Bava Kamma color-coded

MISHNA: There are four primary categories of damage: The category of Ox; and the category of Pit; and the category of Maveh, which, based on a discussion in the Gemara refers either to the tooth of an animal that causes damage or to a person who causes damage; and the category of Fire. Each of these categories is unique; therefore, the halakhot of one cannot be derived from another. The defining characteristic of the primary category of Ox is not similar to the defining characteristic of the primary category of Maveh, and the defining characteristic of the primary category of Maveh is not similar to the defining characteristic of the primary category of Ox. And the defining characteristics of this category of Ox and that category of Maveh, in which there is a living spirit that causes damage, are not similar to the defining characteristic of the category of Fire, in which there is no living spirit. The mishna continues: And the defining characteristics of this primary category of Ox and Maveh and that primary category of Fire, in which the typical manner of their components is to proceed from one place to another and cause damage, are not similar to the defining characteristic of the primary category of Pit, in which the typical manner of its components is not to proceed from one place to another and cause damage; rather, it remains in place and the damage is caused by the injured party proceeding and encountering the obstacle. The common denominator of the components in all of these primary categories is that it is their typical manner to cause damage, and the responsibility for their safeguarding to prevent them from causing damage is incumbent upon you, the owner of the animal or generator of the fire or the pit. And when a component of any of these categories causes damage, the owner or generator of the component that caused the damage is obligated to pay restitution for damage with best-quality land. GEMARA: From the fact that the mishna teaches its ruling employing the term: Primary categories, by inference, there are subcategories of those primary categories. The Gemara asks: Are their subcategories similar to them, i.e., to their respective primary categories, so that the same halakhot apply to them, or are they dissimilar to them? The Gemara cites additional areas of halakha where there are primary categories and subcategories and considers the relationship between them: With regard to Shabbat we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 73a): The primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat number forty-less-one. There too, from the fact that the mishna teaches its ruling employing the term: Primary categories, by inference, there are also subcategories. With regard to the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat, their subcategories are similar to them, as it is no different if one unwittingly performed labor that is a primary category, for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and it is no different if one unwittingly performed labor that is a subcategory, for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Likewise, it is no different if one intentionally performed labor that is a primary category, for which he is liable to be executed by stoning, and it is no different if one intentionally performed labor that is a subcategory, for which he is liable to be executed by stoning. And what difference is there between a primary category and a subcategory? The Gemara explains: The practical difference is that if one unwittingly performs two labors classified as different primary categories together, during a single lapse of awareness, or, alternatively, if one unwittingly performs two labors classified as subcategories of two different primary categories together, during a single lapse of awareness, one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every labor that he performed. Each primary category of labor is an independent transgression. While if one unwittingly performs a labor that is a primary category and another labor classified as its subcategory during a single lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Eliezer, who deems one liable to bring two sin-offerings even if one performs a labor classified as a subcategory together with a labor that is its primary category, why is one labor characterized as a primary category and why is the other labor characterized as a subcategory? The Gemara explains: Of the labors prohibited on Shabbat, that which was a significant labor in the Tabernacle, the Sages characterized it as a primary category, and that which was not a significant labor in the Tabernacle, the Sages characterized it as a subcategory. The labors prohibited on Shabbat are derived from the labors employed in the construction of the Tabernacle; therefore, their classification is also based on their significance in its construction. With regard to ritual impurities, we learned in the mishna (Kelim 1:1): The primary categories of ritual impurity are as follows: Any of the eight species of the creeping animal enumerated in the Torah (Leviticus 11:29–30), and semen, and one who is impure with impurity imparted by a human corpse. A person, a vessel, or food that is rendered impure through contact with an item classified as a primary category of ritual impurity is characterized as a subcategory. In that domain, their subcategories are dissimilar to them, as any person or item classified as a primary category of ritual