((ח) כִּ֣י יִפָּלֵא֩ מִמְּךָ֨ דָבָ֜ר לַמִּשְׁפָּ֗ט בֵּֽין־דָּ֨ם ׀ לְדָ֜ם בֵּֽין־דִּ֣ין לְדִ֗ין וּבֵ֥ין נֶ֙גַע֙ לָנֶ֔גַע דִּבְרֵ֥י רִיבֹ֖ת בִּשְׁעָרֶ֑יךָ וְקַמְתָּ֣ וְעָלִ֔יתָ אֶל־הַמָּק֔וֹם אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִבְחַ֛ר יְהוָ֥ה אֱלֹהֶ֖יךָ בּֽוֹ׃ (ט) וּבָאתָ֗ אֶל־הַכֹּהֲנִים֙ הַלְוִיִּ֔ם וְאֶל־הַשֹּׁפֵ֔ט אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִהְיֶ֖ה בַּיָּמִ֣ים הָהֵ֑ם וְדָרַשְׁתָּ֙ וְהִגִּ֣ידוּ לְךָ֔ אֵ֖ת דְּבַ֥ר הַמִּשְׁפָּֽט׃ (י) וְעָשִׂ֗יתָ עַל־פִּ֤י הַדָּבָר֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר יַגִּ֣ידֽוּ לְךָ֔ מִן־הַמָּק֣וֹם הַה֔וּא אֲשֶׁ֖ר יִבְחַ֣ר יְהוָ֑ה וְשָׁמַרְתָּ֣ לַעֲשׂ֔וֹת כְּכֹ֖ל אֲשֶׁ֥ר יוֹרֽוּךָ׃ (יא) עַל־פִּ֨י הַתּוֹרָ֜ה אֲשֶׁ֣ר יוֹר֗וּךָ וְעַל־הַמִּשְׁפָּ֛ט אֲשֶׁר־יֹאמְר֥וּ לְךָ֖ תַּעֲשֶׂ֑ה לֹ֣א תָס֗וּר מִן־הַדָּבָ֛ר אֲשֶׁר־יַגִּ֥ידֽוּ לְךָ֖ יָמִ֥ין וּשְׂמֹֽאל׃ (יב) וְהָאִ֞ישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יַעֲשֶׂ֣ה בְזָד֗וֹן לְבִלְתִּ֨י שְׁמֹ֤עַ אֶל־הַכֹּהֵן֙ הָעֹמֵ֞ד לְשָׁ֤רֶת שָׁם֙ אֶת־יְהוָ֣ה אֱלֹהֶ֔יךָ א֖וֹ אֶל־הַשֹּׁפֵ֑ט וּמֵת֙ הָאִ֣ישׁ הַה֔וּא וּבִֽעַרְתָּ֥ הָרָ֖ע מִיִּשְׂרָאֵֽל׃ (יג) וְכָל־הָעָ֖ם יִשְׁמְע֣וּ וְיִרָ֑אוּ וְלֹ֥א יְזִיד֖וּן עֽוֹד׃ (ס)
(1) You shall not sacrifice to the LORD your God an ox or a sheep that has any defect of a serious kind, for that is abhorrent to the LORD your God. (2) If there is found among you, in one of the settlements that the LORD your God is giving you, a man or woman who has affronted the LORD your God and transgressed His covenant— (3) turning to the worship of other gods and bowing down to them, to the sun or the moon or any of the heavenly host, something I never commanded— (4) and you have been informed or have learned of it, then you shall make a thorough inquiry. If it is true, the fact is established, that abhorrent thing was perpetrated in Israel, (5) you shall take the man or the woman who did that wicked thing out to the public place, and you shall stone them, man or woman, to death.— (6) A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two or more witnesses; he must not be put to death on the testimony of a single witness.— (7) Let the hands of the witnesses be the first against him to put him to death, and the hands of the rest of the people thereafter. Thus you will sweep out evil from your midst. (8) If a case is too baffling for you to decide, be it a controversy over homicide, civil law, or assault—matters of dispute in your courts—you shall promptly repair to the place that the LORD your God will have chosen, (9) and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, (10) you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the LORD chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. (11) You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. (12) Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the LORD your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die. Thus you will sweep out evil from Israel: (13) all the people will hear and be afraid and will not act presumptuously again. (14) If, after you have entered the land that the LORD your God has assigned to you, and taken possession of it and settled in it, you decide, “I will set a king over me, as do all the nations about me,” (15) you shall be free to set a king over yourself, one chosen by the LORD your God. Be sure to set as king over yourself one of your own people; you must not set a foreigner over you, one who is not your kinsman. (16) Moreover, he shall not keep many horses or send people back to Egypt to add to his horses, since the LORD has warned you, “You must not go back that way again.” (17) And he shall not have many wives, lest his heart go astray; nor shall he amass silver and gold to excess. (18) When he is seated on his royal throne, he shall have a copy of this Teaching written for him on a scroll by the levitical priests. (19) Let it remain with him and let him read in it all his life, so that he may learn to revere the LORD his God, to observe faithfully every word of this Teaching as well as these laws. (20) Thus he will not act haughtily toward his fellows or deviate from the Instruction to the right or to the left, to the end that he and his descendants may reign long in the midst of Israel.
