The Fundamental Sources
וְשֶׁיְּהוּ קוֹרְאִין בְּשֵׁנִי וּבַחֲמִישִׁי עֶזְרָא תִּיקֵּן וְהָא מֵעִיקָּרָא הֲוָה מִיתַּקְנָא דְּתַנְיָא (שְׁמוֹת טו, כב) וַיֵּלְכוּ שְׁלֹשֶׁת יָמִים בַּמִּדְבָּר וְלֹא מָצְאוּ מָיִם דּוֹרְשֵׁי רְשׁוּמוֹת אָמְרוּ אֵין מַיִם אֶלָּא תּוֹרָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (יְשַׁעְיָהוּ נה, א) הוֹי כׇּל צָמֵא לְכוּ לַמַּיִם כֵּיוָן שֶׁהָלְכוּ שְׁלֹשֶׁת יָמִים בְּלֹא תּוֹרָה נִלְאוּ עָמְדוּ נְבִיאִים שֶׁבֵּינֵיהֶם וְתִיקְּנוּ לָהֶם שֶׁיְּהוּ קוֹרִין בַּשַּׁבָּת וּמַפְסִיקִין בְּאֶחָד בַּשַּׁבָּת וְקוֹרִין בִּשְׁנֵי וּמַפְסִיקִין שְׁלִישִׁי וּרְבִיעִי וְקוֹרִין בַּחֲמִישִׁי וּמַפְסִיקִין עֶרֶב שַׁבָּת כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יָלִינוּ ג' יָמִים בְּלֹא תּוֹרָה
The Gemara discusses the second of Ezra’s ordinances: And that they should read the Torah on every Monday and Thursday. The Gemara asks: Did Ezra institute this practice? But it was instituted from the beginning, i.e., long before his time. As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And Moses led Israel onward from the Red Sea, and they went out into the wilderness of Shur; and they went three days in the wilderness, and found no water” (Exodus 15:22). Those who interpret verses metaphorically said that water here is referring to nothing other than Torah, as it is stated metaphorically, concerning those who desire wisdom: “Ho, everyone who thirsts, come for water” (Isaiah 55:1). The baraita continues: The verse means that since the Jews traveled for three days without hearing any Torah they became weary, and therefore the prophets among them arose and instituted for them that they should read from the Torah each Shabbat, and pause on Sunday, and read again on Monday, and pause on Tuesday and Wednesday, and read again on Thursday, and pause on Shabbat eve, so they would not tarry three days without hearing the Torah. Evidently this practice predates Ezra.
See Mishneh Torah, Tefillah 12:1-2, and Kesef Misha ad loc. for ascription of the practice of communal Torah reading to Moses. Likewise, see Talmud Yerushalmi Megillah 4:1.
ת"ר הַכֹּל עוֹלִין לְמִנְיַן שִׁבְעָה וַאֲפִילּוּ קָטָן וַאֲפִילּוּ אִשָּׁה אֲבָל אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים אִשָּׁה לֹא תִּקָּרֵא בַּתּוֹרָה מִפְּנֵי כְּבוֹד צִבּוּר
The Sages taught in a Tosefta (Megilla 3:11): All people count toward the quorum of seven readers, even a minor and even a woman. However, the Sages said that a woman should not read the Torah, out of respect for the congregation.
(ה) ... הַכֹּל עוֹלִין לְמִנְיַן שִׁבְעָה אֲפִילּוּ [אִשָּׁה אֲפִילּוּ קָטָן אֵין מְבִיאִין אֶת הָאִשָּׁה לִקְרוֹת בָּרַבִּים].
...And all go up to the count [reading] of seven, even a woman, even a minor. We do not bring the woman to read in public.
Note that מנין here is not used as a quorum of ten, but rather the count of individuals and aliyot read from the Torah. Brachot were said at the first and last aliyah. See Women, Keri’at Ha-Torah, and Aliyyot Footnote 14-18 (http://www.rcarabbis.org/pdf/frimer_article.pdf) for details
The prohibition on women engaging in communal Torah reading due to כבוד צבור is codified widely, such as in the Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 282:3
What do the Gemara and Tosefta mean? Are they the same?
... Sefer ha-Batim, in Sha`arei Qeri’at ha-Torah 2:6, writes in the name of an unidentified “one of the great [scholars]” that the prohibition against a woman reading in the Torah because of kevod ha-tsibbur refers to Torah readings specifically in the synagogue, but not to a group gathered in a private home. The wording “we do not bring a woman to read in public” fits this interpretation nicely, since it implies bringing her to a place where she is normally not present, i. e. the men’s gallery of the synagogue. It does not fit well with a Torah-reading in a private home where the woman may have been living all along...
Rav Henkin goes on to reject the possibility of Aliyyot for women, but his argument is largely not germane. Even if we accept his premise, see רמ"א אורח חיים, תר"ץ:.
Was there ever a time in which women did go up to read from the Torah? The Frimers argue not, but Rav Yaakov Emden (הגהות יעבץ למגילה כג עא) says that if there are no competent men "חוזרים לדין המקורי."
Note: Rabbenu Tam (or rather the anonymous Tosfotists) and the pshat of the Gemara above reject the proposal that women were only allowed to read the middle aliyyot, which did not have brachot. Nonetheless, the Rashba adopts this position.
The Obligation of Women In Time-Bound Mitzvot & Torah Study
We will be operating under the assumption that the nature of communal Torah reading could be distinct from that of hearing Megillah, upon which the Ritva, Rashba, and many others comment regarding women reading.
וְכׇל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָא אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּיבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת וְכׇל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָא אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים חַיָּיבִין
The mishna notes an additional difference between the obligations of men and women in the performance of mitzvot: With regard to all positive, time-bound mitzvot, i.e., those which must be performed at specific times, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all positive mitzvot that are not time bound, both men and women are obligated to perform them.
Is Torah study a time-bound mitzvah? It appears not. Thus, if the obligation of Torah reading is based on the obligation to study Torah, perhaps women should be obligated.
וּמִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָא נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת: מְנָלַן גָּמַר מִתְּפִילִּין מָה תְּפִילִּין נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת אַף כֹּל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָא נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת וּתְפִילִּין גָּמַר לֵהּ מִתַּלְמוּד תּוֹרָה מָה תַּלְמוּד תּוֹרָה נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת אַף תְּפִילִּין נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת
(א) וְלִמַּדְתֶּם אוֹתָם אֶת בְּנֵיכֶם לְדַבֵּר בָּם - בְּנֵיכֶם וְלֹא בְּנוֹתֵיכֶם, דְּבָרִי ר' יוֹסֵי בֶּן עֲקַבְיָא: מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: כְּשֶׁהַתִּינוֹק מַתְחִיל לְדַבֵּר אָבִיו מְדַבֵּר עִמּוֹ לְשׁוֹן הַקּוֹדֶשׁ וּמְלַמְּדוֹ תּוֹרָה, וְאִם אֵין מְדַבֵּר עִמּוֹ לְשׁוֹן הַקּוֹדֶשׁ וְאֵינוֹ מְלַמְּדוֹ תּוֹרָה - רָאוּי לוֹ כְּאִלּוּ קוֹבְרוֹ; שנ' וְלִמַּדְתֶּם אוֹתָם אֶת בְּנֵיכֶם לְדַבֵּר בָּם; אִם לְמִדְּתָם אוֹתָם אֶת בְּנֵיכֶם - יִרְבּוּ יְמֵיכֶם וִימֵי בְנֵיכֶם, וְאִם לָאו - יְקַצְּרוּ יְמֵיכֶם, שֶׁכָּךְ דִבְרֵי תוֹרָה נִדְרָשִׁים מִכְּלַל לָאו אַתָּה שׁוֹמֵעַ הֵן, וּמִכְּלַל הֵן לָאו:
(1) (Devarim 11:19) "And you shall teach them to your sons to speak in them": and not to your daughters — whence they ruled: When a child begins to speak, his father should speak to him in the holy tongue and teach him Torah; and if he does not do so, it is as if he had buried him, it being written "And you shall teach them (words of Torah) to your sons to speak in them … (21) so that your days will be multiplied and the days of your sons." And if not, your days will be shortened. For thus are words of Torah expounded: From the negative, you infer the positive; and from the positive, the negative.
JPS, Koren, Artscroll, Hirsch, Alter, and virtually all others translate "children" rather than "sons," which is the grammatically accurate translation, contra the derivation in Gemara Kiddushin and Sifrei above. What do you think the Sifrei is trying to do here, if it is not actually making a grammatical derivation?
Consequences of the derivation in Kiddushin-
( זֶה הַכְּלָל, כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחֻיָּב בַּדָּבָר, אֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא אֶת הָרַבִּים יְדֵי חוֹבָתָן:
This is the general rule: all those who are not obligated to carry out a particular action, cannot release [others] from their obligation.
How does the idea of Torah reading as Torah study accord or not accord with the Gemara in Megillah?
If communal Torah reading isn't Torah study, what is it?
(12) Gather the people—men, women, children, and the strangers in your communities—that they may hear and so learn to revere the LORD your God and to observe faithfully every word of this Teaching.
(ו) וְקָטָן. ... מַשְׁמַע מִכָּאן דְּאִשָּׁה חַיֶּיבֶת לִשְׁמוֹעַ קְרִיאַת הַתּוֹרָה וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְקְנָה מִשּׁוּם <ת"ת> תַּלְמוּד תּוֹרָה וְנָשִׁים אֵינָן חַיָּיבוֹת <בת"ת> בְּתַלְמוּד תּוֹרָה <מ"מ> מִכָּל מָקוֹם מִצְוָה לִשְׁמוֹעַ כְּמוֹ מִצְוַת הַקָּהָל שֶׁהַנָּשִׁים וְהַטַּף חַיָּיבִים בָּהּ... <במ"ס> בְּמַסֶּכֶת סוֹפְרִים <פי"ח> פֶּרֶק י"ח כָּתוּב הַנָּשִׁים חַיָּיבוֹת לִשְׁמוֹעַ קְרִיאַת סֵפֶר כַּאֲנָשִׁים וּמִצְוָה לְתַרְגֵּם לָהֶם שֶׁיָּבִינוּ <עכ"ל> עַד כָּאן לְשׁוֹנוֹ:
And a minor: ...From here we learn that a woman is obligated to hear the reading of the Torah, and even though women are not obligated in the commandment of learning Torah, they are still commanded to hear it as in the commandment of 'hakhel' in which women and children are obligated...
Women are as obligated to hear the Torah reading as men, and it is a commandment to translate for them that they may understand.
Prof. Shelomo Naeh "Sidrei Keriat ha-Torah be-Eretz Yisrael: Iyun Mechudash" (Tarbiz 67, 5758, pp. 167-187)
It seems, therefore, that these were not three separate systems [of the cycle of Torah reading in Eretz Yisrael,] but rather just two (which were really one and the same): in one system a complete reading cycle comprised two sets of 154 readings, while in the other the greater cycle was composed of a set of 141 sedarim, in the first round, followed by a set of 167 sedarim in the second round...
The question arises: what is that fixed date when the seven-year cycle of reading is meant to conclude? … The cycle of Torah reading taking seven years can have only one explanation, which is clear to us from the mitzva in the Torah – the mitzva of hak'hel…
[See also Rav Elchanan Samet https://www.etzion.org.il/en/hakhel-septennial-national-assembly]
(ה) הַקְּרִיאָה וְהַבְּרָכוֹת בִּלְשׁוֹן הַקֹּדֶשׁ. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים לא יא) "תִּקְרָא אֶת הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת" בִּלְשׁוֹנָהּ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיֵּשׁ שָׁם לוֹעֲזוֹת:
(ו) וְגֵרִים שֶׁאֵינָן מַכִּירִין חַיָּבִין לְהָכִין לִבָּם וּלְהַקְשִׁיב אָזְנָם לִשְׁמֹעַ בְּאֵימָה וְיִרְאָה וְגִילָה בִּרְעָדָה כְּיוֹם שֶׁנִּתְּנָה בּוֹ בְּסִינַי. אֲפִלּוּ חֲכָמִים גְּדוֹלִים שֶׁיּוֹדְעִים כָּל הַתּוֹרָה כֻּלָּהּ חַיָּבִין לִשְׁמֹעַ בְּכַוָּנָה גְּדוֹלָה יְתֵרָה. וּמִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִשְׁמֹעַ מְכַוֵּן לִבּוֹ לִקְרִיאָה זוֹ שֶׁלֹּא קְבָעָהּ הַכָּתוּב אֶלָּא לְחַזֵּק דַּת הָאֱמֶת וְיִרְאֶה עַצְמוֹ כְּאִלּוּ עַתָּה נִצְטַוָּה בָּהּ וּמִפִּי הַגְּבוּרָה שׁוֹמְעָהּ. שֶׁהַמֶּלֶךְ שָׁלִיחַ הוּא לְהַשְׁמִיעַ דִּבְרֵי הָאֵל:
(5) The Torah reading and the blessings had to be in the sacred tongue, as it is written: "You shall read this Torah" (31:11), in its very language, even though there might be there persons using a foreign language.