impurity impurifies a person and impurifies any vessels with which it comes into contact, while a person or item classified as a subcategory of ritual impurity impurifies food or drink, but does not impurify a person or vessels. After determining that there are instances where the legal status of subcategories is like that of primary categories, e.g., Shabbat, and there are instances where the legal status of subcategories is dissimilar to that of primary categories, e.g., ritual impurity, the Gemara asks: Here, with regard to the laws of damages, what is the relationship between the primary categories and their subcategories? Rav Pappa said: There are, among the primary categories of damage, some whose subcategories are similar to them, and there are, among them, some whose subcategories are dissimilar to them. § Seeking to clarify Rav Pappa’s statement, the Gemara cites a baraita that delineates the primary categories of damage. The Sages taught in a baraita: Three primary categories of damage were stated in the Torah with regard to an ox. An ox causes damage in three ways, and each is classified as a distinct primary category of damage represented by a part of the body of the ox: There is the category of Goring [keren], literally, horn. This is referring to an ox goring a person or an animal and causing damage. And there is the category of Eating [shen], literally, tooth. This is referring to one’s ox causing damage by consuming another person’s produce. And there is the category of Trampling [regel], literally, foot. This is referring to an ox trampling another person’s belongings and causing damage. These are classified as primary categories because they are mentioned explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara elaborates: From where do we derive the primary category of Goring? The source is as the Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And if an ox gores a man or a woman” (Exodus 21:28); and goring is performed only with a horn, as it is stated: “And Zedekiah, son of Chenaanah, made himself horns of iron, and said: So says the Lord: With these shall you gore the Arameans, until they are consumed” (I Kings 22:11). And the verse also states: “His firstborn bull, majesty is his, and his horns are the horns of the wild ox; with them he shall gore the nations” (Deuteronomy 33:17). The Gemara interrupts its citation of the baraita and asks: What is the purpose of citing the additional verse introduced with the term: And the verse also states? The Gemara answers: And if you would say that the first verse cited is not a legitimate source as it is a verse from the Prophets, and we do not derive Torah matters from the texts of the tradition, i.e., Prophets and Writings, come and hear proof from the Torah: “His firstborn bull, majesty is his.” The Gemara rejects the possibility that the reason a second verse was cited is that the primary category of Goring cannot be derived from a verse in the Prophets: But is this a halakhic derivation? It is a mere disclosure of the matter, that goring is performed with a horn. A verse in the Prophets can certainly serve as a source for that disclosure. Rather, the reason the baraita cites a second verse is lest you say, based on the first verse, that when the Merciful One distinguishes between liability for damage caused by an innocuous ox, for which the owner is liable to pay half of the damages for the first three times that it gores, and liability for damage caused by a forewarned ox, which already gored three times and whose owner was cautioned to prevent the ox from goring, for which he is liable to pay the full damages, that statement applies only to damage caused with a detached horn, like the horn of Zedekiah described in the verse, e.g., if an animal held a detached horn in its mouth and caused damage with it; but for damage that an ox caused with a horn attached to its head, say that in all cases the legal status of the ox is that of a forewarned ox and its owner is liable to pay for all of the damage. Therefore, the baraita says: Come and hear a proof from another verse: “His firstborn bull, majesty is his, and his horns are the horns of the wild ox; with them he shall gore the nations,” where the reference is to a horn attached to the ox’s head. Evidently, when an ox gores with its own horns there is a distinction between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox. The Gemara resumes its citation of the baraita: What is a subcategory of Goring? It includes any action that an ox performs with its body with the objective of inflicting damage: Pushing [negifa], biting, crouching upon items with the objective of inflicting damage, and kicking. The Gemara asks: What is different about goring that it is characterized as a primary category of damage, as it is written explicitly in the verse: “And if an ox gores a man or a woman” (Exodus 21:28); accordingly, negifa should also be characterized as a primary category, as it is written: “If one man’s ox hurts [yiggof ] the ox of another” (Exodus 21:35)? The Gemara answers: This negifa mentioned in the verse, is actually a reference to goring, as it is taught in a baraita that the verses states: “And if one man’s ox hurts [yiggof ] the ox of another…or if it is known that the ox was a goring ox in time past” (Exodus 21:35–36). The verse began its description of the case with the term negifa and it concluded with the term goring to say to you that in this context the two terms describe the same action: This