https://www.timesofisrael.com/rabbi-shaked-cant-lead-party-because-politics-no-place-for-a-woman/
Rabbi: Shaked can’t lead party, because politics is ‘no place for a woman’
Shlomo Aviner says ex-justice minister ‘really great,’ but must not be named URWP chief even if it costs right-wing votes
A prominent religious-Zionist rabbi known for his ultraconservative views on gender defended his opposition to former justice minister Ayelet Shaked being named leader of the Union of Right Wing Parties by saying that politics “is no place for a woman.”
Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, the former chief rabbi of the Beit El settlement and head of the Ateret Yerushalayim yeshiva, was one of dozens of rabbis who came out against the possibility of Shaked, who is secular, leading the flagship religious right-wing party after the September elections.
The Walla news outlet on Wednesday published a statement signed by the rabbis in which they expressed support for current URWP leader Rafi Peretz, and declared that the party must never be led by a non-religious candidate.
The statement did not explicitly mention Shaked, but the rabbis indicated that naming her URWP leader would draw substantial opposition from inside the party’s ranks.
On Thursday, Aviner attempted to explain the rabbis’ insistence on a religious candidate leading the party.
“We think that a religious party is needed because this country is not just about its economy or security, it’s also about faith,” he said in an interview on the Kan public broadcaster. “That’s why we need to have people who dedicate their entire lives to the Torah, who can lead these struggles for the benefit of the nation.”
Asked if he supported Shaked at the helm of the URWP, Aviner said no, even if going with another candidate would cost the party votes in September.
He said that while Shaked is “really wonderful,” he did not think it was appropriate for her to lead the party.
“Every person has their own place,” he said. “It’s not right, the complex world of politics is no place for the female role.”
Shaked has declared her intention to run in the upcoming September elections, but has not yet announced the vehicle for her candidacy. Polls indicate that the former justice minister — who left the Jewish Home party last December to form the New Right party along with Naftali Bennett — is one of the most popular politicians in her camp.
She is widely reported to be deciding between running as the head of the New Right with Bennett as her deputy or as a No. 1 or No. 2 in the UWRP.
Aviner’s comments about Shaked drew sharp criticism from female politicians.
Shuli Moalem-Refael, a former MK for Jewish Home, one of the constituent parties of the UWRP, said she was “flabbergasted.”
“The presence of women, including religious women, in the public sphere is self-evident,” she added in a tweet.
Blue and White MK Orna Barbivai, who was the first female head of an IDF directorate, said Aviner’s comments “will give a motivational push for women on why they should be in politics.”
“Thank you to Rabbi Aviner for reminding me why I got into politics,” Blue and White MK Miki Haimovich told the Kan broadcaster.
Other opposition lawmakers weighed in, including Blue and White no. 2 Yair Lapid, who slammed Aviner’s comments on Twitter, saying, “Politics also isn’t a place for chauvinists and religious fanatics.”
Oded Forer, an MK for the right-wing secularist Yisrael Beytenu party, tweeted, “This is the same rabbi who thinks reflexology is witchcraft. [He] represents the phenomenon of extremism that is leading Israel down a dark path toward a halachic state, one that disparages women, abolishes professionalism and launches witch hunts.”
Aviner, a prominent writer and commentator on current events, has previously drawn criticism for espousing radical views he says are rooted in religious law.
He has claimed Jewish law forbids Jews from renting apartments in Israel to Arabs — a claim denounced by many other religious-Zionist rabbis — and has advocated so-called “conversion therapy” for gays along with very stringent views on women’s modesty.
In April, he controversially suggested the fire that gutted the famed Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris could have been divine retribution for the mass burning of Talmud volumes by French Catholic priests in the city eight centuries earlier.
(טו) שׂ֣וֹם תָּשִׂ֤ים עָלֶ֙יךָ֙ מֶ֔לֶךְ אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִבְחַ֛ר יי אֱלֹקֶ֖יךָ בּ֑וֹ מִקֶּ֣רֶב אַחֶ֗יךָ תָּשִׂ֤ים עָלֶ֙יךָ֙ מֶ֔לֶךְ לֹ֣א תוּכַ֗ל לָתֵ֤ת עָלֶ֙יךָ֙ אִ֣ישׁ נָכְרִ֔י אֲשֶׁ֥ר לֹֽא־אָחִ֖יךָ הֽוּא׃
(15) You shall surely set a king over yourself, one chosen by the LORD your God. Be sure to set as king over yourself one of your own people; you must not set a foreigner over you, one who is not your kinsman.
(ב) מלך. ולא מלכה.
(2) "a king": and not a queen.
(ה) אֵין מַעֲמִידִין אִשָּׁה בְּמַלְכוּת שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים יז טו) "עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ" וְלֹא מַלְכָּה. וְכֵן כָּל מְשִׂימוֹת שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל אֵין מְמַנִּים בָּהֶם אֶלָּא אִישׁ:
(5) A woman may not be appointed queen, as it says, “upon yourselves a king” (Deut. 17:15) - a “king” and not a “queen”. A woman may not be appointed to any Position2Lit., mission. in Israel. Only may a man.
רדב''ז על הרמב''ם שם
אין מעמידין אשה וכו'. בספרי מלך ולא מלכה אשר יבחר יי אלקיך בו ע"פ נביא. וא"ת הא כתיב ודבורה אשה נביאה היא שופטה את ישראל, לא קשיא שהיתה מלמדת להם המשפטים א"נ ע"פ הדבור היה:
Radbaz on the Rambam
"Do not appoint a woman etc." In the Sifrei it says- "'King' and not queen," which will be chosen by HaShem, your G-d by means of [the revelation of] a prophet. If you will ask: Behold! It is written "And Devorah was a female prophet and she judged Israel." (Judges 4:4) This is not a question as [all she did] was teach them the laws. Alternatively, this was a specific prophetic instruction (and not a precedent-setting case).
(4) Deborah, wife of Lappidoth, was a prophetess; she led [acted as the Judge of] Israel at that time.
MISHNA: The oath of testimony is practiced with regard to men but not with regard to women, with regard to non-relatives of the litigants but not with regard to relatives, with regard to those fit to testify but not with regard to those unfit to testify due to a transgression that they performed. And the oath of testimony is practiced only with regard to those fit to testify.
מתני': שבועת העדות נוהגת באנשים ולא בנשים. מילתא אגב אורחיה קמ"ל דנשים אינן ראויות להעיד... ושמעינן ממתני' דאשה אינה כשרה לדון דכיון דפסולה להעיד פסולה לדון כדתנן כל הכשר לדון כשר להעיד וכלל גדול הוא ולמדין ממנו.
וכן אמרו בירושלמי (ד,א) שאין האשה מעידה ואין האשה דנה ומאי דכתיב והיא שופטה את ישראל פירושו מנהגת שעל פיה ובעצתה היו נוהגין זה עם זה כדין מלכה ואע"ג דאמרינן בספרי שום תשים עליך מלך ולא מלכה נוהגין היו בה כדין מלכה אי נמי מקבלין היו דבריה ברצונם.
"MISHNA: The oath of testimony is practiced with regard to men but not with regard to women..." This statement teaches us something incidentally: women are not fit for testimony... Our Mishnah teaches us that a woman is unfit to sit in judgment as she is unfit to be a witness and all who are unfit to be be judges are also unfit to be witnesses. As it is taught in the Mishnah (Niddah 49b) that all who are qualified to be a judge are also qualified to be witnesses. This is a great general principle from which we learn.
It also says in the Yerushalmi (4:1) that a woman cannot be a witness nor can she be a judge. So then how do we understand the verse: "she judged Israel at that time." (Judges 4:4)? The explanation of the verse is: they would follow the advice of her mouth and by her advice they would comport themselves, like the way one follows a queen. Even though it says in the Sifrei "you shall set a king over yourself," (Deuteronomy 17:15) "a king": and not a queen; they comported themselves as though she was a queen. Alternatively, they voluntarily accepted her authority.
ולא בנשים. מכאן שהנשים פסולות לדין, דכל שאינו כשר להעיד אינו כשר לדון דתנן בפרק בא סימן (נדה מט, ב) כל הכשר לדון כשר להעיד, ויש כשר להעיד ואינו כשר לדון... למדנו שאין האשה דינה מעתה אין האשה מעידה, ואם תאמר הא כתיב (שופטים ד, ד) והיא שופטה את ישראל, יש לומר דלא שופטת ממש אלא מנהגת כשופטים ששפטו את ישראל, ואף על גב דאמרינן בספרי (דברים שופטים כט) שום תשים עליך מלך ולא מלכה, התם לא מנו אותה אלא נוהגין היו על פיה, ואי נמי שופטת ודנה שהיו מקבלין אותה כדרך שאדם מקבל אחד מן הקרובים.