(6) Proselytes who did not know Hebrew were required to direct their hearts and listen with utmost awe and reverence, as on the day the Torah was given at Sinai. Even great scholars who knew the entire Torah were required to listen with utmost attention. If there was a person who could not hear, he had to direct his heart to this reading, which Scripture has instituted only for the purpose of strengthening the true faith. Each had to regard himself as if he had been charged with the Torah now for the first time, and as though he had heard it from the mouth of God, for the king was an ambassador proclaiming the words of God.
Does this suggest that there is a distinct obligation of listening to Torah reading (separate from Torah learning)? Is this individual or communal? See Yabia Omer 4, Yoreh Deah, section 31 for an argument that the obligation is communal. See Igrot Moshe Orach Chaim 4:23, which may suggest that the obligation is incumbent on each individual. Despite the Gemara above, see Likutei Hanhagot (p. 136) in the name of Rabbi Moshe Soloveitchik that Torah reading is a manifestation of Torah learning. https://www.biu.ac.il/JH/Parasha/eng/shemot/sheffer.html The Frimers also consider the possibility of a two-tiered obligation (p. 81,) but this approach is both innovative and has little textual and meta-halakhic support.
Alternative views to the Magen Avraham
(יא) ודע דנמצא במסכת סופרים (פרק י"ח הלכה ד'): 'שנשים חייבות לשמוע קריאת ספר כאנשים... ומן הדין הוא לתרגם לעם לנשים ותינוקות כל סדר ונביא של שבת לאחר קריאת התורה' עכ"ל.ונראה לי דלאו חיוב גמור קאמר, אלא דומיא דתינוקות, שהרי פטורה מתלמוד תורה, ועוד דאין לך זמן גרמא יותר מזו. ומה שאשה עולה למניין ז', כבר כתבו התוספות בראש השנה (ל"ג. סד"ה 'הא'), דזהו כמו שמברכות על כל מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא, או דמיירי בזמן המשנה, שלא כל העולים היו מברכים, ועוד דברכות אלו אינם משום תלמוד תורה ע"ש.ואין לדמות למצות הקהל, שצותה התורה: 'הקהל את העם האנשים והנשים והטף', שזו היא מצוה מיוחדת פעם לשבע שנים, שהיה המלך בעצמו קורא ספר משנה תורה, שהם דברי כבושין. אבל שנאמר שמחוייבות בכל שבת בקריאת התורה - וודאי הוא מילתא דתמיה, ומעשים בכל יום יוכיחו, ועל פי רוב אי אפשר להן לשמוע.אלא המסכת סופרים אומר על דרך המוסר, בזמן שהיו מתרגמין, שנכון לתרגם לפניהם ולפני התינוקות להשריש בלבן יראת ד' ואהבתו יתברך. (עיין מג"א סק"ו שמסתפק בזה, ולעניות דעתי ברור כמ"ש דומיא דתינוקות, וכן כתב הפרישה ע"ש)
(יב) (יב) וְקָטָן - וְאַף אִם אֵין שָׁם כֹּהֵן אֶלָּא קָטָן קוֹרִין אוֹתוֹ [רי"ט וְרַדְבָ"ז] וְדַעַת המ"א שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ מְחוּיָּיבִין לִקְרוֹתוֹ דמ"ע דּוּקְדַּשְׁתּוֹ לֹא נֶאֱמַר עַל כֹּהֵן קָטָן דְּהָא כְתִיב כִּי אֶת לֶחֶם אֱלֹהֶיךָ הוּא מַקְרִיב וְקָטָן לָאו בַּר עֲבוֹדָה הוּא וְכֵן נוֹהֲגִין בְּיָמֵינוּ שֶׁכְּשֶׁאֵין בבהכ"נ כֹּהֵן שֶׁהוּא בֶּן י"ג שָׁנָה קוֹרִין יִשְׂרָאֵל בִּמְקוֹם כֹּהֵן וַאֲפִילּוּ יֵשׁ שָׁם כֹּהֵן קָטָן. וְיוֹתֵר מִזֶּה נוֹהֲגִין כְּהַיּוֹם שֶׁאֵין קוֹרִין קָטָן כְּלָל לְשׁוּם עָלֶיהָ אֲפִילּוּ אִם כְּבָר נִשְׁלַם מִנְיַן הַקְּרוּאִים אֶלָּא לְמַפְטִיר [אַחֲרוֹנִים]. כָּתַב המ"א בְּשֵׁם מַסֶּכֶת סוֹפְרִים שֶׁהַנָּשִׁים אע"פ שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיבוֹת בת"ת מ"מ חַיָּיבוֹת לִשְׁמוֹעַ קְרִיאַת סֵפֶר כַּאֲנָשִׁים וְאֵין נוֹהֲגוֹת לִיזָּהֵר בָּזֶה וְאַדְּרַבָּה יֵשׁ מְקוֹמוֹת שֶׁנּוֹהֲגוֹת הַנָּשִׁים לָצֵאת חוּץ בְּעֵת הַקְּרִיאָה:
The consensus of poskim has found Magen Avraham’s ruling obligating women in keri’at ha-Torah problematic on several counts. Firstly, the unanimous opinion of the rishonim is to exempt women from keri’at ha-Torah. Secondly, the Talmud and codes indicate that one who calls his non-Jewish slave to the Torah sets him free, because non-Jewish slaves are not obligated in keri’at ha-Torah. Since the ritual obligations of women and non-Jewish slaves are generally equivalent, this would strongly suggest that women, too, are freed from any obligation in keri’at ha-Torah. Thirdly, “the Book” under discussion in Massekhet Soferim is the Book of 78 Lamentations (Megillat Eikha), not the Torah. In addition, many scholars understand the word “obligated” in Massekhet Soferim to mean “ought” or the proper way to act. Finally, even if we were to accept the validity of R. Gombiner’s interpretation of the Massekhet Soferim, why should we assume that this passage is halakhically reliable? After all, many of the decisions recorded in this minor tractate do not represent normative Jewish law. In fact, the very passage under discussion may be a case in point, for it states that women are obligated in reading Shema – contravening an explicit mishna. Clearly, this internal evidence alone should raise questions as to the halakhic reliability of this text. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of halakhic decisors view normative halakha as exempting women from any requirement to hear the public Torah reading. These scholars reject the opinion of Magen Avraham, who links women’s theoretical eligibility for an aliyya with a putative obligation in keri’at ha-Torah. After all, minors may receive aliyyot, yet they are not fully obligated – if at all. What’s more, Magen Avraham himself records that, contrary to his aforementioned view of obligating women in the Torah reading, the prevalent custom of the women in his very own community was to actually walk out for keri’at ha-Torah. The permissibility of this latter practice for women has been reaffirmed in the modern period by many noted authorities.