למתני׳ זקן ממרא על פי ב"ד שנאמר (דברים יז, ח) כי יפלא ממך דבר למשפט שלשה בתי דינין היו שם אחד יושב על פתח הר הבית ואחד יושב על פתח העזרה ואחד יושב בלשכת הגזית באין לזה שעל פתח הר הבית ואומר כך דרשתי וכך דרשו חבירי כך לימדתי וכך לימדו חבירי אם שמעו אמר להם ואם לאו באין להן לאותן שעל פתח עזרה ואומר כך דרשתי וכך דרשו חבירי כך לימדתי וכך לימדו חבירי אם שמעו אמר להם ואם לאו אלו ואלו באין לב"ד הגדול שבלשכת הגזית שממנו יוצא תורה לכל ישראל שנאמר (דברים יז, י) מן המקום ההוא אשר יבחר ה' חזר לעירו שנה ולמד בדרך שהיה למד פטור ואם הורה לעשות חייב שנאמר (דברים יז, יב) והאיש אשר יעשה בזדון אינו חייב עד שיורה לעשות תלמיד שהורה לעשות פטור נמצא חומרו קולו: גמ׳ תנו רבנן כי יפלא ממך דבר
It is in order to flog him, not to execute him, that we came to court. And these other witnesses, through their testimony, are the ones who did this to him, i.e., they are responsible for the entire matter of his execution, and are therefore liable to be executed for giving conspiring testimony. Rav Pappa objects to this: If so, and Ḥizkiyya concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan in the case of the final testimony of the stubborn and rebellious son, let them also execute the witnesses to the sale of one who was abducted, as the witnesses to the abduction could say: It is in order to flog the abductor, not to execute him, that we came to court. And if you would say that Ḥizkiyya holds that one who abducts another and does not sell him is not flogged, that is difficult. But wasn’t it stated: With regard to witnesses to the abduction who were rendered conspiring witnesses prior to the testimony of the witnesses to the sale, Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree. One says: They are flogged, and one says: They are not flogged. And we say: It may be concluded that it is Ḥizkiyya who said that they are flogged, from the fact that Ḥizkiyya said: They are not executed. Since if one were to suggest that it is Rabbi Yoḥanan who said that they are flogged, that cannot be. Since he says that conspiring witnesses are executed in this case, it is a prohibition that is given as a warning of liability for a court-imposed death penalty, and the principle is: With regard to any prohibition that is given as a warning of liability for a court-imposed death penalty, one is not flogged for its violation, even in a case where the transgressor is not executed. The abductor is not flogged. How then could the conspiring witnesses be flogged for testifying against them, as the punishment for conspiring witnesses is identical to the punishment of the one against whom they testified? Rather, it is certain that Ḥizkiyya holds that the conspiring witnesses to the abduction are flogged, and therefore everyone agrees that the conspiring witnesses to the sale are executed. Rather, Rav Pappa says: The previous explanation is rejected, and instead the dispute must be explained as follows: With regard to the witnesses to the sale of the abductee, it is clear that everyone agrees that they are executed, as theirs is testimony concerning an entire matter and would have led to his execution. When they disagree, it is with regard to the witnesses to the abduction. Ḥizkiyya says: They are not executed, as he holds that abduction stands discrete as an independent prohibition punishable by lashes, and the sale stands discrete as an independent prohibition punishable by strangulation. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They are executed, as the abduction is the beginning of the process that culminates with the sale. The witnesses testifying to the abduction are testifying to a transgression that will culminate with the sale of the abductee. The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes with regard to the initial witnesses concerning a stubborn and rebellious son who testified that he engaged in gluttonous and drunken conduct and who were rendered conspiring witnesses that they are not executed, as they could say: It is in order to flog him for past conduct, not to execute him for actions that he might perform in the future, that we came to court. Therefore, there is no connection between their testimony and punishment for future actions. Abaye said in summary: All concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son, and all concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son, and there is a dispute with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son. The Gemara elaborates: With regard to the initial witnesses, all, even Rabbi Yoḥanan, concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son that they are not executed if they are rendered conspiring witnesses, as they could say: It is in order to flog him for past conduct, not to execute him, that we came to court. And with regard to the final witnesses, all, even Ḥizkiyya, concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son that they are executed if they are rendered conspiring witnesses, due to the fact that the initial witnesses could say: It is in order to flog him for past conduct that we came to court, and these final witnesses are the ones who did this to him, i.e., they are responsible for the entire matter of his execution and are therefore liable to be executed. And there is a dispute with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son in a case where two of the final witnesses, who testify after the son was already flogged for engaging in gluttonous and drunken conduct, say: He stole in our presence, and two other witnesses say: He ate in our presence. The dispute is whether the testimony of these two pairs of witnesses is testimony concerning an entire matter or testimony concerning half a matter. Rav Asi says: The witnesses to the sale of a person who were rendered conspiring witnesses are not executed, due to the fact that the one against whom they testified could say: Although they testified that I sold an individual, it was my slave that I sold. In that case, the witnesses are not testifying that he violated a capital transgression, as they cannot attest to the fact that the individual he sold was first abducted. Rav Yosef says: In accordance with whose opinion is that halakha of Rav Asi? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: The testimony of witnesses is valid only when they attest to an entire matter and not to half a matter. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: According to your explanation, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold: The testimony is valid when they testify to an entire matter and even when they testify to half a matter, are the conspiring witnesses executed? Doesn’t Rav Asi say that they are not executed due to the fact that the one against whom they testified could say: Although they testified that I sold an individual, it was my slave that I sold? According to that reasoning, even the Rabbis would concede that they are not executed. Rather, you may even say that Rav Asi’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and it is concerning a case where only witnesses to the sale came to testify and witnesses to the abduction did not come to testify. In that case the accused can avoid punishment; therefore, the conspiring witnesses are not executed. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating that halakha? Obviously, in that case they are not executed, as there is no way to determine that the one he sold is not a slave. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that they are not executed even if witnesses to the abduction ultimately came after the witnesses to the sale had testified and testified that he sold a freeman, not his slave. The Gemara asks: But still, what is the purpose of stating that halakha? When the witnesses to the sale testified, their testimony was not sufficient to execute the accused. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach the halakha in a case where they are not executed even where the first and second pairs of witnesses gesture to one another, ostensibly indicating that the conspiring witnesses to the sale were aware that the witnesses to the abduction would follow and that therefore the initial witnesses are part of the conspiracy to testify and execute the accused. And consequently, it is necessary to teach this halakha lest you say: Gesturing is a significant matter, and the legal status of the two testimonies is that of a single testimony. Therefore, Rav Asi teaches us that gesturing is nothing of significance. MISHNA: A rebellious elder according to the court, who does not observe the ruling of the court, is executed by strangulation, as it is stated: “If there shall be a matter too hard for you in judgment…and you shall arise and ascend unto the place that the Lord your God shall choose…and you shall do according to the matter that they shall declare unto you…and the man that shall do so intentionally, not to listen…and that man shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:8–12). There were three courts there in Jerusalem. One convenes at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and one convenes at the entrance to the Temple courtyard, and one convenes in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. An elder who issues a ruling contrary to the ruling of his colleagues and his colleagues come to that court that is at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and