. תלמוד בבלי מסכת סנהדרין דף לז עמוד א
לפיכך נברא אדם יחידי, ללמדך שכל המאבד נפש אחת מישראל - מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו איבד עולם מלא, וכל המקיים נפש אחת [מישראל] - מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו קיים עולם מלא. ומפני שלום הבריות, שלא יאמר אדם לחבירו אבא גדול מאביך, ושלא יהו המינים אומרים: הרבה רשויות בשמים. ולהגיד גדולתו של הקדוש ברוך הוא, שאדם טובע כמה מטבעות בחותם אחד - כולן דומין זה לזה, ומלך מלכי המלכים הקדוש ברוך הוא טבע כל אדם בחותמו של אדם הראשון - ואין אחד מהן דומה לחבירו. לפיכך כל אחד ואחד חייב לומר: בשבילי נברא העולם.
(BT Sanhedrin 37a) Therefore man was created as a single individual, to teach that anyone who destroys one individual is as if they have destroyed the world, and anyone who saves one individual is as if they have saved the word … accordingly, each person is obligated to say “the world was created for me.”
אמנם בניזקין מילתא אחריתי היא דעיקר ענין נזיקים היא גדר למ"ע ושמרתם מאוד לנפשותיכם ואל תעמוד על דם רעך וכתיב והיה עליך דמים עיין מסכתת מועד קטן דף ה' ע"א ושיער הקב"ה בחכמתו שאם יתחייב התם כך והמועד כך ובור כך ורגל כך וכדומה בזה נגדר הדבר וכל אחד ישמר נזקיו ואם אנו מסופקים אם קרן מחובר די לו בשמירת תם או בשמירת מועד ספיקו להחמיר וכן כל מה שאנו מסופקים בכוונת הקרא צריכים להחמיר מספק איסורא. אמנם שוב כל ספק שנולד אחר כך אם היה המעשה כך או כך או אם הלכ' כפלוני או כפלוני בזה אזלינן לקול' לנתבע ככל ספק ממונא אף על גב דאית ביה איסורא כנ"ל. ואתי שפיר דברי הרשב"א הנ"ל בעזה"י:
Although in Nizkin, the last word seems to be mainly a matter of damages, it is a fence for a positive commandment-- "You are to be very careful of your souls [bodies]" and "Do not stand on the blood of your peer" -- there will be blood upon you. If you look in Moad Katan 5a [you will find] that the Holy One Blessed Be He in His wisdom measured that [in this situation] there the responsibility is such, and the time is such, and in [these famous cases it is such], etc.
ושמואל אמר באפילה שנו - -ואע"ג דלעיל (בבא קמא דף כו:) מרבינן אונס כרצון באדם המזיק מפצע תחת פצע אונס גמור לא רבי רחמנא דהא בירושלמי פוטר אותו שישן ראשון אם הזיק לשני הבא אצלו לישן וכן בהגוזל בתרא (לקמן בבא קמא דף קיב.) גבי הניח להם אביהם פרה שאולה כסבורים של אביהם היא וטבחוה ואכלוה משלמין דמי בשר בזול שכך נהגו אבל מה שהזיקו לא דאנוסין הן ובמתניתין נמי תנן היה בעל חבית ראשון ובעל קורה אחרון דאם עמד בעל חבית ונשברה חבית בקורה פטור ונראה לדקדק דאדם המזיק דמפטר באונס (משום) שהוא כעין גניבה מדתניא בשלהי האומנים (ב"מ דף פב: ושם ד"ה וסבר) המעביר חבית ממקום למקום ושברה רבי יהודה אומר שומר חנם ישבע נושא שכר ישלם והשתא מדמחייב נושא שכר ופוטר שומר חנם ולא מחייב מטעם אדם המזיק ש"מ דבאונס דכעין גניבה אדם המזיק פטור ומדמה ר' יהודה נתקל לגניבה אבל באונס שהוא כעין אבידה שהיא קרובה לפשיעה יותר כדאמרינן בהשואל (ב"מ דף צד:) דגניבה קרובה לאונס ואבידה קרובה לפשיעה נראה דאדם המזיק חייב דא"א לומר שלא יתחייב אלא בפשיעה.
That speaks about someone who trips by himself, and not because something caused him to do so; whereas here, where he tripped because of an obstacle, and where he cannot be expected to have looked where he was going, he is considered an Oneis [guilty of unintentionally causing harm].
(c) Implied Question: Despite the fact that earlier (on 26b) based on the verse “a wound for a wound” the Gemara includes Oneis like Ratzon [purposefully causing harm] with regard to a man who hurts another?
