פרשת מטות - מסעי תשכ"ו - נדרים

but Rabbi Elazar prohibits this. Likewise, with regard to one who divorces an orphaned minor girl whose mother and brothers married her off and remarries her and subsequently dies, she is permitted to the yavam in levirate marriage, and Rabbi Elazar prohibits it. A minor girl whose father married her off, in which case the marriage is valid by Torah law, and who was subsequently divorced while she was still a minor is like an orphan during the lifetime of her father, as he no longer has the right to marry her off, and she cannot become fully married because she is a minor. And if the husband remarries her while she is still a minor and then dies childless, everyone agrees that she is forbidden to the yavam and may not enter into levirate marriage. GEMARA: The Sage Eifa said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Elazar, who prohibits a man from entering into levirate marriage with a woman whom his brother had divorced and remarried? It is because she was forbidden to him at one time; when the first brother divorced her, she became forbidden to the second brother due to her status as the first brother’s ex-wife. A husband’s relatives are forbidden to the wife even after death or divorce. However, the mitzva of levirate marriage grants a special exemption from the prohibition against marrying one’s brother’s wife. In this case, if the first brother had died while they were still divorced, the mitzva of levirate marriage would not have applied, and she would have been forbidden to him. The Sages said to Eifa: If that is so, she should also not require ḥalitza, since she is a forbidden relative. And if you would say: Indeed, Rabbi Elazar also exempts her from ḥalitza, isn’t it taught in a baraita: It was said in the name of Rabbi Elazar that she performs ḥalitza? Rather, Eifa said: I do not know the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. Abaye said: This is the reasoning of Rabbi Elazar: He is uncertain whether the death of the husband determines that she is a candidate for levirate marriage, or whether the original marriage determines it. In other words, he is uncertain as to whether the obligation to perform levirate marriage is established only at the death of one’s brother or already from the beginning of the brother’s marriage. If death determines that she is a candidate for levirate marriage, then she has happened before him for levirate marriage, as she is the wife of his childless brother who died. If the original marriage determines that she is a candidate for levirate marriage, then she was forbidden to him for a time as his brother’s ex-wife and is consequently exempt from levirate marriage. According to Rabbi Elazar, it is due to this uncertainty that the brother may not enter into levirate marriage yet must perform ḥalitza. Rava said: Actually, it is obvious to Rabbi Elazar that death determines that she is a candidate for levirate marriage. However, everyone is well informed with regard to divorces. Everyone knows that the woman was divorced, while not everyone is well informed with regard to remarriage, and they do not necessarily know that she remarried him. Therefore, there is concern that people will mistakenly think that one entered into levirate marriage with his brother’s ex-wife. The Gemara argues against this point: On the contrary, her return to her former husband, since she is living with him, generates publicity, so that it is known that they are remarried. The Gemara answers: Are we not dealing even with a case in which he remarried her in the evening and died in the morning? In this instance and others like it, not everyone would know that he remarried her, and they will think that the brother took his deceased brother’s ex-wife in levirate marriage. In order to avoid such situations, Rabbi Elazar decreed that she is always forbidden. Rav Ashi said: This is the reasoning of Rabbi Elazar: He decreed to prohibit levirate marriage with these, i.e., women who were divorced and remarried, due to the case of a girl who is considered an orphan in the lifetime of her father, who was divorced by her husband and he subsequently remarried her. If a minor girl was married off by her father and was subsequently divorced, she is no longer subject to her father with regard to marriage and divorce, but because she is a minor, any marriage she enters into is by rabbinic rather than by Torah law. The Gemara comments: So too, this is reasonable based on what was taught in the latter clause of the mishna: A minor girl whose father married her off and who was subsequently divorced while she was still a minor, is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. And if the husband remarries her while she is still a minor and then dies, everyone agrees that she is forbidden to the yavam and may not enter into levirate marriage. What is the purpose of stating this halakha? It is obvious. Rather, is it not teaching us Rabbi Elazar’s reason for decreeing that these women who were divorced and remarried are forbidden due to that woman, the girl who is considered an orphan in the lifetime of her father? The Gemara concludes: Learn from here that this is his reason. The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ashi: The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Elazar concerning a minor girl whose father married her off and who was divorced, that she is like an orphan in the lifetime of her father, and that if her husband remarried her, she is forbidden to the yavam, because her divorce was a full-fledged divorce by Torah law while her remarriage was not a full-fledged remarriage, as she was still a minor. This implies that Rabbi Elazar’s ruling is prompted by the case of a girl who is like an orphan in her father’s