the elder says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling in that case, the court says it to them. And if not, they come to those judges who are convened at the entrance to the Temple courtyard, which is a more significant tribunal. And the elder says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling in that case, the court says it to them. And if not, these judges and those judges come to the High Court, the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges that is in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, from which Torah emerges to the entire Jewish people, as it is stated: “And you shall do according to the matter that they shall declare unto you from that place that the Lord shall choose and you shall observe to perform according to all that they shall teach you” (Deuteronomy 17:10). They are the ultimate arbiters who establish the halakha that is binding. If they ruled contrary to the ruling of the elder and the elder then returned to his city, and nevertheless, he taught in the manner that he was teaching previously, he is exempt from punishment. But if he instructed others to act on the basis of his ruling that stands contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is liable to be executed, as it is stated: “And the man that shall do so intentionally not to listen” (Deuteronomy 17:12), meaning that one is not liable unless he instructs others to act. A student who is not yet an elder, i.e., he has not been ordained, who instructs others to act contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, is exempt, as a ruling given prior to ordination is not a valid ruling. It follows that his stringency is his leniency. The stringency imposed upon the student that he is not sanctioned to issue rulings results in the leniency that if he instructs others to act on the basis of his ruling that is contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is exempt. GEMARA: The Sages taught with regard to that which is stated: “If there shall be a matter too hard for you in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between mark and mark, even matters of controversy within your gates, then you shall arise, and ascend to the place that the Lord your God shall choose” (Deuteronomy 17:8). “If there shall be a matter too hard [yippaleh] for you”;
במופלא שבב"ד הכתוב מדבר ממך זה יועץ וכן הוא אומר (נחום א, יא) ממך יצא חושב על ה' רעה יועץ בליעל דבר זו הלכה למשפט זה הדין בין דם לדם בין דם נדה דם לידה דם זיבה בין דין לדין בין דיני נפשות דיני ממונות דיני מכות בין נגע לנגע בין נגעי אדם נגעי בתים נגעי בגדים דברי אלו החרמים והערכין וההקדשות ריבות זו השקאת סוטה ועריפת עגלה וטהרת מצורע בשעריך זו לקט שכחה ופאה וקמת מב"ד ועלית מלמד שבית המקדש גבוה מא"י וא"י גבוה מכל הארצות אל המקום מלמד שהמקום גורם בשלמא בית המקדש גבוה מא"י דכתיב ועלית אלא א"י גבוה מכל הארצות מנא ליה דכתיב (ירמיהו כג, ז) לכן הנה ימים באים נאם ה' (לא יאמר) חי ה' אשר העלה את בני ישראל מארץ מצרים כי אם חי ה' אשר העלה ואשר הביא את זרע בית ישראל מארץ צפונה ומכל הארצות אשר הדחתים שם וישבו על אדמתם
תנו רבנן זקן ממרא אינו חייב אלא על דבר שזדונו כרת ושגגתו חטאת דברי ר"מ רבי יהודה אומר על דבר שעיקרו מדברי תורה ופירושו מדברי סופרים ר"ש אומר אפילו דקדוק אחד מדקדוקי סופרים מאי טעמא דר"מ גמר דבר דבר כתיב הכא (דברים יז, ח) כי יפלא ממך דבר למשפט וכתיב התם (ויקרא ד, יג) ונעלם דבר מעיני הקהל מה להלן דבר שחייב על זדונו כרת ועל שגגתו חטאת אף כאן דבר שחייב על זדונו כרת ועל שגגתו חטאת ור' יהודה (דברים יז, יא) על פי התורה אשר יורוך עד דאיכא תורה ויורוך ור"ש אשר יגידו לך מן המקום ההוא אפילו כל דהו
it is with regard to the most distinguished [mufla] member of the court, an ordained, expert judge, that the verse is speaking. “For you [mimmekha]”; this is a reference to an adviser, who is consulted with regard to significant matters, e.g., intercalation of the year; and likewise it says: “From you [mimmekh] he emerged, who devised evil against the Lord, an adviser of wickedness” (Nahum 1:11). “A matter”; this a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. “In judgment”; this is a logical inference, which is one of the hermeneutical principles. “Between blood and blood”; this is the ability to discern between the disparate halakhot relevant to the blood of a menstruating woman, the blood of childbirth, and the blood of a gonorrhea-like discharge [ziva]. “Between plea and plea”; this is the ability to discern between cases of capital law and cases of monetary law, with regard to which there are differences in evidence protocols, and laws involving the liability to receive lashes. “Between mark and mark”; this is the ability to discern between the disparate halakhot relevant to leprous marks of a person, leprous marks on houses, and leprous marks on garments (see Leviticus, chapter 14). “Matters of [divrei]”; these are the dedications to God or to a priest, and the valuations of one’s value to the Temple, and the consecrations, all of which are matters of speech [dibbur]. “Controversy”; this is the giving of the bitter waters to a sota (see Numbers, chapter 5), which results from a dispute between husband and wife; and the heifer whose neck is broken, which results from an unresolved murder (Deuteronomy 21:1–9); and the purification of a leper, who is afflicted due to evil speech. “Within your gates”; this is referring to gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce in the corner of the field [pe’a], all of which are given to the poor who eat at the gates of the city. “Then you shall arise” from the court where he sits as a judge. “And ascend”; this teaches that the Temple is higher than the rest of Eretz Yisrael, and Eretz Yisrael is higher than all the other lands. Therefore, the language of ascent is employed with regard to travel to Eretz Yisrael. “To the place that the Lord, your God, shall choose”; this teaches that the location that God chose for the Sanhedrin to convene causes their rulings to be authoritative, in the sense here in the mishna that the rebellious elder who instructs others to act contrary to a ruling issued there is liable. The Gemara asks: Granted, the fact that the Temple is higher than the rest of Eretz Yisrael is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And ascend.” But from where does the tanna derive the fact that Eretz Yisrael is higher than all the other lands? The Gemara answers that it is derived from this verse, as it is written: “Therefore, behold, the days come, says the Lord, and they will no longer say: As the Lord lives, Who brought up the children of Israel from the land of Egypt; rather, as the Lord lives, Who brought up and led the descendants of the house of Israel from the north country and from all the countries where I had driven them, and they shall dwell upon their land” (Jeremiah 23:7–8). Apparently, coming from other countries to Eretz Yisrael is also characterized as ascent. The Sages taught in a baraita: A rebellious elder is liable only for instructing another to perform an action involving a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: One is liable for a matter whose essence is known from the words of the Torah itself and whose explanation is understood from traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah. The elder is not liable if the essence of the matter with regard to which he issues his ruling does not appear in the Torah or if the entire matter is written in the Torah. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he differs with regard to one of the minutiae of the scribes in interpreting the Torah, the elder is liable, irrespective of the severity of the transgression. The Gemara elaborates: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir? He derives a verbal analogy between the term matter written here and the term matter that is written elsewhere. Here, matter is written in the verse: “If there shall be a matter too hard for you in judgment” (Deuteronomy 17:8), and there, it is written: “And the matter shall be concealed from the eyes of the assembly” (Leviticus 4:13). Just as there, in the verse in Leviticus, the sin-offering of the congregation is brought only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the rebellious elder is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. And what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is as it is written with regard to the rebellious elder: “According to the Torah that they shall instruct you” (Deuteronomy 17:11), indicating that there is no liability until it is a matter that consists of elements of both the Written Torah and in that the Sages shall instruct you in interpretation of the Written Torah. And what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? It is as it is written with regard to the rebellious elder: “That they shall declare unto you from that place” (Deuteronomy 17:10), from which Rabbi Shimon derives that one is liable even if he deviates from the ruling of the Sanhedrin to any degree whatsoever. Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana said to Rava: Interpret for me that baraita, in which the liability of the rebellious elder for rulings in different areas of halakha is derived from the verses, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the rebellious elder is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. How is such a prohibition found in each of the categories enumerated in the baraita? Rava said to Rav Pappa his student: Go and interpret it for him. Rav Pappa said to Rav Huna: “If there shall be a matter too hard”; there the verse is speaking with regard to the most distinguished member of the court. “For you”; this is referring to an adviser, who knows how to intercalate years and establish months. How is there liability in this matter for karet or a sin-offering? It is as we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 7:7): Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Pappeyas testified that the judges may intercalate the year throughout the entire month of Adar, as the other Sages would say that the judges may do so only until the day of Purim. A ruling contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin could result in a matter for which one is liable to receive karet, as, if his disagreement is to this side, e.g., the court intercalated the year and the rebellious elder ruled that the year is not intercalated, his ruling permits consumption of leavened bread on Passover according to the calendar established by the Sanhedrin. And if his disagreement is to that side, e.g., the court did not intercalate the year and the rebellious elder ruled that the year is intercalated, his ruling permits consumption of leavened bread on Passover according to the calendar established by the Sanhedrin. One who intentionally eats leavened bread on Passover is liable to receive karet, and one who does so unwittingly is liable to bring a sin-offering. “A matter”; this is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. This is a matter involving karet in the case of the halakhot of eleven days, which is the minimal number of days between one menstrual period and another, when if a woman experiences a flow of blood on three consecutive days during those eleven days, she assumes the status of a greater zava, with regard to whom there are unique halakhot, e.g., the passage of seven clean days before purification by Torah law. When the woman experiences a discharge of blood for one or two days, she is a lesser zava, and if she observes the third day clean from the discharge of blood she may immerse immediately and she is ritually pure. As it was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to a woman who experiences a discharge of blood on the tenth of those eleven days. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the ninth day, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the eleventh day. The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the ninth day: Just as a discharge on the ninth day requires the woman to examine herself the following day and requires the observance of a day clean from discharges, so too does a discharge on the tenth day require observance of a day clean from discharges on the eleventh day before immersing in a ritual bath. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, a woman who experiences a discharge on the tenth day assumes the status of a woman who observes a clean day for one or two days after she experiences a discharge. And Reish Lakish says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the eleventh day: Just as a discharge on the eleventh day does not require observance of a day clean from discharge before immersing in a ritual bath, so too does a discharge on the tenth day not require observance of a day clean from discharges on the eleventh day. Even if she were to experience a discharge of blood on the days that follow, the eleventh and the twelfth days, she would not assume the status of a greater zava, as in that case the blood that she saw on the twelfth day would be the blood of menstruation and not the discharge of a zava. According to Reish Lakish, she does not assume that status. Therefore, if the Sanhedrin issued a ruling in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, one who engages in intercourse with that woman before her purification is liable to receive karet. If the rebellious elder issued a ruling in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, then one who intentionally engaged in intercourse with the woman is liable to receive karet. If he did so unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. “In judgment”; this is a logical inference, which is one of the hermeneutical principles,
עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל הֵעִיד אַרְבָּעָה דְבָרִים. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, עֲקַבְיָא, חֲזֹר בְּךָ בְאַרְבָּעָה דְבָרִים שֶׁהָיִיתָ אוֹמֵר וְנַעַשְׂךָ אַב בֵּית דִּין לְיִשְׂרָאֵל. אָמַר לָהֶן, מוּטָב לִי לְהִקָּרֵא שׁוֹטֶה כָּל יָמַי, וְלֹא לֵעָשׂוֹת שָׁעָה אַחַת רָשָׁע לִפְנֵי הַמָּקוֹם, שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיוּ אוֹמְרִים, בִּשְׁבִיל שְׂרָרָה חָזַר בּוֹ. הוּא הָיָה מְטַמֵּא שְׂעַר הַפְּקֻדָּה וְדַם הַיָּרוֹק. וַחֲכָמִים מְטַהֲרִין. הוּא הָיָה מַתִּיר שְׂעַר בְּכוֹר בַּעַל מוּם שֶׁנָּשַׁר וְהִנִּיחוֹ בְחַלּוֹן וְאַחַר כָּךְ שְׁחָטוֹ, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִים. הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר, אֵין מַשְׁקִין לֹא אֶת הַגִּיֹּרֶת וְלֹא אֶת שִׁפְחָה הַמְשֻׁחְרֶרֶת. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, מַשְׁקִין. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, מַעֲשֶׂה בְּכַרְכְּמִית, שִׁפְחָה מְשֻׁחְרֶרֶת שֶׁהָיְתָה בִירוּשָׁלַיִם, וְהִשְׁקוּהָ שְׁמַעְיָה וְאַבְטַלְיוֹן. אָמַר לָהֶם, דֻּגְמָא הִשְׁקוּהָ. וְנִדּוּהוּ, וּמֵת בְּנִדּוּיוֹ, וְסָקְלוּ בֵית דִּין אֶת אֲרוֹנוֹ. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, חַס וְשָׁלוֹם שֶׁעֲקַבְיָא נִתְנַדָּה, שֶׁאֵין עֲזָרָה נִנְעֶלֶת בִּפְנֵי כָל אָדָם מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל בְּחָכְמָה וּבְיִרְאַת חֵטְא כַּעֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל. וְאֶת מִי נִדּוּ, אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן חֲנוֹךְ, שֶׁפִּקְפֵּק בְּטָהֳרַת יָדָיִם. וּכְשֶׁמֵּת, שָׁלְחוּ בֵית דִּין וְהִנִּיחוּ אֶבֶן עַל אֲרוֹנוֹ. מְלַמֵּד שֶׁכָּל הַמִּתְנַדֶּה וּמֵת בְּנִדּוּיוֹ, סוֹקְלִין אֶת אֲרוֹנוֹ:
Akavya the son of Mehalelel testified about four things. They said to him: Akavya, retract the four things you have said and we will make you the head of the court of Israel. He said to them: Better I be called a fool all my days, so long as I do not do wickedness for even a single moment before the Omnipresent, so that they will not say "he retracted because [he wanted] power." He used to declare impure the leftover hair [from leprous skin], and green [or yellow] blood. And the Sages declared [these things] pure. He would permit the [use of] wool that had fallen from a blemished firstborn animal and had been placed in a cavity [for safekeeping] and [the animal] was afterwards slaughtered, but the Sages forbade [the use of the wool]. He would say: One may not make a converted woman nor a freed maidservant drink [from the "bitter waters" that were drunk by a woman suspected of adultery as a test]. But the Sages say: [They are] made to drink. They said to him: There was the case of Karkamit, a freed maidservant in Jerusalem, who was made to drink by Shama'ya and Avtalyon! He said to them: They made her drink an "example" [i.e. the "bitter waters" they made her drink were not authentic]. They excommunicated him, and he died in excommunication, and the Court stoned his coffin. Said Rabbi Yehudah: God-forbid [one should say] that Akavya was excommunicated! For the [Temple] courtyard is never locked for any man of Israel who has wisdom and fear of sin like Akavya the son of Mehalelel [had]. So who did [the Court] excommunicate? It was Elazar the son of Khanoch, who mocked the [laws of] purity of hands. And when he died, the Court went and placed a stone on his coffin, teaching that anyone who was excommunicated and died in excommunication, they "stone" his coffin [i.e. they place a stone on his coffin].
בִּשְׁעַת מִיתָתוֹ אָמַר לִבְנוֹ, בְּנִי, חֲזֹר בְּךָ בְאַרְבָּעָה דְבָרִים שֶׁהָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר. אָמַר לוֹ, וְלָמָּה לֹא חָזַרְתָּ בָּךְ. אָמַר לוֹ, אֲנִי שָׁמַעְתִּי מִפִּי הַמְרֻבִּים, וְהֵם שָׁמְעוּ מִפִּי הַמְרֻבִּים. אֲנִי עָמַדְתִּי בִשְׁמוּעָתִי, וְהֵם עָמְדוּ בִשְׁמוּעָתָן. אֲבָל אַתָּה שָׁמַעְתָּ מִפִּי הַיָּחִיד, וּמִפִּי הַמְרֻבִּין. מוּטָב לְהַנִּיחַ דִּבְרֵי הַיָּחִיד, וְלֶאֱחֹז בְּדִבְרֵי הַמְרֻבִּין. אָמַר לוֹ, אַבָּא, פְּקֹד עָלַי לַחֲבֵרֶיךָ. אָמַר לוֹ, אֵינִי מַפְקִיד. אָמַר לוֹ, שֶׁמָּא עִילָה מָצָאתָ בִי. אָמַר לוֹ, לָאו. מַעֲשֶׂיךָ יְקָרְבוּךָ וּמַעֲשֶׂיךָ יְרַחֲקוּךָ:
In the hour of [Akavya's] death, he said to his son: My son, retract the four things that I used to say. [His son] said to him: And why did you not retract [these statements]? He said to him: I heard them from the mouths of many people, and they [i.e. the other Sages] heard [the opposite] from the mouths of many people. I stood by what I heard, and they stood by what they heard. But [now], you [only] heard [these things] from the mouth of a single person [i.e. me], and [the opposite] from the mouths of many people. It is better to leave the words of the single person, and to grab hold of the words of the many. [His son] said to him: Father, commend me to your colleagues [either referring to those on earth, or those in heaven]. He said to him: I cannot commend [you]. He said to him: Perhaps you do not find in me worthiness? He said to him: No! Your [own] actions will draw you near, or your [own] actions will distance you.