"And not women". From here we learn that women are unfit to be judges. This is because that all who are unfit to give testimony are unfit to judge. As it is taught in the Mishnah in the Chapter of 'Bah Siman' (Niddah 49b): "that all who are qualified to be a judge are also qualified to be witnesses. And there are those that are fit to give testimony but not to judge."... We [thus] learn that a woman cannot judge and therefore cannot give testimony. If you ask- it is written (Judges 4:4) "And she judged Israel"!? The way to answer is she did not literally judge, rather she comported herself as the other Judges of Israel. Even though it says in the Sifrei (Devarim, Shoftim 29) "you shall set a king over yourself," (Deuteronomy 17:15) "a king": and not a queen; in this instance they did not appoint her [officially] rather they followed what came out of her mouth. Alternatively, she judged and decided law and was accepted [by the people] as one accepts one of their own relatives.
MISHNA: Any person who is fit to adjudicate a case and serve as a judge is fit to testify as a witness, and there are those who are fit to testify but are not fit to adjudicate.
כל הכשר לדון כשר להעיד. וא"ת והרי אשה דכשרה לדון כדכתיב בדבורה והיא שופטה את ישראל בעת ההיא ובשלהי פ"ק דב"ק (דף טו.) דרשינן אשר תשים לפניהם השוה הכתוב אשה לאיש לכל עונשין שבתורה וכי היכי דהאי קרא מיירי בנדונין מיירי נמי בדיינין כדדרשינן בהמגרש (גיטין פח:) לפניהם ולא לפני עובדי כוכבים ואשה פסולה להעיד כדאמר בפרק שבועת העדות (שבועות דף ל.) וי"ל דה"ק כל איש הכשר לדון כשר להעיד אי נמי נהי דבנידונין הוי אשה בכלל מ"מ בדיינים אין אשה בכלל ודבורה היתה דנה ע"פ הדיבור אי נמי לא היתה דנה אלא מלמדת להם הדינים ובירושלמי פוסל אשה לדון אית דילפי מועמדו שני אנשים שני מעל פי שנים עדים ואית דילפי מוישארו שני אנשים במחנה:
Any person who is fit to adjudicate a case and serve as a judge is fit to testify as a witness. If you ask: behold, a woman is fit to act as a judge as it is written: "Deborah, wife of Lappidoth, was a prophetess; she led [acted as the Judge of] Israel at that time." In Bava Kama 15a we learn: “And these are the civil laws that you shall set before them” (Exodus 21:1). The verse thereby equates a woman with a man with regard to all punishment in the Torah. Just as this verse deals with litigants it also deals with judges- as is learned out in Gittin 88b "before them [Jews]" and not before idol worshipers. And women are unfit to be witnesses as it says in Shavous 30a? (How do we reconcile Deborah's leadership with these Gemaras)? It is possible to answer that it means to say that every man who is fit to judge is fit to be a witness. Alternatively, granted that litigants can be women, nonetheless, they cannot be judges. And Deborah judged [as she was appointed by] a specific prophetic instruction. Alternatively, she was not [literally] a judge but she taught [the people] the laws. In the Yerushalmi a woman is disqualified from being a judge. There are some who learn [the Biblical source for this] from "...the two parties [lit. men] to the dispute shall appear..." (Deuteronomy 19:17) "two"- [all verdicts] are determined by two witnesses. here are some who learn [the Biblical source for this] from "Two men had remained in camp..." (Numbers 11:26).
...דכלל דפרק בא סימן באיש איירי כלומר כל איש הכשר לדון כשר להעיד ומדבורה דכתיב בה (שופטים ד) והיא שופטה את ישראל אין ראיה דאשה כשרה לדון דשמא לא היתה דנה אלא היתה מלמדת להם הדינים א"נ שמא קיבלו אותה עליהם משום שכינה מיהו בירושלמי דיומא (פ"ו) יש מעתה דאין אשה מעידה אינה דנה...
As it is taught in the Mishnah in the Chapter of 'Bah Siman' (Niddah 49b): "that all who are qualified to be a judge are also qualified to be witnesses. That means any man qualified to judge can give testimony. And from Devorah, about whom it is written: "she led [acted as the Judge of] Israel at that time." (Judges 4:4) there is no proof that a woman is qualified to be a judge; perhaps she did not judge but [just] taught them the laws. Alternatively, the people may have accepted her authority because the Shechinah [was upon her]. However in the Yerushalmi (Yoma 86) it says that since a woman cannot be a witness she cannot be a judge...
וכשהגיע ללא תוכל לתת תנא משמיה דרבי נתן באותה שעה נתחייבו שונאי ישראל כלייה שהחניפו לו לאגריפס
The mishna continues: And when Agrippa arrived at the verse: “You may not appoint a foreigner over you” (Deuteronomy 17:15), tears flowed from his eyes because he was a descendant of the house of Herod and was not of Jewish origin. The entire nation said to him: You are our brother. It is taught in the name of Rabbi Natan: At that moment the enemies of the Jewish people, a euphemism for the Jewish people, were sentenced to destruction for flattering Agrippa.
אותו היום נתחייבו שונאי ישראל כלייה - ירושלמי תני רבי חנינא ברבי גמליאל אומר הרבה חללים נפלו באותו יום שהחניפו לו ודבר תמוה לומר אם היה ראוי מפני התורה כיון דאמו היתה מישראל אלא משום דזילא מילתא כמו שפירש"י שיתחייבו על חנופה מועטת כזאת עונש גדול ופירש ר"י אע"ג דאמר בפרק מצות חליצה (יבמות קב.) ובפרק החולץ (יבמות מה:) גבי רב מרי דמנייה רבא אפורסי דבבל וגבי אושפיזכניה דרב אדא בר אהבה אם היתה אמו מישראל מקרב אחיך קרינן ביה (קדושין דף עו:) היינו דוקא גבי נשיאות ושררות בעלמא דלינהג שררות במתא דדרשינן שום תשים עליך מלך מקרב אחיך מדסמך משימות למקרב אחיך ש"מ דבעינן בהו מקרב אחיך קצת כגון אמו מישראל אבל מלך חזר ושנה עליו מקרב אחיך תשים עליך מלך דקפיד קרא גבי מלך עד שיהא ממש מקרב ממוצע מאביו ואמו מישראל וזו היתה החנופה שמלך בזרוע שלא כדין תורה והודו לו והחזיקו בכך נהי שלא יוכלו למחות היה להן לשתוק ולא להחזיקו...
At that moment the enemies of the Jewish people, a euphemism for the Jewish people, were sentenced to destruction for flattering Agrippa. In the Yerushalmi it teaches that Rebbe Chaninah B'Rebbe Gamliel says: many terrible things happened the day when they flattered him. It would be preposterous to propose that [Agrippa] was fit according to the Torah as his mother was Jewish; rather it was a disgraceful matter, as Rashi explains, that [the Jewish people] incurred guilt because of this small amount of flattery and suffered a great punishment. The Ri explains that even though it says in Yevamos 102a and 45b regarding Rav Mari bar Racḥel, (who was the son of a gentile father and a Jewish mother) was appointed by Rava as one of the officials [pursei] of Babylonia. And regarding Rav Adda bar Ahava’s host (who was the son of a convert) if his mother is Jewish, the words: “From among your brothers” are said about him. (Deuteronomy 17:15). (Kiddushin 76b). This is referring specifically to ordinary leadership or rulership where [they] only has jurisdiction in a specific place. The interpretation of “You shall surely set a king over yourself...from among your brothers”: the juxtaposition of "setting" and “from among your brothers” teaches us that he needs to be “From among your brothers” [at least] partially, for example if his mother is Jewish but a king the verse returns and says "Be sure to set as king over yourself one of your own people; you must not set a foreigner over you, one who is not your kinsman," we [therefore] see that the verse is stringent and requires that a king should literally be from "amongst your people" in that both his father and mother should be Jewish. The flattery was that the king was of unfit lineage in contrast to what the Torah commands and, nonetheless, they agreed [that he should rule] and they gave him encouragement. Granted, they were not in a position to object, however, they could have remained silent and not [actively] encouraged him...
(ה) ונוהגת מצוה זו בזכרים אבל לא בנשים, שאינן דנות, כמו שאמרנו למעלה בהרבה מקומות. ואל יקשה עליך מה שכתוב בדבורה הנביאה (שופטים ד ד) והיא שפטה את ישראל, שאפשר לנו לתרץ שלא היה הדין נחתך על פיה, אבל היתה אשה חכמה ונביאה והיו נושאין ונותנין עמה אפילו בדברים של אסור והתר ודינין גם כן, ולכן כתוב עליה והיא שפטה את ישראל וכו', או נאמר שקבלוה עליהם ראשי ישראל ואחריהם כל אדם לדון על פיה, דבקבלה ודאי הכל כשרים, דכל (כתובות נו א) תנאי שבממון קים. ומכל מקום כל זה שאמרנו שאינן דנות, הוא כדעת קצת המפרשים וכדעת הירושלמי (סנהדרין ג ט) שכן נמצא שם מפרש. אבל לדעת קצת מן המפרשים, כשרות הן לדון. ואמרו כי מקרא מלא הוא שנאמר והיא שפטה. ומה שאמרו בסנהדרין (לד ב) דכל שאינו כשר להעיד אינו כשר לדון, ונשים ודאי אינן כשרות להעיד כדמוכח שם, אפשר שיאמרו לפי דעתם זה לפי שאין למדין מן הכללות (עירובין כז א). והנראה מן הדברים ומן הסברא שאינן בתורת דין, כדאיתא בירושלמי וכדמשמע לפי גמרין דרך פשיטות.