Questions to ponder:
1. Is the Sefrei always used as a halakhic source? (Hint: No)
2. What do the Frimers believe is the root of the obligation of Kri'at HaTorah?
3. Given that the Magen Avraham bases his view on that of Hakhel, does this mean that children are likewise obligated in Kri'at HaTorah (contra the Frimers)?
4. What about the other obligations/benefits of Hovat Ha-Tzibbur (such as needing 10 men for a minyan)? (Hint: See Gemara Sotah 22a)
5. Can women say the berakhot of Keri-at Ha-Torah?
פסקי הראש, מסכת ברכות מ"ז:
"וְהָא דְּסָלְקִי קָטָן וְעֶבֶד וְאִשָּׁה דְּלֵיתַנְהוּ בְּתַלְמוּד תּוֹרָה לְמִנְיַן שִׁבְעָה, מִשּׁוּם דְּסֵפֶר תּוֹרָה לִשְׁמִיעָה קָאֵי וּבְרָכָה אֵינָהּ לְבַטָּלָה..."
R. Asher (Rosh), Berachot 47 (14th C Spain, Germany) "And the fact that a minor and a slave and a woman who are not obligated in Torah study are included in the quorum of seven [who are called up to the Torah on Shabbat] is because the Sefer Torah is there for the purpose of being heard, and it is not a blessing said in vain…"
דברי רבינו תם המובאים בתוספות ר' יהודה שירליאון על ברכות דף מז עמוד ב
וְהָא דְּסָלְקִי קָטָן וְעֶבֶד וְאִשָּׁה, דְּלֵיתַנְהוּ בְּתַלְמוּד תּוֹרָה, לְמִנְיַן שִׁבְעָה, מִשּׁוּם דס"ת לִשְׁמִיעָה קָאֵי,... ...וּבִרְכָתַן אֵין לְבַטָּלָה, דְּלָא מְבָרְכִי אקב"ו עַל הַתּוֹרָה, אֶלָּא אֲשֶׁר בָּחַר בָּנוּ וַאֲשֶׁר נָתַן לָנוּ
Rabbeinu Tam, France, 12th c., as quoted in Tosafot R. Yehudah Sirleon on Berakhot 47b
And the reason that a minor and a slave and a woman may come up to the Torah, even though they are exempt from the study of Torah, is because the Torah scroll is for hearing. And their blessing is not in vain because they do not say "who has sanctified and commanded us regarding Torah," but rather "who has chosen us…and who has given us."
The Use Of לא in the Talmud
Is Torah reading by women a violation of כבוד צבור? Can כבוד צבור be waived?
We will not be addressing the putative question of 'Kol Isha' or licentiousness/tzniut See Saul Berman's 'Kol Isha' (and Tanakh) for information on why women's voices and participation are not a problem in a sacral (or other) contexts. See also the pshat of Gemara Megillah 23a above.
As to the meaning of kevod ha-tsibbur as it relates to women reading the Torah, Petah ha-Devir 282:9 explains it as the need to avoid creating the impression that there were not enough men literate enough to read from the Torah themselves and that women had to be brought in to supplement them. I demonstrated this to be the view of Ritva in Megillah 4a, which the author discusses (section III C), but also of R. Avraham Min ha-Har in Megillah 19b who is even more explicit: “Certainly, le-kha-tehillah she should not fulfill men’s responsibility [by reading the Megillah for them], as is stated in [Berakhot], ‘let there come me’eirah [a curse] upon a man whose wife and children bless on his behalf.’ And it is stated in [Megillah] ‘Everyone is counted towards the quota of people who read the Torah, even a woman or a minor, but the Sages said that a woman may not read the Torah because of kevod ha-tsibbur.’ ”
שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ בְּנֵי גָּלִיל לֵר' חֶלְבּוֹ מַהוּ לִקְרוֹת בְּחוּמָּשִׁים בבהכ"נ בְּצִיבּוּר לָא הֲוָה בִידֵיהּ אַתּא שַׁיְילֵיהּ לֵר' יִצְחָק נַפָּחָא לָא הֲוָה בִידֵיהּ אַתּא שָׁאֵיל בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא וּפַשְּׁטוּהָ מֵהָא דא"ר שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָנִי א"ר יוֹחָנָן ס"ת שֶׁחָסֵר יְרִיעָה אֶחָת אֵין קוֹרִין בּוֹ וְלָא הִיא הָתָם מֵחָסֵר בְּמִילְּתֵיהּ הָכָא לָא מֵחָסֵר בְּמִילְּתֵיהּ רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַרְוַיְיהוּ אֵין קוֹרְאִין בְּחוּמְשִׁין בְּבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹד צִבּוּר
The people of the Galilee sent a question to Rabbi Ḥelbo: What is the halakha with regard to reading from ḥumashim, i.e., scrolls containing only one of the five books of the Torah, in the synagogue in public? Is this permitted, or is it necessary to read from a complete Torah scroll? An answer was not readily available to him. He came and asked Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa, but an answer was not readily available to him either. Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa came and asked this question in the study hall, and they resolved the difficulty from that which Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to a Torah scroll that is missing even one sheet of parchment, one may not read from it in public. This indicates that an incomplete Torah scroll may not be used for a public Torah reading. The Gemara rejects this argument: But that is not so, i.e., this cannot serve as a proof to the matter at hand. There, it is lacking part of the matter it is addressing, as a sheet of parchment is missing, whereas here, it is not lacking part of the matter it is addressing, as it contains a complete book. Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: One does not read from ḥumashim in the synagogue out of respect for the community.