ג' בתי דינין וכו': אמר רב כהנא הוא אומר מפי השמועה והן אומרין מפי השמועה אינו נהרג הוא אומר כך הוא בעיני והן אומרין כך הוא בעינינו אינו נהרג וכל שכן הוא אומר מפי השמועה והן אומרין כך הוא בעינינו אינו נהרג עד שיאמר כך הוא בעיני והן אומרים מפי השמועה תדע שהרי לא הרגו את עקביא בן מהללאל ור' אלעזר אומר אפילו הוא אומר מפי השמועה והן אומרין כך הוא בעינינו נהרג כדי שלא ירבו מחלוקות בישראל ואם תאמר מפני מה לא הרגו את עקביא בן מהללאל מפני שלא הורה הלכה למעשה תנן כך דרשתי וכך דרשו חבירי כך למדתי וכך למדו חבירי מאי לאו דהוא אמר מפי השמועה והם אומרין כך הוא בעינינו לא הוא אומר כך הוא בעיני והם אומרים מפי השמועה ת"ש דאמר רבי יאשיה שלשה דברים סח לי זעירא מאנשי ירושלים בעל שמחל על קינויו קינויו מחול
with regard to a case where there is a spread of leprosy in garments that culminates with the garment’s being completely covered with leprous marks that the garment is pure, just as it is with regard to leprosy of a person? Karaḥat and gabbaḥat are stated with regard to leprosy of a person (see Leviticus 13:42), in the sense of baldness on the back of one’s head and forehead, and karaḥat and gabbaḥat are stated with regard to leprosy of garments (see Leviticus 13:55), in the sense of the newer and the older sections of the garment. Just as there, with regard to leprosy of a person, if the leprosy spread to his entire body he is pure, so too here, with regard to leprosy of garments, if the leprosy spread to the entire garment it is pure. The Rabbis disagree and hold that even if the leprosy spreads, the garment remains impure. Therefore, if one touches the garment throughout which the leprosy spread and enters the Temple, according to the Rabbis, he is liable to receive karet, while according to Rabbi Yonatan ben Avtolemos, he is not liable. “Matters of”; these are the valuations, and the dedications, and the consecrations. The Gemara elaborates: In the case of valuations, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis, as we learned in a baraita: In the case of one who valuates a child less than one month old, for whom the Torah does not specify a value, Rabbi Meir says: He gives the monetary value of the child, as it is apparent that his intent was to give a donation, not a valuation. And the Rabbis say: He did not say anything. If the money is not consecrated and one betrothed a woman with it, she is not betrothed, and one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive karet. In the case of dedications, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 28b): Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Dedications dedicated without specification of their purpose are designated for Temple maintenance, as it is stated: “Every dedicated item is most sacred unto the Lord” (Leviticus 27:28). And the Rabbis say: Dedications dedicated without specification of their purpose are designated for the priest, as it is stated with regard to one who consecrated a field and did not redeem it: “As a field dedicated; to the priest shall be its possession” (Leviticus 27:21). If so, why must the verse state: “Every dedicated item is most sacred unto the Lord”? It is to teach that dedication takes effect on offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity. According to the Rabbis, the property is not consecrated, and if a woman is betrothed with that property, the betrothal takes effect, and one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive karet. According to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, the property is consecrated and he is not liable. In the case of consecrations, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Even a small fork that is consecrated property requires a court consisting of ten people in order to redeem it. The Rabbis say: A court of three judges is sufficient. According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, if it is redeemed before a court of three, the property remains consecrated. According to the Rabbis, the property is not consecrated, and if a woman is betrothed with that property, the betrothal takes effect, and one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive karet. According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, the property is consecrated and he is not liable. “Disputes”; this is the giving of the bitter waters to a sota to drink, and the heifer whose neck is broken, and the purification of a leper. In the case of giving the bitter waters to a sota to drink, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned in a mishna (Sota 2a): With regard to one who issues a warning to his wife not to seclude herself with a particular man, Rabbi Eliezer says: He issues a warning to her based on the presence of two witnesses; only then is the warning effective. And the husband gives her the bitter waters based on the testimony of one witness who saw the seclusion, or even based on his own testimony. Rabbi Yehoshua says: He both issues a warning to her based on the presence of two witnesses and gives her the bitter waters to drink based on the testimony of two witnesses to the seclusion. If the seclusion took place in the presence of one witness, according to Rabbi Eliezer, she is a sota and not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, she is not a sota and she is entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract. The difference is whether the money of her marriage contract is hers. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if she gave that money to another who betrothed a woman with it, it is a betrothal with stolen property and the woman is not betrothed. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, the betrothal would not take effect. In the case of the heifer whose neck is broken, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna (Sota 45b): From where on the body of the murder victim would they measure the distance to determine which city is closest? Rabbi Eliezer says: From his navel. Rabbi Akiva says: From his nose. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: From the place where he became a slain person, which is from his neck. According to all of these tanna’im, if the corpse was measured from a place on the body other than the place prescribed, the heifer is not consecrated for its purpose. According to Rabbi Akiva, if the measurement was taken from his navel, the heifer is not consecrated for its purpose, while according to Rabbi Eliezer, it is consecrated for its purpose. This has clear ramifications with regard to a situation in which one attempts to betroth a woman with that heifer. In the case of the purification of a leper, the dispute concern-ing such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 14:9): If a leper does not have a thumb, or a big toe, or a right ear upon which the Torah says that blood and oil must be placed as part of the purification process for a leper, he has no possibility of purification forever. Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest places the blood and oil for him on its place, i.e., where those body parts would have been if they were intact, and he fulfills his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says: The priest places the blood and oil on his left thumb, toe, and ear, and he fulfills his obligation. Both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon maintain that it is possible to purify such a leper, who would then not be liable to be punished with karet if he were to enter the Temple. The Rabbis, who maintain that such a leper has no possibility of purification, hold that if he enters the Temple he is liable to be punished with karet. “In your gates”; this is gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce in the corner of the field [pe’a]. In the case of gleanings, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is as we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 6:5): Two stalks that were not cut with the sheaves and are then found in a field by a poor person are gleanings and belong to the poor person. Three stalks are not gleanings and the owner of the field can take them, if he chooses. In the case of forgotten sheaves, the same mishna teaches that if he forgot two sheaves, they are forgotten sheaves and belong to the poor, whereas three or more bundles are not forgotten sheaves and belong to the owner of the field. And with regard to all of them, Beit Shammai say: If there are three, it belongs to the poor person, and if there are four, it belongs to the owner. According to Beit Hillel, if a poor person took three stalks or sheaves, they do not belong to him, and if he betrothed a woman with them, the betrothal does not take effect. According to Beit Shammai, she is betrothed. In the case of pe’a, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis, as we learned in a baraita: The mitzva of pe’a is to designate it from the standing grain still growing from the ground. If he did