(5) And this commandment is practiced by males but not by females, as they do not judge - as we have said above in many places. And do not let that which is written about Devorah the prophetess (Judges 4:4), "and she judged Israel," be difficult to you. As it is possible for us to answer that the judgement was not concluded according to her [word]. Rather, [since] she was a wise woman and a prophetess, they would give and take with her - even about matters of the prohibited and the permitted and also civil laws. And hence it is written about her, "and she judged Israel, etc." Or we can say that the heads of Israel accepted her upon them - and after them, everyone - to decide according to her [word]. As everyone is fit [to judge] with acceptance [of the parties involved], since any condition upon money is valid (Ketuvot 56a). And nonetheless, all this that we have said that they do not judge is according to the opinion of some commentators and the opinion of the Yerushalmi (Talmud Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 3:9) - as such is it found there explicitly. But according to the opinion of some commentators, they are fit to judge. And they said that it is an open verse [that proves this] - as it is stated, "and she judged." And [about] that which they said in Sanhedrin 34b that anyone who is not fit to testify is not fit to judge - and women are certainly not fit to testify, as is proven there - it is possible that they would say, according to their opinion, that this is [not an issue] since we do not learn from general principles (Eruvin 27a). But what appears [correct] from the [sources] and from logic is that they are not [included] in the category of judgment, as it is found in the Yerushalmi and as it is implied in our Gemara (Bavli) by way of simple understanding.
(א) למנות מלך מישראל - שנצטוינו למנות עלינו מלך מישראל, כדי שיקבצנו כלנו וינהיגנו כחפצו, ועל זה נאמר (דברים יז טו) שום תשים עליך מלך וגו'. ובספרי שום תשים עליך מלך מצות עשה...
ומה שאמרו (בספרי) שאין מעמידין אשה במלכות, שנאמר מלך ולא מלכה, וכשמעמידין המלך היו מושחין אותו בשמן המשחה (רמב''ם שם יי'ז), ומאחר שנתמנה זכה במלכות לו ולבניו, כמו שכתוב למען יאריך ימים על ממלכתו, הוא ובניו בקרב ישראל.
(1) To appoint a king from Israel: That we were commanded to appoint upon ourselves a king from Israel, so that he can gather us all together and administer us according to his desire. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 17:15), "Surely place upon yourself a king, etc." And in Sifrei Devarim 157, "'Surely place upon yourself a king' is a positive commandment."...
And [also] that which they said (in Sifrei Devarim 157), that we do not set up a woman to the monarchy, as it is stated, "a king" - and not a queen. And when they would set up a king, they would anoint him with anointing oil (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings and Wars 1:7). And once he has been appointed, he acquires the monarchy for himself and for his sons, as it is written (Deuteronomy 17:20), "in order that he will have length of days upon his monarchy; he and his sons, among Israel."
(א) שנצטוינו למנות עלינו מלך וכו' וע"ז נאמר שום תשים עליך מלך וגו'. והמלך מוריש ממשלתו ליורשיו אם יש לו בנים הם יורשים ואם אין לו בנים חוזר לאחים ולמעלה כמו כל הירושות ... וה"ה שאינו יורש וחוזרת הירושה כמו שאין לו בנים דחוזרת לאחים ולמעלה עד יעקב אבינו וכאן עד דוד המלך ע"ה דהוא זכה בכתר מלכות. ומבואר בר"מ ובהרב המחבר דאין מעמידין אשה במלכות שנא' מלך ולא מלכה וכו' ואפשר לומר דוקא בתחלת המינוי אבל בירושה אם הניח בת אפשר דאף הבת יורשת המלוכה כמ"ש הגאון בעל נו"ב במה"ק בחלק ח"מ סי' א' לענין קהל גרים דאף אם אמו גיורת מכל מקום כיון דנפקא לן משום תשים וגו' מקרב אחיך והיינו תחלת השימה אבל אם הוא בירושה שפיר דמי דלא הוי שימה ובזה יישב על רחבעם שבא מנעמה העמוניות ובס"ד יבואר לקמן ה"נ שום וגו' מלך ולא מלכה אבל בירושה אפשר מלכה גם כן וצ"ע. ואפשר כיון דילפינן הירושה דכתוב הוא ובניו וגו' בניו ולא בנותיו ואינם יורשים כלל המינוי שלו רק זכרים ונראה דב"ב הזכרים הם ג"כ יורשים אף על פי דבא מכח בת ע' ביבמות וצ"ע.
We are commanded to appoint a king over ourselves.
Upon this it is written: "You shall surely set a king over yourself" (Deuteronomy 17:15).
The king passes on his sovereignty to his heirs (the hereditary monarchy). If he has sons they they will inherit the throne. If he has no sons then his brothers will inherit the throne and all the way back as with all inheritance (ie. if he has no brothers we seek out more distant relatives).... It is also the case that when he has no heirs that we do not go all the way back to Yaakov, our father, (as in other cases of inheritance) rather we only go back to King David, Peace be upon him, for he merited the crown of [eternal] monarchy. The Rambam and the Sefer HaChinuch explain that we do not appoint a woman to the monarchy, as it says: a king and not a queen (Sifrei). It is possible that this refers specifically to the initial appoint but if the position is inherited [by a princess] then even a woman can inherit the monarchy. So writes the Genius the author of the Noideh B'Yehudah in his holy words (8:1) regarding the community of converts; that even if his mother is a convert he is, nonetheless, no longer disqualified because of "You shall surely set a king over yourself... one of your own people; you must not set a foreigner over you, one who is not your kinsman." (Deuteronomy 17:15). At the initial appointment of the king he should be from your kinsman but if he inherits the throne then he is not transgressing "set". In this way we can understand the reign of Rechavam who was the son of Naamah the Amonite (he was the son of King Shlomo and Naamah the Amonite- a convert). With the help of Heaven I shall explain later that this '"Set"- a king and not a queen'- but if by inheritance a queen as well [is legitimate]. This needs further investigation. It is possible that since we learn the concept of a hereditary monarchy from the verse: "...to the end that he and his sons may reign long in the midst of Israel." (Deuteronomy 17:20) "sons" and not daughters [is implied], therefore [the daughters] would not inherit any of his positions [of authority] but the sons would. It appears, however, that even his grandsons could inherit the throne, even if they were born of his daughter, see Yevamos. This needs further investigation.
The school of Rabbi Elazar taught: “And these are the civil laws that you shall set before them” (Exodus 21:1). The reference to “them” in the verse is referring to all those who stood at the revelation, both men and women. The verse thereby equates a woman with a man with regard to all civil laws in the Torah.
“[And these are the civil laws] that you shall set before them” (Exodus 21:1); the verse equates a woman with a man. This is bewildering! But לפניהם – “before them” is speaking only about those who are qualified to be judges? For that is how the Gemara expounds this verse in the last Perek of Gittin (88b) לפניהם – “before them” and not before commoners [who are not ordained with semichah.] And a woman is disqualified from judging as we have learned in a Mishna in Perek Bo Simon (Needoh 49b): Whoever is qualified to judge is qualified to testify, and a woman is disqualified from testifying as the Gemara says in HaChovail (below 88b) and in Perek Sh’vuas Ho’Aidus (Sh’vuous 30a). We can answer: That the Mishna in Bo Simon (Needoh 49b) is speaking about a man. The Mishna means: Any man who is qualified to judge is qualified to testify. And from that which is written about Devorah (Judges 4:4), “she judges Israel”, (which definitely is proof that she was qualified to be a judge), we cannot bring proof that a woman is qualified to judge, because perhaps they accepted her upon themselves, (even though she was not legally qualified to judge), because of the divine presence [that was with her]. If you ask: In Gittin (88b) we expound לפניהם – “before them” to exclude commoners who are not ordained, and here we expound the same word to include women? We can answer: That there in Gittin 88b, we exclude commoners who are not ordained because the word לפניהם – “before them” refers to the word אלהים – “judges” that is written many times throughout the passages. If the source of the ruling that semichah judges are required is the word אלהים that is written through out the passages, why is the word לפניהם needed? If you ask: without the word לפניהם – “before them” we can elicit that s’meechoh judges are required from the word “אלהים– judges”, which means experts? We can answer; That לפניהם – “before them” is needed to teach us that for all matter of coercion of those who do not want to follow Torah law even though it is not a judgment, even so semichah judges are required to institute the process of coercion. And so is it evident in the first Perek of Sanhedrin (7b) where the Gemara expounds from the words that precede לפניהם in the verse, אשר תשים – “that you shall place” refers to the apparatuses of the judges needed to coerce those who refuse to obey the court.
(יא) לענין דין גר כשר לדון דיני ממונות והוא שתהא אמו מישראל אבל אם אין אמו מישראל פסול לדון את ישראל אבל לחבירו גר דן ולחליצה פסול אפילו לחליצת גרים עד שיהא אביו ואמו מישראל:
Regarding the permissibility of a convert to act as a judge in monetary cases: if his mother is Jewish then it is permissible, however, if his mother is not Jewish then he is unfit to judge a [case involving a born] Jew. He can, however, judge the case of his fellow convert. To [judge] a case of chalitzah: he is unfit, even for the chalitzah of converts, unless both his father and mother are Jewish.