It is noteworthy that kevod ha-tsibbur appears several other times in the halakhic literature,but in each of these other cases the reasoning is clear – although varied. For example, because of kevod ha-tsibbur, it is forbidden to read from an incomplete sefer Torah - even if it is a parchment scroll containing a whole humash (fifth of the Torah). Doing so gives the impression that the community is lax about the fulfillment of basic communal mitsvot – it has money for everything else but not for a whole sefer Torah. Applying the same principle, it is improper to roll the sefer Torah or undrape the Torah lectern while the community waits idly by. The gabbaim should have prepared the Torah in advance and not try to save time at the community’s expense. Kevod ha-tsibbur is also invoked to require the ba’al keri’ahto read standing during the communal Megilla reading, which is only proper out of respect to the community he represents and serves. A minor kohen may not bless the congregation alone, nor may an adult in tattered clothing (pohe’ah) serve as hazzan (cantor), read from the Torah, or bless the people – all based on kevod hatsibbur. Finally, it is likewise forbidden for a community to appoint as their permanent hazzan one who lacks the signature ofadulthood and maturity of a full beard – which is at about 20 years old. In the latter cases it would be improper for a community to chose someone who is “only a kid” or who is dressed in tatters to represent them before the local temporal powers to be – a fortiori before the King of kings.
Questions to ponder:
1. How changeable is the idea of Kevod Ha-tsibbur?
2. Do all of the other examples really have "reasoning that is clear?"
3. Are all of the Talmud's examples still relevant?
4. Is Kevod Ha-tsibbur really about what outsiders might perceive?
ת"ר נִתְמַלֵּא זְקָנוֹ רָאוּי לֵיעָשׂוֹת שְׁלִיחַ צִיבּוּר וְלֵירֵד לִפְנֵי הַתֵּיבָה וְלִישָּׂא אֶת כַּפָּיו...
The Sages taught: If one’s beard is fully grown, he is fit to be appointed an emissary of the community for various matters, and to descend before the ark as a prayer leader, and to lift his hands for the Priestly Benediction...
(יא) אֵין מִמִּנְיַן שְׁלִיחַ צִבּוּר אֶלָּא גָּדוֹל שֶׁבַּצִּבּוּר בְּחׇכְמָתוֹ וּבְמַעֲשָׂיו. וְאִם הָיָה זָקֵן הֲרֵי זֶה מְשֻׁבָּח בְּיוֹתֵר. וּמִשְׁתַּדְּלִין לִהְיוֹת שְׁלִיחַ צִבּוּר אָדֹם שֶׁקּוֹלוֹ עֶרֶב וְרָגִיל לִקְרוֹת. וּמִי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְמַלֵּא זְקָנוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא חָכָם גָּדוֹל לֹא יְהֵא ש"ץ מִפְּנֵי כְּבוֹד צִבּוּר. אֲבָל פּוֹרֵס הוּא עַל שְׁמַע מִשֶּׁיָּבִיא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת אַחַר שְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנִים:
(11) None should be appointed as Reader to the Congregation unless he is reputed for his knowledge and exemplary conduct. If he is an old man, all the better. An endeavor should be made to secure one who has a pleasant voice and is accustomed to read. Anyone whose beard is not full grown, even though he is a great scholar, should, out of respect to the Congregation, not be appointed as the regular reader. But one may publicly recite the blessings before the Shema, as soon as the marks of puberty appear and one has passed the age of thirteen years.
(ו) אֵין מִמִּנְיָן אֶלָּא מִי שֶׁנִּתְמַלֵּא זְקָנוֹ מִפְּנֵי כְּבוֹד הַצִּבּוּר אֲבָל בְּאַקְרַאי מִשֶּׁהֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת יָכוֹל לֵירֵד לִפְנֵי הַתֵּיבָה וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְמַנֶּה מִפִּי הַצִּבּוּר אוֹ מִפִּי ש"צ הַמְּמַנֶּה אוֹתוֹ לְהָקֵל מֵעָלָיו לְהִתְפַּלֵּל בַּעֲדוֹ לְעֵתִים יְדוּעִים:
(6) We do not appoint anyone who does not have a full beard because of the honor of the congregation, but if by happenstance [something comes up], someone which has brought [i.e. grown] two hairs can go down before the Ark as long as he has not been appointed by the congregation or by the [regular] leader appointing him to relieve him to pray for him for defined occasions.
בית חדש אורח חיים סימן נג
ולפע"ד נִרְאֶה דְּאַף לְהָרַמְבַּ"ם וְהָרַשְׁבָּ"א לֹא מְהַנֵּי מְחִילַת הַצִּבּוּר, דָּאֵין פֵּירוּשׁ מִפְּנֵי כְּבוֹד הַצִּבּוּר שֶׁהוּא כְּנֶגֶד כְּבוֹדָם לִפְנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם שֶׁתּוֹעִיל בּוֹ מְחִילַת הַצִּבּוּר, אֶלָּא פֵּירוּשׁוֹ שֶׁאֵין זֶה כְּבוֹד הַצִּבּוּר שֶׁיְּשַׁלְּחוּ לְפָנָיו יִתְעַלֶּה מִי שֶׁאֵין לוֹ הַדְרַת פָּנִים לְהָלִיץ עַל הַצִּבּוּר...אֶלָּא הַדָּבָר פָּשׁוּט כֵּיוָן שֶׁכָּךְ תִּקְּנוּ חֲכָמִים דְּחָשְׁשׁוּ לִכְבוֹד צִבּוּר אֵין בְּיַד הַצִּבּוּר לִמְחוֹל. וְתוּ דְּאִם כֵּן כֹּל הָנֵי תַּקָּנוֹת שֶׁתִּקְּנוּ חֲכָמִים מִפְּנֵי כְּבוֹד צִבּוּר שֶׁלֹּא לִגְלוֹל סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה בְּצִבּוּר...אִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר דְּרַשָּׁאִין לִמְחוֹל, א"כ לֹא הוֹעִילוּ בְּתַקָּנָתָם !כְּלוּם, דְּכֹל צִבּוּר יִהְיוּ מוֹחֲלִים
Bah Orah Hayyim 53
Rather the matter is simple, because the Sages made the takanah this way due to their concern for the dignity of the community, and the community does not have the power to waive it. And further, if they did, all of these takanot of the Sages involving the dignity of the community, such as not rolling the Torah scroll in public (Yoma 60a, Sotah 41a); not allowing a woman to read (Megilah 23a); and not allowing a person whose legs are exposed to raise his hands and bless (ibid., 24a) — for it is a denigration to the community, as is a minor raising his hands to bless (ibid.), since the dignity of the community cannot be subordinate to his blessing — if you say that they are allowed to waive their dignity, then the takanot would not have helped at all, because every community would waive it. And further, the Jewish people would become balkanized, this community waiving their dignity and this community not. Rather, it is surely not in their power to give up their dignity and uproot the Sages’ ruling