not designate it from the standing grain, but reaped the entire field, he designates a portion from the sheaves as pe’a. If he did not designate it from the sheaves, he designates it from the pile where one places the kernels after threshing, before he smooths the pile, at which point the produce is considered grain from which one is obligated to take terumot and tithes. If he already smoothed the pile before designating the pe’a, he tithes the grain in the pile and then gives the pe’a to the poor. If he ground the kernels into flour, he no longer designates pe’a. In the name of Rabbi Yishmael they said: One designates pe’a even from the dough. If a poor person takes pe’a from the dough and betroths a woman with the dough, according to the Rabbis the betrothal does not take effect, while according to Rabbi Yishmael, she is betrothed. § The mishna teaches: There were three courts there in Jerusalem. The mishna then details the procedure followed when a rebellious elder appeared before these courts. Rav Kahana says: If the rebellious elder says his ruling on the basis of the tradition he received from his teacher, and the members of the court say their ruling on the basis of the tradition they received from their teachers, the rebellious elder is not executed, because there is a legitimate basis for his ruling. If the rebellious elder says: This is the correct understanding in my eyes, and does not claim that his ruling is based on tradition, and the members of the court say: This is the correct understanding in our eyes, he is not executed. And all the more so if he says his ruling on the basis of the tradition, and the members of the court say: This is the correct understanding in our eyes, he is not executed. He is not executed unless he flouts tradition on the basis of his understanding and says: This is the correct understanding in my eyes, and the members of the court say their ruling on the basis of the tradition. Know that this is so, as Akavya ben Mahalalel was not executed despite the fact that he ruled contrary to the consensus ruling of his contemporaries, because he based his ruling on a tradition that he received. And Rabbi Elazar says: Even if the rebellious elder says his ruling on the basis of the tradition, and the members of the court say: This is the correct understanding in our eyes, he is executed, so that discord will not proliferate among Israel and to ensure that there will be a standard halakhic ruling. And if you say: For what reason was Akavya ben Mahalalel not executed? It is due to the fact that he did not issue his ruling as practical halakha; he merely claimed that his understanding was correct in theory, which is always permitted. We learned in the mishna that the rebellious elder says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. The Gemara asks: What, is it not including a case where he says his ruling on the basis of the tradition, and the members of the court say: This is the correct understanding in our eyes? The Gemara rejects this: No, the reference is to a case where he says: This is the correct understanding in my eyes, and the members of the court say their ruling on the basis of the tradition. Come and hear proof from that which Rabbi Yoshiya says: There are three matters that Zeira, one of the residents of Jerusalem, said to me: The first is that in the case of a husband who, after warning his wife not to enter into seclusion with a certain man, retracted his warning, his warning is retracted, and if she enters into seclusion with that man, she is not rendered forbidden to her husband.
בן סורר ומורה שרצו אביו ואמו למחול לו מוחלין לו זקן ממרא שרצו בית דינו למחול לו מוחלין לו וכשבאתי אצל חבירי שבדרום על שנים הודו לי על זקן ממרא לא הודו לי כדי שלא ירבו מחלוקת בישראל תיובתא
תניא אמר רבי יוסי מתחילה לא היו מרבין מחלוקת בישראל אלא בית דין של שבעים ואחד יושבין בלשכת הגזית ושני בתי דינין של עשרים ושלשה אחד יושב על פתח הר הבית ואחד יושב על פתח העזרה ושאר בתי דינין של עשרים ושלשה יושבין בכל עיירות ישראל הוצרך הדבר לשאול שואלין מבית דין שבעירן אם שמעו אמרו להן ואם לאו באין לזה שסמוך לעירן אם שמעו אמרו להם ואם לאו באין לזה שעל פתח הר הבית אם שמעו אמרו להם ואם לאו באין לזה שעל פתח העזרה ואומר כך דרשתי וכך דרשו חבירי כך למדתי וכך למדו חבירי אם שמעו אמרו להם ואם לאו אלו ואלו באין ללשכת הגזית ששם יושבין מתמיד של שחר עד תמיד של בין הערבים ובשבתות ובימים טובים יושבין בחיל נשאלה שאלה בפניהם אם שמעו אמרו להם ואם לאו עומדין למנין רבו המטמאים טמאו רבו המטהרין טהרו משרבו תלמידי שמאי והלל שלא שמשו כל צרכן רבו מחלוקת בישראל ונעשית תורה כשתי תורות משם כותבין ושולחין בכל מקומות כל מי שהוא חכם ושפל ברך ודעת הבריות נוחה הימנו יהא דיין בעירו משם מעלין אותו להר הבית משם לעזרה משם ללשכת הגזית שלחו מתם איזהו בן העולם הבא ענוותן ושפל ברך שייף עייל שייף ונפיק וגריס באורייתא תדירא ולא מחזיק טיבותא לנפשיה יהבו ביה רבנן עינייהון ברב עולא בר אבא: חזר לעירו ושנה: ת"ר אינו חייב עד שיעשה כהוראתו או שיורה לאחרים ויעשו כהוראתו בשלמא יורה לאחרים ויעשו כהוראתו מעיקרא לאו בר קטלא הוא והשתא בר קטלא הוא אלא שיעשה כהוראתו מעיקרא נמי בר קטלא הוא התינח היכא דאורי בחלב ודם דמעיקרא לאו בר קטלא הוא והשתא בר קטלא הוא אלא היכא דאורי בחייבי מיתות ב"ד מעיקרא נמי בר קטלא הוא מעיקרא בעי התראה השתא לא בעי התראה מסית דלא בעי התראה מאי איכא למימר מעיקרא אי אמר טעמא מקבלינן מיניה השתא אי אמר טעמא לא מקבלינן מיניה: מתני׳ חומר בדברי סופרים מבדברי תורה האומר אין תפילין כדי לעבור על ד"ת פטור חמש טוטפות להוסיף על דברי סופרים חייב: גמ׳ אמר ר' אלעזר אמר ר' אושעיא אינו חייב אלא על דבר שעיקרו מדברי תורה ופירושו מדברי סופרים ויש בו להוסיף ואם הוסיף גורע ואין לנו אלא תפילין אליבא דרבי יהודה והאיכא לולב דעיקרו מדברי תורה ופירושו מדברי סופרים ויש בו להוסיף ואם הוסיף גורע בלולב מאי סבירא לן אי סבירא לן דלולב אין צריך אגד האי לחודיה קאי והאי לחודיה קאי ואי סבירא לן דצריך אגד גרוע ועומד הוא והאיכא ציצית דעיקרו מדברי תורה ופירושו מדברי סופרים ויש בו להוסיף ואם הוסיף גורע בציצית מאי סבירא לן אי סבירא לן דקשר העליון לאו דאורייתא האי לחודיה קאי והאי לחודיה קאי ואי סבירא לן
The second matter is that in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son whose father and mother sought to forgive him for his gluttonous and drunken conduct and decided not to bring him to court, they can forgive him. The third is that in the case of a rebellious elder whom his court sought to forgive for his deviation from their ruling, they can forgive him. And when I came to my colleagues in the South, with regard to two of the cases they agreed with me, but with regard to a rebellious elder they did not agree with me, so that discord would not proliferate in Israel. This supports the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Kahana. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei said: Initially, discord would not proliferate among Israel. Rather, the court of seventy-one judges would sit in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. And there were two additional courts each consisting of twenty-three judges; one would convene at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and one would convene at the entrance to the Temple courtyard. And all the other courts consisting of twenty-three judges would convene in all cities inhabited by the Jewish people. If the matter was unclear and it was necessary to ask and clarify it, those uncertain of the halakha would ask the court that is in their city. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they said it to them, and if not, they would come to a court that is adjacent to their city. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they said it to them, and if not, they would come to the court at the entrance to the Temple Mount. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they said it to them, and if not, they would come to the court at the entrance to the Temple courtyard. And the elder whose ruling deviated from the ruling of his colleagues says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they said it to them, and if not, these judges and those judges would come to the Chamber of Hewn Stone, where the Sanhedrin would be convened from the time that the daily morning offering is sacrificed until the time that the daily afternoon offering is sacrificed. And on Shabbatot and Festivals, when court is not in session, the members of the court would sit at the rampart. When a question was asked before them, if the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they would say it to them, and if not they would stand for a vote on the matter. If the judges who deemed the item in question ritually impure outnumbered those who deemed it pure, the court would deem the item impure. If the judges who deemed the item in question ritually pure outnumbered those who deemed it impure, the court would deem the item pure. From the time that the disciples of Shammai and Hillel grew in number, and they were disciples who did not attend to their masters to the requisite degree, dispute proliferated among the Jewish people and the Torah became like two Torahs. Two disparate systems of halakha developed, and there was no longer a halakhic consensus with regard to every matter. The baraita continues its discussion of the workings of the Sanhedrin: From there, the Sanhedrin writes and dispatches the following statement to all places: Anyone who is wise and humble and the minds of people are at ease with him shall be a judge in his city. If he is successful in his city, from there, they promote him to the court at the entrance to the Temple Mount if there is a vacant seat on the court, and from there they promote him to the court at the entrance to the Temple courtyard, and from there to the court in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. Apropos the appointment of judges, the Gemara relates that they sent the following statement from there, i.e., Eretz Yisrael: Who is the one destined to receive a place in the World-to-Come? It is one who is modest and humble, who bows and enters and bows and exits, and who studies Torah regularly, and who does not take credit for himself. The Sages cast their eyes on Rav Ulla bar Abba, as they perceived him as the embodiment of all these characteristics. The mishna teaches: If the rebellious elder returned to his city and he taught in the manner that he was teaching previously, he is exempt from punishment, unless he instructs others to act on the basis of his ruling. The Sages taught: He is not liable unless he acts in accordance with his ruling, or he instructs others and they act in accordance with his ruling. The Gemara challenges: Granted, if he instructs others and they act in accordance with his ruling there is a novel element in the fact that he is liable to be executed, as initially, before he was deemed a rebellious elder, he is not liable to receive the death penalty for instructing others to perform the transgression, and now, he is to receive the death penalty. But if he acts in accordance with his ruling, initially, before he was deemed a rebellious elder, he is also liable to receive the death penalty for performing that action. The Gemara clarifies the difficulty: This works out well in a case where he ruled with regard to forbidden fat and blood, as initially he would not have been liable to receive the death penalty; rather, he would have been liable to receive karet, and now he is liable to receive the death penalty. But in a case where he ruled with regard to a transgression for which one is liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty, initially, he is also liable to receive the death penalty. The Gemara explains: There is a novel element even in a case where he acts in accordance with his ruling, as initially, before he is deemed a rebellious elder, he requires forewarning in order to be executed; now, he does not require forewarning in order to be executed. The Gemara asks: If the rebellious elder’s ruling was with regard to one who instigates others to engage in idol worship, who does not require forewarning, what is there to say? Both before and after he is deemed a rebellious elder he is executed without forewarning. The Gemara answers: Initially, before the rebellious elder ruled that instigating others to engage in idol worship is permitted, if after he instigated others, he stated a reason why he thought that it is permitted, we accept his explanation from him and exempt him. Now, after he issued the divergent ruling, if he stated a reason, we do not accept the explanation from him, since he already indicated that he holds that instigating others to engage in idol worship incitement is permitted and that is the reason that he engaged in instigation. MISHNA: With regard to the rulings of the rebellious elder the mishna states: There is greater stringency with regard to traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah than with regard to matters of Torah. If one states: There is no mitzva to don phylacteries, and his intention is in order to have others violate matters of Torah, he is exempt from punishment as a rebellious elder. One who disputes matters written explicitly in the Torah is not considered an elder and a Torah scholar, and therefore does not assume the status of a rebellious elder. If, however, he disputed a matter based on rabbinic tradition, e.g., he stated that there should be five compartments in the phylacteries of the head, in order to add an extra compartment to the four established according to traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah, he is liable. GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: One is liable only for issuing a ruling with regard to a matter whose essence, whose basic obligation, is from matters of Torah and whose explanation is from traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah and which includes the possibility to add to it, and if one added to it, one compromises his fulfillment of the mitzva and does not satisfy his obligation. And we have only the mitzva to don phylacteries that meets those criteria. And Rabbi Oshaya’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A rebellious elder is liable only for a matter whose essence is from matters of Torah and whose explanation is from traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the mitzva of lulav and the other species that one takes on the festival of Sukkot, whose essence is from matters of Torah, and whose explanation is from traditional rabbinic interpretations that establish the identity and the number of the four species enumerated in the Torah, and which includes the possibility to add other species to it, and if one added to it, one compromises his fulfillment of the mitzva and does not satisfy his obligation? The Gemara rejects this possibility: That is not the case, as with regard to the mitzva of lulav, what do we hold? If we hold that fundamentally a lulav does not require binding of the species together in order to fulfill the mitzva, then adding an additional species is inconsequential, as these species with which he fulfills the mitzva stand alone and that additional species stands alone. It is as though he were holding the species of the mitzva and an additional unrelated item that does not affect fulfillment of the mitzva. And if we hold that a lulav requires binding of the four species together in order to fulfill the mitzva, fulfillment of the mitzva is already compromised from the outset. The rebellious elder is liable only when the object of the mitzva was as it should be and the addition compromised that object and disqualifies it. In this case, the object was never as it should be. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the mitzva of ritual fringes, whose essence is from matters of Torah, and whose explanation is from traditional rabbinic interpretations that establish the number of fringes enumerated in the Torah and the number of threads in each fringe, and which includes the possibility to add fringes or threads to it, and if one added to it, one compromises his fulfillment of the mitzva and does not satisfy his obligation? The Gemara rejects this possibility: That is not the case, as with regard to ritual fringes, what do we hold? If we hold that the upper knot is not mandated by Torah law, and one fulfills his obligation by placing the threads on the corner of the garment, these threads with which he fulfills the mitzva are independent and that additional thread is independent and does not compromise fulfillment of the mitzva. The additional string is not considered as joined to the required strings. And if we hold
דקשר העליון דאורייתא גרוע ועומד אי הכי תפילין נמי אי עביד ארבעה בתי ואייתי אחרינא ואנח גבייהו האי לחודיה קאי והאי לחודיה קאי ואי עביד חמשה בתי גרוע ועומד הוא האמר ר' זירא בית חיצון שאינו רואה את האויר פסול:
that the upper knot is mandated by Torah law, then fulfillment of the mitzva is already compromised from the outset when the additional string is tied together with the other threads. The Gemara challenges: If so, the status of phylacteries is also the same. If one crafts phylacteries of the head with four compartments, and he then brings another compartment and places it alongside them, these compartments with which he fulfills the mitzva stand alone and that additional compartment stands alone and does not compromise the fulfillment of the mitzva. And if one crafts phylacteries of the head with five compartments, the fulfillment of the mitzva is already compromised from the outset. The Gemara answers: But doesn’t Rabbi Zeira say: If there is an obstruction which creates an outer compartment of the phylacteries of the head that is not exposed to the air, the phylacteries of the head are unfit for use in the fulfillment of the mitzva? Therefore, adding a fifth compartment to the four compartments of the phylacteries of the head always compromises the fulfillment of the mitzva.