(א) פסול לדון את ישראל. אפילו דיני ממונות ודוקא על ידי כפיה אבל אם מקבלו עליו לדין מותר כן כתבו הרא"ש וטור וכן כתב העט"ז:
"He is unfit to judge a [case involving a born] Jew." This refers even to monetary cases. This is specifically [if the judge] has the power to force [the litigants to follow his judgment]. However, if the litigants accept [such an individual] as their judge then it is permissible. The Rosh and the Tur also write this, as does the Taz.
הרמ''א: מדינין אלו טובי הקהל הממונים לעסוק בצרכי רבים או יחידים הרי הן כדיינים ואסורים להושיב ביניהם מי שפסול לדון משום רשעה:
The Rema: we consider the leaders of the community who are appointed to tend to the needs of the many or individuals- are considered as judges. It is therefore forbidden to appoint on of them [from people] who are unfit to be judges because of their evil.
ינאי מלכא ומלכתא כריכו ריפתא בהדי הדדי ומדקטל להו לרבנן לא הוה ליה איניש לברוכי להו אמר לה לדביתהו מאן יהיב לן גברא דמברך לן אמרה ליה אשתבע לי דאי מייתינא לך גברא דלא מצערת ליה אשתבע לה אייתיתיה לשמעון בן שטח אחוה אותביה בין דידיה לדידה אמר ליה חזית כמה יקרא עבדינא לך אמר ליה לאו את קא מוקרת לי אלא אורייתא היא דמוקרא לי דכתיב סלסלה ותרוממך תכבדך כי תחבקנה אמר לה קא חזית דלא מקבל מרות יהבו ליה כסא לברוכי אמר היכי אבריך ברוך שאכל ינאי וחביריו משלו שתייה לההוא כסא יהבו ליה כסא אחרינא ובריך אמר רבי אבא בריה דרבי חייא בר אבא (אמר רבי יוחנן) שמעון בן שטח דעבד לגרמיה הוא דעבד דהכי אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן לעולם אינו מוציא את הרבים ידי חובתן עד שיאכל כזית דגן
אמרו אשה טובה היתה לו לינאי המלך ושלמינין שמה וכשמת סלקה טבעתו מעל ידו ושלחה לבית שר האסורין אמרה לו רבך בחלום התיר אותם הזקנים. התירן והלכו להם לבתיהם ואח"כ אמרה מת ינאי המלך ואותו היום שמת ינאי המלך עשאוהו יום טוב:
It was said that King Yannai had a good wife and her name was Shlominin. When he died she removed his ring from his hand and sent to the chief Jailer saying, "Your master [instructed me] in a dream to release these elders [imprisoned rabbis]." The were released and went to their homes. After this she proclaimed: "King Yannai is dead". The day that King Yannai died [they] made it into a holiday.
(י) דָּבָר אַחֵר, וְנָתַתִּי גִשְׁמֵיכֶם בְּעִתָּם, בְּלֵילֵי שַׁבָּתוֹת, מַעֲשֶׂה בִּימֵי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח וּבִימֵי שְׁלַמְצָה הַמַּלְכָּה שֶׁהָיוּ גְּשָׁמִים יוֹרְדִים בְּלֵילֵי שַׁבָּתוֹת עַד שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ חִטִּים כִּכְלָיוֹת וּשְׂעוֹרִים כְּגַרְעִינֵי הַזֵּיתִים וַעֲדָשִׁים כְּדִינְרֵי זָהָב, וְצָבְרוּ מֵהֶם חֲכָמִים וְהִנִּיחוּם לַדּוֹרוֹת הַבָּאִים לְהוֹדִיעַ כַּמָּה חֵטְא גּוֹרֵם, לְקַיֵּם מַה שֶּׁנֶּאֱמַר (ירמיה ה, כה): עֲוֹנוֹתֵיכֶם הִטּוּ אֵלֶּה וְחַטֹּאתֵיכֶם מָנְעוּ הַטּוֹב מִכֶּם.
Another explanation of the verse: "I shall give you rains in their season" (Leviticus 26:4)- on Shabbos nights. In happened in the days of Shimon ben Shetach and Shlamtzah the Queen that the rains would descend on Shabbos nights until the wheat [grew as large] as kidneys and the barely [grew as large as] the stones of olives and the lentils [grew as large] as a golden Dinar. The Sages gathered some of this produce and stored it way for generations to come, in order to make known to them how detrimental sin is. This fulfills the verse: "It is your iniquities that have diverted these things, Your sins that have withheld the bounty from you." (Jeremiah 5:25)
(א) פלורידה, ארצות הברית
(ב) אב תש"ע
(ג) ב. מינוי אישה לנשיאת בית כנסת
(ד) שאלה: האם חברי בית כנסת אורתודוקסי רשאים למנות אישה לנשיאת בית הכנסת?
(ה) תשובה:
א. לדעת פוסקים רבים הדבר מותר1פסק הרמב"ם (הלכות מלכים א, ה): "אין מעמידין אשה במלכות, שנאמר 'מלך' (דברים יז, טו) ולא מלכה, וכן כל משימות שבישראל אין ממנים בהם אלא איש". מקור דברי הרמב"ם הוא מדברי הספרי (דברים פי' קנז): "'שום תשים', מת מנה אחר תחתיו. 'מלך', ולא מלכה... דבר אחר: 'שום תשים עליך מלך', מצות עשה. 'לא תוכל לתת עליך איש נכרי', מצות לא תעשה. 'איש נכרי', מיכן אמרו: האיש ממנים פרנס על הציבור ואין ממנים האשה פרנסת על הצבור".
אמנם, מכמה טעמים נראה שאין ללמוד משם שיש להימנע מלמנות אישה לנשיאת בית כנסת:
א. הראשון לציון הרב בן ציון חי עזיאל (פסקי עזיאל בשאלות הזמן, סי' מד) והרב הראשי לתל אביב הרב חיים דוד הלוי (בספרו מים חיים, חלק א סי' ע) פסקו שהאיסור הוא למנות אישה לשררה על הציבור, אך אם הציבור עצמו בוחר באישה ומקבל אותה – אין מניעה בכך. ולפי זה, אם חברי בית הכנסת מקבלים על עצמם שאישה תהיה הנשיאה – אין מניעה בכך. מקורם הוא מדברי הרמב"ן (חידושי הרמב"ן שבועות ל ע"א) שכתב על דבורה הנביאה: "ומאי דכתיב 'והיא שופטה את ישראל' – פירושו מנהגת, שעל פיה ובעצתה היו נוהגין זה עם זה, כדין מלכה. ואף על גב דאמרינן בספרי 'שום תשים עליך מלך, ולא מלכה', נוהגין היו בה כדין מלכה. אי נמי מקבלין היו דבריה ברצונם". וכן כתבו הרשב"א והריטב"א (בחידושיהם לשבועות שם), ואת דבריהם הביא הברכי יוסף (חושן משפט סי' ז ס"ק יא). אמנם, אין ראיה גמורה מדברי הרמב"ן, כי ייתכן שכוונתו היא שהציבור רק נהג בפועל לפי דברי דבורה, אך היא מעולם לא מונתה במינוי רשמי, אך אם ממנים אישה במינוי רשמי, אף שהציבור מקבל אותו עליה – הרי זה בכלל מה שקבעו שאין ממנים אישה. וראה משא ומתן בעניין זה בשו"ת פרי מלכה (סי' סז-עא). וכן ראה בחוות בנימין (חלק א סי' יב) בעניין מינוי גוי לשררה, שדחה סברה זו.
על כל פנים, לגבי שררה על מקום מסוים ואינה על כלל ישראל, דעת הראשון לציון הרב מרדכי אליהו (תחומין חלק ז עמ' 519-518) והראשון לציון הרב אליהו בקשי דורון (שו"ת בנין אב, חלק א סי' סה) היא שהציבור רשאי לקבל על עצמו אישה (וראה בספר משטר ומדינה בישראל על פי התורה חלק ב עמ' 542 הערה 24).
ב. מו"ר הגר"ש ישראלי (חוות בנימין סי' יב) פסק כי מינוי לזמן אינו דומה למינוי של מלך, מפני שמינוי למלך עומד לעולם ועובר בירושה, ורק מינוי כזה מוגדר כשררה. אך מינוי לזמן שאפשר לסלקו אינו אלא כשליח לבצע פעולות מסוימות, ואינו מוגדר כשררה. לפי זה, נשיאות בית כנסת אינה 'שררה'. בדומה לכך כתב הרב שמואל אלימלך טוירק (בשו"ת פרי מלכה, סי' סז): "דאפילו להרמב"ם אין איסור למנות אשה רק במינוי שיש בה שררה וכפייה, אבל בקהילות שלנו הנשיאים רק מוציאים לפועל מה שחברי בית הכנסת או ההנהלה מחליטים, ואין זה שררה אלא עבדות".
