צדק צדק תרדוף
הדף מאת: שירה ר / מרכז יעקב הרצוג
במפגש זה נבחן את מידת החסד לעומת מידת הדין. נשאל, תוך עיון במקורות מן המקרא, התלמוד ומידע משפטי, מהו "צדק", מהו "משפט" ומהי "אמת", ובעיקר נבקש למצוא את האיזון הנכון ביניהם.
א. אברהם אבינו מול יונה בן אמיתי
יונה פרק ז, פסוקים א-יא
וַיַּרְא הָאֱלֹהִים אֶת מַעֲשֵׂיהֶם [=של בני נינווה שחזרו בתשובה] כִּי שָׁבוּ מִדַּרְכָּם הָרָעָה; וַיִּנָּחֶם הָאֱלֹהִים עַל הָרָעָה אֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר לַעֲשׂוֹת לָהֶם - וְלֹא עָשָׂה. וַיֵּרַע אֶל-יוֹנָה רָעָה גְדוֹלָה; וַיִּחַר לוֹ. ב וַיִּתְפַּלֵּל אֶל-ה' וַיֹּאמַר, אָנָּה ה' הֲלוֹא זֶה דְבָרִי עַד הֱיוֹתִי עַל אַדְמָתִי עַל-כֵּן קִדַּמְתִּי לִבְרֹחַ תַּרְשִׁישָׁה, כִּי יָדַעְתִּי כִּי אַתָּה אֵל-חַנּוּן וְרַחוּם, אֶרֶךְ אַפַּיִם וְרַב-חֶסֶד, וְנִחָם עַל-הָרָעָה. ג וְעַתָּה ה' קַח נָא אֶת-נַפְשִׁי מִמֶּנִּי כִּי טוֹב מוֹתִי מֵחַיָּי.
"ה' אֵל רַחוּם וְחַנּוּן אֶרֶךְ אַפַּיִם וְרַב חֶסֶד וֶאֱמֶת.."
And the LORD passed by before him, and proclaimed: ‘The LORD, the LORD, God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth;
(כג) וַיִּגַּשׁ אַבְרָהָם וַיֹּאמַר: הַאַף תִּסְפֶּה צַדִּיק עִם-רָשָׁע? (כד) אוּלַי יֵשׁ חֲמִשִּׁים צַדִּיקִם בְּתוֹךְ הָעִיר; הַאַף תִּסְפֶּה וְלֹא-תִשָּׂא לַמָּקוֹם לְמַעַן חֲמִשִּׁים הַצַּדִּיקִם אֲשֶׁר בְּקִרְבָּהּ? (כה) חָלִלָה לְּךָ מֵעֲשֹׂת כַּדָּבָר הַזֶּה, לְהָמִית צַדִּיק עִם-רָשָׁע, וְהָיָה כַצַּדִּיק כָּרָשָׁע; חָלִלָה לָּךְ הֲשֹׁפֵט כָּל-הָאָרֶץ לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה מִשְׁפָּט?
And Abraham drew near, and said: ‘Will You indeed sweep away the righteous with the wicked? Peradventure there are fifty righteous within the city; wilt Thou indeed sweep away and not forgive the place for the fifty righteous that are therein? That be far from Thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, that so the righteous should be as the wicked; that be far from Thee; shall not the judge of all the earth do justly?’
דיון
סיפורי אברהם ויונה מציגים שתי דמויות נבואיות שמתמודדות עם מצב דומה, בו אלוהים מגלה להם את כוונתו להשמיד "עיר של רשעים", אך בוחרות להגיב בדרך שונה;
  • גם אברהם וגם יונה מבקשים להעביר ביקורת על דרך שיפוטו של אלוהים, מהי הטענה של כל אחד מהם, ומה עומד בבסיסה?
  • כיצד, לדעתכם, אברהם ויונה מפרשים את המושג "צדק" ו"אמת"?
  • עם איזו גישה אתם מזדהים יותר, ומדוע?
ב. משפט צדק
אהרון ברק, גבולות המשפט והשיפוט, בתוך: אמילי בליסקי ואביגדור שנאן (עורכים) גבולות של קדושה בחברה בהגות ובאומנות, הוצאת כתר, עמ' 118
למשפט אין גבולות. מלוא כל הארץ משפט. בכל משפט. כל התנהגות אנושית היא נשוא למשפט. אין תחום בו אין משפט.
תהלים פרק ב, פסוקים ב-ד
עַד מָתַי תִּשְׁפְּטוּ עָוֶל וּפְנֵי רְשָׁעִים תִּשְׂאוּ סֶלָה.

שִׁפְטוּ דַל וְיָתוֹם עָנִי וָרָשׁ הַצְדִּיקוּ.

פַּלְּטוּ דַל וְאֶבְיוֹן מִיַּד רְשָׁעִים הַצִּילוּ.

מילים
  • פני רשעים תשאו - תעדיפו את הרשעים ותעוותו את המשפט.
  • פלטו - הצילו.
אסור לבית דין לרחם על מי שנתחייב, שלא יאמרו: האיש הזה הוא עני, שלא בכוונה עשה. אלא הוא חייב לעמוד במה שנגזר עליו בכל מה שיש לו, בלא חנינה, שנאמר: "וְלֹא תָחוֹס עֵינֶךָ" (דברים י"ט, כ"א)... על זה הזהירה התורה בפסוק: "וְדָל לֹא תֶהְדַּר בְּרִיבוֹ" (שמות כ"ג, ג'), ונאמר: "לֹא-תִשָּׂא פְנֵי-דָל" (ויקרא י"ט, ט"ו).
A king of Israel must not be seated among the Sanhedrin, since it is unlawful to disagree with him or to defy him. But a high priest may be given a seat on the Sanhedrin, provided he is well qualified in terms of wisdom.
אמר ר' יוחנן: לא חרבה ירושלים עד שביססו השופטים את דיניהם בדיוק על חוקי התורה, ולא חרגו מהם אפילו מעט לטובת הנאשם, כלומר לא נהגו לפנים משורת הדין.
there shall be no needy among you” (Deuteronomy 15:4). This verse can be understood as a command, indicating that it is incumbent upon each individual to ensure that he will not become needy. Therefore, your assets take precedence over the assets of any other person. The Gemara concludes: Rather, the verse is necessary to derive the exemption from returning the lost item in the case where he was an elderly person and it is not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item. Rabba says: If there was a lost animal and the elderly person began the process of returning it, e.g., if he struck it even once to guide it in a certain direction, he is obligated to tend to it and return it. The Gemara relates: Abaye was sitting before Rabba and saw these goats standing nearby. He picked up a clod of dirt and threw it at them, causing them to move. Rabba said to him: You have thereby obligated yourself to return them. Arise and return them to their owner. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In a case of a person for whom it is his typical manner to return an item of that type in the field, where there are fewer onlookers, but it is not his typical manner to return an item of that type in the city, what is the halakha? Do we say that for one to be obligated to return a lost item we need an unequivocal obligation to return it that applies in all cases, and since it is not his typical manner to return an item of that sort in the city, let him not be obligated to return such an item at all? Or perhaps, he is obligated in any event to return the item in the field, and once he is obligated to return it in the field, he is also obligated in the city. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved. Rava says: In any case where he would recover his own item and would consider it to be in keeping with his dignity, he is also obligated to return another’s item. And any case where he unloads and loads his own animal’s burden, he is also obligated to unload and load the burden of another’s animal. The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was walking on the road. A certain man encountered him, and that man was carrying a burden that consisted of sticks of wood. He set down the wood and was resting. The man said to him: Lift them for me and place them upon me. Since it was not in keeping with the dignity of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, to lift the wood, Rabbi Yishmael said to him: How much are they worth? The man said to him: A half-dinar. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, gave him a half-dinar, took possession of the wood, and declared the wood ownerless. The man then reacquired the wood and again requested that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, lift the wood for him. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, again gave him a half-dinar, again took possession of the wood, and again declared the wood ownerless. He then saw that the man desired to reacquire the sticks of wood. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to him: I declared the sticks of wood ownerless with regard to everyone else, but I did not declare them ownerless with regard to you. The Gemara asks: But is property rendered ownerless in a case like this? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pe’a 6:1) that Beit Shammai say: Property declared ownerless for the poor is thereby rendered ownerless. And Beit Hillel say: It is not ownerless, until the property will be ownerless for the poor and for the rich, like produce during the Sabbatical Year, which is available for all. As the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, how could Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, declare the wood ownerless selectively, excluding the prior owner of the wood? Rather, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, actually declared the wood ownerless to everyone without exception, and it was with a mere statement that he prevented him from reacquiring the wood, i.e., he told the man not to reacquire the wood even though there was no legal impediment to that reacquisition. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, an elderly person and it was not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item? Why did he purchase the wood and render it ownerless in order to absolve himself of the obligation to lift the burden if he had no obligation to do so in the first place? The Gemara answers: In the case of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, he conducted himself beyond the letter of the law, and he could have simply refused the request for help. The Gemara cites a source for going beyond the letter of the law in the performance of mitzvot. As Rav Yosef taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And you shall teach them the statutes and the laws, and shall show them the path wherein they shall walk and the action that they must perform” (Exodus 18:20). The baraita parses the various directives in the verse. “And you shall teach them,” that is referring to the structure of their livelihood, i.e., teach the Jewish people trades so that they may earn a living; “the path,” that is referring to acts of kindness; “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill; “wherein,” that is referring to burial; “and the action,” that is referring to acting in accordance with the letter of the law; “that they must perform,” that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law. The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said: With regard to the phrase “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill. The Gemara asks: That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The Gemara answers: The reference to visiting the ill is necessary only for the contemporary of the ill person, as the Master said: When one who is a contemporary of an ill person visits him, he takes one-sixtieth of his illness. Since visiting an ill contemporary involves contracting a bit of his illness, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to go and visit him. It was taught in the baraita: With regard to the phrase “wherein,” that is referring to burial. The Gemara asks: That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The Gemara answers: The reference to burial is necessary only to teach the halakha of an elderly person, and it is in a circumstance where it is not in keeping with his dignity to bury the dead. Therefore, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to participate in the burial. It was taught in the baraita: “That they must perform”; that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Jerusalem was destroyed only for the fact that they adjudicated cases on the basis of Torah law in the city. The Gemara asks: Rather, what else should they have done? Should they rather have adjudicated cases on the basis of arbitrary decisions [demagizeta]? Rather, say: That they established their rulings on the basis of Torah law and did not go beyond the letter of the law. MISHNA: Which is the item that is considered lost property? If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, as presumably the owners are nearby and are aware of the animals’ whereabouts. If one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that ran through the vineyards, that is lost property. In a case where one returned the lost animal and it fled, and he again returned it and it fled, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to return it each time, as it is stated: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1). If in the course of tending to and returning the lost item, the finder was idle from labor that would have earned him a sela, he shall not say to the owner of the item: Give me a sela to compensate me for my lost income. Rather, the owner gives him his wage as if he were a laborer, a payment that is considerably smaller. If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. If there is no court there before whom can he stipulate his condition, his financial interests take precedence and he need not return the lost item. GEMARA: With regard to the question in the mishna: Which is the item that is considered lost property, the Gemara asks: Is that to say that all those other cases that we stated in this chapter are not lost property? Rav Yehuda said that this is what the tanna is saying: What is the principle employed in defining a lost item that one is obligated to return? The mishna cites examples to illustrate the principle: If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, and he is not obligated to return it. But if one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that was running through the vineyards, that is lost property, and he is obligated to return it. With regard to the ruling in the mishna that a donkey and cow grazing on the path are not considered lost property, the Gemara asks: And is that the case even if they graze there untended forever? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Until three days pass they are not lost. Thereafter, they are considered lost. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the animal is found grazing at night, even if it is untended for even one hour it can be presumed to be lost, as an owner never grazes his animals untended at night. If the animal is found grazing during the day, even if it is untended for more than three days, it is also not presumed to be lost. The Gemara answers: No, the measure of three days is necessary only in a case where one saw the animal grazing in the early hours in the morning and in the dark of nightfall. For the first three days, we say: It happened that the animal went out a bit earlier or a bit later than usual, but nevertheless, it was with the owner’s knowledge. Once this is observed for more than three days, it is certainly a lost item. This is also taught in a baraita: If one found a cloak or an ax
דיון
  • מה בין מידת הדין למידת הרחמים?
על פי דברי ר' יוחנן, בית המקדש חרב משום שבתי המשפט שפטו בצורה קרה בדיוק לפי החוקים, מבלי לחרוג מהם אפילו מעט, ולא נהגו 'לפנים משורת הדין' בעת הצורך.
  • האם צריכים השופטים לנהוג במקרים מסויימים לפנים מִשׁוּרת הדין ולהתגמש עם החוק, או שמא עליהם ללכת על פי דברי אהרון ברק שטוען ש"אין תחום בו אין משפט"?
  • דונו במונחים 'צדק', 'אמת', ו'משפט' ובמתח שביניהם. כיצד מונחים אלו מתקשרים למקורות שלפניכם?
ג. מידת הצדק ומידת האהבה
קדיש לוז, אבני דרך בקבוצה: קורות ותמורות. ת"א, תרבות וחינוך, 1962, עמ' 126
על מידות ויחסים בין בני האדם
כמה וכמה מידות אתה מוצא ביחסי בני - אדם: מידת האלימות, מידת הדין, מידת הרחמים , מידת הצדק ומידת האהבה. מידת הדין אינה אלא צורה מעודנת של מידת האלימות: האלימות אוהבת להתלבש באיצטלא של מידת הדין. מידת הרחמים - מה מושכת היא את הלב! אולם כמה אי-צדק יש בה! הרי מידת הרחמים מאשרת, לאמיתו של דבר, את קיום החזק והחלש, העשיר והדל. הירחם בחיים הממשיים, לא במטפיזיים, חלש ודל על חזק ועשיר? מידת הרחמים מניחה את קיום האלימות כדבר קבוע ועומד בעולם הזה. אין מידת הרחמים נאה אלא לקדוש ברוך הוא, ואילו אנו, בני אדם, נבחר במידות הצדק והאהבה. וכדי לקיים ביחסי בני- אדם את מידת האהבה יש להבטיח בראש ובראשונה את קיומו האיתן של הצדק כדבר אובייקטיבי שאינו תלוי ברצונו של האדם, בתהפוכותיו, במצב -רוחו וברחמיו. כל עוד עומדת בין בני -אדם זכותו של כל יחיד על קנין, שיש להגן עליו מפני הזולת - תלוי קיומה של מידת האהבה בנס [!!!]

הסברים
  • תכונתה של הקומונה - [לדעת קדיש לוז] יסודה של הקומונה, כרעיון העומד בבסיס יצירת הקיבוץ, טמון במיזוג הציווי המוסרי והאישי עם יצירת מסגרת אובייקטיבית לחיי צדק ואהבה.
מושגים
  • קדיש לוז - (1895 - 1972), איש ציבור, מראשי ההתיישבות העובדת בישראל. נמנה עם מייסדי דגניה ב' והיה חבר הקיבוץ עד יום מותו. היה חבר כנסת, שר החקלאות ויו"ר הכנסת.
דיון
  • קדיש לוז טוען כי "אין מידת הרחמים נאה אלא לקדוש ברוך הוא, ואילו אנו, בני אדם, נבחר במידות הצדק והאהבה". מה אתם חושבים על אמירה זו?
  • מהו, לדעתכם, האיזון הנכון בין הדין, הרחמים, הצדק והאהבה?
  • שתפו את חבריכם במקרה בו איזון זה הופר, מה הייתה תוצאה של "הפרה" זו?