action is negifa and this same action is goring. The Gemara asks: If the two terms are interchangeable, what is different with regard to an ox goring a person that it is written: “And if an ox gores a man or a woman” (Exodus 21:28), and what is different with regard to an ox goring an animal that it is written: “If one man’s ox hurts [yiggof ] the ox of another” (Exodus 21:35)? The Gemara explains: With regard to a person, who has the ingenuity to defend himself and is not easily injured, it is written: “If an ox gores,” a term indicating an attack of greater force. With regard to an animal, which does not have the ingenuity to defend itself and is more easily injured, it is written: “If an ox hurts [yiggof ],” a term indicating an attack of lesser force. The term yiggof is related to the term magefa, meaning plague. The Torah employs that term with regard to the goring of an animal to indicate that when an animal is gored, regardless of the force of the blow, it will likely result in its death. And the Torah’s use of these terms teaches us a matter in passing: Because the effort required for the ox to gore a person to death is greater than the effort required for the ox to gore an animal to death, the halakha is that an ox that is forewarned with regard to goring a person is also forewarned with regard to an animal. But an ox that is forewarned with regard to an animal is not forewarned with regard to a person. The Gemara questions the classification in the baraita of biting, crouching, and kicking as subcategories of Goring: Isn’t biting a subcategory of Eating, as the animal both eats and bites with its teeth? The Gemara answers: No, in cases included in the primary category of Eating, there is pleasure for the animal in the course of its causing damage. In this case of damage caused by biting, there is no intrinsic pleasure for the animal in the course of the damage that it causes, as when the ox bites forcefully, the exclusive objective of the action is to cause damage. The Gemara asks: Aren’t crouching upon items and kicking items in order to damage them each a subcategory of Trampling, as the animal crouches by bending its legs and kicks with its feet? The Gemara answers: No, in cases included in the primary category of Trampling, the damage is commonplace, as it is caused in the course of the animal’s walking; in these cases of crouching and kicking, the damage is not commonplace, as animals do not typically kick or crouch upon utensils. After citing the subcategories listed in the baraita, the Gemara resumes its analysis of the statement of Rav Pappa: But with regard to the statement that Rav Pappa said: There are among them some whose subcategories are dissimilar to them, to which primary category was Rav Pappa referring? If we say that his reference was to these subcategories of Goring, what is different about Goring that defines it as a unique primary category? What is different is that the objective of the ox’s action is to cause damage, and the ox is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage, is incumbent upon you, its owner. In these subcategories of Goring, i.e., pushing [negifa], biting, crouching, and kicking, as well, the objective of the oxen’s actions is to cause damage, and the oxen are your property, and responsibility for their safeguarding, to prevent your oxen from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. Rather, it is apparent that the status of a subcategory of Goring is like that of the primary category of Goring, and when Rav Pappa says: There are among them some whose subcategories are dissimilar to them, he was referring to Eating and Trampling. The Gemara asks: Where are Eating and Trampling written in the Torah that led them to be classified as primary categories? The Gemara answers: The source is as the Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “If a man causes a field or vineyard to be eaten, and he sends forth his animal, and it consumed in the field of another” (Exodus 22:4). The two parts of the verse are referring to different categories: “And he sends forth,” this is a reference to the primary category of Trampling, as sending forth results in the animal trampling another’s produce and damaging it, and likewise it states: “Happy are you that sow beside all waters that send forth the feet of the ox and the donkey” (Isaiah 32:20). Clearly the term “send forth” is a reference to trampling by the feet of the animal. “And it consumed,” this is a reference to the primary category of Eating, and likewise it states: “And I will utterly sweep away the house of Jeroboam, as one consumes with the tooth until it be all gone” (I Kings 14:10). The Master said in the baraita just cited: “And he sends forth,” this is a reference to the category of Trampling, and likewise it says: “Happy are you that sow beside all waters that send forth the feet of the ox and the donkey” (Isaiah 32:20). The Gemara infers: The reason that the phrase: “And he sends forth,” is interpreted as a reference to the category of Trampling is that the Merciful One writes: “That send forth the feet of the ox and the donkey.” The Gemara asks: Were it not for this verse, with regard to what would you have interpreted that phrase? If you say that it could have been interpreted as referring to Goring, that cannot be, as Goring is written in a different verse. If you say that it could have been interpreted as referring to Eating, that too cannot be, as Eating is written in a different verse. Perforce the reference is to Trampling, and the baraita had no need to prove this from the phrase: “That send forth the feet.” The Gemara answers that it is necessary for the baraita to cite the verse: “That send forth the feet of the ox and the donkey,” as it could enter your mind to say that both this phrase: “And he sends forth,” and that phrase: “And it consumed,” are referring to the primary category of Eating, and that phrase: “And it consumed,” is referring to a case where the object damaged is completely destroyed, and this phrase: “And he sends forth,” is referring to a case where the object damaged is not completely destroyed. Therefore, the verse “that send forth the feet of the ox and the donkey” teaches us that the phrase “and he sends forth,” is referring to Trampling. The Gemara asks: And now that we have interpreted that the phrase “and he sends forth” is referring to Trampling, from where do we derive that one is liable with regard to acts categorized as Eating in a case where the object damaged is not completely destroyed? The primary category of Eating is derived from the phrase “and it consumed.” The connotation of that phrase is damage in which the object is completely destroyed. The Gemara answers: It is derived because the category of Eating is juxtaposed to and therefore similar to the category of Trampling: Just as with regard to liability for the category of Trampling, it is no different if the object damaged is completely destroyed and it is no different if the object damaged is not completely destroyed; so too, with regard to liability for the category of Eating, it is no different whether the object damaged is completely destroyed and it is no different whether the object damaged is not completely destroyed. The Master said in that baraita: When the verse states: “And it consumed” (Exodus 22:4), this is a reference to the category of Eating. And likewise it states: “And I will utterly sweep away the house of Jeroboam, as one consumes with the tooth until it be all gone” (I Kings 14:10). The Gemara infers: The reason that the phrase “and it consumed” is interpreted as a reference to the category of Eating is that the Merciful One writes: “As one consumes with the tooth until it be all gone.” The Gemara asks: Were it not for this verse, with regard to what case would you have interpreted that phrase? If you say that it could have been interpreted as referring to Goring, that cannot be, as Goring is written in a different verse. And if you say that it could have been interpreted as referring to Trampling, that too cannot be, as Trampling, is written in a different verse. Perforce the reference is to Eating. The Gemara answers that it is necessary for the baraita to cite the verse: “As one consumes with the tooth until it be all gone,” as it could enter your mind to say that both this phrase: “And it consumed,” and that phrase: “And he sends forth,” are referring to the primary category of Trampling, and this phrase: “And it consumed,” is referring to a case where the animal went and caused damage on its own, and that phrase: “And he sends forth,” is referring to a case where the owner sent the animal to cause damage. Therefore, the verse “as one consumes with the tooth until it be all gone” teaches us that the phrase “and it consumed” is referring to Eating. The Gemara asks: And now that we have interpreted that the phrase “and it consumed” is referring to Eating, from where do we derive that one is liable with regard to actions categorized as Trampling in a case where the animal went and caused damage on its own? The primary category of Trampling is derived from the phrase “and he sends forth.” The connotation of that phrase is a case where the owner sent the animal to cause damage. The Gemara answers: It is derived because the category of Trampling is juxtaposed to and therefore similar to the category of Eating: Just as with regard to liability for the category of Eating, it is no different if the owner sent the animal to cause damage and it is no different if the animal went and caused damage on its own, so too, with regard to liability for the category of Trampling, it is no different if the owner sent the animal to cause damage and it is no different if the animal went and caused damage on its own. The Gemara suggests: And let the Merciful One write only the first phrase, “and he sends forth,” and there would be no need to write the second phrase, “and it consumed,” as the phrase “and he sends forth” connotes Trampling and connotes Eating. It connotes Trampling, as it is written: “That send forth the feet of the ox and the donkey” (Isaiah 32:20), and it connotes Eating, as it is written: “And the teeth of animals I will send forth against them” (Deuteronomy 32:24). The Gemara answers: If not for the additional phrase in the verse, “and it consumed,” I would say that the verse refers either to this category of damage or to that category of damage: It refers either to Trampling, where its damage is commonplace, or to Eating, where there is pleasure for the animal in the course of its causing damage. The Gemara asks: Since both interpretations are of equal validity, let both of them come and be derived from the verse, as which of them will you exclude? Since there is no reason to prefer one category over the other, perforce both are derived, and the phrase “and it consumed” is unnecessary. The Gemara answers: The additional phrase is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that this matter of liability