(d) Answer: The verse does not include a complete Oneis.
1. Source #1: As we see in the Talmud Yerushalmi (2:8) - which exempts the person who lay down to sleep first, in the event that he wounds the person who lay down next to him
2. Source #2: Similarly, in another case (later, 112a) where ‘Their father left them a borrowed cow’, and where, thinking that it belonged to him, ‘they killed it and ate it’. The Talmud rules there that they are obligated to pay the value of the meat at a cheap rate, since they benefited from it; whereas if they damaged it, they are exempt.
3. Source #3: And the Mishnah too (later, on 32a) states that ‘If the owner of the barrel was in front and the owner of the beam behind him’, that ‘In the event that the former stopped (without warning) and the barrel is broken by the beam, the latter is exempt’..
(e) Oneis is like theft and loss of possession: It appears that person who causes damages is exempt when it is comparable to theft ...
(f) Source: (Bava Metzi’a, Daf 82b and Tosfos there DH ‘ve’Savar) In the case where ‘Someone transports a barrel from one location to another and it breaks, where Rebbi Yehudah rules that an unpaid guard swears and a paid guard must pay’.
1. Source (cont.): Now, since he obligates a paid guard and exempts an unpaid guard, and does not obligate the latter because of the case of a person who damages, we see that Oneis by a person who damages, which is comparable to theft, is exempt, and Rebbi Yehudah compares one who hinders another to theft.
(g) Oneis Like loss of possession: On the other hand, it would seem that Oneis, which is comparable to lost possessions, which in turn, is closer to negligence (as the Talmud says in Bava Metzi’a, 94b) ‘Theft is closer to Oneis and loss of possessions, than to negligence) by one who damages is obligated to pay.
1. Reason: Since it is impossible to say that one is only responsible for negligence alone.
(h) Proof: And so it implies earlier (on the first side of the page) where the Talmud declares responsible someone who falls off a roof in a storm wind, even though a one who watches something for free under the same circumstances is exempt.
1. Source: As the Talmud states (later on 45a) in the case of ‘Four guards who stand in for the owner’ each of whom is obligated to pay for the ox, with the exception of the unpaid guard.
2. Source (cont.): The Talmud explains that it speaks where they guarded the ox inadequately, in which case the unpaid guard's obligation is covered, but that of the others is not.
3. Proof (cont.): And it cites Rebbi Yehudah, who holds that by a Mu’ad, there will suffice an inadequate guarding - such as a door that can stand up to a regular wind but not to a storm wind.
4. Proof (concl.): So we see that, even though this will suffice by a unpaid guard, it will not suffice by one who causes damages.
(i) Reason: This is because it is comparable to loss of possession; whereas hindering is comparable to theft, and one who causes damages is therefore exempt.
(j) Proof: And this is also evident (later, on 99b-100a) in the case of ‘A professional butcher who spoiled the slaughter’, where, according to the opinion that exempts someone who slaughters free of charge.
1. Proof (cont.): From which we see that the Makshan thought that even free of charge he is responsible like a paid guard, who is responsible for loss.
(k) Conclusion: And the Talmud answers ‘Say “Because he is a paid guard” ‘. Therefore for payment, he is responsible; free of charge, he is exempt, because it is akin to theft (See Tosfos, Bava Metzi’a 82b ‘ve’Savar’ and Bava Basra 93b ‘Chayav’).
אסור להזיק ממון חבירו ולא לגרו' שום היזק ובו ט"ס
אסור להזיק ממון חבירו ואם הזיקו אע"פ שאינו נהנה חייב לשלם נזק שלם בין שהי' שוגג בין שהיה אנוס (ודווקא שאינו אנוס גמור כמו שיתבאר) כיצד נפל מהגג ושבר את הכלי או שנתקל כשהוא מהלך ונפל על הכלי ושברו חייב נזק שלם:
It is prohibited to damage the money of your friend, and if you do damage [it], even if you didn't benefit from it, you must pay it back completely, whether it was by accident or unintentional (and especially if it wasn't unintentional). If a vessel fell from the roof and shattered or they met while walking and he fell on the vessel and it broke, he is obligated to pay full damages.