ג. הרב אפרתי (חוברת שערי צדק, חלק ו עמ' 254) מביא בשם אחד מגדולי ישראל להליץ על המנהג שבוחרים נשים, מפני שאין זו שררה מוחלטת, שהרי כולם כפופים לחוקים. ולפי זה, אם לבית הכנסת יש תקנות וחוקים שהנשיא כפוף להם – הנשיאות אינה מוגדרת כשררה., אך יש פוסקים שאסרו2הגר"מ פיינשטיין (אגרות משה, יו"ד חלק ב סי' מה) כתב שלכתחילה אין למנות אישה לשררה כדי לחוש לדעת הרמב"ם. אולם אף לדעתו, ישנם ראשונים רבים שחולקים על הרמב"ם, ואם יש צורך אפשר לסמוך על דעתם. וכן נכתב לאסור בשם הגרי"ד סולובייצ'יק (הרב צבי שכטר, מפניני רבנו: קונטרס בעניני פסק הלכה, בתוך בית יצחק לח, תשס"ו, עמ' 28) וכן אסר בשו"ת משנה הלכות (חלק ז סי' רנד)..
(ו) ב. אם המינוי יוסיף יראת שמים ויגרום לנשים ומשפחות להגיע אל בית הכנסת – הדבר אף מומלץ3כלל נקוט בידינו: משפחה שבה האישה באה לבית הכנסת – גם שאר בני המשפחה יגיעו בעקבותיה..
(ז) ג. אם הדבר יגרום לחולשה ומרד כנגד המנהגים – יש להימנע מכך.
(ח) ד. אם המינוי יעורר מחלוקת בבית הכנסת יש לפעול אך ורק בדרכי נועם, מפני שמחלוקת ציבורית – נזקה מרובה.
Florida, USA.
Month of Av 2010
The appointment of a woman to the presidency of a Synagogue.
Question: Is it suitable for the committee of an Orthodox Synagogue to appoint a woman as the Shul President?
Answer:
1. According to the opinion of many Poskim this is permissible. 1: The Rambam (Laws of Kings 1:5) rules: No woman shall be established in the monarchy, as the verse says: "King" (Deuteronomy 17:15) and not a queen. So too, all positions of leadership in Israel should be occupied by men and not women. The source for the Rambam is the Sifrei (Deuteronomy 157) "'You shall appoint', and when [he] dies you shall appoint another in [his] stead." "King", and not Queen. A different interpretation: "you shall set a king over yourself" is a positive commandment. "You shall not take a foreign man to [rule] over you" is a negative commandment. "A foreign man", from here it is said (Sifrei)- A man shall be appointed leader over the people and a woman shall not be appointed leader over the people.
However, [based on the Rambam] there are many reasons to not extrapolate to [our case] of appointing a woman as president of the Shul:
A) The Sphardi Chief Rabbi HaRav Ben Tzion Chai Uzziel (Piskei Uzziel Shialos HaZman 44) and The Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv HaRav Chaim David HaLevi (in his book Mayim Chaim, Section 1:70) both pasken that the Issur (of appointing a queen) is to appoint a woman to rule over the people, however, if the people themselves select and accept her- we do not prevent them from doing so. Based on this if the committee of the Shul accepts upon themselves to have a female president then they should not be prevented from doing so. The source for this is from the words of the Ramban (Chidushei HaRamban Shavuous 30a) where he writes about Devorah the prophetess: "“She judged Israel” means that she led by her word, and they acted based on her advice, like a queen. Although the Sifri says, “You shall place upon yourself a king, and not a queen,” they accorded her the [dictatorial] status of a queen. Alternatively, they accepted her words willingly." So too, the Rashba and the Ritva (on their chiddushim on Shavuous ibid.). The Brichei Yosef quotes their words (Choshen Mishpat 7:11). However, their is not a complete proof from the words of the Ramban because it is possible that the people only acted as they did because these were the word of Devorah as she had never been officially appointed, however, had there been an official appointment of a woman- even if the people accepted her- this could be included in the general category of not appointing women [to leadership]. See Maseh Umatan on this issue in Responsa Pri Melka (67-71). Also see Chavos Binyamin (Section 1:12) about the issue of appointing a non-Jew to authority where he disproves this notion.
In any case, regarding leadership [ruling] on a certain place and not the whole of the Jewish People; the opinion of the Sphardi Chief HaRav Mordechai Eliyahu (Tachumin Section 7 pg. 518-519), as well as the opinion of Sphardi Chief Rabbi HaRav Eliyahu Bakshi Deron (Responsa Binyan Av Section 1: 65) is that the people are able to accept [the authority] of a woman over themselves. (See Mishtar Umedinah B'Yisrael Al Pi HaTorah Section 2 pg. 542 point 24).
B) Our master and teacher HaRav HaGoan Shaul Yisraeli (Chavos Binyamin 12) paskens when an appointment is only temporary then it bears no resemblance to the appointment of a king; as the appointment of a king is eternal [lifelong] and passes on as an inheritance and only such an appointment is considered within the purview of "rulership". According to this the presidency of a Shul is not "rulership". Similar to this is the opinion of HaRav Shmuel Elimelech (Responsa Pri Melka 67): "Even according to the Rambam it is not forbidden to appoint a woman so long as the position is not one of rulership and [being able] to force others to do things. However, in our Shuls the president only carries out the decisions of the Shul committee and governors. This is not rulership but service (lit. slavey)."
C) HaRav Efrati (Chavros Shaarei Tzedik, Section 1 pg. 254) quotes one of the great Rabbis of the generation who was trying to interpret (understand) the custom of electing women as this is not absolute rulership and since everyone (including the elected leader) is subject to the law. According to this understanding, if the Shul has [existing] edicts and laws that the Shul president will be subject to, then this [kind] of leadership will not be considered as "rulership".
However, there are some Poskim who forbid (the appointment of women to leadership).
HaGoan, HaRav Moshe Feinstein (Iggres Moshe Y.D. Section 2, 45) writes that it is preferable to not appoint a woman to a leadership position because we take the Rambam's opinion into account. However, even according to his reasoning (Rav Moshe), there are many Rishonim who disagree with the Rambam and so, in a situation of necessity one can rely on the other opinions. So too, it is quoted in the name of HaRav HaGoan Dovid Soloveitchik that it is forbidden (HaRav Tzvi Shechter Peninei Rabeinu: Kuntres B'inyanei Pesak Halachah, in Beis Yosef 38:5766, pg. 28). It is also forbidden in the Responsa Mishneh Halachos (Section 7, 254).
2. If this appointment will increase the Fear of Heaven and cause women and their families to come to Shul, then we should even encourage it! There is a general rule that we have: in a family where the woman goes to Shul, then the rest of the family will also go with regularity.
3. If such an appointment will lead to weakening or even rebellion against [proper Jewish] customs then it should be prevented.
4. If such an appointment will arouse strife in the Shul- which [should be a place in which all comport themselves] in only pleasant ways. This is because public strife only begets more strife.
Part II, Chapter XII Women on Synagogue Boards חלק שני, פרק יב: נשים בהנהגת בית הכנסת
מחבר: יהודה דוד בלייךAuthor: J. David Bleich
"And Deborah, a prophetess, the wife of Lapidoth, judged Israel at that time" (Judges 4:4). What was the special quality of Deborah that she judged Israel at that time? … I call upon heaven and earth to bear witness that whether Jew or gentile, whether man or woman, whether manservant or maidservant, the Divine Spirit rests upon him in accordance with the deed which he performs.
TANNA DE-BEI ELIYAHU RABBAH, 9
The activities of the feminist movement within the general community have been paralleled within some sectors of the Jewish community by agitation for greater parity for women in matters of religious observance and expression. Rabbinic scholars have long emphasized that the differing ritual obligations which Judaism imposes upon men and women reflect the diverse roles and responsibilities associated with the two sexes rather than the relegation of women to a subordinate or inferior position. Nevertheless, in recent years, the restrictions placed upon women's participation in certain ritual observances and their prerogatives with regard to other observances as well as the philosophical perspectives giving rise to these distinctions have been the subject of wide discussion.
There is one aspect of communal religious life in which an evident lack of parity exists and in which the governing halakhic considerations are the subject of some controversy. Most synagogues, either by explicit provision of their by-laws or by tacit practice, exclude women from membership on their boards of directors and from positions as officers of the congregation. The halakhic basis of this practice, or the absence thereof, has been examined in two articles which appeared in Ha-Darom. Rabbi Seymour Turk, writing in the Nisan 5735 issue of that publication,1This article was subsequently reprinted in Rabbi Turk’s Pri Malkah (New York, 5741), no. 67. See also op. cit., nos. 68-71. argues that there is no basis in Jewish law for the exclusion of women from positions of synagogue leadership. His position is rebutted2Another rebuttal by R. Menasheh Klein appears in his Mishneh Halakhot, VII, no. 254. in the Tishri 5736 issue by Rabbi Kasriel Tchursh, of Tel Aviv.3This article is reprinted in Shevilin, Kislev 5737.