applies only in a case where the owner sent the animal to cause damage, but in a case where the animal went and caused damage on its own, the owner would not be liable for the damage. Therefore, the phrase “and it consumed” teaches us that the owner is liable even in a case where the ox went and caused damage on its own. Having clarified the sources for the primary categories of Eating and Trampling, the Gemara proceeds to identify their subcategories and to determine whether it was with regard to these primary categories of damage that Rav Pappa said: There are among them some whose subcategories are dissimilar to them. What is a subcategory of Eating? It is a case where, for example, an animal rubbed against a wall for its pleasure and damaged the wall, or where it sullied produce by rolling on it for its pleasure. If so, what is different about Eating that it is defined as a unique primary category? What is different is that there is pleasure for the animal in the course of its causing damage, and the ox is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage, is incumbent upon you, its owner. In these subcategories of Eating, as well, there is pleasure for the animals in the course of the damage that they cause and the oxen are your property, and responsibility for their safeguarding, to prevent your oxen from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. Therefore, the subcategories of Eating are not dissimilar to the primary category. Rather, it is apparent that the status of a sub-category of Eating is like that of the primary category of Eating, and when Rav Pappa says: There are among them some whose subcategories are dissimilar to them, he is referring to a subcategory of Trampling. The Gemara asks: What is a subcategory of Trampling? The classification is applied in a case where, for example, an animal caused damage with its body, not its legs, in the course of its walking; or caused damage with its hair that became entangled with an object in the course of its walking; or caused damage with a rope that is upon it; or caused damage with a bit [bifrumbiya] that is in its mouth; or caused damage with a bell that is around its neck. If so, what is different about Trampling that it is defined as a unique category? What is different is that its damage is commonplace, and the animal is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage, is incumbent upon you, its owner. In these subcategories of Trampling, as well, their damage is commonplace, and the oxen are your property, and responsibility for their safeguarding, to prevent them from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. Therefore, the subcategories of Trampling are not dissimilar to the primary category. Rather, it is apparent that the status of a subcategory of Trampling is like that of the primary category of Trampling, and when Rav Pappa says: There are among them some whose subcategories are dissimilar to them, he is referring to a subcategory of Pit. The Gemara examines that assertion: What is a subcategory of Pit? If we say that the primary category of Pit applies when, in the public domain, one leaves an uncovered pit that is ten handbreadths deep, and that is the pit mentioned in the Torah, and a subcategory of Pit applies when one leaves an uncovered pit that is nine handbreadths deep, there is no basis for that distinction, as neither nine handbreadths are written in the Torah, nor are ten handbreadths written in the Torah. The Gemara explains: This is not difficult, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And the carcass shall be for him” (Exodus 21:34), and the Sages have an accepted tradition that a pit ten handbreadths deep causes the death of an animal that falls into it, but a pit nine handbreadths deep causes damage to an animal that falls into it but does not cause death. Accordingly, the pit written in the Torah (Exodus 21:33), which mentions the death of the animal that fell therein, is ten handbreadths deep. This is classified as the primary category of Pit, and a pit nine handbreadths deep is its subcategory. The Gemara asks: Ultimately, this pit that is ten handbreadths deep is a primary category of damage with regard to death, and that pit that is nine handbreadths deep is a primary category with regard to damage. Rather, Rav Pappa’s statement: There are among them some whose subcategories are dissimilar to them, was stated in reference to these subcategories of Pit: His stone, his knife, or his load, any of which he placed in a public domain as obstacles, and they caused damage when people stumbled upon them. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances where one is liable for damage caused by these obstacles? If it is a case where one declared these items ownerless, both according to the opinion of Rav and according to the opinion of Shmuel, cited later in the Gemara, these cases are a subcategory of Pit, as both Rav and Shmuel agree that any obstacle declared ownerless by its owner that causes damage in the public domain is a subcategory of Pit. And if it is a case where one did not declare them ownerless, there is still a difficulty. If Rav Pappa’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who says: We learned that one is liable for damage caused by all obstacles that he places in a public domain, whether or not he declares them ownerless, from the halakhot with regard to one’s pit, these cases are a subcategory of Pit. And if Rav Pappa’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, who