הרואה את חבירו טובע בים או ליסטים באין עליו או חיה רעה באה עליו ויכול להצילו הוא בעצמו או שישכור אחרים להציל ולא הציל או ששמע עכו"ם או מוסרים מחשבים עליו רעה או טומנים לו פח ולא גילה אוזן חבירו והודיעו או שידע בעכו"ם או באנס שהו' בא על חבירו ויכול לפייסו בגלל חבירו ולהסיר מה שבלבו ולא פייסו וכיוצא בדברים אלו עובר על לא תעמוד על דם רעך:
קובץ שעורים בבא קמא אות פח
פח) [דף פ ע"א] מעשה בחסיד שהיה גונח ואמרו אין לו תקנה וכו'. והנה בכתובות דף ס' מבואר דגונח אין בו סכנה וגם הכא מוכח כן, דאי נימא שהיה מסוכן ודאי היה מותר לגדל דאין לך דבר העומד בפני פיקו"נ ובשיטה בשם המאירי כתב דהיה מסוכן, והיינו דכן משמע הלשון "אין לו תקנה" ומ"מ צריך להחמיר בזה כיון שהתקנה היא משום פסידא דאחריני, ותימה, דודאי איסור גזל הותר במקום סכנה.
There was a story with a pious person who was moaning, and they said there was no cure for him, etc. But in the writings of daf 80, it is clear that the one who is moaning is not in danger [of dying]. And this is proven-- if we say that he was in danger, obviously it would have been permissible to grow
Suppose that a judge or magistrate is faced with rioters demanding that a culprit be found for a certain crime and threatening otherwise to take their own bloody revenge on a particular section of the community. The real culprit being unknown, the judge sees himself as able to prevent the bloodshed only by framing some innocent person and having him executed. Beside this example is placed another in which a pilot whose aeroplane is about to crash is deciding whether to steer from a more to a less inhabited area. To make the parallel as close as possible it may rather be supposed that he is the driver of a runaway tram which he can only steer from one narrow track on to another; five men are working on one track and one man on the other; anyone on the track he enters is bound to be killed. In the case of the riots the mob has five hostages, so that in both the exchange is supposed to be one man’s life for the lives of five. The question is why we should say, without hesitation, that the driver should steer for the less occupied track, while most of us would be appalled at the idea that the innocent man could be framed.
. חזון איש, סנהדרין, סימן כה (רב אברהם ישעיה קרליץ 1878-1953
ויש לעי' באחד שראה חץ הולך להרוג אנשים רבים ויכול להטותו לצד אחד ויהרג רק אחד שבצד אחר, ואלו שבצד זה יצולו, ואם לא יעשה כלום יהרגו הרבים והאחד ישאר בחיים ואפשר דלא דמי למוסרים אחד להריגה דהתם המסירה היא פעולה האכזריה של הריגת הפש ובפעולת זה ליכא הצלת אחרים בטבע של הפעולה אלא המקרה גרם עכשו הצלה לאחרים ...אבל הטיית החץ מצד זה לצד אחר היא בעיקרה פעולת הצלה, ואינה קשורה כלל בהריגת היחיד שבצד אחר... מיהו הכא גרע דהורג בידים ולא מצינו אלא דמוסרין אבל להרוג בידים אפשר דאין הורגין
(Chazon Ish, Sanhedrin 25) It is worthwhile to analyze what the law would be in a case where somebody saw an arrow that was shot towards a large group of people, and the onlooker has the ability to steer the arrow to a different direction where it would only kill one person in that direction while the others would be spared, but if the onlooker does nothing, everyone in the large group will be killed and only the one person in the other direction will be spared…
. משנת פיקוח נפש, סימן נ (רב אריה לארענס)
יש לעיין אם נחטף מטוס ורוצים החוטפים לפוצצו על בנין רב קומות כדי להרבות ההרוגים (וכמעשה דארע בבנין התאומים בארה"ב) האם מותר לפוצץ המטוס באויר קודם שיגיע למטרתו, ובפשוטו דומה הדבר לדינא דעכו"ם שאומרים לישראל תנו לנו אחד מכם ואם לאו נהרוג לכולכם דאסור למסור להם נפש מישראל ויהרגו כולם...ואם כן גם בנידון דידן הגם בלאו הכי כל נוסעי המטוס ייהרגו בעוד זמן מה, מכל מקום אי אפשר לילך ולהרוג ליחידים אפילו לחיי שעה כדי להציל הרבים, אמנם למאי דכתב החזון איש ...דמותר להטות חץ כדי להציל הרבים הגם דעל ידי זה יהרג היחיד, דחשיבא מעשה הצלה עיי"ש יש להסתפק בנידון דידן מהו, די"ל דשאני בחץ דביאר החזו"א "דהיא בעיקרה מעשה הצלה" ...ובמעשה דמטוס הרי זו פעולת הריגה ומיתסר, אכן יש לומר דההצלה היא השמדת גוף המטוס אלא דנמצאים בתוכו אנשים וממילא הם נהרגים...ושלאתי לדבר זה לרבנו הגר"ח קיבסקי שליט"א, והשיב רבנו "נסתפקנו בזה", ...אום הוא באופן שבמטוס ישנם רק לחוטפים, אלא דאם נפוצץ המטוס קודם שיגיע לבנין הגבוה יפלו שבריו במקום ישוב ויהרגו כמה יחידים, בזה ודאי הדבר דומה להטיית החץ שדן החזון איש דעלינו להשתדל בהצלת הרבים."