lifetime and that this was the reason for his decree. The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said? In a case where he divorced her while she was a minor and he remarried her while she was still a minor. But if he divorced her while she was a minor and remarried her when she was already an adult, or if he remarried her while she was a minor and she matured to legal adulthood while with him, and he subsequently died, she may either perform ḥalitza or enter into levirate marriage. It was said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: She must perform ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage, since he decreed that all remarried women may not enter into levirate marriage due to the case of one who is like an orphan in her father’s lifetime. Rava asked Rav Naḥman: What is the halakha with regard to the rival wife of a girl whose husband remarried her, according to Rabbi Elazar? Is the girl regarded as a forbidden relative to the extent that even her rival wife may not enter into levirate marriage? He said to him: She herself is forbidden due to a rabbinic decree, as explained already. And will we then proceed to issue a decree to prevent violation of a decree? Accordingly, her rival wife is permitted to enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara challenges: Isn’t it taught in a baraita: It was said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: Both she and her rival wife must perform ḥalitza? The Gemara asks: Would it enter your mind to say: She and her rival wife? Why should two women from the same household perform ḥalitza? Ḥalitza performed by one of them exempts the other. Rather, should it not say: Either she or her rival wife must perform ḥalitza, but even the rival wife may not enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara responds: Are you not emending the mishna? If so, emend it as follows: She can only perform ḥalitza; her rival wife may either perform ḥalitza or enter into levirate marriage. MISHNA: If two brothers are married to two minor sisters, and the husband of one of them dies childless, this widowed girl shall be exempt from levirate marriage due to her status as a forbidden relative, as one is prohibited from marrying the sister of his wife. The same halakha applies to two deaf-mute women, whose status is like that of two minors in this matter, as their marriages are valid by rabbinic law. And if two brothers were married to two sisters, one of them an adult and the other a minor, and the husband of the minor dies, the minor shall leave due to her status as the sister of a wife, as in the first case in the mishna. But if the husband of the adult dies, it generates a Torah obligation of levirate marriage, which is not abrogated by the rabbinic prohibition proscribing the yevama as his wife’s sister. This prohibition is by rabbinic law, because marriage to a minor is rabbinic in origin. What does one do under such circumstances? Rabbi Eliezer says: We instruct the minor, i.e., his wife, to refuse him, so that her marriage is dissolved and he may then enter into levirate marriage with her adult sister, the widow of his childless brother. Rabban Gamliel says: If the minor refuses of her own accord, her refusal is valid. And if not, she should wait until she reaches majority, whereupon her marriage is valid by Torah law, and that widowed adult sister shall be exempt from levirate marriage due to her status as the sister of a wife. Rabbi Yehoshua says: When the brother married to the adult sister dies, leaving the brother married to the minor, woe [ee] to him for his wife, woe to him for his brother’s wife. Under these circumstances, he loses both women: He must release his own wife with a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by performing ḥalitza. He cannot stay married to his wife because she is the sister of his yevama, and he cannot enter into levirate marriage with the yevama even after divorcing his wife, because the yevama is his wife’s sister. The principle that one is completely absolved from levirate marriage when the potential yevama is a forbidden relative does not apply because Torah law does not recognize his marriage to his minor wife. That marriage’s rabbinic sanction does not suffice to render the yevama, his wife’s sister, a forbidden relative who is not a candidate for levirate marriage. GEMARA: The Gemara inquires about Rabbi Eliezer’s suggestion to instruct the minor to refuse: Is it permitted to instruct her to refuse? Doesn’t bar Kappara teach: A person should always cling to three things and distance himself from three things. He should cling to three things: To ḥalitza rather than levirate marriage, to bringing about peace, and to the nullification of vows. And he should distance himself from three things: From refusal; and from accepting deposits, as he is then responsible for them; and from serving as a guarantor. The Gemara answers: A refusal for a mitzva is different, as this refusal is performed to allow the mitzva of levirate marriage to be fulfilled with the other sister. § The Gemara explains the details of the matter itself. Bar Kappara taught: A person should always cling to three things: To ḥalitza; this is in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, as it is taught in a baraita: Abba Shaul said: One who marries his yevama for her beauty, or for the sake of matrimony because he wants to be married to her, or for some other reason, such as her money, it is as if he is having intercourse with a woman forbidden to him, and in my eyes it is almost as if his offspring were a mamzer. Therefore, it is preferable that one performs ḥalitza and avoids sin. One should cling to bringing about peace, as it is written “Seek peace and pursue it” (Psalms 34:15).