Regrettably, neither author cites any of the numerous previous analyses pertinent to this subject. The earliest discussions of the general topic were generated more than half a century ago in what was then Palestine by a raging controversy over granting women suffrage and the right to hold public office. In 1918 women won these rights with respect to elections held by the Jewish Agency but there ensued an impassioned polemic in which leading Palestinian, European and American rabbinic figures espoused opposing views. Many of these diverse positions, originally presented in the form of pamphlets and newspaper articles, are cited briefly by Rabbi Chaim Herschensohn, Malki ba-Kodesh, II, no. 4, in the course of a lengthy exposition of his own permissive view with regard to this matter. Opposing views are cited by R. Yechiel Ya'akov Weinberg, Seridei Esh, III, no. 105.4With regard to the question of female suffrage see also Seridei Esh, II, no. 52. An impressive roster of authorities including the Hafez Hayyim, R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, R. David Hoffmann (Jeschurun, vol. VI, no. 5-6, lyar-Sivan 5679) and four eminent Palestinian scholars, R. Joshua Leib Diskin, R. Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, R. Yechiel Michal Tucatzinski, and R. Yisrael Ze'ev Minzberg (Zot Hukat ha-Torah, Jerusalem, 1920) vigorously opposed permitting women to hold public office.5See also R. Eleazar Meir Preil, Sefer ha-Ma’or, nos. 55-56. Permissive views were held by R. Ya'akov Levinson, rabbi of the Chovevei Torah synagogue in Brooklyn (Shivayon ha-Nashim mi-Nekudat ha-Halakhah, New York, 1920),6See also Chaim Tzernowitz, Ha-Olam, vol. IX, no. 23, March 19, 1920 and vol. IX, no. 24, March 26, 1920; reprinted in Ha-Ivri, vol. X, no. 16-17. and Rabbi Herschensohn. This position was later endorsed by R. Ben-Zion Uziel, Mishpetei Uzi'el, Hoshen Mishpat, no. 6 Some twenty years later, Rabbi Moses Feinstein adopted a somewhat equivocal, but essentially negative view with regard to the election of women to the presidency of a synagogue. This material, which originally appeared in the Tishri 5721 issue of Ha-Pardes and was amplified in a contribution to the Heshvan-Kislev 5721 issue of Ha-Ma'or, has been reprinted in Rabbi Feinstein's responsa collection, Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De'ah, II, nos. 44-45. A strongly negative view was presented by the editor of Ha-Ma'or, Rabbi Meir Amsel, in the Tishri and Heshvan-Kislev 5721 issues of that journal. The current, renewed debate, while contributing but little to the halakhic analysis, broadens the scope of the discussion by adding the dimensions of the very real social and religious concerns of a later generation.
I. The Sources
The major halakhic consideration militating against women's eligibility to serve in positions of communal office is Rambam's ruling, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5: "A woman may not be established as monarch as it is said '[You shall set] over you a king,' but not a queen. Similarly, with regard to all appointments in Israel, only a man may be appointed to them." Commentaries on Rambam give as the source for this ruling the comments of Sifre, Deuteronomy 17:15. Statements similar to that of Rambam are found in the writings of Ramban, Ran, Rashba, Ritva and Rosh, particularly in their commentaries to Shevu'ot 30a, as well as in those of numerous other early authorities, although it is not certain that all of these authorities endorse Rambam's view that offices other than the monarchy are included in this ban.
Rabbi Feinstein points out that while indeed the comment " 'a king,' but not a queen" occurs in Sifre, it is not clear that the exclusion of women applies to offices other than the monarchy. The same verse contains the admonition, "… from among your brethren shall you set a king over you; you can not put over you a foreign man who is not your brother." Both non-Jews and converts are included in this prohibition. Sifre cites the statement of the Gemara, Yevamot 45b, to the effect that foreigners are excluded not only from kingship but from all other positions of authority as well. Rambam apparently assumes that in interpreting the word "a king" as denoting exclusively a male monarch, Sifre intended to bar women from all other communal appointments as well, just as the latter part of the verse excludes non-Jews not only from the monarchy but also from all other positions of authority. Rabbi Feinstein, however, points out that, in its literal meaning, the passage speaks of the monarchy but not of other offices. The exclusion of foreigners from other appointments stems from a pleonasm, the redundant phrase "som tasim—place you shall place." The repetition of the word "tasim—you shall place" is understood as extending the application of the clause "from among your brethren" and rendering its limitation a condition of all communal appointments. Rabbi Feinstein argues that it would be logical to assume that regulations derived from this pleonasm apply only to foreigners but not to women. Since women are barred from sitting upon the throne by virtue of a literal understanding of the word "king" it should not be assumed that women are excluded from other offices as well.
Rabbi Herschensohn contends that women cannot be barred even from the monarchy on the basis of this source. He argues ingeniously—but hardly convincingly—that Rambam misunderstood the passage in Sifre which served as the basis for his ruling. In its entirety, the passage in Sifre reads as follows: " 'You shall set [over you],' if he dies you shall appoint another in his stead; 'a king,' but not a queen." Rabbi Herschensohn avers that the intent of Sifre is not to exclude women from kingship but rather to indicate that the king need not necessarily have a consort. In the event that the king dies another king must be appointed. If, however, the queen dies the king is not required to remarry (as must the High Priest if he is to perform the sacrificial rites on the Day of Atonement). The phrase employed by Sifre is "melekh ve-lo malkah." Rabbi Herschensohn contends that the Hebrew term "malkah" denotes the consort of a king. The term "molekhet," claims Rabbi Herschensohn, is employed by Scripture (II Kings 11:3 and II Chronicles 22:12) as the title of a woman who reigns in her own right.7In point of fact, the term “malkat Shva” (Queen of Sheba) occurs both in I Kings 10:4 and in II Chronicles 9:12; see Sefer ha-Ma’or, loc. cit. Rabbi Uziel refutes this contention and asserts that the proper Hebrew term for a queen who rules in her own right is indeed "malkah." The term "molekhet" in the passages cited is not a noun to be translated "queen," but rather a verb to be translated "reigns." In any event Rambam's understanding of Sifre cannot be set aside unless there is evidence that early authorities interpreted this source in a different manner. Since such evidence is lacking the philological argument is moot.
Rambam's ruling is found in yet another source. Pesikta Zutrati, a medieval collection of earlier rabbinic comments and aphorisms, derives the restriction against the appointment of a female monarch from the phrase "you cannot put over you a foreign man." In explaining this phrase, Pesikta Zutrati comments, " 'A man,' but not a woman—from here it is derived that a woman is not appointed to a position of authority over the community." On the basis of this derivation women are excluded from all offices barred to foreigners8Rabbi Judah Gershuni, Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah, II (Iyar 5710), 74, posits an interesting exception to the prohibition against appointment of women to communal office based upon the selfsame exclusion of foreigners and women from the monarchy. He cites an early authority who questions the propriety of the appointment of Shemiah and Abtalion as heads of the Bet Din since they were the sons of converts as stated by Rambam in his introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah. [See also R. Jonathan Eibeschutz, Urim ve-Tumim 7:1.] Riva is cited as answering that such appointment is permissible if no equally qualified person of Jewish parentage is to be found. Rabbi Gershuni suggests that, similarly, there may not be a prohibition against appointment of a woman to communal office if she is better qualified for the position than any available male. and indeed Pesikta Zutrati speaks explicitly of any "position of authority." Rabbi Feinstein and Rabbi Herschensohn both question the authenticity of this source. It is, however of interest to note that Rabbi Shlomoh Abraham Wertheimer (Maḥazikei ha-Dat, vol. II, no. 9, 12 Kislev 5680) claims to have found in the Cairo genizah a manuscript edition of Sifre which contains a reading identical to that recorded in Pesikta Zutrati.
A further source indicating that women are barred from the monarchy is cited by Rabbi Pinchas Estherson in a contribution to Maḥazikei ha-Dat, vol. II, no. 8. The Gemara, Berakhot 49a, cites an opinion which states that Grace after Meals need not include the phrase "and on the kingship of the House of David, your annointed" because this phrase is not applicable to women or slaves. The implication of this statement is that women may not occupy royal office. Rabbi Herschensohn rejects this evidence and asserts that women are not barred from occupying the position of monarch by virtue of a direct biblical prohibition. Only when David assumed the throne did the monarchy become the exclusive prerogative of the House of David. Thereafter women were effectively precluded from serving as monarchs because the office became the legacy of male heirs. Exclusive male succession is evidenced in II Chronicles 13:5 "… for you should know that the Lord, God of Israel, gave the kingdom over Israel to David for ever, to him and to his sons …" Male succession is necessary to assure that the royal office remain a prerogative of the House of David. Since the monarchy is an inherited office and since familial as well as tribal identity is transmitted paternally, failure to exclude female descendants would have resulted in the office of king ultimately passing to heirs not of the House of David, because the children of a female monarch would not be of "her" house but of the "house" of her consort.9Cf., however, Minḥat Ḥinnukh, no. 497, who suggests that a woman may indeed serve as monarch in the event that she becomes heir to the throne.