הקדמת הרמב"ם לפירוש המשנה
אבל מי שיחשוב שהדינין שנחלקין בהם כמו כן מקובלים מפי משה וחושבים שנפלה המחלוקת מדרך טעות ההלכות או מפני שאחד מהם קבל קבלה אמת והשני טעה בקבלתו או שכח או לא שמע מפי רבו כל מה שצריך לשמוע ויביא ראיה על זה מה שנאמר (סנהדרין דף פח:) משרבו תלמידי שמאי והלל שלא שמשו כל צרכן רבתה מחלוקת בישראל ונעשית תורה כשתי תורות זה הדבר מגונה מאד.
והוא דברי מי שאין לו שכל ואין בידו עיקרים ופוגם באנשים אשר נתקבלו מהם המצות וכל זה שוא ובטל. ומה שהביאו להאמין באמונה הזאת הנפסדת הוא מיעוט הסתכלותו בדברי החכמים הנמצאים בתלמוד שהם מצאו שכל הפירוש המקובל מפי משה הוא אמת ולא נתנו הפרש בין העיקרים המקובלים ובין תולדות הענינים שיוציאו אותם בעיון.
[...]
אבל מה שאמרו משרבו תלמידי שמאי והלל שלא שמשו כל צרכם רבתה מחלוקת בישראל ענין זה מבואר שכל ב' אנשים בהיותם שוים בשכל ובעיון ובידיעת העיקרים שיוציאו מהם הסברות לא תפול ביניהם מחלוקת בסברתם בשום פנים ואם נפלה תהיה מעוטא. כמו שלא נמצא שנחלקו שמאי והלל אלא בהלכות יחידות.
וזה מפני שדעות שניהם היו קרובות זה לזה בכל מה שיוציאו בדרך סברא והעיקרים כמו כן הנתונים לזה כמו העיקרים הנתונים לזה.
אבל כאשר רפתה שקידת התלמידים על החכמה ונחלשה סברתם נגד סברת הלל ושמאי ובם נפלה מחלוקת ביניהם בעיון על דברים רבים שסברת כל אחד ואחד מהם היתה לפי שכלו ומה שיש בידו מן העיקרים.
ואין להאשימם בכל זאת. שלא נכריח אנחנו לשני חכמים מתוכחים בעיון להתוכח כשכל יהושע ופנחס ואין לנו ספק כמו כן במה שנחלקו בו אחרי שאינם כמו שמאי והלל או כמו שהוא למעלה מהם שהקדוש ברוך הוא לא צונו בעבודתו על ענין זה.
אבל צונו לשמוע מחכמי הדור כמו שנאמר (דברים יז) אל השופט אשר יהיה בימים ההם.
ועל הדרכים האלו נפלה המחלוקת לא מפני שטעו בהלכות ושהאחד אומר אמת והשני שקר. ומה מאד מבואר ענין זה לכל המסתכל בו. ומה יקר וגדול זה העיקר במצות:
אבל מי שיחשוב שהדינין שנחלקין בהם כמו כן מקובלים מפי משה וחושבים שנפלה המחלוקת מדרך טעות ההלכות או מפני שאחד מהם קבל קבלה אמת והשני טעה בקבלתו או שכח או לא שמע מפי רבו כל מה שצריך לשמוע ויביא ראיה על זה מה שנאמר (סנהדרין דף פח:) משרבו תלמידי שמאי והלל שלא שמשו כל צרכן רבתה מחלוקת בישראל ונעשית תורה כשתי תורות זה הדבר מגונה מאד.
והוא דברי מי שאין לו שכל ואין בידו עיקרים ופוגם באנשים אשר נתקבלו מהם המצות וכל זה שוא ובטל. ומה שהביאו להאמין באמונה הזאת הנפסדת הוא מיעוט הסתכלותו בדברי החכמים הנמצאים בתלמוד שהם מצאו שכל הפירוש המקובל מפי משה הוא אמת ולא נתנו הפרש בין העיקרים המקובלים ובין תולדות הענינים שיוציאו אותם בעיון.
[...]
אבל מה שאמרו משרבו תלמידי שמאי והלל שלא שמשו כל צרכם רבתה מחלוקת בישראל ענין זה מבואר שכל ב' אנשים בהיותם שוים בשכל ובעיון ובידיעת העיקרים שיוציאו מהם הסברות לא תפול ביניהם מחלוקת בסברתם בשום פנים ואם נפלה תהיה מעוטא. כמו שלא נמצא שנחלקו שמאי והלל אלא בהלכות יחידות.
וזה מפני שדעות שניהם היו קרובות זה לזה בכל מה שיוציאו בדרך סברא והעיקרים כמו כן הנתונים לזה כמו העיקרים הנתונים לזה.
אבל כאשר רפתה שקידת התלמידים על החכמה ונחלשה סברתם נגד סברת הלל ושמאי ובם נפלה מחלוקת ביניהם בעיון על דברים רבים שסברת כל אחד ואחד מהם היתה לפי שכלו ומה שיש בידו מן העיקרים.
ואין להאשימם בכל זאת. שלא נכריח אנחנו לשני חכמים מתוכחים בעיון להתוכח כשכל יהושע ופנחס ואין לנו ספק כמו כן במה שנחלקו בו אחרי שאינם כמו שמאי והלל או כמו שהוא למעלה מהם שהקדוש ברוך הוא לא צונו בעבודתו על ענין זה.
אבל צונו לשמוע מחכמי הדור כמו שנאמר (דברים יז) אל השופט אשר יהיה בימים ההם.
ועל הדרכים האלו נפלה המחלוקת לא מפני שטעו בהלכות ושהאחד אומר אמת והשני שקר. ומה מאד מבואר ענין זה לכל המסתכל בו. ומה יקר וגדול זה העיקר במצות: