Mishnayos Chullin Perek 2

Color Code:

Case: Black

Ruling: Green or Red

Name of opposing Tanna: Gold

Reason: Blue

Condition: Purple

Rule:Fuscia

Chapter 2

Chapter 2 has four main topics. The first two lay out the more intricate details of the Shechitah process. Namely, how much of the pipes need to be severed and identifying four additional actions that will disqualify a Shechita.

The third topic, is how to properly determine whether an animal, despite a proper Shechitah, died because of the Shechitah or on account of some other unrelated health or physical issue.

Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on the proper intent one must have when Shechting an animal, even if not a Korban.

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Mishnah 2:1

Shechting an animal requires the severing of the wind and food pipes or the majority of each. Whereas, for a bird it is sufficient to sever either one of the pipes, in fact, the majority of either one is also fine. Rabi Yehuda requires that, in a bird, the veins in the neck e severed as well.

You will notice that the second of half of the Mishnah seems to duplicate the first half. Per Albeck, this is proof that our Mishnah was edited and stitched together from two distinct sources.

Mishnah 2:2

Our Mishnah introduces us to the Pesul of D'rasah--pressing down on the knife rather than slicing with a smooth back and forth motion. The concern is that by applying undue pressure on the neck, rather than severing the pipe(s) you will dislodge or simply crush them.

The Mishnah first tells us that one may Shecht more than one animal at a time and we need not be concerned that he will press down on the necks. Second, the Mishnah teaches, that two people may Shecht an animal while simultaneously holding the knife--even if holding different parts of the knife--and we need not necessarily be concerned that hte jostling of the knife between will cause them to press down rather than cleanly sever the neck.

Mishnah 2:3

Our Mishnah makes three distinct points. First, continuing with the disqualification of D’rasah, the Mishnah clearly states that simply pressing down on the neck, thereby, severing the wind and food pipes invalidates the Shechita. Further, to avoid any undue pressure even when attempting a normal Shechita, unless the Shochet undertakes a back and forth motion, the knife needs to be at least a neck-width wider than the neck itself.

Second, the Mishnah teaches that while specific intent to Shecht is not needed, the Schechita action must begin with a conscious action and not the result of an accident. In other words, I can drop the knife and, if it serendipitously slices an animal’s neck, the Shechitah is valid. If the knife accidently drops and slices the animal’s neck, then the Shechita is invalid.

Finally, the Mishnah teaches that once the Shechitah process begins, it must take place without hesitation or delay. A delay (called Sh’hiya) of some minimal amount will invalidate the Shechita.

Mishnah 2 4

Our Mishnah describes two of the five Shechitah disqualifications and the status of an animal so disqualified. The first, Ikkur (tearing of the pipes) was introduced in Mishnah 1:2 The second, "Chaladah" is when you insert the knife into the neck and Shecht from the inside out (or otherwise cover up the knife during the Shechita process). Both of these disqualify the animal.

The status of the animal is a matter of dispute. Rabi Y'sheivav rules that, because they were improperly slaughtered, these animals are considered a Niveila and, hence, carry the higher level of Tumah. Rabi Akiva initially rules that they are a Treifa but subsequently changes his mind.

Rabi Y'sheivav imparts a rule that any animal improperly slaughtered (or if it dies on its own) is a Niveila, whereas, an animal that is properly slaughtered, even if it has a disease or other health issues, will be a Treifa.

Mishnah 2:5

This Mishnah serves, in part, as an introduction to the next Mishnah where we will discuss how the physical status of the animal may affect Schechita. Our Mishnah describes an animal from which no blood flows after is was Shechted and rules that the Shechita is valid and we need not be concerned that the animal died prior to the Shechita, thereby inhibiting blood flow.

The Mishnah then describes a dispute whether the meat of such an animal has become susceptible to becoming Tamei despite not having been wetted. Typically, food becomes susceptible to becoming Tamei when wetted by any one of seven enumerated liquids (i.e., wine, blood, oil, milk, dew, honey and water). The Tana Kama applies this rule and, therefore, states that one may eat the meat with "dirty hands"* and need not be concerned about making the meat Tamei.**

Rabi Shimon disagrees, arguing that if the Shechita is sufficient to make the animal kosher to eat it also makes it susceptible to becoming Tamei.

*The Chachomim decreed that unwashed hands are generally considered a second-level of Tumah and, therefore, absent washing of your hands you may not touch Terumah or Kodshim. Many of these details can be found in Mesechtas Yadayim.

**The Meforshim note that we must be describing a case where a person is trying to elevate his eating by treating his food as if it were Kodshim. Otherwise, there should be no concern whether he makes the food Tamei.

Mishnah 2:6

An old or sickly animal that no longer can lift itself into a standing position remains Kosher to eat, so long as it exhibits a modicum of strength. Identifying the touchstone for this determination is the subject of our Mishnah. The Mishnah details a dispute among the Tannaim regarding the telltale signs indicating that the animal, while sapped of strength, retains sufficient vitality to be considered Kosher.

Mishnah 2:7

Our Mishnah discusses the propriety of Shechting an animal on behalf of a non-Jew. The non-Jew’s ownership per se is not the issue. Yet, there remains two concerns. First, is whether the non-Jew’s intent, even if unspecified, in having the animal slaughtered is for idolatrous reasons. Such presumptive intent would prohibit any and all benefit derived from such meat. Second, and a more subtle distinction, is when a third-party is used to Shecht the animal, whose intent matters for these purposes. Is it the owner’s intent? The third-party who is acting upon the animal? Or, perhaps, both?

The Mishna preserves a three-way dispute amongst the Tana Kama, Rabi Eliezer and Rabi Yose. While the Gemara posits two alternative understandings of the Mishnah, the language of the Mishnah suggests that Tana Kama and Rabi Eliezer are arguing as to the propriety of the non-Jewish owner’s intent but agree that his intent would be attributable to the Shochet. Whereas, Rabi Yose holds that regardless of the Non-Jew’s intent, it never is attributable to the Shochet and, therefore, his intent is irrelevant. This is in line with the Talmud's first understanding.

Rabi Yose uses a “Kal V’Chomer” to buttress his argument. We find similar use of this Midrashic tool throughout Mishnayos.

The Talmud posits two understandings of Rabi Yose's Kal V'CHomer. Each, however, are not obvious from the text of the Mishnah itself. Rather, they require significant interpolations into the text to help explain Rabi Yose's point.

Albeck suggests a more simple reading of the Mishnah. Focusing on the fact that intent does,in fact, make a difference when it comes to idolatry, he suggests that the Mishnah is really focusing on the word "Pasul" while distinguishing between a Korban and Chullin. Albeck argues that the term Pasul arising from wrongful intent is a concept unique to the former and has no parallel when it comes to Chullin. Unlike, a Korban where a designation as Pasul condemns the Korban to being burned (see Temurah 7:6), if Chullin is deemed idolatrous, then it is prohibited to derive benefit but it is not "Pasul." (See Chullin 2:8 and 5:1-2, where the term Pasul is used in connection with Chullin being Shechted (i.e., an action) for an idolatrous purpose or in the Azarah or a violation of killing the mother and child animal on the same day).

Surveying other Kal V'chomer's in the Mishnah (see https://www.sefaria.org/sheets/204283) suggests that they can (and were) read more simply further supporting Albeck's suggested understanding of the Kal V'Chomer.

Mishnah 2:8

Following the prior Mishnah's focus on a non-Jew, our Mishnah discusses the status of a Jewish owned animal that is, nevertheless, Shechted for Idolatrous or related purposes.

The examples the Mishnah gives are of natural phenomena which themselves cannot are not considered idols. See Avodah Zara 3:5. Nevertheless, the Mishnah rules that he Shechita is deemed invalid and the meat cannot be eaten even if not wholly prohibited from deriving benefit.

Finally, the Mishnah notes that even if ne or more people are doing the actual Shechita, if one of them has improper intent, that is sufficient to invalidate the Shechita.

Mishnah 2:9

With the prior Mishnah focusing on the person's idolatrous intent, our Mishnah teaches that to avoid imitating pagan practices and to ensure no one mistakenly think he is Shechting his animal to various pagan gods or for idol worship, he must avoid Shechting his animal in certain places or from overtly collecting the blood. For instance, to avoid people thinking he is serving the god of the sea, Poseidon, he may not Shecht his animal over the open sea. Similarly, he should not collect the blood into a bowl or pit, lest people think he is going to use the blood in idol worship.

That the Chachomim were familiar with pagan ritual and practices is not surprising. For a survey of their familiarity, see S. Lieberman, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, pp. 128-138, esp. 134.

Mishnah 2:10

The final Mishnah of the Perek concerns itself with the status of an animal that is Shechted while intending that it be considered a Korban. The concern is not that he actually designated the animal as a Korban; rather we are concerned that his stated intent will confuse people into thinking that one may Shecht an animal for these purposes. While Rabi Shimon remains unconcerned, the Tana Kama distinguishes between types of Korbonos.

For those Korbonos that a person can generally voluntarily consecrate and dedicate, the Tana Kama remains concerned over perceived confsion and, therefore, invalidates the Shechita. For those Korbons that are obligatory and cannot be voluntarily designated, we assume people would know if such an obligation exists and, in their, absence, the Tana Kama is not concerned and the Shechita is valid.