booth, Miriam Berkowitz, Adam Kligfeld, Jonathan Lubliner, Jeremy Kalmanofsky, Gail Labovitz, Baruch Frydman-Kohl, Elliot Dorff, Jane Kanarek, Steven Wernick, Joshua Heller, Pamela Barmash, Reuven Hammer and Daniel Nevins. Opposed: Rabbis Avram Reisner, Elie Kaplan-Spitz. Abstaining: Rabbis Paul Plotkin and Susan Grossman.
We agree with the arguments made by Rabbis Tucker, Dorff and Rabinowitz in the 1980s that recording audio and video on magnetic tape is to be considered forbidden on Shabbat under the category of “writing” unless the process was set up before Shabbat to operate automatically. The same is true for the use of contemporary digital storage media such as hard drives and flash memory. This is also true for “cloud computing,” since in the end the data will be stored in some non‐volatile device. In this discussion Rabbi Rabinowitz made the same comparison used by Rabbi Feinstein regarding microwave ovens: the purpose of cooking is to transform food from a raw to an edible state; the purpose of writing is to store information for later recall. What matters is not the process but the purpose and the result. However, we would clarify that the process does matter somewhat—writing to digital memory can be considered “toledat koteiv,” a derivative form of writing rather than the original form or av. As such it remains biblically prohibited on Shabbat, but other concerns about writing and erasing divine names on digital displays and memory media are not involved. Digital writing performs the same function as conventional writing, though the process is different. As seen above in the discussion of cooking, an activity which shares the same purpose and result as a primary form of melakhah but via a different process is viewed as a toledah, a derivative form of the labor. This differentiation is significant, since the category of writing has other halakhic ramifications. If we were to consider “writing” to digital memory or to a video display to be the exact equivalent of the av of “writing,” then we would never be allowed to “erase” a screen view or digital file which contains one of the divine names. The CJLS has already approved Rabbi Avram I. Reisner’s arguments against considering such erasures to be forbidden.156 For our purposes then, the issue is whether “writing” with electronic devices is the functional equivalent of writing with pen and ink; if so, then it is forbidden as a toledah, a derivative form of the activity called כותב” ,writing,” just as watering plants is forbidden as a derivative form of זורע” planting,” and using a microwave oven is forbidden as a derivative form of בישול” cooking.” Although “writing” is associated with letters and numbers, this creative labor equally applies to recording imagery, sound and other types of data. Rabbi Joel Roth has written, “If the function of writing is appropriately defined as the production of a lasting imprint upon some substance, it seems virtually incontrovertible that the function of photography would have to be considered forbidden under the category of writing.”157 As with Rabbi Feinstein regarding cooking, we find Rabbi Roth’s conclusions about writing to be convincing.

Streaming Services on Shabbat and Yom Tov Rabbi Joshua Heller
Approved on May 13, 2020, by a vote of 19-3-3. Voting in favor: Rabbis Aaron Alexander, Jaymee Alpert, Suzanne Brody, Nate Crane, Elliot Dorff, David Fine, Susan Grossman, Judith Hauptman, Joshua Heller, David Hoffman, Jeremy Kalmanofsky, Steven Kane, Jan Kaufman, Daniel Nevins, Micah Peltz, Robert Scheinberg, Deborah Silver, Iscah Waldman, and Ellen Wolintz-Fields. Voting Against: Rabbis Amy Levin, Avram Reisner, and David Schuck. Abstaining: Rabbis Pamela Barmash, David Booth, and Ariel Stofenmacher.
P’sak
A. This is an unprecedented time in our Jewish tradition. Gathering together in person for prayer is one of our critical practices. This paper reflects a particular transitional moment, as we look ahead from a present when in person communal prayer is impossible, to a near future when it will be possible for small groups only, with many still being excluded. Some congregations will find creative ways to serve the needs of their communities during this time while keeping Shabbat and Yom Tov screen free, and this is to be commended. Other communities will conclude that the wellbeing of their communities and their members depends on offering communal worship during holy times, with electronic transmission being the only means to do so safely, particularly on the High Holidays. After the current crisis is over, some of the leniencies discussed here may no longer apply, but there will still be real human needs and demands to be met through electronic access to ritual.
B. Within the following parameters, it is permissible for a community to offer a stream or interactive videoconference of its services on Shabbat and/or Yom Tov:
1. The equipment must be set up to be running before the holy day, or operate on a timer.
2. While a non-Jewish employee may (and probably should) be assigned to handle potential technical glitches, it is strongly preferable to choose a streaming solution which is always on, or which activates automatically at a set time, over one which must be activated manually, even if a non-Jew is designated in advance to do so.
3. If a minyan is present in one place, one who is located elsewhere who accesses that minyan through video link and prays along may fulfill their obligations to pray as well as any other ritual mitzvot that are part of synagogue ritual, including hearing Torah reading, and dukhening.
4. If, due to the pandemic, 10 Jews cannot gather in a single physical location, then the options for participation would be the same as those permitted to such a group during the week by CJLS rulings. For some congregations, this would mean that no items requiring a minyan would be included. Congregations that rely on the temporary “Zoom ruling” to include items requiring a minyan would have to use a multi-way link that allowed participants to see and hear each other.
5. While under normal circumstances, it is preferred to provide an opportunity for each person to hear the shofar directly, if it is not possible (or safe) to do so, then those listening remotely should hear the shofar through remote means.
6. If the stream is not live, viewers may still use it to guide their own prayer and study, but may not fulfill obligations by responding amen, or rely on the 10 Jews pictured in the video to constitute a minyan.
C. The video feed should be accessed by viewers/participants in a way that does not involve their direct interaction with an electronic device. This may be accomplished by leaving the stream on from before the holy day, by using the equivalent of a timer, or by arranging in advance for a non-Jewish person to activate the stream.
1. Some have suggested using a technical solution which requires people to access the feed before Shabbat, and locks further access on Shabbat itself, but this may have the side effect of excluding those who are accessing the feed through a timer. In any case, there is more leniency to activate the stream in a more direct way for a person who has an illness or disability.
2. If the stream turns on automatically on Shabbat, or can be accessed by logging in on Shabbat, it must be configured so that it is at least possible for users who are accessing via a timer to do so without further interaction with the device. Joshua Heller, Streaming Services on Shabbat and Yom Tov
D. We must educate our communities as to the meaning of Shabbat observance, and offer guidance how to participate in ways that do not violate Shabbat. Still, we must be realistic that these video links will also be accessed by those who choose to do so in a way that is not be respectful of the letter or spirit of hilkhot shabbat. This fact does not prohibit offering the stream, but does mandate that synagogues that offer a stream to do so in a way that minimizes the types of violations that might be committed by users accessing it, in particular by eliminating the need for any typing. This could be done by allowing access through a simple link, or allowing a password to be typed before Shabbat.
E. Every effort must be made to provide those participating via video with a copy of the siddur/humash in a physical format, or to encourage them to download and print out before Shabbat so that they do not have to make further use of a device on Shabbat or Yom Tov. While it is technically possible to share the words of the siddur or other texts on the screen, it is difficult to do this in a way which is easy to read and also fully compliant with the letter and spirit of Shabbat.
F. Initiating a recording on Shabbat is a violation of Shabbat. Individual rabbis must use discretion in determining whether it would be appropriate to configure a device before shabbat to record on shabbat for download after shabbat. Communities should be guided by their previous policy on recording the service. Some might choose to follow the reasoning of Rabbi Lincoln and others in forbidding a recording at all. However, since technology makes it easy for recording to be set on a timer or “always on,” (or, indeed, with some systems is impossible to disable the recording feature, only to discard the recording after the fact) a mara d’atra might choose to enable recording if it is set up in advance and the recording process does not require intervention on Shabbat.
G. These same principles would apply to other ritual activities taking place outside the prayer context (individuals joining for seder, tikkun layl Shavuot or other study). Communities should consider carefully which streamed activities must take place on Shabbat or Yom Tov, and which might just as appropriately be pushed off to another day.
H. Offering many types of activities that were previously only face-to-face, via one-way or twoway video, is a trend that is unlikely to be reversed. It is the nature of these offerings that even if they are not available in one local community, Jews will take advantage of them from elsewhere. There is reason to believe that making services available via these means can actually increase engagement and accessibility with local communities, but care must be taken that doing so does not disrupt the decorum of the service itself.
I. The wider intrusion of technology into Shabbat and Yom Tov worship will require greater fences to preserve the sanctity of the day. It is a short step from watching services to emailing, online shopping, and other activities which violate the letter and spirit of the law. Simple solutions, like covering one’s keyboard or setting “do not disturb,” will be valuable, but will not suffice. Serious communal efforts, perhaps including newly created rituals carried out on the eve of Shabbat that demarcate tolerated from unwelcome technology, will be required to maintain the sanctity of holy time in the face of unprecedented pressures