And Moses told the children of Israel according to all that the LORD commanded Moses.

ראשי המטות [AND MOSES SPAKE TO] THE HEADS OF THE TRIBES OF THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL] — This does not mean that he spoke only to the princes of the children of Israel and not to the people also, but that he showed respect to the princes by teaching them first and that afterwards he taught the children of Israel. This explanation seems to assume that this was the general method of instruction, but from what Biblical verse may we infer that this was so in the case of all addresses, and that this was no exceptional case? Because it says, (Exodus 34:31—32) “[And Moses called unto them], and Aaron and all the princes of the congregation returned unto him and Moses spake unto them; and afterwards all the children of Israel came nigh, [and he gave them all the commandments which the Lord had spoken to him in Mount Sinai]”. But if this be no exceptional case, what reason is there for Scripture going out of its way to state it here? Because by specially stating that the laws about vows were taught in the first instance to the princes and afterwards to the Israelites, it intends to teach that the annulling of vows is really to be effected by one person who is expert in the Law, and that only if there be no such expert, may they be annulled by three ordinary persons. But you may perhaps say that the statement does mean that Moses spoke this section only to the princes of the children of Israel, and that Moses did not speak to them also, and that consequently nothing about the expert and laymen can be inferred! But it is stated here, “This is the word”, and it is stated in the passage dealing with “animals slaughtered outside the sanctuary” (Leviticus 17:2) “This is the word”. What is the case there? It was addressed to Aaron and to his sons and to all the children of Israel, as it is said there, “Speak unto Aaron [and unto his sons and unto all the children of Israel]”! So, too, this was addressed to all of them (and the reason why it is stated here is to tell us that the annulling of vows etc., as above) (cf. Sifrei Bamidbar 153:1; Nedarim 78a).

Moshe spoke to the tribal leaders. He spoke only to them because there was no command from Hashem to teach the entire Bnei Yisroel that the father and the husband can nullify vows of self-denial. The reason Moshe was commanded not to teach everyone these laws was so that they would not be too lenient with vows. Therefore, Moshe taught these laws only to the wise men of Yisroel, the tribal leaders. Furthermore, this verse hints at the statement of the Sages (Nedarim 78a) that the tribal leaders have more power in releasing vows than the rest of the nation, for a single expert judge can release a vow. The matter of releasing vows was not mentioned explicitly in the Torah; it is a halachah l’Moshe m’Sinai.

Said he not himself unto me: She is my sister? and she, even she herself said: He is my brother. In the simplicity of my heart and the innocency of my hands have I done this.’

זה הדבר THIS IS THE WORD — Moses prophesied with the words (introduced his message by the statement), “Thus saith the Lord, About midnight [will I go into the midst of Egypt]” (Exodus 11:4), and other prophets also prophesied with “Thus saith the Lord”, Moses, however, had an additional superiority in that he prophesied also with the expression “This is the actual word [that God hath spoken]” (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:2). Another explanation of זה הדבר THIS IS THE WORD: it is a restrictive phrase serving to intimate that the Sage (the expert) makes use of the expression “invalidating” (התרה), and the husband (dealing with his wife’s vows), only of the expression “annulling” (הפרה), as is the language of Scripture here (e. g., in v. 9), and that if they (one of them) exchanges the expression, it (the vow) is not invalidated nor is it annulled as the case may be (Nedarim 78a).

But if her father disallow her in the day that he heareth, none of her vows, or of her bonds wherewith she hath bound her soul, shall stand; and the LORD will forgive her, because her father disallowed her.

ואם הניא אביה אתה BUT IF HER FATHER DISALLOWED HER — The Hebrew signifies, “if he withholds her” from the vow, that is to say, that he annuls it for her. I would not know what this expression הניא, “withholding”, implies (i.e., how he withholds her) — but when it states, (v. 9) “But if on the day that he hears, he withholds her and annuls [her vows]”, one must admit that “the withholding” consists in “annulling the vow” (i.e. in exclaiming מופר לך) (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:6). But still the plain meaning is that it is a term for “withholding” and “removing” (and the word והפר only shows how and by what means she is to be withheld from keeping her vow); and similar is (Numbers 32:7): “And wherefore do you remove (תניאון) [the heart of the children of Israel from the idea of passing over the land]”; and so, too, (Psalms 141:5): “Oil so choice, let not my head turn away (יניא), and similar, also, (Numbers 14:34): “And ye shall know My turning aside (תנואתי)” — i.e. ye shall know that ye have turned aside from Me.