Introduction to the Talmud #3

§ After clarifying its formulation, the Gemara addresses the halakha in the mishna and asks: From where are these matters, i.e., the halakha that a sukka may not exceed a height of twenty cubits, derived?

Rabba said that it is derived as the verse states: “So that your future generations will know that I caused the children of Israel to reside in sukkot when I took them out of the land of Egypt” (Leviticus 23:43). In a sukka up to twenty cubits high, even without a concerted effort, a person is aware that he is residing in a sukka. His eye catches sight of the roofing, evoking the sukka and its associated mitzvot. However, in a sukka that is more than twenty cubits high, a person is not aware that he is residing in a sukka because his eye does not involuntarily catch sight of the roof, as at that height, without a concerted effort one would not notice the roofing.

Rabbi Zeira said that it is derived from here: The verse states: “And there shall be a sukka for shade in the daytime from the heat, and for refuge and cover from storm and from rain” (Isaiah 4:6). In a sukka up to twenty cubits high, a person is sitting in the shade of the sukka, i.e., the shade of the roofing; in a sukka that is more than twenty cubits high, a person is not sitting in the shade of the roofing of the sukka but rather in the shade of the walls of the sukka, as their considerable height provides constant shade, rendering the shade of the roofing irrelevant.

Abaye said to him: But if it is so that one is required to sit in the shade of the roofing of the sukka, then in the case of one who makes his sukka in Ashterot Karnayim, which is located between two mountains that prevent sunlight from reaching there, so too, it is not a fit sukka, since he is not sitting in the shade of the roofing.

Rabbi Zeira said to him: The two cases are not comparable; there, if one theoretically removes the Ashterot Karnayim mountains that obstruct the sunlight, there is still the shade of the roofing of the sukka. In that case, the sukka is properly constructed and there are only external factors that affect the sunlight. However, here, in the case of a sukka that is more than twenty cubits high, if one theoretically removes the walls of the sukka, there is no shade provided by the roofing of the sukka, since throughout the day sunlight will enter the sukka beneath the roofing from where the walls used to be.

Rava said that the halakha is derived from here: “In sukkot shall you reside seven days” (Leviticus 23:42). The Torah said: For the entire seven days, emerge from the permanent residence in which you reside year round and reside in a temporary residence, the sukka. In constructing a sukka up to twenty cubits high, a person can render his residence a temporary residence, as up to that height one can construct a structure that is not sturdy; however, in constructing a sukka above twenty cubits high, one cannot render his residence a temporary residence; rather, he must construct a sturdy permanent residence, which is unfit for use as a sukka.

Abaye said to him: But if that is so, then if he constructed a sukka with steel partitions and placed roofing over them, so too, there, say that it would not be a fit sukka, as any sukka constructed as a permanent residence would be unfit. However, there is no opinion that deems a sukka of that sort unfit.

Rava said to him in response that this is what I am saying to you: In a case where one constructs a sukka up to twenty cubits high, a height that a person typically constructs a temporary residence, when he constructs a structure of that height that is sturdy like a permanent residence, he also fulfills his obligation. However, in a case where one constructs a sukka more than twenty cubits high, a height that a person typically constructs a permanent residence, even when he constructs it in a less sturdy fashion like a temporary residence, he does not fulfill his obligation.

§ The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabbi Yoshiya said that Rav said: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis with regard to the fitness of a sukka more than twenty cubits high is specifically in a case where the walls of the sukka do not reach up to the roofing; however, in a case where the walls of the sukka reach up to the roofing, the Rabbis concede that even if the roofing is more than twenty cubits high, it is fit. In accordance with whose opinion is it?

It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, who says that the reason that a sukka that high is unfit is because the eye does not automatically catch sight of the roofing. And since the walls of the sukka reach the roofing, the eye catches sight of the roofing, as the person will follow the walls all the way up to the roofing despite their considerable height. However, if the roofing is not contiguous with the top of the walls, a person does not notice it without a concerted effort.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rav Huna said that Rav said: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis with regard to the fitness of a sukka more than twenty cubits high is specifically in a case where there is not an area of four cubits by four cubits in the sukka; however, in a case where there is an area of more than four cubits by four cubits in the sukka, the Rabbis concede that even if the roofing is more than twenty cubits high, it is fit. In accordance with whose opinion is it?

It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira, who says that a sukka that high is unfit due to the shade that is provided by the walls and not by the roofing; and since the sukka in this case is spacious and has a large area, there is shade from the roofing of the sukka and not only from the walls.

§ The Gemara now considers which prohibitions are permitted in times of mortal danger. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: The Sages who discussed this issue counted the votes of those assembled and concluded in the upper story of the house of Nitza in the city of Lod: With regard to all other transgressions in the Torah, if a person is told: Transgress this prohibition and you will not be killed, he may transgress that prohibition and not be killed, because the preserving of his own life overrides all of the Torah’s prohibitions. This is the halakha concerning all prohibitions except for those of idol worship, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. Concerning those prohibitions, one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress them.

The Gemara asks: And should one not transgress the prohibition of idol worship to save his life? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael said: From where is it derived that if a person is told: Worship idols and you will not be killed, from where is it derived that he should worship the idol and not be killed? The verse states: “You shall keep My statutes and My judgments, which a person shall do, and he shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), thereby teaching that the mitzvot were given to provide life, but they were not given so that one will die due to their observance.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that it is permitted to worship the idol in this circumstance even in public, i.e., in the presence of many people. Therefore, the verse states: “Neither shall you profane My holy name; but I will be hallowed among the children of Israel: I am the Lord Who sanctifies you” (Leviticus 22:32). Evidently, one is not required to allow himself to be killed so as not to transgress the prohibition of idol worship when in private; but in public he must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress.

The Gemara answers: Those in the upper story of the house of Nitza stated their opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5). If it is stated: “With all your soul,” why is it also stated: “With all your might,” which indicates with all your material possessions? And if it is stated: “With all your might,” why is it also stated: “With all your soul”? One of these clauses seems to be superfluous.

Rather, this serves to teach that if you have a person whose body is more precious to him than his property, it is therefore stated: “With all your soul.” That person must be willing to sacrifice even his life to sanctify God’s name. And if you have a person whose property is more precious to him than his body, it is therefore stated: “With all your might.” That person must even be prepared to sacrifice all his property for the love of God. According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, one must allow himself to be killed rather than worship an idol.

From where is it derived that one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations and the prohibition of bloodshed? This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to the rape of a betrothed young woman it is written: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). But why would the verse mention murder in this context? But what do we learn here from a murderer?

And conversely, the Torah juxtaposes a betrothed young woman to a murderer to indicate that just as with regard to a potential murderer, the halakha is that if one was ordered to murder another, he must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of bloodshed, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman, if she is faced with rape, she must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations.

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha with regard to a murderer himself, that one must allow himself to be killed rather than commit murder? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another, and therefore there is no need for a verse to teach this halakha. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: As when a certain person came before Rabba and said to him: The lord of my place, a local official, said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you, what shall I do? Rabba said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. Who is to say that your blood is redder than his, that your life is worth more than the one he wants you to kill? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. This logical reasoning is the basis for the halakha that one may not save his own life by killing another.

§ When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Sages taught that one is permitted to transgress prohibitions in the face of mortal danger only when it is not a time of religious persecution. But in a time of religious persecution, when the gentile authorities are trying to force Jews to violate their religion, even if they issued a decree about a minor mitzva, one must be killed and not transgress.

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even when it is not a time of religious persecution, the Sages said that one is permitted to transgress a prohibition in the face of mortal danger only when he was ordered to do so in private. But if he was ordered to commit a transgression in public, even if they threaten him with death if he does not transgress a minor mitzva, he must be killed and not transgress.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But wasn’t the incident involving Esther, i.e., her cohabitation with Ahasuerus, a public sin? Why then did Esther not surrender her life rather than engage in intercourse? The Gemara answers: Abaye says: Esther was merely like natural ground, i.e., she was a passive participant. The obligation to surrender one’s life rather than engage in forbidden sexual intercourse applies only to a man who transgresses the prohibition in an active manner. A woman who is passive and merely submits is not required to give up her life so that she not sin.

Rava says that there is another justification for Esther’s behavior: When gentiles order the transgression of a prohibition not in order to persecute the Jews or to make them abandon their religion, but for their own personal pleasure, it is different. In such a situation there is no obligation to sacrifice one’s life, even when the sin is committed in public.