(יז) אִשָּׁה לֹא תִּקְרָא בְּצִבּוּר מִפְּנֵי כְּבוֹד הַצִּבּוּר. קָטָן הַיּוֹדֵעַ לִקְרוֹת וְיוֹדֵעַ לְמִי מְבָרְכִין עוֹלֶה מִמִּנְיַן הַקּוֹרְאִים. וְכֵן מַפְטִיר עוֹלֶה מֵהַמִּנְיָן שֶׁהֲרֵי הוּא קוֹרֵא בַּתּוֹרָה. וְאִם הִפְסִיק שְׁלִיחַ צִבּוּר בְּקַדִּישׁ בֵּין מַשְׁלִים וּבֵין הַמַּפְטִיר אֵינוֹ עוֹלֶה מִן הַמִּנְיָן. צִבּוּר שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בָּהֶם יוֹדֵעַ לִקְרוֹת אֶלָּא אֶחָד עוֹלֶה וְקוֹרֵא וְיוֹרֵד וְחוֹזֵר וְקוֹרֵא שְׁנִיָּה וּשְׁלִישִׁית עַד שֶׁיִּגְמֹר מִנְיַן הַקּוֹרְאִים שֶׁל אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם:
(17) A woman should not read the Law at a congregational service, out of respect to the congregation. A minor who can read and understands to whom the blessings are offered may be counted in the number of those who read the Law. The person who reads the lesson from the Prophets is also counted in their number, since he reads in the Torah as well. If, however, the reader of the congregation intervened with the recital of Kaddish between the reader of the concluding section of the Pentateuchal portion for the day and the reader of the lesson from the Prophets, the latter is not counted in the number of those who read the Law. In a congregation where there is only one individual competent to read, he goes up to the reading-desk, reads a section, goes down, then goes up again and reads a second section, does the same a third time and so on till he has completed the number of those who should have read that day.
If there is a distinction between this language and the baraita of Gemara Megillah 23a, as is suggested by many in Frimer footnote 259, what does that say about the Gemara there? Can the Frimers have it both ways?
אִם רָצוּ הַצִּבּוּר לִמְחוֹל עַל כְּבוֹדָם נִרְאֶה שֶׁהָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדָם...
חסדי דוד, תוספתא מגילה, פ"ג, ד"ה הכל עולין
"וְנִרְאֶה <דעכ"פ> דְּעַל כׇּל פָּנִים, אִם עָלְתָה, לֹא תֵּרֵד הוֹאִיל וּמִדִּינָא עוֹלֶה לַמִּנְיָן..."
Hasdei David, (R. David Pardo) Tosefta Megilla, 3, (18th C Venice)
And it seems that in any case, if she was called up, she shall not step down, for according to the law, she is part of the quorum of seven…"
שו"ת מהר"ם מרוטנברג חלק ד (דפוס פראג) סימן קח
ועיר שכולה כהנים ואין בה [אפי'] ישראל אחד נ"ל דכהן קורא פעמים ושוב יקראו נשים דהכל משלימי' למנין ז' אפי' עבד ושפחה וקטן (מגילה כ"ג ע"א) ופי' רבי' שמחה זצ"ל דלאו דוקא למנין ז' אלא אפי' לשלשה דתנן סתמא בפ"ג דמגילה (כ"ד ע"א) קטן קורא בתורה [ומתרגם] ונהי דמסיק עלה אבל אמרו חכמי' לא תקרא אשה בתורה מפני כבוד הצבור היכא דלא אפשר ידחה כבוד .הצבור מפני פגם כהנים הקוראים שלא יאמרו בני גרושות הם
Responsa R. Meir of Rothenburg 4:108 (Prague edition), Germany, 13th c.
And in a town whose residents are all kohanim and there is not even one Yisrael, it seems to me that a kohen should read twice and then women should read the rest, for all complete the quorum of 7…and R. Simhah explained that this refers not only to the quorum of 7 but also to the quorum of 3, for the Mishnah states simply: A minor may read from the Torah." And even though the Talmud concludes that the sages said that a woman should not read because of the honor of the congregation, in a case where there is no alternative, let the honor of the congregation yield to the concern that we will defame the kohanim, so that people will not say they are the children of divorcées (and therefore no longer valid kohanim
[The Bah says that] just as a community should choose the imposing figure over the wise man to represent it before the Lord, so the congregation should not denigrate qeri’at ha-Torah by performing it through women. This line of thought is out of tune with modern perceptions…Jewish women are widely represented in the professions, including those, such as law and public office, which demand that they act as representatives and advocates for others…Does it make sense to accept as halakhah an opinion that is based on anachronistic cultural presumptions? It is, to say the least, ironic that many of those would would today rely on Bah to exclude women from qeri’at ha-Torah reject his position with respect to young, beardless ba’alei tefillah, and permit, if not encourage, the young to participate in leading the service…To recapitulate, there appears to be sound halakhic basis for the argument that…in synagogues where there is a consensus that a woman’s torah reading does not violate community standards of dignity, women may be permitted to read the Torah (or at least portions of it) as well. The only serious objection to qeri’at ha-Torah by women is the one raised by the baraita, namely that women’s Torah reading violates kevod ha-tsibbur, and kevod ha-tsibbur should be regarded as a relative, waivable objection that is not universally applicable.
What about כבוד הבריות?
תָּא שְׁמַע: גָּדוֹל כְּבוֹד הַבְּרִיּוֹת שֶׁדּוֹחֶה [אֶת] לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה. וְאַמַּאי? לֵימָא ״אֵין חׇכְמָה וְאֵין תְּבוּנָה וְאֵין עֵצָה לְנֶגֶד ה׳״! תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַב בַּר שְׁבָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא בְּלָאו דְּ״לֹא תָסוּר״. אֲחִיכוּ עֲלֵיהּ, לָאו דְּ״לֹא תָסוּר״ דְאוֹרָיְיתָא הִיא?! אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: גַּבְרָא רַבָּה אָמַר מִילְּתָא, לָא תְּחִיכוּ עֲלֵיהּ. כׇּל מִילֵּי דְרַבָּנַן אַסְמְכִינְהוּ עַל לָאו דְּ״לֹא תָסוּר״, וּמִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ שְׁרוֹ רַבָּנַן. תָּא שְׁמַע: ״וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ מֵהֶם״ — פְּעָמִים שֶׁאַתָּה מִתְעַלֵּם מֵהֶם, וּפְעָמִים שֶׁאֵין אַתָּה מִתְעַלֵּם מֵהֶם.
The Gemara cites an additional proof from a baraita: Come and hear: Great is human dignity, as it overrides a prohibition in the Torah. The Gemara asks: Why? Let us also say here: “There is neither wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against the Lord.” Rav bar Shaba interpreted this prohibition, which is overridden by human dignity, before Rav Kahana as referring to the prohibition of: “According to the Torah taught to you and the ruling handed down to you, you shall do, you shall not deviate to the left or the right from that which they tell you” (Deuteronomy 17:11). The Yeshiva students laughed at him, as the prohibition of “you shall not deviate” is by Torah law, like all other Torah prohibitions. Why should human dignity override it any more than any other Torah prohibition? Rav Kahana replied to them: A great man has spoken, do not laugh at him. The Sages based all rabbinic law on the prohibition of “you shall not deviate”; however, due to concern for human dignity, the Sages permitted suspension of rabbinic law in cases where the two collide. All rabbinic decrees are predicated on the mitzva in the Torah to heed the judges in each generation and to never stray from their words. Therefore, when the Sages suspend a decree in the interest of preserving human dignity, human dignity is overriding a Torah prohibition. In any case, it only overrides rabbinic decrees. The Gemara cites an additional proof from a baraita: Come and hear: With regard to the laws of returning a lost object, it is stated: “You shall not see the ox of your brother or his sheep go astray and ignore them; return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1). The baraita explains that the seemingly extraneous expression and disregard them must be understood to give license that at times you disregard lost objects and at times you do not disregard them.
One should note a significant change in the manner of speaking between the Jerusalem Talmud and the Babylonian Talmud. The Jerusalem Talmud does not mention Kvod Habriyot but rather Kvod Harabim. It might be that this linguistic change reduces the scope of Kvod Habriyot, and establishes that the value of Kvod Habriyot should be kept only in cases where offending Kvod Hayahid will result in offending the dignity of the many. Namely, since the presence of a naked person in the marketplace offends the dignity of those present, one should avoid asking a person to remove his cloths in the middle of the marketplace, but not due to one's dignity as an individual. However, it is possible that this different manner of speaking broadens the scope of Kvod Habriyot by emphasizing that the dignity of the individual is also the dignity of the many, because the humiliation of the individual causes the humiliation of the entire human race. By this interpretation, the person is prohibited from forfeiting personal dignity, for by so doing a person is forfeiting the dignity of the many.
(ט) וְכֵן יֵשׁ לוֹ לִכְפּוֹת יָדַיִם וְרַגְלַיִם וְלֶאֱסֹר בְּבֵית הָאֲסוּרִים וְלִדְחֹף וְלִסְחֹב עַל הָאָרֶץ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (עזרא ז כו) "הֵן לְמוֹת הֵן לִשְׁרשִׁי הֵן לַעֲנָשׁ נִכְסִין וְלֶאֱסוּרִין":
(י) כָּל אֵלּוּ הַדְּבָרִים לְפִי מַה שֶּׁיִּרְאֶה הַדַּיָּן שֶׁזֶּה רָאוּי לְכָךְ וְשֶׁהַשָּׁעָה צְרִיכָה. וּבַכּל יִהְיוּ מַעֲשָׂיו לְשֵׁם שָׁמַיִם וְאַל יִהְיֶה כְּבוֹד הַבְּרִיּוֹת קַל בְּעֵינָיו שֶׁהֲרֵי הוּא דּוֹחֶה אֶת לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁל דִּבְרֵיהֶם וְכָל שֶׁכֵּן כְּבוֹד בְּנֵי אַבְרָהָם יִצְחָק וְיַעֲקֹב הַמַּחֲזִיקִין בְּתוֹרַת הָאֱמֶת שֶׁיִּהְיֶה זָהִיר שֶׁלֹּא יַהֲרֹס כְּבוֹדָם אֶלָּא לְהוֹסִיף בִּכְבוֹד הַמָּקוֹם בִּלְבַד שֶׁכָּל הַמְבַזֶּה אֶת הַתּוֹרָה גּוּפוֹ מְחֻלָּל עַל הַבְּרִיּוֹת וְהַמְכַבֵּד אֶת הַתּוֹרָה גּוּפוֹ מְכֻבָּד עַל הַבְּרִיּוֹת. וְאֵין כְּבוֹד הַתּוֹרָה אֶלָּא לַעֲשׂוֹת עַל פִּי חֻקֶּיהָ וּמִשְׁפָּטֶיהָ:
"Similarly, [a judge] has the right to bind one's hands and feet, imprison him in jail, push and drag on the ground… With regard to everything, his actions must be for the sake of Heaven. He may not take human dignity [kevod ha-beriyot] lightly, for it overrides rabbinic prohibitions, and certainly the dignity of the children of Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov who bear the true Torah…"
[Private] Women's Torah Readings
(ט) כל הטמאים אפילו נדות מותרים לאחוז בס"ת ולקרות בו והוא שלא יהיו ידיהם מטונפות או מלוכלכות:
All of those who are ritually impure (temeim), even menstruating women (nidot), are permitted to hold a sefer torah and to read from it, provided that their hands are not filthy or dirty.
(ח) כל הטמאין ואפילו נדות ואפילו כותי, מותר לאחוז ספר תורה ולקרות בו; שאין דברי תורה מקבלין טומאה. והוא שלא יהיו ידיו מטונפות או מלוכלכות בטיט, אלא ירחצו ידיהם ואח"כ יגעו בו.
Any impure person, even [a woman in] a niddah state or a gentile, may hold a Torah scroll and read it. The words of Torah do not contract ritual impurity. This applies when one's hands are not soiled or dirty with mud. [In the latter instance,] one should wash one's hands and then touch the scroll.
Negative Minhagim
Don't we need unanimous consent to change minhagim (if we can at all)?