says: We learned that one is liable for damage caused by all obstacles that he places in a public domain that he did not declare ownerless, from the halakhot with regard to one’s ox that gored another animal, these cases are a subcategory of Ox. With regard to the subcategories of Ox, the Gemara already established that their legal status is like that of the primary category of Ox. The Gemara asks concerning an obstacle that is a subcategory of Pit: What is different about Pit that it is defined it as a unique category? It is that its initial formation, i.e., the digging of the pit, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and it is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage to others, is incumbent upon you. In these subcategories of Pit, too, their initial formation, i.e., the placement of the obstacle in the public domain, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and they are your property, and responsibility for their safeguarding, to prevent them from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. Rather, it is apparent that the status of a subcategory of Pit is like that of the primary category of Pit, and when Rav Pappa says: There are among them some whose subcategories are dissimilar to them, he is referring to a subcategory of Maveh. The meaning of the term Maveh is not clear; therefore, the Gemara asks: What is the primary category of Maveh to whose subcategories the Gemara referred? If one suggests that Rav Pappa said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who says: Maveh, this is the category of Eating, this cannot be Rav Pappa’s intent. But didn’t we already establish that the legal status of a subcategory of Eating is like that of the primary category of Eating? Clearly, Rav Pappa was not referring to subcategories of Maveh. And if one suggests that Rav Pappa said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rav, who says: Maveh, this is the primary category of Man, which includes damage caused by a person, not by his property or animals, what primary categories and what subcategories are there in that category? The halakha is the same with regard to all damage that a person causes. And if you would say that there is a distinction: The primary category is a case where one causes damage while awake, and a subcategory is a case where one causes damage while asleep; but didn’t we learn in a mishna (26a): The legal status of a person is always that of one forewarned, and he is liable for any damage that he causes, both when he is awake and when he is asleep? Accordingly, that is not the distinction between a primary category and a subcategory. Rather, perhaps Rav Pappa was referring to cases where one causes damage with his phlegm or his spittle. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances where one would be liable for damage in that case? If it is a case where his phlegm and spittle cause damage as they were moving through the air after the person expectorated, that is damage caused by his direct action and there is no room to distinguish between the damage that it caused and any other damage caused by one’s direct action. If it is a case where his phlegm or spittle causes damage after it comes to rest on the ground, e.g., if one slipped in the spittle, fell, and was injured, both according to Rav and according to Shmuel this is a subcategory of Pit, as the spittle is an ownerless obstacle in the public domain. Rather, it is apparent that the status of a subcategory of Maveh is like that of the primary category of Maveh, and when Rav Pappa says: There are among them some whose subcategories are dissimilar to them; he was referring to a subcategory of Fire. The Gemara asks: What is a subcategory of Fire? If we say that it is a case of his stone, his knife, or his load, where he placed them on top of his roof, and they fell off the roof by means of a common wind, and they caused damage, what are the circumstances in which one would be liable for the damage that was caused? If it is a case where those items caused damage as they were moving through the air propelled by the wind, that is a case of Fire. If so, what is different about Fire that defines it as a unique category? What is different is that another force, the wind, is involved with the fire in causing damage, as the wind causes the fire to spread, and the fire is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, to prevent it from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. In these subcategories of Fire too, another force is involved with the items placed on the roof and causes damage, as the wind causes them to fall, and they are your property, and responsibility for their safeguarding, to prevent them from causing damage, is incumbent upon you. Rather, it is apparent that the status of a subcategory of Fire is like that of the primary category of Fire, and when Rav Pappa says: There are among them some whose subcategories are dissimilar to them, he was referring to a subcategory of Trampling. The Gemara questions this explanation: A subcategory of Trampling? But didn’t we already establish that the status of a subcategory of Trampling is similar to that of the primary category of Trampling? The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa was referring to one’s liability to pay half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles in a case where they were inadvertently propelled by the foot of a walking animal, which is a halakha learned through tradition and not explicitly written in the Torah. The Gemara asks: But if it is a unique halakhic category and the payment is different, why is it characterized as a subcategory of Trampling? The Gemara explains: It is due to the fact that it shares a common aspect with Trampling. One whose animal propels pebbles while it walks and thereby causes damage is liable to pay half of the damages from his superior-quality property, and he does not pay only from the body of his animal, as is the halakha concerning half the cost of the damage paid by the owner of an innocuous ox that gored a person or an animal. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rava raise a dilemma with regard to that matter? As Rava raised a dilemma: With regard to one’s liability to pay half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles propelled by the foot of his animal, does one pay damages exclusively from the body of his ox that caused the damage, or does one pay damages from his superior-quality property? The Gemara explains: Although it is a dilemma for Rava, it is obvious to Rav Pappa that one pays from his superior-quality property, and in that sense, he classified the pebbles that cause damage as a subcategory of Trampling. The Gemara asks: According to Rava, who raises it as a dilemma, why is it characterized as a subcategory of Trampling when its legal status is different both in terms of the extent of one’s liability and in terms of the manner of payment? The Gemara explains: It is classified as a subcategory of Trampling in order to exempt from liability pebbles that cause damage in the public domain, just as damage in the category of Trampling is exempt in the public domain. § One of the primary categories of damage enumerated in the mishna is the category of Maveh and another is the category of Fire. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of Maveh? Rav says: Maveh, that is the category of Man, which includes a person who causes damage, but not the property or animal of a person that causes damage. And Shmuel says: Maveh, this is the category of Eating. The Gemara elaborates: Rav says: Maveh, this is the category of Man, as it is written: “The watchman said: Morning has come, and also night; if you will inquire [tivayun], inquire [be’ayu]” (Isaiah 21:12). The terms “tivayun” and “be’ayu,” meaning inquire, refer to a person, who is able to inquire. Accordingly, Maveh relates to an action performed by a person. And Shmuel says: Maveh, this is the category of Eating, as it is written: “How is Esau searched out [neḥpesu]; how are his hidden places revealed [nivu]” (Obadiah 1:6)? The terms nivu and maveh share a common root. The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that nivu connotes Eating? The Gemara explains that it is as Rav Yosef translates the verse into Aramaic: How is Esau searched out [itbelish]; how are his hidden places revealed [itgaleyan]? The meaning of the Aramaic term itgaleyan means revealed, and that is the meaning of the Hebrew term “nivu.” Maveh references the animal’s teeth, which are covered when its mouth is closed and revealed when it eats. The Gemara asks: And as for Rav, what is the reason that he did not say that Maveh refers to Eating, as does Shmuel? The Gemara explains that Rav could have said to you: Is it taught in the mishna: Niveh? Niveh is the passive form of the word maveh, which would be the appropriate form if the reference was to teeth that are revealed. The term in the mishna is maveh, an active form of the verb. And as for Shmuel, what is the reason that he did not say that Maveh refers to the category of Man, as does Rav? The Gemara explains that Shmuel could have said to you: Is it taught in the mishna: Bo’eh? Bo’eh is a form of the word maveh connoting an action taken directly, which would be appropriate were the reference to one’s actions that cause damage. The term in the mishna is maveh, which connotes an action that one causes another to take. The Gemara notes: After all, the meaning of the term in the verses is not precise according to one Sage, Rav, and it is not precise according to the other Sage, Shmuel. It is apparent that their dispute is not based upon their interpretation of the verses; it must be based on another issue. The Gemara asks again: As for Rav, what is the reason that he did not say that Maveh refers to Eating, as does Shmuel? The Gemara explains: Rav holds that the tanna teaches the primary category of Ox in the mishna. This includes damage caused by an ox and all matters involving damaging actions that are completed by an ox, i.e., the actions included in the categories of Goring, Eating, and Trampling. Perforce, Maveh refers to a different category of damage, i.e., Man. The Gemara asks: And as for Shmuel too, who interpreted Maveh as Eating, doesn’t the mishna teach the category of Ox, which should include all matters involving damaging actions that are completed by an ox? Rav Yehuda said that according to Shmuel, the tanna teaches Ox specifically with regard to damage caused with its horn, and it teaches Maveh with regard to damage caused with its tooth. And when the mishna contrasts Ox with Maveh, this is what the tanna is saying: The defining characteristic of the primary category of Goring, where there is no inherent pleasure for the animal in the course of its causing damage, is not similar to the defining characteristic of the category of Eating, where there is pleasure for the animal in the course of its causing damage.