Laws of Saving Lives (Rav Aryeh Lawrence, contemporary) – “With respect to the case of an airplane commandeered by terrorists who want to fly it into a skyscraper full of people (such as what happened with the World Trade Center), it would seem at first glance that this resembles the case of the bandits who tell a Jewish community to hand over one person or else they will kill everybody, that this is forbidden, but on the other hand this may be similar to the case of the Chazon Ish where one is simply engaged in an act of saving by deflecting an arrow even though a smaller population will be killed as a result; however, this case may be worse because the act of saving is itself an act of murder of the innocent people on the plane, unless it can be argued that the act of saving is simply shooting down the plane, and the people are only incidentally killed, and so I asked the great Torah scholar Rav Chaim Kaniefsky (contemporary B’nei Brak) what he thought and he said “we don’t know the answer.” However, if the only people on the plane were the terrorists, it would seem that this is directly analogous to the case of the Chazon Ish even though innocent bystanders might get killed by the falling debris of the plane.”
Rabbi J. David Bliech
Autonomous vehicles employ advanced sensor technology to detect surroundings and sophisticated algorithms to predict the trajectory of nearby moving objects. Self – driving cars can also use information technology to communicate with each other, thereby achieving better coordination among various vehicles on the road. However, Since automobiles are heavy and move at high speeds they have limited maneuverability and often cannot stop before traversing a significant distance. Therefore, even if automobile-to-automobile communication, sensors and algorithms are all functioning properly, autonomous automobiles will not always have sufficient time before collision with objects that suddenly change direction. It is inevitable that self driving automobiles will sometimes collide with each other, with human driven automobiles, and with pedestrians. Automated vehicles must perforce be programmed to respond to situations in which a collision is unavoidable. They must be programmed to select one option out of two or more possibilities.
Consider the following example. And autonomous automobile carrying five passengers approaches a heavy truck that suddenly departs from its lane and heads directly towards the autonomous automobile. In a split second, the self driving car senses the trajectory and the weight of the oncoming truck. It calculates that a high impact collision is inevitable with the resulting death of five passengers. Those deaths can be diverted only if the car swerves towards the pavement on its right hand side. Unfortunately, an elderly pedestrian happens to be crossing the road And will be killed if the autonomous automobile swerved to the right. In order for the five passengers in the self and will be killed if the autonomous automobile swerved to the right. In order for the five passengers in the self driving car to be preserved from death, the car must swerve in a manner that will kill a single person driving car to be preserved from death, the car must swerve in a manner that will kill a single person.
On first analysis, the issue seems to be identical to a problem addressed by Hazon Ish: Hoshen Mishpat, Sanhedrin, 25, involving a flying arrow or a grenade who is trajectory will cause it to land in the midst of a large group of people. A bystander has the ability to deflect the arrow so that it will fall elsewhere and kill only a single individual. Is he permitted to do so in order to limit loss of human life?
The Palestinian Talmud, Terumot 8:4, discusses the case of a group of people ordered to deliver a single person from among their number to be put to death and are admonished that, should they fail to comply, the entire group will be killed. The Palestinian Talmud for bids them to become complicit in the death of even a single person despite the fact that, as a result, the entire group will be annihilated. Deflecting and arrow or a hand grenade would seem analogous to this situation addressed by the Palestinian Talmud.
Nevertheless, Hazon Ish distinguishes the case under discussion from the situation addressed by the Palestinian Talmud with the comment that delivering a person to death is an act of cruelty while the rescue of the larger group is merely an attendant circumstance. Deflecting the arrow, however, is primarily an active rescue unrelated to the death of a single person who happens to be in the path of the arrow. Nevertheless, Hazon Ish expresses reservation with regard to the validity of that conclusion on the grounds that the death of the single victim of the diverted arrow or grenade is not caused indirectly by delivering the victim to murderers but is the direct result of the act of deflecting the arrow. And act constituting the proximate cause of death of an innocent victim, suggests Hazon Ish, is forbidden even in order to save a much larger number of lives.