There is yet another passsage in Sifre which may be cited in support of the position that women are barred from holding public office. This argument was formulated by Rabbi Ritter of Rotterdam in the 12 Kislev 5680 issue of Maḥazikei ha-Dat.10See also another article by Rabbi Ritter, “Das Frauenwahlrecht nach der Halacha,” Jeschurun, VI, no. 9-10, Elul-Tishri 5679. Deuteronomy 1:12 records that Moses addressed the community of Israel and declared, "Get for yourselves men, wise, understanding and known to your tribes and I will place them over you." Sifre, puzzled by the seemingly superfluous term "anashim—men," queries, "Would you then have thought women?" and proceeds to interpret the term "anashim" as connoting individuals possessing exemplary qualities. While this exegetical comment recorded in Sifre certainly does not, in itself, serve to establish a halakhic prohibition against appointment of women to positions of communal leadership, Rabbi Ritter argues that the incredulity expressed by the Sages reflects the fact that such a prohibition was known to exist on the basis of some other source. However, in context, the comment of Sifre does not bear out Rabbi Ritter's contention. Moses' quest was not simply for persons to fill positions of communal leadership, but for judges to share the burden of judicial duties. Women are barred from serving as judges11See Ḥoshen Mishpat 7:4. but their exclusion from the ecclesiastic judiciary is based upon technical grounds not at all relevant to the question of whether or not they may occupy other communal offices. Since women are barred from serving as judges, Sifre, quite understandably, points out that the term "anashim" is superfluous. There is no reason to assume that Sifre would have expressed the same incredulity with regard to their suggestion of the appointment of women to other offices. Accordingly, no proof may be adduced from this source in establishing a prohibition against women occupying other positions of formal communal leadership.12Cf., Mishpetei Uzi’el, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 64, sec. 2.
Rabbi Tchursh advances another consideration which would preclude women from occupying synagogal office. Rema, Hoshen Mishpat 37:22, rules that officers of the kahal (Jewish community) acquire the status of judges and hence all those disqualified from serving as judges are disqualified from holding communal office. Since, in terms of normative Jewish law, women are disqualified from serving as judges, it follows that they may not hold office.
II. The Arguments
1. Acceptance as Distinct from Appointment
Rabbi Uziel adopts a permissive attitude toward the election of women to communal office. He draws attention to Tosafot, Niddah 50a, which records one opinion to the effect that a woman may indeed serve as a judge and that Deborah actually did fulfill this function in an official capacity. If a woman may serve even as a judge it follows that there is no impediment to women holding any other communal office. Thus it appears that at least one authority—Tosafot, Niddah 50a—disagrees with Rambam's position. Moreover, argues Rabbi Uziel, Rambam's restriction of women from holding public office should be understood as referring only to appointments made by the Bet Din. Such appointments do not require communal approval and are limited to males. The community may, however, at its discretion, choose any individual to occupy a position of communal leadership. Occupants of such office exercise authority by virtue of consent or "acceptance" (kabbalah) on the part of the community rather than on the basis of appointment by means of fiat. Since such choices are entirely voluntary insofar as the community is concerned, contends Rabbi Uziel, no restrictions are made upon the person who may qualify. This is also Rabbi Turk's rationale in permitting women to occupy synagogal office.13The identical argument was also advanced by Chaim Tzernowitz, Ha-Olam, March 26, 1920.
However, the notion that the prohibition against women occupying communal office applies only to appointments and not to voluntary "acceptance" is rejected by Rabbis Feinstein, Amsel and Tchursh. While Rabbi Feinstein fails to distinguish between "acceptance" and appointment of a woman insofar as the prohibition is concerned, he nevertheless maintains that Tosafot disputes Rambam's exclusion of women from communal office. Rabbi Feinstein draws attention to other statements of Tosafot (Shevu'ot 29b, Gittin 88b and Baba Kamma 15a) in explanation of Deborah's role as a judge. Tosafot explains that despite the specific exclusion of women from serving as members of a Bet Din, Deborah served as a judge because she was "accepted." Female incumbency of the office of judge presents two problems: 1) the general question of whether women may hold public office; 2) the narrower question of whether a woman may serve as a judge even on an ad hoc basis. The second question poses an entirely different problem which may be restated as follows: How can the decisions of a person disqualified from holding judicial office have binding authority upon litigants? Tosafot's explanation, argues Rabbi Feinstein, resolves only the question of how the decision can have binding force. It is a well-established principle that persons disqualified from serving as judges may serve in that capacity on an ad hoc basis with the consent of the litigants. Under such circumstances, decisions rendered by judges who have been voluntarily "accepted" by the litigants are fully enforceable. Rabbi Feinstein maintains that "acceptance" is possible only on an ad hoc basis, but is not an operative concept with regard to permanent occupancy of an office by one who is barred from positions of communal authority. Accordingly, reasons Rabbi Feinstein, Tosafot must have been of the opinion that women are excluded only from the monarchy but not from other offices. Thus Tosafot was not at all troubled by Deborah's incumbency in office and found it necessary to explain only how it was possible for her judicial decisions to be binding. According to Rabbi Feinstein's analysis, Rambam's exclusion of women from communal office is disputed by Tosafot.
Several scholars dispute the contention that Tosafot disagrees with Rambam and permits the appointment of women to public office. Rabbi Amsel argues that there is no basis for the thesis that the community may "accept" the authority of a woman and permit her to occupy an office of leadership. The concept of "acceptance" is found only in the context of legitimization of persons otherwise disqualified from serving as judges. In such instances litigants may voluntarily accept the binding authority of a judge on an ad hoc basis. This, contends Rabbi Amsel, is the meaning of "acceptance" as applied by these authorities with regard to Deborah. Her authority was voluntarily accepted in each individual case by the litigants who appeared before her.
It may also be inferred from the comments of Radbaz, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5, that he is of the opinion that a woman cannot be "accepted" for appointment or election to a position of communal leadership. Radbaz seeks to explain how it was possible for Deborah to have been appointed to the office of judge (as distinct from the question of how she could render decisions in particular cases brought before her). Radbaz records several arguments advanced by Tosafot in answering the question of how Deborah's decisions were binding in individual cases, but fails to cite the answer that she was "accepted" by the populace. The omission of this argument is significant. Radbaz obviously maintains that "acceptance" does not vitiate the prohibition against women holding communal office.14Cf., R. Ya‘akov Levinson, Shivayon ha-Nashim, pp. 18ff. Rabbi Yisrael Ze'ev Minzberg also argues vigorously that acceptance is a valid procedure only on an ad hoc basis but cannot validate permanent or prolonged incumbency in office. He notes that the phrase "som tasim," from which the prohibition is derived, refers explicitly to induction into office and asserts that there can be no "acceptance" when a transgression is involved. Rabbi Levinson resolves the question with regard to Deborah's functions as a judge by noting that Scripture carefully states, "… and the children of Israel went up to her for judgment" (Judges 4:5) indicating that Deborah did not occupy an official position but that each such act was spontaneous and voluntary on the part of the litigants.
Rabbi Tchursh also cites evidence to the effect that persons disqualified from holding office cannot be "accepted" by the community. The Mishnah, Kiddushin 76a, indicates that families occupying certain hereditary offices may be considered to be genealogically pure and need no further proof to establish that fact. If, however, queries Rabbi Tchursh, the community may voluntarily "accept" individuals who are otherwise disqualified, how then can incumbency in office, in itself, substantiate a claim of genealogical purity? It follows that a disqualified person may not be voluntarily "accepted" by the community.
2. The Position of Sefer ha-Hinnukh
Rabbi Feinstein further argues that at least one other authority disagrees with Rambam's exclusion of women from public office. Communal posts are passed on by means of inheritance. This provision is derived from regulations prescribed with regard to the monarchy which in the Jewish commonwealth is a hereditary office. Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 497, expressly states that this provision applies not only to the monarchy but to lesser positions as well. Although with regard to converts, Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 498, is careful to state that their exclusion is not limited to the monarchy but extends to lesser offices as well, in citing the law, no. 497, which excludes females from royal office this authority fails to indicate that a similar restriction applies with regard to other communal offices. Apparently, argues Rabbi Feinstein, the author of Sefer ha-Hinnukh was of the opinion that women are not barred from occupying communal offices other than the monarchy. Nevertheless, despite these differing opinions, Rabbi Feinstein explicitly states that Rambam's position alone is sufficient to preclude the appointment of a woman to synagogal office.
Rabbi Feinstein, however, adds a significant obiter dictum. Citing Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:7, he strongly emphasizes that evildoers and the nonobservant are prohibited from holding communal office.15See also Iggerot Mosheh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, III, no. 11. The appointment or election of such individuals, declares Rabbi Feinstein, is a more serious infraction than is the naming of a woman to such office. If confronted with a choice between a nonobservant male and an observant female Rabbi Feinstein asserts that one should strive for the appointment of the observant woman.
3. Election of Women by Women
Rabbi Levinson formulates another—rather ingenious—argument in support of one manner in which he believes women may be elected to office without violation of the prohibition "a king, but not a queen." Noda bi-Yehudah, Hoshen Mishpat, I, no. 1, and Hatam Sofer, Sotah 41b, followed by Minḥat Hinnukh, no. 497, maintains that the prohibition "You shall set over you a king—'a king' but not a queen" applies only to the act of "simah," i.e., appointment or installation. According to this view, there is no concomitant commandment which would, post factum, prohibit a woman who has been appointed to office from exercising the duties of her office. Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 497, declares that the commandment "You shall set over you a king" is a binding obligation only upon males but not upon females. Rabbi Levinson argues that if women are not commanded to establish a monarchy and, by extension, are not commanded to establish other communal offices, they are not subject to the prohibition against appointing a female to such office. Since women are exempt from the duty imposed by this verse they are exempt also from the limitations placed upon fulfillment of that duty. However, argues Rabbi Levinson, there is no evidence whatsoever indicating that women are forbidden voluntarily to appoint or to participate in the appointment of a king. Consequently, avers Rabbi Levinson, they are under no constraint which would prevent them from appointing a queen or other female official. Thus, argues Rabbi Levinson, women may legitimately vote for women representatives as their delegates to serve on communal bodies. Since there is no prohibition against women holding office, but only against their appointment, this prohibition may be circumvented, Rabbi Levinson contends, by giving women the power to vote. Since women are not prohibited from electing other women, women may be elected by votes of other women to synagogue boards or similar offices.
It should, however, be noted that not all authorities agree that there is no prohibition against women serving in (as distinct from being appointed to) communal office. Tosafot, Sotah 41b, is apparently of the opinion that not only may a woman not be appointed to office, but that a woman, if appointed, is also constrained from exercising the powers of office. Tosafot indicates that failure to protest the exercise of official prerogatives by one who is excluded from appointment to office constitutes a transgression. Failure to protest the exercise of prerogatives of office (as distinct from the original appointment) can logically constitute a transgression only if the exercise of such prerogative is in itself a violation of Halakhah. It is thus difficult to interpret these comments of Tosafot in a manner compatible with the thesis of Noda bi-Yehudah, Hatam Sofer and Minḥat Hinnukh.16Cf., Shivayon ha-Nashim, p. 27.
In this context it is of interest to note a recent pronouncement by a member of the London Bet Din. In Britain's United Synagogue, whose constituent synagogues are subject to the ecclesiastic authority of the Bet Din and the Chief Rabbi, women are not permitted to occupy synagogal office.17In a statement issued on January 9, 1951, the late Chief Rabbi, Sir Israel Brodie, ruled that women are ineligible to hold synagogal office. This restriction is incorporated in the by-laws of the United Synagogue. The ruling of Rabbi Brodie was reaffirmed by the incumbent Chief Rabbi, Immanuel Jakobovits, in a statement issued by the Office of the Chief Rabbi, dated December 5, 1977. Rabbi Jakobovits, while barring women from membership on Boards of Management, suggests that “Synagogue Councils” with women members be established to deal with “spheres of education, youth, cultural and other activities.” The authority and role of such Councils is not defined in this statement and hence it is difficult to assess the halakhic problems, if any, with regard to female membership on such Councils. In a statement to the Jewish Chronicle (May 16, 1975), Dayan Morris Swift declared that it is "halakhically wrong" for women to serve on synagogue boards of management, even if elected by other women members. A similarly negative view was voiced by Rabbi Dr. Benjamin Gelles, rabbi of London's Finchley Synagogue (Jewish Chronicle, May 23, 1975).
4. Communal Office Under Contemporary Conditions
Rabbi Turk alludes to a distinction which may be drawn between contemporary synagogue office and communal offices which are the subject of discussion in rabbinic sources. The point, which is made briefly, requires some amplification. As has been noted, the paradigm case for exclusion of women from office is the monarchy. Women (and converts) are barred from holding lesser offices as well because such offices enjoy in miniscule form powers conferred upon the monarch. The monarch governs by royal fiat and does not require the consent of the governed. The primary attribute of his office is that of coercive authority. Other offices to which specific reference is made by the Gemara as being closed to converts have as their prerogative the power of coercion, e.g., the office of inspector of weights and measures (Kiddushin 76b). A convert may not act as a bailiff or shoter, even though such officials merely carry out the directives of the Bet Din because bailiffs are empowered to use force in discharging their duties. Indeed, the term "serarah" used in this context implies "lordship" or unilateral enforcement of law or edict by one in a position of authority. Tosafot and Rosh, in their commentaries to Yevamot 101b (followed by Shakh, Yoreh De'ah 269:15), both state explicitly that the exclusion of a convert from public office is limited to exclusion from positions of authority involving the power of coercion which is the hallmark of monarchy. It would appear that the same criterion is applicable in determining offices from which women are barred. Nowhere is there an indication that women are to be excluded from purely honorific positions.18This is true for membership in deliberative and advisory bodies as well. It is of interest to note that the name of the Ḥafeẓ Ḥayyim appears together with the names of a number of women on a roster of delegates to a “Pan-Russian Jewish Conference”; see Sefer ha-Ma’or, no. 56. See, however, the letter of R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, Aḥi‘ezer: Koveẓ Iggerot, ed., Aaron Sorasky (Bnei Brak, 5730), I, no. 152, in which he declares that he and other prominent rabbinic figures served as delegates to such conferences solely because of the grave need to counter the attempts of secularists to wreak havoc upon the spiritual welfare of the community; see, infra, note 20. Under contemporary conditions, synagogue officials and boards of directors have no power of coercion whatsoever. They rely upon the good will of synagogue members for compliance. Although Rema stipulates that officials of the kahal must meet the selfsame requirements as judges, it must be remembered that the officials to whom Rema refers were empowered to levy and collect taxes. Assessment of the rate to be paid by each householder does indeed involve a judicial function. In times gone by these officials could exact taxes and enforce their will in other areas as well. Today, since there exists no autonomous kehillah structure, no decision can be enforced other than by means of voluntary compliance; even assessment and collection of synagogue dues is contingent upon the good will of the membership. Under such circumstances the officers of a congregation do not exercise even an approximation of royal power since they cannot in any way compel compliance.19Chaim Tzernowitz, employing a similar line of reasoning, goes beyond this position in asserting that the prohibition is limited to executive or administrative offices but not to membership in legislative or parliamentary bodies since members of such bodies merely enact laws but do not enforce them. If women are excluded only from communal positions of authority in which the office-holder is endowed with coercive authority it may then be argued that, under present conditions, women are not precluded from holding synagogal office.20Cf., however, the view of R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, Aḥi‘ezer: Koveẓ Iggerot, ed. Aaron Sorasky (Bnei Brak, 5730), I, no. 151, opposing participation of women in mixed bodies for reasons of tradition and ẓni‘ut.
While adducing no evidence for his contention, Rabbi Levinson advances an interesting argument in support of the thesis that the prohibition against the appointment of a female monarch is not applicable to contemporary political or communal office. Rabbi Levinson argues that the prohibition, while encompassing not only the monarchy but lesser offices as well, applies only to those offices whose holders enjoy the prerogatives of lifetime incumbency and hereditary succession. In the opinion of Rabbi Levinson, the verse " … that he may prolong his days in his kingship, he and his children" (Deuteronomy 17:20) serves not merely as a description of the nature of royal office but also as a limitation upon the prohibition "a king, but not a queen" contained in the earlier verse. According to this argument, election or appointment of a woman to a term of office for a specific number of years is not at all proscribed.
The halakhah "a king, but not a queen" appears to be a reflection of the religio-social ideal "Kol kevudah bat melekh penimah—The entire glory of the king's daughter is within" (Psalms 45:14). Various explanations have been offered in attempts to formulate the philosophical basis of this ideal. Such explanations are based upon an analysis of the concept of zni'ut in all its ramifications. A review of these formulations is beyond the scope of the present discussion. Suffice it to say that, the ideal of "kol kevudah" notwithstanding, women were never barred from seeking gainful employment or from engaging in commerce. Indeed, there are virtually no halakhic restrictions placed upon a woman seeking a career outside the home.
Nevertheless, the kol kevudah concept does find expression in Halakhah. This expression is perhaps more a matter of form than of substance, but is significant nonetheless. It would appear that the restriction "a king, but not a queen" is designed to give formal recognition to kol kevudah as an ideal, if not a norm. It is precisely in the public arena, in the holding of public office and thereby commanding constant public attention, that the Torah saw the greatest possible violation of feminine zni'ut. Of course, this restriction in no way guarantees the approximation, much less the realization, of this ideal, but it does serve to emphasize the principle as a halakhic desideratum and as such the form is as significant as the substance.
It must be emphasized that the issue of membership of women on synagogue boards is a halakhic question. To be sure, there are diverse views but, as is the case in all other areas of Halakhah, the decision for any specific synagogue must be made only by that synagogue's mara d'atra. The rabbi who is both qualified to act as a halakhic decisor and firmly convinced of the cogency of the arguments of the permissivists is privileged to act in accordance with his views. The rabbi who is unconvinced by these arguments, impressed by the number and eminence of the non-permissivists, or who feels that a breach of accepted practice may genuinely offend the religious sensibilities of some congregants may wish to find a solution which will grant the substantive desire for feminine representation and participation in decision-making without doing violence to halakhic forms. The participation and involvement of women in the synagogue is certainly to be encouraged and maximized. Given a spirit of good will and cooperation, substantive accommodation of the needs and desires of women can be achieved even within existing parameters.