(א) הַפֵּאָה נִתֶּנֶת בִּמְחֻבָּר לַקַּרְקָע. בְּדָלִית וּבְדֶקֶל, בַּעַל הַבַּיִת מוֹרִיד וּמְחַלֵּק לָעֲנִיִּים. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, אַף בַּחֲלִיקֵי אֱגוֹזִים. אֲפִלּוּ תִשְׁעִים וְתִשְׁעָה אוֹמְרִים לְחַלֵּק וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר לָבוֹז, לָזֶה שׁוֹמְעִין, שֶׁאָמַר כַּהֲלָכָה:
(1) Peah is given from [the crop] while it is still connected with the soil. But in the case of hanging vine-branches and the date-palm, the owner brings down [the fruit] and distributes it among the poor. Rabbi Shimon says: the same applies to smooth nut trees. Even if ninety-nine [of the poor] say [to the owner] to distribute it and one says to leave it in the field, this latter is listened to, since he spoke in accordance with the halakhah.
Is this Mishnah at all relevant, despite Rav Henkin's view (Response to "Women's Aliyot In Contemporary Synagogues" pgs.102-103)? If we differentiate between private homes and public places, like the Sefer ha-Batim does, does this mean that consent need be unanimous?
http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/english/tfila/frimmer1.htm#star
R. Eliezer Berkovits and Justice Menahem Elon question the very premise [that the innovation of women's prayer groups violate minhag], namely, that the absence of women's tefilla groups, hakafot or Megilla readings in previous generations establishes a minhag that they are prohibited. The lack of such practices over the past centuries was not the result of any deliberate determination; rather, it merely demonstrates that there was no social need for them.The situation would be analogous to the institution of Bat Mitsvah celebrations, which were unheard of in Orthodox Jewish circles several decades ago, yet now enjoy the approval of leading posekim...
There is a major debate among aharonim regarding a situation in which a community regularly and consistently (ragil u-matsui) refrains from acting in a certain manner-although the action is essentially halakhically permissible. Does such passive behavior, in and of itself, in the absence of a pre-existing pesak halakha le-issur (a restrictive halakhic ruling), constitute a communally binding prohibitive custom (lo ra'inu ra'aya be-minhag), or perhaps not (lo ra'inu eino ra'aya)? Even according to those who answer in the affirmative, the community's passive behavior creates a minhag only when such inaction resulted from a deliberate and conscious decision. It is not sufficient that the community simply did not act; it had to have decided not to act. Moreover, the reason for the decision to refrain from a particular activity must be rooted in the desire for greater halakhic scrupulousness.
In light of these principles, the lack of women's prayer groups in previous generations cannot serve as the basis for a binding minhag. While the non-appearance of women's tefilla groups in previous generations is obviously passive behavior, there is no evidence-or even a claim-that it resulted from any form of halakhic ruling. Similarly, it was not the consequence of any deliberate or conscious decision to refrain from establishing women-only tefillot-it was simply not done. And finally, the absence of women's services in the past had little to do with halakhic stringency, especially in light of the reality that most women rarely attended shul at all!
The fact is, however, that women's prayer groups, in which one woman leads many others in prayer, have been around in one form or another ever since the Jews crossed the Red Sea. On the verse, ". . . And Miriam sang unto them . . .", the Mekhilta states that just as Moses led the men in song and praise of God, Miriam, his sister, led the women. Midrash Or haAfeila posits that with the words recited first by Miriam and then her female entourage, "Sing ye to the Lord, for He is highly exalted," Jewish women accepted upon themselves the obligation of daily prayer. Finally, a commentary attributed to R. Sa'adya Gaon notes that Miriam sang the 18 verses of the Red Sea song and the women repeated them, just as the hazzan recites the 18 benedictions of the shemone esrei to which the community answers amen. All the above texts suggest that women's praying together-even with a female precentor-has clear roots in Jewish tradition.
Records show that throughout the Middle Ages, certain women were noted because they led groups of women in prayer. This institution continued in Europe, and the female precentor later became known as the firzogerin (foresayer), foreleiner (forereader) or zogerke (female sayer). The latter were generally educated and highly literate women who chanted or sang aloud prayers, Psalms and tehinot (supplications), some of which were original compositions. Among Sephardic Jews, on the other hand, there are traditions of a regular women's service with a hazzanit and keriat haTorah. Thus, the late Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Haifa, R. Joseph Messas, writes:
The wont of righteous women is to rise earlier than their husbands and prepare them coffee, then wake them up to worship their Creator and hand them the coffee to restitute their minds, to have kavvana in their prayer. . . . And I saw in a book that in some places in Spain, the "kosher" and learned women used to rise very early to [go to] their synagogue (beit ha-kenesset she-la-hen), and pray together (mit-pallelot be-tsibbur), and appoint one of them as shelihat tsibbur, and take out a sefer Torah; and some of them used to don tefillin, and everyone was wrapped in a tallit, and they used to do so on the Sabbath and Holidays, too. And afterwards they used to return to their homes and wake up their husbands and their sons to get up and pray. And this they used to do as a stringency which they undertook, since women are exempt from time-bound mitsvot, so they will have time to prepare their husbands' needs. And that is why they used to rise early for prayer while their husbands were still asleep. And this settles the correct meaning of the verse, "A nation that rises as a lioness and as a lion" (Numbers 23:24); the female is mentioned first, before the male, for as we have said, both the man and the woman used to rise to worship their Creator, but the woman before the man.
The Irony of Rupture and Reconstruction
Poignantly, one prominent recent source offered the theme of the mimetic versus the text as support for limitations on women's roles. In 2017, a collective halakhic response signed by seven prominent American Orthodox rabbis, six of them affiliated with Yeshiva University, forbade women from serving as synagogue clergy. Responding to a query from the Orthodox Union (OU), key support for the prohibition was put forward based on the concept of masora, handed-down tradition: "[I]t must be assumed . . . that normative practice reflects a baseline truth that must be grappled with when innovations are suggested. Great caution must be employed before altering mesoratyisra'el."9 The footnote to these sentences comments, "Dr. Haym Soloveitchik has written extensively on the strength of 'minhag'-common practice-as a determining factor in halakhic inquiry." The irony is that in his studies of both medieval Ashkenaz and contemporary Judaism, "common practice" is mostly more lenient than the plain understanding of formal legal writings, and therefore begs exegetical justification.10 Here, by contrast, the authors of the responsum drafted Soloveitchik as precedent for banning a behavior even if compelling textual backing existed. In this case, it is the mimetic-like that was sanctified within a new text to protect the stricter tradition from the broader interpretative possibilities of the canonic written word.