The basic principle enunciated by Hazon Ish in distinguishing an act of murder from an active rescue is on exceptional people. To be sure, rescue of the many has priority over rescue of an individual. Triage in the emergency room requires that, when time is of the essence, tourniquets be applied to multiple accident victims before a longer period of time is devoted to a single patient who requires extensive life-saving treatment.
The foregoing nonwithstanding, there are circumstances in which it is difficult to distinguish between rescue and complicity and murder. During the Holocaust the Nazis frequently sought the assistance of members of the Judenrat in accomplishing their diabolical goals. In many cities, including Vilna, they demanded lists of various categories of Jews to be deported to death camps. Failure to cooperate was punishable by death. Fully aware of the consequences, the local rabbinic authorities forbade the ghetto leaders to comply. In Kovna, A city not far from Vilna, The Nazis also demanded cooperation but in a different guise. They approached the Judenrat and presented several thousand white cards to them with instructions to distribute the cards to able-bodied workers. All other residents faced immediate deportation. With great emotional anguish, the rabbinic authorities of Kovna, including the eminent R. Avraham Dov Ber Kahana-Shapiro, counseled cooperation.
At least one Holocaust historian found the halakhic advice contradictory and assumed that conflicting advice given in those two cities reflected opposing halakhic views. That was not the case. The fact pattern in Vilna what is identical to that addressed by the Palestinian Talmud, viz, “Deliver one of your company; if not, we will kill all of you” and the rabbinic authorities responded accordingly. In Vilna the Jewish officials were ordered to prepare lists of individuals to be consigned to death. In doing so they would have become complicit in homicide. Whether consciously as part of their malevolent scheme or otherwise, the Nazis presented the Judenrat with an opportunity to save at least a limited number of lives. They did not solicit assistance in designating people for death. Instead, they presented conditions for sparing the lives of some individuals already marked for death. Receipt of a white card represented a reprieve from what would otherwise have been certain death. A consequentialist would object That the net result was the same. Nevertheless, the essential nature of each of those acts was different: one constituted the taking of human life; The other, limitation of atrocity.
However, the situation described by Hazon Ish is entirely different from conventional acts of rescue that may leave others to die. The emergency room physician has done nothing to cause the death of the patient he does not treat. And distributing cards to some inhabitants of the ghetto, the Judenrat Preserved the lives of those who were with in their power to rescue. They did not decree death for those they could not save nor were they even indirectly complicit in delivering the victims to the oppressor. In contradistinction, the goal of the person who alters the course of the arrow and causes it to strike a previously unendangered victim is indeed to preserve the lives of a larger number of people but, his intention notwithstanding, it is the act of the intervenor that is the proximate cause of the death of a previously unendangered innocent victim. The intervenors motive is the rescue of an endangered victims but his act directly causes a death that would otherwise not occur.
This dilemma is virtually identical to what has become known as the trolley problem. In the trolley problem, a driverless trolley is headed towards five people who are stuck on the track and will be killed unless the trolley is redirected to a side track. And engineer is standing next to a switch. If he pulls the switch the trolley will be redirected to a side track and the five presently standing in the path of the trolley will be rescued. However, standing on the side track there is another person who will be killed if the switch is pulled to redirect the train. Is it morally permissible to preserve the lives of five individuals by redirecting the train and thereby killing a single person who is heretofore not at all in danger?
A variation of the problem is presented in the foot bridge hypothetical. In the latter case, a pedestrian standing on the foot bridge that traverses the track. Also present on the foot bridge is an extremely large and having a man. His body mouth is substantial enough to stop the trolley if he were pushed off the foot bridge and onto the track. However, if he is pushed off the foot bridge into the path of the trolley he will certainly be killed. Is it morally permissible to push this man to his death, thereby saving five other persons standing in the path of the trolley?
The same dilemma might well arise in the operation of a conventional motor vehicle: a driver suddenly sees two pedestrians crossing a road in front of him. Given the velocity of the car, if he does nothing, both the victims will be struck and killed. If he swerves one way or the other, he will avert one of the pedestrians but not both.
The halakhic ramifications of both the trolley problem and the footbridge hypothetical presented in the case of the autonomous automobile must be examined in light of the discussion of an entirely different matter presented in Shabbat 4a. During the talmudic period, The commonly employed bread baking process called for firmly pressing loaves of bread against the oven wall. The stages prohibited detaching baked bread from the wall of an oven on Shabbat. Baking is one of the 39 proscribed forms of labor. For purposes of culpability, violation of the Sabbath prohibition is defined as placing pride in an oven and allowing it to remain in situ until browning of the surface occurs or until the loaf becomes somewhat hardened, i.e, The bread cannot be broken without causing strands of partially baked dough to become elongated.